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İÇİNDEKİLER

– Black Sea Basin: A Region in the Making, A Geopolitical Crash Zone or A Marginalized Area in World Politics? / **Şükrü Yazğan** 7
–The Return of Turkey: The Return of Empire or Something Else …. / **Ivo Hristov** 13
–The Caucasus: The Current Development and Expectations and Perspectives for the Next Decade / **Elhan Mehtiyev** 27
–East or West, Trusting Solidarity Is The Best! / **Şükrü Server Aya** 47
–The Russian Influence on the Black Sea Region / **Elif Hatun Kılıçbeyli** 51
–The Road to Peace in the Black Sea Region: Through Parity or Preponderance? / **Hakan Arıdemir - Volkan Kalender** 65
–International Relations in the Black Sea: A Review of Turkish - Ukrainian Case / **Mesut Idriz - Muhamed Ali** 73
–Çok Kutupluluk Tartışmaları ve Karadeniz Havzası'nın Bölgesel Görünümü / **Göktürk Tüysüzoğlu** 81
–Energy and Geopolitical Interests of the Leading World Countries Relative to Black Sea and Caspian Sea Region / **Samadov Farid Ramiz - Abdurrahmanova Irada Hamid** 111
–Channel İstanbul Project in Terms of International Law / **Alaeddin Yalçınkaya** 119
–Karadeniz ve Çevresinde Yaşanan Güncel Uluslararası Deniz Hukuku Sorunları / **Ümit Yalım** 129
–Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Güney Kafkasya'da Etnik Milliyetçiliğin Uluslararası Sisteme Etkisi / **Yusuf Ziya Bölükbaşı – Yavuz Cankara** 137
–The Policies of US, Russia and EU on the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict / **Bakhtiyar Aslanov** 163
–The Russian-Georgian Conflict and Its Implications for
–Territorial Integrity and Policy of the Republic of Georgia / **Erdal Düzdaban** 185
–Conflict and Peace in Wider Black Sea Region / **Tatiana Budeci** 197
–Sovyetler Birliği Sonrası Kafkasya'da Savaşlar ve Yeni Yapılanmalar / **Osman Güdü** 215
–De-Securitization of ENP in the Black Sea:

A Case Study on the Network Governance Approach
/ **Çiğdem Üstün** 229
–The Black Sea Dimension of the "Shared Neighborhood":
Turkey, the EU, and Prospects for a "New" Cooperation
/ **Gonca Oğuz Gök - Emel Parlar Dal** 255
–Geo-Historical Impact of the Black Sea on
the Eastern Neighborhood Policy of the EU
/ **Halil Erdemir - Hatice P. Erdemir** 265
–Komşuluk Politikaları Bağlamında
AB'nin Ortadoğu Politikası / **Murat Ercan - Gökberk Yücel** 291
–Changing Geometry of the Pipelines:
Gas and Politics in the Wider Black Sea / **Plamen Dimitrov** 309
–Transportation as a Competitive Advantage: Linking Black Sea to
the Rest of Europe in the West, to the Asia through South Caucasus
in the East **/ Ariz Huseynov** 331
–How to Catch Flies with Honey / **Ana Vasilache** 391
–The Impact of the Council of Europe's Conditionality on Party Law
in Turkey **/ Ömer Faruk Gençkaya** 401
–Promotion and Practices of Interaction: Local Government at
District Level and Civil Society in Bulgaria
/ **Juliana Hadjitchoneva** 419
–Citizens' Involvement in the Local Governance Processes in
Georgia: Tbilisi Case Analyzes in Direction of Cultural Heritage
/ **Tinatin Kldiashvili** 445
–"Fundamental Problems of Local Government in Georgia"
/ **Ana Gorgodze** 453
–Long Waves of Regional Co-Operation in Black Sea Region:
Challenges and Opportunities for Turkey's Energy Security
/ **Arif Darmawan** 463
–Gelişmekte Olan Sanayi Bölgeleri Bağlamında Kentsel
Nüfus Büyümesi / **Petek Özsoy - Kürşat Çapraz** 481
–Conceptual Foundations of Human Development
/ **Shoirakhon Nurdinova** 499
–Marka Şehirlerin Oluşturulmasında Dış Ticaretin Önemli Rolü:
Sakarya Örneği / **Kürşat Çapraz** 511
–Post-Sovet Azərbaycanda Din və Kimliyin Dəyişən və Inkişaf Edən
Təbiəti Haqda / **Şamsi Verdiyev** 529

Black Sea Basin: A Region in the Making, A Geopolitical Crash Zone or A Marginalized Area in World Politics?

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Marmara University

Black Sea Basin is generally considered as a venue for transportation, a region of transition, a buffer zone or an area of conflict rather than a region/basin on its own. It seems to be characterized by centrifugal tendencies and diverging policies or strategies rather than unifying (f)actors. This reality is partly due to region's inadequate institutionalization and structuralization as an order. Black Sea is considered as a region/basin between different "real" regions: a shatter zone where leading actors of different neighboring regions and their policies compete or a waterway/territory linking different regions and projects.

There is an apparent lack/inadequacy of material and ideational flows among regional actors at sub-state, state and inter-state levels to support institutionalizations for socio-political and/or economic unification of the Black Sea Region. For most of the significant actors and decision makers in the region Black Sea is just a peripheral area instrumentalized in their strategies to increase their importance or strengthen their power positions in/for their primary areas of geopolitical interest.

The basic reason for inadequate regionalization is inadequate ideational flows to support such a project. Not only the policies and interest definitions but also the dreams and convictions of the regional countries for the future and their preferences for the international strategic environment are divergent. This incompatibility in interests and ideals as well as plans for the future is a result of their conflicting Set of Social Values (SoSVs) that lead to differing goals and objectives. These divergencies between regional countries resulted in differences in preferences and priorities for the trajectory of the evolution of regional system. As all regional actors try to materialize differing systemic possibilities and to form or maintain differentiated order

patterns, they follow different policies to reach their peculiar goals rather than a common regional agenda.

Absence of a common identity, ideology or political orientation among actors in the Black Sea region precludes the formation of a common cultural basis which may act as a catalyst for the creation of a new institutional framework in the basin. This deficit in ideational foundations is exacerbated by the lack of regional actor(s) that may provide economic, political and military leadership for the formation of a new region—and thus plays the role of Germany and France in the formation of the European Union. So, for most of the state level actors Black Sea Basin remains to be just a secondary/marginal area when compared to their primary strategic orientations. For Romania and Bulgaria the European Union is far more significant and beneficial in political and economic terms then any new regional grouping clustered around the Black Sea basin. For Russia, a global power, Black Sea area is just one of the many neighboring regions and issues (albeit a strategically important one) to deal with to address its larger geo-political concerns. For Turkey, one of the most ardent advocates of a regional project in/around Black Sea basin, the region remains to be one of the many neighboring areas to benefit from as a transit country located between various regions—Middle East, Balkans, Mediterranean, North Africa, Europe, the Islamic World.

Absence of ideational flows to support a new regionalization project is strengthened by the lack of adequate functional links that bind the regional countries. When the statistical data showing the flow of goods, services and the people in and around the region analyzed, it can be argued that existing functional links between regional countries are generally bilateral rather than organized on a regional scale to form a self-sustaining network of relations. A similar pattern can also be discerned when the maps depicting the existing and planned infrastructural projects for transportation and communication is considered. They seemed to be constructed and/or planned to connect the region or the regional countries to other regions rather than providing an infrastructure to connect material flows within the Black Sea basin.

Despite all these inadequacies and shortcomings, creation of a separate Black Sea identity and prioritization of regional solutions to regional problems is an indispensible requirement for the formation of a more peaceful, prosperous and stable region. The common objective of all

contributors to this volume is to provide a scholarly framework for elaborating the problems deterring a regional cooperation in the Black Sea basin, and for providing solutions to economic, political, administrative problems at different levels of government through co-operation among local, national and international actors.

All the following articles are modified and edited versions of the papers presented at the "4th BLUE BLACK SEA INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS on POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND SOCIETY: Local and International Perspectives for Conflict Resolution, Cooperation and Democratization" which was held in İstanbul, Turkey, on 24-27 November 2013. The articles in the volume is organized into six sections: "Foreign Policy," "Legal Disputes and Ethnic Conflicts," "European Union: Policies and Perspectives," "Energy and the Pipelines," "Local Governments: Problems and Reforms," and "Economy and Domestic Politics."

FOREIGN POLICY

The Return of Turkey:
The Return of Empire or Something Else ….

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The Issue

Contrary to the cliché that history is repeated, it is exactly history that proves that this never happens. This conclusion is fully valid for the new role of Turkey in the rise of the 21st century. What processes does this country undergo is for us—Bulgarians—not a question of mere curiosity or a subject of professional interest. The understanding of these processes is of special significance in the conditions of continuing erosion of the Bulgarian society in the last 20 years, which takes place simultaneously with the dramatic transformation southeast of our border. Making the long story short, there we witness the emergence of a new regional power. One reaction to this fact is to close our eyes in front of this fact and ignore it. The other is to face the reality and try to prepare ourselves for it.

The overall geopolitical status of Turkey in the near future will be a function of the influence and interference of three massive factors:

1) the ongoing geopolitical transformation of the country which is revealed in the change of its status from a peripheral player into a regional center of power having its own periphery. Presently Turkey is in the middle of this process.

2) the painful social transformation of the Turkish society that marks the abandoning of the social matrix of the Kemalist laicist model of modernization and the move towards a "neo-Islamic" model that represents an attempt for synthesizing the modernization impulse with the Islamic civilization code. Today the country finds itself in the most critical point of this move due to the principal incoherence of the social powers which gravitate around the two main axes.

3) the global transformation of the region of the Near and Middle East resulting mainly from the new strategic positioning and priorities of the USA, which generates political vacuum in the region.

The question is "do we witness a resurrection of the Empire?" For many the Turkish economic[1] and political upsurge is a realization in a new form of old pan-Ottoman aspirations. Such are not absent indeed but the historic conditions are quite different. And this is valid both for the status of the Turkish society its potential and interests and for the geopolitical positioning of Turkey. This positioning is determined by two key factors: the elimination of the bloc antagonism from the era of the Cold War[2] (meanwhile replaced by new division lines) and by the astonishing social change that is leading to the transformation of Turkey into a regional center of power. These processes demand that the dominant perceptions about the role of Turkey in the beginning of the 21st century are abandoned. Until recently at least Turkey was considered as an important but not independent factor in a foreign geopolitical and civilization project. This perception denied Turkey the possibility to be a subject of its own history. Indeed to a larger extent this was true for the post-imperial period and the period of the Cold War when both in political and military plan Turkey was a key element in the strategy of "restraining" the Soviet Union in the Balkans, the Near East and Caucasus.[3] Nowadays, however, this approach does not correspond to the reality. In his latest book *Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power*[4] Zbigniew Brzezinski specifically underlines the fundamental role of Turkey in the 21st century and especially for the Near and Middle East, although again as an integral part of a "big" West: i.e. for the "big" West Turkey

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1 According to data of the IMF Turkey ranks 17th in the world of volume of the Gross Economic Product, see http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/01/pdf/text.pdf. It is important to note that now the country is transiting to a principally new quality of its economy i.e. from extensive to intensive technological economic growth

2 More on the subject in George Friedman, "Turkey's Strategy," http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/turkeys-strategy.

3 For more details see, F. Stephen Larrabee, *Troubled Partnership: U.S.–Turkish Relations in an Era of Global Geopolitical Change* (N.A: RAND, 2010).

4 Zbigniev Brzezinski, *Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power* (Sofia: Obsidian, 2012).

remains an instrument of the western strategy for control and balance of the powers in the region. This control however is exercised as per a new strategic scenario and in new forms: by implementation and support for the political Islam, destruction of the Soviet regimes in the region and geopolitical re-configuration of the so-called "Big Near East" from Marrakesh to Tyan Shang. Turkey was assigned the role of a "supervisor" and a key factor of this process in the region. It was supposed that there is a coincidence of the global interest of the West with the interest of the local power Turkey.

The reality is, however, different. The country gradually transforms itself into an independent geopolitical and civilization center with its own interests and behavior. Shortly, this is a center that will try to combine: externally the Turkish and pan-Islamic vectors, based internally on absolute capitalist liberalism in the economy and relative neo-Islamic conservatism in the politics.[5] The desired outcome of this process is the transformation of Turkey in an independent geopolitical center, i.e. its transformation from a periphery into a nucleus with its own periphery. This strategic goal is given intellectual wrapping by the "Davutoglu" doctrine in the mould of a "strategic deepening" of the new Turkish foreign policy. The process itself is contradictory, painful and most importantly – reversible since Turkey is now in the most vulnerable point of this trajectory: the point of bifurcation[6], which means that even the most neglected internal or external factor may change the delicate balance into one or another direction.

Presently the country is making a complex geopolitical move: it is abandoning its peripheral status assigned to it by the Western project but does not yet possesses the necessary resources and weight to transform itself into an independent pole of a geopolitical power. This determines the relative ambivalence and—in the first glance only—the seeming непоследователност of its behavior in the last years: on the one hand a

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[5] Till recently by tradition one was a reserved prerogative of the nationalist secular Turkey from the period of the republic and the other - the trade mark of the late "Ottoman Empire" (mostly in the period of the reign of Sultan Abdul Hamid II and WW I). The "split" between the Turkish and the Islam origin is compared by a Turkish analyst with the split between the heights of "Tjan Shang and the shadows of the Arafat Mountain".

[6] According to Nobel laureate Ilya Prigogine the concept is also applicable for the social systems.

process of critical review of the present geopolitical interactions of Turkey is under way (which does not stop the country from using the whole arsenal of the Western alliance when useful) and on the other hand the country is looking for and taking benefit from every new geopolitical opportunity and affiliation, even with centers and subjects that have contradicting interests[7].

The Turkish geopolitical transformation from a peripheral status into one of a regional center of power is taking place in the context of at least three simultaneously running processes: the transformation of the role of the USA in the region of the Near and Middle East and on the Balkans; the re-definition of the American strategic interest in the Pacific region[8], the accelerating process of military, political and economic integration of countries around Russia –the Eurasian alliance—and the crisis of the European integration process. These processes pre-determine the dynamics and the real chances in front of the Turkish geopolitical transformation as well as the rigid limits of this process in time and space.

Presently Turkey is making a peculiar social experiment: the association of a society Islamic in its genesis with the latest achievements of modernity. Kemalism in its known form is done with. Although, it still enjoys solid grounds of support by the military, administrative and political elite, but it is not so popular among the ordinary people. Unlike Kemalism, which is a pragmatic statist ideology for different secularist elites whose aim is to westernize and modernize the former Ottoman society through modernization "from above", carried out by the military and administrative corps of an extra powerful state, the role of Islam in modern Turkey is much more ambivalent. First of all, looking from a historic perspective, the Ottoman empire, although theocratic, was never a state in which religion and the Islam ulema played a dominant role—as for example in the neighboring Sefavid Iran. In Turkey Islam and its religious leaders were always under the control of the military

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[7] Russia, Iran, the break-up with the former strategic ally Israel against the propagandist exposure of the country as a patron of the repressed Muslims: mainly Palestinians and so on.

[8] More into this see, Craig Cohen and Josiane Gabel (Eds.) *Global Forecast 2012 Risk, Opportunity, and the Next Administration* (Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2006). Very shortly this transformation is passing through strategic negotiation with Iran, circumvention of Israel and neglecting of Saudi Arabia. The Syrian crisis has catalyzed all three options.

and administrative elites of the Empire who used them for internal or external mobilization. Secondly, a typical; ottoman (Turkish) tradition, dating back to the Seldjuk Sultanate and its heirs in Anatolia is the existence of a specific "social" Islam which is not controlled by the state and which is represented by a variety of religious "brotherhoods" (Sufi tarikats–orders) which unite different social elements. Apart from the purely religious tasks it has, this large and complex networks perform the subtle but very important role of an integrating media for different social layers even today. In the third place there is a significant religious and social minority – the alawites (the Turkish Shia followers), who are united by the long-lasting tradition of discrimination and apparent opposition against the state, accompanied by internal social and economic support and solidarity among its members. Last but not least, despite the authoritarian modernization which has been carried from Ataturk until nowadays and which is aiming to diminish the role of religion against laicism and place under strict state control the cult and its servants, the Sunni Islam in its Anatolian version has preserved its role as a peculiar cultural-religious code for the majority of the Anatolian rural society as a counterbalance of the secular military, administrative and business elites concentrated in the big cities.[9]

What matters as well is the specific dynamics of the modernization of the country leading to a couple of parallel processes: the urbanization accompanied by serious stratification changes and as a result the acquisition of a new social quality of this society; large-scale movement of people from East to West and overpopulation of the large city centers in Central and Western Turkey with people from the villages attracted by the dynamical industrialization of the country; the emergence of a new Anatolian bourgeoisie, cherishing its traditional culture including the traditional Islam but also seeking modern cultural, economic political and institutional channels for representation and expression of its own interests.

It is this peculiar social cocktail of differing, even opposing social groups and interests, accompanied by the persisting Kurd problem in Southeast Anatolia that creates the specific but very resistant "spinal column" of the Turkish political Islam from the emergence of Milli Görüş till the presently ruling party of Erdoğan, Gül and Bülent Arınç. Turkey's modern political

[9] Robert Mantran et al, *History of the Ottoman Empire* (Sofia: IK Riva: 2012).

Islamism, that is classified as a synthesis of "ottomanism, westernism, islamism and Turkism," has no analogue in any other Muslim state. According to one of the most popular interpretations, however, this neo-Islamism is nothing else but the same old Islam fundamentalism albeit "dressed up" in contemporary clothing, using pseudo democratic rhetoric and practices (such that the West will like) but actually pushing the Turkish society back into the Middle Ages. The neo-Islamic wave is de-masked as an anti-secular counterrevolution that is putting an end to the secular reforms of Kemal Ataturk.

According to other interpretations the new course of AK Parti gives equal opportunity to the secularist supporters and the pro-Islam social movements which were oppressed until recently to reveal their identity and to represent and defend their specific interests in a particularistic society.

One major deficiency of the analyses of today's Turkey is that the majority of them are trying to put the specifics of the country into pre-determined a priori framed interpretation models. In this way the desired is presented as actual. The new social regime in Turkey which is in a process of a very contradictory self-constitution represents a complex combination of neo-ottomanism, neo-islamism and neo-modernism. The spinal column of this regime – economic, financial and above all social of Erdogan is Anatolia i.e. the big concerns and holdings[10] and the new Anatolian middle class that has emerged after the big reforms of Turgut Özal. The Western term "holding" in this case is not the exact term to be used. When Ataturk comes to power, he bans all forms of religious self-organization of the Turkish population.[11] However, being exactly a form of social self-organization such formations continue to exist, contrary to the ban and play the role of knots of a non-statist social network for mutual support: along with the studying of the Quran, these structures offer support in the form of loans, employment opportunities etc. In time these dervish quasi-social organizations become the basis for the foundation of different institutions – banks, newspapers,

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[10] See, Ömer Demir, Mustafa Acar and Metin Toprak, "Anatolian Tigers or Islamic Capital: Prospects and Challenges," *Middle Eastern Studies,* Vol. 40, No. 6 (Nov. 2004), pp. 166-188.

[11] See Sukran Wahuide, *Islam in Contemporary Turkey* (Sofia, St. Kliment Ochridski University Publishing, 2010), (in Bulgarian).

magazines, televisions and other businesses. Presently behind the so called neo-Islamic wave this process of synthesis is taking place – on the one hand Islam has preserved itself as a norm for the Turkish identity despite the seven decades of attempts for a pro-Western secularist modernization and on the other hand we witness a sharp social, economic and religious activity and autonomy of the people. These are people who rely on their own social networks, self-support and a very sound economic background.

Indeed the process is not guaranteed unquestionable success and the chances for collapse are rather high. There are no guarantees that the rejection of the authoritarian Kemalist model would not result in its opposite – the introduction of a neo-Islamic dictatorship by using the democratic procedures. There exists a real threat that while going along the path of democracy and using the democratic procedures a result that has nothing to do with democracy is produced. The "Ergenekon" and "Balyoz" cases, the persecution of opposition journalists, the use of the state apparatus for suppression of the political opposition are a real part of the contemporary political landscape in Turkey. These processes showed their final "representation" in the dramatic developments around Gezi Park in Istanbul, which unleashed the deep confrontation between the two Turkeys[12]: the one of Anatolia and the other of the big cities of Central and Western Turkey. From here onwards the future of today's Turkey and of its foreign policy will be a function of the influence of an intertwined complex, generated by the existence of three massive social faults.

The first one is the traditional Turkish-Kurdish opposition. The new tactics of AKP is to neglect as much as possible the growing Kurd nationalism by placing it into the framework of the more general pan-Islamic brotherhood and solidarity. Putting forward the unifying notion of Sunni Islam the ruling elite in Ankara believes that through concessions in the fields of language, cultural and educational autonomy it will succeed in neutralizing the biggest threat before the Turkish territorial integrity in the 21st century. This threat however remains constant and is being fed by at least two circumstances: the existence of a practically independent Kurd state in

[12] Metaphorically defined as a collision between the, so called, "Kara Turkler" and "Beyaz Turkler", regardless of the general conventionality and fragmentation of this division. Indeed the social reality is rather more complex and multi-layered.

Northern Iraq, which is backed by oil resources and enjoying external geopolitical support and the eventual second Kurd autonomy in Syrian Mesopotamia. It is only a question of time and suitable conditions this external Kurd centre to ignite the spark and blow South-Eastern Anatolia.

The second fault is a relatively unfamiliar but very serious and deep contradiction inside the Turkish society: the discrimination of the largest religious minority in the country – that of the Alawites i.e. the Turkish Shiites. The Shia community is between 15 and 20 million. Due to the long period of segregation which dates back to the Ottoman–Sefavid wars in Anatolia in the 15th century the Turkish Alawites have formed a significant and sound network of social integration in all spheres, representing remarkable success especially in education and in business—fields which stood in the periphery of the state and where the state least restrained this part of the Turkish society. The Alawite community is a target of escalating or subsiding waves of ostracism from the side of the Sunni majority, and the course of neo-islamisation of the society makes this community especially sensitive. The paradox is that the Alawites are the most ardent supporters of the secularist state, since in it their religious difference would not be a problem of such magnitude as it might be in a Sunni Islamic Turkey.

The third fault which appears to be central for the future of Turkey is the growing secularist – islamist antagonism which may be subdivided into:

- Antagonism between the old Kemalist nationalist elite and the social groups clustered around it and the neo-Islam wave and
- Antagonism between the secularist liberal social circles concentrated mainly in Western Turkey and the Islam "democrats" of Erdogan

Both poles have a solid political, electoral, economic and other support including from external geopolitical players. The research will concentrate on this knot, which is dominant and determinant. The deadly clutch in which the two social axes of the contemporary Turkish society are has to be resolved in the following years (if not even earlier). This is the context in which the declarations of the Turkish ruling elite for a new role of Turkey in the East and on the Balkans have to be interpreted. There are three key factors which determine the new role of Turkey in the Near East: the impressive economic model backed by the power of a leading military power in the region, the specific democratization of the Turkish society and the re-discovered Islamic

tradition synthesized with modernity. It was expected that these factors when combined with the inherited imperial prestige from the times of the Ottoman dynasty will constitute a real resource for the domination of Turkey in the Arab and Muslim East which will "fill in" the power vacuum after the "Arab spring".

The European and Balkan dimension

If in the Orient the desire of Turkey to become a key factor for the Arab and Muslim world (and mostly for the Sunni population) is not exhausted, the situation on the Balkans is rather different. Here the attempts of Turkey to "come back" in Europe confront a complex of contradictions and counteractions of an entirely different nature.

The general framework that predefines the geopolitical behavior of Turkey in the region consists of the following schematically enumerated circumstances:

- the existence of a critically low regional balance of powers, regardless of the formal membership of the majority of the states to NATO and the EU (excluding the Western Balkans);
- the existing configuration of weak states, weak military forces, fragile institutionalism, stagnating economies and deteriorating demography in the states in the heart of the Balkans – Bulgaria and Macedonia;
- the presence of compact Muslim and Turkish minorities in the region.

The Balkans is a region where at least three massive geopolitical projects collide[13]: that of the European Union, the Russian one (through the Eurasian alliance and the dominating (for now) geopolitical role of the USA. Despite the apparent overlapping of the interests of the Western project of the EU and USA, it is obvious that there are important differences between the two, mostly related to the attempts of the EU to act as an independent player.

[13] With a large scale of conventionality, one can point at the new alliance based on-interest (energy and military) between Greece, Israel and Cyprus, silently supported by the USA and obviously opposing the Turkish interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. The allied marine maneuvers of September 2011 near Castelloriso (only 2 water miles from the Turkish shore) were a clear demonstration for this.

However, the latest systematic crisis in Europe, which was not merely economic, clearly showed that the ambitions of Europe do not correspond to its abilities. It is in this context that the actually frozen further enlargement of the EU in the Western Balkans; the institutional and economic crisis in Greece; and the thorough and systematic weakness of the newly-accepted EU members Romania and Bulgaria have to be examined. The EU has enlarged horizontally but the lack of a true internal integration and the unwillingness or impossibility for such integration to be carried out (also on the Balkans), seriously question the perspectives for a new European "empire". It is not excluded in the most pessimistic scenario that Europe shrinks back to a narrow "Caroling" core (A. Fursov) of intensive integration around Germany, surrounded by a loose European periphery.

In the second place Russia has stopped its strategic retreat associated with the defeat of the Soviet Union in the Cold War and is re-claiming its influence through a series of energy and other economic projects and mostly through its preserved political influence in Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece and Montenegro.[14] The Lavrov-Kerry "pact" on the Syrian crisis clearly showed who the actual players that define the rules of the big political game in the region are. The EU is not one of them. Therefore it should not be excluded that the new Russian geopolitical limes starts moving southwards in both directions: to Southern Caucasus and the Balkans.

In the third place the long-lasting process of application of Turkey for membership in the EU[15] will most probably not end up successfully because of the fact that the two negotiating parties pursue diametrically opposing aims. In theory from the point of view of the EU Turkey may hypothetically become a member but with no special conditions. One of the lot. For Turkey the accession of the EU under such conditions shall mean that the country

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[14] For the political relations between the two countries in the Eurasian context refer to "Political Relationships of the Republic of Turkey with the Russian Federation," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Regions/EasternEurope/RussianFederation/Relations+Russian.htm.

[15] More on the subject in E. Markova and M. Lesenski, "The Long Way of Turkey towards Its Accession to the European Union–Facts and Challenges," GEPI-Institute for Regional and International Research http://www.osf.bg/cyeds/downloads/12_GEPI_Turkey_EU.pdf

abandons its wishes to be an independent player on the political scene. On the outer surface the EU brings civilization, religious and demographic constraints for the admission of Turkey "in the club". But if the issue is confined to "Realpolitik", France and Germany understand quite well that for them this shall mean that they have to divide the political dividends at least into three because Turkey wants to access the EU as a subject of its own independent will and under its conditions and not as a peripheral territory conceding its market, resources and workforce. Turkey does not want to be an object but a subject of globalization.

At the same time there exists also the specific Turkish strategic "complex" for insecurity displayed by the different visions of the Turkish national strategic culture[16] and identity that is revealing a society which is still on its way of modernization as well as yet in the process of formation of the nation[17]. The painful sensitivity of the Turkish military and political elite towards the country's neighbors, the country's territorial integrity, the statute of minorities and the near Turkish history display the lack of self-confidence in the society's own social cohesion beyond the administrative mechanisms for "social engineering" applied by the state. Here one can find one explanation for the lack of agreement between the EU and Turkey on key issues concerning the European integration and the preservation of the members' identity. This disagreement has a specific socio-historical geometry: while the Turkish society and state are on the ascending curve of their modernization (a process whose key components are the national sovereignty and the formation of a single nation from different cultural, linguistic and other elements), the EU is rather an alliance between "old" societies who have long ago passed the peak of their modernization in all its aspects – industrial, national, institutional and cultural. In this sense the motivation logic of the two partners in the process of negotiation are too different and lying beyond the concrete technical dispositions of the negotiation chapters. We have societies which are in different phases of their

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[16] Regarding the concept for "strategic culture" see, C. S. Gray, "Strategic Culture as Context: The First Generation of Theory Strikes Back," *Review of International Studies* 25(1) (1999), p. 49-69.

[17] P. Bilgin, "Turkey's Changing Security Discourses: The Challenge of Globalisation," *European Journal of Political Research* 44(1) (2005), p. 175-201.

existence and development and which follow different logics that are adequate for this respective phase of existence.

From this starting point two directions of the Turkish "Drang nach Osten" are possible. The first is the re-positioning of Turkey to the East, i.e. the playing of the Islamic, Near East and Arabian card (incl. the announcement of R. Erdogan for association with SOC, the choice of a Chinese air-defense system etc.) is in fact an attempt for exertion of influence on the EU for making concessions to the acceptance of Turkey in the EU. The other hypothesis, however, seems more viable: that Turkey has really re-positioned itself and its true goal is to become not an EU member but a dominant power in the Near East and Caucasus. That requires the definition and gradual implementation of a long-term strategy (dating back to the first mandate of AKP in 2002), which very often uses the modern technologies of soft power in open competition with its Sunni "partners"- Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Turkey is trying to become dominant by using its geopolitical and economic position. It is striving to become the crossing point of all energy projects in the region and in this way playing "check and mate" to the suppliers of energy resources.

At the same time none of the key factors that support the new global role of Turkey in the Arab-Muslim world has the same weight when speaking about the Balkans. The so called "democratization" of the Turkish society is specific and deeply dependent on a series of external factors to serve as a label for a new Turkey in the Balkan region. The re-discovered Islam tradition does not have any ground in a region whose socio-civilization code is predominantly Christian. Moreover the Ottoman "heritage" is treated, least to say, ambivalent in the different Balkan countries: from openly apologetic in Bosnia and Sandjak, selectively through the prism of the new Albanian nationalism in Albania and Kosovo, hesitantly negative in Bulgaria and Macedonia and openly negative in Serbia and Greece. The review of the Turkish strategy on the Balkans in the last 20 years shows that the stress is placed on the dense integration of the Turkish and Muslim communities on the peninsula. In this strategy the Albanian factor plays a key role (because of its ascending demographic and geopolitical importance). The move with the Albanian "pawn" may play "check" on at least four countries in the region and this is one of the biggest constraints before the successful return of Turkey in the region. If Turkey chooses to rely predominantly on the Muslim

factor, which will be understandable for a Muslim state, this will rather lead to the deepening of the confrontation and tension between the Balkan peoples, between the civilization codes of Christianity and Islam. If Turkey has bigger ambitions the use of its unique geostrategic position on the crossroads between the East and the West, the success of its economic model and the demonstration of cultural tolerance may give to it the role of a factor of stability in a region characterized by stagnating economies, impoverished population and ambivalent geopolitical vision.

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The Caucasus: The Current Development and Expectations and Perspectives for the Next Decade

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The growing importance of the Caucasus is influenced by its geographical location between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, bordering with NATO and the European Union, as well as by its direct access to Central Asian and Middle Eastern countries. In relation to Turkey and Western Europe, it is the doorway to Central Asia and now to Afghanistan. It has always served as a gateway to the Middle East for Russia.

The region is divided by territorial and separatist conflicts, which foster the continued mistrust and animosity among the countries in the region. Armenian military aggression of vast Azerbaijani territories, Russia's annexation of Georgian territories and as well as opposition of local authoritarian ruling systems for democratic transformation are major impediments for much needed changes in the landscape and a rethinking of values throughout the region.

Azerbaijani democracy is very limited and the opposition political parties are deprived of any possibility to get access to TVs and radio which are all dominated by the ruling regime. Their desire to meet people in the regions and hold regional party conferences are very restricted and in many cases are not allowed. For instance, the main opposition party Musavat cannot hold its Kurultay (conference) as all conference centers in Baku are rejecting to allow a space due to the fear of the authorities. Opposition Halq Cebhesi Party leader is deprived of his foreign passport and has not traveled abroad since 2005. Police and illegal pro-governmental bandit groups are free to beat and arrest opposition party leaders directly in their headquarters. Opposition party members are not represented in the parliament and as all MPs are appointed by the ruling regime. To enter the parliament you must go through the list of

the rulers of Azerbaijan confirming allegiance to the ruler and in some cases in parallel of allegiance you must pay for a MP mandate.

The government which has embezzled billions of dollars coming from the oil money is highly corrupted. Embezzling in building roads and bridges and "investing" in building companies and by this way writing off and wasting billions out of the budget is a state practice led by the state officials. The country has no independent judiciary system and all authorities are concentrated in the hand of one authoritarian system on the top of it is sitting Ilham Aliyev who had replaced his father in 2003 like that of Bashar Assad replaced his father in 2000. So all the state structures like executive, legislative and judiciary are tightly controlled by the ruling regime imposing NO on any of independent public activities and opposition rallies. Having absolute control on TVs and radios the regime has fined and put arrest warrant to pro-pluralist newspapers and in some cases the newspapers have themselves imposed self-censorship to their own newspapers in a fear of being arrested, beaten, tortured or fined with enormous amount.

The country's TV and press are abundant with unprecedented coverage by the soviet style propaganda and brain washing campaign of the ruling family and family members. With enormous wealth and resources the population is immigrating to Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan for earning their daily life as the business is highly monopolized in Azerbaijan. The medieval methods of management, authoritarianism and corruption from other side are a major curse in Azerbaijani political establishment.

Within the past years Georgia has accomplished quite significant achievements leaving behind the practice of the former soviet space countries. Georgia has been reforming the soviet inherited system, paving the way for transparency and democracy moving closer to democratic way of development and being good example for other the two non-transparent countries in the Caucasus. After Saakasvili's rise to power, Georgia has been changed fundamentally eliminating the roots of corruptions and putting the country on the path of democracy. Although Georgian government had not succeeded in meeting of all expectations of the Georgian people but the achievements in building nation-state is very encouraging. The road to democracy and transparency in Georgia is complex and the centuries of old non-democratic practice still is in effect and reflected in people's behaviors. But the reform policy has led to change of the ruling government led by

President Saakashvili himself. It has been the demonstration of change in Georgia towards democracy and sure it will take long process to achieve the established institutions of democracy. Georgia's presidential governing system has been undergone reforms and the parliament now has more power and the authority for forming a government based on election results. Georgia is steadfastly moving towards integration into EU's structures and is going to sign Eastern partnership agreement with EU in Vilnius at the end of November. Georgia's NATO aspirations are steadfast and irreversible.

Unlike Georgia, both Azerbaijan and Armenia have more centralized presidential system of administration. As to Armenia, the country is still led by former warlords and war criminals and nationalistic, Nazi minded ideology towards Azerbaijan and Turkey is dominating at the state level. Armenian leaders are still reaping the results of aggression and the status quo producing ethnic hatred and animosity in the public speeches. The TV programs and the press totally controlled by the government are full of hatred, racism and shows of "heroism" of war criminals that massacred Azerbaijanis or destroyed the entire Azerbaijani villages and towns. There is a dominant atmosphere of ignoring the sufferings of the other but enjoying it which is unprecedented human behavior infused into Armenian society. There is no debate on peace with Azerbaijan and Turkey and any such person promoting for peace with Azerbaijan could be terrorized or killed as a betrayer if any public statement made.

Corruption, monopoly over resources, unemployment and emigration of its population is characteristic features of today's Armenia. Armenian presidential and parliamentary elections have been assessed as not free and fair and the parliament is dominated by the governmental and the government supported oligarchic elements and their supporters.

Both Azerbaijan and Armenia are formally represented in European democratic institutions but both have different agenda for being represented there.

Foreign and Security Policy

Azerbaijan and Armenia are members of the Commonwealth of Independent Countries (CIS), while Georgia has already withdrawn from all

structures. Armenia is a member of Russia dominated Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and is in bilateral security treaty with Russia.

Analyzing major powers influence in the Caucasus, it must be noted that Russia still remains a dominant player in the Caucasus based upon the problems inherited from the former Soviet Union and not yet settled. Even after these many years, Russia retains significant influence over those problems and sometimes is part of the problem. Russia believes that it has legitimate interests in the Caucasus and the entire Caspian Basin and has expressed at different levels its opposition to any foreign military installation or objects in Azerbaijan or in the Caspian Basin[18].

In generalizing Azerbaijani foreign policy, it is important to note that the major determining element of relations with all partners whether it is Russia, Turkey, US or EU is expressed in an effort to get more support for removal of Armenian occupation and liberation of Azerbaijani lands. For years, Azerbaijan tried to get Russia's support for eliminating the results of Armenian occupation and in return to meet Russia's dominating military-security concerns in Azerbaijan and the Caspian Basin. This policy has not yielded any results so far but served for balanced relations with Russia. The major problem in Azerbaijani–Russian relations focused on Russia's continued military support of Armenia. Azerbaijan believes that the continued Armenian occupation for the past 20 years has been maintained only due to Russia's considerable support and armament of Armenia[19]. Russia does not deny providing arms to Armenia, while serving as a mediator within the Minsk Group of OSCE at Armenian -Azerbaijani negotiations. End of exploitation of strategically important Gabala Radar Station put an end to the last foreign military object which is a great historical moment for independent Azerbaijani statehood. Russia still remains a major weapons supplier for the Azerbaijani Army developing military-technical cooperation[20].

We are observing a new development in bilateral relations which are again dictated by numerous factors from both sides. Russian president Putin

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18 "US 'Buildup' in Caspian Alarms Russia," *DAWN-International* March 15, 2006.

19 "Analysis: Putin Seeks To Draw Azerbaijan Back Into Russian Orbit," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty* 21.02. 2006.

20 *Itar-Tass News Agency* 22.02.2006.

has an idea of more integrated CIS which is characterized by his initiatives on Eurasian Economic Union and Customs Union (CU). Azerbaijan is reluctant to join to these structures and did not sign any of agreement leading to these newly proposed unions. This issue is now greatly debated in the former soviet space and has diverse approaches.

The problem is, in reality if to approach pragmatically, the proposed Customs Union would be in the benefit of all former soviet countries as their economy and the quality of produced commodities and trade relations have much more similarities. These countries inherited the same economic and technological level and are still not drastically re-constructed their technology and the level of economy.

The produced commodities of these countries have less competence with western goods and commodities and have no other market for realization of their products except in the soviet space. Proceeding from the European experience, such practice would be highly beneficial in easing the economic and trade relations among member states leading to declining of prices of goods imported by the member states. The CU is considered as the first stage in the process of Eurasian Economic Union with much integrated economic policy with future possible integrated political and military structures. This factor has been speculated as a genuine purpose of creating of CU and EEU. Embracing of new form of union with the former patron, while the countries of the former soviet space have not fully realized their independence and sovereignty have created the sort of suspicion and hesitancy. The history of the Soviet Union and the legacy of former soviet structures from one side and the 20 years of practice of enjoying independence and change of values have significant impact on the decisions of former soviet countries. Within this perspective, Georgia unambiguously has stated the impossibility of reversal of its decision to return to CIS not alone to CU or EEU while Armenia has already reversed its decision on European Neighborhood Policy and agreed for CU and formation of EEU. Azerbaijani case is delicate as Azerbaijan did not fully involved in European Neighborhood Policy and at the same time did not express public support for CU displaying its reluctance of membership at CU arguing that it would not be a member of the Union where Armenia is. But so far such statements have been made by the low profile politicians and there is no solid information on the behind the door meetings between Russian and Azerbaijani leadership. In fact, such Union is in the interest of

the ruling regime for continuity of the dynastic system since there is no place for a long term survival of the authoritarian corrupted regime in a community of free nations. But the regime leadership is also concerned that the wealth and the resources they control now can occasionally be shared and taken out and the relative independence they have exercised in international space could be totally weakened. Pro-democracy forces view such Union as an encroachment to Azerbaijani sovereignty and independence and are radically opposed to it. They see the new Union as a fruitful environment for abuse of fundamental human rights.

Second, Russia was not happy with shutting down of Gabala radar station as Azerbaijan and Russia could not come to an agreement and some considered it as a humiliation for Russia. But Russian decision also merits appreciation as they did not employ old methods but I believe Russia is willing to take a different strategy. Russia has launched a dramatic effort of strengthening of Armenian army as an additional pressure to Azerbaijan signing military technical cooperation agreement. It is modernizing its base in Armenia and providing the sophisticated weapons to Armenia. It is expected that upcoming visit of President Putin to Armenia will enhance the armament of Armenia to a new stage.

Third, major Azerbaijani argument was based on NK negotiation with Armenia under Russian mediation. While initially in early 2010, Russia was supportive of renovated Madrid Principles which was accepted by Azerbaijan, later on after several months Russia retreated from its previous position by making a deal with Armenian side regarding for a long term use of Russian military base in this country and supported Armenian backed interpretation of Madrid principles which triggered sharp Azerbaijani reaction. It served as the main argument and pretext for Azerbaijani side to stand firm in Gabala negotiations.

Turkey played a key role for transportation of Azerbaijani energy resources via Georgia to Turkey and Europe which allowed Azerbaijan to be economically independent and sovereign in decision making. Close US-Azerbaijani-Georgian–Turkish cooperation has triggered traditional enemies and rivals of Turkey to concentrate on more active and determined Iran-Armenia–Russia axis. Turkey's access to and its presence in the Caspian Basin and Central

Asia has traditionally been viewed by this axis as undesirable and a challenge to their foreign policy[21].

Azerbaijani people view Turkey's presence in the region as a crucial factor for economic development, peace and security. Turkey's regional presence has increased and become more important in the light of energy transportation routes and issues related to the security of the region. Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum oil and gas transportation routes and the planned Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway route is the cornerstone of cooperation among the three countries. The newly planned Trans Anatolian Gas Pipeline (TANAP) is going to contribute to strengthening of bilateral ties investing huge amount into Turkish economy.

The Agreement on Strategic Partnership and Mutual Support (Stratejik İşbirliği Anlaşması) signed between Azerbaijan and Turkey in 2010 advanced the relationship to the allied level in case of a military attack or other aggressive behavior against either of the countries and promoted intensified military and military-technical cooperation[22]. Turkey has helped in forming the Azerbaijani Army, while military-to-military relations continue to develop but not in the level it should be.

Turkey's economic and trade relations with Georgia have reached the point that Turkey is now Georgia's biggest trade partner[23]. Armenia's hostile claims to Turkey and Azerbaijan made it impossible for Turkey to establish relations with Armenia. Efforts to establish relations with Turkey for its own economic survival backfired due to Turkish demand to leave Azerbaijani territories.

However Azerbaijan and Turkey have a shortage of coordination of foreign and security policy and the economic and human to human relations are not in the level the people of the both countries so extremely would like to have. Azerbaijani regime is trying to keep a distance from Turkey in an effort to maintain its tighter control over the situation in Azerbaijan. The

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21 Paola Ceragioli and Maurizio Martellini, "The Geopolitics of Pipelines," *Asia Times* 28.05.2003.

22 Shahin Abbasov, "Azerbaijan-Turkey Military Pact Signals Impatience with Minsk Talks-Analysts," Eurasia.net, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/62732, (27.03.2011).

23 "The Tbilisi Squeeze," *The Daily Beast* 29.06.2010.

Regime is afraid of the projection of Turkish democracy into Azerbaijan. On this direction, the regime is taking preventive measures such restricting Turkish influence via TVs, by not abolishing a visa regime and Azerbaijan based Turkish centers. The regime's policy is, to much extent, a reflection of regime survival policy and they act within this policy irrespective that is Turkey, Germany or the United States.

In some foreign policy issues there are lack of coordination such as on Israel, Kosovo or concerted actions towards removal of Armenian occupation. It is ironic that until now we still have visa regime between the two countries while Russia has non visa status with Turkey but this policy is coming from Baku. Economic, social security, and employment issues between the two countries are artificially not resolved while we enjoy those with all former soviet countries.

Turkey has closed its borders with Armenia since 1993 Armenian military campaign and Turkey is a single country in the world which politically supports Azerbaijan in all international forums. But Turkey's protest against occupation is passive and is not active. It can be judged and compared by PM's international speech at UN or elsewhere on Gaza or Palestine and on Azerbaijan. While at UN it has been devoted some 8 minutes on Gazza situation, Azerbaijani cause took just 30 second within the context of an overall Caucasus. Turkish leadership did not make this issue a subject of its relations with EU, US or Russia and even tried in some cases to ignore Azerbaijani sufferings and establish relations with Armenia.

Azerbaijan and Iran have a disagreement over the Caspian Status and Azerbaijan is displeased by the Iranian economic support of Armenia despite the situation on the ground. Frequent arrests of Islamic party members in Azerbaijan in charge of spying for Iran and Azerbaijan's close ties with Israel have created bilateral suspicions between Iran and Azerbaijan[24].

Iran and Armenia have very good economic and political relations including military ties. Iranian warm relations with Armenia are being argued as part of joint Iranian-Russian strategy aimed at weakening Turkish-American influence in the region.

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[24] "Администрация Президента Азербайджана: 'Обвинения Ирана необоснованны'," 13 февраля, 2012, *Day.Az* http://news.day.az/politics/315355.html

The United States regional approach in the Caucasus was based on a policy of isolation of Iran and diminishing the role of Russia, while encouraging normal and good relations with Russia and Turkey[25]. As to bilateral relations between the United States and Azerbaijan, the priorities of the United States continue to lie in security, energy, and democratic and economic reform[26]. Azerbaijani-US Cooperation is focused on border and maritime security, upgrading the air defense systems and intelligence cooperation[27]. In support of the United States, Azerbaijan has sent its troops to Afghanistan and Iraq, allowing its air space to be used by American planes heading to Afghanistan, and allowing airplanes to land in Azerbaijani airports en-route to their final destinations.

While assessing the Azerbaijan-US security cooperation, it should be indicated that the relations is not aimed at establishing or bringing any US bases or troops to the area in the short term. From Azerbaijani perspective that would risk deteriorated relations with Russia and Iran and may cause tense politico-economic relations for that Azerbaijan is not ready yet. Azerbaijani leadership has consistently denied any plans for hosting foreign troops[28].

The US administration played a pivotal role in diversifying energy supplies of Azerbaijan contributing Azerbaijani sovereignty and independence. However, the US administration did not enthusiastically engage in pursuit of democratic reform in Azerbaijan which led to dynastic succession and strengthening of the current authoritarian regime in Azerbaijan. As co-chairmen of Minsk Group of OSCE at Armenian-Azerbaijani negotiations US position was overshadowed and influenced by the Armenian Caucus at US Congress which is under the influence of hostile to Turkey and Azerbaijan. Armenian groups are undermining the fundamental US interests in the region.

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25 "House testimony on US policy in Caucasus (Outlines U.S. Economic, Diplomatic Efforts in Region)." USIA, EUR408 08/01/96 Text: Herbst 7/30.

26 "Deputy Secretary of State William Burns Press Conference October 18, 2011," http://photos.state.gov/libraries/azerbaijan/366196/Press%20Transcripts/baku-111018-Burns.pdf.

27 "Azerbaijan, USA Discuss Military Cooperation," *Itar-Tass* 19.05.2006.

28 "No Plans to Allow US Military Base in Azerbaijan: Moscow," *Xinhuanet* 24.08.2005, www.chinaview.cn 2005-08-24

Armenian-US relations have elements of history and but starting from the 70s of last century it is influenced by the representatives of Armenian Caucus in the US Congress which has a hostile agenda against Turkey and Azerbaijan. In the 90s of last century, Armenia has been the biggest US aid recipient per capita in the world. Both the United States and Russia have been economically and militarily supportive to Armenian side during the Armenian military campaign against Azerbaijan.

Caucasian countries' NATO policies are diverse and polarized and are determined by their level of relations with Russia. Any move of these countries towards integrated relations with NATO is considered as an unfriendly action by Russia. Azerbaijan's NATO policy should be considered within the context of her relations with Russia and to some extent with Iran. Azerbaijan's government currently adheres to a position which would not counter Russia's sensitivity. In contrast to his father's positive statements regarding NATO membership, the current Azerbaijani leader I. Aliyev has shifted the policy repeatedly stating that "NATO is not in the agenda of Azerbaijani politics and Azerbaijani is not willing to host any foreign troops in Azerbaijan[29]. This trend has taken an upper hand after the Russia-Georgia war in August 2008.

Iran has also repeatedly expressed its opposition to third countries involvement in the Caucasus and the Caspian Basin. Iran views NATO as a US dominated Alliance, and its expansion towards the Caucasus is perceived as a threat to the Iranian regime. Azerbaijani officials are not trying to publicize their cooperation with NATO, thus trying to suppress any negative reactions from Russia or Iran.

Azerbaijan is cooperating with NATO within the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) and plays important role as a transit country for the delivery of shipments to NATO troops in Afghanistan[30]. NATO has

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[29] Ilham Aliyev, "Vopros Voennogo Prisutstviya Inostrannix Sosudarstv Na Azerbaydzanskoy Territorii V Povestke Dnya Ne Stoit," *Day.Az/Interfax* 04.06.2006.

[30] *Miaz İnfo* http://www.milaz.info/news.php?id=22207 10/02/2012

occasionally expressed its interest in maintaining the security of energy transportation routes via the Caucasus to Turkey[31].

NATO has always supported Azerbaijan's sovereignty and integrity and stated its unacceptability of the acquisition of lands by force in its resolutions and statements. Yet Azerbaijani society expects NATO to take a more openly expressed position towards Armenia's occupation and as to the amount of military hardware stationed inside Armenian-held territories (which is equal to half of Armenia).

Both Azerbaijan and Armenia sets out their reform plans and timelines in their Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP), which is jointly agreed for a two-year period. All three countries have been contributing troops to the KFOR and ISAF in Afghanistan and Georgia is the second largest non-NATO troop contributor nation in Afghanistan. All three countries are participating in the Partnership Action Plan on Terrorism (PAP-T). This includes sharing intelligence and analysis with NATO, enhancing national counter-terrorist training capabilities and improving border security.

Azerbaijani-EU relations are represented within European institutions such as Council of Europe and Eastern Partnership which are more focused on democracy and human rights and on bilateral relation with each of EU countries.

In 2011 Azerbaijani leadership decided to join the Non Aligned Nations Movement as some experts argue to keep a distance from both NATO and Russia but at the same time leading the country into uncertainty.

Armenian side called its policy with major powers as a policy of complementarity trying to balance Russia, Iran the United States and EU. Armenia-Russia military alliance was also "complimented" with limited Armenia-US and intensifying Armenia–NATO military cooperation[32].

Armenia considers Russia as a guarantor for its security[33]. Its military-technological relationship with Russia constitutes the core of the security policy in Armenia. Armenia is hosting Russian military base N102 and

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31 "НАТО заинтересовано в обеспечении безопасности БТД," *Day Az* 04 Июля 2006.

32 "Interview with Deputy FM A.Kirakosyan," *Mediamax Agency* 30.05.2003.

33 "Armenia Sees Russia As Strategic Partner-Defense Minister," *RIA Novosti* 06.03.2006.

Azerbaijan believes that the base serves as an additional source of weapons and continued political support for Armenia.[34] The country is heavily militarized and its president argued that the country has "types of ammunition that countries ten times the size of Armenia would dream of having."[35] Russia has intensified armament of Armenia, especially for the past three years. It was appreciated in the bilateral meetings of Russian and Armenian presidents, the amount of which was disclosed by Armenian Prime Minister: "Over the past three years we have obtained the amount of weapons which we did not for the past 20 years."[36] Armenia purchases Russian arms from Russia by Russia's internal prices[37], while Azerbaijan does it by world prices.[38] According to Germany based "Global Index of Militarization-2013" Armenia is the fourth militarized state in the world[39]. Armenian leadership has numerously stated that Armenia had no intention of joining to NATO[40]. NATO's stance is also loyal to such relationship and it tries to build its relationship on bilateral basis[41].

Armenia has been isolated from all big regional energy and transportation projects running from Caspian basin. In addition to Military alliance, Russia is having a heavy economic weight in Armenia having an ownership of major Armenian economic objects and being the main trade partner providing the country with energy products via the pipelines running through Georgia.

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34 "NATO Intends to Cooperate with Armenia for Long Term," *PanArmenian .Net* 06.2006.

35 "NATO-Opinion: Press Point with NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen and the President of Armenia, Serzh Sargsyan," 25.05.2010.

36 Новости Армении "Премьер-министр Армении: За последние 3 года мы беспрецедентно вооружились," *NEWS.am* Сентябрь 3, 2013.

37 "Russia to Supply Arms to Armenia at Preferential Prices," *Interfax News Agency* 10.11.2003

38 "Armenian Army Chief Untroubled By Russian-Azeri Military Ties," 23.02.2006 www.armenialiberty.org.

39 "Глобальный индекс милитаризации-2013," составленного Международным институтом конверсии в Бонне (BICC), *News.am* 08.11.2013.

40 Robert Kocaryan, "Armeniya Ne Namerena Vstupat v. NATO," *Day.Az* 22.04.2006 http://www.day.az/ news/armenia/47126.html.

41 R. Simmons, "NATO Doesn't Object to Russian Base In Armenia," *Itar-Tass* 23.05.2006.

Armenia has also developing economic relations with Iran and Iran-Armenia gas pipeline can meet all Armenian gas consumptions.

The recent decision of Armenian side to join Customs Union on the eve of the signing of EU Eastern Partnership Agreement has been a demonstration of Armenia's dependence on Russia since any move against Russia's will would be resulting in a change of the regime and the status quo in Azerbaijani–Armenian front line on which Armenian regime is sitting.

Georgia's location as a transit country for Caspian energy routes enhanced its international importance. Georgia established very strong military relationships with both NATO and the United States. The United States initiated active military training in 2002-2005 focusing on Georgian infantry and logistics battalions as well as officers of Georgian army[42].

Georgia's foreign policy was dramatically changed by the rise to power of reformist President Saakasvili in 2004. Although the appeal of NATO membership was made official in the 2002 Prague Summit by the former Georgian President Shevardnadze, NATO's policy has been the cornerstone of a new Georgian democratic leadership. This policy stated Georgia's unambiguous will to become a NATO member [43] with overwhelming support of a broad spectrum of the entire society[44]. In March 2006 Russia and Georgia finally signed an agreement for complete withdrawal of Russian troops from Georgia by 2008[45].

However, Russia was unhappy with such development and publicly opposed NATO's eastward expansion into the Caucasus. Georgia considered Russian military forces and its peacekeeping troops as a potential threat to its

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[42] Jonathan Moor, "U.S. Marine-Led Task Force Trains Republic of Georgia Soldiers," *American Forces Press Service* 27.03.2006.

[43] "Georgia Looks Forward To Membership In NATO And EU, Saakashvili Says," *Associated Press* 15.09.2005.

[44] "Parlament Gruzii Prinyal Postanovlenie 'Ob Integrasii Gruzii v NATO'," *Day.Az* 12.05.2006 http://www.day.az/news/georgia/48548.html

[45] "Agreements Signed on Russian Military Withdrawal From Georgia," *Eurasia Daily Monitor* Volume 3, Issue 65 (04.04.2006).

national security[46] which was expressed directly in the National Security Concept of Georgia adopted in July 2005.

A military operation against Osetian rebels in 2008 has been the moment of settling scores of Russia with Georgia to change the ongoing development in the region in an effort to stop Georgia's move to NATO. At the same time, it is also intended to punish Georgia and show Russia's determination to both Western and former Soviet countries, while intimidating the latter's aspiring interests to integrate into Euro–Atlantic structures. That was a final stage of the latest covert war of interest between Russia, NATO and the United States, starting from the Balkans to the Caucasus.

Consequently, Georgia-Russia relations have been terminated and the diplomatic relations have been abolished. Russia considered Georgia as an enemy country and treated it this way. Georgia in her turn has accelerated its bid for NATO membership, internal political reforms and reforms in security sector are also aimed for integration into Euro Atlantic political and military institutions.

At the Bucharest Summit in April 2008, Allied Heads of State and Government agreed that Georgia will become a member of NATO. This decision was subsequently reconfirmed at successive NATO summits in 2009, 2010 and 2012. NATO and Georgia pursue an active political dialogue and practical cooperation, including through the unique framework provided by the NATO-Georgia Commission, to assist Georgia in achieving its Euro-Atlantic aspirations.

Chicago summit of NATO called on Russia to reverse its recognition of the South Ossetia and Abkhazia regions of Georgia as independent states and NATO once again reiterated its continued support to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Georgia within its internationally recognized borders.

Azerbaijan and Georgia have forged close economic cooperation especially in the field of energy resources and transportation routes as all Caspian Azerbaijani oil and gas routes are being run via Georgia and Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway is going to be another link connecting Azerbaijan with Georgia and Turkey.

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[46] "Parlament Gruzii Prinyal Postanovlenie O Vivode Rossiyskix Mirotvorceskix Sil. Tekst Postanovleniya," *Day. Az* 18.07.2006, http://www.day.az/news/georgia/54260.html.

Azerbaijan has invested hugely in Georgia and Azerbaijanis are the second nation after Turkey visiting Georgia. Georgia's democratic reform is serving as an inspiration for the people of Caucasus for democracy and freedom and transparency. Georgia's move towards Euro-Atlantic integration is an additional momentum for more western involvement in the region.

By finalizing the current situation and the regional interplay, the two essential factors should be indicated as the major obstacles for the change of the regional landscape.

1. The existing military occupation of Azerbaijani lands and annexation of Georgian entities.

2. The democracy problem in the region, lack of free elections and unavailability of people to peacefully change the power.

Occupation of Azerbaijani lands has made both Azerbaijan and Armenia vulnerable for dependency on Russian leadership. Armenian side has forged close political–military alliance and economic integration with Russia so that to keep these territories in its hand and insure its current military advantage so that to dictate the military realities on the ground. The recent reversed decision of Armenian leadership on Customs Union was also dictated by this factor. Armenia's short term interests are aimed at establishing a favorable international environment to maintain the status quo for longer periods and take maximum advantage of the military gains. The nationalistic demands are prevailing over economic and democratic development pursued by the successive rulers of Armenia who came to power under the wave of creating Greater Armenia at the expense of Azerbaijani lands.

Although Azerbaijani side did withdraw from military alliance with Russia and closed all Russian military objects in Azerbaijan, Russia still has a final say on the territories currently under occupation. Russia still has significant influential leverage in Azerbaijan, characterized by numerous factors including close ties of the ruling elite with Moscow, trade and economic relations, the presence of millions of Azerbaijani migrants earning their life in Russia.

In terms of democracy, Azerbaijani current regime is willing to be represented in the European democratic institutions, but at the same time is trying to ignore the obligations before these organizations. The regime is interested in cooperation with these institutions to the point that it would not

contradict to its own interests. That means that if any reform challenge or shaken the regime's durability it should be avoided since the cornerstone of the domestic and foreign policy is the regime survival policy like we have witnessed in Arab authoritarian systems. The lethal effect of such policy is that the regime itself is becoming the national security problem. So the policy within the past 20 years has been adapting the European values and principles to Azerbaijani regime's interests which are now facing steady opposition from these institutions after 12 years of failure to stick to the obligations. The energy factor has also played a role in appeasing the regime's corrupt and anti-democratic actions. For the past years Azerbaijan received billions from energy resources and the amount which foreign companies have invested in the Azerbaijani economy is more than foreign investment made in Russian economy. But what picture we have right now. Azerbaijani health system is totally crippled and you can see thousands of people per day in Azerbaijani-Iranian check points going to Iran for treatment. Educational system, especially school system is paralyzed and more than half of students during the admission year of 2012 and 2013 have got less than 150 scores out of 700. Azerbaijani science is too far from any technological invention and the prominent research. You cannot see any book store in Baku anymore which we had in abundance in the soviet period.

While these billions which have triggered dozens of books, articles and the research studies in Turkey and the west predicting strong army and the mighty economy for Azerbaijan, in reality we are facing emigration of Azerbaijani people to Russia and the remaining 20 years of occupation. Azerbaijan was not able to liberate even one village from Armenia that is considered poor compared to Azerbaijan and diplomatically has reached the disadvantages negotiating position it never been throughout the history of negotiations. The economic standards of both people are the same but people in our leaderships are extremely rich, that is the only difference we have right now.

Situation in Armenia generally is the same but the extent of falsifications and corruption is slightly moderate than in Azerbaijan. Armenian ruling regime is always trying to form some kind of coalition of forces in the parliament and the government and the elections are being held more proportionally. While the Azerbaijani leader takes 85% of votes, Armenian leader satisfies with 56% giving 37% to opposition leader. In case of

Azerbaijan that is around 5%. While opposition is represented Armenia's parliament; in Azerbaijani parliament there is absolutely no opposition MP. While Armenian opposition and civil society members can freely act inside the country having access to TVs, Azerbaijanis are deprived of these rights.

With such development of the current events in Caucasus and the former soviet space, we can judge that Georgia will become a member of European and Euro-Atlantic community with a democratic state system. It might result in losing the two separate entities or democratic Georgia can easily attract and accommodate the peoples of separatist regions into the United Georgia.

In case of Azerbaijan and Armenia much can be changed if the current situation changed peacefully and Azerbaijani wounds are healed. In case of continuation of the current stalemate the likelihood of resumption of hostilities is high and the entire region's development will be plunged into uncertainty.

But even in the case of end of occupation, if no democracy these countries will again immerse into the huge corruption and lasting authoritarian systems and in Azerbaijan case it could lead to a formal monarchic system with black perspectives for future. But the new generation armed with social media and western education is a hope that such development would not happen. But the mechanism for a peaceful change should be worked out as the main driving force for democratic change of landscape of the entire region. But the latest development has showed that there is less perspective for democratic change in Azerbaijan and Armenia and the second no intention from Armenian side to peacefully leave Azerbaijan lands.

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East or West, Trusting Solidarity Is The Best!

Şükrü Server Aya
Researcher (Turkey)

Dear Ladies and Gentlemen,

Firstly I welcome and thank the overseas visitors, as well as the writers, and in particular the organizers of this event which started in the year 2008 at the Sakarya University and is now taking a step for larger expansion under the Marmara University.

The objectives of the "Blue Black Sea Initiative" are known to the former participants and are also reconfirmed in the internet. Given the limited sources of the Sakarya University, this movement got a strong hold for now, but surely needs an expansion, if not revision of the modest and sincere objectives.

Realist researchers would normally get some degree of knowledge about the past relations between the member countries; today's standing which is regulated by the executive politicians or governments. Let me warn you; do not believe in everything you read only from your sources about the past, and also understand that today's politicians are empowered for short periods of two to four years, whereas this project must continue and sustain itself for the next generations. What we are doing today is taking care of a "tree of solidarity and friendship" in the Blue Black Sea area, and our relations should be as clear as the sea waters and we must trust in the blue future.

For this reason, this paper aims to alert and incite the young participants of today, to think how they can make this tree of co-shared benefit, humane compassion and progress by intelligence become stronger. Short sighted interferences by politicians, militarist, and extreme nationalist or religious organizations must be kept aside, because our aims and studies may not serve their fixed ideas and means to propagate them.

I would strongly suggest that you disbelieve this paper and comments as well, until such time that you make your own evaluation about the truth and the need to set the objectives and means to achieve them.

Some headlines of the points that need to be elaborated and decided upon by all member countries and in particular their academic and social institutions are submitted hereunder.

Why do we need solidarity and togetherness for the future?

1. By now the whole world should have learned that settlement of conflicts by arms and hawkish governments, do not bring long term peace, but cause the death of so many innocent and decent humans, enriching the countries who make and sell instruments to destroy, instead of growth and progress of average citizens. Hence, the need of "peace at home, peace in the world" as Ataturk had once said should be the main target of the future generations.

2. The second concern should be the preservation instead of depleting the limited environmental means of this globe and controlling the birth rates especially between the poor people of the continent. This is a serious and critical question and you will find all faiths and their messengers and publications against your reason and logic.

3. How the members and believers of the Blue Black Sea Movement can achieve their goals, need certain workshop meetings, projects, arguments and joint decisions to execute these with the limited sources, and possibly up against the resistance of the executive staff, who are in service for a short time, whereas this project is to bear fruits years later. So, they may not see the happy days which will naturally have to come.

As you know there is a "Black Sea Economic Cooperation" (BSEC) founded in 1992, the name of which confuses minds with our name. Let me read just a paragraph from their 2012 report expressed by a deputy Foreign Minister:

"We need to have a clear vision and prepare BSEC so that it can meet regional and global challenges. Turkey believes in the BSEC mission for the

future and will do its part to unlock our joint potential and big prosperity to our region."

What did you understand from this polished sentence? My understanding is that in the past twenty years you could not achieve serious positive and beneficial results for the members, but still believe in meeting regional and global challenges of today and will unlock (what?) potential and future (when?) big prosperity to our region!

Gentlemen, "time is your enemy" and you have to decide soon, whether you act now instead of creating excuses with nice words! You have to make your plan realistically by a time schedule and count on your own selves. Remember, some hard fruits or plans can break your teeth or hopes when time comes to bite them!

Propagating the new objectives of the Blue Black Sea:

In compliance with the plan and objectives to be decided upon, the support of ordinary people of each country should be searched and gradually obtained to become a serious assessment to the future unification of the future Black Sea Union. The following means or tools of progress for the intended solidarity and co-existence may be found worth thinking:

a. Formation of annual camps of says not less than 2 not more than 4 weeks for students of universities or even outside citizens in the same age, to attend an economic "festival of the Blue Black Sea citizens" in the member countries where very modest accommodation should be arranged as if an Olympic village or summer camp.

b. The group of a few hundred or may be some thousands, should plan their future activities in workshops and execute the schedule of that year's plan which may include sporting events appealing to the public, concerts, plays, folklore shows, demonstration of special skills or talents etc. which the people of that area may want to watch also!

c. Possibly the "capital owned" press and media will not devote enough attention and support in such idealist programs. Hence, the distribution of the news-activities-events can be organized through websites in different languages, eventually to sort out a multi-language minimal dictionary for the

visitors of different countries to be able to communicate better than the hand language.

d. Such events can be later expanded into "country fair" style exhibits of local productions and goods, where people can find themselves nearer to simpler, affordable purchases versus the expensive or luxurious items of the countries which become rich by selling to the poor, attracted by the commercials. In short a "middle-class" market should be preferred which may bring more people together.

Conclusion:

The Blue Black Sea region people should realize that no capitalist country will donate anything for their progress or development in the region, unless they make very large profits as the rule has been with past colonies.

One Turkish proverb says: "One neighbor can be in need of even ashes of the other neighbor."

The people of this region in material wealth may much poorer compared to the developed countries of the west, who may be more intelligent or hard working or better organized than us. But in moral, humane and traditional principles we still have values that the rich cannot understand. Many of us would still offer the single hen we have to our guest… We should question if so much of hospitality that brings joy to the host is right in today's world where money is nearly everything.

Personally, I would still prefer offering the hen, but out of the many we have in the house coop. So, pay attention to the rooster, your hen, and your eggs and most important of all, to the countryside foxes that steal you're hard earned food.

The Russian Influence on the Black Sea Region

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Introduction

After the date of 18th August 1991, the Soviet Union stayed in the history thanks to Moscow-centered Russian Federation's administrators and the Putsch Committee of CenComm of Communist Party. The end of the Cold War led to dramatic change in the landscape of Eurasian geopolitics. Firstly this unexpected finishing made first shock in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and Caucasia; then all over the world's countries more or less. These events accompanied by globalization, led to the transformation period for all new sovereign countries and new approaches for taking these countries to western-size political, economic and social structures began. Also geopolitical theories were re-created by US centered think tank organizations.

The Black Sea region stands out as a region where *realpolitik* once more has come to the fore[47]. The new political maneuvers, new theoretical approaches, and changes in geopolitical thoughts on the Black Sea region emerged. Turkey, Russia, Ukraine are main actors on this status. This article concludes that Black Sea region's powers, their rights on law, international treaty on the Black Sea are changing the Black Sea countries sides- as EU members, NATO members etc.- and their new expectations making their importance above Black Sea policies, new geopolitical rapprochements, new organizations and their structures. The main ideas of traditional geopolitics

[47] G. Flikke et al, "The Shifting of Black Sea Region: Actors, Drives and Challenge," *NUPI (Norwegian Institute of International Affairs* http://English.nupi.no/activities/departments/Department–of-Russian-and-Eurasian-Studies/Prosjekter/The-Shifting-Geopolitics-of-the-Black-Sea-Region-Actors-Drivers-and-Challenges (06.08.2011); J. Sherr "Security in the Black Sea Region: Back to Realpolitik?" *SouthEast Europe and Black Sea Studies* 8 (2), pp. 141-153.

can be related to the heritage of realist thought in International Relations, which considers the international relations as a balance of power approach. The main argument of this paper is that Russian influence is still powerful in the Black Sea region; this can be changed with soft tools and using the legal rights for all Black Sea coastline states. In this article new rapprochement for geographical areas as Black Sea Region will be criticized.

1. The Black Sea's Historical Background

The Black Sea has historically been a crossroad of many geopolitical formations[48]. The Black Sea is an inland sea between Southeastern Europe and Asia Minor that is part of the Atlantic Ocean. It is connected to the Mediterranean Sea by the Turkish Bosphorus and the Sea of Marmara, and to the Sea of Azov by the strait of Kerch[49]. Since the beginning of 1990s, the Black Sea region was inscribed in Wider Europe as one of several circles of regional cooperation streching from the North to the South East[50]. In the 15th-17th centuries, the Black Sea was regarded as the intersection of the most important transportation lines supporting trade among neighboring governments and peoples[51].

For many centuries the Black Sea stayed under control of the regional powers: first Ottoman Empire, then Russian Empire controlled islands, coastline and also other different administrates such as Khanate, Principalities. After the October Revolution in 1917, the Russian Empire completed her life and new owner of all territories was Soviet Russia.

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48 B. Karadeniz, "Security and Stability Architecture in the Black Sea," *Perceptions* (Winter-2007), p. 97.

49 The Black Sea has an area of 422.000 km^2 and a maximum depth of 2,206 meters at the Euxine abyssal plain in the center of the Black Sea, just South of Yalta on the Crimean Peninsula. *The Maritime Handbook* Oceanography, AquaSciences Center-UniBO, 2008, p.84.

50 "Blacksea-Russia," www.russiablacksea.com (06.08.2011).

51 A. Vasiliev, "The Black Sea Region in Turkish Foreign Policy Strategy: Russia & Turkey on the Black Sea," Carnegie Moscow Center Report No. 2010-2 (2010), p.1.

In the Blacks Sea region there was one power who is deeply interested with geopolitical controls and expansionist policy beginning from 18th century. Barbara Jelavich wrote,

> The Russian expansionist policy toward the Ottoman Empire was continued by the launching of another campaign in 1736 ... The war with Turkey continued two more years, but finally on July 21, 1774, the most important treaty in the entire history of Russo-Turkish relations that of Kuchuk Kainardji, was signed. In this agreement Russia gained an increase of territory in the Black Sea and the port of Azov; the Khanate of Crimea was recognized as an independent state. The Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, which had been occupied by Russian troops, were returned to the control of the Porte on condition that religious freedom and good government be maintained.[52]

The treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji was thus a notable defeat for the Ottoman Empire. It lost its attempt to maintain control over the Black Sea; the Russian right of intervention in the Principalities obtained official recognition. Russian power effected political, economic acts in the Black Sea region and also Ottoman Empire. But after the empires era, particularly after the World War 1, there is not any conflict between two new sovereign states till present. The Montreux Convention is highly positive effect on this peaceful climate.

The development of the Turkish Straits regime can be divided into two periods: the Ottoman Empire period and the Republic of Turkey period. International agreements on the Turkish Straits, until the Montreux

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[52] Barbara Jelavich mentioned that Russian interest began with Peter the Great in 1690s, with an expedition directed against the khan of the Crimea. His intention was to take the Black Sea port of Azov. After the Mongol conquest, establishing a state that could protect itself against renewed foreign invasion, and extending their dominion across Siberia to the Pacific. Peter the Great laid the lines of Russian foreign policy for the next century. His program and his methods of action were followed by his successors, and his aims were largely achieved by Catherine II by the 1790s. B. Jelavich, *St.Petersburg and Moscow: Tsarist and Soviet Foreign Policy, 1814-1974*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974), p.14, 20.

Convention, can be investigated in three periods: the period of Turkish sovereignty (1453-1809), the period of regulation via bilateral agreements (1809-1841) and the period of multilateral agreements (1841-1923).[53]

Turkish Foreign Ministry share the convention on this paragraph,

> The Montreux Convention, which is essential element in the context of Black Sea security and stability, has been properly and impartially implemented by Turkey for more than seven decades. In this regard, the successful implementation of the Montreux Convention since 1936 is a testimony of the balance carefully established by the Convention.[54]

The Montreux Convention was expected to remain in force for twenty years, not for seventy years.[55]

2. The Russian Influence and Transformation of the Policies

Russian influence in the Black Sea region began after the Turco-Russian War in 1774. Tsarist Russia had three targets on her territorial empire: 1) to be Orthodox Christian's Leader; 2) to establish and protect Slav brotherhood; 3) to enlarge the territorial space and sea power. For enlarging the sea power, the Black Sea was ready as a lake for Russian Empire. Thus, many wars with Ottoman were fatal reality. In the Balkans, on the coast of the Black Sea, regional states were also under the control of the Ottoman Empire.

Political changes and multi-conflicts in the first quarter of 20th century led to shock changes in the Black Sea region. Neither the Russian nor the

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53 H. Kanbolat et al, "The Montreux Convention and the Black Sea Geopolitics," *Eurasia Critic: Eurasian Intelligence and Strategies* (November 2008), http://www.eurasiacritic.com/articles/montruex-convention-and-black-sea-geopolitics, (06.08.2011).

54 Details of the Montreux Convention are shared widely by the Turkish Foreign Ministry's official web site. As understood from the articles and speeches, Turkey is aware of her advantages and applies its necessities carefully. See, www.mfa.gov.tr/implementation-of -the-montreux-convention.en.mfa

55 "Montreux Convention, Article 21," in Kanbolat.

Ottoman Empire survived. In a new framework, a more peaceful period began. First, Russian Soviet then Soviet Union protect the peaceful strategy in the Black Sea region as a main actor. Soviet Union has settled the Russian Navy in the Black Sea bays as Novorassisk in Krasnodar Kray.[56]

Irina Kobrinskaya (a researcher in Institute of World Economy and International Relations in Moscow) has written in her report about the Russia's vision and policy toward the Black Sea region in the two decades after the demise of Soviet Union;

Russia's vision and policy toward the Black Sea region (BSR) has gone through at least four stages:

- The 'initial phase': 1991 -1994, characterized by the emergence of armed ethnic conflicts, their 'freezing', and the establishment of a new post-Soviet status quo;
- The Chechen phase: 1995-2002, when Russia mainly viewed the situation in the BSR through the prism of the Chechen War;
- The 'recovery' period: 2003-2008, when Russia began acting along several dimensions. Though loosely connected in practice, these activities were marked early on as a high priority in Russia's strategy. As early as September 2003, then Russian President V. Putin referred to Azov-Black Sea region as a zone of Russia's 'strategic interests'. He stressed that the Black Sea provides Russia with a direct exit to its most important transport routes, and thus that an effective security system is needed for the region;
- New active regional strategy phase: August 2008-present, beginning with the five-day war in the Caucasus. [57]

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[56] The Soviet Navy, (Vayanna Marskoy Flot originally established in 1783), was based at the Karantinnaya and Streletskaya Bays in Sevastopol, and at Novorassisk in Krasnodar Kray. It possesses the vast majority as the Northern Fleet, Pacific Fleet, Black Sea Fleet, Baltic Fleet, Caspian Flotilla, Naval Aviation and the Coastal Troops. "State of Russian Navy: 2010: RussianArms," Russian Armed Forces-Ministry of Defence, Moscow, (2010).

[57] I. Kobrinskaya, "The Black Sea Region in Russia's Current Foreign Policy Paradigm,". *PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo* No.41 (Dec-2008).

A new Black Sea Region strategy is just one regional priority of Russian Foreign Policy[58]; but Irina Koblinskaya advance the argument that a new BSR strategy closely coincides with the main characteristics of Russian foreign policy[59].

Russia has been moving increasingly away from the West and is focused on maintaining regional hegemony. The Kremlin has been using Russia's recently acquired economic might, by virtue of the high oil prices and unprecedented demand for gas, to achieve its foreign policy goals. One of those goals is to become the world's primary supplier of energy resources. That requires a tight grip on the purchasing and distribution of the oil and gas resources of the former Soviet Union.[60]

Russia has turned a generous profit as the trade middleman between cheap Central Asian oil and gas, and energy-hungry economies in the West. By selling Central Asian oil and gas at a premium abroad, Russia has earned windfall profits and undertaken obligations to supply countries such as EU members and China well beyond its own abilities. The West is seeking to diversify sources and suppliers. US and EU plans to create new energy transit routes through Turkey have already caused some tension in global energy markets. Russia supplies more than seventy percent of Turkey's natural gas[61] and roughly forty percent of the EU's—a position that may be in jeopardy if the pipelines through Turkey are built using non-Russian sources of supply.[62]

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58 "Regional Priorities" of Russian Federation consists of 37 articles, and Black Sea region is only referred in Article 12. See, "The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation," *President of Russia Official Web Portal* 12.07.2008 http://archive.kremlin.ru/text/docs/2008/07/204750.shtml.

59 Kobrinskaya.

60 Vasiliev, p.6.

61 F. Hill and O. Taspinar, "Turkey and Russia: Axis of the Excluded?" *Survival* Vol.48, No.1 (Spring 2006) cited in A. Cohen and C. Irwin, "US Strategy in the Black Sea Region," The Heritage Foundation, 13 Dec. 2006.

62 Cohen and Irwin.

3. Political Changes in the Black Sea region: New Sovereign Countries and EU, NATO

After the Soviet period, the Black Sea region rearrange with the international organizations and new sovereign countries as Bulgaria, Rumania, Moldavia, Ukraine, Georgia. It was a great exchange and Russia was shocked against all of these changes. During the B. Yeltsin's period, Black Sea region countries were replaced active role in the international organizations and they shaped their foreign policies in the future. Rumania and Bulgaria had a time for selecting to be a member to EU and NATO and the other international organizations. But, Russia's political scene has continued to change were political change and at the end of 1999 V. Putin has become a new president. V. Putin received rigid policies on force and Russian foreign as well as interior-policy has changed volte face. Russian *realpolitik* return with V. Putin. Russia has shown the non-conciliatory face everywhere. At that period, Ukraine and Georgia could not aggrieve this chain. Although they had velvet revolutions; they turn out to be unsuccessful. Russia used all pressures for protecting her force on Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldavia in the Black Sea region. Last unforeseen event made by Georgian government, and Russia clearly use all her power in this war[63]. Ukraine's policy has changed from last quarter of 2008, and the winds have changed in favor of Russia.

By revitalizing its fleet and making political inroads in the region, the Kremlin hopes to reassert its strategic influence and thus putting US interests in potential jeopardy. Recent geopolitical events in Ukraine and the Caucasus region illuminate the strategic importance of the Black Sea to Russia and reenergized its efforts to creatively transform the Black Sea Fleet from a moribund flotilla into a viable force capable of conducting a wide array of maritime operations[64].

Thus, for example, Ognyan Minchev declared of the powers on the Black Sea region and in her comprehensive analysis[65] she has written that;

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63 Georgian Army, 08.08.2008.

64 J.A Mowchan, "Russia's Black Sea Threat". *US Naval Institute*, Vol.137/2 (Feb.2011).

65 O. Minchev, "Major Interests and strategies for the Black Sea Region," *Framework Analytical Review* (Sep. 2006), p. 10.

There are three groups of basic interests, represented in the Black Sea region of today. First, we have the interest of the West, divided quite explicitly between the US and the positions of the major continental European countries. Both Washington and the EU powers pursue strategies for change and transformation of the region around the Black Sea, motivated by different-only partially coinciding-policy agendas. Second, the interests of post-Soviet Russia and Turkey, getting closer and closer together in a block of the status quo powers in the Black Sea region. Third, we observe the interests of the smaller Black Sea countries (Ukraine included, even if its size does not correspond to the definition of a 'small country').[66]

Turkey and the Black Sea

Turkey is a key member of NATO, performing a viable role in the South Eastern Europe of the Western strategic realm. Turkey has not rejected US offers on enlarging cooperation in the Black Sea, although it is claiming to protect its rights and privileges based on the 1936 Montreux Convention. For protecting its present cooperation with Russia, Turkey accepted to buy expensive natural gas from Russia through Blue Stream.

The Blue Stream gas pipeline is designed to transit Russian natural gas to Turkey across the Black Sea, by passing third countries. The pipeline supplements the existing gas transmission corridor from Russia to Turkey crossing the territory of Moldova, Bulgaria and Ukraine. The pipeline was completed in December 2002. In Feb.2003, commercial gas started flowing through the pipeline. In 2007 Blue Steam supplied some 9.5 bcm of gas, with 7 bcm conveyed in 2006. In 2010, Blue Steam gas pipeline reached its design capacity of 16bcm per year.[67] As we see, this pipeline connects not only energy supply, at the same time Turkish-Russian co-partnership.

The Blue Stream Gas Pipeline (BSGP) from Russia snakes along the bottom of the Black Sea and resurfaces in the Turkish port of Samsun. Opened in 2003, BSGP was due to deliver 10 billion cubic meters of gas in

66 Minchev.

67 www.russianenergy.com/en/company/2031/blue_stream (06.08.2011).

2007, with its full capacity of 16 billion cubic meters scheduled to be reached in 2010. Russia has been exploring the option of increasing the BSGP's capacity to 32 billion cubic meters a year with the aim of selling the gas on to Europe and perhaps forestalling the Nabucco pipeline through which the Europeans want to import Caspian, Central Asian and perhaps one day Iranian gas without crossing Russian territory.[68]

For Turkey security concept of the Black Sea consists of the maritime domain and the land of the countries from the Organization of the BSEC (Black Sea Economic Cooperation)—of which only six of these countries are littoral states[69]. BSEC was established at a time when a new era of peace and security was taking shape in Europe and beyond on the basis of the principles laid down in the Helsinki Final Act, in the follow-up CSCE documents and in the Charter of Paris. The BSEC based on universally shared values such as democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms, prosperity through economic liberty and social justice, and equal security for all the participating states. It aims at ensuring that the Black Sea becomes as sea of peace, stability and prosperity, striving to promote friendly and good-neighborly relations[70]. In recent years, BSEC has increasingly been the subject of criticism in Turkey. The organization is losing its former appeal for Turkey, and Turkey as a regional power preferred an economical profit sharing with Russia. By this way Turkey would turn its back and forgot that it is a member of transatlantic organizations. This type of connection created by Russia for maintaining the Russian influence in the Black Sea region. It is so logical and profitable for Russia; and USA and EU could not find a dissolve and finished the Russian monopoly in the oil and gas supply from Caspian Basin and Central Asian resources. In some political speeches, told about Game theory and one of the types of games named by 'infinitely long games'. This game has a winning strategy and outcomes are so clear, 'win' and 'lose'. Russia plays this game and just focused one goal: National interest. For reaching this goal, Russia can use all energy, all possibilities—although not moral, not

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68 K. Barysch, "Turkey's Role in European Energy Security," *Centre for European Reform*-London (December, 2007), p. 3.

69 Karadeniz, p. 97.

70 E. Ozer, "The Black Sea Economic Cooperation and Regional Security," *Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs* (1997), p. 8.

symmetric power—for winning this game. By this way, we can understand to 'democratic rights', 'humanism' and also protecting the regional people.

Conclusion

The Black Sea region is bound to grow not only in strategic importance but will also come increasingly into the focus of public attention in the second decade of the 21st century.[71] Russia also well learned to create new strategies with use of the different tools for arguing her influence in the Black Sea.

In addition to Russia's oil and gas concerns in the former Soviet republics, the Kremlin is trying to rebuild its sphere of influence to the South. It has exerted tremendous political pressure on Western-leaning states, such as Georgia, and rewarded states that have remained loyal to Russia, such as Armenia, Ukraine falls under both categories[72]. All US based strategists—not only US citizens, from Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Georgia strategists—are working hard to figure out how to beat Russia at its own game[73]; the Chess Board game has survived by the senior researchers with new tools, new annexes. But Caucasia and Black Sea region is not so smooth and one dimensional platform for playing and winning the game. The US need to rethink what anchoring means in practice and sustain to their theories. In the 1990s, it meant pursuing membership in NATO and the EU roughly in parallel. But European common foreign policy on security and energy did not work. As well, European states preferred to their own policies on energy and security on a bilateral connections[74] with Russia. European states had direct diplomatic relations with Russian presidency.[75]

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71 D. Grotzky and M. Isic, "The Black Sea Region: Clashing Identities and Risks to European Stability," *Center for Applied Policy Research* (Oct. 2008), p. 4.

72 Cohen and Irwin.

73 Z. Baran, "EU Energy Security: Time to End Russian Leverage," *The Washington Quarterly*, (Autumn 2007), p 139.

74 The Sochi Meeting between V. Putin and A. Merkel's on 21-22.01.2007 was a good sample. V. Putin as Russia's president use two million euro from the federation's national budget just for this diplomatic meeting. Two leaders did not hide their friendship and close partnerships. In 2007, A. Merkel and V. Putin met face-to-face four times. Conversational subjects are energy-security, oil-pipeline

Generally V. Putin criticized on using the power for solving the issues on the Black Sea region by the western strategists, journalists as B. Yeltsin's Chechen strategy. But, last President of Russian Federation, D. Medvedev also protects the same position in his speech, "My first priority is Russia's interests…."[76]

As also I. Kolbinskaya mentioned in her report, Russian foreign policy on the Black Sea region based on principles of realpolitik and it is clearly geo-economically and geo-strategically motivated. The Russian foreign policy also reshaped by the presidency of Russia on his hidden and open motives. At this moment, its visible that Russian foreign policies use new tools under its command. Russia is the main actor in CIS, BRIC, CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization) UN, ASEAN, SCO, OSCE, EurAsEC, Troika. Russia prefers to make one to one contacts in the energy sector or other areas.

In recent years, especially after the Iraq intervention, oil prices have increased, and this case give a high profit chance to Russia. Actually, neither USA nor his coalition partners could not give a chance like this to her. During the Iraq war, Russia focused to increase all energy corridor maps, pipelines, recoordination. Energy-hungry developed countries—many of them from EU—regarded Russia's advantages on energy supply. Unfortunately, after this Russia it will not so easy give up on her dominant position in the energy sector. Even the Soviet period, USA was so feel indisposed; now it seems to keep going for long term.

First of all, Russia prefers to 'regionalism'; political decisions, plans can be coordinated, reshaped, changed by Russian Presidency. Now, Russia plays again 'win or lose' game; but just for her advantage not as a win-win strategic result. Like this game and results, Russia plays main-powerful role in the Black Sea region; if out of region powers can use power of suggestion,

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capacities and transit passes and closed with 'close quartet' as Russia, USA, EU ,UN. Yevgeni Yevgeniyevich Grigoryev, Strategichesky,'Tesny i dolgasrochniy'. www.ng.ru/world/2007-01-23/12_merkel.html (06.08.2011).

75 After the meeting, A. Merkel and V. Putin declared that they are 'strategic partners' on energy sector. Russia guaranteed to supply energy to Germany for long years in all conditions. Natalya Melikova, www.ng.ru/politics/2007-01-22_illumination.html.

76 archive.kremlin.ru/eng/articlesarticle200253.shtml (06.08.2011).

Russia receive them accurately. After coordination of regional programs, Russia turn her face to the world. Russia is so careful for protecting its high advantages on national interests. Euro-Atlantic powers can create multi-functional partnerships, but it is so hard in this period. Distinguishing feature of Russian foreign policy in the Black Sea is its multi-vectored and balanced character

Just on appliance, Russia wants to protect her geopolitical role as the largest Eurasian power, and add some extraordinary shows to the world.[77] It seems that external factors and external actors and conditions may not influence Russia's Black Sea policy behavior and strategic orientation (including Caspian energy policy, the situation in Caucasian states, relations with the West, regional problems and so on) that are certain and indispensable, and thus difficult to predict in medium-term future.

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[77] During the Chechen war, Russian troops are extremely advantageous due to the Chechen armament; but Russia preferred to use very heavy destroy new troops for two reasons: want to make a show in the region and try to find new weapons market.

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The Road to Peace in the Black Sea Region: Through Parity or Preponderance?

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Realist theories of International Relations have accorded a major place to dyadic capability distributions in explaining war and peace dynamics among states. With regards to the effect of power distributions on the occurrence or absence of war, there are two competing propositions: "Balance of Power Theory" proposes that an equal distribution of power among dyads (pairs if states) prevents war, whereas "Power Transition Theory" argues that power parity leads to war. These two opposing arguments clearly present a challenge not only at the theoretical level, but also at the level of policy.

It is important to point out to the major factors/determinants of the international system at the present. The first observation in this regard is the relative increase in the importance of geopolitical factors, combined with a relative decline in the importance of ideological ones in inter-state relations in this new international system. In addition, the economic and technological aspects of power have become as important as the military and political ones.

Furthermore, it is possible to argue that the international system in formation appears to be sub-system dominant. Under bipolarity, especially when the system was highly polarized, the systemic factors heavily affected the sub-systems. In other words, sub-systems were not likely to be autonomous from the international system. This situation has changed in the new international system, however. It is not possible anymore to analyze sub-systemic relations using a systemic factor, such as the US-USSR rivalry. For example, factors such as ethnic and religious/denominational composition and existing power structure gain importance in analyzing recent events in

the Middle East. The same can also be said of other regions that possess subsystem characteristics like the Balkans, the Caucasus, and South Asia.

It is possible to observe the balance of power system at work in the subsystems, as long as they are independent from the intrusion of the multipolar structure of the international system. This system, which we label as interest-based balance of power, has been showing its impact on regional politics, especially with the removal of the ideological aspect of the Cold War. Absent the intrusion of the international hierarchy, we expect to find war and peace dynamics among the dyad nations in the Black Sea Region to follow either the Balance of Power or the Power Transition propositions, and we investigate this question for the post-Cold War era.

Power Distributions and War: Power Transition Theory

Power Transition theory in its original formulation pertained to the interactions among only the most powerful states in the world at a given time and the system changing wars (Organski 1958, Organski and Kugler 1980). The theory's assumptions differ from the Balance of Power Theory. Whereas balance of power theory assumes the international system to be anarchic, power transition theory assumes a hierarchical international system.

In stark contrast to the balance of power theory (Morgenthau 1948, Waltz 1979), power transition theory proposes that power parity, not preponderance, leads to conflict. The most powerful state (the defender) is in time confronted by a contender (the challenger) for dominance of the international system. The transition leads to conflict if the challenger is dissatisfied with the international order; and otherwise it leads to a peaceful takeover.

This logic was applied to other pairs of states, despite the explicit limited scope of the original formulation. First, the domain of the theory was extended to include all great power dyads (Houwelling and Siccama 1988; Kim 1989; Gochman 1990). Then the extension in time from the original 1816-1975 period to 1648-1992 came (Kim 1992). The temporal extension rests on relaxing the restriction on internal growth through industrialization as the only method to augment power and letting power augmentation through alliances as well.

Despite the application of power transition logic to other dyads, there was not a theoretical framework until Lemke's works (1996, 2000). Lemke's "multiple hierarchies" model the international system as being composed of several nested hierarchies with the international hierarchy at the top. The regional hierarchies are identical with the international hierarchy: They, too, have dominant, great, and lesser powers within, and they operate under the same structural factors power transition theory asserts. Power parity and dissatisfaction with the status quo lead to increased probability of conflict.

The latest extension of the theory is the inclusion of cooperation dynamics as well as that of conflict, and of the effect of the power distribution in a region between the defender and the next four powerful states. Efird theoretically and empirically shows that the power transition logic can also be used to explain integration and that power preponderance by regional defenders reduce the probability of conflict. (Efird, 2001)

To sum up, at its core, power transition theory argues and empirically demonstrates that dyadic power parity and dissatisfaction with the status quo increase the probability of conflict among pairs of states.

The Black Sea Region

In this study, we use the member states of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization for our population of cases. However, there have been debates on the definition of the Black Sea region, as well as the appropriateness of the notion of the Black Sea as a region with a distinct identity, and they need to be addressed before moving on to our inquiry.

One view is that the Black Sea Region did not have an identity in the past. This view argues that contrary to the Baltic Sea, a general identity was not born out of the Black Sea concept. The term Black Sea has been accepted by the littoral states in the last two centuries. The nation-state, in its attempts at the creation of national identity, has prevented the occurrence of a regional identity. All the nation-states in the region have excluded the Black Sea from their national identity. None of the littoral states have their capital cities bordering the Black Sea. In short, nation-states surrounding the Black Sea have formed their identity by moving away from the Black Sea (King 2008, 5). Thus, this view contends that the region denotes a "relationship" not an identity, where the notion of relationship refers to whether a region has been

formed politically, economically, or strategically. From this perspective, the dense relationships in the Black Sea region have declined in the last two centuries.

Others argue that the Black Sea region has been created for political purposes. In this sense, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization was founded for regional cooperation after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Now, the region is defined by the West to serve the following objectives: to help states like Ukraine and Georgia in their unification efforts with the Euro-Atlantic or to organize relations with those states that are not ready for such unification yet (Trenin 2008, 108-111).

Another view proposes that the region was created artificially in line with the interests of the great powers. The common interest for the region in the post-Soviet era is security, not the improvement of trade (Weihe 2006, 31).

Those who argue that the Black Sea cannot be treated as a region view its historical background, multi-ethnic structure, and disputed issues as hindering unification, geography being the only unifying factor. Yet, they point out to the existence of a relative unity (King 2004, 13-27).

We take the region to be in lieu with the countries of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization. Although there may be problems in the identity of the region due to different histories of the countries, the organization represents an attempt to leave these behind and create at the least an environment for the mutual understanding by providing a diplomatic forum for the member states in which confidence-building measures can be taken. We are in agreement with Aybak's (2001) evaluation that the region can be considered one given a medium-term approach (2-3).

Research Design and Empirical Analysis

In its latest formulation, power transition theory's logic applies to minor power dyadic interactions as well. Thus, we set out to test whether power preponderance or power parity leads to war among the dyads in the Black Sea region. We test the proposition that war is a function of power parity.

The unit of analysis is annual observations of the dyads in the Black Sea region. The temporal domain of the study is the period 1992-2001. We take 11 of the 12 countries that are members of the Black Sea Economic

Cooperation Organization. Serbia is excluded from this list since it became a member in 2006, and our data runs only through 2001.

The dependent variable is the occurrence or absence of interstate war among the Black Sea Region dyads. Correlates of War (COW) project defines disputes as war when military conflicts lead to 1000 battle fatalities, or 100 troops are deployed (Small and Singer 1982). The measure is frequently used in conflict research.

Since the dependent variable is dichotomous we use logistic analysis. Logistic analysis provides the effect of each independent variable on the logs of the odds ratio of the dependent variable. Data for the dependent and explanatory variables come from EUGENE (Scott and Stam 2000).

Our explanatory variable is power parity. Following Danilovic and Clare (2007) we operationalize the variable as follows:

$$\text{Power Parity} = 1 - \text{abs}\,|(\text{power (A)} - \text{power (B)} / (\text{power (A)} + \text{power (B)}|$$

Where: power (A): Country A's capability

power (B): Country B's capability

The values of the measure range from 0 (exact disparity) to 1 (exact parity), with higher values indicating the dyad members are closer in relative power. We expect the coefficient of this variable to be significant and to have a positive sign.

Table 1. Parity and War

Variable	Coefficients
Parity	3.631* (1.869)
Constant	-6.741*** (1.377)
Number of observations	495
Model chi-Square	4.52**

NOTE: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01 (one-tailed t-tests)

Table 1 shows the empirical results. The model chi-square of 4.52 is significant at the 5 % level with a p-value of .03, which tells us that our model as a whole fits better than a model with no predictors. In other words, the probability of obtaining this chi-square statistic (4.52) is less than 5 % if the independent variable has no effect on the dependent variable. The coefficient for the power parity variable takes the expected positive sign, and statistically significant at the 10 % level with a p-value of .057—just slightly shy of being significant at the 5 % level.

We take this finding to be encouraging. The logistic regression penalizes datasets with small numbers of observations, and unavailability of data prevents us from using a larger data set. Moreover, power transition theory places an equally important emphasis on satisfaction/dissatisfaction with the status quo in explaining no war/war outcomes. Status quo evaluations complement relative power distributions in explaining war and peace dynamics in dyadic interactions. Yet, we are unable to add the dissatisfaction variable due to data limitations.

Conclusion and Further Research

We test whether power parity or power preponderance leads to war among dyads in the Black Sea Region. We find tentative support for the Power Transition Theory's proposition that parity in national capabilities increases the probability of war among dyads. The model tested is statistically significant, and the explanatory variable, power parity, is significant and carries the expected positive sign.

However, there are some caveats. First, there is the issue of data limitations. The hostility data is available between 1992 and 2001. The number of observations is low as a result, which in turn negatively affects logistic regression.

More importantly, we run into the problem of not being able to use a measure for status quo evaluations. The most important issue for international politics, as well as the power transition research program, seems to be that of status quo evaluations. Although several measures have been used to gauge satisfaction levels, a theoretical framework on a causal explanation of status quo evaluations has been absent. Moreover, there is also a need for a measure that takes into account the different levels of status quo

evaluations. As Danilovic and Clare (2007) point out, with power transition logic being applied not only at the systemic level but on regional and local levels as well, the status quo evaluation variable needs to be able to differentiate among a state's satisfaction / dissatisfaction with the international order, with the order in its region and in regions it has interest in, and with the order in its dyadic interactions.

We consider this study as a first step for further research. We contend that the results encourage further research in exploring dyadic interactions in the region using the Power Transition Theory.

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APPENDIX A.

COUNTRY LIST

ALBANIA, ARMENIA, AZERBEIJAN, BULGARIA, GEORGIA, GREECE, MOLDOVA, ROMANIA, RUSSIA, TURKEY, UKRAINE

International Relations in the Black Sea: A Review of Turkish - Ukrainian Case

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The most important feature of the Black Sea Region is its closeness to Balkans, Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Middle East. Therefore, throughout the history, the ruling nations of the region and the world have set the goal of ruling the region and keeping it under their control as their strategic aim. The fact that the Black Sea Region has been the target of many different empires (the Roman, Byzantine, Russian and Ottoman Empires etc.) throughout the history is the sharpest proof of that. (Özbay, 2010; Baran, 2008: 87) Since the 18th century, when the region became the center of the conflict between the Ottoman and the Russian empire, the Ottoman's official entry into the World War I by bombing the Russian battleships and the harbors in the Black Sea, the acceleration of the Tsarist Russia's disappearance process because no support was received from the Black Sea after the Çanakkale war in 1915, are some of the examples that show how significant this region is for the world balance in recent and the ancient history. (Özbay, 2010)

Geopolitical and the geostrategic location, different underground sources and the potential population of the Black Sea region have turned it into a significant strategic, economic, transportational and political center. Also, the region plays an important role in use of military force. The role of the countries having an expansionist policy in this area in moving the power through this sea and the role of the Turkish straits in the military strategies indicate the militarily importance of the Black Sea region. (Koca, 2010: 74-76) We could also state that the regional and the global powers of the 20th century have produced different policies and strategies devoted to the Black

Sea. In this respect, we will try to present you the policies of the Russian Federation, USA, EU and Turkey about this region in the following part.

During the Cold War period, according to the general paradigm of the policy of the Soviet Union for the Black Sea, the aforesaid sea had to be closed to the battleships of the countries that are not riparian. As a consequence of that strategy, this sea was almost counted as blocked to the other countries during the Cold War period. All of the countries riparian to the Black Sea except Turkey were a part of the Warsaw Pact. In the period until the destruction of the Berlin Wall and the falling apart of the Soviet Union, lots of district changes took place. As a result of this, the Black Sea region began to be open to the world. (Özbay, 2010)

In that period, some events such as new policies of the USA about the Black Sea, some establishments, like NATO and EU, policies of expansions in the countries located in the region and colorful revolutions experienced in some coastal countries (Ukraine and Georgia) indicate the new international and regional jeopardy/balance that Russia has faced recently. In this new period, the policy of Russia in this region has been described as ineffective and reactive. The reasons of the passiveness in the policy of Russia to some extent are the new balances like increasing interest of the EU, USA and the NATO in the region after the September 11th and colorful revolutions. However, the recent conjuncture has been forcing Russia under the government of Putin/ Medvedev to create new policies about the region. The attitude of Russia towards the Georgian crisis was a response of the Russian governors to the expansionist, containment and surrounding policies of the west in this region. (*see* Arıdemir, 2011: 136)

During the occurrence of the new conjuncture after the Cold War period, the USA and the EU, except for the Russian Federation and Turkey, started to be interested in the region closely. In the USA's strategies, the borders of the Black Sea haven't been limited only with the riparian countries, including an area extending from the Central Asia to the Balkans. According to these strategies, with the end of the Cold War and because of the existence of geostrategic and geopolitical power gap, it has been needed to fill this gap by the USA and the EU factors. According to the exterior policy of the USA, the Black Sea region's closeness to the world's most important energy sources shows that it has a significant strategic location. Some factors such as the region's becoming the connection of the energy in the strategy importance in

the recent years and its potential for playing an active role with the west in struggling with the facts like terrorism after the September 11th attacks, highly affected the Black Sea for having an important place in the USA's foreign policy. As a result, the USA have been taking important steps in the integration of the countries in this region to the west (especially NATO) and so weakening the influence of Russia. (Özbay, 2010; *see* Arıdemir, 2011: 103-115) We can state that the policy of the EU for the Black Sea is new comparing to the other regions (Adriatic and Baltic Sea, etc.).

However, strategic steps such as the EU taking steps for factoring on a global scale and that some countries from the Black Sea region like Romania and Bulgaria becoming members of this union, affects the Black Sea region for importantly taking part in the vision of the foreign policy of the EU. The European Contiguity Policy and Broader Europe policy, the SYNERGY Program for the cooperation in the energy field, the platform called Black Sea Euroregion, the Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe project and TRACECA project are the most obvious indicators of EU's policies for this region. Even if the policies of the EU for the Black Sea region are matching with those of the USA, they often coincide with Russia. (Isic, 2008; Arıdemir, 2011: 99-103; Özbay, 2010)

When it comes to the Black Sea policy of Turkey, we need to state that in the consideration of Turkish political elite, the region has had an important and strategic location throughout the history. Turkey's role in the Black Sea region has been increasing day by day with the end of the Cold War period, even though the fact that during the Cold War period, the Black Sea policy of the Turkish foreign policy had a passive image because of the conditions of the two-sided world of the age. In the period after the Cold War, the principles that determine the policy of Turkey for the region are as follow: increasing the welfare and the stability, ensuring the peace, not supporting the separatist acts, maintaining the territorial integrity, founding of economic associations and turning the place into an attractive commercial center etc. Turkey's leading and active role in many regional organizations and initiatives in the Black Sea (like the role of Turkey in KEİÖ and BLACKSEAFOR etc.), is the sharpest proof of the above mentioned policy. (Özbay, 2010; Koca, 2010: 78; Arıdemir, 2011: 161) The successful implementation of the principles noted above, will considerably affect the position of Turkey in the International arena.

Turkish-Ukrainian Relations: Politics, Crimea, Global/Regional Cooperation and Economy

In the Turkish foreign policy Ukraine is considered as one of the most important countries in the Black Sea region. The strategic situation of this country in the Black Sea and Eastern Europe, its economic potential, its situation on the energy routes considering that 80 % of the Russian gas goes to Europe via this country, the situation of Crimea within the borders of this country, and its cooperation with Turkey in many regional initiatives, are some of the factors that make the Ukrainian State important for the Turkish foreign policy. At the same time the increasing influence of Turkey in Balkans, Middle East and Central Asian regions, and its important role in the Black Sea region after the Cold War, has made Turkey an important part for the Ukrainian Foreign Policy (Özdal, 2012)

When Ukraine declared its independency and approved this declaration with a referendum, shortly after, this declaration was recognized by Turkey (16 December 1991). Turkish-Ukrainian political relations were established on the 3rd of February 1992. Following this date many agreements and protocols were signed between these two countries in the fields of politics, law, economy, military, education and culture. At the same time, mutual visits in the level of Presidents, Prime Ministers and Ministers of Foreign Affairs have been a big contribution in developing the bilateral relations between both countries. At the beginning of the 2000s the bilateral relations were accelerated considerably. In the year of 24-25 January 2011, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey Mr. Erdoğan was in Ukraine for an official visit and during this visit the Turkish-Ukrainian High Level Strategic Council (Türkiye-Ukrayna YDSK) was established, by raising the mutual relations to a strategic relations position. The first meeting of this Council was held during the official visit of the Ukrainian President Yanukovych in Turkey (22 December 2011) where important steps were taken for the Visa Exemption and Free Trade negotiations between two countries. Under the aforementioned Council, the Associate Strategic Planning Group (Ortak Stratejik Planlama Grubu-OSPG) was established and its purpose is to undertake the important role of developing the economic and cultural aspects of the regional and international topics in the bilateral relations. (www.avrasyamerkezi.okan.edu.tr/ 27.08.2012; www.kirimdernegi.org.tr/ 28.08.2012; Özdal, 2012)

Another important feature of the recent bilateral relations is the change in the aforementioned relations. Turkey has been supporting the efforts of Ukraine to join NATO since 2004, and after 2010 has venerated the Foreign Policy of Ukraine. However, according to some assessments, Turkish foreign politics towards Ukraine in the recent period is not balanced and is supportive towards pro-American political movements in this country. (Özdal, 2012; Sel, 2010)

One of the most important elements in the Turkish-Ukrainian relations is the Crimean Tatars. In order to understand the special interest of Turkey on the Crimean Tatars we have to look deeply into history. The 1 million Crimean Tatars living in Turkey and the situation of Autonomous Republic of Crimea within the borders of Ukraine plays the bridge role for the bilateral relations. According to the Turkish Foreign Policy it is important for the Crimean Tatars in Ukraine to be integrated and live as loyal citizens of that country. (Özdal, 2012; Sel, 2010) In this aspect, for the Crimean Tatars forced to leave their lands during Stalin's time, Turkish Republic has helped supporting them to go back to their lands not only by diplomatic statements but also by building habitations and developing their infrastructure. (Dağlı, 2009: 52-53)

The active bilateral role undertaking in the international and regional foundations is another important dimension of Turkish-Ukrainian relations. Both of the countries, besides their active roles in OSCE, EC and NATO, are taking roles also in regional economic initiatives like Black Sea Organization for Economic Cooperation (Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization-BSEC); in nature protection initiatives like the Convention of Protect the Black Sea against Pollution-Brussels Convention, Black Sea Strategic Planning Commission (KSEP), Black Sea Memorandum and in military initiatives and cooperation like NATO-Ukraine Commission Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group BLACKSEAFOR and Operation Black Sea Harmony-OBSH. (www.mfa.gov.tr/ 02.09.2012; Paçal, 2007: 77-92; Dağlı, 2009: 176-191)

The economical and trade relations between Turkey and Ukraine start on the 4th of May 1992 with the first assigned agreement and on the 20th of April 1994 when the Trade and Economical Cooperation agreement started to operate. On the following times mutual important economical agreements and trade protocols were signed. (www. musavırlıkler.gov.tr/ 05.09.2012)

Latterly we can say that the economic and trade capacity between Turkey and Ukraine has accelerated. However, because of the world economic crisis, this capacity has started to decrease and only after 2010 this capacity started to increase again. We can say that Turkish companies and holdings are very active in Ukraine. Companies like Doğuş, Altınbaş, Enka, Aysel and Çukurova are investing in many sectors, and Turkish entrepreneurs' total investment is more than 3 billion dollars in this country. Turkey is in the 6th place when it comes to Ukraine's big trade partners, and it is the 3rd in export after Russian Federation and Germany (www.mfa.gov.ua/ 06.09.2012; www.musavırlıkler.gov.tr/ 05.09.2012; www.mfa.gov.tr/ 04.09.2012).

	2004	**2005**	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**
Volume	2352	2642	3159	4622	6583	3079	4324
Exports	1941	2034	2390	3650	4633	2127	3026
Imports	411	607	769	972	1950	952	1298
Balance	1530	1427	1621	2630	2683	1174	1728

In conclusion, Turkey's policy towards Ukraine is generally balanced, however, Turkish foreign politics can be criticized because of its' inclination towards pro-western oriented opposition in Ukraine. Crimean Tatars are an important element for the Turkey-Ukrainian bilateral relations. The acting together of both countries in regional and international organizations creates a very important dimension for the mutual relations. The trade and economic relations between two countries are quite strong despite the world economic crisis in the late years. However, considering the potential of both countries, it is obvious that these relations are not good enough. Our suggestion is that the economic relations between Turkey and Ukraine should develop according to both countries capacities.

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Çok Kutupluluk Tartışmaları ve Karadeniz Havzası'nın Bölgesel Görünümü

(Debates on Multipolarity and the Regional Outlook of the Blacksea Basin)

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Giriş

Soğuk Savaş'ın sona ermesi ile birlikte, ABD ve SSCB üzerinden ifadesini bulan ve uluslararası ilişkilere yön veren sistemsel çift kutupluluk da sona ermiştir. Soğuk Savaş'ın sona ermesini, "tarihin sonu" olarak okuyan ve ABD'yi tek süper güç olarak ilan ederek, onun sistemsel hegemonyasına ve düzenleyiciliğine dayalı olarak işleyecek bir çağa adım attığımızı ilan eden yaklaşımın geçerliliği ise, bugün itibarıyla, ciddi bir tartışma konusu haline gelmiştir. ABD'nin, özellikle ekonomik, teknolojik ve askeri anlamda kaynaklarının sınırlı olması ve dünyanın çeşitli coğrafyalarında beliren bölgesel güçlerin her geçen gün ABD'nin sistemsel hegemonyasına karşı kendi varlıklarının/etkinliklerinin altını çizecek politikalar izliyor oluşu, Soğuk Savaş sonrasında ABD'nin liderliğine/hegemonyasına dayalı bir tek kutupluluğun kurumsallaştırılacağına ilişkin öngörülerin geçerliliğini azaltmıştır. Mevcut konjonktürde, evrimsel bir gelişim çizgisinde de olsa, çok kutupluluk ekseninde şekillenecek bir uluslararası sistemin doğuşuna tanıklık ediyoruz.

Karadeniz Havzası, gerek sahip olduğu ekonomik, ticari ve demografik potansiyel, gerek bünyesinde barındırdığı enerji kaynakları, gerekse de enerji zengini ve dolayısıyla sistemsel güç mücadelesine sahne olan coğrafyalara komşu olması gibi nedenlerle çok önemli bir kırılma noktasını ifade etmektedir. Karadeniz Havzası'nın, Soğuk Savaş döneminde, SSCB'nin sistemsel hegemonyasına tabi olduğunu unutmamak gerekir. Soğuk Savaş sonrasında ise, özellikle havzanın batısında yer alan Balkanlar coğrafyasının AB'nin üyeliğinin de katkısıyla Batılı değerleri içselleştirme konusunda büyük bir mesafe kat ettiğini söyleyebiliriz. Ne var ki, havzanın geneli için aynı şeyi söylemek mümkün değildir. Zira Karadeniz Havzası, ABD

önderliğindeki Batı'nın sistemsel hegemonyasına karşı çıkan ve çok kutupluluk bağlamında bir uluslararası sistem arzuladığını her ortamda açıkça ifade eden Rusya'nın "arka bahçesi"dir. Türkiye ise, Karadeniz'i kendi sistemsel rolünün altını doldurmak ve uluslararası sistemin işleyişine etki etmek amacıyla kullanmak istemektedir. Bu çerçevede, Karadeniz Havzası'nın çok aktörlü bir bölgesel/sistemsel altyapıya sahip olduğu anlaşılabilecektir. Karadeniz Havzası'nın, tek kutupluluktan çok kutupluluğa geçiş bağlamında süregelen tartışmalar çerçevesinde, önemli bir örnek olarak incelenebileceği ortadadır.

Bu çalışma; tek kutupluluk, hegemonya ve çok kutupluluk gibi kavramların üzerinde durduktan sonra, Karadeniz Havzası'nın güncel görünümünü değerlendirecek ve havzanın sistemsel çok kutupluluk tartışmalarına nasıl bir etkide bulunduğunu ya da bu tartışmalardan nasıl etkilendiğini ele alacaktır.

Tek Kutupluluk, Hegemonya ve Çok Kutupluluk Tartışmaları

Tek kutupluluk, uluslararası sistemde belirleyici tek bir gücün varlığının altını çizmektedir. Bu bağlamda tek kutupluluk ile hegemonya arasındaki farkın da ortaya konması gerekmektedir. Hegemonya, sistem içerisindeki aktörlerin birbirleriyle olan siyasal ilişkilerine ve birbirlerini etkileme kapasitesine ilişkin bir kavram iken, tek kutupluluk maddi gücün dağılımına atıf yapan bir husustur.

Tek kutupluluk; aktörlerin kendi güçlerini ortaya koyabilmek için sahip olmayı arzuladıkları maddi unsurların çok büyük bir bölümünü kontrolü altında tutan ve bir devletin, devlet olması için gereken unsurlardan nüfusun büyüklüğü ve işlevselliği, kaynakları etkin bir şekilde işleyebilme yeteneği, ekonomik ve askeri güç ile örgütsel yeterlilik konusunda ileri düzeye varmış devletleri/aktörleri ifade edebilmek için kullanılan sistemsel bir tanımlamadır.[78] Tek kutuplu uluslararası sistemde, bahsettiğimiz tüm bu faktörleri içselleştirmiş tek bir devlet, sistemi istediği şekilde düzenleme yeteneğine sahiptir. Uluslararası sistem içerisindeki diğer aktörler, kendi dış politikalarını ve birbirleriyle olan ilişkilerini, sistemi düzenleyecek ve

[78] William C. Wohlforth, "Unipolarity, Status Competition and Great Power War," *World Politics*, LXI/1, 2009, s. 28-57.

denetleyecek güce sahip olan bu gücün kararlarına uygun bir şekilde düzenlemek zorundadırlar.[79]

Tek kutupluluk, çift kutupluluk ya da çok kutupluluk gibi tanımlamaların realist/neorealist teorisyenlerce ortaya konmuş ya da yaratılmış birer kavramsal çerçeve olduklarını da unutmamak gerekir.[80] Nitekim uluslararası ilişkileri ya da sistemi anlamlandırmak için kullanılan "kutup" kavramının devletlerarasındaki kaynak dağılımı ve kapasite farklılığını daha etkin bir şekilde gösterebilmek için kullanıldığını da görmek gerekir. Tek kutupluluk kavramı incelenirken 3 önemli faktörün göz önünde bulundurulması gerekmektedir.[81] Bunlardan birincisi, tek kutup olma anlayışını içselleştirmiş devletin/aktörün tutumudur. Bu aktörün, sistem içerisindeki davranışlarını ve politikalarını etkileyen en önemli hususlar ise onun gücünü etkileyebilecek sınırlamalar ve fırsatlar çerçevesinde nasıl hareket ettiğidir. Hatta iç politika çerçevesindeki gelişmeler, istikrar ve siyasal kurumların/aktörlerin rolü de tek kutup pozisyonundaki devletin/aktörün etkin politikaları izleyebilmesine etki etmektedir. Kurumsal tutarlılığa sahip, kendi toplumunca meşru görülen bir siyasal sistem yapılandırmış ve sahip olunan gücü daha da etkin kullanabilme ya da sahip olunan sistemsel istikrarı devam ettirebilme yönünde hareket eden siyasal aktörler/grupların rol oynadığı devletler/aktörler, tek kutup haline gelmiş devletlerin bu rollerine istikrar kazandırabilecektir.

Tek kutupluluk anlayışına eklemlenmesi gereken ikinci önemli faktör ise, uluslararası sistem içerisinde yer alan diğer devletlerin düşünce, yaklaşım ve politikalarıdır. E.H.Carr, uluslararası sisteme hâkim olan istikrarın ve tek kutup konumundaki aktörün bu pozisyonunu koruyabilmesinin, sistem içerisindeki diğer devletlerin, sistemsel istikrardan ne denli memnun olduklarına bağlı olduğunu kaydetmektedir.[82] Robert Gilpin ise, uluslararası sistem içerisindeki diğer aktörlerin, tek kutup konumundaki aktöre yönelik politikalarının kazanç-maliyet ekseni üzerinde hareket ettiğini belirtmektedir.

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79 John J. Ikenberry, "Unipolarity, State Behavior, and Systemic Consequences," *World Politics*, LXI/1, 2009, s. 1-27.

80 Kenneth Waltz, "Uluslararası Politikanın Değişen Yapısı," *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, V/17, 2008, s. 3-44.

81 Ikenberry, *a.g.m.*, s. 1-27.

82 Michael Fox, "E.H. Carr and the Crisis of Twentieth-Century Liberalism," *Millennium: Journal of International Relations*, XXXVIII/3, 2010, s. 1-11.

Yani, sistemin işleyişi çerçevesinde elde edilen kazanç maliyetin altında kalırsa, diğer aktörler sistemsel istikrarı değiştirmek için eyleme geçmektedirler. Bu çerçevede, sisteme hâkim olan gücün, diğer aktörlerin kazançlarına istikrar getiren ve riskleri azaltarak sistemin devamlılığını sağlayan devlet/aktör olduğu söylenebilir.[83]

Uluslararası sisteme hâkim olan güç, uluslararası ticaret bağlamında serbest pazar ekonomisinin işleyişini sağlama konusunda diğer devletler nezdinde ne denli etkin olursa, sistemsel rolü o kadar güçlenmektedir. Uluslararası alanda işbirliğinin, dominant gücün etkinliğine ve politikalarına bağlı olduğu söylenebilir. Tek kutup konumundaki sistemsel aktör, sahip olduğu ekonomik ve askeri yetenekler çerçevesinde, sistemi düzenleyebilme ve kontrol altında tutabilme rolünü ne denli etkin oynarsa ve maliyeti ne denli üstlenirse, diğer aktörler tarafından o kadar benimsenmektedir. Kindleberger'in de belirttiği üzere, Soğuk Savaş döneminde, ABD'nin Batı Bloku içerisinde ve SSCB'nin Doğu Bloku kapsamındaki rolleri bu kapsamda ele alınabilir.[84]

İç politika çerçevesindeki gelişmeler de tek kutuplu sistemi etkileyebilmektedir. Hatta çift kutuplu sistemsel düzenin, devlet yönetimi ve siyasal istikrar anlamında çok daha olumlu sonuçlar doğurduğunu belirten analizler çoğunluktadır.[85] Bu çerçevede, Soğuk Savaş döneminde ABD tarafından izlenen karar alma süreci bir örnek olarak sunulmaktadır. Zira Sovyet tehdidi nedeniyle, karar alma pozisyonunda olan kişi/gruplar çok daha dikkatli hareket eder ve sınırlı bir güvenlik çerçevesi içerisinde hareket ederlerken, sivil toplum örgütleri ve muhalefet de kendi duruşunu belirlerken, SSCB tehdidi nedeniyle çok daha çekinceli hareket etmiş ve istikrarı gözetmiştir. Çift kutupluluk ortadan kalktıktan sonra, sistemi düzenleyen tek kutup olması beklenen ve süper güç olarak ifade edilen ABD'nin bu konumun hakkını verememesi ve sistemin çok kutupluluğa evrilmesinin en

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83 Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

84 Charles P. Kindleberger et al., *Manias, Panics and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises*, (New Jersey: John Wiley& Sons Publishing, 2005).

85 Kenneth Waltz, "The Stability of a Bipolar World," *Daedalus*, LXXXXIII/3, 1964, s. 881-909.

önemli nedeni olarak, devlet yönetimi ve topluma egemen olan Sovyet tehdidi benzeri bir birleştiricinin yaratılamamış olması gösterilebilir.[86]

Sistemsel tek kutupluluktan memnun olmayan devletler/aktörler, bir araya gelerek ya da aralarında ittifak oluşturarak, kendilerinden çok üstün olan aktörü dengeleme arayışına girerler. Bu aynı zamanda, Jervis'in üzerinde önemle durduğu "güvenlik ikilemine" eklemlenmiş bir davranış kalıbıdır.[87] Hatta Soğuk Savaş'ı dahi bir güvenlik ikileminin yansıması olarak gören isimler bulunmaktadır.[88] Bu şekilde, sisteme egemen olan devletin/aktörün meşruiyeti azaltılırken, aynı zamanda güçler birliğine gidilerek etkin ve büyük bir karşıt güç yaratılarak, egemen gücün kararları ve politikaları istenen yöne çekilmeye çalışılır. Ancak bu ittifakların kurumsallaşması ve süreklilik kazanması ihtimali oldukça düşüktür. Bu tarz geniş tabanlı ittifaklar, daha çok kritik anlarda ve sistemin geleceğini çok yakından ilgilendiren olumsuz durumlarda ortaya çıkar.

Mevcut konjonktürde, uluslararası sisteme egemen tek bir kutbun olduğu söylenemez. Soğuk Savaş sonrasında, ABD'nin, bu yönde bir pozisyonu içselleştirmesi beklenmekteydi. Ne var ki, ABD'nin askeri, ekonomik ve siyasal gücünün sınırlı olması, "süper güç" olarak adlandırılan bu aktörün, uluslararası sistemin konjonktürel işleyişine ve geleceğine dair kararlar verilmesi noktasında her anlamda kendi işine gelen kararlar almasını engellemektedir. Bu bağlamda, ABD'nin tam manasıyla bir "süper güç" olmadığı ve sisteme egemen bir hegemon haline gelemediği anlaşılabilmektedir.[89] Bu durumun oluşmasında, ABD'nin Soğuk Savaş döneminde kendi bloku içerisinde kurguladığı hegemonyayı, Soğuk Savaş sonrasında sistem geneline yansıtamaması çok etkili olmuştur. 11 Eylül 2001 sonrası, Bush yönetiminin hegemonya anlayışından vazgeçerek imparatorluk mantığını yerleştirmeye çalışmasına karşın, Bush sonrası başkanlık koltuğuna oturan Obama'nın imparatorluk mantığından vazgeçmesi, ABD içerisindeki

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86 Wohlforth, *a.g.m.*, s. 28-57.

87 Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics*, XXX/2, 1978, s. 167-214 ve Charles L. Glaser, "The Security Dilemma Revisited", *World Politics*, L/1, 1997, s. 171-201.

88 Robert Jervis, "Was the Cold War a Security Dilemma?" *Journal of Cold War Studies*, III/1, 2001, s. 36-60.

89 Muharrem Ekşi, "The Bush Administration Fiasco From Hegemony to Empire and the Obama Restoration," *Bilge Strateji*, I/2, 2010, s. 109-128.

kafa karışıklığını da yansıtmaktadır. Avro-Atlantik ya da Batı Bloku adı verilen kutup içerisinde, gerek siyasal, sosyo-kültürel ve ekonomik değerler, gerekse de tehdit uyumlaşması çerçevesinde hegemonyasını yaratmış olan ABD, çift kutuplu sistemin yıkılmasının ardından, dünya genelinde benzer bir tehdit algılaması ve değerler bütünü yaratabilmiş değildir.

Hegemonya, sistem içerisindeki bir unsurun diğerlerine üstün ya da diğerlerine oranla baskın olduğunu kaydeden bir kavramdır.[90] Antonio Gramsci, bu kavramı, baskın olanın diğerlerinin izniyle/rızasıyla gücü elde etmesi olarak tanımlamaktadır. Siyasal, ekonomik ve toplumsal yansımaları olan hegemonya, rıza unsurunun altını çizmesiyle baskı unsurunu dışlamaktadır.[91] Terry Eagleton'a göre, siyasi/sistemsel hegemonun görevi, siyasal birliğin temelini kurgulayacak öznelik biçimlerini üretmektir. Yani Eagleton'a göre, hegemon, kendi toplumsal, ekonomik ve kültürel değerlerini aynen ya da bir miktar farklılaştırarak sistemin geneline yaymayı ya da kabul ettirmeyi hedeflemektedir.[92] Tarihsel sistem analizi yapan düşünürlerden Giovanni Arrighi'ye göre ise, hegemonya, yüz ya da yüz elli yıllık süreler çerçevesinde belli bir aktörün düzenleyici bir merkez güç haline gelmesidir. Hegemonyanın oluşturduğu üstünlük; askeri, ekonomik, teknolojik ve siyasal gücün birleşimi sonucunda belirmekte ve sistemde yer alan diğer aktörlere/devletlere karşı askeri güç kullanmadan sürdürülmektedir.[93] Sistemsel üstünlüğün devam ettirilmesi için askeri gücün kullanılmaya başladığı noktada hegemonya zayıflar ve askeri güç kullanımının süreklilik kazanması hegemonyanın sona erdiği anlamına gelir. Antonio Gramsci, hegemon gücün, liderliğini ve etkinliğini sürdürebilmek için toplumun diğer üyelerinin de rızasını ve desteğini sürekli hale getirmesi gerektiğinden bahsetmektedir. Bu nedenle, hegemon, kendisini desteklemeleri için sistem

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90 Çınar Özen, "Neogramşiyan Hegemonya Yaklaşımı Çerçevesinde Güç ve Global Finans: Fax Britannica'daki Büyük Dönüşüm," *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, II/8, 2006, s. 3-31.

91 William I. Robinson, "Küresel Kapitalizm ve Ulusötesi Kapitalist Hegemonya: Kuramsal Notlar ve Görgül Deliller," *Praksis*, VIII, 2003, s. 125-168.

92 Terry Eagleton, *İdeoloji*, (çev.) Muttalip Özcan (İstanbul: Ayrıntı Yayınları 2011).

93 William I. Robinson, "Giovanni Arrighi: Systemic Cycles of Accumulation, Hegemonic Transitions and the Rise of China," *New Political Economy*, I, 2010, s. 1-14.

içerisinde yer alan bazı aktörlere (bizim örneğimizde devletlere) ayrıcalıklar sağlamak zorundadır.

Wallerstein, hegemonyanın maddi temellerini üç faktörün şekillendirdiğini belirtir. Bunlar; üretim, ticaret ve finans sektörleridir.[94] Charles Kindleberger ise, mevcut uluslararası ekonomik yapılanmanın liberal karakterinin altını çizerek, bu yapılanmanın devamını sağlayabilmek ya da sistemi düzenleyebilmek için bir hegemon gücün varlığının çok önemli olduğunu söylemektedir. Görüldüğü üzere, Wallerstein'e göre, hegemon yalnız kendi çıkarları doğrultusunda hareket edip diğerlerini de bu motivasyonla hareket etmeye zorlarken; Kindleberger, hegemon gücün kendi çıkarlarını/önderliğini korumanın yanı sıra sistemde yer alan tüm aktörlerin çıkarlarına hizmet ettiğini belirtmektedir.

Tek kutupluluk ile hegemonya tam manasıyla aynı anlama gelmese de bu iki kavram arasında yakın bir ilişki olduğu ortadadır. Nitekim sistem içerisindeki herhangi bir aktör, sahip olduğu ulusal güç unsurları ekseninde "süper güç" olarak addedilebilecek bir yetiye sahip olsa ve bu yetisini de sistemi denetlemek ya da kendi çıkarlarına uygun olarak dönüştürmek için kullanmak isterse, hegemonya oluşumuna gitmek zorunda kalacaktır. Hegemonyaya dayanmayan bir tek kutupluluk uzun ömürlü olamaz. Zira "süper güç" olarak görülen ve tek kutuplu bir sistemsel yapı yaratmak isteyen aktörün/devletin kaynakları diğerlerinden oldukça üstün olsa da, sistem içerisindeki diğer aktörler, süper güce karşı birleşerek/ittifak yaparak dengeyi sağlayabilirler.

Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde, ABD hegemonyasına dayalı bir tek kutupluluğun inşa edileceği ve ABD'ye eklemlenmiş serbest pazar ekonomisi, çoğulcu demokrasi, liberal değerler gibi unsurların sistemin geneline yayılacağına dair bir anlayış belirmişti. Ne var ki, eski Sovyet coğrafyasında yaşanan ekonomik ve siyasal krizler, Irak, Somali, Bosna ile Kosova problemleri, etnik/dinsel ayrımcılığa dayalı sorunların gün yüzüne çıkması ve El Kaide gibi örgütler eliyle yükselişe geçen terörizm gibi hususlar, süper güç olarak adlandırılan ABD'nin siyasal, diplomatik, ekonomik ve askeri kapasitesi/etkinliğinin sorgulanmasını beraberinde

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[94] Sertif Demir, "20. ve 21. Yüzyılların Başlangıç Dönemlerinin Karşılaştırılması: Örtüşen ve Ayrışan Olguların Bir Analizi," *Gazi Akademik Bakış*, V/10, 2012, s. 207-228.

getirmiştir. Bu durum da göstermektedir ki, süper güç ABD üzerine temellendirilmek istenen tek kutupluluk anlayışı, hegemonya oluşumu ile taçlandırılamadığı, yani Batılı toplumsal, siyasal, ekonomik ve kültürel değerler sistemin tamamına kabul ettirilemediği için, başarıya ulaşamamıştır. Çin ve Rusya'nın yükselişleri ve her iki aktörün de ABD'nin liderliğine dayalı olarak yapılandırılmak istenen uluslararası sistemden hoşnut olmadıklarını açıklayarak, ABD ya da Batı hegemonyasına dayanan bir tek kutupluluğu reddetmeleri önemlidir. Zira her iki aktör de kendi ekonomik, toplumsal, siyasal değerlerinin, algılarının ve çıkarlarının sisteme yansıtılmasını istemekte ve bu bağlamda çok kutuplu bir uluslararası sistem istemini dillendirmektedirler.[95]

Çok kutupluluk ise uluslararası sistem içerisinde ikiden fazla sayıda başat gücün bulunduğu bir yapılanmadır. Çok kutupluluk kavramı da "dengelenmiş çok kutupluluk" ve "dengelenmemiş çok kutupluluk" olarak ikiye ayrılmaktadır. Dengelenmiş çok kutupluluk durumunda, uluslararası sistem içerisinde diğerlerinden üstün bir hegemon güç yer almamakta ve bu nedenle de güç asimetrisi görülmemektedir. Bu sistem içerisinde güvenlik riskleri ve tehditler daha kolay bir şekilde kontrol altına alınabilmektedir. Dengelenmemiş çok kutuplulukta ise, ulusal güç unsurları açısından diğerlerinden önde yer alan bir aktörün/devletin hegemonya arayışına girmesi söz konusudur. Bu arayış çerçevesinde sistem içerisindeki diğer aktörler ile hegemonya arayışındaki aktör arasında çatışma unsuru yadsınamaz bir gerçeklik olarak belirmektedir.[96]

Mevcut konjonktürde uluslararası sistemin dengelenmiş çok kutupluluğa doğru yol aldığı da ortadadır. Soğuk Savaş sonrası, tek süper güç olarak konumlanan ABD, hegemonya inşasında yeterli başarıyı gösteremediği için, Fukuyama'nın "Tarihin Sonu" tezinde ifadesini bulan[97] ABD'nin önderliğine ve Batılı ekonomik, siyasal ve kültürel değerlere referans gösteren tek kutupluluk anlayışı yeterli etkinliğe kavuşturulamamıştır. Örneğin, Avrupa Birliği, liberal bir dünya sisteminin kurulmasını, ABD kadar istiyor olmasına

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95 Susan Turner, "Russia, China and a Multipolar World Order: The Danger in the Undefined," *Asian Perspective*, XXXIII/1, 2009, s. 159-184.

96 John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: Norton Publishing, 2001).

97 Francis Fukuyama, *Tarihin Sonu ve Son İnsan* (İstanbul: Profil Yayıncılık, 2012).

karşın, ABD'nin siyasal hegemonyasının kendisini denetlemesini ya da sınırlamasını arzulamamaktadır. Bu yönüyle, AB'nin çok kutupluluğa fazlaca uzak durmadığı söylenebilir. Son dönemde, AB içerisinde, Avrupa'nın daha bağımsız bir tavır izlemesini isteyen Almanya ve Fransa ile ABD'ye daha yakın duran İngiltere arasında görülen ayrışma bu çerçevede değerlendirilebilir.[98] Çin ve Rusya ise, ABD'nin tek boyutluluğa eklemlemeye çalıştığı hegemonya girişimlerine karşı çıkan en önemli aktörlerdir. Her iki küresel güç de ABD'nin girişimlerini dünya barışına tehdit olarak algılamakta ve tüm aktörlerin düşünce, çıkar ve isteklerine dayalı bir sistem kurgulanmasını savunmaktadır. Çin ve Rusya, çok kutuplu bir dünya düzeni yaratılabilmesini temel amaçları olarak gösteriyor olsalar da bu düzenin nasıl şekillendirilebileceği yönünde somut bir öneri/proje ortaya koymamaktadırlar. Bu yönüyle, çok kutupluluğun, ABD'nin üstünlüğüne ya da hegemonya oluşturma girişimine bir tepki olarak ortaya konduğunu söyleyebiliriz.

Karadeniz Havzası'nın Bölgesel Görünümü

Karadeniz Havzası, küresel güçlerin uluslararası sistem eksenli güç mücadelelerinin merkezinde yer alan Avrasya coğrafyasının bir alt bileşeni olarak Avrupa ile Asya kıtalarının birbirlerine en yakın olduğu coğrafi alanı nitelemektedir. Türk Boğazları aracılığıyla Akdeniz'e açılan ve bu bağlamda yarı kapalı bir havza olduğunu söyleyebileceğimiz Karadeniz Havzası, sahip olduğu coğrafi, sosyo-kültürel ve toplumsal çeşitlilik ile de bilinmektedir. Balkanlar, Kafkaslar, Rusya-Ukrayna ve Türkiye gibi çok farklı bölgesel bileşenleri olan Karadeniz Havzası, bu yönüyle objektif ve kapsayıcı bir bölgesel kimlik tanımlayamamıştır.[99] Yani bugün itibarıyla "Karadenizlilik" eksenli bir bölgesel kimlik yapılandırılamamış durumdadır.

Soğuk Savaş döneminde SSCB'nin havzaya hâkim bir hegemon güç olarak belirmiş olması, havzanın doğusu ile batısı arasındaki toplumsal ve siyasal farklılıkların bir yana itilmesini ve Sovyet tahakkümüne dayalı

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98 John Peterson vd., "Multipolarity and Transatlantic Relations: Multilateralism and Leadership in a New International Order," *Transworld*, 1, 2012, s. 1-26.

99 Panagiota Manoli, "Reinvigorating Black Sea Cooperation: A Policy Discussion," *Commission on the Black Sea Policy Report*, III, 2009.

bölgesel bir görünümün oluşmasını beraberinde getirmişti.[100] Soğuk Savaş'ın sona ermesi ise Karadeniz Havzası'nda dramatik değişimleri beraberinde getirmiştir. Zira SSCB'nin tarihsel devamı olan Rusya, içerisine sürüklendiği toplumsal, sosyo-ekonomik ve siyasal problemlerle çalkalanmaya başlamış ve 2000'li yılların başına kadar bölgesel görünümünü netleştirememiştir.[101] SSCB'nin dağılmasının ardından Karadeniz Havzası'nda bağımsız hareket etmeye başlayan yeni devletlerin ortaya çıkması, bu devletlerin hemen hepsinin etnik, dinsel ve bölgesel bağlamlı siyasal problemler yaşaması ve bölgede kanlı iç savaşların patlaması, Batı Dünyası'nın dikkatini Karadeniz Havzası'na çekmiştir.[102] 1990'ların başından itibaren Avrasya Coğrafyası'nda kartlar yeniden dağıtılmaya başlanırken, Karadeniz Havzası bu dağıtımın merkezinde bulunuyordu.[103] Bu değişim bağlamında ön plana çıkan en önemli unsur ise Karadeniz Havzası tanımının kapsamına yönelik olarak ortaya çıkan farklılık olmuştur. SSCB'nin dağılmasıyla oluşan güç boşluğunu doldurabilmek için harekete geçen ve doğuya doğru genişlemeyi en önemli gelecek stratejisi olarak belirleyen AB'nin[104] ortaya koyduğu ve ABD tarafından da desteklenen bir plan doğrultusunda Geniş Karadeniz Havzası adı verilen bir bölgesel yapı ortaya konmuştur.[105]

Soğuk Savaş döneminde Karadeniz'e kıyısı olan ülkeler üzerinden ifadesini bulan Karadeniz Havzası tanımlaması, 1992 yılında bölgesel işbirliğini kurgulayabilmek amacıyla kurulan KEİT'e üye olan ülkelerin konumlandıkları coğrafyadan da anlaşılacağı üzere mahiyet değiştirmiştir. Güney Kafkasya, Türkiye, Ukrayna ve Balkanlar'ın ekonomik, ticari ve

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[100] Mustafa Aydın, "Regional Cooperation in the Black Sea and the Role of Institutions," *Perceptions*, X/3, 2005, s. 57-83.

[101] Vladimir Popov, "Mortality Crisis in Russia Revisited: Evidence From Cross Regional Comparison," *CEFIR Working Paper*, 157, 2011.

[102] Mustafa Aydın, "Black Sea and the Caucasus Region; Causes of Instability and the Ways to Deal with Them," *The Turkish Yearbook*, XXX, 2000, s. 213-225.

[103] Yannis Tsantoulis, "Geopolitics (Subregionalism), Discourse and a Troubled Power Triangle in the Black Sea," *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, IX/3, 2009, s. 243-258.

[104] Bogdan Aurescu, "The Role of the European Union in the Wider Black Sea Region," *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, X/1, 2011, s. 35-45.

[105] Bülent Karadeniz, "Security and Stability Architecture in the Black Sea," *Perceptions*, XII/2, 2007, s. 95-117.

özellikle enerji odaklı olarak birbirlerini tamamlayan bir coğrafi konuma sahip olmaları ve her birinin Karadeniz ekseninde ortaklaşıyor oluşları,[106] Karadeniz Havzası'nın klasik tanımının değişmesi anlamında önemli bir rol oynamıştır. Demokratik yönetim anlayışı, serbest pazar ekonomisi, insan haklarına ve azınlıklara saygı gibi siyasal literatüre Batılı değerler olarak yerleşmiş unsurları Karadeniz'i çevreleyen coğrafyalara aktarabilmeyi ve bu bölgeleri kendi değerlerine ve sistemsel stratejilerine eklemlemeyi arzulayan AB ve ABD, Geniş Karadeniz Havzası adı verilen bir bölgesel tanımlama yaratılmasına ön ayak olmuştur.[107] Alexander Goncharenko günümüzde Karadeniz Havzası'nın tam olarak neyi ifade ettiğini çok iyi bir şekilde özetlemiştir:

> "Klasik jeopolitik teorilere göre, Karadeniz Havzası, Avrasya'da düzenin ve güvenliğin en önemli köşe taşlarından biridir. Bu bölge sahip olduğu doğal kaynaklar, enerji ve ulaşım hatları ile çok hassas bir alandır. Karadeniz Havzası, kalpgâh (heartland) ve kenar kuşak (rimland) teorilerinin de kesişim alanını oluşturmaktadır. Bu bölge üzerinde sağlanacak hâkimiyet, Avrasya egemenliğini de beraberinde getirecektir. Bu nedenle Karadeniz Havzası; siyasal, askeri, finansal, vb. alanlarda tüm küresel aktörlerin ilgi alanında bulunmaktadır."[108]

Güncel uluslararası ilişkiler literatüründe Karadeniz Havzası deyince akla gelen en önemli unsur, kuşkusuz, enerji olmaktadır. Karadeniz, hem sahip olduğu enerji kaynakları hem de enerji zengini coğrafyalara komşu olması gibi nedenlerle dünya ekonomisinde ve siyasetinde çok önemli bir yer

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[106] Gareth Winrow, "Geopolitics and Energy Security in the Wider Black Sea Region," *Southeast Eıuropean and Black Sea Studies*, VII/2, 2007, s. 217-235.

[107] Mustafa Aydın, "Europe's Next Shore: the Black Sea Region After EU Enlargement," *Institute For Security Studies Occasional Paper*, LIII, 2004, s. 9-12.

[108] Alexander Goncharenko, "The Wider Black Sea Area: New Geopolitical Realities, Regional Security Structures and Democratic Control: A Ukrainian View," *NATO Defense College Occasional Paper*, XI/2, 2005.

tutmaktadır. Karadeniz Havzası'ndaki ülkelerin tamamı enerji üretimi konusunda aynı seviyede olmasa da, hepsinin dünya enerji piyasasında üretici, tüketici ya da transit ülke olarak var olduğunu görüyoruz.[109] Karadeniz Havzası, enerji güvenliği anlamında Avrupa açısından çok önemli seçenekler sunmaktadır. Her şeyden önce, bu havza, coğrafi anlamda Hazar ve Orta Asya'nın petrol ve doğalgazının Avrupa'ya ulaşabilmesi için en kısa ve karlı olan yolu ifade etmektedir. Yine, Karadeniz Havzası'nda bulunan ülkelerin hemen hepsi dış politika stratejilerini oluştururken enerji terminali olma ya da enerji üretiminden kar elde etme hedefinde olduğu için, Batılı aktörler ile birlikte girişilecek enerji ulaştırma projelerine sıcak bakmaktadırlar.[110] Sahip olunan enerji rezervleri bakımından havzanın geneline ilişkin dengeli bir dağılım söz konusu değildir. Bu durum, havza ülkelerinin ihtiyacının karşılanması noktasında geniş kapsamlı bir işbirliğinin gerçekleştirilmesini zorunlu kılmaktadır. Fakat henüz bölgesel ve kapsayıcı bir işbirliği yapılandırılabilmiş değildir. Rusya'nın öngördüğü Güney Akım Projesi'nin, AB tarafından ortaya konan ve ABD tarafından da desteklenen NABUCCO'yu anlamsızlaştırması bu çerçevede verilebilecek önemli bir örnektir.

Çatışma iklimini güçlendiren temel problemlere göz gezdirdiğimizde ayırdına varacağımız en önemli gerçeklik, bu problemlerin sıklıkla havza devletlerinin kendi içlerinde ya da birbirleriyle olan ikili ve çok taraflı ilişkilerinde ortaya çıkan siyasal ve yönetimsel arızalar ekseninde belirdiğidir.[111]

Karadeniz Havzası'nda yer alan ülkeler arasında çatışma boyutunun ön plana çıkmasına neden olan yönetimsel problemlerden en önemlisi, bölge ülkelerinin birbirleriyle uyumlu olmayan siyasal kültürü ve yönetimsel yapılanmasıdır. Havzanın tarihsel, sosyo-kültürel ve coğrafi anlamda çok parçalı bir görünüm arz etmesi ve Geniş Karadeniz Havzası tanımlaması üzerinden bu çok parçalılığın meşrulaştırılmaya çalışılıyor olması bu noktada

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[109] Necdet Pamir, "The Black Sea: A Gateway to Energy Security and Diversification," *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, VII/2, 2007, s. 245-263.

[110] John M.Roberts, "The Black Sea and European Energy Security," *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, VI/2, 2006, s. 207-223.

[111] Franz Lothar Altmann vd., "Democracy and Good Governance in the Black Sea Region," *Commission on the Black Sea Policy Report*, IV, 2010.

çok önemli bir husustur. Ortak bir siyasal kültürün yaratılamamasında etkili olan bir diğer önemli faktör de küresel güçler arasındaki Karadeniz tabanlı güç mücadelesinin havza ülkelerini kutuplaşmaya ve birbirlerine karşı yabancılaşmaya itmesidir.[112] Havzada yer alan AB ya da NATO üyesi ülkeler ile ne AB ne de NATO'ya üye olmayan ve Rus baskısını yakından hisseden ülkeler arasında havzaya bakış noktasında ortaya çıkan farklılık bu noktada ele alınabilecek önemli bir örnektir. Bulgaristan ve Romanya'nın Karadeniz Havzası'na olan yaklaşımı ile Ermenistan ve Ukrayna'nın Karadeniz'e bakış açılarının aynı olması beklenemez.

Havzanın batısı söz konusu olduğunda, AB'nin sahip olduğu yumuşak güç ağır basmakta ve reform çabaları genel itibarıyla bu aktörün temsil ettiği liberal demokrasi ilkeleri üzerine temellendirilmeye çalışılmaktadır.[113] Ne var ki, havzanın doğusu ve kuzeyi ele alındığı zaman, AB'nin temsil ettiği yumuşak gücün etkinliği ve kabul edilebilirliği azalmakta ve reform çabalarının hızı da oldukça yavaşlamaktadır. Rusya'nın, Sovyet döneminin korporatist yönetim anlayışına atıfla ortaya koyduğu otoriter tabanlı ve muhalefeti belli kalıplar içerisinde kontrol altında tutmaya yönelik 'yönetilebilir demokrasi' anlayışı, havzanın doğusunda ve kuzeyinde etkinleştirilmeye çalışılmaktadır.[114] Bölge ülkelerinin, tarihsel ve sosyo-kültürel manada, otoriter yönetim kalıplarına aşina olmaları ile AB'nin üzerinde durduğu siyasal dönüşüm programının oldukça maliyetli olması, havza ülkelerinin Rusya'nın ortaya koyduğu yönetilebilir demokrasi olgusuna yakın durmalarına neden olmaktadır. Yine, etnik/dinsel/bölgesel ayrımlar ekseninde ortaya çıkan merkezkaç kuvvetlerin kontrol altında tutulabilmesi noktasında otoriter bir anlayışın daha etkin olacağı düşüncesi ve Rusya'dan algılanan güvenlik tehdidi, havzanın kuzeyinde ve doğusunda yer alan ülkelerin liberal demokrasi temelinde gerçekleştirilecek siyasal ve yönetimsel reformlardan uzak durmalarına yol açmaktadır.

Karadeniz Havzası'ndaki devletlerin önemli bir kısmı idari yönetim mekanizması konusunda büyük bir ikilem yaşamaktadırlar. Havza

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[112] Mitat Çelikpala, "Escalating Rivalries and Diverging Interests: Prospects for Stability and Security in the Black Sea Region," *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, X/3, 2010, s. 287-302.

[113] Aydın, *a.g.m.*, 2004.

[114] Nikolay Petrov, "Russia's Over-Managed Democracy in Crisis," *PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo*, LXX.

devletlerinin çoğu üniter devlet anlayışını benimsemiş olsa da, küreselleşmenin getirdiği yerellik arayışı ve çeşitli devletlerde yaşayan farklı etnik grupların üniter devlet yapısını kabul etmek istememeleri, bölgeler arası farklı bir görünüm arz eden ekonomik ve sosyal gerçeklikler ile birleşince, merkeziyetçi anlayış sorgulanır bir hal almaktadır. Etnik çatışmaların giderek artması ve merkezi yönetimlerin bu çatışmalara bir çözüm bulamaz hale gelmesi, merkeziyetçi anlayışın küreselleşen dünyanın gerçeklerine yanıt veremez hale geldiğinin göstergesidir.[115] Gerekli yönetimsel reformları gerçekleştirmeyen havza ülkelerinin sonu, donmuş çatışma bölgeleri üzerinden toplumsal/ulusal/bölgesel temelde fiili bir bölünmeye kadar varabilir. Dağlık Karabağ, Abhazya, Güney Osetya, Transdinyester ve Kırım gibi etno-kültürel, tarihsel ve siyasal ayrımlara dayalı ayrılıkçılık girişimleri bu çerçevede ele alınabilecek önemli bölgesel meselelerdir.[116]

Havza devletleri, Sovyet tarzı merkezden planlanmış korporatist ekonomi modelinden pazar ekonomisine geçiş yapmak üzere yapısal reformlar gerçekleştirmeye başlamışlardır. Bu minvalde, kendilerini dünya ekonomisinin işleyişine eklemleyebilmek için, geçiş sürecinde başta ABD ve AB olmak üzere, birçok ülkeden teknik, uzmanlık odaklı ve mali yardım almaya başlamışlardır.[117] Karadeniz Havzası'nda yer alan Türkiye ve Yunanistan dışındaki devletlerin hepsi birer "geçiş ekonomisi" haline gelmiştir.[118] Yapısal ekonomik meseleler, siyasal-yönetimsel problemlerle birleştiği noktada ciddi bir toplumsal ve bölgesel güvenlik unsuru olarak, havzada çatışma faktörünü işbirliğine üstün kılmaktadır.

Çok Kutupluluk Tartışmaları Çerçevesinde Karadeniz Havzası'nın Değerlendirilmesi

Neorealist kuram tarafından altı çizilen güç dengesi yaklaşımına uygun olarak hareket edersek, Karadeniz Havzası'ndaki bölgesel yapının da önünde

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115 Aydın, *a.g.m*., 2000.

116 Özgür Özdamar, "Security and Military Balance in the Black Sea Region," *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, X/3, 2010, s. 345.

117 Aydın, *a.g.m.*, 2005.

118 Panagiotis Gavras, "The Current State of Economic Development in the Black Sea Region", *Commission on Black Sea Policy Report*, I, 2010.

sonunda savunmacı realizmin[119] öngördüğü sistemsel dengeye göre şekilleneceğini söyleyebiliriz. Rusya, 1990'ların ilk yarısında yaşadığı siyasal, ekonomik ve toplumsal çalkantıyı atlattıktan sonra Avrasyacı düşünce kalıbına eklemlenen ve daha 1993 yılında ilan edilen "yakın çevre politikasına" uygun olarak hareket etmeye çalışmaktadır.[120] Nitekim Rusya, bu politika ekseninde, tıpkı SSCB döneminde olduğu gibi Karadeniz Havzası'nda kendi hegemonyasını kurgulamak ve bölgesel bir tek kutupluluk yaratmak istemektedir. Rusya'nın, havza ülkelerinde yaşayan Rus azınlığı, Ukrayna'daki Kırım Meselesi[121] ve Moldova'daki Transdinyester ayrılıkçılığı[122] özelinde görüldüğü üzere, kendi çıkarlarına uygun bir şekilde kullanması bu bağlamda ele alınabilir. Rusya, enerji bağımlılığı çerçevesinde kendisine eklemlediği eski Sovyet cumhuriyetlerini, artan enerji ihtiyacı sayesinde kendi çıkarlarına uygun hareket etmeye zorlayabilmektedir. Bu ülkenin, Turuncu Devrim döneminde, Ukrayna'daki Batı yanlısı hükümete karşı uyguladığı enerji kesintileri, Ukrayna'da ekonominin ve gündelik yaşamın kötü yönde etkilenmesinde ve Turuncu Devrim'in sona ermesinde

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[119] Özellikle Kenneth Waltz ve Robert Jervis tarafından öngörülmüş olan ve sistemik denge unsurunun kavramsallaştırılması noktasında önemli bir meşruiyet sağlayan savunmacı realizme göre, uluslararası sistemin temel oyuncuları olan devletler, kendi ulusal savunmalarını ve güvenliklerini riske atmayacak boyutta bir askeri/ekonomik/teknolojik güce sahip olurlar ve aynı zamanda sistemde yer alan diğer oyuncuları da yakından takip ederler. Dengeyi oluşturan devletler, kendi güvenliklerini riske atacak adımlar atılması durumunda, o adımı atan devlet/devletlere karşı göreceli bir güçsüzlük içerisine sürüklenecekleri için, dengenin yeniden sağlanması ve gücü bir amaç olarak görmeye başlayan devlet/devletlerin dengelenebilmesi noktasında, o devlet/devletlere karşı, birlikte hareket etmeye başlarlar ve sonuç olarak güç dengesini yeniden inşa ederler. Bu yaklaşıma göre, devletler birbirlerine karşı göreceli güçlerini arttırmayı değil, sistemin sağlayacağı güvenliğin göreceli olarak arttırılmasını amaçlamaktadırlar.

[120] Erel Tellal, "Zümrüdüanka: Rusya Federasyonu'nun Dış Politikası," *Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi*, LXV/3, 2010, s. 190-236.

[121] Elena Mizrokhi, "Russian Separatism in Crimea and NATO: Ukraine's Big Hope, Russia's Grand Gamble," *Chaire de Recherche du Canada*, 2009.

[122] Helge Blakkisrud vd., "From Secessionist Conflict Toward a Functioning State: Processes of State and Nation Building in Transnistria," *Post-Soviet Affairs*, XXVII/2, 2011, s. 178-210.

dolaylı bir role sahiptir.[123] Bunun yanı sıra, Rusya'nın, yakın çevre politikasına uygun olarak, kendisini çevreleyen havza ülkelerindeki etnik/dinsel/bölgesel çatışmaları kullandığını ve bu meseleler ekseninde, havza devletlerini kendi istediği yönde hareket etmeye zorladığını görüyoruz. Rusya, Dağlık Karabağ Meselesini kullanarak Azerbaycan ve Ermenistan'ı kendi istediği yönde politikalar izlemeye itmekte; Transdinyester Meselesini kullanarak Moldova'nın NATO üyeliğini engellemekte ve Abhazya ile Güney Osetya'nın kendi koruması altında bağımsızlık ilan etmelerini sağlayarak,[124] ABD ve AB ile yakınlaşan Gürcistan'ı cezalandırmaktadır. Bu bağlamda, Rusya'nın havzada kendisini düzenleyici bir hegemon güç haline getirmeye çalıştığını ve uluslararası sistemin işleyişine yönelik çok kutupluluk talebinin aksine, Karadeniz özelinde kendi hegemonyasına eklemlenmiş bir tek kutupluluk kurgulamaya çalıştığını belirtebiliriz. Ancak Rusya, AB ve ABD'nin Karadeniz Havzası'na verdiği değerin ve bu iki aktörün gücünün/etkinliğinin farkındadır. Bu çerçevede, mevcut koşullar içerisinde, Karadeniz özelinde birlikte hareket ettiğini söyleyebileceğimiz AB ve ABD ile kendi arasında oluşturulacak bir bölgesel dengeye (ya da çift kutupluluk) de sıcak yaklaştığını söyleyebiliriz.

Rusya'nın ulusal güç unsurlarına güvenerek ve bu unsurları etkin bir şekilde kullanarak hegemonya arayışına girmesi, havza ülkelerini büyük çaplı bir güvenlik ikilemine sürüklemektedir. Buna karşın, AB ve NATO'nun Karadeniz Havzası'na yönelik genişleme faaliyetleri ve bu bölgeye bir aktör olarak yerleşip, havzayı, çok kutuplu bir görünüm arz etmeye başlayan uluslararası sisteme eklemleme çabaları da Rusya'yı aynı tür bir ikileme sürüklemektedir.[125] Rusya, bu ikilemi saldırgan realist[126] unsurları devreye

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[123] F. Stephen Larrabee, "Rethinking Russia: Russia, Ukraine, and Central Europe: The Return of Geopolitics," *Columbia Journal of International Affairs*, LXIII/2, 2010, s. 33-52.

[124] İlyas Kamalov, "Karadeniz Bölgesindeki Bazı Güncel Sorunlar," *Karadeniz Araştırmaları*, VI/21, 2009, s. 13-21.

[125] Janusz Bugajski, "Georgian Lessons: Conflicting Russian and Western Interests in the Wider Europe," *CSIS*, 2010.

[126] Saldırgan realizm, uluslararası sisteme hâkim olan anarşinin devletlerin saldırgan bir politika izleyerek coğrafi ve siyasal genişleme yönünde harekete geçmelerine neden olacağını belirtmektedir. Saldırgan realizme göre, tüm devletler kendi ulusal güçlerini diğerlerine oranla maksimize etmenin peşindedirler. Zira sadece

sokarak atlatmaya çalışmakta ve havza ülkelerini Batı'nın siyasal değerlerinden ve askeri örgütlenmelerinden uzak tutmaya çalışmaktadır. Rusya'nın, Ağustos 2008'de, Abhazya ve Güney Osetya'daki gelişmeleri ön plana sürerek Gürcistan'a düzenlediği askeri operasyon bu çerçevede değerlendirilebilecek ve saldırgan realizme eklemlenmiş bir eylemdir. Rusya'dan tehdit algılayan ve güvenliklerini tehlikede gören havza ülkeleri ise, kendi aralarında yaşadıkları sorunlar nedeniyle ve Rusya'ya karşı oluşturacakları ittifakın yeterli etkinlikte olamayacağını düşündüklerinden, Rusya'nın gücünü dengeleyebilecek ve havza ülkelerinin güvenliğini garanti altına alabilecek olan ABD ve AB ile ittifak arayışına girmektedirler. Bu yönelim, Rusya'nın kendi güvenliğini sağlayabilme ve küresel güç konumunu pekiştirebilme stratejisi bağlamında, büyük çaplı bir güvenlik ikileminin içerisine sürüklenmesine ve havzadaki çıkarlarına geniş çaplı bir saldırı gerçekleştirildiği gerekçesiyle saldırgan realizmi içselleştirmesine neden olmaktadır. Rusya'nın yaşadığı güvenlik ikilemi ile havza ülkelerinin yaşadığı güvenlik ikilemi, Rusya'nın saldırgan realizme yönelmesi ve havza ülkelerinin de ABD ve AB ile ittifak yapması sonucunda dengelenmekte ve havza sıfır toplamlı bir çatışma sürekliliğinin içerisine sürüklenmektedir.

Soğuk Savaş sonrası, ABD'nin kendisi üzerindeki askeri/siyasal etkinliğinin azaltılabilmesi noktasında ciddi bir isteklilik gösteren ve bu bağlamda, özellikle İngiltere ile Almanya-Fransa arasında Avrupa'nın geleceğine ilişkin çeşitli anlaşmazlıklara sahne olan AB ise, üyeler bazında bu tartışmalardan etkilenmektedir.[127] Ne var ki, Rusya ve Çin'in aksine, çok kutuplu bir sistemsel işleyişin yaratılabilmesi noktasında çok da girişken bir yaklaşım sergilemeyen AB, Karadeniz Havzası'na yaklaşım noktasında da genel itibarıyla ABD ile birlikte hareket etmektedir.[128] AB, sahip olduğu

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en güçlü olan devletler kendi çıkarlarını koruyabilir ve siyasal varlıklarını garanti altına alabilir. Saldırgan realizm, anarşik bir uluslararası sistem içerisinde kendi güvenliklerini korumak ve bu amaçla güç elde etmek zorunda olan devletlerin, verili güç ile yetinmeyeceklerini ve uluslararası sistem içerisindeki siyasal hâkimiyet yüzdelerini olabilecek en üst seviyeye varana dek arttırmak isteyeceklerini, yani hegemonya arayışında olacaklarını kaydetmektedir.

127 Christian Schweiger, *Britain, Germany and the Future of the European Union* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan Publishing, 2007), s. 82-151.

128 Daniel Hamilton, "A Transatlantic Strategy For the Wider Black Sea?" *The Wider Black Sea Region in the 21st Century: Strategic, Economic, and Energy*

ekonomik, teknolojik, siyasal ve sosyo-kültürel işleyiş ve içselleştirmiş olduğu sosyal refah düzeyi aracılığıyla yansıttığı "yumuşak güç"[129] çerçevesinde havzanın batısında yer alan ülkeler başta olmak üzere, havza dâhilindeki ülkelerle karşılıklı bağımlılık[130] ve çoğulcu siyasal-yönetimsel anlayış temelinde ilişkiler geliştirmeye çalışmaktadır.

2004 ve 2007 genişlemeleri ile aynı zamanda bir Karadeniz gücü haline gelen AB'nin havzadaki etkinliği, havzanın AB'ye eklemlenmiş olan Batı kesiminde birincil önemdedir. Nitekim bu bölgede yer alan devletlerin önemli bir bölümünün AB üyeliğine paralel olarak NATO'ya da üye olduğunu ve Karadeniz Havzası'na yaklaşım noktasında ABD ile AB arasındaki sistemsel birlikteliğin, özellikle Balkanlar ekseninde karşılık bulduğunu söyleyebiliriz. Nitekim Rusya'nın coğrafi yakınlık, askeri üstünlük, siyasal öngörü ve elinde tuttuğu enerji kozu üzerinden ifadesini bulan bölgesel etkinliği, Karadeniz'in doğusunda ve kuzeyinde en önemli

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Perspectives, (der. Daniel Hamilton ve Gerhard Mangott), (Washington: Center For Transatlantic Relations, 2008).

[129] Yumuşak güç, bir ülkenin askeri, siyasal ve ekonomik güç unsurlarıyla değil, sahip olduğu başarılı sosyal bütünlük ve kültürü aracılığıyla yansıttığı güç olarak görülebilir. Yumuşak güç araçlarının temelinde ikna ve cezbetme unsurları yer almaktadır. Bir devlet, uluslararası sistemin karmaşık ilişkiler ağını kendi lehine kullanabiliyor ve kendi ulusal çıkarlarını ve istemlerini, bu sistemin kuralları içerisine gizleyebiliyorsa, yumuşak güç kullanımı aracılığıyla çok daha maliyetsiz ve kolay bir şekilde istediği sonuca ulaşabilecektir. Yumuşak güç unsurunun uluslararası sistem ile uyum içerisinde kullanılması halinde küresel ve bölgesel hegemonyaların oluşumu kolaylaşacaktır.

[130] Karşılıklı bağımlılık, bir sistem içerisindeki birimlerin ve olayların birbirlerine bağlı olması anlamına gelmektedir. Karşılıklı bağımlılık çerçevesinde söz konusu edilen bağımlılık ilişkisi, ekonomik, toplumsal, siyasal ya da askeri alanlarda geçerli olabilir. Karşılıklı bağımlılık ilişkisinin kurulabilmesi hususunda üzerinde durulan en önemli nokta ise ekonomik, siyasal ya da askeri alanlar çerçevesinde ortaya çıkan iletişim ve etkileşimin belli bir maliyet kıstası çerçevesinde ele alınabiliyor oluşudur. Karşılıklı bağımlılık üzerine çalışan neoliberal kuramcıların en çok hataya düştükleri nokta, bu uygulamanın taraflara her zaman kazandıracağı şeklinde ortaya konan yanılgıdır. Hâlbuki karşılıklı bağımlılık çerçevesinde de olsa tarafların her zaman kazançlı çıktığı söylenemez. Zira faydaların eşitsizliği ve kazancın bölüşümü noktasında ortaya çıkan çatışmalar, ilişkinin asimetrik bir hal almasına da yol açabilecektir.

sistemsel/bölgesel faktör olarak görülmektedir. Örneğin, Gürcistan ve Ukrayna, yaşadıkları renkli devrimlere paralel olarak AB ve NATO üyeliğine odaklanmışlar, ancak Rusya'nın kendileri üzerinde uyguladığı siyasal, enerji odaklı ve askeri baskı neticesinde, yaşanan iktidar değişiklikleriyle (Ukrayna'da Rusya'ya daha yakın duran Viktor Yanukovic'in başkan olması ve Gürcistan'da ise Rusya ve Batı arasında daha dengeli bir tavır izlemeyi temel yaklaşım olarak benimseyen Bidzina Ivanishvili'nin Gürcü Rüyası Partisi'nin iktidara gelmesi),[131] Rusya ve Batı arasında dengeyi gözeten bir pozisyona sürüklenmişlerdir.

AB ile Rusya arasındaki karşılıklı bağımlılık ilişkisi de bu iki küresel aktörü, Karadeniz Havzası özelinde, çatışmadan kaçınmaya itmektedir. Nitekim AB, enerji kaynakları açısından Rusya'ya bağımlıdır.[132] Aynı şekilde, Rusya, sahip olduğu enerji kaynaklarının en önemli müşterisinin AB üyeleri olduğunu bilmektedir.[133] Yani Rusya'nın büyümesini önemli oranda AB finanse etmektedir. Bu çerçevede, Karadeniz Havzası'nın batısının AB, doğu ve kuzeyinin ise Rusya'nın bölgesel etkinliğinde kalması ve adeta üzerinde anlaşılmış bir dengenin gözetiliyor oluşu, iki aktör arasındaki karşılıklı bağımlılık da dikkate alındığında, anlaşılır bir hususdur. Bu bağlamda, Rusya ve AB'nin, Karadeniz Havzası'nda çift kutuplu bir bölgesel görünümün oluşturulabilmesi hususunda üstü kapalı bir anlaşmaya vardıkları söylenebilir. Rusya'nın, havzanın doğusundaki ülkeleri, Rus hegemonyasını Avrasya özelinde inşa etmeyi planlayan Avrasya Birliği Projesi'ne eklemleme çabaları, Karadeniz özelindeki çift kutupluluğu sistematikleştirmeyi amaçlayan bir yaklaşımın ürünüdür. Rusya, Avrasya Birliği Projesi[134] ile kendi yumuşak gücünü AB'ye rakip olarak kurgulamanın

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131 Kornely Kakachia, "Gürcistan Parlamento Seçimleri Sonucu: Dış Politika ve Yeni Yaklaşım Arayışları," *Hazar Raporu*, 2013, s. 35-42.

132 Habibe Özdal, "AB-Rusya İlişkilerinde Kuyruk Köpeği Sallıyor," *USAK Analist*, VIII, 2011.

133 Ariel Cohen, "Russia: The Flawed Energy Superpower," *Energy Security Challenges for the 21st Century: A Reference Handbook*, (der. Gal Luft ve Anne Korin), (New York: Praeger Security International Publishing, 2009), s. 33-34.

134 İlk planda Belarus, Kazakistan, Kırgızistan, Tacikistan ve Rusya arasında oluşturulması planlanan, orta ve uzun vadede ise önemli bir bölümü Karadeniz Havzası içerisinde yer alan eski Sovyet cumhuriyetlerini de kapsaması planlanan, liderliğini ise Rusya'nın yapacağı ekonomik ve siyasal işbirliği girişimidir.

ve Avrasya geneli ile Karadeniz özelindeki ülkeleri yaratacağı hegemonyaya eklemlemenin peşindedir. Tabii ki, bu çaba, uzun vadeli bir hedefe işaret etmektedir.[135]

Karadeniz Havzası'nda yer alan ve Rusya'nın ardından bölgenin en önemli gücü olarak addedilen Türkiye, Rusya'nın havza geneline yansıttığı askeri güç odaklı saldırgan tutumu yumuşatmaya ve Rusya'yı da bölgede gerçekleştirilebilecek siyasal ve ekonomik işbirliğinin bir parçası yapmaya çalışsa da, bu konuda pek de başarılı olamadığı Gürcistan özelinde ortaya çıkmış durumdadır. Nitekim Türkiye, Gürcistan ile ekonomik, ticari ve siyasal ilişkilerini ilerletirken, Gürcistan-Rusya ilişkilerine hâkim olan gerginliğin aşılabilmesini önleyememiş ve 2008'deki askeri çatışma yaşanmıştır. Aslında Türkiye'nin de Rusya'dan algıladığı güvenlik tehdidi anlamında bu ülkeye karşı kendisini çok da rahat hissettiği söylenemez. Nitekim iki ülke arasındaki ilişkiler de daha çok enerji, ekonomi ve ticaret eksenli olarak gelişmektedir ve henüz geniş kapsamlı bir siyasal boyut kazanabilmiş değildir.[136] Yani neorealizmin öngördüğü yüksek politika-alçak politika ayrımı Rusya-Türkiye ilişkileri bağlamında da etkisini göstermektedir. Yine de Rusya'nın Türkiye'ye karşı olan tutumu savunmacı realizmin öngördüğü dengenin dışına pek çıkmamaktadır.

Avrupa Birliği'ni kendisine örnek olarak alan ve ilk kez Kazakistan Devlet Başkanı Nursultan Nazarbayev tarafından 1994 yılında bir hedef olarak ortaya konan bu girişim, daha sonrasında BDT'yi ikame edecek ve Rusya'nın Avrasya anakarasındaki hegemonya hedefine eklemlenen bir proje olarak Vladimir Putin tarafından sahiplenilmiştir. Avrasya Birliği'nin teşkilatlandırılabilmesi yolundaki ilk adım ise 1 Ocak 2012'den itibaren Belarus, Rusya ve Kazakistan arasında bir ortak pazar oluşturulması olmuştur. Bu 3 devlet projeye liderlik yapıyor gibi görünseler de kontrol Rusya'dadır. Kısa vadeli hedef ise 2015 yılı itibarıyla Avrasya Birliği'ni örgütsel anlamda oluşturabilmektir. Orta Asya'da yer alan eski Sovyet cumhuriyetlerinin yanı sıra, Ermenistan, Gürcistan (şimdilik reddetse de), Ukrayna gibi ülkeler de bu birliğe alınması muhtemel ülkeler olarak görülmektedir. Vladimir Putin, bu birliği Rusya'nın bölgesel yumuşak güç uygulaması olarak görmekte ve bu nedenle bu projeye çok değer vermektedir.

135 Hannes Adomeit, "Putin's Eurasian Union: Russia's Integration Project and Policies on Post-Soviet Space," *CIES Neighbourhood Policy Paper*, IV, 2012, s. 1-13.

136 Fatih Özbay, "Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Türkiye-Rusya İlişkileri: 1992-2010," *Bilge Strateji*, II/4, 2011, s. 35-77.

Montrö Boğazlar Sözleşmesi, Karadeniz Havzası'ndaki çıkar çatışmasının görünür bir askeri çatışmaya dönüşmesini engelleyen en önemli faktördür. Sözleşme uyarınca, Karadeniz'e kıyısı olmayan ülkelerin savaş gemilerinin bu denize girmesinin engellenmesi, ABD ve Çin gibi küresel aktörlerin kendi sistemsel etkinliklerini, Karadeniz özelinde, askeri ve dolayısıyla siyasal anlamda görünür kılmalarını engellemektedir.[137] Bu yönüyle, Montrö Sözleşmesi, havzada çok kutuplu bir yapının kurgulanabilmesini geciktirmekte ya da zorlaştırmaktadır. Bu durum, en çok Rusya ve Türkiye'nin işine gelmektedir. Zira Montrö Sözleşmesi'nin yarattığı statüko bağlamında Rusya'nın havzadaki en güçlü askeri/siyasal güç olduğunun altı kalın çizgilerle çizilmektedir. Yani Rusya, havzada bölgesel hegemonya oluşumu noktasında coğrafi yakınlık avantajını askeri tedbirlerle taçlandırma şansına sahip olmaktadır. Türkiye ise, Montrö'nün sağladığı güvenlik ve istikrar sayesinde, Türk Boğazları'na eklemlenecek çatışma sürekliliğinden kurtulmakta ve Karadeniz Havzası'nda, Rusya'dan sonra en önemli bölgesel güç olma konumunu sürdürme şansına kavuşmaktadır. Türkiye'nin, Karadeniz Havzası özelinde, ABD, AB, Rusya ve havza ülkeleri arasındaki çok taraflılığı düzenlemeyi hedeflemesi ve bölgenin sahip olduğu ekonomik, ticari ve enerji tabanlı potansiyelin kullanılabilmesi yönünde işbirliğini beraberinde getirecek politikalar izliyor oluşu, Montrö Sözleşmesi sayesinde anlamlanmaktadır.

Rusya, ABD ile AB'nin Karadeniz özelinde birlikte hareket ettiklerini görmektedir. Bu çerçevede, ABD'nin, Karadeniz özelinde AB'ye eklemlenmesi, Rusya tarafından, havzada yaratılmak istenen çift kutuplu sistemsel görünümün bir yansıması olarak kabul görmektedir. Havzanın batısında AB ve NATO üyeliği ile anlamlanan Batı hegemonyasının yayılmasının önüne geçmenin ulaşılabilir bir hedef olmadığını gören Rusya, Karadeniz'in doğusunda ve kuzeyinde yer alan ülkelere yönelik politikaları ve yaklaşımıyla, havza özelinde, en azından çift kutuplu bir görünümün oluşmasını sağlamaya çalışmaktadır. Bu amaçla, Rusya'nın, Montrö Sözleşmesi'nin değiştirilmesine şiddetle karşı çıktığını, Avrasya Ekonomik Birliği Projesi ile kendi hegemonyasını Avrasya'da taçlandıracak bir yumuşak güç uygulamasına giriştiğini, enerji faktörü üzerinden ifadesini

[137] Necmettin Akten vd., "75. Yılında Montrö Boğazlar Sözleşmesi: Karadeniz'in Değişen Jeopolitiği Çerçevesinde," *ORSAM Rapor*, 51, 2011.

bulan bağımlılık unsurunu havza ülkelerine ve AB'ye karşı kullandığını ve gerektiği takdirde de, Ağustos 2008'de Gürcistan'a karşı uyguladığı gibi, sert güç unsurlarına yöneldiğini söyleyebiliriz.

Karadeniz Havzası, gerek havza ülkelerinin kendi içlerinde yaşadıkları sorunlar, gerek birbirleriyle olan ilişkilerinde beliren arızalar, gerekse de üzerinde durduğumuz Rusya ile AB/ABD arasındaki bölgesel/sistemsel hegemonya rekabeti çerçevesinde ele alındığında çatışmayı içselleştirmiş bir görüntü sunmaktadır. Ne var ki, son dönemde Karadeniz odaklı ticari, ekonomik ve özellikle enerji eksenli işbirliği girişimlerinin arttığına tanıklık ediyoruz. Nitekim havza, bu alanlarda ciddi bir potansiyele sahiptir ve bu potansiyelin kullanılabilmesi noktasında çıkarları birbirleriyle örtüşen, siyasal anlamda benzer yaklaşımlara sahip ve coğrafi açıdan birbirlerini tamamlayan ülkelerin işbirliğine gittikleri görülebilmektedir.[138] Türkiye'nin çabaları ile Güney Kafkasya'da oluşma emareleri gösteren enerji, ulaştırma ve ticaret eksenli bölgesel işbirliği buna bir örnektir. Bakü-Tiflis-Ceyhan Petrol Boru Hattı, Bakü-Tiflis-Erzurum Doğalgaz Boru Hattı, Bakü-Tiflis-Kars Demiryolu, Türkiye, Gürcistan ve Azerbaycan arasında gelişen bölgesel işbirliğini gözler önüne seren projelerdir. Bunun yanı sıra, Türkiye'nin çabalarıyla Karadeniz'de güvenliği sağlayabilmek için girişilen BLACKSEAFOR (Karadeniz Deniz İşbirliği Görev Grubu) ile Black Sea Harmony (Karadeniz Uyumu) gibi ortak güvenlik operasyonları da önemli birer hükümetlerarası işbirliği girişimidir.[139] Bu tarz çok taraflı girişimlerin yanı sıra, daha dar kapsamlı ve sektörel hükümetler arası işbirliği girişimleri de görülebilmektedir. Türkiye ile Rusya arasında, enerji, ticaret, turizm sektörlerine odaklanmış olan hükümetler arası işbirliği girişiminin stratejik bir boyuta evrilmesi[140] (iki ülkenin karşılıklı ticaret hacmi dolaylı kalemlerle 50 milyar dolara ulaşmıştır) bu duruma bir örnek olarak gösterilebilir.

1992 yılında, ABD ile AB'nin teşvikleri ve Türkiye'nin inisiyatif alması sonucu, ekonomik temelli bir işbirliği yaratma ve Geniş Karadeniz Havzası

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[138] Göktürk Tüysüzoğlu, *Karadeniz Havzasında Rekabet Analizi; İşbirliği Söylemlerinin Bölgesel Çatışma Beklentilerine Yansıması*, (İstanbul: Derin Yayınları, 2013).

[139] Mitat Çelikpala, "Türkiye ve Kafkasya: Reaksiyoner Dış Politikadan Proaktif Ritmik Diplomasiye Geçiş," *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, VII/5, 2010, s. 93-126.

[140] Fatih Özbay, "The Relations Between Turkey and Russia in the 2000s," *Perceptions*, XVI/3, 2012, s. 69-92.

tanımlamasının bölgesel meşruiyetini sağlayabilme hedefiyle oluşturulmuş olan Karadeniz Ekonomik İşbirliği Teşkilatı (KEİT), havzada işbirliğinin çatışma faktörüne üstün gelmesini sağlama yönünde başarısız olmuştur denilebilir. Türkiye'nin, bugün dahi en önemli dış politika hedeflerinden biri olan, Karadeniz Havzası'nda bölgesel bir dengeleyici olabilme anlayışının temelini atmış olan bu örgüt, havza ülkelerinin Karadeniz özelinde bir bölgeselleşme girişimine katılarak uzun vadede başarılı olabilecek bir projenin parçası olmaktansa, kısa vadede sonuç verebilecek ve onların sosyal refah ile güvenlik istemlerini karşılayabilecek AB ve NATO üyeliği seçeneğine yönelmeleri ile anlamsızlaşmıştır. Aslında KEİT'in başarısız olmasında etkili olan en önemli faktörlerden biri, Batılı aktörler ile Rusya arasındaki Karadeniz tabanlı hegemonya savaşımıdır. Zira KEİT'in kuruluş amacı, SSCB'den koparak bağımsızlığına kavuşan ya da SSCB baskısından kurtulan ve ortak yönleri Karadeniz'i çevrelemeleri olan tüm eski Doğu Bloku ülkelerini Batılı ekonomik, siyasal ve sosyal değerler ile tanıştırmak ve onları ABD liderliğinde şekillenecek Batı hegemonyasına eklemleyebilmekti. KEİT'in kurucusu Türkiye ise, NATO üyesi ve AB üyeliğini arzulayan bir ülke olarak, hemen hepsiyle yakın tarihsel, sosyo-kültürel ve coğrafi yakınlığı olan Geniş Karadeniz Havzası'ndaki devletlerin yaşayacağı dönüşüm sürecini denetleme görevini üstlenmişti. Böylece hem Batı'nın Karadeniz Havzası'na ilişkin bilgi eksikliği ve coğrafi uzaklıktan kaynaklanan dezavantajlarını Türkiye aracılığıyla biraz olsun gidermesi sağlanabilecek hem de Türkiye'nin Soğuk Savaş sonrası ne tür bir pozisyonu üstleneceğine dair soru işaretleri ortadan kalkmış olacaktı. Üstelik Türkiye'nin bölgesinde etkin bir ülke olabilme hedefinin de altı çizilecekti.[141] 1990'ların ikinci yarısından itibaren, Rusya'nın yükselişine paralel olarak, AB ve ABD'nin strateji değişikliğine gittiğini ve önceleri kendi denetimlerinde kalacak farklı bir bölgeselleşme öngördükleri Karadeniz Havzası'na, AB-NATO genişlemeleri eliyle doğrudan müdahale ettiğini görüyoruz. Bu durum, havza ülkelerinin yaptıkları dış politika tercihleri ve Rusya'nın da sert güç unsurlarını devreye sokma istekliliği ile birleştiği noktada, KEİT'in öngördüğü bölgesel işbirliği hedefini anlamsız kılmıştır. Nitekim KEİT, nispeten bağımsız bir örgüt niteliğine sahipti ve kurumsal

[141] Tüysüzoğlu, *a.g.e.*, s. 255-256.

yapısı aracılığıyla kısa vadede hükümetler arası,[142] uzun vadede ise havzanın potansiyelini yansıtan enerji, ulaştırma, turizm gibi sektörler üzerinden fonksiyonel bir işbirliği gerçekliği yaratabilecekti. Ne var ki, bugün itibarıyla çift kutupluluk üzerinden ifade edilebilecek bölgesel görünüm, KEİT'i etkisizleştirmiş ve bu örgütü havza ülkelerini ilgilendiren bir forum havzasına büründürmüştür.

Karadeniz Havzası'nın mevcut görünüm itibarıyla Batı ile Rusya arasında dengelenmiş bir çift kutupluluğa eklemlendiğini ve bunun havzadaki çatışma ve işbirliği iklimini etkileyen birincil faktör olduğunu belirttik. Bu görünümü içselleştirmiş olan Karadeniz Havzası, Rusya'nın çok kutupluluğu uluslararası ilişkilere hâkim kılmayı hedefleyen sistemsel öngörüsü çerçevesinde değerlendirildiğinde, oldukça kritik bir role sahiptir. Zira Rusya, çok kutupluluk hedefine ulaşabilme yönünde Karadeniz Havzası'nın da yer aldığı Avrasya genelinde kurgulayabileceği hegemonyanın çok önemli bir rolü olacağına inanmaktadır. Ne var ki, uluslararası sistem çerçevesinde çok kutupluluğu yapılandırmayı hedefleyen bir aktörün, kendi yakın çevresindeki aykırı sesleri bastırmayı ve Karadeniz özelinde Batı etkisini silmeyi ya da etkisizleştirmeyi hedefliyor oluşu kendi içerisinde bir çelişki ya da ironi yaratmaktadır. ABD ve AB ise, Karadeniz Havzası özelinde genel itibarıyla birlikte hareket ederek, Rusya'nın Karadeniz'de kuracağı hegemonyaya dayalı olarak kendilerine yönlendirebileceği gücünü ve potansiyel sistemsel etkinliğini kırmayı hedeflemektedirler. Rusya'nın uluslararası sistemin işleyişi noktasında savunduğu çok kutupluluğu, bu ülkenin yakın coğrafyası üzerinden işleterek, Rusya'ya mesaj vermeyi hedefleyen ABD, havzaya yaklaşım noktasında AB ile birlikte hareket ettiği için, bu girişimin çok boyutluluktan çok çift kutupluluğu gündeme getireceği ortadadır. Havzada Rusya'nın ardından en önemli bölgesel güç konumundaki Türkiye ise birbirlerini dengelemeye çalışan bu aktörler arasında bir bağlantı noktası olarak sistemsel rolünü ve etkinliğini kanıtlayabilmek amacındadır.

Sonuç

Soğuk Savaş dönemi boyunca eklemlenmiş olduğu SSCB hegemonyasına dayalı tek kutupluluğun SSCB'nin dağılması sonrası ortadan kalkma

[142] Panagiota Manoli, "Reflecting on the BSEC: Achievements, Limitations and the Way Forward," *ICBSS Policy Brief*, I, 2006.

emareleri göstermesi, Karadeniz Havzası'nı Batılı aktörler ile Rusya arasındaki hegemonya mücadelesinin merkezi haline getirmiştir. Soğuk Savaş'ın sona ermesinin ardından havzanın kapsamına ve coğrafi görünümüne dair Geniş Karadeniz Havzası tanımlaması çerçevesinde farklı bir bölgesel gerçekliğin yaratılması da, içselleştirilen coğrafi, sosyo-kültürel, tarihsel ve siyasal kimlikler ekseninde bölgesel çatışma faktörünün altını çizen bir gerçeklik olmuştur. Havzaya dair en önemli bölgesel işbirliği kurumu olan KEİT'in dahi Geniş Karadeniz Havzası bağlamında anlamlandırılıyor oluşu, bölgeye içkin bir çatışma sürekliliği yaratmıştır.

Uluslararası sistem içerisindeki aktörlerin dış politika uygulamalarına yön veren en önemli unsur haline gelen enerji konusunda potansiyeli olan bir bölge olan Karadeniz Havzası, aynı zamanda Orta Asya-Hazar Havzası ve Ortadoğu gibi enerji zengini bölgelere komşu durumdadır. Bu yönüyle Karadeniz'i kontrol eden gücün enerji kaynakları bağlamında önemli bir güce sahip olabileceği ortadadır.

Mevcut konjonktürde, uluslararası ilişkiler çerçevesinde en çok dillendirilen husus, Soğuk Savaş sonrasında ABD'nin liderliği ekseninde Batı hegemonyasına dayalı bir tek kutupluluğu içselleştireceği belirtilen uluslararası sistemin çok kutupluluğa doğru yol aldığıdır. Zira ABD, kendi sistemsel hegemonyasını belli aktörlere/devletlere/bölgelere kabul ettirmeyi başaramadığı için hegemonya kavramını anlamsızlaştıran askeri çözümlerden medet umar hale gelmiştir. Yine, özellikle 1990'ların ikinci yarısından itibaren bu hegemonya arayışının dünyanın çeşitli bölgelerinde yer alan çeşitli güçler tarafından sorgulanması ve kabul edilmemesi, Soğuk Savaş'ın hemen ardından ABD liderliğine dayalı ve AB'yi de kendisine eklemleyen ve "tarihin sonu" olarak görülen hegemonya inisiyatifinin başarılı olamayacağını kanıtlamıştır. Özellikle Çin ve Rusya gibi küresel aktörler tarafından önerilen ve ABD'nin sistemsel partneri AB içerisinde dahi, ABD ile sürdürülen ittifakın niteliğine dair tartışmalara neden olan çok kutuplu bir sistem arayışı, uluslararası sistemin bugününe ve geleceğine ışık tutacak en önemli gerçeklik haline gelmektedir. Çin ve Rusya, çok kutupluluk fikrine önderlik ederek, sistem içerisindeki tüm aktörlerin çıkarlarını ve gelecek öngörülerini göz önünde bulunduracak ve karar alma mekanizmasına çok taraflılığı eklemleyerek daha demokratik bir sistemsel yapı yaratacak bu oluşum sayesinde dengelenmiş bir sistemin yaratılabileceğini ve bu sistem

bağlamında çatışma faktörünün önemli oranda baskılanabileceğini kaydetmektedirler.

Karadeniz Havzası ise, mevcut görünümü ile çift kutuplu bir sistemsel yapıya sahiptir. Nitekim havzanın batısında, Balkanlar'da, AB ve NATO genişlemelerine paralel bir Batı hegemonyasının oluştuğu söylenebilecekken, Karadeniz'in kuzeyinde ve doğusunda Rusya'nın siyasal ve askeri baskısının temel belirleyici olduğu ortadadır. Zira çok kutupluluk tartışmaları çerçevesinde ABD ile olan müttefiklik ilişkilerinin dahi tartışıldığı AB, Karadeniz Havzası'na yaklaşım çerçevesinde ABD ile birlikte hareket etmektedir. AB ve NATO genişlemelerinin paralel yürütülmesi bu tamamlayıcılığın en net göstergesidir. Havza ülkelerine yaklaşım noktasında Rusya'nın daha çok sert güç unsurlarına yöneldiği söylenebilecekken, AB, sahip olduğu demokratik ve müreffeh toplum yapısı çerçevesinde, içselleştirmiş olduğu yumuşak güç uygulamalarını kullanmaya çalışmaktadır. AB'nin güvenlik alanında yaşadığı boşluğu da NATO doldurmaktadır. ABD ve AB'nin en önemli hedefi, Karadeniz Havzası'nda, Soğuk Savaş benzeri topyekûn bir Rus hegemonyasının oluşmasının engellenmesidir.

Türkiye, oluşan çift kutupluluğun havza özelindeki dengeleyicisidir. NATO üyesi ve AB ile üyelik müzakereleri yürüten bir ülke olmasına karşın, Montrö Sözleşmesi'nin değiştirilmesine karşı çıkarak havzayı ABD'nin savaş gemilerine kapatan Türkiye, son dönemde Rusya ile olan ikili ilişkilerine de stratejik bir mahiyet kazandırmıştır. Havza özelindeki en önemli işbirliği örgütü olan KEİT'in kurucusu olan Türkiye, Batılı değerlerin havzaya yayılması noktasında öncü bir aktör olmasına karşın, aynı zamanda Karadeniz özelinde bağımsız bir bölgeselleşme girişimi yaratılmasını arzulamaktadır. Ne var ki, havzaya egemen olan çift kutupluluk, havza devletlerinin dış politika tercihlerini de rekabet çerçevesinde kurguladığı için KEİT'in etkinliği arttırılamamakta ve Karadeniz özelindeki işbirliği inisiyatifleri kısa vadeli, proje odaklı ve geçici bir mahiyet taşıyan hükümetler arası antlaşmalara bağımlı kalmaktadır.

Kendi içerisinde çift kutuplu bir yapı gösteren Karadeniz Havzası, uluslararası sistemin ne tür bir yapılanma çerçevesinde işleyeceğini belirleyecek önemli bir cephe unsurudur. Nitekim Rusya, bu bölgeyi kendi sistemsel rolünü biçimlendirecek ve çok kutupluluk anlayışını güçlendirecek bir ağırlık merkezi olarak görmektedir. Rusya Devlet Başkanı Vladimir Putin'in, hiçbir etkinliği olmayan BDT (Bağımsız Devletler Topluluğu)

yerine Avrasya özelinde ikame etmeye çalıştığı Avrasya Birliği Projesi'nin en temel etkinlik alanlarından biri de Karadeniz Havzası'dır. Rusya, Karadeniz Havzası'nı, Batı'nın sistemsel etkinliğini durduracak bir sınır bölgesi olarak görmektedir. ABD ise AB ile birlikte hareket ederek, Rusya'nın arka bahçesine yerleşmeye ve özellikle Karadeniz ekseninde oluşacak Rus hegemonyasına dayalı bir tek kutupluluğun önüne geçmeye çalışmaktadır. Böylece Rusya'nın, Avrasya genelinde artacak bölgesel/sistemsel etkinliği dengelenecek ve Putin'in her ortamda savunduğu çok kutupluluk anlayışı, Rusya'nın arka bahçesinde de çift kutupluluk çerçevesinde ifadesini bulacaktır.

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Energy and Geopolitical Interests of the Leading World Countries Relative to Black Sea and Caspian Sea Region

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Economic competitiveness of a country or a region is defined by its level of use of innovative technologies. However it should be noted that security of economy with energy resources, continues to remain a fundamental basis of economic independence and potential of economic growth of any state. Movement of the international geopolitical interests in the power sphere flows to the Caspian and Black Sea regions, and each of these territories plays the key independent role in providing with energy resources of the countries of Europe. Huge stocks of oil and gas resources fall on the countries of the Caspian region, it should be noted the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline and the prospective Nabucco project. It should be noted that the Black Sea region throughout many centuries was and now remains a link between the East and the West. Therefore regardless of the different use, it is impossible to consider these two regions separately and at the same time not to consider interests both. The efficiency and reliability of cooperation in the power sphere of the countries of production, transit and consumption of energy resources should be considered as a whole.

Since the beginning of the 90s, after publication of data on geological exploration, Caspian region has been in the sight of the international oil and political circles. Forecasts about the possible income of about 100 billion dollar were given. It provoked strong interest from the state and private structures of the countries of the near and far abroad to problems of development of oil and gas richness of the Caspian Sea. It is possible to give "The contract of century" concluded in the 1994 between the government of Azerbaijan and multinational oil corporations (such as BP, Statoil) as an

example. In process of strengthening of the state independence of Azerbaijan, political stability, democracy in society and the market relations in economy received bigger development. Conditions for integration into world economy were created.

Thanks to pursued policy, Azerbaijan began to play a significant role in geopolitics of the Caucasus and the Caspian region. Thanking not only to oil and gas stocks, but also a position taken in Black Sea and Caspian regions, Azerbaijan turned into the geopolitical center of concentration of interests of the USA, the countries of Europe and Asia. Thanks to development of oil and gas resources, and also implementation of grandiose projects for their export to the world markets, the Caspian region turned into one of the most important regions of the world in the 21st century. The agreement which has become known as "Contract of century" opened ample opportunities for the foreign companies of signing of new agreements in Azerbaijan. Since 1994 to the present 27 agreements for the investigation, production of hydrocarbons and share distribution of production were signed between SOCAR (State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic) and the foreign oil companies.

Value of agreements for the Azerbaijani oil policy can be generalized in the following way:

- During implementation of contracts the infrastructure of the oil industry will considerably be renewed and a new, powerful infrastructure of the oil industry will appear;
- The stream of fixed capital for other spheres of domestic economy will be provided;
- Azerbaijan will get new and modern technologies;
- New enterprises to serve the foreign oil companies will be created in a large numbers in Azerbaijan;
- A strong impetus to development of banking and insurance business will be given;
- A large layer of businessmen who will act within laws of a civilized society will be created;
- The budget will increase considerably with the taxes paid by the foreign companies from their profits;

- New workplaces will open in various spheres of the industry and service.

As a result of all above, shortly a powerful economic potential will be created in the country that in turn will allow keeping and strengthening independence of Azerbaijan in further.

In due time on the Black Sea region processes of social and economic modernization which was connected with formation of the regional states was carried out. Geostrategic importance of the region define not only possibilities of the next transport connection of the Caspian states with the countries of Europe, but also prospect of huge deposits of oil and gas, development and deliveries of which to the world market begins soon. It also explains the fact of the beginning of vigorous activity of the international oil and gas corporations in the region. Transit value of the region as a key element which connects the East and the West increases more and more against a fight aggravation for control over energy resources and power streams, and also the geographical proximity to the Middle East defines the strategic value of the Black Sea region.

Key actors who try to be active in the Black Sea it is possible to divide into 3 groups:

1. World Leaders: The European Union, USA, Russia are full-fledged geopolitical actors and they independently define their interests and policies in the region. Their interests in the region constantly increase.

2. Regional Countries: Turkey, Azerbaijan, Iran, Ukraine, Romania and other camps of the region. It is difficult for these participants to pursue independent policy irrespective of global actors because of economic, politically and other restrictions. Therefore they are compelled to coordinate their actions with them.

3. International Organizations: NATO, EU, OSCE, GUAM, and others. Their interests and actions have direct influences on regional processes.

According to National Security Strategy of the USA, Black Sea and Caspian regions are considered important not only because of oil and gas stocks, but also because of the routes which connect the markets of Central and South East Asia. Value of these regions for the USA can be formulated in the following provisions:

1. The Black Sea is an important piece of way for Caucasus, Caspian Sea and Central Asia to the Western markets. Therefore, the Black Sea is placed in the center of power corridors between the East-West and the South-North.

2. These regions are also considered as an alternative for of oil and gas reserves of the Middle East which is the reason that pushed USA to adjustment of good relations with these regions.

3. USA desires to redirect power streams from the Black Sea region into the Mediterranean. Even if the influence and presence of USA in the Black Sea is very limited and it is supervised by other states (Russia and Turkey) in military and economic sense; the Mediterranean is almost completely supervised by the United States and their allies on NATO. Besides, projects of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Samsun-Ceyhan give the chance to the USA to get independent access to the Caspian oil region.

Now three main were defined directed the Caspian resources on the world market: Europe, China and Persian Gulf. The European Union is the main consumer for the given resources. In the conditions of strong power dependence on the Russian energy carriers, the European Union carries out attempts to establish independent access to stocks of energy resources in Central Asia. According to forecasts of the European Union, the Caspian region can provide about 15% of requirements of EU in gas till 2020. Access to stocks of gas of Central Asia has to provide a diversification of energy deliveries and long ago became one of the most important questions of energy policy of EU. Since 2007, in connection with accession of Romania and Bulgaria into EU, the European Union becomes the active player of the Black Sea region to which it got direct access. As the Black Sea is at the intersection of energy routes that are particularly important for EU which ensures its own energy safety from external sources; the safety and stability of this region is extremely important for EU. Today there are about ten routes for the delivery of Caspian resources to the European market.

1. The Blue Stream gas pipeline crosses the Black Sea from the bottom and has the capacity of 16 billion cubic meters/year.

2. The gas pipeline from Russia to Turkey which passes through Ukraine, Moldova, Romania and Bulgaria is in use since 1988. In 1996 the capacity of gas grew to 14 billion cubic meters/year.

3. Transportation of crude oil by tankers from the Russian port of Novorossiysk to Walnut port in Oleksandropolis via Bulgarian port of Burgas for further sending to consumers in Western Europe.

4. Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Oil pipeline that has entered into exploitation in 2006 and pumps over 1 million barrels of crude oil a day/50 million tons per year.

5. The Kirkuk-Ceyhan (Iraq-Turkey) Oil pipeline was put into operation in 1999, and it has the capacity of 1.5 million barrel in a day

6. Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum Gas pipeline is put into operation in 2007 and has the volume of 6,6 billion cubic meters of gas a year.

7. Nabucco project which will transport natural gas via Turkey to Austria through Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary will have a capacity about 32 billion cubic m/year is at the development stage.

Additional opportunities for satisfaction of increasing demand of the European consumers, apart from the main projects of transportation, will guarantee diversification as sources of gas and transit routes. The Nabucco project answers this purpose only but its weakness is the lack of guaranteed volumes of gas. This reason is called also by the European politicians who are supporters of the Russian South Stream. Russia tries to reach two main objectives (construction of its own gas pipelines and minimization of possibility of construction of the Nabucco project) because "Nabucco" not only provides an alternative to the Russian routes for delivery of Central Asian natural gas but it is a competitor on gas purchases at the countries. The most important argument which is given by the Russian side concerning the projects is the reliability of deliveries in comparison to already existing transit projects because, according to Russia, the project depends on the third countries is not always safe and reliable. The wide network of the main gas pipelines allows Russia to deliver natural gas to EU countries with the minimum expenses. By developing and constructing new main pipelines, Russia tries to strengthen its monopolist status in the market as much possible.

Having considered and analyzed power policy of the states of world powers in the territory of the Caspian and Black Sea region, we can draw a conclusion that the policy of Russia is aimed at a desire to fix a zone of the influence on the regional countries (Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia).

The United States, without wishing to weaken the influence, try to relocate the main ways of transportation of energy resources to a zone of the Mediterranean Sea where they have a strong influence, and coincidence of interests between the USA and EU give these players all advantages in association of the forces for achievement of goals.

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LEGAL DISPUTES AND ETHNIC CONFLICTS

Channel İstanbul Project in Terms of International Law

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Introduction

On the eve of 2011 general election, the president of Justice and Development Party (JDP) and Prime Minister Erdogan explained the idea of constructing a channel in one of his electioneering speeches. He named this channel as "crazy project".[143] The construction of a channel between the Marmara Sea and the Black Sea which is parallel to the Bosphorus has been debated on occasion since then. However it is also obvious that such a giant investment which is very important is still not discussed that much. Starting from the year 2011 (including the first half of 2013) the project did not take so much of attention and therefore there were not many people who were talking about the crazy project, however in August 2013 the discussions about the channel and the third bridge have started again.

The main reason of the construction of the channel is -as clarified by the Prime Minister- the increased traffic through the Bosphorus Strait. Especially with the increase in the number of the Russian oil tankers passing through the Bosphorus, Turkey was forced to take new measures each year. Even the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline can be regarded as an outcome of such urgency. The planned Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline, pumping Russian oil from Samsun, Turkey's Black Sea port, to Ceyhan, a Mediterranean port, is also because of this heavy traffic. However, constructing of this pipeline for now is suspended because of its high cost. As Russian Energy Minister Alexander Novak said "It depends on whether this project will be competitive enough to survive… However, it does not seem so at the time being…" Following the

[143] Sum Jones, "Istanbul New Bosphorus Canal to Surpass Suez or Panama," *The Guardian Website* 27.04.2011, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/apr/27/istanbul-new-bosphorus-canal (26.12.2013).

early euphoria were growing concerns on the Russian side that the proposed shipment tariffs for Samsun-Ceyhan oil were less attractive than the fees imposed for oil transported via the Bosphorus, where accidents are a concern due to congested oil tanker traffic.[144]

Although protecting the Bosphorus waterside residences from the tanker accidents is one of the primary reasons of the channel project, having a new Bosphorus is also another outcome. That's why the estate prices of the probable construction place of the channel have risen very quickly since spring 2011. Beside that outcome the probable travel fee of the tankers and ships which will use the channel will be an attractive income for Turkish national treasure.

In this paper, the concerned project will be analyzed in terms of international law. Regarding the project environmental effects must also be taken into consideration. However, while the deep discussion of the environmental aspects of this project will be left to another study, only some international law aspects of these environmental problems will be dealt in this paper.

For a comprehensive analysis of the subject then let's first look at the resources of international law on the related issue:

International Law Resources on the Concerned Project

For analyzing this project in terms of international law first of all we have to specify which resources could be implemented to Channel Istanbul Project. That's why we mostly use the international treaties that are related with the Bosphorus, Black Sea, environmental problems or channel construction like that one.

First of all there are some general regulations related to hegemony, equality, *pacta sunt servanda* and environmental protection. Charter of the United Nations Article 2 says "the organization is based on the principle of

[144] Ergin Hava, "Russia Says Oil Pipeline via Turkey not Financially Viable," *Todays Zaman Website* 21.04.2013, http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=313283 (17.12.2013).

the sovereign equality of all its members"[145]. The sovereignty gives the right of carrying out and operating on any project within the borders of a country. However contemporary international law brings some limits due to human rights problems and environmental threats.

For straits and other waterways as a general resource, we have to look at United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) of 1982. This Convention is regarded as the constitution of the Law of the Sea. More than 160 states are contracting parties of the treaty. However Turkey did not sign this Convention because of the disagreement on the coastal waters and continental shelf for east Aegean islands. Even though Turkey is not contracting party of the UNCLOS, the provisions of the Convention that Turkey did not oppose in the course of the negotiations are also restrictive for it. According to some authorities, even if 2 of 3 states accept any arrangement, it is seen as "international custom" for all.

On the other hand, as it is seen in the development process of the international law, many regulations of international customary law have been codified through many international treaties. Concerning the Bosphorus the most important treaty is 1936 Montreux Treaty. Fundamental rules of the 1936 Treaty have been codified from customary law like 1982 Convention or others. According to the Statute of the International Court of Justice, after the international conventions "International custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law" is also one of the main resources.[146] For these reasons, especially on the environmental issues Turkey could not be unmindful of UNCLOS.

"The general principles of law recognized by civilized nations" are third group of resources of the international law as mentioned in the Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 38. In this context the sovereign equality and independence of the states are foremost rules of the general principles of the international law.

In addition to the general regulations, we see lot of treaties on the Bosphorus in last several centuries. In the 18th and 19th centuries, there were

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[145] "Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice," https://treaties.un.org/doc/ Publication/CTC/uncharter.pdf (25.12.2013).

[146] "Statute of the International Court of Justice," *International Court of Justice Website* http://www.icj-cij.org/ documents/?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0, (26.12.2013).

several wars among Ottoman Empire, Russia, UK and others related to Bosphorus. Almost all agreements after those wars contained some arrangements concerning Bosphorus regime. After the Independence War of Turkey, the founding treaty of the new Republic of Turkey, the Lausanne Treaty of 1923 is also one of the milestones of this process. By the time of 1936 Montreux Treaty, the Lausanne Treaty (Lausanne Straits Convention or Convention Relating to the Regime of the Straits, 24 July 1923) was completely in effect.

Because of the conditions of 1930s, the littoral states of the Black Sea or the contracting parties of the Lausanne Treaty necessitated a new regulation on the Straits. Hence the signing states "desiring to regulate transit and navigation in the Straits of the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmara and the Bosphorus comprised under the general term 'Straits' in such manner as to safeguard, within the framework of Turkish security and of the security, in the Black Sea, of the riparian States" made a new convention.

The Main Questions

Related with the construction of the Channel Istanbul there will be various issues related to international law. The main question of this paper is to answer the question that whether the below-mentioned acts are appropriate to the international law or not:

1. To construct such a channel,

2. If there will be an environmental disaster or danger for Black Sea by constructing such a channel,

3. Prohibiting of passing of ships in Bosphorus,

4. Closure of the Bosphorus for naval or tanker traffic and enforcing them to use the Channel.

5. Pricing of ships passing which will use the Channel,

6. Enforcing the ships which will use the Channel to pay pilotage and rowage

1. Constructing a Channel and International Law

First of all as an independent and sovereign country, Turkey has the right to implement any project that may be crazy or not. It is not important whether

the project is economic or non-economic. To implement such a project Turkey need not to get any permission from any other states. This right of Turkey depends on the general principle of the law. Furthermore there is no need to have any international treaty especially for such an act. As a sovereign country, Turkey is free to have any project and to implement it even though it is crazy! However in this century restrictions which are derived from human rights, environmental issues or signed conventions are increasing every day.

2. Environmental Problem and International Law

If there will be an environmental risk for Black Sea or for the region because of this channel, Turkey is not free to act as it wishes due to human rights and environmental issues. These cases are open for intervention of other states and those acts are starting to get more *jus cogens* character each passing day. This study does not examine whether the channel project will induce an environmental disaster or not however there are some serious assertions on this issue. For example it is expected that if such a channel will be constructed the hydro-carbon stock on the basin of the Black Sea will spread out all of the sea and the Straits, because of delicate balance of the Bosphorus and Black Sea.[147] However, such a project needs more comprehensive investigations on its environmental effects. National or international research projects must be directed to that issue and also bigger funds must be dedicated for them. Not only Turkish but also European Union funds must be used in such researches. Then if there is any environmental danger, what will be the legal status of the channel?

If because of the construction of this channel there is any environmental problem for the Black Sea, the Crazy project will be unlawful in terms of international law. Technical aspects of environmental problems are out of this paper's content, however we all know that the international environmental law is developing and every other day it is restricting more the states' sovereignty on these issues. Therefore if the Black Sea environmental regime develops and starts to see the project as catastrophe then the project will anyway be problematic according to the international law.

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[147] For example, Mikdat Kadıoğlu, "Kanal İstanbul'un Çılgın Etkileri" [Crazy effects of the Channel Istanbul], *Milliyet*, 19 Mayıs 2013.

3. Impeding the Passage of Vessels through the Bosphorus

Prohibiting of the passing of the ships in international straits is contrary to international law. According to 1982 Convention, Articles 37 and 38 «..In straits .., all ships and aircraft enjoy the right of transit passage, which shall not be impeded…Transit passage means the exercise in accordance with this part of the freedom of navigation and over flight solely for purpose of continuous and expeditious transit of the strait between one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone. However, the requirement of continuous and expeditious transit does not preclude passage through the strait for the purpose of entering, leaving or returning from a State bordering the strait, subject to the conditions of entry to that State…"[148]

As for 1936 Montreux Treaty, Article 2 writes that: "In time of peace, merchant vessels shall enjoy complete freedom of transit and navigation in the Straits, by day and by night, under any flag and with any kind of cargo, without any formalities.. No taxes or charges other than those authorized by Annex I to the present Convention shall be levied by the Turkish authorities on these vessels when passing in transit without calling at a port in the Straits.."[149] It must be added that this freedom is valid for peace time and for merchant vessels. War times and war ships rules are arranged in other articles of the Treaty.

In the light of these regulations Turkish authorities can not impede the right of transit passage from the Bosphorus. Albeit Turkey did not sign the 1982 UNCLOS, 1936 Montreux Treaty is so important and Turkey is the first and foremost party of it. On the other hand, as mentioned above this part of UNCLOS is obligatory for Turkey resulting from the codification process of the international customs. For these reasons prohibiting ships passing through Bosphorus is impossible.

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148 "Straits Used For International Navigation," UNCLOS, http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/ texts/unclos/part3.htm (30.12.2013)

149 "Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits Signed at Montreux, July 20th, 1936," http://sam.baskent. edu.tr/belge/Montreux_ENG.pdf (30.12.2013).

4. Closure of the Bosphorus for Naval or Tanker Traffic and International Law

Closure of the Bosphorus for naval or tanker traffic is also impossible. Impeding of the passage and closure of the Bosphorus may be different sometimes. Due to meteorological reasons (bad weather conditions) the Bosphorus may be closed not only for international passage but also for boats between Üsküdar and Eminönü, the two littoral towns of Istanbul.

The Bosphorus is sometimes also closed for only limited days or limited hours a day in a year for some cultural and sport activities. Prime Minister Erdogan said that the Bosphorus will be used only for cultural and sport activities throughout the year.[150] But such type of closure is also contrary to the arrangements especially in the 1936 Montreux Treaty.

5. Pricing of Ships Passing

Pricing of ships passing which will use the planned Channel instead of Bosphorus is depending on the constructive country. Turkey is entitled to get toll. As it was mentioned above "… No taxes or charges … shall be levied by the Turkish authorities on these vessels passing in transit without calling at a port in the Straits.." but this rule will not be valid for the ships which will use the planned Channel. As for other artificial channels like Suez or Panama, for planned Channel Istanbul Turkey is free for pricing of ships and tankers passing which use the Channel. The problem will arise if the ships and tankers are forced (by limitation on the use of Bosphorus) to use the Channel, so to pay the toll. However because of the heavy traffic sometimes the vessels may wait two days and in such conditions although the Bosphorus is free for any vessel, the ships may themselves instead of waiting prefer to use the Channel and pay the toll.

6. Pilotage and Towage and International Law

Enforcing the ships which will use the planned Channel to pay pilotage and towage will depend on the Turkish authorities. According to Montreux Treaty Article 2/3 "pilotage and towage remain optional". But this option is

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[150] "İstanbul'a İkinci Boğaz: Kanal İstanbul," *CNNTurk Website* http://www4.cnnturk.com/2011/turkiye/04/27/istanbula.ikinci.bogaz.kanal.istanbul/614661.0/ (30.12.2013).

valid for the Bosphorus, the natural way from a high sea to another, not for the Channel. Since this Channel will be artificial, the owner country does have the right to decide how this Channel will be used. Therefore Turkey may easily enforce the vessels and tankers passing the Channel for pilotage and towage.

Conclusion

1936 Montreux Treaty is the main source of international law for the Bosphorus. Also for the Channel Project this Treaty is the foremost source. The Montreux Treaty is very important not only for Turkey and littoral countries of the Black Sea but also for both global and regional peace. This reality is one of the main reasons why the 1936 Treaty must be protected from any changes for economic goals. Due to this "Crazy Project", Montreux Treaty should not be opened to any discussion or injured.

On the other hand although Turkey is not a part of 1982 Convention because of the Aegean Sea disputes with Greece, much of the arrangements of this Convention have been accepted and implemented by Turkey. Apart from that many articles of this Convention are also international customs which are also the main resources of international law. At the same time as a special convention, a lot of articles of Montreux Treaty are the same with the general convention regulations of 1982.

Under the light of these treaties as an independent state Turkey is free to construct any channel or implement any project however due to that construction the other states should not bear new charges or should not lose any advantage which is under the guarantee of international treaties. Furthermore because of such a project other states or mankind should not come across various environmental problems.

Consequently, if the Channel will be constructed, due to international obligations the Bosphorus could not be closed and the vessels could not be forced to use this Channel. Vessels using the Channel will have to pay the toll but the ones using the Bosphorus will not. Furthermore the vessels should not be forced to use the planned Channel.

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Karadeniz ve Çevresinde Yaşanan Güncel Uluslararası Deniz Hukuku Sorunları

(Contemporary Sea Law Problems in The Black Sea Basin)

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Hazar Denizi havzası ve Orta Asya ülkelerinde üretilen petrolün, dünya pazarlarına aktarma merkezi olarak kullanılan Karadeniz'in güvenliği her geçen gün daha da önem kazanmaktadır. Karadeniz'de günde ortalama olarak 300 gemi hareket halindedir. Bu gemilerin yarısı Türk Boğazlarını kullanmaktadır. Boğazlardan bir günde geçiş yapan 150 gemiden yaklaşık olarak 30'u petrol ve yan ürünlerini taşıyan gemilerdir. Kıyı Emniyeti Genel Müdürlüğü'nün 2012 yılı Faaliyet Raporu'ndaki verilere göre, 2012 yılında, İstanbul Boğazı'ndan 28.077 ve Çanakkale Boğazı'ndan 24.062 olmak üzere Boğazlar bölgesinden toplam 52.139 gemi geçiş yapmıştır.

Karadeniz'e kıyısı olan devletler ile kıyısı olmayan devletlerin Karadeniz'deki faaliyetleri, 1936 tarihli Montrö Boğazlar Sözleşmesi ve 1982 tarihli Birleşmiş Milletler Deniz Hukuku Sözleşmesi'ne göre yürütülmektedir. Türkiye BM Deniz Hukuku Sözleşmesinin 3, 15, 73, 84 ve 121 nci maddelerine itiraz etmiş ve sözleşmeyi imzalamamıştır. 3 ncü madde Karasularının genişliği, 15 nci madde Sahilleri bitişik veya karşı karşıya olan devletler arasında karasularının sınırlandırılması, 73 ncü madde Sahildar devletin kanun ve kurallarının yürürlüğe konulması, 84 ncü madde Deniz haritaları ve coğrafi koordinatlara ilişkin listeler, 121 nci madde ise Adaların Rejimi ile ilgilidir.

Karadeniz'de Türk karasularının genişliği 12 mildir. 1986 yılında Türk Hükümeti tarafından alınan karar ile Karadeniz'de 200 mil genişliğinde Münhasır Ekonomik Bölge ilan edilmiştir. Türkiye'nin Karadeniz'de, FIR Hattı, NAVTEX, COSPAS-SARSAT ve Arama Kurtarma sorumluluğu vardır.

Türkiye Cumhuriyeti ile Karadeniz'e sahili olan Bulgaristan, Romanya, Ukrayna, Rusya Federasyonu ve Gürcistan arasında, 2001 yılında imzalanan anlaşma ile **Karadeniz İşbirliği Görev Grubu (BLACKSEAFOR)** kurulmuştur. Anlaşmanın amacı, bölgede güvenlik ve istikrara katkıda bulunarak iyi komşuluk ilişkilerini güçlendirmek olarak belirlenmiştir. BLACKSEAFOR, biri Komuta Kontrol Gemisi olmak üzere, tarafların tahsis edeceği en az 4-6 gemiden müteşekkildir. BLACKSEAFOR'a tahsis edilebilecek harp gemilerinin ana sınıfları, Fırkateyn/Muhrip, Korvet/Karakol Botu, Mayın Tarama Gemisi, Amfibi Gemiler ve Tekneler'dir. BLACKSEAFOR'un görevleri;

- Arama ve Kurtarma Harekâtı,
- İnsani Yardım Harekâtı,
- Mayın karşı tedbirleri harekâtı,
- Çevre koruma harekâtı,
- İyi niyet ziyaretleri ve
- Barışı Destekleme Harekâtı gibi tüm taraflarca kararlaştırılan diğer görevlerdir.

Türkiye, BLACKSEAFOR'dan ayrı olarak, 2004 yılında **Karadeniz Uyumu Harekatı'**nı (Operation Black Sea Harmony) başlatmıştır. Birleşmiş Milletler Güvenlik Konseyi'nin 1373, 1540 ve 1566 sayılı kararları çerçevesinde yürütülen harekâta, 2006 yılında Rusya Federasyonu, 2007 yılında Ukrayna ve 2009 yılında da Romanya katılmıştır. Harekâtın amacı, Karadeniz'de terörizm, kitle imha silahlarının yayılması ve diğer muhtemel yasadışı faaliyetlere karşı caydırıcılık sağlamak ve bu risklerle mücadele etmektir.

Karadeniz ve çevresinde, değişik zamanlarda ve değişik ülkelere ait askeri ve ticari gemiler tarafından uluslararası hukuk kuralları ihlal edilmiştir. Bu ihlallerden başlıcaları şunlardır:

a. Scan Bothnia gemisinin yaptığı ihlaller:

İngiliz bayraklı Scan Bothnia isimli ticari gemi, Ukrayna'dan yükünü aldıktan sonra İstanbul Boğazı'ndan geçiş yapmış ve 10 Haziran 2006 günü, Derince limanına yanaşık durumdayken, Sahil Güvenlik birliklerine gemi ile ilgili bir ihbar gelmiştir. İhbarda, gemide 6 adet tank ve bu tanklara ait bir konteyner olduğu belirtilmiştir. Geminin gümrüklü sahada bulunması

nedeniyle yapılan ilk incelemede, geminin boğaz geçişinde yetkili birimlere yükünü genel kargo olarak ve yükü arasında tehlikeli yük olmadığını beyan ettiği tespit edilmiştir. Bunun üzerine Derince limanında bulunan gümrük yetkilileri garnizonda bulunan askeri birliğe başvurarak bilirkişi talebinde bulunmuştur.

Gümrük yetkilileri ve askeri bilirkişi ile müştereken yapılan kontrolde, gemi güvertesinde 4 ve ambarında 2 olmak üzere toplam 6 adet zırhlı araç olduğu belirlenmiştir. Zırhlı araçların, Rus yapımı T-72 tank şasisine monte edilmiş, üzerinde vinç tertibatı olan, ön tarafında dozer kepçesi bulunan, arka tarafında kurtarma ve çekme amaçlı tertibatı bulunan paletli zırhlı araç / tank kurtarıcı olduğu tespit edilmiştir.

Konteyner'de bulunan sandıkların üzerinde ihracatçı firma olarak bir Ukrayna şirketinin, ithalatçı firma olarak ta bir Amerikan şirketinin isimlerinin yazılı olduğu görülmüştür. Sandıkların içerisinden 12.7 mm.lik uçaksavar makinalı tüfeği ile tanklara ait yedek parçalar bulunmuştur.

Zırhlı araç ve silahların bulunması üzerine gemi limanda bir hafta süreyle alıkonulmuştur. İhracat ve ithalat yapan firmalar ile temasa geçilerek silahların aidiyeti doğrulanmış ve bunun üzerine Kocaeli Cumhuriyet Başsavcılığınca takipsizlik kararı verilmiştir. Daha sonra gemiye para cezası verilerek limandan ayrılmasına müsaade edilmiştir.

Geminin İngiliz bayraklı, askeri malzemelerinde Amerikan şirketi vasıtasıyla Irak'a gönderilecek olması nedeniyle konu ulusal basın tarafından yakından takip edilmiştir. Bazı basın ve yayın organları tarafından, gemiye askeri bilirkişinin gönderilmesi ile geminin alıkonulmasının uluslararası hukuka ve iç hukuka aykırı olduğu iddia edilmiş ve bu konu sert bir şekilde eleştirmiştir. Hâlbuki 4926 sayılı **Kaçakçılıkla Mücadele Kanunu**'nun 16 ncı maddesine göre, "kaçakçılığı önleme, izleme ve soruşturmakla görevli olanların bilgi ve belge talepleri, kamu veya özel kişilerce eksiksiz karşılanmak zorundadır". Geminin askeri araç, yedek parça ve silahları beyan etmemesi nedeniyle, konunun uluslararası silah kaçakçılığı olup olmadığının belirlenmesi ve askeri bilirkişilerin gemiye gönderilerek durum tespitinin yapılması yasa gereğidir.

Birleşmiş Milletler Deniz Hukuku Sözleşmesi (BMDHS)'nin 2 nci maddesine göre sahildar devletin egemenliği kara ülkesinin ve iç sularının ötesinde karasularını da kapsar. Karasularından Zararsız Geçiş Hakkını

düzenleyen 17, 18 ve 19 ncu maddelerine göre geçiş sahildar devletin düzenine yani koyduğu kurallara uygun olmalıdır. Ayrıca Sözleşmenin 38 nci maddesinde belirtilen Transit Geçiş Hakkı'na göre, boğazdan geçecek gemilerin, devletin ülkesine yani boğazlara giriş şartlarına uygun olarak giriş yapması gerekmektedir. Bu bağlamda Türk Boğazlarında seyir yapacak gemilerin 1996 tarihli **Türk Boğazları Deniz Trafik Düzeni Tüzüğü**'ndeki kurallara uyması gerekir. Anılan Tüzüğe göre gemiler, **SP-1** (Seyir Planı-Sailing Plan-1) Raporunu, boyları ve su çekimlerine göre 24 veya 48 saat önceden Trafik Kontrol Merkezi'ne vermekle yükümlüdür. Scan Bothnia gemisi SP-1 Raporunda yükünü genel kargo olarak belirtmiş ve yükü arasında tehlikeli yük olmadığını beyan etmiştir. Böylece anılan gemi **BMDHS**'nin **2, 17, 18, 19** ve **38** nci maddeleri ile **Türk Boğazları Deniz Trafik Düzeni Tüzüğü**'nün **25** nci maddesini ihlal etmiştir.

Sınıraşan Örgütlü Suçlara Karşı Birleşmiş Milletler Sözleşmesi'ne Ek Ateşli Silahlar, Parçaları ve Aksamları ile Mühimmatın Yasadışı Üretimine ve Kaçakçılığına Karşı Protokol'ün 3/e maddesine göre, ihraç ve ithal edilen ateşli silahlar ve mühimmatın bir Taraf Devletin ülkesinden veya ülkesi üzerinden geçirilmeden önce o devletten izin alınması gerekir. Ayrıca Protokolün 10/3 ncü maddesine göre de ithalat belgesinde yer alan bilgiler geçiş ülkesine önceden bildirilmek zorundadır. Bothnia gemisi, söz konusu ithalat için Türkiye'den izin almadığı ve ithalat belgesinde yer alan bilgileri Türkiye'ye önceden bildirmediği için anılan protokolün **3/e** ve **10/3** ncü maddelerini de ihlal etmiştir.

Ukrayna'dan hareket ederek boğazlar bölgesini geçen ve Kardak Kayalıkları bölgesinde 9 Kasım 2013 günü Yunan Sahil Güvenlik birliklerince el konularak Rodos Adası'na götürülen **"Nour M"** adlı geminin de benzer ihlaller yaptığı değerlendirilmektedir.

b. Fransız Askeri Gemilerinin yaptığı ihlaller:

2008 ve 2009 yıllarında Montrö Sözleşmesi kapsamında Karadeniz'e giriş yapan bazı Fransız Askeri Gemileri uluslararası hukuk kurallarını ihlal etmiştir.

Fransız Deniz Kuvvetlerine ait bir fırkateyn, Karadeniz'e giriş yaptıktan sonra, Karadeniz'de Türk FIR Hattı içerisinde bulunan bölgede topçu atışı yapmak istemiştir. Geminin atış talebi ile atış yapmak istediği tarih arasında

bir gün bulunduğundan, Gemi Komutanı Türk makamlarınca uyarılmış ve atış yapması engellenmiştir. Türkiye ve Fransa'nın da taraf olduğu 1944 tarihli **Şikago Uluslararası Sivil Havacılık Sözleşmesi**'nin Ek-15 Havacılık Bilgi Hizmetleri 5.1.1.3 ncü maddesine göre atış yapılacak bölge ve atışın özellikleri hakkında en az 7 gün önceden NOTAM duyurusu yapılması gerekmektedir. Anılan gemi sözleşmede belirtilen süreye uymadığı gibi NOTAM duyurusu yapmaya da gerek duymamıştır. Geminin bu eylemi Karadeniz bölgesindeki Deniz Seyir Güvenliğini ve Hava Trafiğini tehlikeye atacağından Türk makamları tarafından gerekli uyarılar yapılarak engellenmiştir.

Anılan gemi birkaç gün sonra Türk FIR Hattının kuzeyine çıkarak topçu atışı yapma talebini tekrarlamıştır. Türk yetkilileri tarafından yapılan değerlendirmede, geminin **Türk NAVTEX Servis Sahası** içerisinde olduğu tespit edilmiştir. Bunun üzerine Türk makamları tarafından, topçu atışının Karadeniz bölgesindeki Deniz Seyir Güvenliğini ve Hava Trafiğini tehlikeye atacağı belirtilerek geminin faaliyeti engellenmiştir. Fransız Askeri Gemisi, hem Şikago Sözleşmesi bağlamında Sivil Havacılık kurallarını hem de NAVTEX bağlamında Seyir Güvenliği kurallarını ihlal etmiştir. Montrö Boğazlar Sözleşmesine göre Karadeniz'e kıyısı olmayan gemilerin Karadeniz'de yapacağı faaliyetlerle ilgili bir sınırlama yoktur. Ancak Fransız Askeri Gemisi'nin kendi ülkesi yerine Karadeniz'de topçu atışı yapmak istemesine bir anlam verilememiştir. Karadeniz'e kıyısı olan ülkelerin Askeri Gemilerinin, Manş Denizi'nde Fransız FIR Hattı ve NAVTEX Servis Sahası içerisinde topçu atışı taleplerine nasıl bir tepki vereceği de merak konusudur.

Başka bir Fransız Askeri Lojistik Gemisi de Montrö Sözleşmesi'nin 13 ncü maddesine göre ön bildirimde bulunarak, Türk Boğazlarını iki günlük süre içerisinde geçeceğini ve Karadeniz'e giriş yapacağını belirtmiştir. Ancak gemi Çanakkale Boğaz geçişini hızlı yapmış ve İstanbul Boğazı'na gece giriş yaparak boğazlar bölgesini bir günlük süre içerisinde geçmiş ve Karadeniz'e bir gün önceden girmiştir. Montrö Sözleşmesi'nin 13 ncü maddesine göre tarih değişiklikleri, üç gün önceden ön bildirim yapılmasını gerektirmektedir. Gemi Karadeniz'e belirttiği tarihten bir gün önce girmek suretiyle sözleşmenin 13 ncü maddesini ihlal etmiştir. Ayrıca Montrö Sözleşmesinin 10 ncu maddesine göre askeri gemilerin Boğazlar'a gündüz giriş yapması gerekmektedir. Anılan Fransız Askeri Gemisi İstanbul Boğazına gece girmek

suretiyle sözleşmenin 10 ncu maddesini ihlal etmiş ve İstanbul Boğaz trafiğini tehlikeye atmıştır.

c. Amerikan Hastane Gemilerinin Türk Boğazlarından geçerek Karadeniz'e çıkma talebi:

Rusya Federasyonu ile Gürcistan arasında 2008 yılında gerçekleşen Güney Osetya Savaşı sırasında, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri tarafından Gürcistan'a insani yardımda bulunmak maksadıyla iki hastane gemisinin gönderilmesine karar verildi. Ancak Amerikan Hükümeti'nin Türk Boğazlarını kullanarak Karadeniz'e çıkartmak istediği hastane gemilerinin tonajı her biri 70.000 ton olmak üzere toplam 140.000 ton'du ve bu tonaj Montrö Sözleşmesi'ndeki tonajı aşıyordu. Montrö Sözleşmesi Madde 18, 1/d paragrafına göre, Karadeniz'e kıyısı olmayan ülkelerin insani yardım amacıyla göndereceği geminin tonajı 8.000 tonu aşmaması gerekmektedir. Türk tarafının Montrö kurallarını hatırlatması üzerine Amerikan yönetimi hastane gemilerinden vazgeçmiş ve insanı yardım malzemelerini tonajı uygun olan askeri gemiler vasıtasıyla göndermiştir.

d. Karadeniz'e kıyısı olmayan ülkelere ait askeri gemilerin Karadeniz'de Türk limanlarına yaptığı ziyaretler:

Türk Karasularına, iç sularına ve limanlarına gelen gemiler BMDHS'nin 2 nci Maddesi gereği Türk Hükümeti'nin koyduğu kurallara uymakla yükümlüdür. Karadeniz'e giriş yapan yabancı silahlı kuvvetlere bağlı bazı gemilerin, Türk limanlarını ziyaretlerde uluslararası hukuk kurallarına uymadığı görülmektedir. Gemilerin faaliyeti, 1983 tarihli **Yabancı Silahlı Kuvvetlere Bağlı Gemilerin Türk İç sularına ve Limanlarına Gelişleri ve Bu Sulardaki Hareket ve Faaliyetlerine İlişkin Yönetmelik** ile düzenlenmiştir. Yönetmeliğin 17 nci maddesine göre, Liman ziyaretleri sırasında yabancı Silahlı Kuvvetlere bağlı gemilerin personeli ancak mahallin en büyük mülkü amirinin, garnizon komutanının görüşünü alarak vereceği izin ile **5682 sayılı Pasaport Kanunu** ve **5683 sayılı Yabancıların Türkiye'de İkamet ve Seyahatleri Hakkında Kanun** hükümlerine uygun olarak sahile çıkabilirler. Mütekabiliyet esası göz önünde bulundurulmak suretiyle gemi komutanı tarafından gemi personelinin adını, soyadını ve rütbesini ihtiva eden bir liste yerel mülkü amirliğe verilir. Bazı ülkelere ait

askeri gemi komutanlarının, Karadeniz limanlarının bulunduğu şehir ve ilçelerdeki yerel mülkü amirliğe isim listesi vermeden personeli sahil bölgesine çıkardığı görülmektedir. Böylece BMDHS'nin 2 nci maddesi ve 1983 tarihli yönetmeliğin 17 nci maddesi ihlal edilmektedir.

e. Karadeniz Hava Sahasını kullanan Suriye yolcu uçağının Ankara'ya indirilmesi:

10 Ekim 2012 Tarihinde, Rusya Federasyonu'ndan, Karadeniz hava sahasını kullanarak Şam'a giden Suriye Havayolları'na ait yolcu uçağı, Türk hava sahasına girmesini müteakip, F 16 savaş uçaklarının eşliğinde Esenboğa Havalimanı'na indirilmiştir. Uçağın askeri malzeme ve mühimmat taşıdığı ihbarı üzerine Ankara'ya indirildiği belirtilmiştir. Sivil Havacılık kurallarını düzenleyen 1944 tarihli Şikago Sözleşmesi'nin 35 nci maddesine göre, sivil yolcu uçakları, üzerinden uçtukları devletlerin müsaadesi olmadıkça harp cephanesi veya harp silah ve araçları taşıyamaz. Eğer ihbar doğruysa Suriye yolcu uçağı bu maddeyi ihlal etmiştir. Ancak yine aynı 35 nci madde kapsamında her devlet harp silah ve vasıtalarından ne kastettiğini ilgili kanun ve yönetmeliklerinde belirtmek zorundadır. Türk Sivil Havacılık Kanunu'nun 93 ncü maddesine göre uçuş sırasında, silah, cephane ve her nevi harp malzemelerinin taşınması yasaklanmıştır. Madde genel bir ifade olup silah, cephane ve harp silahlarından ne kastedildiği belli değildir. Anılan kanunda konuyla ilgili açık hükümlerin belirtilmesi ve bu tür uygulamalarda daha dikkatli olunması sivil havacılığın emniyeti bakımından önem arz etmektedir.

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Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Güney Kafkasya'da Etnik Milliyetçiliğin Uluslararası Sisteme Etkisi

(The Impact of Ethnic Nationalism in the Post Cold War South Caucasia to the International System)

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Giriş

Kafkasya, geçmişten günümüze çok dilli, dinli, milletli yapısı ve hegemonya yarışındaki güçlerin ve grupların kanlı mücadelelerine tanık olunan bir coğrafyadır. Bu mücadeleler genellikle etnik çatışmalar şeklinde geçmesine rağmen, asıl hedef küresel ve bölgesel güçlerin Kafkasya üzerinde sağlayacakları egemenliktir.

Güney Kafkasya, 21.yüzyılı yaşadığımız bu günlerde, barındırdığı doğal kaynaklar ile hidrokarbon enerjisine dayalı dünya ekonomisi için, "Yeni Büyük Oyun" olarak da ifade edilen, bölgesel ve küresel düzeyde önemli bir ilgi ve rekabet alanıdır. Bu sebeple bölgede vuku bulan hemen her uluslararası sorunun, yerel ve görünür özelliklerin ötesinde bölgesel ve küresel ölçekte, jeopolitik bir çerçevede değerlendirilmesi gerekir. Bölgenin sahip olduğu petrol ve doğalgaz kaynakları ile jeopolitik ve jeostratejik konumu birçok bölgesel ve uluslararası sorunun doğmasında etkendir.

Bölgede Soğuk Savaş sonrası ortaya çıkan etnik milliyetçilikler ve bunların neden olduğu çatışmaların temelinde, Çarlık Rusya'sı ve SSCB'nin bölgede uygulamış oldukları nüfus politikaları, Sovyetler sonrası ortaya çıkan ideolojik boşluğu milliyetçiliğin doldurması ve Sovyet rejiminin bırakmış olduğu alışkanlıklar ve kurumlar etkili olmuştur. Ancak bu çatışmaların arka planında bölgede hâkimiyet kurmak isteyen küresel güçlerin çıkar hesapları bulunmaktadır. Bu çatışmalar uluslararası sistemin niteliğini de değiştirmiş, Soğuk Savaş sonrası tek kutuplu hale gelen sistem, Güney Kafkasya'da

yaşanan etnik çatışmalar ve güç mücadelelerinin sonunda çok kutuplu bir yapı halini almıştır.

Çalışmamızda Güney Kafkasya'da yaşanan etnik milliyetçiliklerin uluslararası sisteme etkisi ortaya konulmaya çalışılmıştır. Bu bağlamda öncelikle Kafkasya coğrafyası ele alınmış; daha sonra bölgedeki çatışmalar, sadece Güney Kafkasya ile sınırlandırılarak açıklanmaya çalışılmış; son olarak da Güney Kafkasya'daki milliyetçi hareketlerin uluslararası sistem boyutu ele alınarak, Rusya ve ABD'nin Kafkasya politikaları ve buradaki çatışmalara yaklaşımı incelenmiştir.

Kafkasya Bölgesi

Kafkas sözcüğü "Kaf'ın Dağı" anlamına gelmekte olan Farsça "kafkah" sözcüğünden türemiştir. Yunanlıların, bölgenin tarifi için kullandıkları "Caucasus" isminin kökeni Latince "Kaukasos" dur ve etimolojik olarak "buzla kaplı buz parlaklığıyla göz kamaştıran" anlamlarına gelen Farsça "Kraukasis"den türemiştir. Türkçe "Kafkas" ve Rusça "Kavlaz" sözcükleri de yine aynı kökenden gelmektedir[151].

Karadeniz ve Hazar denizlerinin ortasında bulunan Kafkasya'nın kuzeyinde Kafkasönü de denen Kafkas dağlarının sona erdiği Don ve Kuma ağzı bölgesi, güneyinde ise Aras nehri vadisi ve Kars platosu bulunmaktadır. Arap seyyahların "Cebel-i Elsine" yani Diller Dağı dedikleri Kafkaslar genel olarak Kuzey ve Güney olarak ikiye ayrılmaktadır[152]. Kafkasya sıradağlarının ikiye böldüğü Kafkasya, Büyük Kafkas Dağlarının kuzeyinde bulunan Kuban çöküntüsü, Stavropol platosu ve Terek çöküntülerinin oluşturduğu ve Rusya Federasyonunun egemenliğinde bulanan "Kuzey Kafkasya" ve ya "Kafkasönü", güneyinde Küçük Kafkas Dağları, Rioni ve Kura çöküntülerinin oluşturduğu Ermenistan, Gürcistan ve Azerbaycan'ın yer aldığı "Güney Kafkasya"dan oluşmaktadır. Güney Kafkasya için günümüzde

[151] Mithat Çelikpala, "Siyasi, Ekonomik ve Demografik Göstergeleriyle Kuzey Kafkasya," *Kafkasya Araştırma ve Analiz Dergisi*, Yıl 1, Sayı 1, (2006), s. 39.

[152] Alâeddin Yalçınkaya, *Kafkasya'da Siyasi Gelişmeler Etnik Düğümden Küresel Kördüğüme* (Ankara: Lalezar Kitabevi, 2006), s. 9.

"Transkafkasya" deyimi sıklıkla kullanılmaktadır. Siyasi açıdan Kafkasya'nın tamamı Avrupa kıtası içinde değerlendirilmektedir[153].

Kafkasya tarih boyunca güç mücadelelerinin yaşandığı bir coğrafya olmuş, çeşitli toplulukların işgaline maruz kalmıştır. Araplar ilk kez 625 yılında girdikleri Kafkasya'dan Hazarların saldırılarına karşı koyamayarak geri çekilmek zorunda kalmıştır. 7. yy'da Hazar İmparatorluğu, 8. yy'da Abhaz krallığının hâkim olduğu Kafkasya'da 10. yy'dan itibaren kuzeyinde Kıpçaklar, güneyinde ise Oğuz Türkmen boyları görülmeye başlamıştır. 13. yy'da Moğol istilasına uğrayan Kafkasya'da daha sonraları Timur hüküm sürmüş, 16. yy itibariyle Kafkasya Osmanlı topraklarına bağlanmıştır. Daha sonraları İran, Osmanlı ve Rus İmparatorluğu arasında savaşlarla el değiştiren Kafkasya 19. yy ile birlikte Rus işgaline uğramıştır. Rus işgaline direnişin simgesi Şeyh Şamil'in ardından Kafkaslarda büyük Rus mezalimleri görülmüş ve Anadolu'ya kitlesel göçler yapılmıştır. Soğuk Savaşın bitip, SSCB'nin dağılmasıyla günümüzde Güney Kafkasya bağımsızlığına kavuşmuşken, Kuzey Kafkasya hala Rus sınırları içinde yer almaktadır[154].

Günümüzde Kuzey Kafkasya'da yer alan özerk bölgeler şunlardır: Adige Cumhuriyeti, Karaçay-Çerkes Cumhuriyeti, Kabardin-Balkar Cumhuriyeti, Kuzey Osetya Cumhuriyeti, Çeçen Cumhuriyeti, İnguş Cumhuriyeti ve Dağıstan Cumhuriyeti. Güney Kafkasya'da yer alan bağımsız devletler ise, Azerbaycan, Gürcistan ve Ermenistan'dır. Özerk bölgeler ise; Güney Osetya, Abhazya, Acara Cumhuriyeti, Cevahati Bölgesi, Nahçivan ve Dağlık Karabağ'dır[155].

Kafkasya etnik, dini ve dil bakımından dünyanın en zengin bölgelerinden biridir. Elliden fazla etnisitenin yaşadığı Kafkasya'da yüzü aşkın dil ve lehçe konuşulmaktadır. Kuzey Kafkasya'nın yerli halkları olarak; Vaynahlar (Çeçen, İnguş), Dağıstan halklarından bazıları (Avar, Lezgi, Dargı, Laklar), Abhazları ve Çerkesleri (Kabardey, Adige, Çerkez) kabul edilmektedir. Bunların dışında bölgede önemli sayıda ve yerli halk olarak kabul edilen Türk grupları (Karaçay, Balkar, Kumuk ve Nogay) ile İraniler olarak bilinen

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153 Habip Yıldırım, "Kafkasya'da Etnik Çatışmalar ve Türkiye Açısından Bölgenin Önemi", *Sakarya Üniversitesi SBE Uluslararası İlişkiler ABD*, Yayınlanmamış Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Sakarya Üniversitesi, Sakarya, 2007, s. 6-7.

154 Yıldırım, s. 8-12.

155 Yıldırım, s. 7.

Osetler ve Tatlar yaşamaktadır[156]. Bunun dışında bölgede önemli miktarda Slav (Rus ve Ukraynalı) topluluk yaşamaktadır. Güney Kafkasya'da ise Gürcüler (Svan, Megrel, Laz ve Bat), Acaralar, Azeri Türkleri, Ermeniler, Talişler, Kürtler, Yahudiler, Osetler, Tatlar, Abhazlar, Avarlar, Lezgiler, İnguşlar ve Asurîler yaşamaktadır[157].

Kafkasya'da konuşulan diller genel olarak üç grupta ele alınır: Kafkas dilleri, Hint-Avrupa kökenli diller ve Türkçe dil grubuna ait olan diller. Kafkas dil grupları (Çerkezce adıyla bilinen Adigece, Kabartayca, Abhazca, Abazaca, Ubıhce ile Gürcüce, Lazca, Çeçence, İnguşça, Avarca, Lezgice ve diğerleri) % 35, Ural Altay dil grubu yani Türkçe konuşanlar (Azerice, Karaçayca, Balkarca, Kumukça, Nogayca ve diğerleri) % 35 ve Hint-Avrupa dillerini konuşanlar (Ermenice, Rusça, Ukraynaca, Osetçe, Tatice ve Talişçe ile diğerleri) % 28 civarındadır[158].

Dini inanç bakımından da çeşitlilik gösteren Kafkasya'da en yaygın din İslam'dır. İslamiyet'ten sonra Ortodoks Hıristiyanlık gelmektedir. Kafkasya'da İslamiyet 8. yy'dan itibaren yayılmaya başlamıştır. Günümüzde Azerbaycan nüfusunun %80'i, Azerbaycan'da yaşayan Dargı ve Lezgi, Tat ve Talışlar Caferilik çizgisinde Şii'dir. Diğer Kafkas halkları ise Şafi (Avar, Dargı, Kumuklar, Laklar, Tabarasanlar, Rutullar, Agullar, Kaytak ve diğer Dağıstan halkları) ve Hanefi (Nogay, Kabardey, Çeçen, İnguş, Karaçay, Abazin, Müslüman Abhazlar, Adige, Balkar, Çerkezler, Acaralar ve Müslüman Osetler) mezhebine bağlı Sünni Müslümanlardan oluşmaktadır.[159] Ruslar, Ermeniler, Gürcüler, Osetler ve Abhazlar ise Hristiyan unsurlardır.

Bölge halkının; % 55,9'unun Müslüman, % 43,6'sının Hıristiyan ve % 0,4'ünün ise Musevi olduğu bilinmektedir. Türkler toplam dil grubunun %36,6'sına, din grubunun %65,5'ine ve coğrafya'nın %56,6'sına sahip en hâkim gruptur. Yine Müslüman unsurların da Türkleştiği, Türklerle akrabalık kurduğu ve Türkiye'de önemli lobilerinin olduğu da altı çizilmesi gerekilen bir husustur.[160]

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156 Çelikpala, s. 41.
157 Yıldırım, s. 17-19.
158 Yalçınkaya, s. 12.
159 Çelikpala, s. 42.
160 Yalçınkaya, s. 13.

Kafkasya'nın jeopolitik ve jeostratejik önemine gelecek olursak; Kafkasya'nın coğrafi konumu incelendiğinde, bölgenin Avrupa-Asya-Afrika ana kolları arasına girmiş olan 5000 km uzunluğundaki Akdeniz-Ege Denizi-Boğazlar ve Marmara Denizi-Karadeniz-Azak Denizi gibi birbirlerine bağlı iç denizlerin oluşturdukları bir su koridorunun doğu ucunda bulunan, aynı zamanda Hazar Denizi ile de doğuya sokulmuş ve bağlanmış bir konumda olduğu görülmektedir. Kısaca Kafkasya kuzey-güney ve doğu-batı yollarının birleştiği bir bölge olmaktadır.[161]

Kafkasya bölgesi, Orta Asya'nın giriş kapısı, Orta Asya bakımından Batı pazarlarına açılan bir geçit olması ve Orta Asya ile bir bütün olarak ele alındığında zengin petrol ve doğalgaz rezervlerine sahip olması bakımından büyük güçlerin mücadelelerine tanık olunmaktadır.[162] Aynı zamanda Kafkas Dağları; kömür, demir cevheri, kurşun, çinko, bakır, molibden, manganez gibi maden yataklarıyla yer altı kaynakları bakımından çok zengindir[163].

Zengin yer altı ve yer üstü kaynakları ile Orta Asya ve Batı arasında yer alan Kafkasya hem jeopolitik hem de jeostratejik açıdan dünyanın en önemli bölgesidir diyebiliriz. Bunun yanında son dönemlerde tamamlanan enerji nakil hatları sebebiyle bölge büyük bir rekabet alanına dönmüştür.

Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Güney Kafkasya'da Yaşanan Etnik Çatışmalar

Sınır içi etnik çatışmalar, bir ülke dâhilinde, bir ya da birden fazla etnik grubun, diğer etnik gruplara veya grupların dominant konumunda bulunan bulunduğu merkezi yönetime karşı geniş ölçekli başkaldırışını anlatmaktadır. Buradaki etnik grup kavramı, ortak soy, ortak tarihsel geçmiş veya ortak dil ve kültür gibi temellerde bir araya gelen ya da örgütlenen bireyler topluluğuna işaret etmektedir. Kan bağı, etnik bilinç ve kimliğin oluşmasında önemli olmakla birlikte, mutlak bir unsur değildir. Son tahlilde etnik kimlik

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161 Yıldırım, s. 27.

162 Hakan Kantarcı, *Kıskaçtaki Bölge Kafkasya* (İstanbul: IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, 2006), s. 59-60.

163 Muharrem Yıldız, *Dünden Bugüne Kafkasya* (İzmir: Yitik Hazine Yayınları, 2006), s. 25.

bir his, bir psikolojik bağ meselesidir ve bu bağ, kişi seviyesinde, değişik kıstaslar esasında öznel olarak ifade edilebilir.[164]

Soğuk Savaşın sona ermesi ve SSCB'nin dağılmasıyla birlikte Kafkasya, Rusya Federasyonuna ve birbirlerine karşı bağımsızlık peşinde koşan etnik grupların kanlı savaşlarının yaşandığı bir coğrafya şeklini almıştır. Birçok etnik grubun, dilsel ve dinsel farklılığın bir arada yaşadığı bölgede SSCB'nin dağılmasıyla başlayan çatışmalar günümüzde hala devam etmektedir. Kafkasya'da yaşanan bu etnik çatışmalar dünyanın ilgisini de bu bölgeye çekmektedir. SSCB döneminde cumhuriyetlerin sınırları etnik topluluklar arasında bir takım anlaşmazlıklara sebep olacak şekilde çizilmiş; tarihi, doğal, etnik şartlara dikkat edilmemiştir. Bunda SSCB'nin bölgeyi daha rahat yönetme isteğinin de önemli bir payı vardır. Bu politika SSCB'ye Çarlık Rusya'sından kalan bir özellik olup günümüz Rusya Federasyonu tarafından da uygulanmaktadır.

Kafkasya, dünyanın iki süper gücünden biri olan SSCB'nin dağılmasının ardından jeopolitik bir sarsıntı geçirmiş, adeta savaş bölgesine dönmüştür. Bu minvalde, Kafkasya bölgesinde jeopolitik boşluk alanı oluşmuş ve bölge oluşan jeopolitik boşluğu doldurmak isteyen küresel ve bölgesel aktörlerin güç mücadelesine sahne olmuştur. Brezezinski'nin tabiriyle Kafkasya "Avrasya'nın Balkanları"dır.[165]

Zengin etnik mozaik bölgede önemli bir kültürel ve sosyal zenginliğe sebep olmuş fakat bu durum Kafkaslardan ve Kafkasya dışında yer alan güçlerin müdahalesine zemin hazırlamıştır. Kafkas toplulukları göçe zorlanmış, çoğunluğun içine azınlıklar yerleştirilmiş, azınlıkların çoğunluğu yönetmesi istenmiş ve bu tür olaylar bölgede düşmanlıkların artmasına neden olmuştur. Kafkasya'daki etnik grupların nüfusları, dağılımları ve önemleri değişmiş olmasına rağmen günümüze kadar değişmeyen tek özellik bölgedeki etnik zenginliğin devam etmesidir.[166]

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[164] Muzaffer Ercan Yılmaz, "Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Dönemde Sınır İçi Etnik Çatışmalar," *Uluslararası Hukuk ve Politika* Cilt: 2, No 6, (2006), s. 18.

[165] Zbigniew Brezezinski, *Büyük Satranç Tahtası Amerika'nın Önceliği ve Bunun Jeostratejik Gerekleri*, Çev. Ertuğrul Dikbaş ve Ergun Kocabıyık, (İstanbul: Sabah Kitapları, 1998), s. 112-113.

[166] A. Faik Demir, *Türk Dış Politikası Perspektifinden Güney Kafkasya*, (Ankara: Bağlam Yayınları, 2003), s. 70.

Stalin'in bölgeye müdahalesi, hassas olan demografik yapının daha fazla karmaşık bir görünüm arz etmesine sebep olmuş, günümüzde yaşanan çatışmaların temelini teşkil etmiştir. Stalin'in iskân politikası doğrultusunda Kuzey ve Güney Kafkasya halkları hiçbir zaman tamamen kendi bölgelerinde tutulmamış, bir bölümü Sovyet Rusya'nın çeşitli bölgelerinde iskân ettirilerek bunların yaşadığı topraklara başka halklar yerleştirilmiş hatta yaşadıkları bölgelerde oluşturulan idari sınırlarla etnik bütünlük parçalanmıştır. Bundan kaynaklanan sorunlar sebebiyle bölgelerin eski ve yeni sahipleri arasında ihtilaflar ve çatışmalar çıkmıştır.[167]

Kafkasya'da yaşanan etnik çatışmaların bir diğer nedeni de SSCB mirası kurum, kuruluş, düşünce, inanç ve fikir sistemdir. Özellikle Güney Kafkasya'da bağımsızlıklarını kazanan devletler SSCB sonrası geçiş sürecini çok sancılı yaşamışlardır. Ulusal kurtuluş ve otoriter rejimlerden demokrasiye geçişler olmuştur. Ancak, totaliter bir rejimden ve sosyalist bir ekonomiden demokrasiye ve piyasa ekonomisine geçmek görülmemiş bir şeydi. Bu devletlerde, devlet, ulus, kimlik, ideoloji, siyaset ve ekonomi gibi olguların yeniden inşası gerekmekteydi.[168] Bunların inşasında önemli sorunlarla karşılaşılmış, etnik milliyetçiliklerin daha çok artmasına neden olunmuştur.

Sovyetler Birliği döneminde Güney Kafkasya'da tedricen sağlanan barış ortamı, Sovyetler Birliği sonrasında yerini şiddetli siyasi, etnik ve askeri çatışmaya bırakmıştır. Etnik grupları imparatorluk çatısı altında tutmaya çalışan Sovyet rejimi, komünist gücü ve Rus imparatorluk dönemine ait ekonomik ve politik araçları kullanmıştır. Sovyet hükümetlerince halkların denetim altında tutulması için büyük bir başarı ile uygulanan bu politika, Sovyetlerin ani yıkılışıyla birlikte tüm Avrasya coğrafyasında çözümü oldukça zor ayrılıkçı etnik çatışmaların doğmasına neden olmuştur.[169]

SSCB'nin dağılmasından sonra Güney Kafkasya'da Gürcüler, Ermeniler ve Azeri Türkleri bağımsızlıklarına kavuşurken birçok etnik grup bunların

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[167] Kantarcı, *Kıskaçtaki Bölge Kafkasya*, s. 35.

[168] Fikret Elma, "Küreselleşme Sürecinde Güney Kafkasya Demokrasi, Güvenlik ve İşbirliği Sorunu," *Uluslararası Sosyal Araştırmalar Dergisi* Cilt 2, Sayı 6, (2009), s. 198-199.

[169] Reha Yılmaz, "Bağımsızlık Sonrası Dönemde Rus-Gürcü İlişkileri ve Kırılma Noktaları," *Avrasya Etüdleri* 38 (2010), s. 23.

idaresi altında yaşamaya devam etmiş ancak dönemin milliyetçi uyanışından etkilenerek etnik çatışmalara neden olmuşlardır. Kuzey Kafkasya'daki etnik çatışmaların aksine Güney Kafkasya'daki etnik çatışmalar günümüzde hala çözülebilmiş değildir.

Güney Kafkasya'da etnik çatışmaların ortaya çıkmasında önemli bir faktörde konumundan kaynaklanmaktadır. Hazar Denizi ve Karadeniz arasında yer alan, İran, Türkiye ve Rusya ile çevrili bulunan, Hazar kaynaklarının üstünde oturan ve bunların Batı pazarlarına ulaştıracak yollara sahip olan Güney Kafkasya'nın Batı'nın ekonomik çıkarları doğrultusunda güvenliğinin sağlanması gerekmektedir. Bu konuda AB, NATO ve ABD bölgede istikrar için uğraşmakta[170] ancak uluslararası sistemin aktörleri ve bölge üzerinde yaşanan çekişme buna izin vermemektedir.

Güney Kafkasya'da Gürcistan sınırları içinde vuku bulan Gürcü-Oset çatışması ile Gürcü-Abhaz çatışması ve Azerbaycan toprakları içinde kalmasına rağmen Ermeni işgali altında bulunan Dağlık Karabağ sorunu, bölgedeki etnik çatışmalar arasında önemini koruyan ve devam eden çatışmalardır. Burada bu çatışmalara değinilecektir. Bunlar dışında Gürcü-Acara gerginliği, Cevahati Bölgesi sorunu, Azeri-Lezgi ve Azeri-Taliş gerginliklerine burada değinilmeyecektir.

Abhazya ve Güney Osetya Sorunu

Gürcistan, Güney Kafkasya bölgesinin etnik çatışmalar bağlamında en sorunlu ülkesidir. SSCB döneminde göreceli olarak belli bir refah seviyesinde bulunan Gürcistan, 1991'den sonra ekonomik olarak bir siyasal birlik içinde olmanın vermiş olduğu imkânları kaybetmiştir. Petrol ve doğalgaz gibi ülkeye yabancı yatırımı çekebilen ve doğrudan ekonomik gelir getirebilen kaynakları da olmayan Gürcistan'da ekonomik sorunların siyasal yansımaları diğer ülkelere göre daha şiddetli ve etkili olmuştur. Böyle bir ortamda, Sovyet sonrası dönemde Güney Osetyalılar ve Abhazyalılarla Gürcüler arasındaki ilk çatışmalar 1990 yılının sonlarında yaşanmıştır. Gürcistan'ın 1991 sonrası yaşadığı ekonomik sorunlar ve bu sorunlardan etkilenerek şiddetlenen sosyal ve siyasal çalkantılar, aynı yıllarda ülkenin etnik olarak karışık ve coğrafi olarak daha uzak bölgelerinde derinden

[170] Tracey C. German, "Corridor Of Power: The Caucasus And Energy Security," *Caucasian Review Of International Affairs*, Vol 2 (2), (Spring 2008), s. 64.

hissedilmiştir. Etnik sorunların yaşandığı bölgede, ekonomik sorunların varlığı ve çözümlenememesinin arkasında Tiflis'teki merkezi hükümetin politikalarının yetersiz olduğu inancı, çözümün daha iyiyi vadeden yerel siyasetçilerden gelebileceği beklentisi ile birleşince, 1990'lı yıllarda milliyetçi ve ayrılıkçı duygular daha da artmıştır.[171]

Bunun yanında Gürcistan'da bağımsızlık sonrası inşa edilmeye çalışılan Gürcü kimliği ve ulus-devlet yapılanması diğer etnik gruplar arasında hoşnutsuzluğa neden olmuştur. Gürcistan'da 26 Mayıs 1991'de yapılan Abhazların ve Osetlerin katılmadığı seçimlerde devlet başkanlığına seçilen Gamsahurdiya, Gürcistan'da Gürcü milliyetçiliğine dayalı politikalar izlemiştir. "Gürcüler için Gürcistan" fikrini benimseyen Gamhasurdiya, Abhazya ve Güney Osetya'da yaşayan Gürcülerin haklarını korumak için bu bölgelerin politikalarını etkilemeyi amaç edinmiştir. Gürcüleştirmeye ve Hıristiyanlaştırmaya dayalı bu politikalara, Abhazya ve Güney Osetya idareleri tarafından şiddetle karşı çıkılmıştır.[172]

Son olarak Gürcistan'da etnik milliyetçiliğin bu denli güçlü olması ve çatışmalara zemin hazırlamasına en önemli katkıyı Rusya Federasyonu yapmaktadır. Gürcistan kurulduğundan beri Rusya ile ilişkileri en gergin olan Kafkasya devletidir. 2000 yılında dönemin Gürcistan Devlet Başkanı Eduard Şevarnadze, iki ülke arasındaki gergin ilişkilerin nedenlerini; Moskova'nın ayrılıkçı bölgeleri desteklemesi ve Moskova'nın eski Sovyet cumhuriyetlerinin toprak bütünlüğü konusunda çifte standart politikası izlemesi şeklinde belirtmiştir[173].

Güney Osetya ve Abhazya sorunlarını anlamak için, bu sorunların ortaya çıkışı ile tarihsel gelişimine bakmak gerekir. Hem Gürcü-Oset ilişkileri hem de Gürcü-Abaza ilişkileri ve Soğuk Savaşın sona ermesinin ardından kurulan Gürcistan'da yaşanan birtakım sorunlar bu topluluklar arasında etnik çatışmalara yol açmıştır.

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171 Ahmet Öztürk, "Rusya-Gürcistan Krizi: Yerel Bir Çatışma, Küresel Yansımalar." *OAKA*, Cilt 4, Sayı 7, (2009), s. 6.

172 Duhan Kalkan, "Güney Kafkasya Bölgesindeki Etnik Çatışma Alanları," *Selçuk Üniversitesi SBE Uluslararası İlişkiler ABD*, Yayınlanmamış Yüksek Lisan Tezi, Selçuk Üniversitesi, Konya, (2010), s. 94

173 İlyas Kamalov, *Putin Dönemi Rus Dış Politikası Moskova'nın Rövanşı* (İstanbul: Yeditepe Yayınları, 2008), s. 103.

Soğuk Savaşın bitmesiyle başlayan ve geçtiğimiz birkaç yıl önce yeniden alevlenen Gürcistan-Abhazya savaşı, aslında her iki ülkenin ulusal kurtuluş hareketi olarak görülebilir. Gürcistan, bağımsızlığı kazanmasına rağmen sürekli Rusya tehdidinden kurtulmak ve sınırlarını güvenlik altına almak, Abhazlar da diğer Güney Kafkas halkları gibi bağımsızlıklarını elde etmek için bu savaşı başlattılar. Kısacası her iki grubun davranışı birbirlerine paraleldir.[174]

Abhazlar, 12. yy'dan daha geriye uzanan, köklü bir devlet geleneğine sahip, Kafkasya'nın en eski yerli halklarından biridir. Sünni Müslüman olan Abhazlar, Kafkas dillerinden Abhazca konuşurlar. Abhazya sorunun temelinde, Gürcistan sınırları içinde bulunan ve coğrafi olarak Kuzey Kafkasya'nın bir parçası olan Abhazya Özerk Cumhuriyeti'nin bağımsız bir devlet olma isteği yatmaktadır.[175]

Abhazlar, hem Çarlık hem de SSCB döneminde çeşitli asimilasyon politikalarına maruz kalmışlar, kendi yurtlarında azınlık durumuna düşmüşlerdir. Yetmişli yıllarda ayrı bir cumhuriyet olma girişimlerinin yanı sıra Gorbaçev yönetiminde bağımsızlık istekleri artmış, 28 Haziran 1988'de, SSCB'ne başvuruda bulunarak, kendilerine "Sovyet Cumhuriyeti" statüsü verilmesini istemişlerdir. SSCB dağıldıktan sonra Abhazya parlamentosu, 23 Temmuz 1992'deki oturumunda bağımsızlığını ilan etmiş, bunun karşısında Gürcü ordusu aynı yıl Abhazya'nın başkenti Sukhumi'ye girerek kanlı çatışmaları başlatmıştır. Çatışmalar üzerine Kuzey Kafkasya Özerk Cumhuriyetleri, Abhazlar lehine, Rusya'ya baskıda bulunarak duruma müdahale etmesini istemişlerdir. 20 Mayıs 1993'de ateşkes anlaşması imzalanmasına rağmen Temmuz 1993'de çatışmalar bir daha baş göstermiş, Abhazlar doğal sınırlarını geçerek Gürcistan'ın bir kısmını işgal etmişlerdir. Çatışmalar sonucu, nüfusun büyük çoğunluğuna sahip Gürcülerin büyük bir

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[174] Alexandros Petersen, "The 1992-1993 Georgia-Abkhazia War: A Forgotten Conflict," *Caucasian Review Of International Affairs* Vol 2 (4), (Autumn 2008), s. 198.

[175] Hakan Kantarcı, "Soğuk Savaş Sonrasında Kafkasya'da ABD ve Rusya Federasyonu (RF)'un Güç Mücadeleleri ve Bu Mücadelenin Türkiye'ye Etkileri," *Süleyman Demirel Üniversitesi SBE Uluslararası İlişkiler ABD*, Yayınlanmamış Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Süleyman Demirel Üniversitesi, Isparta, (2006), s. 53.

bölümü (250 bin kişi) Abhazya'dan kaçmak zorunda kalmış ve yerlerine, Abhaz kökenliler yerleştirilmiştir.[176]

Kafkasya'da etnik çatışmaları kendi lehine kullanan ve siyasi baskı aracı haline getiren Rusya, bu çatışmadan da yararlanmıştır. Abhazya'ya yenilen Gürcistan'da 1993 yılında ayaklanmalar vuku bulmuş, ülke parçalanmanın eşiğine gelmiştir. Gamsahurdiya istifa etmiş onun yerine Rusya'nın daha sıcak baktığı Eduard Şevarnadze geçmiş, BDT'ye katılmamak için elinden geleni yapan Gürcü hükümeti istemeyerek de olsa BDT'ye katılmıştır. Gürcistan, BDT üyeliğinin yanı sıra Rus askeri üslerinin varlığının 25 yıl daha uzatılmasını öngören anlaşmayı da imzalamıştır.[177]

Abhazya sorunu bundan sonraki süreçte de devam etmiştir. Abhazlar tam bağımsızlık isterken, Gürcüler üniter yapının bozulacağı gerekçesiyle karşı çıkmaktadır. Bir diğer sorun da Gürcü göçmenlerdir. Çatışmalarda Abhazya'dan kaçan Gürcülerin geri dönmesini Abhazlar kendi vatanlarında azınlık durumuna düşecekleri için istememektedir. UNIMOG'un tahminlerine göre Abhazya'nın nüfusu 230.000 olup, bunun 90.000'i Abhaz, geri kalan 40.000'i Gürcü olmak üzere, Rus, Ermeni ve Rum'dur. 2008 yılında yaşanan Rus-Oset ve Gürcü savaşında Abhazlar da Rus ve Osetlerin yanında yer almışlardır. Hâlihazırda, Abhazya Özerk Cumhuriyeti fiili bağımsız devlet gibi davranmakta, Gürcü-Abhaz anlaşmazlığı devam etmektedir.[178]

Osetyalılar Kafkasya'da yaşayan, Hint-Avrupa dil grubunun Farsça kolundan gelen Osetçe dilini konuşan, sayıları 700.000 civarında olan etnik bir gruptur. Osetler arasında Rusça da ikinci dil olarak yaygın bir şekilde kullanılır. Gürcistan sınırları içinde yer alan Güney Osetya yaklaşık 3900 kilometrekarelik bir alana sahiptir ve burada yaşayan Osetlerin sayısı Kafkasya'daki Osetlerin toplam sayısının ancak yüzde beşi kadardır. Güney Osetya, Kafkas sıradağlarının yamaçlarında bulunmakta ve doğusu, batısı, güneyi Gürcistan ile çevrilmiş olup Kuzey sınırı bir tünelle Rusya'ya bağlanmakta, bu da doğal olarak Kuzey Osetya ile bağlı olmaktadır.[179]

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176 Kantarcı, "Soğuk Savaş Sonrasında Kafkasya'da…", s. 54.

177 Kamalov, s. 104.

178 Kantarcı, "Soğuk Savaş Sonrasında Kafkasya'da …," s. 55-56.

179 Öztürk, s. 4-5.

Güney Osetya Halk Cephesi 20 Eylül 1990'da Güney Osetya'yı SSCB dağılmadan önce SSCB içinde Güney Osetya Demokratik Cumhuriyeti adıyla ayrı ve egemen bir cumhuriyet olarak ilan etti. Osetyalılar aynı yıl içinde Gürcistan'da yapılan seçimleri boykot ederek kendi müstakil seçimlerini yaptılar. Ancak milliyetçi Devlet Başkanı Gamhasurdiya yönetimi Osetya'da yapılan seçimleri geçersiz ilan ederek Güney Osetya'nın otonom statüsüne son verdi. 1991 yılı iki kesim arasında çatışmalarla geçti. 1992 yılı da genel olarak sıcak çatışmalarla geçmiş ve yılsonuna doğru tarafların ateşkesi kabul etmeleriyle bölgeye Rus, Gürcü ve Osetlerden oluşan ve Avrupa Güvenlik ve İşbirliği Teşkilatı'nın gözetiminde bir barış gücü yerleştirilmiştir.[180]

Güney Osetya'lıların Gürcistan yönetiminden istekleri ilk etapta bağımsızlık olmakla beraber daha sonraları Kuzey Osetya ile birleşerek Büyük Osetya Cumhuriyetini kurmak ve bunun da Rusya Federasyonuna bağlanmasını sağlamaktır.

2003 yılında Gül Devrimi ile iktidara gelen Şaakaşvili yönetiminin aşırı Batı yanlısı ve milliyetçi politikaları sonucunda Rusya bölgeye daha fazla müdahil olmaya başlamış ve bu 1992'den beri sessizliğin yaşandığı bölgede 2004 yılı itibariyle çatışmaların yaşanmasına ve daha sonraki dönemde Rusya-Gürcistan savaşının çıkmasına neden olmuştur.

İlk olarak Temmuz 2004'de daha sonra Ağustos 2005'te Rus Meclisi Duma Güney Osetya ve Abhazya'daki bağımsızlık hareketlerinin desteklenmesi kararını aldı. Rusya bu politika ile Kafkasya'daki etkinliğini ve hareket alanını genişletmeye çalışmaktadır. Bu kararın alınmasında iki faktör etkili olmuştur. Bunlardan birincisi Saakaşvili yönetiminin aşırı Batı yanlısı politikaları ve Rus çıkarlarına yönelik daha açık ve sert tavrı buna neden olmuştur. İkinci olarak Rusya artık tam olarak egemen olamadığı Balkanlar ve Doğu Avrupa'daki gelişmelere ancak Kafkasya'dan cevap verebilirdi. Özellikle Kosova'nın bağımsızlığı ve buna Avrupa-ABD'den verilen destek Rusya'yı Kafkasya konusunda önlem almaya itmiştir.[181]

7 Ağustos 2008 yılında tarihinde Gürcü birliklerinin Güney Osetya'ya yaptığı saldırıyla başlayan ve Rus Barış Gücü askerlerine yapılan saldırıyla birlikte Rusya'nın müdahil olduğu savaş neticesinde Gürcistan hezimete uğramıştır. Daha önceleri, 3 Eylül 2006'da Gürcistan Savunma Bakanını

[180] Öztürk, s. 7.
[181] Öztürk, s. 8.

taşıyan helikoptere Osetlerce yapılan saldırı, 7 Ağustos 2007'de bir Gürcü köyüne Rus jetlerince fırlatılan füze olayı savaşın başlamasının işaretleriydi. Bu olayların vermiş olduğu gerginlik Gürcistan'ı Güney Osetya'ya saldırmaya itmiştir. Rusya tarafı ise Gürcistan saldırısına, bölgedeki Rus vatandaşlarını korumak için müdahil ve Rus Barış Gücü askerlerine yapılan saldırının da savaşa girmelerine neden olduğunu ifade etmiştir. 7-16 Ağustos 2008 tarihleri arasında yaşanan çatışmalara Güney Osetya ve Rusya'nın yanında Abhazyalılar da katılmış, Rusya'nın kara, deniz ve hava güçleriyle Gürcistan'ı önemli şehirlerini bombalamasıyla Gürcü birlikleri Abhazya ve Güney Osetya'dan çekilmiştir. Rusya Gürcistan topraklarının bir kısmını da işgal etmiştir. Daha sonra Sarkozy Planı çerçevesinde Gürcistan'dan askerlerini çekse de, 26 Ağustos 2008 tarihinde ayrı birer bağımsız devlet olarak tanıdığı Güney Osetya ve Abhazya'da askeri varlığı devam etmektedir.[182]

Güney Osetya ve Abhazya savaşları sonucunda bölgede dengeler değişmiştir. Bu savaşlar sonucunda oluşacak denge, aktörlerin kimlik ve çıkarlarıyla şekillenecek ve böylece Güney Kafkasya'nın geleceğinin savaşlara gebe olup olmayacağı görülecektir.[183]

Dağlık Karabağ Sorunu

Dağlık Karabağ sorunu da Kafkasya'da cereyan eden diğer etnik çatışmalar gibi tarihsel nedenlerden kaynaklanmaktadır. Bölgede sıkılıkla nüfus ve nüfuz değişimi yaşanmış ve yaşanmaktadır. 1823 yılında yani Rusların Kafkaslarda bulunmadığı süreçte Karabağ nüfusunun %91'i Azeri Türklerinden, %9'u Ermeniydi. Kafkaslarda Rus hâkimiyeti kurulduğu zaman 1832'de Dağlık Karabağ nüfusunun %65'i Azeri Türklerinden, %35'i ise Ermenilerden oluşmaktaydı. Ruslar, güneylerinden Hıristiyanlardan oluşan tampon bir bölge oluşturma gayretiyle bölgeyi Ermenileştirmeye başladılar. 1871'de Ermeniler %24, Azeriler %76, 1897'de Ermeniler %39.5, Azeriler %59.5, 1897 yılında Ermeniler %70, Azeriler %30, 1979'da Ermeniler %75.9, Azeriler %23 ve SSCB yıkılmadan önce 1989 yılında

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182 Öztürk, s. 8-9.

183 Ondrej Ditrych, "Identity, Interests and the Resolution of the Abkhaz Conflict," *Caucasian Review Of International Affairs*, Vol. 2 (3), (Summer 2008), s. 123.

Ermeniler %76.9, Azeriler ise %21.5 nüfus oranlarına sahiplerdi[184]. Rakamlardan da anlaşılacağı üzere Rusların Karabağ'ı Ermenileştirmesi bölgede etnik milliyetçiliğin artışına neden olmuştur.

Karabağ sorununun altında bölgenin Ruslar tarafından Ermenileştirilmesi ile çoğunluğu oluşturan Ermenilerin Ermenistan'a katılma isteği karşısında Azerbaycan'ın toprak bütünlüğünü koruma isteğidir. Özellikle Ermeni milliyetçiliğinin "Büyük Ermenistan" fikri çerçevesinde bölgeyi işgal etmesi ve Karabağ'daki Azeri Türklerine soykırım uygulaması sorunun içinden çıkılmaz bir hal almasını sağlamıştır.

1987 yılında bir grup Ermeni aktivist 75 bin kişi tarafından imzalanan ve Karabağ ve Nahçıvan'ın Sosyalist Ermenistan'a bağlanmasını talep eden bir dilekçe Sovyetlere sunulmuştur. Şubat 1988'de Karabağ bölgesi Şurasının Azeri ve Ermeni Yüksek Şurasından, Karabağ bölgesinin Ermenistan'a devrini talep etmesiyle çatışmalar başlamıştır. Sovyetler Birliği Yüksek Şurası sınırların değişimini reddetmiş, Karabağ'da özel bir yönetimin kurulmasını kararlaştırmıştır. Bu kararla Karabağ'ın Azerbaycan sınırları içinde kalacağı tescillenmiştir. Karabağ yerel yönetimi Karabağ Cumhuriyetini ilan ederek Azerbaycan'dan ayrıldığını ilan etmiştir. Azerbaycan yönetimi bu durum karşısında 1991 yılında Karabağ'ın otonom statüsünü kaldırmıştır. Bu durum karşısında Ermeniler ayaklanmış, Azerbaycan ordusu Karabağ'a girmiştir. Bunun karşılığında Ermenistan'da ülkesindeki Azeri Türklerine yönelik saldırıya geçmiş, binlerce Azeri Ermenistan'ı terk etmiştir. Azeri milliyetçilerde buna tepki olarak Sungait'te Ermenilere saldırmışlardır. Etnik gruplar arasındaki şiddet sebebiyle 1989-1991 yılları arasında önemli sayıda karşılıklı göçler yaşanmıştır. Daha sonra Ermeni birlikleri (Daha doğrusu Rus Birliklerinin takviyesi ile) Karabağ bölgesini işgal etmişler, hatta ileride koz olarak kullanmak için Azerbaycan topraklarının da bir kısmını da işgal ederek Azerbaycan-Türkiye arasında ileride oluşabilecek muhtemel sınırı ortadan kaldırmışlardır. Karabağ'ın işgali ve yapılan soykırımlar Ermeni milliyetçiler için önemli bir başarıdır. Bunu gerçekleştirirken Rus disaporası ve diğer ülkelerdeki Ermeni

[184] Adil Baguirov, "Nagorno-Karabakh: Basis And Reality Of Soviet-Era Legal And Economic Claims Used To Justify The Armenia-Azerbaijan War," *Caucasian Review Of International Affairs*, Vol. 2 (1), (Winter 2008), s. 13-14.

diasporasının desteğini almaları da Ermeni milliyetçiliğinin Karabağ işgalindeki kararlılıklarının göstergesidir.[185]

Karabağ işgali ve akabinde gerçekleşen Hocalı soykırımı Azerbaycan'daki politik durumu derinden sarsmıştı. Mart 1992 yılında Hocalı'da 1000'den fazla Azeri Türk'ü öldürülmüştü. Bu olaydan sonra Azerbaycan'da yönetim değişikliği olmuş ve Ayaz Muttalibov istifa ederek Moskova'ya kaçmıştı. Azerbaycan Halk Cephesi lideri Ebulfez Elçibey iktidara geldi ve ilk işi Azerbaycan'ı BDT'den çıkarmak oldu.[186]

Türkiye, Azerbaycan topraklarının işgaline ve soydaşlarının öldürülmesine tepkisiz kalmadı. Ermenistan'la tüm diplomatik ilişkiler durduruldu ve Ermeni sınırı kapatıldı. Hatta bu konu Türkiye-AB ilişkileri ve Türkiye-ABD ilişkilerinin de önemli bir sorunu olmakta ancak bu sorunun ortaya çıktığı tarihten günümüze kadarki bütün hükümetler Ermenistan sınırının açılması için işgalin bitmesi gerektiğini belirtmektedirler. Türkiye'nin yanı sıra uluslar arası camiada bu sorun ciddi şekilde tartışıldı. Bu sorunun çözümü için AGİT tarafından 11 üyeli Minsk grubu oluşturuldu. Ancak hem Rusya'nın hem de ABD'nin Ermenistan politikalarını desteklemesi sorunun çözümünü zorlaştırmaktadır.

2000'li yıllarda da süren çözüm arayışlarında somut adımlar atılmaması üzerine, Azerbaycan Savunma Bakanı Sefer Abiyev'in Haydar Aliyev'e askeri töreninde yaptığı "Azerbaycan ordusu işgal altındaki toprakları kurtarmak için hazırdır" açıklaması bölgede tansiyonun hala yüksek olduğunu kanıtlamaktadır.[187]

BM Genel Kurulu, 14 Mayıs 2008 yılı tarihinde aldığı kararla Azerbaycan'ın egemenliğine ve toprak bütünlüğüne vurgu yapmıştır. 7 red oyuna karşı, 39 evet oyuyla kabul edilen kararda, Azerbaycan'ın toprak bütünlüğünün desteklenmesi, Ermenilerin işgal ettikleri Azerbaycan

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185 Emin Gürses, *Uluslararası Sistem ve Milliyetçilik*, (İstanbul: Bağlam Yayıncılık, 1996), s. 158-160.

186 Vedat Gürbüz, "Dağlık Karabağ Sorunu Karşısında Taraf Ülkeler, Bölgesel ve Küresel Güçler," *Bölgesel Sorunlar ve Türkiye Sorunlar, Tehditler, Fırsatlar*, Ahmet Hamdi Aydın, Seyhan Taş ve Saniye Adıgüzel (Ed.) (Kahramanmaraş: Kahramanmaraş Sütçü İmam Yayınları, 2008), s. 120.

187 Kalkan, s. 84.

topraklarından şartsız olarak çıkarılması, mülteci konumunda bulunan Azerbaycanlıların vatanlarına dönmesi konuları yer almıştır.[188]

Dağlık Karabağ sorununda Batılı ülkelerin ve kuruluşların girişimleri devam ederken, bölgedeki etkinliğini sürdürmeyi isteyen Rusya'nın çabasıyla 2008 yılında, Azerbaycan ve Ermenistan Moskova bildirgesini imzalamışlardır. Bu bildiride; Madrid Kriterlerine tarafların uyması ve barışın en kısa sürede sağlanması konuları görüşülmüştür.[189] Fakat gelinen süreçte barış sağlanamamış, özellikle Ermeni tarafının tacizleri devam etmiştir. 20. Yüzyıla kadar nüfusunun büyük çoğunluğu Müslüman Azeri Türklerinden oluşan Dağlık Karabağ, günümüzde Ermeni ayrılıkçılığı ve irredentalizmiyle karşı karşıyadır.[190] Bu sorunun çözülmesi çok zor görünmektedir.

Güney Kafkasya'daki Etnik Milliyetçiliğin Uluslararası Sistem Boyutu

Sovyetlerin çöküşünü takiben, genelde Kafkasya, özelde ise Güney Kafkasya, küresel ve bölgesel rekabet ve çıkar çatışmalarının da körüklediği etnik çatışma ve savaşlarla dünyanın en istikrarsız bölgelerinden biri haline geldi.[191]

1989'da Berlin duvarının yıkılması ve 1991'de Doğu Bloku ile SSCB'nin dağılmasıyla sona eren Soğuk Savaş'ın ardından uluslararası sistem, günümüzde halen devam eden, yeniden yapılanma sürecine girdi. İki kutuplu uluslararası yapının ortadan kalktığı bu süreçte, istikrarsızlık kaynakları ortaya çıktı. Bir yandan zengin ve fakir ülkeler arasındaki ekonomik uçurumun hızla açılmasıyla Doğu-Batı karşıtlığı yerini Kuzey-Güney karşıtlığına bırakırken, diğer yandan bölgesel çatışmalar pek çok bölgede gerginliğe yol açtı.[192] Bu çatışmaların yaşandığı bölgelerin başında Kafkasya gelmektedir. Nitekim SSCB'nin dağılma sürecinde ortaya çıkan ideolojik

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188 Kalkan, s. 84.

189 Kalkan, s. 84-85.

190 Baguirov, s. 23-24.

191 Elma, s. 199.

192 Oral Sander, *Siyasi Tarih (1918-1994)*, Cilt 2 (Ankara: İmge Yayınevi, 2002), s. 585.

boşluğun saldırgan milliyetçilikle doldurulmasıyla[193] ortaya çıkan bölgesel çatışmalar–Dağlık Karabağ, Abhazya, Güney Osetya–Güney Kafkasya üzerindeki hegemonya yarışını gözler önüne sermektedir.

Avrasya'da egemenlik çabası konusunda II. Dünya Savaşının sonundan bu zamana, Soğuk Savaş yılları ve Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönem olmak üzere, küresel düzeyde rakip ve çatışan önemli güçler olarak Sovyetler Birliği (şimdi Rusya Federasyonu) ve ABD'den bahsetmek gerekir. Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde iki güç arasındaki rekabet ve hegemonya kavgası bu dönemin ekonomik, siyasal ve askeri özelliklerine bağlı olarak hem geleneksel çatışma alanlarında hem de siyasi ve askeri açılımlar üzerinde gerçekleşmiştir.[194] Burada bu iki devletin (Rusya Federasyonu ve ABD) Güney Kafkasya politikaları ve Güney Kafkasya'daki etnik çatışmalara bakışı irdelenecektir. Buradan hareketle Güney Kafkasya'daki etnik milliyetçiliklerin uluslararası sistem boyutu bu manada değerlendirilecektir.

ABD ve Güney Kafkasya

SSCB ve Doğu Blok'unun dağılmasından sonra ABD, Doğu Avrupa, Balkanlar, Ortadoğu, Güney Kafkasya ve Orta Asya'da çıkan boşlukları doldurmak için harekete geçti. Bu bağlamda özellikle, dünya petrol ve doğalgaz rezervlerinin büyük çoğunluğuna sahip olan Ortadoğu ve Hazar Havzası ABD açısından önem arz etmekteydi. Wolfowitz, "doğal kaynakları kontrol edildiği takdirde bir küresel güç üretebilecek herhangi bir düşman bir gücün egemen olması engellenmeliydi" sözleriyle bölgenin uluslararası sistem açısından değerini belirtmişti. Dolayısıyla bölgesel güçler olan İran, Türkiye ve Rusya ile çevrili bulunan kalpgah (Avrasya'nın kalbi), gerek Hazar bölgesi enerji kaynaklarının uluslararası pazarlara ulaştırılabilmesinde gerekse Orta Asya ve Ortadoğu'ya yakınlığı sebebiyle sahip olduğu stratejik konum, ABD'nin dünyadaki hegemonyasını sürdürmesi açısından çok

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[193] Oral Sander, "Yeni Bir Bölgesel Güç Olarak Türkiye'nin Dış Politika Hedefleri," *Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi*, Faruk Sönmezoğlu (Der.) (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 2001), s. 608.

[194] Öztürk, s. 12.

önemlidir. Soğuk Savaştan sonra küresel ya da bölgesel rakipler istemeyen ABD Güney Kafkasya'da Rusya ve İran'ın etkinlik kurmasına karşıdır.[195]

İlk zamanlar bilinmeyen bir coğrafya olması ve etnik çatışmaların şiddetli geçmesi sebebiyle uzak durulan Güney Kafkasya'nın stratejik öneminin anlaşılmasından birlikte ABD'nin ilgisi artmıştır. ABD Başkanı George Bush'un 1990'da Körfez Savaşı'ndan sonra "yeni dünya düzeni"nin üç temel taşı "demokrasi, serbest pazar ekonomisi ve insan hakları" kavramlarının Güney Kafkasya'da gelişmesini destekleyeceklerini ifade etmiştir. ABD'nin Güney Kafkasya politikasını daha etkinleştirmesi Rusya'nın Çeçenistan savaşında almış olduğu yenilgi sonrasına rastlamaktadır. ABD, Rusya'nın kendi topraklarını bile koruyamadığını düşünerek Kafkasya politikasını 1996'dan sonra belirginleştirerek, bölgeyi "yaşamsal çıkar alanı" ilan etmiştir.[196]

Özellikle Güney Kafkasya devletlerinin demokrasiye ve serbest piyasa ekonomisine geçmesini arzulayan ABD'nin bölgeye yönelik hedeflerinin gerçekleştirilmesinde kullandığı en önemli araç yardım programları oldu. "Özgürlüğü Destekleme Yasası" ile bağımsızlığa kavuşan Kafkas devletlerini ekonomik açıdan desteklenmesini sağlayan ABD aynı zamanda çeşitli kuruluşların da (Dünya Bankası, USAID kredileri, USDA satış hibeleri gibi) bölgeye yardım etmesini sağladı. ABD'nin bölgeye yardım programları, demokrasi, ekonomik reform, güvenlik ve hukuk reformu ve insani yardım başlıkları altında toplanabilir. Bunun yanında çeşitli vakıf ve kuruluşlarla bölgede etkinliğini arttırmayı düşünen ABD'nin demokrasi söylemi, daha çok ABD yanlısı kişilerin iktidara gelmesini sağlamaktır. Örneğin, 2003'de Kadife devrim (Gül devrimi) sayesinde Soros vakıflarının desteği ile iktidara gelen Şaakaşvili ABD yanlısı politikaları ile dikkat çekmektedir.[197]

ABD'nin bölgeye yönelik dış politika stratejisinin bir diğer yönünü de, bölgede kültürel hegemonya tesis etmektir. Kültürel hegemonya üç ayak üzerine inşa edilmiştir. Bu ayaklardan birincisi dildir. Bölgede İngilizcenin

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[195] Burçin Canar, "Soğuk Savaş Sonrasında Amerika Birleşik Devletleri ve Rusya Federasyon'un Güney Kafkasya Politikası (1991-2005)," *Ankara Üniversitesi SBE Uluslararası İlişkiler ABD*, Yayınlanmamış Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Ankara Üniversitesi, Ankara, 2006, s. 44-45.

[196] Canar, s. 46.

[197] Canar, s. 47-51.

kullanımı yaygınlaştırılmaya çalışılmaktadır. İkinci olarak ABD bölgede "Ilımlı İslamı" desteklemektedir. İslamın ılımlı olması demek, uluslararası güç merkezlerine konumlanışta ılımlı olunması kast edilmektedir. Üçüncü olarak da demokratikleşmedir.[198] Kültürel hegemonyanın kurulması, ABD'nin bölgeye daha çok müdahil olması doğal olarak bölge politikalarını ABD tarafından tayin edilmesini kolaylaştıracaktır.

ABD, Dağlık Karabağ sorunu ve Gürcistan'ın toprak bütünlüğü (Abhazya ve Güney Osetya) konularında, bölgeyi "yaşamsal çıkar alanı" ilan etmesiyle bu sorunların çözümünde aktif rol almıştır. Eski ABD Dışişleri Bakanı Strobe Tallbott "200 Milyar varillik petrol üzerinde oturan" Güney Kafkasya ve Orta Asya'da istikrarsızlık ve çatışma istemediğini dile getirmiştir. Dolayısıyla, Batılı şirketlerin, Güney Kafkasya ve Orta Asya'da yaşamsal öneme sahip petrol ve gaz rezervlerine ulaşmasını tehdit eden bölgesel çatışmalara, Batı'nın çıkarları doğrultusunda çözüm gerçekleştirilmeliydi. Aynı zamanda ABD, Rusya'nın Güney Kafkasya'da etkinliğinin sürmesini sağlayan bu çatışmaların çözümüyle bölgedeki Rus etkinliği sona erdirmek istemektedir. Bu nedenle Tallbott'un dediği gibi "ABD'nin birincil görevi" bölgedeki çatışmaları sona erdirmektir.[199]

ABD'nin Kafkasya politikaları içindeki en önemli konu şüphesiz Hazar enerji kaynaklarını Batı pazarlarına ulaştıran boru hatlarıdır. Günümüzde iki güzergâh bulunmaktadır: Bakü-Novorossisk ve Bakü-Tiflis-Ceyhan (BTC). Rusya ve Türkiye'nin yanı sıra diğer bölge devletlerinin, bölge dışı aktörlerin, ulusal ve çok uluslu şirketlerin katıldığı boru hatları mücadelesinin temelinde bölgede ekonomik ve stratejik etkinlik kurma hedefi vardır. Dolayısıyla devletler için asıl mesele bu kaynakların en yakın yoldan Batı pazarlarına ulaştırılması değil, en uygun devletlerden geçmesi meselesidir.[200] ABD'nin hedefi bölgedeki Rus egemenliğini kırmaktır. Bu yüzden BTC hattını desteklemektedir. Azerbaycan'ın Ermenistan'ı, ABD'nin İran'ı istememesi bölgede Türkiye ve Gürcistan'ın önemini arttırmıştır. ABD bu yüzden bölgede istikrar istemekte, Rusya ise etnik ihtilafları kullanarak bölgede istikrarsızlık oluşturmaktadır. Bundan en çok etkilenen ülke ise Gürcistan'dır. BTC boru hattının geçtiği Gürcistan'da yaşanan etnik

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198 Kantarcı, "Soğuk Savaş Sonrasında Kafkasya'da …," s. 86.

199 Canar, s. 56-57.

200 Canar, s. 40.

milliyetçilikten kaynaklanan savaşlar boru hattının da güvenliğini etkilemekte, bu da ABD çıkarlarına aykırı düşmektedir.

Rusya Federasyonu ve Güney Kafkasya

SSCB dağıldıktan sonra onun varisi olarak uluslararası sisteme dâhil olan Rusya Federasyonu, ilk etapta içeride demokratik rejimi tesis etmek ve serbest piyasa ekonomisine entegre olmak, dışarıda da batıyla bütünleşmeyi amaçlıyordu. Ancak Yeltsin'in dış politika danışmanı Sergei Stankeviç'in sözcülüğünü yaptığı "Avrasyacılık" akımı doğrultusunda tekrar eski Sovyet cumhuriyetlerine gözünü dikti. Bunu Ruslar "yakın çevre stratejisi" şeklinde tanımladılar. Bağımsız Devletler Topluluğu (BDT) vasıtasıyla eski Sovyet cumhuriyetleri üzerinde hâkimiyet sağlamaya çalıştılar.[201]

Rusya, Kafkasya'da ilk olarak bölgesel güçler olan Türkiye ve İran ile rekabet içine girdi. İran'ın Panislamist, Türkiye'nin ise Pantürkist politikalarla Kafkasya'da egemenlik kurmaya çalıştıklarını düşünen Rusya, daha sonraları İran ile işbirliği yaparak Kafkasya'da Antitürkist politikalar benimseyerek Türkiye'yi Kafkasya'dan uzaklaştırmaya çalıştı. Etnik milliyetçiliğin savaş alanına döndürdüğü Kafkasya'da kendi sınırları içinde kalan Kuzey Kafkasya ve sınırdaş olduğu Güney Kafkasya'da uluslararası sistemin niteliğini belirleyen en önemli güç Rusya olmuştur.

Kuzey Kafkasya, Kafkasya'nın giriş kapısı ve bölgenin kontrolünü sağlayabilecek asıl stratejik öneme sahip olan arazidir. Güney Kafkasya üzerinde kontrol sağlamak için Kuzey Kafkasya'ya sahip olmak şarttır. Bu yüzden Rusya fiilen Kuzey Kafkasya'yı elinde bulundurmaya özen göstermektedir.[202] Yine bu sebeple Rusya Kuzey Kafkasya'daki bağımsızlık taleplerini reddetmiş ve Çeçenistan ile büyük bir savaş yaşamıştır.

Kuzey Kafkasya'yı Rusya için önemli kılan şey petrol kaynakları ve Hazar petrol ve doğalgazının Batı pazarına ulaştırılmasını sağlayacak boru hatlarının buradan geçmesidir. Çeçen savaşının çıkışı, Çeçenlerin Vahabiler tarafından desteklenmesinin sebebi de budur. Çeçen ve İnguş Cumhuriyetlerinde 60 Milyon ton petrol rezervi bulunmaktadır. Aynı zamanda Hazar kaynaklarını Batı pazarına ulaştıran Bakü-Novorossisk boru

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[201] Canar, s. 63-64.

[202] Kantarcı, *Kıskaçtaki Bölge Kafkasya*, s. 62.

hattının Çeçenistan üzerinden geçmesi, Çeçen savaşının asıl nedenini oluşturmaktadır[203]. Küresel güçler Çeçen savaşı sebebiyle bu hattın güvenliğini sorgulayarak Rusya'yı sistemin dışına itmeye çalışmakta, aynı zamanda Çeçenler arasında dini eksende milliyetçi hareketler oluşturarak Rusya'ya karşı kullanmaktadırlar. Aynı şekilde Güney Kafkasya'da da BTC boru hattı ile devre dışı bırakılmaya çalışılan Rusya bir taraftan boru hattının kilit ülkesi Gürcistan'ın istikrarını etnik çatışmalar yoluyla bozmakta bir taraftan da Mayıs 2007'de Kazakistan ve Türkmenistan ile imzaladığı anlaşmayla Hazar kaynakları üzerindeki kontrolünü arttırmaktadır.[204]

Rusya'nın Kafkasya'ya yönelik politikasının değişiminde 1999'da NATO'nun 50. Kuruluş yılında aldığı genişleme ve geleneksel sorumluluk alanı dışına müdahale etme kararı da etkili olmuştur. Bu kararı bir tehdit olarak algılayan Rusya, 2000 yılında kabul ettiği Ulusal Güvenlik Doktrini'nde kendini küresel bir güç olarak ilan etmiş ve çok kutuplu bir dünya tercih ettiğini göstermiştir.[205]

Putin ile birlikte çok kutuplu dünya hedefi doğrultusunda çok yönlü, aktif dış politika izleyen Rusya, "yakın çevre" olarak tanımladığı Güney Kafkasya'ya da bu şekilde yaklaşmaktadır. Güney Kafkasya'da artan ABD etkinliğine karşı Rusya, bölge devletleriyle işbirliğine önem vermekte, bir başka deyişle, Kafkasya'nın tümüne yayılabilecek ABD hegemonyasını çeşitli ülkelerle yapacağı işbirliğiyle dengelemeye çalışmaktadır.[206]

Bölgedeki eski nüfuzunu kazanmaya çalışan Rusya, bir taraftan "yakın çevre" politikası ile eski Sovyet toprakları üzerindeki iddialarını korumaya çalışırken, diğer taraftan bölgedeki etnik çatışmaları, bölgeye yeniden yerleşmekte bir araç olarak kullanmaktadır. Rusya, Batıyla bütünleşme çabası içinde olan ve kendine göre Gürcistan ve Azerbaycan'ın bu sadakatsizliğini, Abhazya, Dağlık Karabağ ve Güney Osetya'daki ayrılıkçı güçlere destek vererek, cezalandırmayı başarmıştır. Güney Kafkasya'da, Gürcistan ve Ermenistan üzerindeki egemenliğini kuran Moskova, bilhassa Gürcistan'da Acaristan, Güney Osetya ve Abhazya etnik çatışmalarını ustaca kullanmak

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[203] Ufuk Tavkul, *Etnik Çatışmaların Gölgesinde Kafkasya* (İstanbul: Ötüken Yayınları, 2002), s. 122-123.

[204] German, s. 72.

[205] Yılmaz, s. 25.

[206] Canar, s. 68.

suretiyle, Tiflis'e baskı yapabilmekte ve bölgedeki askeri varlığını sürdürebilmektedir. Aynı şekilde, Dağlık Karabağ sorunu nedeniyle ve Türkiye'ye karşı sınır güvenliğini korumak gerekçesiyle, Ermenistan'daki askeri mevcudiyetini sürdürmeyi başaran Moskova'nın, Kafkasya'daki hâkimiyetini yeniden kurduğu görülmektedir.[207]

Gürcistan'ın Rusya karşıtı faaliyetlerinin (enerji koridorları, ekonomik entegrasyon, çatışma psikolojisi ile ayrılıkçı sorunun çözümü, diğer yerel sorunlar) ABD tarafından koşulsuz desteklenmesi, ABD'nin bölge ülkelerine yönelik çeşitli alanlardaki girişimleri Rusya'nın bölgesel menfaatlerini tehdit etmiştir. Özellikle Gürcistan'daki "Gül Devrimi" ve ardından Rus karşıtı politikalar Rusya'yı daha sert politikalara sevk etmiştir. Kosova'nın bağımsızlığını önleyemeyen, ABD füzelerinin Çek Cumhuriyeti'ne ve Polonya'ya yerleştirilmesini durduramayan Rusya, Batı ile Gürcistan üzerinden hesaplaşmaya kararlı bir şekilde hazırlanmıştır[208]. Etnik milliyetçilikleri Gürcistan'da ustaca kullanan Rusya 2008 yılında yaşanan savaşta Osetleri ve Abhazları kışkırtmış, daha sonra bunlara karşı Gürcü saldırılarını fırsat bilerek Gürcistan'ı savaşta mağlup edip Batı'dan rövanşı almıştır. Bunun yanında NATO'nun genişlemesi yoluyla batılı güvenlik kurumları tarafından güvenlikleri teminat altına alınacağını düşünen Gürcistan'a bu teminatın aslında hayata geçirilemeyeceğini göstermek ve iyi bir ders vermek için bu savaşa Rusya dâhil olmuş ve Gürcistan parçalanmıştır.[209]

Sonuç

Kafkasya, Orta Asya ve Ortadoğu'ya yakınlığıyla, Hazar havzası ve Karadeniz arasındaki konumuyla stratejik ve ekonomik açıdan uygun konumuyla uluslararası sistemin tüm aktörlerinin dikkatini çekmiştir. İngiliz, Rus ve Osmanlı İmparatorluklarının 19. yüzyılda Kafkasya hâkimiyeti için yaptıkları mücadelelerin bir benzeri, SSCB yıkıldıktan sonra daha çok sayıda ve aktörün katılımıyla gerçekleşmiştir. Kafkasya'da uluslararası sistemde

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207 Kantarcı, "Soğuk Savaş Sonrasında Kafkasya'da …," s. 72.

208 Yılmaz, s. 29-30.

209 Roman Muzalevsky, "The War In Georgia And Its Aftermath: Russian National Security And Implications For The West," *Uluslararası Hukuk ve Politika,* Cilt 5, Sayı: 19, (2009), s. 125.

günümüzde hegemonyasını sürdürmeye çalışan ABD ve ABD hegemonyasına karşı çok kutupluluğu savunan Rusya Federasyonu mücadele halindedir. ABD bölgede Azerbaycan, Gürcistan ve Türkiye ile ittifak halindedir. Buna karşı Rusya, Ermenistan ve İran ile ittifak kurmuştur.

SSCB'nin dağılmasından sonra Kafkasya'da tarihi düşmanlıklar tekrar baş göstermiş, Kafkas halkları bağımsızlık arayışına girişmişlerdir. Bağımsızlık arayışları etnik milliyetçiliğin yükselmesi sebebiyle savaş düzeyine ulaşan çatışmaları (Çeçenistan, Güney Osetya, Abhazya ve Dağlık Karabağ) doğurmuştur. Bu çatışmaların sonucunda on binlerce insan ölmüş, yaralanmış ve mülteci konumuna düşmüş, milyarlarca dolar değerinde maddi zarar ortaya çıkmıştır.

Soğuk Savaş sonrası yeniden yapılanma sürecine giren uluslararası sistemde bağımsızlıklarını kazanan eski Sovyet cumhuriyetleri (Azerbaycan, Ermenistan ve Gürcistan) katılımıyla Güney Kafkasya alt sistemi ortaya çıkmıştır. Sovyetlerin dağılmasının ardından ortaya çıkan boşluğu milliyetçiliğin doldurmasıyla ortaya çıkan ve hala çözüme kavuşturulamayan etnik çatışmalar bölgeye damgasını vurmakta, bölgede hegemonya yarışındaki küresel ve bölgesel güçlerin kullandığı bir araç olmaktadır. Bu etnik çatışmalar bölgeye egemen olma aynı zamanda Hazar kaynaklarına sahip olabilme adına kullanılan bir araçtır. Kafkasya'daki devletlerin ve Kafkasya'ya hâkim olmak isteyen devletlerin dış politikalarını üretirken bunları göz önünde bulundurmaları gerekir.

Güney Kafkasya'daki etnik milliyetçiliklerden yararlanma, rekabet halindeki küresel ve bölgesel güçlerin en çok başvurduğu yollardan biridir. Örneğin, Batı bloğuna yakınlaşan Gürcistan'da Rusya Osetleri ve Abhazları kullanarak hem bu ülkenin BTD'ye girişini sağlamışlar hem de 2008 yılında yaşanan savaşta olduğu gibi çıkarlarına aykırı davranan Gürcistan'ı parçalamışlardır. Aslında Rusya'nın amacı buradaki etnik grupların bağımsızlıklarını kazanması değildir. Çünkü kendi ülkesinde de birçok etnik grup yaşamakta hatta Çeçenistan savaşında olduğu gibi Batı tarafından tahrik edilebilmektedir. Rusya'nın amacı etnik ihtilaflardan yararlanarak bu ülkeler (Azerbaycan ve Gürcistan'ı) siyasi baskı altında tutmak, çıkarlarına aykırı davranmamalarını sağlamak ve ABD uydusu olmalarını engellemektir. ABD ise bölgeye yerleşmeye çalışmakta, bunu da kendisine yakın iktidarlar kurma ve maddi olarak destekleme yoluyla sağlamaya çalışmaktadır.

Sonuç olarak Güney Kafkasya'da etnik milliyetçilikler uluslararası sistemin yapısını derinden etkilemektedir. Rusya etnik ihtilafları kullanarak bölgeye ABD'nin yerleşmesini engellemeye çalışmakta, bunda da başarılı olmaktadır. Rusya, Kafkasya'daki en güçlü aktör konumundadır. Bunda bu bölgeye tanıması, eski bakiyesi olması ve etnik çatışmaların ortaya çıkış nedenini (nüfus değişimleri böylece bölgeyi rahat idare edebilmesi) bilmesi yatmaktadır. Her ne kadar ABD ve NATO bölgeye girmek ve etnik çatışmaları çözmek istese de bunda başarılı olamamaktadır. Rusya'nın ayakta kalabilmesi, Kafkasya'yı elinde tutmasına bağlıdır. Nitekim Kuzey Kafkasya'daki Çeçenistan ve Dağıstan'ın bağımsızlığını bu yüzden istememişti. Güney Kafkasya'da aynı şekilde öneme haizdir. Rusya, Orta ve Doğu Avrupa'dan vazgeçebilirdi ve vazgeçti ama Kafkasya'dan vazgeçmesi mümkün değildir. Güney Kafkasya'da sağlanacak egemenlik, bütün aktörlerden ziyade Rusya için jeopolitik ve jeostratejik konumu ve enerji kaynakları ile hayatta kalabilmesinin tek koşuludur.

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The Policies of US, Russia and EU on the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict

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Fluctuating US Policy on the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict

After the collapse of the USSR, the US decided to support newly independent post-soviet states with humanitarian assistance by Freedom Support Act. Section 907 of Freedom Support Act, which was adopted under the influence of Armenian lobby groups on Congress, precluded the US government from supplying humanitarian assistance to Azerbaijan. Indeed, this kind of policy on the part of the US towards the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has negatively impacted US-Azerbaijan relations as well as the role of the US in the peaceful resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh for a long period. "The implications of Section 907 have still continued which impact on the US position as a mediator" (Kasim, 2012).

Another problematic side of US policy on the conflict manifested itself in 1991, when Congress embarked on allocating aid directly to Nagorno-Karabakh. While the provision of assistance to the Nagorno-Karabakh 'is well-intentioned,' notes John Herbst, the State Department's deputy coordinator for the former Soviet states, "it would actually exacerbate the problem by seeking to create artificial ratios for assistance to the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan and injecting political issues relating to the status of the disputed region" (Foley, 1996).

On the other hand, another reason for US reluctance to take on a more active role towards peaceful solution of this conflict was Russia's uncertain policy vis-à-vis post-Soviet countries, especially South Caucasus republics. When the US realized that the purpose of Russia and its "Near Abroad" policy was not to contribute to peaceful process around conflicts in Central Asia and S. Caucasus, and Russia might not hesitate to utilize military power

in order to control the post-Soviet republics, the US changed its policy towards these countries, especially those in S. Caucasus (Kasim, 2012).

Despite the influential role of the Armenian Lobby, some attempts were made by US administration to lift the restraints imposed by Section 907. Of course, these endeavors had different reasons, like for instance, increasing the economic, strategic and security interests of the US in the region after the policies of Russia pushed the US to change its geostrategic policy towards Caspian-basin countries. "In 1994, the Clinton Administration introduced bill H.R. 3765 to lift the restrictions and faced strong opposition from the supporters of the Armenian lobby. The discussions about the issue in Congress indicated the ignorance and misperceptions related to the conflict". This kind of attempts to revoke Section 907 was made several times in the 1990s by Clinton administration and representatives of Congress (ibid).

In 1992, the obvious high level Western interest in the Nagorno Karabakh conflict was observed and it was partly the result of "this high level American intervention" that led to the establishment of the Minsk Group of CSCE (later, OSCE) (John, 1996; 260). In 1997, the chaotic condition over the issue of presenting the representatives to the co-chairmanship from France, which Azerbaijan was against because of the existence of Armenian lobbies in France. Therefore, Azerbaijan side requested a representative from US as a co-chair of Minsk Group of OSCE and the US was approved as third co-chair (ICG, 2005; 10). "A trilateral chairmanship has existed since the start of 1997, comprising Russia, France, and the USA." In spite of these complicated directions of its domestic and foreign policies, as one of the Co-Chairs of OSCE Minsk Group, the US has made certain efforts to achieve peaceful resolution of the conflict. One of the initial initiatives of the US was implemented, when the presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia organized face-to-face negotiations during the NATO Summit in Washington in April 1999. Indeed, this meeting represented a new phase in the peace talks between these two conflicting countries. According to the changes of geopolitics in the world, US policy under Bush administration also altered in the beginning of the last decade. US Secretary of State Colin Powell asked the leaders to continue their talks in Key West, Florida, in April 2001. Firstly, positive answer of the co-chairs following the end of the Key West discussions made it clear that the high expectations were going to be fulfilled". A day after 9*/11*, the ex-president of Azerbaijan, Heydar Aliyev

emphasized that Azerbaijan was a "strategic partner" of the US and could join operations by the United States against terrorism. This statement of full support and assistance to US by Azerbaijan changed the attitudes toward Section 907, and President Bush waivered the amendment on 25 January 2002. He stressed that the waiver of this amendment established suitable grounds for US border security assistance to Azerbaijan, and will not obstruct the efforts to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In the following years, as a member of Minsk Group Co-Chairs of OSCE, US facilitated between the parties to the conflict to push the peace process (Kasim, 2012).

After the Russia-Georgia war, Vice President Cheney visited Georgia and Azerbaijan in early September 2008. During his visit to Azerbaijan, he mentioned that the US works to achieve a peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict by considering the territorial integrity and other international principles. The United States has profound and continuous interests in security, stability and well-being of Azerbaijan. In this regard, the US thinks, the resolution is really important that will contribute to the security and stability of Azerbaijan and the region, as well (ibid).

The US hosted the presidents Sergs Sargisyan and Ilham Aliyev to hold talks in in Chisinau, Moldova, on 9 October 2009, during the Summit of Commonwealth of Independent States. The Minsk Group Co-Chairs took part in the negotiations after *one-on-one* talks by the two presidents. After negotiation, US Co-Chair, Robert Bradtke reported that, "the two presidents discussed line-by-line details of a possible settlement." In December of the same year, Co-Chairs presented "revised" Madrid principles to President Aliyev in Baku and in January to President Sarkisyan in Yerevan (Nichol, 2010).

The US supported the rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia for the integration of Armenia into the Western world. Even though one of the major reasons for Turkey's closing its borders and cut all diplomatic relations with Armenia in 1993 was the latter's occupation of Azerbaijan's territories, no precondition concerning the resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict was mentioned in the protocols between Turkey and Armenia about opening the border. That's why, the ongoing processes around those protocols disappointed Azerbaijan and officials from Azerbaijan criticized this act of diplomacy. On the other hand, the US criticized the policy of Azerbaijan on the rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia. While Armenian President

Sarkisyan was invited to the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington DC in April 2010, President Aliyev did not get an invitation. On 14 April 2010, President Aliyev criticized the Obama administration and Ali Hasanov, an official in Presidential Administration, complained that current activities by the U.S were not acceptable as a member of the Minsk Group. As a result, the support of US to Turkey–Armenian rapprochement and its lack of efforts towards the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict prompted a reaction from Azerbaijan and this situation, in its turn, signaled a closer cooperation with Russia. In July 2010, according to some analysts, the visit of US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to Azerbaijan was an important step to recover US-Azerbaijan relations, which was essential for an active and effective role of US in the peaceful solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. State Department answered that the US stays evenhanded in its mediation initiatives (ibid).

When Deputy Secretary of State William Burns visited Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan in October 2011, he stated in Baku that "Azerbaijan is an important US ally" and noted the importance of Azerbaijan's energy exports to Europe as well as clarified that settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is a priority for US interests. In the end of 2011, US backed successful bid of Azerbaijan for two-year term on the UN Security Council (ibid).

After violence on the line of contact between Azerbaijan and Armenian forces on June 4–5, 2012, Secretary Clinton while visiting the South Caucasus expressed her regrets about the violence and called both countries to continue to seek a peaceful solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. When Armenia planned to open regular civilian airline travel between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, in late March 2011, Civil Aviation official Arif Mammadov reportedly emphasized that Azerbaijan can shoot down airplanes, which haven't got the permission by Azerbaijan to land at an airport reconstructed in Khankendi/Stepanakert, the capital of unrecognized "Nagorno-Karabakh conflict". The defense ministry of Armenia in response declared that Armenia's air defenses are capable to protect the airspace of the country. Later, U.S Ambassador Bryza condemned the idea of attacking a civilian plane. In June 2012, new US Ambassador to Azerbaijan Richard Morningstar stressed that security and prosperity in the region can only be

assured by the peaceful resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh and promised to support the efforts by the Minsk Group (Nichol, 2013).

Russia: A Member of the OSCE Minsk Group or Provoker?

Historically, military and strategic partnership between Moscow and Yerevan has been a vital factor of the economic progress as well as security guarantee of Armenia (Cierco and Freire, 2005; 64-65). Morfini claims that Moscow has provided weapons and other logistic support to Armenia and Azerbaijan in order to increase destructive capacity of the conflict during the war over the Nagorno-Karabakh in 1988-1994 (Morfini, 2010). As Ismailzade argued, "Russia is considered the most important outside player in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict" (Ismailzade, 68). Russia's military partnership with Armenia and economic cooperation with Azerbaijan gives it a monopolistic position in terms of economic and security influence. In this regard, Russia has a potential role in the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, at least as a credible mediator. But, the peaceful solution of this conflict and stability would deprive Russia of its role as stability keeper in the region. That's why, Russia-led negotiation doesn't seem to be effective to solve the conflict and Moscow will try to undermine the peace process indirectly to gain political and economic power in South Caucasus. Maintaining the status quo around the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is in the interests of Russia (Morfini, 2010). The first initiative by Russia towards solving the conflict was suggested by Russian President Boris Yeltsin together with Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev in September 1991. The mediators had proposed cease-fire agreement, new elections, the return of refugees and IDPs and constitutional government in Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast to the parties. Because of some military and paramilitary skirmishes in the disputed area before the bargaining process, this phase of negotiations failed (Bashar, 2008; 91). As a peacemaker, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) entered the mediation process when Azerbaijan agreed to the invitation to be member of CIS Tashkent Agreement on security in May 1992.

By suggesting its own ceasefire agreements, organizing its separate meetings according to the principles and acting independently of the endeavors by OSCE, Russia became more proactive in the process beginning from early 1993. The "hardliner policies" by Moscow and strange mediation

initiatives between international community and Russia became dominant in the negotiation process (Bashar, 2008; 98). In 1994, Russian officials accused the Minsk Group of endeavoring to cripple the offer of serious peace initiative. Conversely, Westerner diplomats accused Russia of trying to scatter forming of "a broader-based alternative plan." Russian mediator, Vladimir Kazimirov claims that the Swedes scheduled the Minsk Group meetings, twice in Paris and Prague, which clashed with the meetings of CIS in Moscow, where Russia was aiming to organize peace negotiations. He perceived this as a direct attempt to undermine the mediation efforts by Russia. On the other hand, the mediators of Minsk Group complained that Russia held the negotiations in Moscow without informing them on 8 September. To the Western mediators, officials in Moscow responded that the CSCE had wittingly decided to hold a meeting of Minsk Group in Vienna on 12 September, when they were planning to organize more negotiations in Moscow. Russia didn't dispatch any representative to the meeting in Vienna. These squabbles induced the president of Armenia, Levon Ter-Petrosian to complain that "the impression is created that the mediating countries and international organizations are not interested so much in settling the conflict, as in settling their own accounts and relationships, which are unconnected with it" (De Waal, 2003; 254). Russia's competition with the CSCE formed mistrust and suspicion by Azerbaijani officials to derail the year-long mediation initiatives (Mooradian and Druckman, 1999; 711).

By citing Tomas De Waal, it is emphasized in the report of Crisis Group that Russia was able to be best broker until cease-fire in 1994. (De Waal, 2003, 195-196, 198-205) As a result of understanding regional stability and Azerbaijan's energy resources, Moscow shifted its policy from strongly supporting Armenia to more neutral position after cease-fire agreement (ICG, 2004; 7).

Bashar claims that Russian-OSCE coherence problems didn´t even end after the signing of the cease-fire agreement. Moscow also challenged Swedish co-chair, Jan Eliasson´s initiatives of shuttle diplomacy. Russia has arranged meetings for negotiations between ministers of Azerbaijan and Armenia and came up with the solution plans which threaten the capacity of OSCE to satisfy both parties for a resolution in the terms of OSCE. Criticism by Russia towards the conflict resolution initiatives caused Russian boycotts regarding the meetings of Minsk Group on several occasions. However,

international community understood that resolution of the conflict without the support of Russia is impossible (Bashar, 2008; 94-95). However, Russia has supplied Armenia with over 1 billion US Dollar in weapons including T-80 tanks, possibly Scud-2 missiles, large caliber field artillery and several kind of heavy artillery since 1996 until 1998 (Cohen, 1998; 4). Cohen argues that denominator of the separatist movements in Nagorno-Karabakh is the support by Russia. Russia suffers "phantom pains" related to the loss of controlled territories by this entity (ibid, 1998; 7). Moreover, Mychajlyszyn argues that since, Armenia is the major strategic partner of Russia, Moscow has continually favored Yerevan in this conflict. Nowadays, more than 60 % budget revenue of Armenia is brought from the loans by Russia. Azerbaijan is concerned about this dependency of Armenia on Russia and it is difficult for Azerbaijan to trust Moscow as a neutral and impartial mediator (Kasim, 2003; 33).

By seeming to act as secondary actor supporting Armenia, as well as becoming active third party willing to resolve the conflict peacefully, Russia has been a 'paradoxical' actor in this conflict. Since the outbreak of the conflict, Moscow comprehended itself as being in a unique position compared with other mediators as both conflicting countries were at some point under the control of USSR (Bashar, 2008; 97). At the Budapest summit in December 1994, the plan was to grant the CSCE a mandate to establish the first international peacekeeping force especially for Nagorno-Karabakh, by which Russia would become a major player, not a snobbish part (De Waal, 2003; 254-255). Russia's intention is perceived to attempt to increase its sphere of influence by having military bases in the territories of both countries. Moreover, one of Russia's purposes was to control oil pipelines (Bashar, 2008; 97). The unwillingness of other OSCE Participating States to contribute actively to the military aspect of the crisis management also motivated the attitude of Russia. Western states decided to send only 30 soldiers for the first team of 150-200 troops for deploying as the peacekeeping force by OSCE in the region (Paye and Remacle, 1996; 121). However, Turkey did accept to deploy neither a unilateral Russian peacekeeping forces nor mixed Russian-Turkish troops. Azerbaijani President, Heydar Aliyev hesitated to cooperate with Russia on economic and military policies and he suggested Russian military be deployed in Azerbaijan within the framework of the CSCE (Fuller, 1994, 32 and 36).

After this dilemma, CSCE reaffirmed the central and vital role of the Minsk Group (Paye and Remacle, 1996; 121).

New phase of cold peace talks started after the downfall of Ter-Petrosian in 1998. The lack of dialogue between the conflicting parties also reflected the deepening of polarization between the West and Russia. Azerbaijan signed treaty for military cooperation with Turkey and strengthened its diplomatic relations with the US. Armenia-Russia military and economic alliance was still strong. Strong military presence of Russia in Armenia was seemed to become incentive for the sides to be eager for achieving a peace resolution on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Furthermore, Armenia agreed to maintain the military base of Russia at Gyumri for 25 years beginning from 1995 and the extensive "Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance" followed this effort between these partner countries in 1997. By referring to Abbasov and Khachatrian, Kasim argues that in November 1998, Minsk Group's proposal of "common state" to the settlement of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is known as Russia's initiative. This proposal included de facto independence of Nagorno-Karabakh by having its own constitution, seal, and flag as well as direct foreign relations with foreign states. By considering these attributes against the territorial integrity and sovereignty of itself, Azerbaijan refused to accept the proposal (Kasim, 2010).

In spite of aggressive Russian policy toward Georgia, the relations between Moscow and Baku were recovering under Putin's presidency in 2002. As well as Russia has been working more harmoniously with the member states of Minsk Group on the negotiation processes (De Waal, 2003; 276). Discords in relations between Azerbaijan and Russia included the accusation of Russian "tilt" toward Armenian side in the Nagorno-Karabakh peace negotiations. Moscow acknowledged that huge amount of Russian military and weaponry had been transferred to Armenia in 1997 and Russia has transferred its heavy weaponry and artillery from Georgia to Azerbaijan in 2000 and 2005-2007 (Nichol, 2010). Russia started to pursue more balanced policy over the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict compared to the mid-1990s, when Putin succeeded Boris Yeltsin as a president of Russian Federation. Since Putin visited Azerbaijan in January 2001, bilateral relations between Moscow and Baku have changed in more pragmatic direction. And Russia announced that Moscow would recognize peaceful agreement between two parties of the conflict (Ismayilzade, 2005).

On January 23, 2007 the meeting between the foreign ministers of Azerbaijan and Armenia was organized in Moscow. Although, Armenian sources claimed little progress, the Foreign Minister of Azerbaijan reportedly emphasized that the negotiations over the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict are "intensive" and noted that Azerbaijan considers "the last principle of the settlement." Following this meeting, the Co-Chairs of Minsk Group decided to organize discussions with Azerbaijani and Armenian presidents (Nichol, 2007; 11). After the meeting between Ilham Aliyev and Robert Kocharian in St. Petersburg on June 9 2007, Co-Chairs of OSCE Minsk Group provided "an assessment of emerging situation" in the resolution process of the conflict in their statement on 13 July 2007 (Pashayeva, 2009; 61).

The security and diplomatic situation in the South Caucasus, especially the attitude of Russia to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict after the Russia-Georgia war, totally changed. This war caused the emergence of Russia's image as an aggressor state towards its neighbor countries. To restore its reputation after this war, Russian President, Medvedev and Foreign Minister of Russian Federation, Lavrov visited Armenia and after his visit to Yerevan, Medvedev talked to the President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in October. Medvedev also visited Azerbaijan (Penkova, 2008; 3-4). As following steps, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev invited the President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev and the President of Armenia, Seryh Sargsyan to meet in Moscow in order to negotiate on the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict on 2 November 2008. As a result of the negotiation, the conflicting parties and mediators signed Joint Declaration over the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (Pashayeva, 2009; 63). This declaration neither established a breakthrough in the negotiation process, nor brought any new element to the format and principles of the talks. However, the signing of the Moscow Declaration serves different symbolic implications for the conflicting parties and the mediator. For Moscow, it was good chance to show up Western countries and the rest of the world that Russia still plays important role in the settlement of the conflicts in the South Caucasus. In this regard, this initiative positively increases the reputation of Russian Federation from an aggressor to the peacemaking in the eyes of European audience.

The first article of the declaration stresses that the parties will endeavor to settle the conflict "based on principles and norms of the international law as well as decisions and documents adopted within this framework". By referring to this point, Azerbaijani officials argue that this document reportedly declares that the commitments of signing sides and international community have to and will resolve this conflict according to the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. Additionally, Baku claims that the absence of any representative of "Nagorno-Karabakh Republic" on this talks demonstrated to the international community that this entity is not part of the conflict. Moreover, this is also written in the Moscow Declaration clearly that political negotiation will be continued between Azerbaijan and Armenia. The leaders of opposite parties in Armenia accused the Armenian President, Serj Sarkisian that by signing this document, he "for once and for all buried Nagorno-Karabakh as a party of the conflict."[210] Final point of celebration by Azerbaijan was to be committed to solve the conflict step-by-step, which Baku has supported to follow that recommendation by the Co-Chairs of the Minsk Group. Fifth article of the declaration emphasizes "the international guarantees for all aspects and stages" of the peaceful settlement. Analysts were arguing that after the Moscow Declaration, there was a ripe momentum for the effective and peaceful resolution of the conflict during the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Azerbaijan and Armenia together with the Co-Chairs of the Minsk Group in Helsinki in December. However, it was obvious that Russia was needed to seriously contribute to the peace process for the sake of the security in the region (Ismayilzade, 68-74). Another important aspect of this declaration was that the conflict parties signed the first document since cease-fire agreement in 1994 (ICG, 2009; 4).

Although, the relations between West and Moscow was deteriorated as a result of Russia-Georgia war, Russia and Western countries constructively cooperate over the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict by sharing a perception based on peaceful settlement of this conflict within the framework of the basic rules of OSCE's 2007 Madrid document. In May 2009, the former US Minsk Group Co-Chairman, Matthew Bryza stressed that as arduous as our relations with Moscow about Georgia, they are equally good regarding to Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (ibid). The President of Russia, Medvedev in Sochi on 25

[210] http://www.regnum.ru/news/1078589.html.

January 2010, hosted the next meeting of Minsk Group. By arguing it "undermined the entire framework of the agreement, Aliyev refused Sargsyan's proposal for specifying an exact date to vote on final status of Nagorno-Karabakh. Medvedev met Sargsyan and Aliyev at least 3 times in Sochi in January, St. Petersburg in June and Astarkhan in October 2010 and his personal involvement made little to stimulate the negotiations. At the initial session, he suggested that the parties confirm majority of the basic principles already agreed and "two or three questions" will be discussed in upcoming discussions. Foreign Minister of Russian Federation, Lavrov noted the importance of consolidating "what has been achieved so far" and sending an "important political signal … that the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan clearly aim … at a peaceful settlement". Azerbaijan claims that it will cement status quo and will motivate Armenia to drag the talks out and pin withdrawal from Kelbajar and some parts of Lachin on the determination of final status of the Nagorno-Karabakh. Single tangible outcome was achieved in the Astrakahan talks on 27 October for exchanging the bodies of the killed people and prisoners of war. It is mentioned in the report of Crisis Group, "Azerbaijan reacted emotionally to the death images of Mubariz Ibrahimov, who was posthumously awarded the title of "National Hero". Armenian society was outraged by the alleged maltreatment of Manvel Saribekyan, who died in captivity in October, a month after being taken hostage, and by Aliyev's speech at the Ibrahimov funeral, calling Armenia "historical Azerbaijani lands" (Crisis Group, 2011; 9-10).

The agreement on the Gyumri base between Armenia and Russia was renewed in August 2010 in order to extend the duration until the year 2044 and Armenian officials emphasize that this agreement can cover freeing of its territory in the case of attack by Azerbaijan (ICG, 2011; 14-15). However, during his visit to Azerbaijan in September 2010, Medvedev stressed that this agreement was not purposed against Azerbaijan (Nichol, 2010; 13). Presidents Aliyev, Argisyan and Medvedev announced a statement promising "to tackle all disputable issues peacefully and to probe incidents along the ceasefire line together under the aegis of the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs and with assistance from the OSCE chairman-in-office's special envoy."[211]

[211] "Meeting with Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan, President of Russia," 05.03.2011, http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/1859.

On 9 March 2011, co-chairs of the Minsk Group denounced the cease-fire violations along the front-line, which occurred before and after the meeting in Sochi, including the confirmed shooting of an Azerbaijani child by sniper. Before Sochi talks of presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia in Russia, Aliyev emphasized, "no one wants war, least of all Azerbaijan, which has made such great achievements. However, this does not mean that negotiations … will be focused on the prevention of war." (*Interfax*, January 16, 2012) Aliyev and Sargisyan made a joint statement at the meeting in Sochi asking the action of Russia to facilitate humanitarian relations between two conflict countries. Presidential Administration official in Azerbaijan, Ali Hasanov noted in late March 2012 that Azerbaijan appreciate the negotiation mediated by the Russian president as the most important means to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the first purpose of Baku to persuade Moscow to utilize its impact to solve the conflict. (CEDR, 2012).

Presidents Aliyev and Sargisyan met in Kazan city of Russia on 24 June 2011 and they made a joint statement that talks have been successful and agreement was reached on few issues, on which further negotiations will be held. However, few weeks later, Russian president Medvedev reportedly announced that there was small progress in the negotiations and he sent letters two president for suggesting how to continue the talks. In early August, at the summit in Sochi, Russia, President Medvedev invited Aliyev for "an absolutely frank conversation with you about our future steps" to settle the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Aliyev mentioned that the "settlement of the conflict, so called all displaced persons can return to their homes and peace, tranquility and cooperation are restored in the region."[212] (CEDR, 2011) Analyst Hikmet Hadjizade in Azerbaijan argued that Medvedev admonished Aliyev at the meeting not to take military action against Nagorno-Karabakh. In early September 2011, Aliyev and Sargisyan condemned the unwillingness of each other to settle peacefully the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict at the celebratory meeting of CIS in Dushanbe, Tajikistan. In October, Co-Chairs of Minsk Group announced a statement after negotiations with the presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia that, two leaders had achieved an agreement in principle over some border incident

[212] "Meeting with President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev," The Kremlin, President of the Russian Federation 09.08.2011.

observation and investigation procedures that they has called to develop at the meeting in Sochi in March 2011. Call to finalize these procedures was raised at the Ministerial Council Meeting of OSCE in Vilnius in December 2011 (Nichol, 2013; 21-22).

European Union: Interests and Dilemmas in the region

The focus of European Union on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict began in 1992. This interest has been developed within the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements for the South Caucasus region since 1999 and through the membership of Azerbaijan to Council of Europe in 2001. The TACIS (Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States) National Indicative Program in 2002-2003 required that the over-riding political priority for Azerbaijan [be] the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict" (Franke, Gawrich, Melnykovska, Schweeickert, 2010; 167). However, the European Union has so gradually moved toward any active policy of conflict settlement that it demonstrates unwillingness to follow its own efforts over the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (Wolf, 2007). Furthermore, the Special Representative of the EU for the South Caucasus was appointed in 2003 and the Union is part of the OSCE Minsk Group (Pop, 2008). Azerbaijan and EU cooperate to settle the humanitarian issues related to the conflict and the latter directly provides financial assistance through TACIS and ENPI for the refugee, IDP problems and food security. Azerbaijan has been expecting for more than decade for the European Union to declare Armenia as a country occupying the territory of Azerbaijan. However, the EU is not eager to favor any partner of ENP (Aliyeva, 2006). Although, majority of EU member countries don't consider the South Caucasus of "significant strategic importance", few member states have a history of bilateral relations with the South Caucasus. Only in recent years, the EU started to demonstrate its specific instruments and policies toward the South Caucasus (Lynch, 2003). The enlargement in 2004 brought EU frontiers closer to the region and initially, it focused on the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia conflicts. The European Union seeks well-organized states and tries to eliminate the renewed outbreak of war that might undermine the security of the Union (European Council, 2003; 8). European Union applied the similar steps towards to the South Caucasus as did to rest of the post-Soviet countries during the 1990s. In

1996, the Union signed the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA) with Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia and has implemented the TACIS programs to support them since 1999. In 2001 its commission adopted Country Strategy Papers (CSP) for the regional cooperation of all three countries with each other in 2002–2006. However, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia blocked them from developing the cooperation and implementing the PCAs. In this regard, in February 2001, the European Union proclaimed its resolve to take more active political role in the South Caucasus to initiate alternative ways to accelerate the conflict prevention and resolution as a part of the PCA (General Affairs Council Conclusions, Brussels, 26-26 February 2001). The Foreign Ministers of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia expressed their positive approach and welcomed this initiative of the EU (Joint Communiqué, 2001). The EU appointed Haikki Talvitie, Finnish Ambassador, as Special Representative (EUSR) to the region in 2003 (Joint Action, 2003). The evolution of EU policies vis-à-vis the region occurred while Brussels was engaged in active foreign and security policies process as well as conflict–mediation capabilities. The European Union has been trying to draw its role in a new neighborhood policy that is "neither at war nor at peace". By applying political and economic instruments to supply incentives, the EU has been directly involved in rehabilitation and peace building role in conflict resolution. It also applied similar steps, including the fight against illegal migration and trafficking, environmental degradation and terrorism, in cooperation with the countries in the South Caucasus (Coppieters and Legovold, 2005). Initially, Georgia and Armenia employed June 2005 "Framework Proposal for its Action Plan" to request EU assistance on some consequences of the conflict. It called for help in preserving and timbering the ceasefire regime in the conflict zone as well as increasing its initiative for peaceful resolution of the conflict by considering the self-determination right of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians[213]. Armenia also offered that the European Union encourage regional cooperation and stop the economic blockade of the country. In the final phases of the talks Armenia dropped those recommendations, since the Union was unwilling to incorporate those. Furthermore, Yerevan asked the EU to abstain from funding regional projects that increase its isolation. On 17 February 2006, by calling for economic

[213] "Framework Proposal for ENP Armenia Action Plan," 15 June 2005.

integration in the South Caucasus, Commissioner, Ferrero-Waldner confirmed that the EU is not happy with the project of build regional railway connecting Azerbaijan, Turkey and Georgia, and bypassing Armenia (Saghabalian).

Azerbaijan has been urging the EU to impel Armenia to withdraw its forces from Nagorno-Karabakh. Baku has been disappointed that the European Union is unwilling to call Armenia occupier of the territory of Azerbaijan. In the draft version of Action Plan, four main actions added by the Commission are conserved to "contribute to the peaceful solution of the conflict". These included intensified diplomatic efforts, sustainable support for peaceful resolution and enhanced support for the OSCE Minsk Group talks process as well as funding projects for people-to-people contacts. With respect to other sections, the drafts refer to promotion of durable efforts for peace, aid to refugees and internally displaced persons, de-mine areas and promote the involvement of representatives of civil society (Action Plan, 2006)[214]. In the first phase of the negotiations, differently from Georgia, Armenia was satisfied and accepted the suggestions by Brussels on the section of conflict resolution of the Action Plan. It was argued that strengthening institutional capabilities, democratic reforms, and reconstruction of economies as well as establishing strong civil societies would motivate a peaceful resolution of conflict resolution. Officials in Yerevan claim that since it discussed conditionality, the European Union would more likely estrange the conflicting parties rather than stimulate partnership. Actually, enforcing conditionality would make the EU an arbitrator between Azerbaijan and Armenia on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, while the Union is not officially part of the OSCE Minsk group for mediating the negotiation process (ICG, 2006)[215]. Indeed, Armenia is eager to see the European Union's assistance to increase regional cooperation in different fields, including development of TRACECA and other transport

[214] "Draft Elements for Inclusion in an EU/Armenia ENP Action Plan," 28 December 2005, and "Draft Elements for Inclusion in an EU/Azerbaijan ENP Action Plan," 23 February 2006.

[215] "Crisis Group Interview, Senior Officials, Ministry of Foreign Affairs," Yerevan, January 2006.

corridors connecting the EU countries and South Caucasus, Central Asia via the Caspian and Black Seas (Action Plan).[216]

Unlike Abkhazia, the EU has not been so active in funding the projects pertaining to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict since the cease-fire of 1994, in part due to unwillingness of Azerbaijan as well as Armenian Diasporas about these projects.[217] On 15 June 2005, the foreign ministry proposed that it may be willing to alter its point of view and stated to support direct people-to-people contacts between Armenians and Azerbaijanis to vanquish hostility and attain stability (ICG Report, 2006). It was also suggested that the Union should also initiate funding to help NGOs, media outlets and sources in order to promote debate in public and combat propaganda on the conflict, which is conducted in Azerbaijani and Armenian societies.(Barnes, Cohen and Lynch, p. 25) Currently, European Partnership's program for civil society for the Peaceful Settlement of the Conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh (EPKN) is a consortium of 5 NGOs in Europe working with local partners to build confidence and peace building projects that would eventually assist the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (Felberbauer and Labarre, 2013).

The European Parliament prepared a message by calling on both conflicting sides to continue working for peaceful resolution "on the basis of respect for minority rights and on the basis of the principles of international law." ("European Neighborhood Policy, 2006) While in Nagorno-Karabakh section of the ENP Action Plan of Armenia (as 7th priority) includes the principles of self-determination of people, Azerbaijan's ENP Action Plan (1st priority) entails "the respect of and support for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability and internationally-recognized borders of each other" (Shiriyev, 2013). In general, there are few points repeatedly voiced in the annual reports of the Action Plan of the European Neighborhood Policy for Azerbaijan and Armenia by the European Union: (1) To work more intensively with Armenia in order to reach accord over "the Madrid Principles in accordance with the commitments made by the Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan in the framework of the Minsk Group"; (2) To

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216 "Draft Elements for Inclusion in an EU/Armenia ENP Action Plan", op. cit

217 "Crisis Group Interview, Senior Official, EU Delegation," Tbilisi, December 2005.

procure unconditional access for representatives of the European Union to Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding areas to support peace-building and conflict transformation activities; (3) Support the environment initiative to development in the conflict resolution, motivate and promote related peace-building activities; (4) Continuing robust commitment by the European Union to promote the solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict; as well as close consultations with the OSCE. (ENP Report, 2012, 2013). According to Migut, the EU tries to give a pure message to the conflicting parties, Azerbaijan and Armenia that the EU prefers the official talks by the OSCE Minsk Group; the EU is not eager to support any political outcome; however at the same time, the Union is ready to work with societies as commitment to the values of human security and the approach that societies need to be prepared for the implementation of peaceful settlement. That's why; the EU seeks to continue for financing confidence and peace building projects of civil society representatives (Migut, 2011).

In October 2013, the latest tangible changes on the position of the European Union regarding to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is mentioned in the European Parliament resolution on the European Neighborhood Policy. Thus, by referring to the resolutions (of UN Security Council 822, 853, 874 and 884 in 1993) as well as the Basic Principles enshrined in the L'Aquila joint statement of 10 July 2009 of the OSCE Minsk Group, the Eastern Partnership clearly emphasizes that the occupation of the territory of one Eastern Partnership country by another one violates the core principles and goals of the Eastern Partnership. This document reminds the above-mentioned resolutions and reaffirms the urgent need to achieve regional security and stability and urges Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan to solve the territorial conflicts in order to attain the purposes of the Eastern Partnership to integrate with the EU.

Conclusion

Comparative historical examination of the policies of the above-mentioned actors on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict indicates that all three powers have periodically had different positions and performances on the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as a mediator. To sum up, U.S has tried to preserve its regional interests especially against Russia. The undeniable impacts of the Armenian lobby groups on US foreign policy as

well as US economic interests in the oil and gas recourses of the Caspian basin has put the States in dilemma as to whether to take active part in the mediation role in order to contribute to the peaceful resolution of the conflict. After the disintegration of the USSR, U.S's indecisive positions and its national interests have been controversy. As regards Russia, it has had an active role in the negotiation process as a mediator. Simultaneously, the successor of the Soviets has utilized various options and ways to keep other actors away from playing a role in solving the problems and conflicts in the region. In general, Moscow's position is questionable from the beginning of the escalation as well as the negotiation periods of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The lack of enough institutional and geopolitical capabilities of the European Union limits its role to play a substantial role in this process. Therefore, the EU has mostly taken the initiative in civil society level to fund different peace and confidence building projects that should be considered as integral part of the Track I Diplomacy.

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The Russian-Georgian Conflict and Its Implications for Territorial Integrity and Policy of the Republic of Georgia

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Introduction

Georgia is probably one of the most significant of the former Soviet states due to its history of political turmoil and ethnic wars. Owing to its ethnically diverse population, the Georgian lands have witnessed a high percentage of the ethnic clashes within the former Soviet states. Both the Georgian-Abkhazian and the Georgian-Ossetian conflicts are linked to the issue of the status of ethnic minorities. During the period of Russian colonial domination in Georgia, the Roman principle *Divide Et Impera* was employed by both the Russian empire and later by Soviet Russia. The existence of different ethnic groups, like Abkhazians and Ossetians on Georgian territory was manipulated for the purpose of weakening Georgia and strengthening Russian influence in the region, by dividing Georgian territory into ethnic units.

Russia has been heavily involved in the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian conflicts. Assessments of its role in the conflicts vary, but none disputes the fact that Russia plays an important role in the region's conflicts. Its policies have been multi-faceted, including political, economic, security and humanitarian dimensions.[218]

Following the war between Georgia and Russia in August 2008 and the resulting Russian recognition of independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the Caucasus has new serious security issues. First, the war highlighted that the frozen nature of the South Caucasus conflicts was a chimera, even if the war may have entrenched further the frozen nature of

[218] N. Popescu, "Outsourcing' *de facto* Statehood: Russia and the Secessionist Entities in Georgia and Moldova," (2006), p.1.

peace processes in the region. Second, the crisis generated new sources of instability for the entire post-Soviet space, not only because it highlighted a new form of Russian revisionism but also because it brought to the fore the limits of Western policy in what Kremlin views as its sphere of influence[219]. Rising aspirations for independence escalated into large scale violence between separatist and Georgian forces.

These conflicts took lives of thousands, forced many people to leave their homes and brought into question the sovereignty and territorial integrity and policy of Georgia. This paper therefore tries to map Russia's policies towards the conflicts in Abkhazia, particularly in Ossetia and its implications on territorial integrity and policy of Georgia Republic.

Russian Policy

Russia's view of its territorial integrity is set out in in two essential documents: the "Concept of National Security of the Russian Federation", and the "Concept of External Policy of the Russian Federation", both of them were published in 2000.

President Putin promulgated both concepts during his first months in the Kremlin. However, the fact that the document on national security was published before the external policy strategy is not only symbolic; it also highlights the importance of national security as a component of Russia's external policy and Moscow's policy in general.

Basically, the two documents prioritise CIS areas (commonly known as the 'near abroad') in line with the old Tsarist strategy which regarded Russian control of a cordon of buffer states as the best guarantee of security in the Russian Empire. Both documents also reflect the deep-seated fears of territorial disintegration in today's Russia. After the USSR's collapse and the loss of territories which had belonged to Russia since the time of Russian Empire, new problems have emerged[220]. The most crucial issues are

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[219] N. Mikhelidze, "After the 2008 Russia-Georgia War : Implications for the Wider Caucasus and Prospects for Western Involvement in Conflict Resolution," *The Conference on the Caucasus and Black Sea Region: European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and Beyond*, 2009, p.2

[220] F. Cameron and J. Domanski, "Russian Foreign Policy with Special Reference to its Western Neighbours," *EPC Issue Paper* No. 37 (13 July 2005), p.5.

separatism in the Northern Caucasus and the security of autonomous regions within neighboring countries.

The "Concept of External Policy" document makes it clear that strategic partnerships and good relations with its CIS neighbors, on a bilateral and multilateral basis, are the top priorities of Russian foreign policy. It states that the partnership with the CIS is a guarantee of national security and stresses the importance of specialized regional institutions in the CIS area including the customs union, the collective security agreement, and so on.

Actually, Russia would like to play the role of an independent, economically viable player on the international stage not to be dominated by any superpower or 'global policeman'. Regional integration is viewed as a vehicle for promoting Russian foreign policy and its influence. The Russian Federation is reflecting the earlier Tsarist geopolitical project of building a ring of semi-dependent states with a common border to ensure security, and its desire to make the CIS the core and leader of the process[221].

Russian policy, particularly towards to Georgia since the 2003 Rose revolution has sought to revert to the status quo ante. At the best, the Russian Government would prefer to regain the positions it acquired in the 1990s.[222]

The main type of Russian efforts to this goal was directed through conflict settlement mechanisms. Russian-led peacekeeping operations have *de facto* guarded the borders of the secessionist entities, helping to maintain a status quo that was favorable to the secessionist sides. Peacekeepers allowed the secessionist elites to pursue state-building projects while deterring the metropolitan states from attempting to regain control of the regions.[223] Information obtained from peacekeeping observers supports the idea that Russia's increasing influence in South Ossetia and Abkhazia over the years has transformed the separatist conflicts into essentially Russia-Georgia disputes. Most residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia reportedly were granted Russian citizenship and passports and most appeared to want their regions to be part of Russia.[224]

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[221] Cameron and Domanski, p.6

[222] D. Lynch, Why Georgia Matters," *Chaillot Paper Institute for Security Studies* (2006), p.45.

[223] Popescu, p.3

[224] V. Socor, *Eurasia Insight* (November 20, 2006).

The Russian goals can be summarized as follows,

- Providing Russia with control over Abkhazia and South Ossetia, including using their territory and air space for broader defense objectives in the South Caucasus.
- Control of the South Caucasus energy corridor (East-West corridor). If a pro-Russian regime were established in Georgia, it would bring the strategic Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and the Baku-Erzurum (Turkey) gas pipeline under Moscow's control.[225]

Georgian Policy

Since the November 2003 Rose revolution, Georgia has launched itself into the process of democracy and state building, led by an energetic and determined leadership, which has the support of the majority of the population. Georgian state building reflects the core challenge of crafting democracy in a dysfunctional state embedded in a conflict-ridden region.[226]

The image of pre-revolutionary Georgia was positive neither in the region nor in the international area due to corruption and lack of rule of law. In 2001, the Head of Parliamentary Anti-corruption committee David Usupashvili stated "there are two ways to survive here: to become financially strong yourself or to place yourself under the protection of someone who is strong. But there is no way to be a citizen; there is only this kind of feudalism in politics, government and business".[227]

On the day of his inauguration, Saakashvili declared from the grave of King David as David the Builder, who united Georgian lands, "We must all say: Georgia will be united and strong, that Georgia will restore its wholeness and become a united strong state".[228] This can be translated into a focus on five areas: establishing the rule of law, conducting political and institutional

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[225] A. Cohen and R. Hamilton, "The Russian Military and the Georgia War: Lessons and Implications," (June 2011) p. ix.

[226] Lynch, p.10.

[227] A. Lieven, "Georgia-A Failing State?" *Eurasianet Magazine* (2001)

[228] G. Sepashvili, "Saakashvili Vows Improvements with Drastic Measures," *Civil Georgia Report* (January 2004).

reforms, restoring the central powers across the country, launching economic reforms, and reforming the security sectors

Since the Rose revolution, Tbilisi has sought to restore the writ of Georgian sovereignty across all of its territory. The rebellious region of Ajara was brought back into the Georgian fold in May 2004. In a carefully managed strategy of pressure, Saakashvili and his administration forced the Ajaran leader leave the country.

In 2004, Saakashvili began to increase pressure on South Ossetia by tightening border controls and breaking up a large-scale smuggling operation in the region that allegedly involved Russian organized crime and corrupt Georgian officials.

Basically, the policy of Georgia is to unite the regions and enjoy democratization along with economical welfare. Saakashvili's stated policy emphasized local government initiatives and decentralized policy making, especially for minority clusters. The logic behind this plan was twofold: minorities would feel less discrimination by the central government since elections would most probably select minority representatives. Besides, Saakashvili announced his intention to staff civil service offices with ethnic minorities in enclave districts, using 'positive discrimination' policies to achieve their 'integration into the state apparatus.'

The Conflicts with Abkhazia and South Ossetia

The Georgian–Abkhaz and Georgian-Ossetian conflicts have a definitely ethnic character. This character dates back to the soviet period. After the Bolshevik revolution in 1917, the region of Abkhazia maintained a relationship of treaty association with Georgia, until it was included as an autonomous republic within the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1931.

The problem was that by 1989 persons of Abkhaz ethnicity represented only 17.8 percent of the autonomous republic's population. As Georgian nationalism flourished in the late 1980s, the Abkhaz population and especially local elites became restive, fearing their possible cultural and ethnic disappearance within an independent Georgia.[229]

[229] Lynch, p. 20

The signature by a thousand Abkhaz of the so called 'Lykhny Declaration' in 1989, organized by the people's forum of Abkhazia and calling for the creation of a Soviet Socialist Republic of Abkhazia separate from the Georgian republic raised tension levels. In addition to that, in 1991 Georgian attempt to create a branch of Tbilisi University in the Abkhaz regional capital of Sukhumi provided the final impetus to commence fighting. Georgian forces entered Abkhazia in order to restore Georgia's territorial integrity in 1992. Despite the fact that the Georgians were successful initially, the Abkhaz regrouped with the support of volunteers from the North Caucasus, used Russian weapons and forced back the Georgian army. Russia was not only a source of support but also provided arms and equipment, and allowed its troops to participate in combat operations.

In 1993, the Abkhaz army expelled all Georgian forces from the Abkhaz region. They also forced the Georgian population living in Abkhazia out the region, causing approximately 280,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs). As a result of the war several thousand people were killed on both sides. Following a ceasefire agreement in May 1994, Russian peacekeeping forces were deployed in June 1994, under a mandate from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The United Nations deployed a mission to observe and monitor the activities of the CIS peacekeeping forces and developments in and around security zone. During the war between Russia and Georgia, there were no known participants from other CIS states.

As for the Ossetian region, the story looks similar to Abkhazia. The main causes of the conflict arose from ethnic factors. The Ossetian Autonomous region had been included in the Georgian Republic in 1922, dividing it from the Autonomous Republic of North Ossetia within the borders of Russian republic.

Despite the efforts of the Supreme Soviet of South Ossetia, the Ossetian region voted to upgrade its status to the level of Republic in 1989. In response, the Georgian parliament annulled South Ossetia's autonomy. This led to armed conflict between Georgian forces and militias of South Ossetian beginning in 1992. The fight lasted until June 1992 when a ceasefire was agreed and trilateral peacekeeping operation assigned within the framework of supervision by Russian forces.

Georgia Efforts to Solve the Frozen Problems with South Ossetia after the Rose Revolution

In July 2005, President Saakashvili announced a new peace plan for South Ossetia that offered substantial autonomy and a three-stage settlement, consisting of demilitarization, economic rehabilitation, and a political settlement. South Ossetian de facto "president" Eduard Kokoiti rejected the plan, asserting in October 2005 that "we [South Ossetians] are citizens of Russia." In November 2006, a popular referendum was held in South Ossetia to reaffirm its "independence" from Georgia.

The separatists reported that 95% of 55,000 registered voters turned out and that 99% approved the referendum. In "alternative" voting among ethnic Georgians in South Ossetia (and those displaced from South Ossetia) and other South Ossetians, the pro-Georgian Dmitriy Sanakoyev was elected governor of South Ossetia, and a referendum was approved supporting Georgia's territorial integrity. In March 2007, President Saakashvili proposed another peace plan for South Ossetia that involved creating "transitional" administrative districts throughout the region—ostensibly under Sanakoyev's authority—which would be represented by an emissary at spell out (JCC) or alternative peace talks.[230] In July 2007, President Saakashvili decreed the establishment of a commission to work out South Ossetia's 'status' as a part of Georgia.

During the latter half of July 2008, Russia conducted a military exercise, codenamed Caucasus 2008, which involved more than 8,000 troops and was conducted near Russia's border with Georgia. One scenario was a hypothetical attack by unnamed forces on Georgia's breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russian forces practiced a counterattack by land, sea, and air to buttress Russia's "peacekeepers" stationed in the regions, protect "Russian citizens," and offer humanitarian aid.

Simultaneous with the Russian military exercise, U.S. troops, Georgian troops, and token forces from Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Ukraine conducted an exercise in Georgia, code-named Immediate Response 2008, aimed at

[230] J. Nichol, "Russia-Georgia Conflict in South Ossetia: Context and Implications for U.S. Interests-Updated" *Foreign Affairs* (October 24, 2008).

increasing troop interoperability for NATO operations and coalition actions in Iraq.[231]

Russia's War in Georgia

August 1-2, 2008

Tensions in South Ossetia escalated when a military vehicle carrying six Georgian police officers was hit by two remote-controlled explosive devices while travelling on a bypass road linking Georgian villages in the conflict zone with Georgia's interior. The South Ossetian side countered with a report that six persons, including a member of the North Ossetian peacekeeping battalion, were killed and 15 injured in shelling and sniper attacks from the Georgian side. The South Ossetian *de facto* authorities stated that they would mobilize their troops, including volunteers from the North Caucasus and Russia, if tensions in the region escalated further. Russian airborne troop's commander Valery Evtukhovich announced to Interfax their readiness to assist the Russian peacekeepers in South Ossetia if needed.[232]

August 8, 2008

From midnight on August 8, Georgian troops began an attack intended to destroy the road connecting the Roki tunnel with Tskhinvali, and advance towards the breakaway capital. Georgian forces seized several South Ossetian controlled villages located on higher ground around the breakaway capital. When Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili launched military force, he insisted that he had been provoked. Russia's military build-up over many months in Abkhazia and on the border with South Ossetia seemed to indicate that Moscow was ready to punish Georgia for what it saw as a strategic challenge to its geopolitical ambitions.[233]

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[231] Nichol, p. 5.

[232] S. Cornel, J. Popjanevski and N. Nilsson, "Russia's War in Georgia: Causes and Implications for Georgia and the World," *Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program* (August 2008), p.12-13.

[233] Antonenko, Oksana (2008): A War with No Winners, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 50:5, page 30.

August 9, 2008

Overnight on August 9, Russian jets carried out several attacks against the Black Sea port of Poti, the military base and railway station in the town of Senaki in western Georgia.

August 12, 2008

In a meeting with French President Nicolas Sarkozy in Moscow, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev signed a cease-fire plan. The plan provided for the withdrawal of troops from both sides to their positions as of August 7, and ended to military actions, and free access for humanitarian aid. French President Nicolas Sarkozy arrived in Tbilisi to present the peace plan to the Georgian side. Georgian President Saakashvili rejected a provision calling for international talks on the status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. After telephone consultations with Russian President Medvedev, Russia agreed to removal of the provision. President Saakashvili accepted the cease-fire plan.

August 25-26, 2008

The Russian upper house of Parliament passed an appeal to President Medvedev to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states. The following day, President Medvedev expressed his intention to recognize the two territories.

Russian-Georgian Conflict and Its Implications for Territorial Integrity and Policy of Georgia

The recent Russia-Georgia conflict harms both countries. In the case of Georgia and South Ossetia, the fighting reportedly resulted in hundreds of military and civilian casualties and large-scale infrastructure destruction. The August 2008 war between Russia and Georgia has substantial implications for the security of Georgia.

Tens of thousands of displaced persons added to humanitarian concerns. The fighting appears to have hardened anti-Georgia attitudes in both South Ossetia and Abkhazia, making the possibility of re-integration with Georgia more remote.

Implications on Policy

Georgian opposition politicians and other citizens largely muted their criticism of Saakashvili in the initial period after the ceasefire; however there are signs of a growing debate about the causes and conduct of the conflict.

Former legislative speaker Nino Burjanadze stated that at some point society would evaluate the events of early August 2008. The current head of parliament Davit Usupashvili stated in early September that

> "Saakashvili was misled by someone ... who told him that the Russians were prepared to surrender Tskhinvali provided we would halt our activities in Abkhazia.... He would not have walked into this trap had someone not offered him assurances that the Russians were not going to move in through the Roki tunnel.... He tended to trust and believe the wrong kind of people or take thoughtless and emotional steps. In any case, it is a matter of his personal political responsibility. At the same time, certain people must face criminal charges because of the things that happened. The time for this will come...."

Some politicians have signed a Charter of Georgian Politicians, which pledges pro-government and opposition parties to mute criticism during crises to the nation.[234]

By temporarily invading Georgia, Russian President Medvedev wanted to punish Saakashvili. The logic behind the punishment was coercing Georgia to accept Russian conditions on the status of the separatist regions, to give up its aspirations to join NATO, and to replace Saakashvili as president.

Conclusions

Russia's invasion was not a response to the situation in South Ossetia, but a move with strategic aims that far surpass South Ossetia. Indeed, as subsequent Russian statements would indicate, the Russian aggression appears to have sought to punish Georgia for its pro-Western foreign policy,

[234] Nichol, p.13.

and to achieve the demise of the Georgian government. Georgia's decision to move into Tskhinvali may plausibly have been a rash miscalculation on the part of the leadership including Georgians and those friendly to Georgia.

The Saakashvili administration probably did not expect the Russian military response to immediately broaden to the entire territory of Georgia. But given the military logic on the ground, it was also equally plausibly a purely pragmatic tactical move. Russia's decision to wage war in Georgia indicates that Russia for years failed to reach its political objectives in the South Caucasus with political instruments, and saw no better choice but to employ war, the ultimate and most costly instrument to its international reputation, to achieve these objectives[235].

It is clear that the Georgia has now lost both Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Although few countries will recognize them, the events of August 2008 have turned Tbilisi's claims of territorial integrity into mere rhetoric.

George Margvelashvili has been selected on 27 October 2013 as president who would like to continue cooperation with west but also would like to not have any conflict with Russian federation. It seems much depends on whether the Georgian president implements recently announced reforms.

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[235] Cornel, Popjanevski and Nilsson, p. 30-32.

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Conflict and Peace in Wider Black Sea Region

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Introduction

The Black Sea Region, according to the geographic criteria, includes the six riparian states: Romania, Ukraine, Russia, Georgia, Turkey and Bulgaria. The concept of the "Wider Black Sea Region" has been launched in a study by researchers Ronald D. Asmus and Bruce P. Jackson in 2004.[236] It includes the following neighboring states: Albania, Greece, Romania, Moldova, Armenia and Azerbaijan. The term of "wider" refers rather to a politico-economic region, than to a geographic one. Therefore, the Wider Black Sea Region is stretching from the Balkans to the Caspian Sea, making it one of the most dynamic areas in the post-Cold War and post-Soviet Union. It represents a significant geo-strategic region on the international arena.

The importance of the Black Sea was based for centuries on the role that the region had at the intersection of the former powers and empires (Greek, Roman, Byzantine, Ottoman, and Russian).[237] Black Sea was and is a point of contact for commercial circuits and regions rich in energy resources. Currently, the Wider Black Sea Region goes through a historical period characterized by long and painful separation of communism and of belonging to the Soviet sphere of influence, of transition from a closed society and economy to the values, of democracy and market economy.

The evolution in the Wider Black Sea Region is generated by the changes in national security from Balkans with Former Yugoslavia, Albania, Greece;

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[236] Ronald Asmus D. and P.Bruce Jackson, "The Black Sea and the Frontiers of Freedom," *Policy Review* (June 2004), p.11.

[237] Bruce, Hitchner R. "The Sea Is Friendly with Strangers: History and Achievement of Euro-Atlantic Strategy for the Black Sea," *A New Euro-Atlantic Strategy for the Black Sea Region, (*Bucharest: IRSI, 2004), p. 27-32.

Caucasus with Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan; Near and Middle East, with Turkey, Iraq and Iran.

Black Sea area reflects at small-scale changes, developments and trends in political, economic and social manifested in Europe. In recent years we are witnessing a gradual concentration of security forces in the Wider Black Sea Region and the existence of the unresolved local conflicts, intentionally kept in an uncertain stage also represent a significant risk to the security of the Region.

The control and management of this Region, under present conditions, is not only a challenge that will raise interest in economic competition, but also a necessity to harmonize efforts for the development and realization of projects of cooperation and strengthening the security.

According to Aymeric Chauprade and Francois Thual "the sea, by itself, cannot have an important geopolitical operation unless links between the two shores exist."[238]

From geostrategic perspective, the both sides of Black Sea are characterized by numerous tensions and conflicts (South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh). International security organizations bring important contribution and efforts to the conflicts resolution. And as we can observe, in all these conflicts is implied Russian Federation, as it considers the Black Sea a key strategic objective. The methods for implementing this objective are diverse. Russia participates actively in regional initiatives, especially in the BSEC and BLACKSEAFOR, in this way being involved in influence of neighbouring states policies, as well as artificially encouraging and supporting the above mentioned local conflicts. Russia imposes its military presence in these strategic areas as a complementary method of implementing its strategic concepts of great power.

International Actors Manifested In the Wider Black Sea Region

The most important actors with global vocation and international organizations manifested in the Wider Black Sea Region are: United States (U.S.), European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),

[238] Chauprade Aymeric and Francois Thual, *Geopolitics Dictionary* (Bucharest: Corint, 2003), p. 452.

the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

United States is interested in democratization and stabilization of the Region, as it had an essential role in the implementation of security and stability beyond the old Iron Curtain. United States is closely concerned with strengthening regional cooperation, democratization, fighting corruption and organized crime. The Black Sea is an area of the U.S. strategic importance for fight against terrorism and other threats.

The EU interest to this Region has considerably increased, when Turkey was accepted in 1999 as a candidate state to join EU, with tendency to integrate Ukraine and Moldova, and also, when Romania and Bulgaria joined the European Union in 2007 and its borders enlarged to the shores of the Black Sea. The European Union has to fight numerous tensions and conflicts, but also has many economic advantages, knowing its dependence on oil imports. The emergence of a Wider Black Sea Region as an emerging hub of European security is a major development in the first decade of the twenty-first century. This process is currently unfolding, and has substantial implications for European security in a wider definition of the term—touching upon traditional, military aspects of security, but equally affect increasingly important areas of energy security and so-called 'soft security' challenges. The emergence of this Region is taking place as a result of multiple developments—the eastward expansion of the European Union being primary among these, in combination with important developments in the political and economic spheres in the countries surrounding the Black Sea.[239]

NATO, the global politico-military alliance on the one hand continues the so-called policy of "containment" of the Russia Federation, and on the other hand the strengthening of the NATO-Russia cooperation.

The OSCE enjoys tolerance in the South Caucasus, but it does not have the necessary power and means to solve the great problems in the Region. It plays the role of an observer. In Moscow's view, the OSCE is an organization for conflict prevention.

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[239] Svante E. Cornell et al., *The Wider Black Sea Region: An Emerging Hub in European Security*, (Joint Center, December 2006), p.5.

The CIS does not have the same initial strength, and Ukraine and Moldova looking more insistently to Europe. Russia tries, through all political, economic and other measures, to maintain its leadership and to create a politico-military and economic bloc, which is like a continuation of the former Soviet Union.

The EU and the "Frozen Conflicts" From the Wider Black Sea Region

The European Union's main aim is to create a unified, peaceful and prosperous Europe. The EU has always described itself a peace project from Robert Schuman's declaration on 9 May 1950 to the treaty of Lisbon in 2009, which states that "The Union's aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples." Via its foreign policy the EU intends to take peace and stability beyond its borders.

Nevertheless, whilst the EU as a body might behave as an actor for peace and stability in a semi-altruistic fashion, many EU member states might seem to act more independently when it comes to security. For example some states might view NATO membership as more important than EU membership. Other members might feel that in order to retain peace in their neighborhood as well as assuring their energy supplies it is vital to have good relations with Russia.

In December 2007 *A Strong European Neighbourhood Policy* was published by the Commission with more details on conflict resolution and political dialog. EU states that it can make an important contribution by working around the conflict issues, promoting similar reforms on both sides of boundary lines, to foster convergence between political, economic and legal system, enabling greater social inclusion and contributing to confidence building.[240] The EU has the capacity of serving as an impartial party in negotiations and peacekeeping formats over the unresolved conflicts, which will bring much needed legitimacy and credibility to these processes.

The question of making the EU's borderlands more stable, peaceful and prosperous is more relevant than ever, as the divide between conditions in the EU and in its immediate neighborhood grows. It is profoundly in the EU's interest to ensure that the areas to its south and east are developing in the

[240] Karen Henderson and Carol Weaver, *The Black Sea Region and EU Policy: The Challenge of Divergent Agenda* (Ashgate, 2010), p. 67, 73.

right direction—becoming more secure, resolving their internal and external conflicts, and building the institutions of market economy and democracy.[241] The challenge of unresolved conflicts in the Wider Black Sea Region, building long term stability and conflict management in the Wider Black Sea Region is an essential objective for the EU.

The Wider Black Sea Region forms a part of the EU's borderland toward both Russia and the Middle East. This Region was among the worst hit by the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and is still faced with deep-seated security challenges relating to this. The EU cannot avoid the fact that its own enlargement has brought it in ever closer proximity with the remaining unresolved and active conflicts that exist in the Region.[242]

The EU membership of Romania and Bulgaria brings the "frozen conflicts" to the EU's very doorstep. Transnistria is less than a hundred kilometers away from the EU's new borders, and Abkhazia and the North Caucasus are just across the Black Sea. Continued instability in these conflict zones affects Europe. On the one hand, the flow of potential refugees would be likely to reach Europe, as well as drugs, arms and migrants. On the other hand, the EU's proximity to the Region would require the Union to play a leading role in conflict resolution and peacekeeping. Indeed, this is made all the more pressing by Russia's partial role in the conflicts, making it unviable as a peacekeeper and honest broker. Building stability in this environment is hence an increasingly important priority for the EU. This, in turn, can only be achieved through the resolution of the conflicts of the Region.

At the same time, long-term regional stability will be dependent on the role of the main powers in the Region: Russia, Turkey, the United States, and as far as the Caucasus is concerned, also Iran. Turkey's EU bid provides a golden opportunity for cooperation in stabilizing the Region, a role Turkey is already playing but whose full potential is not utilized. As far as Russia is concerned, the EU is still at pains developing a common policy toward an increasingly difficult Russia. Yet the future of the EU's entire eastern borderlands is dependent on Europe finding a constructive relationship with

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241 Cornell et al, p.11, 20.

242 Svante E. Cornell and Frederick S. Starr, *The Caucasus: A Challenge for Europe*, (Joint Center, June 2006), p.50.

Russia that nevertheless ensures that Europe's own interests and regional stability are not sacrificed.

Russia's dominant role in current peacekeeping and negotiation formats and the close connection between conflicts and organized crime are the primary obstacles to the resolution of these conflicts. Vested Russian geopolitical interests in the South Caucasus and Moldova are clearly reflected in processes for conflict resolution, making them tools for maintaining the status quo, rather than finding solutions. Revenues from activities related to organized crime provide an additional incentive for keeping the conflicts unresolved. Meanwhile, EU interest in the unresolved conflicts around the Black Sea is gaining legitimacy, and Europe has a potentially positive role to play in the conflict resolution processes. Current formats of negotiation and peacekeeping must, however, be addressed and the Russian role in these must be made subject to discussion.

Russia provides diplomatic, political, military and financial assistance to breakaway authorities, including provisions of citizenship to residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the apparent direct seconding of Russian security personnel to their governments,[243] and training of Transnistrian militia.[244]

Russia maintains a significant military presence in the form of peacekeepers, which nevertheless fail to display the neutrality expected by such forces under the United Nations charter. It should be mentioned that prior to these forces' deployment as peacekeepers, Russia played a central role in militarily supporting the war effort of the secessionist regions in their struggle against the Georgian central government.[245]

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[243] Brian Fall, "Conflict in the South Caucasus," *Asian Affairs* 38 No: 2, p.198-209.

[244] Nicu Popescu, "The EU in Moldova: Settling Conflicts in the Neighbourhood," *European Union Institute for Security Studies Occasional Paper* No: 60 (2005), p. 24.

[245] Svante E. Cornell, *Small Nations and Great Powers: A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus*, (Richmond: Curzon Press, 2001).

Transnistria



Fig.1.1

The European Union "in its neighborhood and beyond, the EU cannot […] confine itself to the economic and political spheres; it also needs to be able to guarantee stability, prevent conflicts and manage crises on its own doorstep.[246] The "frozen conflicts" existing in the neighboring states pose problems for the EU. The European Neighbouring Policy has been developed to resolve the conflict that opposes the separatist region of Transnistria with the central government of Moldova. There is no apparent urgency for the EU

[246] European Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, "Building our Common Future: Policy Challenges and Budgetary Means of the Enlarged Union 2007-2013," (2004), p. 24.

to become more involved with this conflict: there is no fighting in Transnistria. However, calm is in appearance only, the security situation is far from stable and could deteriorate at any moment. Russia still keeps its military presence in the region. Consequently, the conflict poses considerable soft security challenges to the enlarged European Union as the separatist region has emerged into a hub for illicit trafficking in arms, people and drugs, organized crime, money-laundering and smuggling. The conflict is also the closest geographically to the enlarged EU as it stands less than 100 km from the border of Romania.

Since 2009 political conditions in Moldova have significantly changed towards more democratic, accountable, and decidedly pro-European structures of government. In the Transnistrian region, too, there is now a greater degree of political pluralism and following the election of Yevgeni Shevchuk to the presidency, a relatively more open-minded political class has replaced the regime of long-time ruler Igor Smirnov. As a result, relations between Moldova and the Transnistrian region, at the level of the top leadership have vastly improved and become more constructive.

In Transnistria, a peacekeeping mission consisting of Russian, Transnistrian and Moldovan troops is deployed, tasked with monitoring of the demilitarized security zone between Moldova and Transnistria. As in South Ossetia, the tripartite force is supervised by a Joint Control Commission (JCC), consisting of Russia, Moldova and Transnistria, with the OSCE and Ukraine as observers. A political process for negotiations, known as the "five-sided format", on Transnistria's status has been established, consisting of the parties Moldova and Transnistria, with Russia, OSCE and Ukraine as mediators.[247] Lately, Russia, which played the dominant role here, put the so-called Kozak Plan on the table in 2003, to resolve the conflict; this envisaged the presence of Russian troops to be extended to 2020, and Transnistria being given far-reaching veto rights within a federal Moldovan state. Not only would this have curtailed Moldova's freedom of action in the area of foreign policy, but it would have also put the proper functioning of the nation state into question. Backed by the EU and the USA, the Moldovan government rejected this concept. Subsequently, Brussels and Washington

[247] Andreas Johansson, "Transnistria between East and West," *Kungl. Krigsvetenskapsakademiens Handlingar Och Tidskrift*, No. 2 (2006), p 98.

joined the negotiations as observers, creating what has since been called the 5+2 format. But by then, the efforts to resolve the conflict had come to a dead end. In 2006, the formal 5+2 negotiations broke off. It needed the impetus of the Meseberg Memorandum for them to be resumed. In June 2010 in Meseberg, at the meeting of Chancellor Angela Merkel and President Dmitri Medvedev, a joint approach by the EU and Russia was proposed to resolve the conflict, including the setting up of a joint Political and Security Committee at ministerial level. Transnistria thereby became a test case for future cooperation with Russia. In addition to providing this impulse, the Meseberg Memorandum also injected a new dynamic into the conflict resolution efforts. The 5+2 negotiations can already start to get things on the right track now. But a conclusive settlement of the conflict will take time. It should follow a dual approach. While fundamental principles are defined in the 5+2 negotiations by way of a top-down approach, the solutions should be found step by step following a bottom-up approach.

In Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the UN and OSCE, respectively, are theoretically mandated with conflict resolution. These organizations have quite different organizational cultures, implying serious obstacles to coordination between the two conflict resolution processes. The South Ossetian cease-fire is monitored by a Joint Control Commission (JCC), containing five parties: Georgia, South Ossetia, Russia, the Russian Republic of North Ossetia and the OSCE Mission. Russia holds a veto in the OSCE and is thus able to neutralize it as an actor. The JCC format thus in practice leaves Georgia against South Ossetia and two actors strongly biased in the latter's favor. The peacekeeping force is led by Russia, and includes Russian, Georgian and Ossetian components. All negotiations have been hosted by Russia, and there is no established role for the OSCE or other international bodies in these talks.

As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, Russia has opposed UN peacekeeping on the territory of the former Soviet Union, limiting UN presence in Abkhazia to an unarmed observer mission, UNOMIG, comprising 121 observers. A CIS peacekeeping force is deployed, however exclusively consisting of Russian soldiers. Moreover, the CIS per se has no mandate to involve in peacekeeping operations. UN engagement in conflict resolution has mainly consisted in the assignment of a special envoy for the conflict. Since 1997, initiatives of the special envoy have included initiating a

Geneva process for discussion. Also, a "Group of Friends of the Secretary General" has been formed, comprising major western states and thus constituting moderate progress in reducing Russian dominance of the process. However, these powers hold only a consultative role, and Russia acts as facilitator in the so-called "friends" group. Aside from this, international interest in the conflict in Abkhazia has remained low, and Russian dominance over the conflict resolution processes remains largely unchallenged.[248]

Abkhazia and South Ossetia
Fig. 1.2



Up until 8 August 2008, the policy of European Union was not to get too much involved in the conflicts in the South Caucasus. The EU emerged from the August war as a substantial player in the conflicts in Georgia for the first time. The end of hostilities was agreed on the basis of Sarkozy Plan which, despite the fact that it is interpreted differently by the two sides, remains the basis for managing the status quo. The EU, together with the UN and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is now a co-host of the Geneva Process, the political format that is trying to move a

[248] Cornell et al, p.49-50.

solution of the conflict forward. The Geneva Process emerged as a mechanism to implement the six point Sarkozy Plan that was the basis for the cessation of hostilities between Georgia and Russia in August 2008. Led by the EU, the UN and the OSCE it now provides a space for discussion between the parties involved in the conflicts in Georgia, including between the Georgian government and the leadership of the self-declared Republics of Abkhazia and Ossetia.

A European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM), consisting of several hundred unarmed observers is the only international presence on the ground, since the Russia vetoed the continuation of the UN and the OSCE missions that had previously monitored and engaged with the South Ossetian and Abkhaz conflicts respectively. The main objective of the EUMM is to fulfill the European commitment in re-establishing stability and normalization following the Georgia – Russia War through an observer mission that includes Georgia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The mission is to observe the compliance of human rights and fulfillment of the six-point-program established under the French brokered peace agreement between Georgia and Russia on 12 August 2008. The EUMM has so far failed to secure agreement by the authorities in Abkhazia and South Ossetia to operate inside these territories and is restricted to Georgian administered areas (European Council 2008).

The EU also took the lead in the organization of a donor's conference that helped muster the financing for Georgia's reconstruction but despite the new profile, the problems that plagued the Union's policy to the Georgia conflicts remain. One very difficult subject is the way to engage with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The recognition of Russia of the independence of the two entities has changed the dynamic of the situation. In deference to Georgian sensitivities, the European Union has so far failed to develop a nuanced response that, whilst stopping short of recognition, would allow engagement with the territories. It thus has even less ability to make an impact on the decision making in the two territories than it had before the war.[249]

Another threat to peace in the Wider Black Sea Region is the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Peace negotiations imposed under international pressure do little to halt the cycle of mistrust and militarization if publics are not prepared to accept inevitable compromises.

[249] Henderson and Weaver, p. 82.

Outside pressure, whether through European conventions or human rights declarations, is unlikely to change the mentality of confrontation, since the parties to the conflict appear incapable of examining critically their historically grown perceptions. Today the peace process is at a dead end. There is no common basis of understanding. In neither country there is any serious political movement striving for compromise.[250]

Peaceful resolution of the conflict is likely to mean that Azerbaijan would have to carry the major burden of concessions. This is a proposition that few in Baku are willing to consider. Failure to reach such a painful compromise, unfortunately, could mean renewed conflict. The majority of the population in Azerbaijan would support a military operation to win back Nagorno-Karabakh, or at least the occupied regions around Nagorno-Karabakh, which Armenia controls as a buffer zone. The government is adept at manipulating popular opposition to the international treatment of the conflict to consolidate its power base. It has been careful to centralize decision-making regarding Nagorno-Karabakh, and given Azerbaijan's rudimentary structures of democracy the peace process remains quite opaque to the public. Even the political opposition, however, while suppressed, is strongly against any compromise solution.

Thus, so far the negotiations have failed to produce any significant progress. The Minsk Process initiated by the OSCE provides a platform for dialogue, but so far has not been able to develop feasible proposals to resolve the conflict. There has been little willingness on either side to making concessions, and mediators have failed to secure agreement on rules governing the status of Nagorno-Karabakh. The 1994 ceasefire has led to a situation that is generally described as "no peace, no war."

The OSCE co-chairmen proposed two peace plans in 1997 (known as the "package" and "staged" plans) that envisaged greater autonomy for Nagorno-Karabakh and diminishing Azerbaijani sovereignty over the region. Both of them were accepted by Azerbaijan. Armenian President accepted the second plan, but was forced to resign because of his concessions.

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[250] Daniel Hamilton and Gerhard Mangott, *The Wider Black Sea Region in the 21st Century: Strategic, Economic and Energy Perspectives* (Washington D.C.: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2008), p.60.

Nagorno-Karabakh
Fig.1.3



Each country believes that time is on its side. Yerevan hopes that the de facto reality of Nagorno-Karabakh as an independent state will lead to recognition by the international community, especially after Kosovo has gained its independence. Baku is wary of negotiations and pins its hopes on its arms buildup. Many people in Azerbaijan believe that the army is strong enough to initiate a new war, possibly a blitzkrieg. This could turn out to be an illusion. Meanwhile the prospect of a new war is something for which people are psychologically prepared. Mistrust is high, dialogue opportunities are low and on both sides a maximalist attitude is widespread. Civil society is weak, yet a strong civil society appears to be a prerequisite for accepting compromises to peacefully resolve the conflict.[251]

Referring to Turkey, it has major interest in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution, as its key policy goal for the Region is to maintain peace within the Black Sea. The leadership in Ankara received the 2003 Rose Revolution with anxiety. Above all else, Turkey seeks stability in its Georgian neighbor, and it has been nervous about the Saakashvili government's confrontational position towards Moscow. Ankara does not believe that peaceful resolutions of the "frozen conflicts" in Abkhazia and

[251] Hamilton and Mangott, p.70-74.

South Ossetia are possible without the involvement of Russia, or before amicable relations have been established between Russia and Georgia. On Abkhazia, Turkey has great potential to act as a mediator as there are more Abkhaz living in Turkey than in Abkhazia. At times, Turkey has tried to play just such a role, but has never given it the consistent focus this task requires. It has also been reluctant to take any action in Georgia (including Abkhazia) that could irritate Russia. Nonetheless, Ankara has sided with the Western alliance in expressing support for Georgia's further integration into the Euro-Atlantic framework—including that country's eventual membership in NATO. In fact, Turkey is home to NATO's Partnership for Peace training center and has been responsible for training thousands of personnel from Georgia (as well as Azerbaijan and Central Asia).[252]

The European Union engagement with the conflicts in Georgia was to a large extent marginal until August 2008, while the engagement with the most serious conflict in the region between Armenians and Azerbaijanis over Nagorno-Karabakh, as many say, was largely non-existent. EU policy was to give "support" to the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs, from Russia, the US and France, in their efforts to resolve the conflict. The EU support never took the form of anything than words. France's role as co-chair has been ambivalent for some but not for the French themselves who have always jealously guarded their role as co-chair and insist that this is a French role and not a European one.

The resistance of some parts of the Brussels bureaucracy to engage with the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has been stiff. They saw the conflict as an insurmountable obstacle to promoting regional cooperation in the South Caucasus and opted for separate bilateral relations. Slowly however things are changing on this front too with the Eastern Partnership trying to develop several regional dimensions.

There is also a cautious attempt by the EU Special Representative (EURS) to tiptoe round the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, doing enough to make a contribution but not too much to irritate any of the EU member states which, as with Georgia, bring their own agendas to the discussion. And the stakes in the Nagorno-Karabakh issue are even higher for some of the member states than the ones in Georgia. Many member states are trying to cultivate good relations with Azerbaijan because of its important role as an energy producer

[252] ibid, p.101.

and energy transit country. Others support Azerbaijan because they see the threat to its territorial integrity as a part of Russian machinations in the post-Soviet space, whilst others are concerned they have large, influential and rich Armenian communities in their midst which they are not keen to upset.

To its credit, European civil society has been much more ready to engage with the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. It is through civil society that the first proper EU engagement with the conflict is likely to ensue. Depending on how the process to resolve the conflict develops, the EU will also be well placed to use its experience in other conflict regions in the process of the post-conflict economic rehabilitation, and in the development of a programme of cross community confidence building, including through the provision of a monitoring force. However, a significant EU political and financial commitment to the peace process can only happen if the EU is directly involved.[253]

Conclusion

What are the perspectives of the Wider Black Sea Region in the 21st century? According to the analysts the future of this Region is suspended between a prosperous and democratic EU, a largely authoritarian Eurasia, and a turbulent Middle East.

Promoting peace in the Wider Black Sea Region is a strategic ambition of the states, as well as international organizations. As we have noticed, there is an international cooperation in the Wider Black Sea Region, but it continues to face challenges. Parts of the Wider Black Sea Region are presently not moving toward greater stability and peace.

The key objective is to resolve the "frozen conflicts": Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh; and to induce a greater degree of international cooperation and peace in the Region. For successful resolutions of the "frozen conflicts" there should be clear manifestations of cooperation among the major actors. The EU and NATO are dominant actors in the Wider Black Sea Region. Russia, therefore, has good reason to be concerned about the possible expansion of the EU and NATO by absorption of Georgia and the Ukraine, as well as Moldova, into the EU and NATO. NATO expansion will bring a potentially predominant power to the Russian borders. Moreover, if there was a resolution to Nagorno-Karabakh, that

[253] Henderson and Weaver, p.83.

would free up Armenia and Azerbaijan as potential NATO allies. Were Azerbaijan to be absorbed into the EU, the EU would have a more secure source of energy. Russia loses some of its leverage over the export of gas to Europe. This could adversely affect the larger Russian economy.

The conflict in Transnistria is the closest geographically to the EU, at the same time, it is the most solvable. The conflict features high on the agenda of EU-Russia and EU-Ukraine relations. A settlement of the conflict in Transnistria through the Meseberg Memorandum would attenuate the soft peace challenges in the Wider Black Sea Region. Republic of Moldova is oriented to a democratic and prosperous Europe, as this constitutes one of the priorities of its foreign policy.

Georgia, as well as Moldova is focused on cooperation with the European Union, at the moment negotiating on Association Agreement. Georgia had no plans to join the Customs Union of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia. This also represents a guarantee for peace in the Wider Black Sea Region.

Armenia chooses Custom Union over Association Agreement. After nearly four years of negotiating the Association Agreement with the EU, Armenian president Serzh Sargsyan made an abrupt turn, announcing his intention to instead join the Customs Union with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. It is not possible to combine the two frameworks because of contradicting tariff regulations. Sargsyan's statement was made after increased political and economic pressure from Russia in recent months. Armenia's participation in Russia-led integration projects will imply very limited possibilities for cooperation with the EU. It will also result in Armenia's deeper isolation and cause additional complications for the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution process.

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Sovyetler Birliği Sonrası Kafkasya'da Savaşlar ve Yeni Yapılanmalar

(Wars and New Structures in Caucasia in the Post-Soviet Era)

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Giriş

Kafkasya tarih boyunca Anadolu ile Asya kıtası arasında köprü oluşturan konumu ile bir çok medeniyetin, uygarlığın, kültürün geçişine tanıklık etmiş, üzerinde binlerce yıllık tarihi ve kültürel zenginliklerini bu geçişler içinde zenginleştirmiş, istilalara uğramış, mitolojik tanrılara ev sahipliği yapmış ve Kafdağının ardı hep gizemli kalmıştır. Yüzlerce dilin konuşulduğu, tarih boyunca onlarca halkın vatanı olan Kafkasya her dönemde bu özellikleri ile gündemde olmuştur. Bu bölgenin Çarlık Rusya'sından sonraki 1917'deki Bolşevik devriminde kurulan Sovyetler Birliğinin dağılmasından sonrasındaki savaşların ve yeni yapılanmaların (Abhazya-G.Osetya) içinde Abhazya'ya bu projeksiyonla bakacak olursak;

A) Tarihte Abhazya
B) Çarlık Rusya döneminde Abhazya,
C) Sovyet Sosyalist Cumhuriyetler Birliği döneminde Abhazya
D) Sovyetler Birliği sonrasında Abhazya, olarak tanımlamak gerekir.

Tarihte Abhazya

Abhazya ve ülkeye adını veren otokton halkı Abhazlar bölgede uzun bir tarihi geçmişe sahiptir. Abhazlar ilk güçlü devlet örgütlenmesini M.S. 8'inci yüzyılda gerçekleştirmişlerdir. 730'da kurulan Abhaz Krallığı, Karadeniz'in en güçlü devletlerinden biri olarak yüzlerce yıl hüküm sürmüştür. 10. ve 11. yüzyıllarda Abhaz Krallığı, Batı Gürcistan'ı da içine alacak şekilde genişlemiş ve başkentini Novy Afon'dan Kutaisi'ye taşımıştır. Moğol istilası ile bu krallık yıkılmış ve Abhazlar yeniden eski topraklarına çekilerek orada egemenlik sürmeye devam etmiştir. Abhazya daha sonra Arap, Pers, Bizans

istilalarını yaşamış, 1555'de bölgede hâkimiyet kuran Osmanlı imparatorluğunun, 1810'da da Çarlık Rusya'sının kontrolüne geçmiştir.

Çarlık Rusya'sı Döneminde Abhazya

Çarlık Rusya'sının sıcak denizlere inme ve imparatorluğunun sınırlarını genişletme düşüncesi, bölge halkları ile Çarlık Rusya'sının ordularını karşı karşıya getirmiştir. Rusların ''Dağlı'' dedikleri Kafkas halkları Çar ordularına uzun yıllar direnmiştir. Bu direniş çoğu zaman çok güçlü ordu ve silahlara sahip Çar güçlerine ağır yenilgiler yaşatmış ve bu çatışmalar 300 yıl sürecek kanlı savaşlarla sürmüştür. Bu savaşlarda Kuzey Kafkas halklarıyla birlikte Abhazlar da Rusya'ya karşı başkaldırmıştır. Çar'ın sayı ve silah gücü ile donanımlı ordularına yenilmek diğer Kafkas Halkları gibi Abhazlar için de tam bir yıkım olmuştur. Çarlık Rusyası'nın Abhazya'yı işgal ve ilhak etmesinden sonra Abhazların büyük bir bölümü 1864'de, kalanların da önemli bir kesimi 1877-1878'de (93 Harbi'nden sonra) anayurtlarını terke zorlanarak dönemin Osmanlı topraklarına sürgün edilmiştir. Bu iki büyük sürgün sonucu Abhaz nüfusunun %70'inden fazlası anayurtlarını terk etmek zorunda bırakılmış, boşaltılan topraklara Ruslar, Kazaklar ve Gürcüler yerleştirilmeye başlanmıştır. Sürgün sonrası döneminde Abhazya'da Rus askeri yönetimi kurulmuş, ülke "Sohum Askeri Bölgesi" olarak tanımlanmış ve buna uygun bir askeri-idari yönetim aygıtı oluşturulmuştur. Çarlık Rusya'sının uyguladığı sürgün politikası sonucu Abhazların çok büyük bir kesimi Abhazya'dan ayrılmak zorunda kalmıştır. Çarlık Rusya'sının izlemiş olduğu bu sömürgeci politikalarla, kendi iç dinamikleriyle ekonomik ve kültürel gelişiminin engellenmiş olması, Abhazları giderek kendi ülkelerinde azınlık durumuna düşürmüştür.

Sovyet Sosyalist Cumhuriyetler Birliği Döneminde Abhazya

1917 Ekim devriminden sonra yıkılan Çarlık Rusya'sının yerine yeni bir devlet kurulmuş, bu yapı tüm eski imparatorluk içinde yer alan halkların oluşturduğu Sovyet Sosyalist Cumhuriyetler Birliği içinde tarihteki yerini almıştır.

1917'de Rusya'da gerçekleşen Bolşevik İhtilali, Kafkasya'yı da etkisi altına almış ve Abhazya'ya yeniden egemen devlet olma şansı getirmiştir. 1921'de "Abhazya Sovyet Sosyalist Cumhuriyeti" kurulmuştur. 1922'de ise

Abhazya ile Gürcistan, iki ayrı egemen devlet olarak "Anlaşmalı Sosyalist Federal Cumhuriyeti" oluşturmuşlardır. Abhazya'nın 1925 Anayasası bu çerçevede ele alınmış ve bu anayasada; iki ayrı egemen devletin varlığı, bir bütün ve ayrı ayrı sınırı ve egemenliği, etnik alandaki eşitlik ve özgürlüğü, devlet olma özelliği, işlenmiştir.

Abhazya'nın devlet statüsü bu anayasa ile belirlenmiştir. Lenin'in ölümünden sonra, 1931'de SSCB'nin başına Gürcü asıllı J. Stalin'in geçmesi ile birlikte, Abhazya'nın 10 yıllık "cumhuriyet" statüsü "özerk cumhuriyet" statüsüne dönüştürülerek Gürcistan'a bağlanmış ve. SSCB tarihinde siyasi statüsü düşürülen tek ülke Abhazya olarak tarihe geçmiştir. 1931'den 1953 yılına kadar J. Stalin'in iktidardaki sürede, Lavrenti Beria (Kafkasya gizli polis şefi) ile birlikte Abhazların Gürcüleştirme politikaları içinde Abhaz aydınları yok edilmiş, Abhazlar Abhazya'dan sürülmüştür. Geçmişte ve günümüzdeki Gürcistan yönetimlerinin izlemiş olduğu imha ve inkâr politikaları, Abhazya'daki bütün halkların Gürcüleştirilmesine yönelik politikalar ile sorun bu günlere taşınmıştır.[254]

Abhazya'yı Gürcüleştirme politikaları 1931-1978 yılları arasında en ağır şekilde uygulanmış, bunun sonucu olarak, Abhazların genel nüfusa oranı 1900'ün başında yüzde 55'lerde iken, 1940'larda yüzde 25'lere, 1970'lerde ise yüzde 18'lere gerilemiştir. Buna karşılık Gürcü-Megrel-Svan nüfus oranı ise, son 50 yıl içinde yüzde 20'lerden yüzde 45'lere çıkarılmıştır. Tam bir asimilasyon politikası izlenmiştir.

1953'de J. Stalin'in ölümüyle birlikte, Abhazlar kendi ülkelerinde yeniden söz sahibi olmaya başlamıştır. Ancak Gürcistan'ın Abhazya'yı kontrol etmek için anayasal haklarını kısıtlama girişimi yüzünden 1967 ve 1978'de büyük çaplı gerginlikler yaşanmış, bunun üzerine 1978'de Abhazya ve Gürcistan anayasaları, 1977'de düzenlenen SSCB anayasasına paralel olarak yenilenmiştir. Böylece Abhazya ile Gürcistan ilişkileri, Abhazya lehine nispeten iyileştirilmiştir.

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[254] Kuzey Kafkas Kültür Derneği, Abhazya Gerçeği, (Ankara: Kafdağı Yayınları, 1992).

Sovyet Sosyalist Cumhuriyetleri Birliğinden Sonra Abhazya:

Sovyetler Birliği'nin dağılmasından sonra, birçok bağlı devlet bağımsızlıklarını ilan etmiş, bu süreçte de Gürcistan ile Abhazya arasındaki ilişkiler yeni bir boyut kazanmıştır. 1991'de Gürcistan iktidarı, 1921 ile 1928 yılları arasındaki tüm hukuki kararları yürürlükten kaldırarak, Gürcistan Abhazya ilişkilerini sağlayan tüm hukuki kararları da geçersiz saymıştır. Bu karar Abhazya ile olan ilişkileri tamamen hükümsüz bırakmıştır. Bu gelişmeler ile yükselen Gürcü milliyetçiliği ve şovenizm, Gürcistan'da iktidarı da devirmiş, Şevardnadze Gamsakhurdiya'yı darbe ile devirerek iktidara gelmiştir. Abhazya parlamentosu, Gürcistan'daki yeni iktidara, çağrı yaparak, yeni dönemde Gürcistan, Abhazya ilişkilerini düzenlemeyi önermiştir. Abhazya'nın bu çağrısı yanıtsız kalınca, Abhazya Parlamentosu yasal ve self-determinasyon temelinde meşru siyası haklarını kullanarak 23 Temmuz 1992'de egemenliğini ilan etmiştir. Ve kendisine bağımsız devlet statüsü veren 1925 Anayasası'na geri dönerek, bağımsızlık yolunda ilk adımını atmıştır. Bu kararın parlamentoda görüşülmesi için, 14 Ağustos 1992 tarihinde oturum kararı alınmış, ne yazık ki bu tarihte Abhazya parlamentosu toplanamamıştır. Zira Gürcistan'ın silahlı birlikleri Abhazya'ya saldırarak, Gal, Oçamçira, Sohum ve Gagra kentleri işgal etmiştir. Abhazlar direnişe geçmiş, Abhazlar ile birlikte bu ülkede yaşayan Ruslar, Türkler, Ermeniler, Rumlar, Kazaklar ve Gürcüler ile Megrellerin bir kısmı bu direnişe katılmıştır. Savaş 1 yıl sürmüş, bu süreçte Adıgey, Kabatay, Çeçen, Oset, Dağıstanlı, ve Türkiye'li Abhazlar bu savaşta Abhazya'nın yanında yer alarak destek vermiş, 3 Eylül 1992'de Moskova'da Boris Yeltsin gözetiminde Gürcü ve Abhaz liderler bir araya gelmiştir. Askeri güçlerin geri çekilmesi konusunda anlaşmaya varılmış, ancak Gürcistan bu anlaşmaya uymamıştır. Savaş yeniden şiddetlenmiş, her iki tarafta ağır kayıplar vermiştir. Bir yıl içinde 5 bin Abhaz öldürülmüş, on binlercesi yaralanmış, savaş Abhazya'da 10 milyar dolarlık maddi değer kaybına yol açmıştır. Abhazya'nın kültürü, ekolojisi, tarihi büyük ölçüde tahrip edilmiş ve savaş Gürcü birliklerinin Abhazya'dan atılması ile sona ermiştir. Savaş sonrası Abhazya-Gürcistan arası Birleşmiş Milletler, AGİT, ve Rusya Federasyonu gözetiminde diplomatik maraton başlamış; 1 Aralık 1993'de başlayan bu maratonda barış yolu ile çözümler aranmış, savaş nedeni ile Abhazya'yı terk eden Gürcü mültecilerin dönüşleri görüşülmüş, iki ülke arasında tampon bölge oluşturulmuş, ticari ve kültürel ilişkilerin yürütülmesine yönelik çalışmalar

yapılmıştır. Ancak, bu görüşmelerde kendi istediği politik kararları sağlayamayan Gürcistan yeni bir hamle ile ambargo kararı alınmasını sağlamıştır.

1995 yılında Gürcistanın talebi üzerine Bağımsız Devletler Topluluğu Abhazya'ya ağır yaptırımlar içeren ambargo uygulamaya başlamış, Şevardnadze'nin bu girişimleri ile Abhazya'ya karşı ambargo kararının uygulanması Rusya'ya bırakılmıştır. Rusya, Eylül 1994'de Abhazya sınırını kapatmış, Ekim sonunda ise denizden de abluka oluşturması sonucu Abhazya dünyadan tamamen tecrit edilmiş ve ağır bir ambargoyla karşı karşıya bırakılmıştır. Bu süreçte ilaç ve insani yardımlar dahi Abhazya'ya ulaştırılmamıştır.[255]

2000'li yılların başına kadar Abhazya'nın dünyadan izole durumu devam etmiştir. Bu yıllarda Rusya ile Gürcistan arasındaki işbirliği havası 2003 yılında Gürcistan'daki iktidar değişikliğiyle birlikte bozulmaya başlamış, Gürcistan'daki yeni iktidarın yüzünü tamamen Batı'ya çevirmesi ve Abhazya sorununu Batılı ülkeler üzerinden çözme girişimleri Rusya-Gürcistan ilişkilerini daha da kötüleştirmiştir. Gürcistan'la ilişkileri bozulan Rusya'ya, Abhazlar için yeni bir fırsat doğurmuş ve Abhazya Rusya üzerinden dünyaya yeniden açılmaya başlamıştır.

1997'de Abhazya Gürcistan'a siyasi bir proje sunmuş. ''Tarafların ilişkisini federatif bir yapıya oturtan ve karşılıklı bir stratejiyi belirleyen oluşumuna'' ait öneri projeye, Gürcistan yanıt vermemiştir. Bu girişimden sonra da Abhazya projesini geri çekmiştir. Bu gelişmeler üzerine Milliyetçi Gürcüler iktidarın da desteği ile 26 Mayıs 1998 de, sınırdaki barış gücü askerlerini de yararak yeniden Gal bölgesini işgal etmeye kalkmıştır. Çok sayıda insanın öldüğü çatışmalardan sonra, B.M, AGİT ve Rusya 1998 yılı sonunda barış görüşmelerini yeniden başlatmıştır.

16-18 Ekim 1998'de Atina'da ve 7-9 Haziran 1999'da İstanbul'da, 15-16 Mart 2001'de Yalta'da görüşmeler yapılmış, iki taraf sınır güvenliği, mültecilerin dönüşü, ekonomik ilişkilerin geliştirilmesi hakkındaki konuları tekrar ele almış, ancak bu süreçte, siyasi bir çözüm sağlanamamıştır.

Abhazya'nın 1997 yılındaki federatif çözümü de yanıtsız kalınca 3 Ekim 1999'da Abhazya'da yapılan referandumda halkın % 98'i bağımsızlıktan

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[255] Alaeddin Yalçınkaya, *Kafkasya'da Siyasi Gelişmeler: Etnik Düğümden Küresel Kördüğüme*, (Ankara: Lalezar, 2006), s.184.

yana oy kullanmıştır. Tüm görüşmelerde, Gürcistan'ın siyasi çözüm önerisi otonomi vermekten ileri gitmemiştir Kafkaslarda, Sovyetler Birliği'nin dağılmasından sonra başlayan, Gürcistan-Güney Osetya ve Gürcistan-Abhazya arasındaki sıcak çatışma süreci, Gürcistan'ın çok büyük bir stratejik hatası ve emperyal güçlerin yönlendirmesi ile 7 Ağustos 2008 gecesi Gürcistan kuvvetleri Güney Osetya'nın başkenti Shinval'de Rus arabulucular ve sivillere saldırmış, tüm dünyanın gözü olimpiyatlarda iken bir oldu bittiye getirilerek G. Osetya işgal edilmiştir. Bu girişime Rus ve Oset askeri güçlerinin tepkisi hızlı olmuş, Güney Osetya'daki sivilleri koruma gerekçesiyle Rus kuvvetleri Güney Osetya'ya girerek, Gürcü ordularına ağır bir darbe vurarak, devamında da Gürcistan içindeki tüm mevziileri yerle bir etmiştir. Gürcistan devlet başkanı Şakaaşvili A.B.D ve Batılı müttefiklerinden yardım istemişse de, istediği yardımları alamamış ve birkaç gün içinde ağır kayıplar vererek ülkesinin geleceğinin çok kötü sonuçlara giden adımlarını atmıştır. Bu arada, Rusya Federasyonu Dışişleri Bakanı Sergei Lavrov barışın sağlanabilmesi için Rus arabulucuların yetkilerinin arttırarak girişimlerini desteklemiştir.[256]

Güney Osetya'da yaşanan olaylar üzerine Abhazya'da da hareketlenmeler yaşanmış, Rusya-Abhazya askeri birlikleri Gürcistan sınırı boyunca ve Kodor Vadisi'nde bir araya gelerek, Abhazya, Gürcistan sınırı boyunca oluşabilecek askeri hareketlilikten endişe duyan Abhazya'ya yardım ederek, bu bölgeden Gürcü birliklerinin tamamen çekilmesini sağlamıştır.[257] Gürcistan birlikleri Güney Osetya sınırından da çıkarılarak bölgede etkisizleştirilmiştir.[258]

Yaşanan bu mücadele Rusya'nın politik bazı adımlar atmasını gerektirmiş, Rusya Federasyonu Devlet Başkanı Medvedev ile Abhazya ve Güney Osetya'lı liderler Bagapş ve Kokoity'nin 26 Ağustos 2008'de bir

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256 http://www.un.int/russia/new/Mainroot/docs/warfare/statement090808en.htm

257 http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/2008-156-4.cfm

258 Charlotte Hille, "Devletlerarası Hukukta Abhazya'nın Tanınması", *Uluslararası Abhazya'nın Bağımsızlığı ve Kafkasya'nın Geleceği Konferansı*, 30-31 Mayıs 2009, İstanbul.

araya geldiği toplantı sonunda Abhazya ve Güney Osetya'nın bağımsız devletler olarak resmen tanınmasına karar verilmiştir.[259]

Bağımsızlığın tanınması ile birlikte Abhazya'nın uluslararası alandaki statüsü birden değişmiş, bu değişiklik hem uluslararası, hem bölgesel hem de özelde Kuzey Kafkasya'daki politikalar bağlamında önemli gelişmelere de sebep olmuştur. Abhazya, bilinmeyen, izole ve kapalı bir devletçik olmaktan çıkıp uluslararası alanda tanınan ve konuşulan, bağımsızlığıyla uluslararası hukukun temel kurallarını etkileyecek bir takım süreçleri başlatan, küresel mücadelelerin de merkezinde yer alan bir ülkeye dönüşmüştür. Abhazya ile ilgili tartışmaların bir diğer noktası da başta, Rusya'nın ardından Nikaragua, Venezuela, Nauru, Vanuatu ve Tuvalu'nun da Abhazya'nın ve Güney Osetya'nın bağımsızlığını tanıması, bu iki ülkeyi uluslararası siyasi sisteminin bir parçası haline getirmiştir. Bu tanıma kararları tüm dünyada çok geniş yankılar uyandırmış, Avrupa Birliği ve A.B.D, Rusya'nın aldığı bu kararı yeniden gözden geçirmesi talebinde bulunmuş, ancak Rusya bölgesinde oynanan satranç oyununun en güçlü silahını kullanarak aldığı kararın arkasında durarak Gürcistan'da kaybettiği stratejik gücünü Abhazya üzerinden yeniden kazanmıştır.

Abhazya'nın, Birleşmiş Milletler Güvenlik Konseyi Daimi Üyesi Rusya Federasyonu ve Birleşmiş Milletler üyesi beş ülke tarafından resmen tanınmasıyla Abhazya ile Gürcistan arasında yepyeni bir dönem başlamıştır.

Bağımsızlıktan sonra Abhazya, demokratik, katılımcı bir siyasal yapı kurmaya çalışmış, parlamentosuyla özellikle savaş sonrası dönemde kendi halkına yeten bir devletleşme sürecini başlatarak ekonomik yapıyı oluşturma yolunda çaba göstermiştir. 2004-2005 sonrası dönemde Rusya'nın baskısıyla ambargo kalkınca ekonomisi canlanan Abhazya, 2005-2008 arası döneminde de dünya ile iletişimi hızlandırmış, diaspora ile ilişkilerini arttırmış ve küresel ekonomik düzenin parçası olma yolunda çaba göstermiştir. Bu süre zarfında Abhazya'da siyasal partiler kurulmuş, seçimler yapılmış ve toplum normalleşen bir hayata doğru adım, adım ilerlemiştir.[260] 2005'ten sonra

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[259] "Russia Recognizes South Ossetia and Abkhazia to Save People's Lives" *Pravda.Ru Websitesi* 26.08.2008, http://english.pravda.ru/russia/kremlin/26-08-2008/106214-russia_ossetia_abkhazia-0/

[260] Mithat Çelikpala, "Uluslararası İlişkiler Bağlamında Abhazya", *Xabze.Net Haber Sitesi* 06.01.2012 http:// www.xabze.net/blog/?p=915.

yaşanmaya başlayan bu süreç 2008 Ağustos ayında yaşanan "5 gün savaşı" ile farklı bir zemin kazanmıştır.

2008 yılındaki resmi tanıma öncesinde, Abhazya'nın anayasası, bayrağı, milli marşı ve diğer devlet sembolleri mevcuttur. Seçilmiş bir parlamentosu, bir devlet başkanı, başbakan ve bakanlar kurulu, kendi bağımsız dış politikası, küçük ama etkin bir ordusu, iç ve dış sınır kontrol birlikleri, hukuk sistemi ve devletin gözetiminde bulunan sosyal ve ekonomik kurumları bulunmaktadır. Yaşanan sert ekonomik ambargolara rağmen Abhazya turistik altyapısını, tropikal tarım koşullarını ve doğal kaynak avantajlarını kullanmak suretiyle belli bir ekonomik faaliyet seviyesine erişmeyi başarmıştır.

Politik açıdan bakıldığında ise, savaş sonrasında siyasi çoğulculuk sistemine geçilmiş, çok partili sistem ve canlı bir sivil toplum örgütlenmesi yaratılmış, devlet başkanlığı ve parlamento seçimleri yapılmıştır. Demokratik özgürlükler açısından bakıldığında, Abhazya resmen tanınmasından önce bile ABD merkezli Freedom House adlı sivil toplum kuruluşu tarafından "yarı bağımsız" ülke kategorisine alınarak Gürcistan ile aynı seviyede yer almış ve uluslararası anlamda tanınmış bulunan pek çok eski Sovyet devletinin de üzerinde bir konuma yerleşmiştir.[261]

Devletlerarası hukuk açısından Abhazya devlet sayılabilmek için aranan tüm kriterleri karşılamaktadır. 1933 tarihli Montevideo Konvansiyonu'nun Devletlerin Hak ve Yükümlülükleri konulu 1 nolu maddesine göre "devletlerarası hukukun bir parçası olarak devlet şu özellikleri taşımalıdır: (a) daimi bir nüfus, (b) tanımlanmış bir toprak parçası, (c) bir hükümet, (d) diğer devletlerle ilişki kurabilme kapasitesi.[262] Tüm bu veriler Abhazya için mevcuttur.

Yeni bir devletin tanınması ile ilgili iki ekol mevcuttur. "açıklayıcı teori" ye göre "yeni bir devletin tanınması, prensipte yeni bir devletin varlığından

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[261] Richard Berge, "26th of August 2011" *Abkhaz World Websitesi* 26.08.2011, http://abkhazworld.com/headlines /706-26th-of-august-2011-by-richard-berge.html

[262] "Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States" *University of Oslo-The Faculty of Law Websitesi* http://www.jus.uio.no/english/services/library/treaties/01/1-02/rights-duties-states.xml.

bağımsız politik bir eylemdir." Buna göre belirlenmiş bir toprağı, daimi bir nüfusu, kendi kendini kontrol edebilen bir hükümeti, kendi işlerini görebilen ve bunu yapma kapasitesine sahip olan oluşumlar devlet olarak tanımlanır ve bu anlamda tanınma zorunluluğu yoktur. Bu teoride resmen tanınma, temel yasal ilkeden çok uluslararası hayatın politik bir gerçekliğidir. Diğer devletler tarafından tanınsın ya da tanınmasın devlet olmanın gerektirdiği koşulları eksiksiz yerine getiren her yeni devlet yürürlüktedir.[263]

Kabul gören diğer bir tanınma tezi de "yapıcı teori" olarak adlandırılan muhafazakâr görüştür. Bu teori açıklayıcı teorinin aksine tanınmanın bir devletin önemli özelliklerinden biri olduğunu savunur. Bu teoriye göre "devlet olmakla ilgili hak ve yükümlülükler sadece tanınma yoluyla elde edilebilir. Yapıcı teori bir ülkenin devlet sayılabilmesi için kaç tane devlet tarafından tanınması gerektiğini belirtmemektedir. Bu yüzden bu muhafazakâr ve kısıtlayıcı teoriye göre bile, Abhazya, BM üyesi iki devlet tarafından tanındıktan sonra devletlerarası hukuk açısından devlet sayılabilmek için gereken resmi kriterleri, diğer devletler tarafından diplomatik tanınma dahil olmak üzere yerine getirmiş sayılmaktadır.[264] BM üyesi iki devlet tarafından tanınmasının Abhazya'nın kendini yöneten bağımsız bir devlet sayılması için yeterli olduğu düşünülmektedir.

2008 yılının Ağustos ayında yapılan savaş Türk dış politikası açısından çok zorlayıcı bir savaş olmuş, Türkiye bu savaşta insani önlemler alma (Kızılay yardımları, zorunlu göçmen akımına karşı önlemler vb.) dışında genel olarak hiçbir adım atmamıştır. Savaş sırasında Abhaz, Gürcü ve Oset'lerin sorunları yerine enerji hatlarının güvenliği ile ilgilenilmiştir. ABD ve Batı ittifakı Gürcistan'ı Abhazya ve Güney Osetya'ya karşı desteklemekle soruna tek taraflı bir bakış açısı sergilemektedir. Bu anlamda meseleye soğuk Savaş mantığı ile bakmakta ve Gürcistan'ın toprak bütünlüğünü savunmaktadır. Oysa Abhazya ve Güney Osetya geri döndürülemez şekilde Gürcistan'dan ayrılmıştır. Uluslararası toplum da Abhazya'nın bağımsızlığını

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263 Viacheslav Chirikba, "Devletlerarası Hukuk Açısından Abhazya Cumhuriyeti'nin Yasal Konumu ve Statüsü", *Uluslararası Abhazya'nın Bağımsızlığı ve Kafkasya'nın Geleceği Konferansı*, 30-31 Mayıs 2009, İstanbul, s. 22

264 Charlotte Hille, "Devletlerarası Hukukta Abhazya'nın Tanınması", *Uluslararası Abhazya'nın Bağımsızlığı ve Kafkasya'nın Geleceği Konferansı*, 30-31 Mayıs 2009, İstanbul.

tanımalı ve desteklemelidir. Bu destek demokrasiye ve barışa büyük bir katkı sağlayacaktır.

Kafkasya'da barış ve istikrarın sağlanması için Türkiye ve Rusya'ya büyük görevler düşmektedir. Rusya ve Türkiye'nin bölge politikaları açık ve şeffaf olmalıdır. Öncelikli misyon bölgedeki ekonomik yapının güçlendirilmesidir. Abhazya'ya ulaşım imkanlarının geliştirilmesi, özellikle Türkiye'den deniz ve havayolunun açılması önem taşımaktadır. Abhazya da buna karşılık Türkiye ile ilişkileri kültürel ve ekonomik ilişkilerden siyasi ve güvenlik ilişkilerine dönüştürmelidir.

Dünya açısından Kafkasya, sadece stratejik coğrafi önemi ile değerlendirilmemeli, bu bölgede yaşayan halkların haklarını koruyacak politikalar geliştirilmeli, bölgenin kültürel, ekonomik ve ekolojik zenginliği desteklenmelidir.

Türkiye'de nüfusu milyonları aşan Abhaz-Adige diasporası, Abhazya ve Kuzey Kafkasya için teminattır. Diasporanın tarihi misyonunu yerine getirebilmesi örgütlenmesini güçlendirmesi ve siyasallaşması ile mümkündür. Diasporanın sahip olduğu potansiyel tüm zorluklara ve engellemelere rağmen bir değişim ve dönüşüm sağlayacaktır. Çünkü eğitimli ve toplumu sürükleyecek elit, entelektüel grupların sayısı arttıkça ve bu grupların inisiyatifi geliştikçe süreç doğru yönde işlemeye devam edecektir.

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EUROPEAN UNION:
POLICIES AND PERSPECTIVES

De-Securitization of ENP in the Black Sea: A Case Study on the Network Governance Approach

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The European Neighborhood Policy and De-securitization

Enlargement of the European Union (EU) since the 1980s pushed the EU towards regions that it lacked amicable relations with i.e. the Mediterranean. Policy initiatives such as the Barcelona Process, EURO-MED, ENP and Union for the Mediterranean aimed to increase economic, trade, political and cultural relations with the neighboring countries while creating a ring of friends in which security threats are eliminated. However, all these years that the EU tried to increase policies towards the region, the security threat perception increased. For instance migration which has been a topic of Justice and Home Affairs only in the 1990s, in the 2000s we observed that security aspect of migration has been emphasized and Foreign and Security Policy pillar started to deal with migrants and migration. As Ole Waever conceptualized; securitization means that some issues which were not considered as a security problem are now perceived as security threats because security perception is constructed, interpreted and re-interpreted. It is the process by which issues between two or more units leave the sphere of normal bargaining and escalate to the realm of emergency.[265] There has been an increase in securitization of human, social and cultural issues in the last two decades especially after the end of the Cold War. Securitization in economic, social and cultural policy matters prevented the states, people and societies to further relations and to approach each other. This demonstrates the need to re-consider policies' falling under high and low politics since

[265] Adela Halo, "Policy Recommendations" (paper presented at the Joint Workshop of the PfP Consortium Study Group Regional Stability in South East Europe and the Albanian Institute for International Studies, Triana, Albania, September 24 – 27, 2009)

there is a constant debate on cooperation among the states, especially the regional ones. The priority is given to increase effectiveness in governance and competitiveness in economic and trade relations – which are considered as *sine qua non* of globalized economic system of the 21st century.

The EU's foreign policies including the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), since its initiation in 2004, aimed at increasing political association and the greatest possible degree of economic integration around the Union.[266] EU enlargement policies, as part of its foreign policies, have been most successful due to the conditionality clause applied to the future members; however, neighborhood policies lack the effectiveness of this clause since neighborhood countries do not have the prospect of membership. Thus, the Union has been in immediate need to find new ways to create an atmosphere of cooperation with its neighbors in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea regions.

We observe that securitization of economic, social and cultural issues hinder the possible cooperation efforts not only between the EU and the regional countries, but also among the regional states. In order to re-position these issues at the low politics level rather than high politics, it has been argued that there is a need for de-securitization, since it means not to have issues phrased as threats against which we have counter measures but to move them out of this threat defence sequence and into the ordinary public sphere.[267]

Ole Waever theorizes three strategies of de-securitization; not speaking about an issue as a threat at all; managing a securitization so that it does not spiral; and moving the securitized issue back into normal politics.[268] By all means, the most effective way of de-securitization would be the last strategy.

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[266] "European Neighbourhood Policy Overview," accessed November 17, 2013, http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/

[267] Sinem Akgül Açıkmeşe, "EU Conditionality and Desecuritization Nexus in Turkey," *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, (2013) p. 5, doi: 10.1080/14683857.2013.812772 (November 17, 2013)

[268] Ole Waever, "The EU as a Security Actor: Reflections from a Pessimistic Constructivist on Post-Sovereign Security Orders," in *International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration: Power, Security and Community,* eds. Morten Kelstrup and Michael C. Williams (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 253.

In the literature, there are four forms of de-securitization processes suggested; stabilization, replacement, re-articulation and silencing. This paper argues that stabilization can be the most appropriate form of de-securitization in the Black Sea region since it suggests that an issue is cast in terms other than security but the larger conflict still looms.[269] It is believed that high securitization level in the region among the regional states is very difficult to overcome by re-articulation; removing an issue from the securitized by actively offering a political solution to the threats, dangers and grievances, or silencing; issue disappearing or failing to register in security discourse. The paper does not see the replacement as a viable option of de-securitization since it suggests moving out one issue at hand of security while securitizing another.[270]

The main question in the neighborhood should be the following; how can the EU be effective in de-securitization via stabilization without the conditionality clause of the enlargement policies? Since the Union's enlargement in 2007, to Romania and Bulgaria, both at the political and academic levels this question has been debated regarding the Black Sea region. Region increased its importance since two of its members are littoral states and it is considered to be strategically important, as it is rich in natural resources and lies at the junction of Europe, the Caspian Sea and Central Asia. In this framework, the EU felt the necessity to design a policy initiative towards the region, and the Communication from the EU Commission on Black Sea Synergy was published in April 2007. The communication promoted the concepts of regional cooperation and local ownership, and brought together all the major political actors while facilitating good neighborly relations, cross-border cooperation programs and sectoral partnerships.[271] In this broader framework, the EU gives special importance to energy and infrastructure projects as the most promising fields for constructive cooperation in the region.

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[269] Açıkmeşe, "EU Conditionality and Desecuritization Nexus in Turkey," p. 6.

[270] ibid.

[271] Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, *Black Sea Synergy – A New Regional Cooperation Initiative*, Brussels, April 2007, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/ com07_160_en.pdf

After the Black Sea Synergy initiative, the EU launched yet another initiative, called Eastern Partnership (EaP), in December 2008.[272] Although the Black Sea Synergy initiative has a more inclusive approach towards all the actors in the Black Sea region, the EaP has a more differentiated and a more limited geographical approach, in which only Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine take part. The EaP aims to establish stronger channels of communication as well as the socialization and Europeanization of the targeted countries, through more effective bilateral and multilateral measures.[273]

The above-mentioned initiatives, by proposing further cross-border cooperation, sectoral partnerships and multilateral measures, offer a new way for de-securitization via stabilization in the region; network governance.

Network Governance and the ENP

In the new century, especially due to the fast globalization, new forms of governance have been debated. Instead of hierarchical government structures, more horizontal forms of network governance and communication which is conducted through a participatory manner[274] have been preferred in creating regional cooperation areas. Horizontal governance models help to establish institutions in which the actors have equal rights, and they have a more egalitarian approach to participational decision making.[275] Thus, they have a potential to serve the needs of the EU in its foreign policies in the neighboring regions by promoting democracy and increasing cooperation.

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[272] Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, *Eastern Partnership*, Brussels, December 2008, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/Lex UriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2008:0823: FIN:EN:PDF

[273] Sait Akşit and Çiğdem Üstün, "Introduction: Change in EU's and Turkey's Neighbourhood Policies" in *Turkey and the EU: The Process of Change and Neighbourhood,* eds. Atila Eralp and Çiğdem Üstün, (Zeplin İetişim: Ankara, 2009), p. 12.

[274] Sandra Lavanex and Frank Schimmelfennig, "EU Rules beyond EU Borders: Theorizing External Governance in European Politics", *Journal of European Public Policy*, 16 (2009), p. 796.

[275] Robyn Keast et al., "Mixing State, Market And Network Governance Modes: The Role Of Government in Crowded Policy Domains," *International Journal of Organization Theory and Behavior* 9 (2006), p. 36.

The network governance model is seen as a means of pluralist model to achieve some general benefits among autonomous but interdependent organizations.[276] Since the economic, social and cultural needs of the societies have become complex issues, it is observed that hierarchical administration models cannot meet these needs. The increase in the number of public and private actors in the governing processes effects the way the societies are governed and new theories on administration have been suggested such as society centered neopluralism, corporatism, neo-corporatism.[277] New governance theories all focus on the importance of coordinated actions among differentiated actors which requires the formation of networks and increased interdependencies among these networks. Coordinated actions of the networks has been perceived as essential to enhance learning, use the energy resources more efficiently, to increase capacity to plan and address complex issues and achieve greater competitiveness.[278]

Network governance means informal cooperation structures can be extended by which societies can overcome the difficulties of hierarchical state systems. The following table summarizes the network governance model regarding structural arrangements, relationships, integrating mechanism, institutional arrangements, issue complexity and accountability perspectives. This table suggests that the network governance is a result of the need for flexibility due to the complexity of political, social, economic and cultural issues which ask for more informal debating platforms rather than hierarchical state structures lacking social interdependence and exchange.

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[276] Ayda Eraydin et al, "Network Governance for Competitiveness: The Role of Policy Networks in the Economic Performance of Settlements in the Izmir Region," *Urban Studies*, 45 (2008), p. 2292.

[277] Eva Sorensen, "Metagovernance: The Changing Role of Politicians in Processes of Democratic Governance," *The American Review of Public Administration,* 36 (2006), p. 100.

[278] Keith G. Provan and Patrick Kenis, "Modes of Network Governance: Structure, Management, and Effectiveness," *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 18 (2007), p. 229.

Outcome Focus	Reflexivity
Structural Arrangements	Collective/Communal Organizations
Relationships	Social/Communal Interdependent
Integrating Mechanisms	Social exchange, common vision, trust, reciprocity
Institutional Arrangements	Compacts, accords, negotiation tables, informal networking
Issue Complexity	Complex
Accountability	To group-internal

Source: Robyn Keast et al., "Mixing State, Market and Network Governance Modes: The Role of Government in "Crowded" Policy Domains", International Journal of Organization Theory and Behavior 9(2006)

Cooperation through networks is argued to stimulate cooperative collaboration and ensure regional commitment while increasing the mutual dependence and trust among actors.[279] These aims correspond to the aims of the EU in its neighborhood in which it desires to create regional awareness, cooperation, harmony and prosperity without the conditionality clause applied in its enlargement policy. Since the hierarchical instruments could not create the cooperation that EU wanted to achieve in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea regions, it has been proposed that ENP may be conceptualized as a roof over expanding structures of sectoral functioning cooperation.[280] Especially, it is argued that instead of vertical

[279] Klaus Semlinger, "Cooperation and Competition in Network Governance: Regional Networks in A Globalised Economy," *Entrepreneurship & Regional Development: An International Journal*, 20 (2008), p. 554.

[280] Sandra Lavenex, "A Governance Perspective on the European Neighbourhood Policy: Integration Beyond Conditionality?" *Journal of European Public Policy*, 15(2008), p. 951.

institutionalization, horizontal informal relations to be created in the neighbouring regions would be effective in converging interests.[281]

One should observe that the EU itself is a multilevel and transnational system which requires multiplicity of actors in decision making processes. Therefore it is argued that this characteristics of the EU should be extended to the neighboring regions even the borders cannot be extended. Instead of border extension, enlargement, boundaries can be extended through network governance method, which would increase the application of governance patterns below the membership line.[282] Informal, loose and horizontal networks could bring public, private, international, subnational, civil and bureaucratic actors in the neighboring regions together with the EU actors without the limitations of borders and vertical membership talks. It is argued that this type of governance structure can increase the influence of the EU beyond its borders.

> The more the EU is integrated into its international environments and the more international actors and practices are integrated into the EU, the more influential and visible the EU is in the international arena.[283]

In addition to the above mentioned points, one should emphasize the importance of the civil society engagement in the network governance method. As the public administration debate turned to governance from government, at the national and subnational levels, civil society has been seen as an important component of governance at local, national and to a certain extent international levels. The network governance could be the method to include the civil society into the interactive decision making process due to its informal and horizontal characteristics.

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[281] ibid, p. 940.

[282] Mette Sicard Filtenborg et al, "An Alternative Theoretical Approach to EU Foreign Policy 'Network Governance' and the Case of the Northern Dimension Initiative," *Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association*, 37 (2002), p. 394.

[283] ibid, p. 402.

This argument has been critically important for the EU to adopt a more network governance approach rather than a hierarchical vertical government approach in the neighborhood. One of the aims of the ENP has been increasing the democratization in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea regions. Since the mid-1990s the EU used several tools to increase democratic movements in the Mediterranean countries, i.e. EU regional and structural funds. However, it has been observed that since the Barcelona Process none of the instruments that the Union utilized increased democratic understanding in the region. Civil society is as crucial as political parties in democratization of a society, and central to the development of a wider community of values and societal goals. Thus, civil society organizations can extend the values of the Union in the neighboring regions, while serving a democratizing function within state-society relations.[284]

With these aims in mind, the EU established the cross-border cooperation programmes including different actors active in the regions such as the business people, civil society organizations, municipalities, governorships, academics, researchers, international organizations and possible other actors interested in the issues at hand at a regional level. Cross-border cooperation has been seen as an important instrument in creating economic and social links and cooperation between regions.[285] Cross-border cooperation definitely requires a multi-level governance structure in which local and non-local actors would be involved in.[286] This characteristics of cross-border cooperation inevitably changes the administrative structures of the countries by bringing the idea of governance instead of government. As the local, regional, national, public and private actors come together, democratization processes could gain momentum at a regional level. Also, since cross-border cooperation mechanisms tend to focus on low politics issues affecting the lives of the people living in the region, it proposes solutions for local issues without dealing with the political conflicts at the state level. In a holistic manner cross-border cooperation can be defined as a loose institutionalized

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[284] James Wesley Scott and Ilkka Liikanen, "Civil Society and the 'Neighbourhood' — Europeanization through Cross Border Cooperation?" *Journal of European Integration*, 32 (2010), p. 424.

[285] ibid, 429.

[286] Markus Perkmann, "Building Governance Institutions Across European Borders," *Regional Studies*, 33 (1999), p. 658.

collaboration between subnational authorities across national borders.[287] Since it does not require strict institutionalization it becomes easier for the local authorities to cooperate at a low level which brings stabilization of cross-border relations to a certain extent.

Cross-border cooperation mechanisms can include issues which are technical or depoliticized such as transportation, spatial planning, environmental policies, fisheries and so on. The first cross-border cooperation was established at the Dutch-German border in the 1950s. In the 1990s when cross-border cooperation mechanisms were applied in the Baltic region and central and eastern European countries (CEECs) -PHARE and TACIS -, they were more developed and chambers of commerce, city administrations, public and private sector representatives were involved in the processes. These mechanisms helped the Baltic and CEECs adoption of EU values and policies before the enlargement in 2004 and 2007.

The literature explains possible networks which can be established with neighboring regions under three headings; information, implementation and regulatory networks. Firstly, information networks disseminate knowledge on the issue and best practices in the field. Secondly, implementation networks focus more on enhancing cooperation by implementing rules and finally regulatory networks formulate common rules and standards via their legislative mandate.[288]

When the EU integration process is nearly completed, one can expect to have regulatory networks at the regional level since the EU *acquis* is being adopted and implemented. Therefore it is more likely to have regulatory network mechanisms when there is a possible EU membership at the end of the tunnel. Regulatory networks due to their legislative mandates require conditionality clause to be effective. The experience of the EU has demonstrated that when conditionality works, meaning when there is an enlargement, it becomes possible to establish common standards. In the ENP cases, since one cannot observe the possibility of membership in the near

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[287] Markus Perkman, "Cross-Border Regions in Europe Significance and Drivers of Regional Cross Border Cooperation," *European Urban and Regional Studies* 10 (2003), p. 156.

[288] Lavenex, "A Governance Perspective on the European Neighbourhood Policy: Integration Beyond Conditionality?" p. 943.

future, it is difficult to assume regulatory networks would be simply established. Thus, this paper argues that information and implementation networks should be utilized in creating a cooperative atmosphere at the regional level in the Black Sea region. Besides, regulatory networks may need the resolution of political and geopolitical rifts in the regions while information and implementation networks could go further into low politics issues. Furthermore, regulatory networks need de-centralization in regional countries more than the information and implementation networks. Neighboring regions of the EU are lacking de-centralization and democratic governments generally. Therefore, efforts which would be invested in creating a regulatory network would be wasted in these regions.

Although cross-border cooperation is seen as a best practice mechanism for network governance establishing a link between the neighboring regions and the EU, this type of cooperation needs local actors, civil society organizations, public and private sector active in the region. Network governance can be a difficult type of governance for some regions due to the deficiencies among the local actors. Therefore, it has been argued that third countries' ability to participate as equal partners depends on their governing capacity.[289] Briefly, it can be argued that participation of citizens, political equality, communality and plurality[290] are needed for establishing a successful network governance mechanism.

Black Sea Basin Program 2007-2013: A Case Study

Just after the enlargement of the EU to Romania and Bulgaria, the EU established Black Sea Cross-Border Cooperation Program under the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI)[291] in 2007.

Via this program the EU aimed to support sustainable development, reduce differences in living standards across the regional borders and address challenges after the EU enlargement in the Black Sea region. The countries included in the program are Greece, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova,


[289] ibid, p. 952.

[290] Sorensen, "Metagovernance: The Changing Role of Politicians in Processes of Democratic Governance," p. 103.

[291] In 2004, when the Union created the ENP, it decided also that the financial means to implement the ENP would be made available through the ENPI.

Bulgaria, Romania, Russia, Turkey, Georgia and Ukraine which either have direct links to the basin or integrated to the basin through cultural, economic, historical factors. The program area includes both large rural areas, in Russia, Ukraine, Turkey and Bulgaria, and urban areas i.e. capital cities and cities of over 1 million population.

The program aims to include all the stakeholders in the cross-border cooperation in order to contribute to a stronger and sustainable economic and social development of the regions of the Black Sea Basin.[292] The program also specified objectives as; promoting economic and social development in the border areas, working together to address common challenges, promoting local, people-to-people cooperation in line with the challenges observed in the region. Mainly economic and social development of the region is lagging



[292] Black Sea Basin Joint Operational Programme, Final Version, November 2007, p. 7.

behind the EU standards and the infrastructural development of the region needs to be addressed. Political tensions, migration and environmental degradation are counted as the main challenges which need to be addressed by the local, national, regional and international actors.

As part of the program the EU conducted a SWOT analysis of the region and defined strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats in the Black Sea.[293] According to this analysis, the priority topics in the program have been decided in coherence with the Black Sea Synergy initiative published as part of the ENP. In this initiative priority areas were listed including democracy, respect for human rights and good governance, managing movement and improving security, the 'frozen conflicts', energy, transport, environment, maritime policy, fisheries, trade, research and education, science and technology, employment and social affairs, and regional development. Black Sea Basin Program was designed to emphasize more on three of these priority areas; democracy, environment and regional development. In line with these priorities, since 2007 projects on supporting cross border partnerships for economic and social development based on combined resources, sharing resources and competencies for environmental protection and conservation and supporting cultural and educational initiatives for the establishment of a common cultural environment in the Basin were funded under this program.

Some examples of these projects are:


Industrial Symbiosis Network for Environment Protection and Sustainable Development in Black Sea Basin (SymNet) aimed to minimize the environmental degradation and also in return of effects of climate change while maximizing economic and social development in Black Sea Basin by establishing industrial symbiosis system.[294] This project ended in July 2013 and in total €670.692 was given under ENPI and IPA programs. The project

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[293] Please see Annex I.

[294] *Industrial Symbiosis Network for Environment Protection and Sustainable Development in Black Sea Basin (SymNet)*, Joint Operational Programme "Black Sea Basin 2007-2013" Joint Managing Authority and Joint Technical Secretariat May 2012, http://www.blackseacbc.net/index.php/eng/content/download/11379/287521/file/20120524%20Priority%201%20Symnet%2092.pdf


is coordinated by Bulgarian Academy of Sciences and partners include research centers, universities and civil society organizations from Romania, Moldova and Turkey.



OLKAS. From Aegean to the Black Sea. Medieval Ports in the Maritime Routes of the East aimed to project the relationship of the entire economic/tourism/cultural space of Black Sea, through monuments which constitute a network of culture and constituted indicators of interactions during an important historical period.[295] This project will end in January 2014 and in total €625.223 was granted. The project is coordinated by European


[295] *OLKAS. From Aegean to the Black Sea. Medieval Ports in the Maritime Routes of the East,* Joint Operational Programme "Black Sea Basin 2007-2013" Joint Managing Authority and Joint Technical Secretariat May 2012, http://www.blacksea-cbc.net/index.php/eng/content/download/11754/297654/file/20120620%20Priority%201% 20Olkas%20168.pdf

Centre for Byzantine and Post -Byzantine Monuments in Greece and partners include culture centers, museums, civil society organizations and universities from Ukraine, Turkey, Georgia, Bulgaria and Romania.




Black Sea Network of Regional Development (BlasNET) aimed to achieve sustainable economic growth of the regions-partners under the project, to improve the competitiveness of their SMEs and their performance on the international markets, through increasing the potential and international relations of the regional stakeholders, by establishing a network among them.[296] This project ended in September 2013 and in total €442.876 was granted. This project was coordinated by Regional Agency for Entrepreneurship and Innovations in Bulgaria and partners include universities, ministries, and civil society organizations working on economic development from Greece, Romania, Moldova and Ukraine.

[296] *Black Sea Network of Regional Development (BlasNET),* Joint Operational Programme "Black Sea Basin 2007-2013" Joint Managing Authority and Joint Technical Secretariat May 2012, http://www.blackseacbc.net/index.php/eng/content/download/12221/310993/file/20120719%20Priority%201%20BlasNET%2096.pdf




Interpretative Trails on the Ground -Support to the Management of Natural Protected Areas in the Black Sea Region (Inter Trails) aimed to provide support to the establishment of national and cross-border expert structures for interpretation of nature and cultural diversity in nature protected areas and for the training of experts in modern environmental management practices.[297] This project ended in October 2013 and in total €375.220 was granted. This project was coordinated by an NGO network in Bulgaria and partners included research centers and civil society organizations from Romania, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia.

[297] *Interpretative Trails on the Ground -Support to the Management of Natural Protected Areas in the Black Sea Region (Inter Trails),* Joint Operational Programme "Black Sea Basin 2007-2013" Joint Managing Authority and Joint Technical Secretariat May 2012, http://www.blackseacbc.net/index.php/eng/content/download/11380/287525/file/20120524%20Priority%202%20Inter%20Trails%20 150.pdf




Black Sea Earthquake Safety Net(work) – ESNET aimed to contribute to increase capacity of emergency units to react to earthquake disasters.[298] The project will end in March 2014 and in total €616.463 was granted. This project was coordinated by National Institute of Research Development for Earth Physics in Romania; partners include civil society organizations and research centers from Bulgaria, Moldova and Turkey.

[298] *Black Sea Earthquake Safety Net(work) – ESNET*, Joint Operational Programme "Black Sea Basin 2007-2013" Joint Managing Authority and Joint Technical Secretariat May 2012, http://www.ab.gov.tr/files/CBC/karadeniz._soi/Uygulanan%20Projeler/20120806_priority_2_esnet_80.pdf



Black Sea Cultural Animation Program Pilot model for mobilizing the common cultural characteristics for creative destination management in the Black Sea Basin aimed to promote community partnership for the establishment of a common cultural environment in the Black Sea Basin via mobilizing the local cultural resources and education.[299] This project ended in February 2013 and in total €216.798 was granted. This project included beneficiaries and partners of high schools, local administrative bodies, and culture centers from Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey, Georgia, and Armenia.

[299] *Black Sea Cultural Animation Program Pilot Model for Mobilizing The Common Cultural Characteristics for Creative Destination Management in the Black Sea Basin,* Joint Operational Programme "Black Sea Basin 20072013" Joint Managing Authority and Joint Technical Secretariat May 2012, http://www.blacksea-cbc.net/index.
php/eng/content/download/11381/287529/file/20120524%20Priority%203%20Cultural%20Animation%20Program%2026.pdf



Assessment and Conclusion

As one can observe, these projects reflect the essence of the network governance in which multiple actors such as the research centers, universities, international and national civil society organizations, local administrative units, and regional umbrella organizations work together with an aim to increase cooperation without the involvement of high politics, states and political conflicts. The topics chosen under this program are also consistent with the idea of network governance i.e. environment, tourism, cultural exchange, natural disasters and so on. Therefore, it can be argued that the Black Sea Basin Program has been designed in line with the network governance practices and ideals.

However there have been some criticisms regarding program since the program seems overreaching and over ambitious in priority areas.[300] This paper argues that over ambitions are not created by the Black Sea Basin

[300] Colin Maddock, "Mid-term Evaluation of ENPI-CBC, An Overview of the Findings fort he Black Sea Basin Programme," (paper presented at Black Sea Cross Border Cooperation Annual Conference 2012, Chisinau, Moldova, September 18-19, 2012).

Program, but the EU's Black Sea Synergy paper which was published before the program was initiated. In analyzing these programs which are a part of the ENP, one should remember that these types of network governance programs find it necessary to reflect the priorities of ENP strategies. When this program was initiated as mentioned above only three of the priority areas were included and the rest has been left out. Therefore, this paper argues that the EU when creating policies initially towards the neighboring regions, should be more concise and to the point. It can be seen that the over ambitions have been tried to be reduced and the program aims have been minimized. Another criticism was over the bureaucratic delays due to the centralized characteristics of the regional states which is a valid criticism. However, one should also consider the bureaucracy at the EU level as well. It has been observed that the incompatibility of the bureaucratic procedures of the EU and the countries in which projects are applied create issues in the implementation of these projects. Therefore, there is a certain need in simplification of bureaucratic structures both in the regional states and at the EU level. Thirdly, there are some question marks over this program since it is the first time that the EU is using the network governance approach in a region where there is almost no future for enlargement i.e. Ukraine, Georgia. In the previous attempts of the EU in using the network governance approach through cross-border cooperation such as the Baltics, this approach was backed up by the conditionality clause of the enlargement. Thus, it has been observed that the cooperation at the borders has been relatively easier and faster than the Black Sea region. There is a viable concern that the lack of conditionality may strengthen the geo-political rivalries and prevent the network governance approach to be effective around the borders. When one studies the region, it is seen that there are various initiatives started by different actors which all aim to increase cooperation and harmony. Some of these initiatives are Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), Black Sea Forum for Dialogue and Partnership, Commission for the Protection of the Black Sea against pollution, Black Sea Littoral States Border / Coast Guard Cooperation Forum (BSCF), Kiev Initiative, The Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation, Black Sea and Central Asia Economic Outlook, Black Sea Trade and Investment Promotion Program, Black Sea Euroregion, Black Sea Synergy and Eastern Partnership (EaP). All these initiatives, although they all started with good will, created an inflation of regional cooperation efforts which decreases the importance of projects that are being

implemented. There is a certain need to rethink about the effectiveness of the initiatives active in the region and if necessary merge some of them while abandoning the others. The problem though lies in the involvement of high politics in some of these initiatives and reluctant attitudes of the regional states to give up the projects which are not positively affecting the cooperation efforts.

One should admit that the network governance approach needs liberal democracies with powerful civil society involvement and decentralization to a certain extent in order to be successful. The region that is being discussed is not governed by decentralized governments; the idea of loose governance with the inclusion of public and private actors is not welcomed in most of the regional states. These negativities create problems in the implementation of the Black Sea Basin Program; however the studies demonstrate that the EU is perceived as a more benign actor than the other international and regional actors.[301] Thus, this paper argues that the EU touching upon people's lives through using a tool such as network governance dealing only with low politics issues is the most viable solution to speed up the baby steps towards democratic governance in this region. It has been observed that there was an enthusiasm among the regional private and public actors when the Black Sea Basin Program was initiated and the budget foreseen for the Program was increased to €28 million from €17 million and it has been decided that the Cross-Border Cooperation Program for the Black Sea basin to be renewed for the multi-annual financial framework (2014-2020).[302]

[301] EU4SEAS -The EU and Sub-Regional Multilateralism in Europe's Sea Basins: Neighbourhood, Enlargement And Multilateral Cooperation, FP7 Collaborative Project,20092012.

[302] Fernando Garces de los Fayos, "The EU's Black Sea Policy, Where Do We Stand?" *Policy Briefing, DG for External Policies, Policy Department*, DGEXPO/B/PolDep/ Note/2013_221, September 2013, p. 7.

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EU4SEAS -The EU and Sub-Regional Multilateralism in Europe's Sea Basins: Neighbourhood, Enlargement and Multilateral Cooperation, FP7 Collaborative Project 2009-2012

Annex 1

Strengths	Weaknesses
1. Strategic geopolitical role and position: one of the main external border areas of the EU for trade and labour migrations; 2. EU gateway for energy resources trade; 3. Strong Foreign Direct Investment inflows; 4. High potential environmental diversity, and agricultural, tourism and fishery resources; 5. Low labor costs/good skills and competencies, compared to labor forces from competitors as close to the EU; 6. Rich cultural heritage, human capacities and social values.	1. Poor quality of industrial and transport infrastructure; 2. Intra-and inter-regional disparities in economic development; 3. "Closed sea" negative environmental impacts from external agents located in the Black Sea physical basin; 4. Demographic decline due to migration; 5. Low level of administrative capacity for implementation of local development policies; 6. Scarcity of education infrastructures, low technological level of innovation centers; 7. Constraints to economic development from physical-climatic conditions, especially in the South, and environmental degradation; 8. Geopolitical constraints to trade and mobility of persons; 9. Security issues / frozen conflicts, corruption, organized crime.

Opportunities	Threats
1. Substantial growth of GDP after 2000, multiplicative effects in neighboring regions; 2. Large parts of the coastal area in Member States will have access to Cohesion Policy funds; 3. Improving political and economic stability facilitating attraction of FDI; 4. Growth in demand for tourism services, potentially extended to all coastal regions; 5. Large investments planned in pan-European transport axis, petrol/gas pipelines; 6. Introduction of new methodologies in education, training and life-long learning, to overcome physical and structural constraints (e.g. Bologna-process, ICT, VET reform); 7. Increased relations among coastal regions of Black Sea promoted by International partnership initiatives.	1. Return to macro-economic instability -due to economic and political factors (e.g. oil prices); 2. Migration of most skilled workers to EU-industrialized countries; 3. Competition from Newly Industrializing Countries in industrial development and attraction of FDI; 4. Increasing environmental degradation due to external factors; 5. Increasing distance between EU members and neighbors in customs, common market and labor mobility; 6. Increased threats due to local conflicts, organized crime, corruption, terrorism; 7. Delays in resolving/combating: frozen conflicts, organized crime, corruption, and terrorism.

The Black Sea Dimension of the "Shared Neighborhood": Turkey, the EU, and Prospects for a "New" Cooperation

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Introduction

The Black Sea region is one of the most complex regions with its changing dynamics, complex realities, interests of insiders and outsiders. Its strategic position, linking north to south and east to west, as well as its oil, gas, transport and trade routes are all important reasons for its increasing relevance.[303] Turkey, as a Black Sea country did not so far develop a cohesive strategic perspective towards the region since the Soviet threat weighted heavily in their strategic calculations throughout the Cold War years. However, with the demise of the Soviet Union the Black Sea region was conceived as a zone of cooperation with the neighboring countries rather than as a zone of threat under Soviet influence or in other terms, a securitized zone. For EU, the Black Sea region has long been neglected in their neighborhood policy mostly oriented towards the Mediterranean region in the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership launched in 1995. It was only after 2007 enlargement of the EU with the accession of two Black Sea countries Bulgaria and Romania, EU started to share geographical borders with the region. This bordering together with the launch of a new neighborhood strategy in 2008, namely the Eastern Partnership changed the deal in the EU's policy towards the Black Sea region. Of course, these developments also strategically impacted the problematic EU-Turkey

[303] Mustafa Aydin and Dimitrios Triantaphyllou, "A 2020 Vision for the Black Sea Region: the Commission on the Black Sea Proposes," *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 10:3 (2010), p. 373.

relations which have long lacked a Black Sea dimension. However, in recent years the energy factor, economic interests and the "Russian ambitions" seem to have pushed Turkey and EU to develop their Black Sea policies on a new common strategic ground. Despite challenges and divergences, this cooperation needs to be further developed in the coming years.

This paper will be structured around the following research questions: Given the increasing tensions in the MENA region since the start of the Arab uprisings in late 2010, could this newly shared "Black Sea" neighborhood create an added value for both the European neighborhood policy (ENP) which is actually in crisis and the problematic EU-Turkey relations? Could the prevailing political instabilities in the MENA region push the EU and Turkey to explore common grounds of cooperation in the Black Sea basin? What are the converging and diverging interests of the EU and Turkey with regard to this region?

With these questions in mind, this study first looks at how Turkey-EU relations have evolved since the 1990s in their Mediterranean neighborhood. In doing so, the Arab Spring effect and its repercussions on Turkey's and EU's MENA policies will also be briefly explained. Second, the paper examines whether the two actors, Turkey and EU could booster their cooperation in the wider Black Sea region in which they have important common strategic interests, especially in the fields of economy, energy and security.

Turkey, the EU and the Shared Neighborhood in the MENA Region:

Since the mid-1990s, EU has been working to establish a credible policy towards the Mediterranean region and trying to play an active role in efforts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and contributing to the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) as a member of the so-called Middle East Quartet (the US, the EU, Russia and the UN). Within this framework, in 1995 EU initiated the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), better known as the Barcelona Process, with its Mediterranean neighbors in order to create the means for dialogue, cooperation, peace, and stability between EU and its southern Mediterranean countries. In 2004, EU launched the ENP, which aimed and increase the possibilities of cooperation in political and economic spheres, taking on the model of the accession process in order to offer its

neighbors a deeper involvement in the EU policies. In 2007 a new policy under the name of the Mediterranean Union was introduced by French President Nicolas Sarkozy, which was criticized heavily by Turkey since it has been presented as an alternative to Turkey's potential EU membership. As a result of the criticisms, the Mediterranean Union has gone through modifications and launched under the Barcelona Process as Union for the Mediterranean. Turkey has participated in this process and emphasized its improved relations with the Mediterranean and the Middle Eastern countries and its importance as an asset in the development of the ENP and creation of ring of friends in the region. Within this framework, Turkey also emphasized its role in the Middle East and the resolution of conflict between Israel and Palestine. [304]

In fact, Turkish foreign policy makers prioritized to improve its relations with the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries in 2000s, while trying to solve its problems with its Middle Eastern neighbors. Accordingly, some scholars conceptualize Turkey's increasing activism towards the region as "*Middle Easternization*" of Turkish Foreign Policy.[305] In this regard, Turkey increased its economic and cultural relations with the MENA countries, which led to agreements on ending the visa requirements with countries such as Libya, Jordan, and Tunisia.[306] Turkey's approach to the Mediterranean and the Middle East demonstrated some resemblance to the EU's policies in pursuing a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; promoting political and economic reform in the region; working toward peaceful stabilization and reconstruction in Iraq; and finding a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear crisis.[307] Turkey has also been in harmony with EU in promoting a reform agenda in the Middle East. Turkey has also been more eager to play third party roles in the resolution of conflicts in the region. Due to its political and economic transformation, strongly linked to

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[304] Çiğdem Üstün, "EU and Turkish Neighborhood Policies: Common Goals," *Caucasian Review of International Affairs* 4, No.4 (Autumn 2010), p. 345.

[305] Meliha Benli Altunısık, "Turkey-EU Relations: Creating New Synergies in the Middle East", in Atila Eralp, Michele Comelli, and Çiğdem Üstün (eds.), *The European Neighbourhood Policy and the Southern Mediterranean: Drawing from the Lessons of Enlargement* (Ankara: METU Press, 2009), pp. 151-52.

[306] Üstün, "EU and Turkish Neighborhood Policies…" p. 344.

[307] Altunısık, pp. 151-52.

EU accession process, Turkey has become an object of attraction especially for reformers in the Arab Middle East.[308]

Yet, the popular uprisings that began in 2010 in MENA region has so far resulted in a political turmoil and instability on most of the MENA countries, which also dramatically affected Turkish foreign policy towards the region. Turkey since 2010 has been trying to act like a "normative power" towards the region, emphasizing the importance of rule of law, respect for human rights, democracy, legitimate governance. In the EU's side, since the mid-1990s, EU has been working to establish a credible policy towards the Mediterranean region. However, the ENP towards the MENA region has long been problematic. In this regard, the process called Arab Spring has so far had important implications for Mediterranean dimension of the shared neighborhood. The issues like "stability" and regional "cooperation" has become even more problematic considering the instability and uncertainty towards the future of the region. Therefore, the prevailing instabilities in the MENA region turns the attention towards Turkey and EU's newly shared neighborhood: Black Sea region. In this regard, the next section will question whether the prevailing political instabilities in the MENA region push the EU and Turkey to explore "new" common grounds of cooperation in the Black Sea basin?

The Black Sea Dimension of the Shared Neighbourhood: Potentials for Cooperation and Their Limitations

The emergence of the Black Sea as a region-between-regions and the conflicting agendas of powerful local and external players have long prevented the necessary regional focus towards the Black Sea. Situated at the crossroads between Europe and Asia, the Black Sea has been a site of contention and confrontation for centuries. Throughout the Cold War, it was the scene of East–West strategic competition, yet, the changes since the end of the Cold War have allowed for the first time in history the emergence of a potentially cooperative environment around the Black Sea. However, the conflicts in Transnistria/Moldova, Nagorno–Karabakh/Azerbaijan,

[308] Tarık Oguzlu, "Middle Easternization of Turkish Foreign Policy: Does Turkey Dissociate from the West", *Turkish Studies* 9 No.1, (2008).

Chechnya/Russia, Abkhazia/Georgia and South Ossetia/Georgia still continue to cast shadows over prospects for regional cooperation.[309]

With the expansions of NATO and the European Union in 2000's, the Black Sea has become the eastern frontier of Europe. The EU has not considered the Black Sea basin a distinct region with static and clearly determined borders. The EU's increasing awareness towards the Black Sea region can be seen as a new phenomenon which started with the accession of Bulgaria and Romania in the EU in 2007. In 2003, the European Security Strategy (ESS) became the first official document to state that the South Caucasus was a part of the region that required further attention.[310] In this regard, the European Commission launched an important initiative, namely the Black Sea Synergy Paper and expressed the need for regional cooperation specifically in the Black Sea region in 2007. EU fell short of defining an institutional relation with the region until the initiation of the Black Sea Synergy.[311] Yet, EU's 2007 Black Sea Synergy was very broad, both in terms of the content and the geographical space it covers, which made it very difficult to implement. As a result, EU launched the Eastern Partnership (EaP) on the heels of the August 2008 war. The EaP focuses on deepening bilateral cooperation and a greater degree of alignment with EU.[312] Therefore, especially with 2004 and 2007 enlargements of EU, Turkey and the EU began to share the same neighborhood in the Mediterranean, Middle East, the Black Sea, and the Caucasus regions.

Turkey, as a key regional actor of the region started to strategically engage with the region in the 90s by taking a lead role in jointly developing a common Black Sea identity under the framework of a regional economic cooperation organization, BSEC. The launch of the BSEC initiative increased hopes for the possibility of fostering institutionalized relations among the actors of the region. While adapting to the new geopolitical realities of the

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309 Mustafa Aydın, "Geographical Blessing versus Geopolitical Curse: Great Power Security Agendas for the Black Sea Region and a Turkish Alternative", *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 9: 3 (2009), 271-285, p. 271.

310 Mitat Celikpala, "Escalating Rivalries and Diverging Interests: Prospects for Stability and Security in the Black Sea Region," *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 10: 3 (2010), p. 294.

311 Aydın, ,p:274.

312 Celikpala, 294.

post-Cold War era, Turkish foreign policy first aimed to prioritize economic relations among the Black Sea countries with divergent security and strategic interests related with this region. However, systemic and regional developments associated with long-lasting domestic instabilities in the regional countries have long prevented the construction of a distinct Black Sea identity, as well as of a strongly integrated regional approach which in fact necessitates setting aside different geopolitical interests of all regional players. Turkey placed special importance on furthering cooperation in the Black Sea region while emphasizing the value of rule of law, democratic transition, and respect for human rights, and establishing closer relations with the West, especially with EU. [313] After the 2008 August War in Georgia, Turkey took further steps towards establishing a platform for the regional countries under the auspices of the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform to create positive relations between Armenia, Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Russia. [314]

The question is then, what are the converging and diverging interests of EU and Turkey in these newly Shared Neighborhoods in general? EU appears to have two major interests in the region: to secure energy supply lines from the east and to prevent the various security risks of the region from directly threatening Europe's own security.[315] Like the EU's ENP, Turkey's foreign policy seeks to ensure the region's stability, prosperity and security, for the benefit of all in both MENA and Black Sea regions. At the centre of Turkey's policies is a deliberate effort to prevent the Black Sea region from becoming the new focal point of global rivalry and conflict.[316] Moreover, due to the candidacy status of Turkey, EU has always been a determining element in Turkish foreign policy-making, while Turkey itself is a crucial element in EU's neighborhood due to the cultural, political, economic, and commercial ties of Turkey to the regional countries in the Mediterranean, the Middle East, the Black Sea, and the Caucasus.

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313 Çiğdem Üstün, "Europeanisation of Foreign Policy: The Case of Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Black Sea Region," *Journal of Southeast Europe and Black Sea Studies* 10: 2 (2010), p. 232.

314 Çiğdem Üstün, "EU and Turkish Neighborhood Policies…" p. 349.

315 Aydın, p, 274.

316 Celikpala, p. 296.

However, Turkey believes that the favorable atmosphere that was created after the publication of Black Sea Synergy Paper faded away when the EU initiated Eastern Partnership and excludes some of the regional actors such as Turkey and Russia. Current attempts at policy coordination in the Black Sea region, embodied in several regional institutions and multilateral forums, fail to deliver substantive results. There are some crucial regional factors that prevent Turkey and EU to both cooperate and coordinate their relations, if they will, in the region. In fact, important security issues such as the unresolved secessionist conflicts undermine the drive for regionalism and obstruct collective action and institutions. The composition of the Black Sea region is highly diversified in terms of the size and power of its countries, their systems of governance, the sophistication of their economic and financial structures and human development indicators.[317] Also, EU focuses on the importance of Turkish-Armenian relations towards a further cooperation in the region. Above all, the prolongation of Turkey's accession to the EU has always been a factor which decreases the enthusiasm of Turkey to align with the EU and cooperate towards the region. There is a lot of "potential" for the EU and Turkey to cooperate, but this potential is not yet actualized because of the absence of effective channels of dialogue and rapidly changing regional issues.[318] The recent Ukrainian crisis once again complicated the already complex situation in the Black sea region and made the issues of stability and cooperation in the region as elusive as ever.

Conclusion

Turkey and the EU have both converging and diverging interests in the Black Sea region currently under tension after the annexation of Crimea by Russia this year. The Ukrainian crisis seems to have changed the existing balances in the EU-Russia relations. The Ukranian crisis has suddenly turned to an important security issue for the EU and has caused the worst East-West tensions since the Cold War. Obviousy, the EU's decision of applying sanctions against Russia rose the tensions between two sides. On the Turkish side, a cautious policy towards Russia is striking. Despite the expression of their anxieties about some 300,000 Tatars in Crimea with which Turkey has

[317] Aydin and Triantaphyllou, p. 374.
[318] Eralp, p:201.

very close cultural and religious links, Turkish leaders avoided a real break up with Russia which would have negatively influenced their relations with the latter.

As argued by some observers, the Ukrainian crisis caused the rise of strategic importance in the Black Sea region and this would positively impact the future of Turkey-EU relations. However, it will not be false to argue that the most important determining factor in Turkey-EU relations is Turkey's own democracy and democratization process at home. The two actors could act harmoniously face the regional crisis in their neighborhood and thus further develop their cooperation in the fields of security, economics and democracy promotion. On the other hand, Turkey's EU bid has been going through a difficult period in recent years. In this regard, a synergy is needed through increasing cooperation and common interests. The Black Sea region can thus provide a new terrain of cooperation between two actors and help them overcome their strategic divergences with regards the Black Sea. In short, the EU-Turkey partnership in the Black Sea region has potential to create an added- value to the EU-Turkey relations.

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Geo-Historical Impact of the Black Sea on the Eastern Neighborhood Policy of the EU

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Introduction: Why The Black Sea Is Important?

European countries' energy needs and demands are on constant rise. Similar hunger for energy and security is true for the littoral states of the Black Sea. Therefore, co-operative and/or conflicting policies in and around the Black Sea are diversified and intensified in many fields of the region which had/has wider implications regionally and internationally. Sustainable development requires constant, reliable and cheap energy sources. Sea transportation is the cheapest[319] so far, so the Black Sea will continue to play its significant economic, political and strategic roles not only in the policies of the regional countries but also those energy related countries' institutions, companies and organizations.

In addition to existing pipelines, there are new pipelines either under construction and/or in a negotiation of planning in and around the Black Sea. European continent more or less is lacked of raw energy material sources compare to other continents. Therefore, the members of the European Union (EU) have to purchase energy for their members' industrial continuity of developments in order to sustain adequately at present level of their prosperity. To be a competitive power among the leading powers of the world, the EU's ever-increasing needs and extensive dependence to the Russian energy sources have to be diversified. In addition to this, there are developing countries in and around the Black Sea who hopelessly looking for

[319] Sea transportation is the cheapest among the transportation system and types as compare to rail road 3.5 times, land road 7 times and airways 15 times.

every kind of energies, potential energy sources and suppliers. Vice versa, there are desperate countries that have to sell and ready to supply energy in many different forms for all those potential buyers for their badly needed economy and national developments. These two sides' aims would/could be possible to achieve through the Black Sea and its littoral states. That makes the Black Sea a focal point for the regional and international conflicting energy related policies. Such an important water basin, due to its nature of geographical, strategic and economic situation, intensifies of many conflicting and divers competition in and around the Black Sea. There are various different powers used diverse policies in the region to achieve their own end.

The EU has tried to use its soft and hard-powers in the Eastern Europe and further extend its effect to neighboring countries, namely Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine. The EU's soft-power instruments will be effective if they are supported by hard-power initiatives on targets. Nevertheless, those intended policies had to be accepted, observed and respected by the both sides: appliers and receivers. The EU used/using its policies on those Eastern neighbors in general and the Black Sea in particular. Some of these political instruments were used in the same region previously by some other influential powers in the past, as like the Roman Empire and the Osmanlı (Ottoman) State.

There are many questions need to be answered on the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) as a tool of soft-power whether it will be effective on the Black Sea region or not. The EU has the potential and the capabilities to use its soft-power where hard-power exercised previously. Some of the union's soft power initiatives are declining on the Black Sea region while others on the rise. The recent international turbulences and changes within the EU and the Eurasian region create great concerns for the regional states and the world community. Dualities and dilemmas in its soft and hard power political exercises among the Union may create additional difficulties in implementation on Eurasian and the Black Sea region.

This study focus on the Black Sea's economic, political and security capacity by special reference to its historical (particularly Roman) roots with a comparative analysis of the EU's recent Eastern Neighborhood Policy (ENP) as a use of power and its overall assessment of the policy implementation on the Black Sea region. How can these theoretical and

practical policy approaches are classified within the political theories of International Relations and these policies consequences for the region will be also touched upon.

The Classical Politics in the Black Sea and Its Region

Western countries are using academic research outcomes and findings effectively in their daily lives and in planning their activities. This is particularly true when one consider the study of the Roman Empire and its experiences. Therefore, scrutinizing the Roman Empire's policies on the Black Sea will provide some important hints what were/are the European political leaders' policies all about. Moreover, geopolitics and geography somehow determine more or less similar policies to the players of the region even though players might have changed throughout the ages.

The Eastern Roman Empire's (Byzantine Empire) relationship with the east and west improved as a result of mutual needs where the Black Sea and its milieu would become the core of these relationships. The Roman Empire tried to establish contact with China by a roundabout route, from Cherson on the Crimea through Lazica and the Caucasus. But that when the Byzantine agents found out the secret of manufacturing silk, Justinianus did not carry out his plan in this direction. Emperors' interest in Lazica and Iberia (the regions on the eastern edge of the Black Sea) was partly religious (responding to an approach from the Christian inhabitants of these areas), and partly military (to be able to watch the passes across the Caucasus).[320]

The Eastern Roman Empire was linked to its suppliers by two routes passing to the south. One branch of the famous Silk Road which began in China and ran through Persian territory before arriving to Byzantium (İstanbul) was completely under Persian control. Persia was able to interrupt the trade whenever she wanted. The Hephthalites and Persia were the immediate neighboring states in the east. From these, the Hephthalite kingdom of which the Romans had some knowledge was a central Asian state most relevant to contact via Persia.

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[320] The strategic importance of this area was its accessibility to Constantinople once the Persians began to intervene in Lazica, the Romans also realized that it was important to deny the Persian access to the Black Sea for fear of an attack on Constantinople.

Another route passed to the south of this road by the Indian Ocean, either to the Red Sea and Alexandria or to the Persian Gulf and then again overland through Persian territory. This road equally was insecure, since the Persians controlled the purchase of silk of Ceylon and Empire had to maintain good relations with the Arab states around the Red Sea. At the same time this route involved a sea road and was rather dangerous and longer than the land route.[321] Persia was normally an obstacle for the Romans in making contact with the Far East as today for the EU.

When the Roman Empire became a Christian state, the emperors were keen to spread Christianity.[322] In spite of expansion still being an important aim for the Eastern Roman Empire, the idea of expansion towards the east had become of less immediate concern because of the problems in the west. Re-establishment of the Roman Empire took precedence, not surprisingly, over expansion in the east (hence desire for peace with Persia).

After Migration of Nations in 375, in particular after the 540s the Eastern Roman Empire had been squeezed from both the east and the west.[323] Therefore, the Empire had to construct different policies for these enemies, those in the west and its traditional adversary in the east. So, the Byzantine Empire tried to follow a kind of 'equilibrium policy' amid these disturbances. When the Byzantine Empire was 'making peace treaties in its international and inter-state relations'[324] in the east, it followed a defensive[325] policy in the west in the Balkans for the security and continuity of the Empire. Hence, the Emperor would be able to keep his Empire balanced. The two major adversaries would certainly have kept the Empire busy up to the end of the sixth century.[326]

Here we shall deal with the events of the individual Byzantine Emperors, using subdivisions to avoid confusion. From Roman Emperors' point of view there were a great number of political and military reasons for accepting the Turkish alliance. The most important reasons were strategic and focused on

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321 Moorhead, *Justinianus,* 165-166.
322 Vasiliev, *History,* Vol. I, 135.
323 Corripus, *Justini,* I, 250-57.
324 Chrysos, *Diplomacy*, 25-41.
325 Ostrogorsky, *History,* 82.
326 See Maurice, *Strategicon*.

two main points: one was the problem on the Danubian frontier where the invasions and defensive weaknesses of Empire continued. Migrations of Nations affected and kept the Empire busy in the west.[327] Empire struggled on the Danube frontier and in Italy with Hunnic tribes who moved westward over the Black Sea simply to provide stability on the western frontier of the Empire. Emperor's attention was turned to the Danubian frontier and worried more about this area than about his eastern frontier.[328] The two cutting edge eastern frontier in the Caucasus and western frontier in the Danube concentrated on and around the Black Sea.[329] Under these circumstances they have contacts with the Turks for economic demands to provide Chinese and eastern luxuries[330] as well as in the other European countries.

If the geographical condition of the area between the Khazar Sea (Caspian Sea) and the Black Sea and the connections[331] of Byzantium with this region are envisaged, we will see that there were different ways of connecting. The Black Sea was very rough, tempestuous, and changeable; one can understand how difficult the journey would be. On the other hand the other routes were not much better. Another probable route was by the northern Black Sea area; this was rather long and dangerous because of the threat of Avars, Unigurs, Utigurs, Qutrigurs and other migrant tribes. The shortest land road passed through Trapezus and followed the southern Black Sea until it arrived to Byzantium, but there was a Persian threat to the land of Lazica so Byzantium had to keep this region under its sovereignty. In fact it was for this reason that the Eastern Roman Empire wanted to dominate Lazica, which sometimes had been in alliance with the Persians, in order to make this road secure.[332] The

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327 See, Procopius, *Wars*, about the Franks VII .xx, xxvii,VIII. xx, xxiv, xxxiii, xxxiv; the Germans, VIII. xxii. 27, the Goths, VII. iv, xxxvi, xxxvii, xxxix, VIII. v, xii, xxi, xxiv, xxvi, xxxv; the Huns I. i, iii, x, xii, II. xv, xxviii, III. x, xvi, xxi, xxvi and the Lombards VII. xxxix, VIII. xviii, xxi, xxv, xxvi, xxx, xxxi, xxxiii, xxvii.

328 Kaegi, *Military Unrest*, 89, 96.

329 Menander, X. 1, 65-95.

330 Menander, X. 1, 51-52, "because they (the Romans) made more use of it than other people".

331 Angeliki Laiou, *Political Geography*, Beaton and Rouche, *Making History,* 100-106.

332 Procopius, *Wars*, I. xi. 28, I. xii. 19, I. xxii. 3, II. xv. 16, II. 16, II. xv. 16, II. xviii. 16, II. xv. 2-4, VIII. xiv. 45-53, VIII. xv. 2-11, VIII. xvi. 1.

EU's Caucasian neighbourhood policies should be dealt with this understanding of geopolitics.

As it is in the Roman Empire and subsequently Byzantine Period, powers tried to influence if they cannot obtain the Black Sea. Trade, security and cultural purposes play an important role in deciding whether to seek the power influence or gain the dominance on the land. So, geography is extremely important as it imposes many constraints and limits as well as opportunities and possibilities to peoples and nations where it is located.[333]

On the other hand, as formidable as these limits are, today there is still more than enough room for individuals, agencies, institutions and organizations to play their roles in improving and changing forced policies of geography. That means there are many players in creating local, national and international policies alongside geopolitics. More or less players recognize what their limits are and act accordingly even though there are many aiming to achieve more than their capacity. This had taken places in the local history of the Black Sea as it happens today.

Energy Resources and the Black Sea's Geopolitics

To write on the struggle for control over the vast energy resources and related policies were interesting and difficult subject matter for academics. The Black Sea and its immediate region such as in the Caucasus and Central Asia lead a number of political intrigue, fierce commercial competition, geo-strategic rivalries, ethnic feuding and elusive dependence more or less from very early ages up to present time.

Energy resources in the region are concentrated mainly in the Caspian Sea Basin and the Russian Federation. The littoral states of the Black Sea and neighboring regional countries are the major energy players in the region. These are Russian Federation, Turkey, Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Armenia. The external powers were also influential on the Black Sea energy politics, such the United States,

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[333] There are various discussions and literature on the importance of geopolitics. See for detailed discussion on geopolitics and its implementation on people and states in Faruk Sönmezoğlu, *Uluslararası Politika ve Dış Politika Analizi,* Beşinci Baskı (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 2012), s. 626-29.

the European Union, China and Iran. The area's natural possible and proven oil and gas reserves resources are estimated one of the world largest and this is very important for the energy consuming market and European States.[334]

The newly independent former Soviet Union states were the most vulnerable in an intense political and commercial competition for control over oil resources and export routes in the region. The complex structure of national identities, mentalities, goals, instruments are in constant changes, moreover the new players' perception differ depending on the new developments. The main aims of the games are to gain upper hand in power relations, widened influence, more security and ever increasing wealth of possessions.

There are continuing problems in the region such as intra-regional conflicts, internal political stability, unscrupulous entrepreneurial operations, and a shortfall in commercial expertise and legal structures for international operating businesses. Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, which share the majority of the region's energy deposits, are landlocked and, therefore, dependent on their immediate neighbors for their export. So, this makes them vulnerable to their neighbors' problems and, sometimes, to becoming a pawn in the rivalry of the larger powers adjacent to the Caucasus and Central Asia.

Regional and international powers' long-term policies made the region much more complex than before. Both parties stand to gain or lose significantly depending on whether they correctly predict the outcome of the region's many developing issues. The world oil production capacity and the ever-grooving demand are narrowing day by day, which lead to greater dependence oil and gas energy resources. This intensified the rivalries about the potential energy resources and their transportation from the producing region to the market or the consumers' region. Central Asian energy resources have offered an alternative energy supply compare to other supplying regions for the potential consumers. This, on the other hand, provides security to the regional states other than stability and liberty.

Energy resources and its transportation lead to a number of issues, the political and economic future of the Russian Federation and its behavior towards neighbors and regional states. It also influence on Turkish political

[334] The detail information of oil and gas reserve of the region can be accessed via http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org, (20.11.2013).

and economic future stance. USA, EU and China involve the regional energy issues.

Regional states focus on the Caucasus and Central Asian energy resources transportation via the Black Sea and its associated geo-politics in the region. The major locations of the region's oil and the factors affecting oil development, exploitation and export are also concern for the political players. The Caspian Sea dispute encapsulates the nature of the intra-regional competition. The internal political problems of the regional states, the technical and commercial impediments to implementing oil projects had to be addressed carefully. Oil transportation projects over the Black Sea, principal short and long-term export options, including the complex issue of pipelines became real issues for which the US, the EU, Russia and other key actors could develop their policies to encourage stable exploitation of Caspian oil.[335]

The energy resources have played a key strategic role in the world politics since the discoveries of the sources. The Caspian Sea area played an important role in the political games of the littoral states as well as external powers. The oil carriage is a considerable strategic importance for the developed as well as developing countries for their sustainable prosperity. One of the reason Germans lost their wars was 'the Germans ran out of oil in their quest for oil' during the Europeans Great Wars.[336]

Russia, Turkey and the West were engaged in an intense influence competition over the oil-producing areas. The Caucasus and Central Asia was fraught with tensions and bloody confrontations between corruption and poor administration, fierce competition between large oil companies, and the proliferation of dubious international entrepreneurs. There were always commercial competition, corruption, poor administration and ethnic tension experienced in the region, which are more or less still valid present daily lives of the locals.[337] The tension between Azerbaijan and Armenia goes to

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[335] Rosemarie Forsythe, *The Politics of Oil in the Caucasus and Central Asia*, Adelphi Paper 300 (1996), p.10.

[336] ibid.

[337] The rivalries over the oil of the region and its transportation issue goes to back the 1890s. The competition had occurred between the Russians and the American firms, American Standard Oil, the Rothschilds and the Nobels. One of the similarities between at that time and present is the frequent Western complaint in

back to the beginning of the 20th century. At the last decade of the 20th century intense rivalries escalated to bilateral conflicts and war. It has a potentiality to spill over the region.

Post-Soviet regional accessibility has led to substantial increase of involvement of western and other international companies. Compared to Soviet times, much more sophisticated technology and geophysical expertise came to the area. This led the development of advanced methods for finding and exploiting deeper deposits, which discovered new reserves. The exploration of new energy resources raised a question of how to transport these resources to the consumers. The rivalries lie in the possible route of the pipelines and shipment of the reserves.[338] Not all prospects have led to production, due to disappointing exploration results and the inability to move forward with exploration and production work in certain fields, where ownership rights are contested by other Caspian states.

Conflicting interests of the Caucasian and Central Asian states, the dispute over demarcation of the Caspian Sea, domestic political instabilities, and technical factors play important roles in Caspian oil development and export. In addition, external interests based on commercial, domestic and international policies, create a range of pressures on the oil development and strategic formation of the region.

Vladimir Putin, as the President of the Russian Federation, sees Europe as what the Tsars and commissars saw before him "Europe always wanted to invade Russian territory".[339] This raise Russian historical struggles against the Swedes, the Poles, the French, the Germans, the Lithuanians, etc., and therefore, just like the communist rulers as in the past, he wants buffer states between the Russian Federation and Europe.

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the 1890s of arbitrary Russian transport rates and regulations, and widespread government corruption that made it very difficult to conduct stable business ventures in the region. See for further details on this historical issue in, ibid.

338 ibid, pp.11-13; for time series and more detailed data, please consult on-line data service at http://data.iea.org.

339 Yaşar Onay, *Rus Stratejisinin Mimarları*, (İstanbul: İlgi Kültür Sanat Yayınları, 2007); Yaşar Onay, *Batı'ya Direnen Devlet: Rusya Rus Devlet Geleneği ve Kutsal Devletin Meşruiyeti*, (İstanbul: Yeni Yüzyıl Yayınları, 2008); Yaşar Onay, *Rusya ve Değişim*, (Ankara: Nobel Yayınları, 2002).

He wants overwhelming influence not only in the Baltic States but also his buffer states in the Eastern Europe. It is difficult to accept the collapse of the Warsaw Pact which it is almost impossible for the time being to reconstitute due to NATO existence through new members of the region. Nevertheless, the Russian leaders will keep applying pressure in various ways through gas pipelines, crime groups, cyber-attacks and so like. The same applies to this need for buffer states in Belarus and Ukraine. The reason why Georgia was invaded in 2008 was to show Russian determination not to leave its immediate area to foreign powers. Russia, even though it is struggling with lacks the military bandwidth to reconstitute the Russian empire, want to see their continuation of influence in Central Asia. Russian rulers think that Russia is open at most sides to invasion. It is a great land power with no natural borders, and land powers are particularly insecure. They lack the security of sea powers, which are protected by oceans.[340] On the other hand, Russia tries to overcome such weaknesses with the usage other geographically blessing of natural resources of oil and gas.

Oil and Gas Exploitation, Exports and Regional States' Policies

There are conflicting interests of the regional states, international powers and corporations over the Caucasian and Central Asian oil and gas. Commercial, domestic and foreign affairs of the involving states, create a range of pressures on the oil development and strategic formation of the region. Who are the external players and why they are interested in with this particular region?

The area is increasingly intensifying clash and cooperative hard works on influencing various issues, political maneuvering, shifting alliances, commercial competition and outright war. There are parties who want to involve almost on every issue related with the region. These are Russia, Turkey, the UK and Iran. These states have, at different times, controlled substantial areas, seeking either to exploit the region's natural endowments, or to use it as a launching point from which conquer India and the rest of

[340] "Interview: Robert D. Kaplan On How Geography Affects The Fate Of Nations," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Website* 11.09.2012 http://www.rferl.org/content/robert-kaplan-geography-fate-nations/24704951.html.

South Asia. The Caspian Basin countries have tried to declare and maintain some kind of independence. Nevertheless, they either failed and/or eventually submitted to one or another of the imperial powers.

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, these countries are trying to sustain their independence. Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan regards that their energy reserves their guarantee for their independence. Probably the most crucial issue is that even if these landlocked countries were able to overcome the enormous problems of getting the oil out of the ground, they would not be able to export it without the cooperation of their neighbors. This leads, a the regional and international levels, to a complex series of maneuvers and kaleidoscopic alliances and counter-alliances, designed to gain access to and influence over, some of the most valuable resources in the world.

Russia was the dominant player in the regional game for the past century or so. Russian domination was maintained and reinforced during the Soviet Union period, and the ties Russians' retains with the region's states, as a result, remain strong. Russia set a new and theoretically self-determining state in its backyard, forming a cordon between it, China, Turkey and Muslim populated areas. This required the evolution of a new strategic regional policy. Russia regarded that external powers' involvement with the regional states and their natural resources by any means as a threat to the Russian interests. Accordingly, Russia had reacted any political or economic approach by Turkey, the US, the UK and other Western countries in the region. Russia was supportive to initiatives to the actions that had taken place only if the move includes Russians in it. That means Russian inclusion should improve Russian technology, Russian bounties should be established with the wider world market and Russia should be sharing the profits available originated from the region.[341]

Natural gas offers an affordable and environmentally acceptable option to power people's lives today. It will also help to meet the world's rising demand for more and cleaner energy into the future. Some companies are using recently developed technology to open up new resources of natural gas. There is a cooling gas to be liquefied to ship it to faraway markets. Facilities should be extended to turn gas to liquid. For example Shell constructed the

[341] Forsythe, p.16.

world's largest plant to turn natural gas into liquid products in Qatar. As it is discussed above pages the Black Sea and beyond is very important for the EU. Therefore, the EU uses every way to be effective on the Black Sea. So, the European Union Neighborhood Policy (ENP) was created as a result of such policies.

The EU Policy Options on the Black Sea and Its European Neighborhood Policy

Soft-power[342] regarded as an ability to attract and co-opt on targets. For the achievement and realization of the policies, initiators' images and influences have to be adaptable and changeable. Traditional European great powers used and tried their military power to dictate what they had aimed at the first half of the 20th century. Nevertheless, they recognised that the newly established supranational identity, the EU, has to commit more money and effort to its soft-power tools including diplomacy, economic assistance and communication for better influence around the EU.

Racism and extremism is a real threat and it is very likely that it will be with the Europeans for the decades to come. Prominent members of the EU states, Germany, France and Austria in this sense, should respond adequately to the provocation of their extremists and racists within their countries.[343] Such racist and extreme terrorist activities within the EU countries seriously undermine the EU's initiatives. Old hatreds and sour memories of the last century, and deeply rooted institutional racism had to be dealt adequately and

[342] Joseph Nye worked as Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs, Chair of the National Intelligence Council, and Deputy Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology. For further info see: "Joseph Nye: Profile, Selected Publication Citations," http://www.hks.harvard.edu/about/faculty-staff-directory/joseph-nye (12.03.2013).

[343] Timothy Garton Ash, "2014 Is Not 1914, But Europe Is Getting Increasingly Angry and Nationalist," 18.11.2013, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/nov/18/europe-angry-nationalist-eu-elections (25.02. 2014).

urgently within the sphere of the EU and beyond in order to refresh European sincerity and trustworthiness.[344]

Hard policies applied on the Eastern European countries for the implementation of the western European powers' domination as Russia pursued similar policies from the east to the same end.[345] How far these power usages were relevant and effective on those Eastern countries and the region is questionable. Whatever the outcome of those policies would have been various hard and soft power, direct or indirect instruments were used in region.

Due to the historical experiences of Eurasian countries it is rather doubtful whether the ENP will be effective on the area. The EU has soft-power instruments in which hard-power exercised previously. At present the EU is trying to make them as the EU's Eastern neighbors within the policy of Eastern Neighborhood. The Union will be attractive not because of its cultural and moral values, but rather because of its economic and welfare policies of individuals and private expectations of the various involving parties.

The European Neighborhood Policy is expected to reinforce stability, security and to contribute to the efforts at conflict resolution among others in EU's neighbors. The EU has prepared and is constantly evaluating its documents on the development of regional and inter-regional cooperation and further integration at the enlarged EU's external borders. It is expected that the ENP will contribute to development of regional interaction in the area of

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[344] Robin Oakley, "Institutional Racism: Lessons from the UK," 05.12.2000 *European Roma Rights Center*, http://www.errc.org/article/institutional-racism-lessons-from-the-uk/1191 (25.02. 2014); Benedict Brogan and James Slack, "Why Britain Is the Least Racist Nation in Europe, Equalities Watchdog Trevor Phillips Says," *MailOnline* 19.01.2009. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1121483/Why-Britain-racist-nation-Europe-equalities-watchdog-Trevor-Phillips-says.html (25.02. 2014); Paul Lappalainen, "Institutional Racism in Sweden and Europe," http://www.rijo.homepage.t-online.de/pdf/EN_EU_ZE_racism.pdf (25.02. 2014).

[345] J. Bourne, P. Liddle and I. Whitehead, *The Great World War 1914-1945* (London: Clays, 2000).

trade, security and energy supply across the nations.[346] The ENP's aim is involving a ring of countries, sharing the EU's fundamental values and objectives, drawn into an increasingly close relationship, going beyond co-operation to involve a significant measure of economic and political integration if not unification.[347] The EU prepared a number of documents aiming to the development of regional cooperation and integration at the enlarged EU's external borders.[348] The policy aims involving a ring of countries, sharing the EU's fundamental values and objectives, drawn into an increasingly close relationship, going beyond co-operation to involve a significant measure of economic and political integration.[349] To this end the EU is expecting its values and objectives are respected and well received by the neighbouring countries.[350]

Even though the ENP aimed to contribute and create an atmosphere to solve those existing conflicts among the neighbors, the practice of the policies differed on the divided Cyprus issue.[351] It is a general expectation that the EU policies will be useful for the fight against organised crime and corruption, money laundering and all forms of trafficking and migration.[352]

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[346] On this subject Commission of the European Communities published a "European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper" in Brussels on 12 May 2004 with a number of COM (2004) 373 final. For the document it can be accessed in the EU's web page: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/strategy/strategy_paper_en.pdf, p.3. From now on (COM (2004) 373 final).

[347] "David Cameron's EU speech" 23.01.2013, *TheGuardian* 23.01.2013, http://www.guardian.co.uk/ politics/2013/ jan/23/david-cameron-eu-speech-referendum (12.03.2013).

[348] COM (2004) 373 final, p.4.

[349] COM (2004) 373 final, p.5.

[350] COM (2004) 373 final, p.8; C. Ponting, *World History*, (London: Pimblico, 2001).

[351] O. M. Öztürk, *Kıbrıs Annan Belgeleri Üzerine Değerlendirmeler,* (Ankara: Odak Yayınları, 2004); R. Denktaş, *Koloni İdaresinde Kıbrıs Türkleri*, (İstanbul: Akdeniz Haber Ajansı, 1997); İ. Kalaycı, *Kıbrıs ve Geleceği*, (İstanbul: Nobel, 2004).

[352] The ENP's neighbours in Europe are Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova. The EU and Russia have decided to develop their strategic partnership further through the creation of four common spaces, as defined at the 2003 St. Petersburg summit. In Caucasus Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia are also within the scope of the EU's ENP plan.

The EU documents it is stated that "in Eastern Europe, the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements provide the basis for contractual relations". It is further declared and encouraged the aimed countries that "the ambition and the pace of development of the EU's relationship with each partner country will depend on its degree of commitment to common values, as well as its will and capacity to implement agreed priorities".[353] Stronger partner dominates the weaker partner in a relation of the two involving parties' negotiations. The EU dominate, even dictate, the agreed values and priorities, which is almost impossible for any weaker partner to lay dawn any priority or a value against the wishes and desires of the member states and its subsequent bodies.[354] Nevertheless, special attention will be paid to peculiarities and circumstances of the partners' geographic location, political and economic situation. The relations with the EU and neighboring countries, reform programs, needs and capacities and interests of the ENP will be influential on the matter of final decision on the relations. This meant that every one of the countries in concern would be dealt individually and differentiated according to their special circumstances. The shared values and coherent regional approaches should contribute for further regional cooperation and more benefits for the partners within the umbrella of the EU.

The ENP's major aim is to make the EU neighbors more focused on the EU policies and principals. So, neighbors will feel close in various ways to the EU and its members. It is hoped that this might prevent any hostile feelings and movements against the EU and its associates. The ENP will facilitate benefits in economic and social development through convergence of economic legislation, the continued reduction of trade barriers, which will stimulate investments and growth of desired activities first and far most for the EU, and, then, neighbors. It is expected to resolve outstanding issues between the EU and neighbors as well as among the neighbors of the neighbors. Good neighborhood environment will provide better acceptance and implementation of previously agreed and on-going agreements. The EU is supporting and has an intention further financing this program for cross-border, transnational and regional co-operation for the benefit of its member states. The aimed links on community programs, promoting cultural,

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353 COM (2004) 373 final, p.7

354 A. Linklater, *Men ad Citizens in the Theory of International Relations,* (London: Macmillan, 1990), pp.17-37.

educational, environmental, technical and scientific linkages for the implementation of the policies.[355] Whoever meets EU norms and standards will be able to get financial and other means of support of the EU which will be decided by the Commission.[356] If the process demonstrates good progress, further steps along the path to greater integration will be made particularly on the internal market and other key EU policies. So, the system and process is a dynamic nature for further progress and changes depended on newly emerging situations, which will be assessed by the EU Commission.[357] The EU's High Representative is a staunch supporter of freedom of the press, which is regarded and supported as a fundamental element of a democratic society in the non-members of the EU. One of the important country in Eurasia is Ukraine and towards the end of 2013 and the first quarter of 2014 is witnessed a number of changes, and rivalries of the values of the EU and the East, Russia.

The EU Commission published an ENP report of Ukraine on 12 May 2010.[358] The report was an overall assessment of five years of implementation of the ENP. It is stated that "after years of steady progress in many areas covered by the Action Plan, Ukraine witnessed a slowing in the pace of reform in 2009, as a result of global economic and financial crisis and domestic political and constitutional difficulties." What was indicated in the report was that the internal politics and constitutional issues continue to create the difficulties on the implementation of the EU's neighborhood packages. So, this determines the requirements for some amendments and

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[355] S. George & I. Bache, *Politics in the European Union,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp.6-155.

[356] COM (2004) 373 final, p.9.

[357] "The Situation of NGOs in the Russian Federation" 26.03.2013, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/136573.pdf (27.03.2013).

[358] The MEMO/10/185, Brussels, 12 May 2010, ENP Country report 2009-Ukraine. For further info see at: "Communication from the Commission European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper," http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/strategy/strategy_paper_en.pdf (15.03.2013); "List of treaties by country: Ukraine", http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/searchByCountryAndContinent.do?countryId=3856&countryName =Ukraine (15.03.2013).

alterations initially on the domestic political settings and other matters in Ukraine. Whether Ukraine was ready to such changes and alterations on the directions of the ENP packages was/is another matter for each involving partners. It was expected that 'what is good for the EU, should be also regarded 'as good' for Ukraine'. According to the report, 'Ukraine was ready for those changes but require economic stability and further progress is needed'. It is decided by the EU officials that global economic and financial crisis played a crucial role for the slowing pace of the requested reform. It seemed this decision is lacked regional sensitivities and power balances of the area.

Further steps had to be taken according to the report which stipulates on "efforts to enhance macro-financial stability, reform of the constitution in order to enhance political stability while maintaining the pace of democratic development, energy sector reform (in particular as regards gas), public administration reform, the fight against corruption notably through judicial reform as well as measures to improve the business and investment climate." When these changes and requirements met adequately as suggested by the Commission, and then, the new assessments will be made according to the new developments and situations in the line of the EU necessities.

Most of the issues mentioned on the EU and Ukraine relations are political matters, governance and along with the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) an Association Agenda. Despite many short-comings the EU regarded the 2010 presidential elections as met with the EU's democratic standards.[359]

In 2009, the EU launched the Eastern Partnership, the Eastern dimension of the ENP framework, aiming at substantially upgrading engagement with the six Eastern neighbors. These are carried on by two dimensions: First, by bilateral track, whose objectives include Association Agreements, Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas as well as progress on visa and mobility issues. Second one is multilateral track which is intergovernmental platforms and Flagship Initiatives. These approaches expected for gradual political

[359] "Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament Brussels". For more info at, http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/searchByCountryAndContinent.do?countryId=3856&countryName= Ukraine (04.12.2006).

association and deeper economic integration between the involving parties.[360] As it is seen in the political sense, Ukrainian authorities tried to accomplish the requirements. Nevertheless, it was not certain that majority of Ukrainians supported such policies or not.[361]

In order to facilitate better integration and awareness of the communities, easy access should be available for those people who want to travel and explore the others. So, negotiations have taken places during 2009 and 2010 aiming to increased air traffic, new and more flight connections, entering new airlines on the market and finally more choice and cheaper prices for passengers.[362]

The EU stated that some of its neighbors have made economic and political reforms. Even some of the neighboring states have made the Action Plans the center-piece of their domestic reform strategies and international financial institutions (IFIs) are also aligning their policies with them. Nevertheless, poverty and unemployment, mixed economic performance, corruption and weak governance remain major challenges in most of neighbors.[363] The younger generation, are often faced with bleak personal prospects; "frozen conflicts" and recent events in North Africa and South Western Asian Countries (the Middle East) and Southern Caucasus remind the world community that the conditions for peaceful coexistence remain to be established. There are major challenges ahead between some of EU's neighbors and with other key countries in their respected regions. These are not only the EU's neighbors' problems. They consist risk producing major spill overs and challenges for the EU, such as illegal immigration, unreliable energy supplies, environmental degradation and terrorism.

Regional and global disturbances create an indication that the ENP had to be strengthened, in order to avoid potential cost of failing to support its neighbors in their reform efforts will be much more than expected at present. Therefore, the EU must present attractive political and economic offers to its ENP partner countries. These should include offering them improved trade and

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360 http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm; http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/ukraine/ index_en.htm;

361 http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/ukraine/ index_en.htm.

362 http://ec.europa.eu/ external_relations/ukraine/ index_en.htm.

363 http://ec.europa.eu/ external_relations/ukraine/ index_en.htm.

investment prospects, making people-to-people contacts and legitimate short-term travel easier, being more active in addressing on frozen conflicts honestly and fairly, and opening more possibilities to mobilize funding. The EU must help those neighboring countries who are willing to reform to do this faster, better and at a lower cost to their citizens and beyond. It must also provide more incentives and convince those who are still hesitant on the policies and intentions of the EU within the ENP framework.[364]

International Consequences of the EU Policies in the Region

The Black Sea's regional countries' foreign relations with some of the EU members are an indication of the past and future relations within the EU and other powers in the region. Germany is a keen supporter the countries' transition to democracy and a market economy and its efforts to move closer to Europe.[365] There is regular political exchange between Germany and regional states, such as Ukraine in recent decade or so.[366] Germany's federal states, cities and municipalities, universities and schools as well as private associations and individuals are also strongly involved in bilateral and multilateral relations.[367] Acting on behalf of the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology, a German Advisory Group has been advising the Ukrainian government on questions of economic and social policy.

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364 http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com06_726_en.pdf; http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/0703_enpi _figures_en.pdf

365 M. Fulbrook, *History of Germany* 1918-2000, (Oxford: Blackwell 2002); C. G. Von Krockow, *Die Deutschen In Ihrem Jahrhundert 1890-1990*, (Leck: Clausen & Bosse, 1990).

366 The German authorities have repeatedly expressed their keen concern about the trials of former Ukrainian Prime Minister Julia Tymoshenko and other high-ranking officials of the former government and emphasized that Germany and the EU expect Ukraine to demonstrate its firm commitment to democracy and the rule of law. This and such statement are seen in the press conferences of the EU officials. "The Situation of NGOs in the Russian Federation," 26.03.2013, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/136573.pdf (27.03.2013).

367 "Ukraine," http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Aussenpolitik/Laender/Laenderinfos/01-Laender/Ukraine .html (09.03.2013).

Germany is for example the Ukraine's third largest bilateral donor, after the United States and Canada.[368]

There was also cooperation in the judicial sector and on human rights issues. Germany supporting Ukraine's efforts to build a sound and stable state based on along the Western lines particularly on criminal procedure, constitutional and administrative law. To this end, the German Federal Government funds legal advisory and multilateral projects in Ukraine such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).[369]

Political relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the East European Republics such as Moldova and Belarus are the same degree or more on the process of intensification of relations similar to Ukraine.[370] In relations with Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine, Germany and the EU members are increasingly pinning their hopes on isolating those responsible for the repression and supporting civil society and the democratic forces in Eastern Europe. The EU and its members restrict political relations with Belarus until progress has been made in terms of democracy, human rights and the rule of law.[371]

Romania, on the other hand, similar to those members in the EU, tries to develop its bilateral relations not only with the Republic of Ukraine but also Moldova and Belarus. The Romanian authorities are claiming that Romanian relation to its neighbors derived from its communion of history, languages, traditions and cultures. Consequently, Romania desires its neighbors closely

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368 Ibid.

369 Ibid.

370 "Republic of Moldova," http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Aussenpolitik/Laender/Laenderinfos/01-Laender/Moldau.html (09.03.2013).

371 "Ukraine," http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Aussenpolitik/Laender/Laenderinfos/01-Laender/Ukraine. html (09.03.2013);
"Republic of Moldova," http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Aussenpolitik/Laender/Laenderinfos/01-Laender/Moldau.html (09.03.2013).;
"Belarus," http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Aussenpolitik/Laender/Laenderinfos/01-Laender/Belarus.html (09.03.2013).

interconnected with the Union first and foremost for itself, then for the neighbors and subsequently for the EU.[372] To this desired end, Romania expects Ukraine should maintain its European perspective and aspirations which will be a key element to consolidate the regional stability and further progress.[373]

Romania and particularly regional EU members are keen to make the Black Sea Synergy a workable and effective instrument for their foreign policies. The Black Sea Synergy was initiated in 2007, under the German presidency of the EU, and officially launched on 14 February 2008, in Kiev. The main arguments for the EU to adopt the initiative were linked to the Eastern neighborhood and its strategic position to various places. These includes the important connections to Central Asia, the South Western Asian Countries, but also to the Western Balkans, the great potential to develop energy, transport and commercial routes, and the high relevance of issues like environment or democracy. It is also expected that it would build up cooperation in democracy, human rights, good governance, border management, protracted conflicts, energy, transports, environment, maritime policy, fishing, migration, education, research and development in the Black Sea region.[374] In order to make more effective for Romania, Romanians are actively committed to the implementation of the Synergy through the development of a sectoral partnership on environment, which was launched on 16 March 2010, in Brussels.

Romania actively seeking an effective synergy in the Black Sea by initiating the "Black Sea NGO Forum" in fruitful partnership with the Federation of Nongovernmental Organizations in Romania (FOND) and the Black Sea Trust. Through these initiatives Romania highlights the importance

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372 "Neighbourhood of Interest to Romania as EU Member: The Republic of Moldova,"
http://www.mae.ro/ en/node/2110 (10.03. 2013).

373 "Neighbourhood of Interest to Romania as EU Member: Ukraine,"
http://www.mae.ro/en/node/2106 (10.03. 2013).
It can be argued that this is a similar approach to the relations between Turkey and Greece within the EU matters.

374 "Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Black Sea Synergy-A New Regional Cooperation Initiative",
http://ec.europa.eu /world/enp/pdf/com07_160_en.pdf, (10.03. 2013), s. 1-13.

of moving on to a straightforward, concrete delineation and complementarities between the principles of implementation of the Black Sea Synergy and the multilateral dimension of the Eastern Partnership along the line with the EU expectations. These two European initiatives are now in the phase of implementation of the projects and the recommendations proposed in the networks established under their aegis, both at regional and macro-regional levels.[375]

Romania's' status as EU and NATO member and the vicinity of the Western Balkans render necessary a special relationship between Romania and those states.[376] Therefore, supporting the European and Euro-Atlantic path of the Western Balkan states and the Black Sea region will be benefit of those involving states. Perhaps the above policies should be categorized as liberal policies as it is indicated in international liberal theory assumptions.

Conclusions

The recent developments within and in neighboring regions of the EU force the policy-makers of the EU rethink of its eastern neighborhood policy and the Black Sea. The EU had to reconsider its neighborhood policy with a clear credible membership perspective, and assist to resolve those existing and frozen conflicts within and neighboring countries. Ukraine should be one of the first primary goals to achieve such policy due to a number of economic, political, military and strategic reasons relating to the Black Sea.

The EU had a strategy to make its neighbors familiar and Europeanized with the policies invented by the ENP framework. The instruments that were/are used/used EU money, trade opportunities, friendly nudging, cultural activities, scientific cooperation, educational exchanges and sportive events and so on. The EU preferred the region Europeanized and sensible to the EU but not necessarily within the EU. They should rather remain outside but related to and of the EU. The neighboring countries should become as like its EU members. They should contain certain specialties as liberal, democratic, internationalist, law-abiding and peaceful for themselves and for the EU.

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375 "Neighbourhood of Interest to Romania as EU Member: Black Sea Region," http://www.mae.ro/en/ node/2183?page=2 (10.03. 2013).

376 "Neighbourhood of Interest to Romania as EU Member: Western Balkans," http://www.mae.ro/en/node/2185 (10.03. 2013).

These neighbors might be examples for further relations with the neighbors' neighbors.

The EU derives most of its 'soft-power' in the East from offering the prospect of the EU membership to the regional as well as others in other regions. The EU uses every available opportunity for pressurizing the neighboring countries and beyond by making sanctions and pressures on curtain matters to make to the targets familiarize with the EU standards and values. This is also another indication how EU institutions are involving with the targeted states. Policy changes and related public statements were made for the realization of the EU policies. Nevertheless, the acceptance and implementation of the EU required changes would determine the outcome whether the EU was successful in its soft policy or not. It is a general hope that the ENP and "Eurosoft-power" will help to flourish better life standards and peaceful coexistence for decades to come.

Nevertheless, geopolitics and geo-historical impacts of the Black Sea is a determination of the present policies of the region. Energy needs, security demands requires constant and reliable policies for the EU. The Black Sea has this capacity to contribute the EU's such demands. As in the examples of the EU policies the EU authorities adopted old policies of the Roman Empire. Therefore, in order to see the future policies, one should study the past of the regions' geopolitical, geostrategic implications and determinants.

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Komşuluk Politikaları Bağlamında AB'nin Ortadoğu Politikası

(EU's Middle East Policy in the Context of Its Neighborhood Policies)

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Giriş

Avrupa Birliği (AB) bugünkü konumuna değişik evreler geçerek gelmiştir. Bu süreç içerisinde AB bir yandan bütünleşmeye diğer taraftan da genişlemeye önem vermiştir. Çünkü AB, demokrasi, özgürlük, adalet, hukukun üstünlüğü gibi değerleri benimseyen Avrupalı devletler ile büyük bir Avrupa ailesi oluşturmak ve bu ailenin istikrarını ve güvenliğini garanti altına almak istemektedir. AB, her genişleme sonunda yeni sınırlara ve komşulara sahip olmuştur. Mayıs 2004 yılında gerçekleştirilen son genişlemenin ardından yeni sınır komşularına karşın yeni politikalar izlemeye başlamıştır. Beşinci genişleme dalgasından sonra AB, komşularına yönelik mevcut politikalarında değişikliğe giderek, genişlemeye paralel olarak Avrupa Komşuluk Politikasını hayata geçirmiştir.

2004 yılında Birlik tarafından hayata geçirilen Komşuluk Politikası kapsamı içerisinde, Orta Asya, Ortadoğu ve Afrika ülkeleri ile ilişkilerin geliştirilmesi ve ilerletilmesi bulunmaktadır. Avrupa Birliği, enerji gereksinimi, sınırlarında istikrar ve güvenliğin sağlanması, kendisine komşu olan bölgelerde bölgesel çatışmaların önlenmesi, bölge ile ticaret ve ulaşım ağlarında alt yapının geliştirilmesi ve güveliğinin sağlanması gibi nedenlerden dolayı, bölgedeki ülkeler ile ilişkilerini gözden geçirerek reforme etme gereği duymuştur. Başka bir ifadeyle, AB Komşuluk Politikası çerçevesinde, sınır ülkeleriyle ilişkilerini yeni bir zemine oturtarak, ikili ortaklık antlaşmaları ve eylem planları ile bölge ülkelerine yönelik yeni bir yol haritası çizmeye çalışmaktadır.

Bu çalışmada, AB'nin Komşuluk Politikası ile bölgede istikrarın sağlanması ve bölgeye kendi değerlerini aktarması hususunda ne kadar başarılı olacağı, bölge ülkelerinin AB'nin bu yeni Komşuluk Politikasını ne kadar benimseyeceği analiz edilecektir. Ayrıca AB "neden son genişlemeden sonra komşuluk politikasına ihtiyaç duymuştur" ve "bu politikayı hangi araçlarla gerçekleştirmeye çalışacaktır" sorularının cevapları aranmaya çalışılacaktır.

AB'nin Komşuluk Politikasın Gelişimi ve Amacı

Beşinci genişlemeden sonra Avrupa Birliği'nin sınırları ve komşuları değişmiştir. Birliğin sınırları bir taraftan siyasi ve ekonomik istikrarsızlığın yaşandığı Ortadoğu ve Afrika ülkelerine, diğer taraftan ise enerji ihtiyacının büyük bir bölümünü karşıladığı Rusya'ya ve diğer ülkelere kadar genişlemiş ve farklı yapıya sahip bölge ve ülkeler ile komşu olmuştur. Aynı zamanda son genişleme ile birlikte değişen sınırlar, yeni fırsatları ve ihtiyaçları beraberinde getirmiştir.

AB'ye komşu olan ülkelerin, gelişmiş, iyi yönetilen ve istikrarlı olmaları AB'nin yararınadır. Sınır komşularında istikrarsızlık, çatışmaların yaşanması, ülkelerin iyi yönetilmemesi ve refah seviyesi düşük olması, AB'nin güvenliği açısından tehdit oluşturmaktadır. Çünkü komşudaki istikrarsızlık ve çatışmalar doğrudan AB'yi etkileyecektir. Refah seviyesi düşük, sorunlu ve istikrarsız bölgelerden AB'ye göç ve iltica olması, bunların yanı sıra değişik suçlara karışmış kişilerin AB sınırları içinde hayatını devam ettirmek istemesi, AB üye ülkelerini ve AB vatandaşlarını endişelendirmektedir. Avrupa Birliği, birlik vatandaşlarının endişeleri giderebilmek için öncelikle, demokrasi, özgürlük, serbest piyasa ekonomisi, hukukun üstünlüğü gibi değerleri komşu ülkelerinde benimsemesini desteklemekte ve bu bağlamda komşu ülkeler ile arasında yapay sınırlar oluşturulmasını engellemeye çalışmaktadır. Bu çerçevede, Mart 2003'te Komisyon tarafından "Daha Geniş Avrupa–Komşuluk: Güney ve Doğu Komşularıyla İlişkiler İçin Yeni Bir Çerçeve" dokümanı hazırlanarak "Daha Geniş Avrupa Görev Gücü" oluşturulmuştur. 12 Mayıs 2004 tarihinde ise komşuluk politikasının temel belgesi niteliğinde olan "Avrupa Komşuluk Politikası Stratejik Belgesi"

yayımlanmıştır.[377] Avrupa Birliği Komşuluk Politikası ile taraflara birliğe tam üyelik taahhüt etmemektedir. Birliğin Komşuluk Politikası, aday statüsünde olmayan İsrail, Ürdün, Moldova, Fas, Tunus, Filistin, Ukrayna, Ermenistan, Azerbaycan, Mısır, Gürcistan, Lübnan, Cezayir, Suriye ve Belarus gibi ülkeleri kapsamakta ve bu yeni politika ile AB, kendisini bir dostlar halkası ile çevrelemeyi amaçlamaktadır.

Komşuluk politikasının amacı ikili ilişkilerin desteklenmesi, güvenlik ve işbirliğinin güçlendirilmesi, AB ile komşuları arasında ayırt edici sınırların kaldırılması, siyasi, ekonomik ve kültürel işbirliğinin sağlanması olarak belirlenmiştir. Başka bir ifade ile AB, Komşuluk Politikası ile Rusya'dan Karadeniz'e ve Akdeniz'in güneyine kadar uzanan dostlar halkası zinciri oluşturarak, AB'nin değerlerini komşuları ile paylaşmak, komşularının politikalarını AB ile uyumlaştırarak, uyumlu dış ve güvenlik politikaları oluşturmayı hedeflemektedir. Ayrıca komşuları ile ekonomik entegrasyonu sağlayıp, kapsamındaki ülkelerin Avrupa tek pazarına katılmalarını öngörmektedir.

Komşuluk Politikası Çerçevesinde AB'nin Ortadoğu Politikası

Ortadoğu bölgesi ekonomik ve stratejik nedenlerle her zaman AB'nin gündeminde olmuştur. Bölge istikrarsızlık ve çatışmalar nedeniyle Avrupalı devletler tarafından yakından takip edilmekte, özellikle, güvenlik, enerji, göç gibi konulardan dolayı son zamanlar AB'nin gündeminde yer almaktadır.

Çalışmanın ana teması olan AB'nin Ortadoğu politikasına geçmeden önce bölgenin genel görünümü hakkında kısa analizde bulunulması daha doğru olacaktır. Bölge sahip olduğu stratejik konumu ve kaynaklarından ötürü sürekli istilaya uğramış ve çatışmaların kaynağı olmuştur. Ortadoğu'da I. Dünya Savaşından önce Fransızlar ve İngilizler hâkimiyetini kurmaya çalışmış, iki savaş arasındaki dönemde Almanlar, Soğuk Savaş döneminde ABD ve Rusya kendi etki alanını kurmaya çalışmışlardır. Soğuk Savaş sonuna kadar bölge ülkelerinin bir kısmı ABD'nin bir kısmı Rusya'nın

[377] Sinem Kocamaz, "Avrupa Birliği'nin Komşuluk Politikası Çerçevesinde Transkafkasya Ülkeleri İle İlişkileri," *USAK* Cilt:2, Sayı: 4 (2007). s.69.

yanında yer almayı diğer bir bölümü ise bu ülkelerden bağımsız bir dış politika izlemeyi tercih etmişlerdir.[378]

Soğuk Savaşın son bulması ile birlikte başta bölge olmak üzere dünyada barış, güvenlik ve istikrarın sağlanacağı savunan pek çok siyasetçi ve bilim adamı anarşik yapılı sistemin varlığını hesaplamamışlar olmalı ki; ne bölgede barış sağlanabildi ne de çatışmalar son buldu. Tam tersine bölge istikrarsızlığın ve çatışmaların kaynağı olarak dünya siyasetinin merkezine oturmuştur. Örneğin Soğuk Savaş'ın hemen sonrasında 1990'lı yılların başlarında Saddam Hüseyin'in Kuveyt'i işgal etmesi, İsrail- Filistin çatışmaları, ABD ile İran arasındaki nükleer sürtüşme bölgedeki ortamı daha da germiştir. 11 Eylül 2001 tarihinde ABD'de yapılan ikiz kulelere saldırı ve bu saldırı sonrası ABD'nin terörle mücadele kapsamında Afganistan ve Irak'a gerçekleştirdiği müdahale bölgeyi huzursuz etmiştir. 2010 yılında başlayan ve bütün Ortadoğu'yu sarsan Arap baharı ise bölgeye istikrarı getirememiştir. Bölgede hala çatışmalar ve isyanlar devam etmektedir.

Ortadoğu'daki çatışmaların sebebi nedir? Bu gelişmeleri başta ABD olmak üzere AB nasıl değerlendirmektedir? İki aktör (ABD ve AB) bölgeye yönelik nasıl bir politika uygulamaktadır? Uyguladıkları politikalar arasındaki fark(lar) nedir? ABD ve SSCB arasında yaşanan Soğuk Savaşın son bulması ile birlikte Avrupa'yı tehdit eden komünizm duvarı da yıkılmış oldu. SSCB'nin yıkılmasıyla Avrupa'nın güvenlik endişesinin tam olarak ortadan kalktığı düşünülürken, Ortadoğu ve Afrika'daki yaşanan çatışmalar yeni sorunları gündeme getirmiştir. Soğuk Savaş dönemindeki ideolojik çatışmalar yerini etnik, mezhepsel ve ülke içi çatışmalara bırakmıştır. Bu çatışmaların kaynağı olarak, ülke içinde yaşanan kötü yaşam koşulları, fakirlik, yolsuzluk, aşırı milliyetçi anlayış gibi faktörler görülmektedir. Ortadoğu'daki sorunlar toprak anlaşmazlıkları, ideolojik çekişmeler, güç ve statü rekabeti, etnik ve kültürel farklılıkların tahrik edilmesi başlıklarında toplanırken bunlara su, petrol ve din politikalarını da eklemekte fayda bulunmaktadır.[379] Batıyı tehdit eden bu sorunların ağırlıklı olarak Ortadoğu

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[378] Ertan Efegil ve Neziha Musaoğlu, "Demokratikleşme Bağlamında, Avrupa Birliği'nin Ortadoğu Politikası," *Akademik Ortadoğu Dergisi* Cilt: 3, Sayı: 1 (2008) s. 166.

[379] Sinem Kaya, "Avrupa Birliği'nin Genel Ortadoğu Politikası Bağlamında İsrail'in Gazze Operasyonuna Yaklaşımı," *Ortadoğu Analiz* Cilt 1, Sayı: 2 (2009), s. 40.

bölgesinden çıkması, ABD ve Avrupalı siyasetçilerin bu bölgeye yönelmesine neden olmuştur.

Haluk Özdemir'in "Süper Güç Nedir? ABD'nin Ortadoğu'ya Yönelik Dış Politikası" başlıklı makalesinde belirttiği gibi, ABD'nin Ortadoğu politikası geleneksel olarak iki temel sorun etrafında dönmektedir. Bunlar petrol ve İsrail'in güvenliği. İsrail'in güvenliği ahlakla ilgili bazı endişeleri gündeme getirirken, petrol daha çok ulusal çıkarlarla ilgili olmaktadır. Bölge halkına göre ise İsrail, Batılı ülkeler tarafından 1947'de oluşturulan yapay bir devlettir. İsrail vatandaşları içinse, bu bölge radikal grupların İsrail devletini yıkmak için fırsat kolladığı düşman bir bölgedir. Tüm bu farklı görüşler çerçevesinde ABD, İsrail devletini koruma ve ona güvenlik sağlama rolü üstlenmiştir.[380] Bu çaba, İsrail güvenlik güçlerinin Filistinliler üzerinde uyguladığı insan hakları ihlallerine bakılmaksızın ve kararlı bir biçimde gösterilmektedir. İsrail'in güvenliği ve petrol gibi nedenlerden dolayı ABD bölgenin yeniden yapılanması görevini üstlenmiştir. Diğer bir deyişle ABD, Baba Bush ile birlikte Büyük Ortadoğu Projesi ile bölgeyi yeniden yapılandırmak istemiştir. BOP çerçevesinde ABD bölgenin demokratikleşmesini savunmakta ve demokratikleşme sürecini ise askeri müdahale ve baskıcı politikalar ile bölge ülkelerinde rejim değişikliği yolu ile gerçekleştirmeyi planlamaktadır.

Bölgeyle yakından ilgilenen diğer bir aktör ise Avrupa Birliği'dir. Çünkü Avrupa Birliği sınırları içerisinde 20 ile 30 milyon civarında, çoğunluğu Ortadoğu kökenli Müslüman nüfus yaşamaktadır. Her yıl binlerce Ortadoğu kökenli fakir, kalifiyesiz kişiler AB üyesi devletlere göç etmekte ve her yıl AB sınırlarında yaşayan Müslüman nüfusun sayısı artmaktadır. Bu artış Avrupalı ülkeleri hem ekonomik hem de siyasi olarak olumsuz etkilemektedir. AB'nin bölgeyle ilgilenmesinin diğer bir nedeni enerji arzı ve güvenliğidir. Enerji sıkıntısı çeken AB, enerji ihtiyacının büyük bir bölümünü bu bölgeden ihraç etmektedir. Diğer bir nedeni ise AB'nin pazar ihtiyacıdır. Son olarak ise AB'nin duyduğu güvenlik endişeleridir. AB, 2000'li yıllar itibariye güvenliği tehdit eden unsurlar olarak terör, insan

[380] Haluk Özdemir, "Süper Güç Nedir? ABD'nin Ortadoğu'ya Yönelik Dış Politikası," *ASE*, http://www.ankarastrateji.org/yazar/doc-dr-haluk-ozdemir/super-guc-nedir-abd-nin-ortadogu-ya-yonelik-dis-politikasi/ 19 Aralık 2012.

kaçakçılığı, nükleer silahların yayılması, bölgesel etnik, dini, kimlik, ideolojik çatışmalar ve örgütsel suçları olarak belirlemiştir. Özellikle güvenlik ve enerji gibi nedenlerden dolayı Avrupa Birliği, ABD gibi bölgenin demokratikleşmesi gerektiğini savunmaktadır. Fakat AB, ABD'den farklı bir usul ve yöntem izlemektedir.

Genel olarak AB'nin Ortadoğu bölgesi için kullandığı anahtar kelime, "istikrar ve demokrasi"dir.[381] AB'ye göre her iki kavramın birbirine bağlı olarak etkin olarak uygulanması sağlandığında güvenlik sorununun çözümü kolaylaşacaktır. Çevresinde dostlar halkası zinciri oluşturabilmesi için, komşularının demokrasiyi ve serbest piyasa ekonomisini benimsemesi ve de hukukun üstünlüğü ile insan haklarına saygı göstermeleri gerekmektedir. AB'nin güvenlik endişesi komşularının bu ilkeleri benimsemesiyle son bulabilecektir. AB, bu politikalarının ilk halkası olarak 2004 yılında gerçekleştirdiği genişlemeyle, Merkezi ve Doğu Avrupa ülkelerini birliğe dâhil etmiştir. Diğer halkasını ise aynı yıl içerisinde hayata geçirdiği, Akdeniz, Ortadoğu, Kafkasya ve Orta Asya bölgelerini kapsayan komşuluk politikası çerçevesinde gerçekleştirmeye çalışmaktadır. Komşuluk Politikasına ise 1995 Barselona süreci çerçevesinde, Avrupa-Akdeniz Ortaklık Antlaşmaları imzalayarak işlevlik kazandırmaktadır.

Komşuluk Politikası Çerçevesinde AB'nin Ortadoğu Stratejisi ve Kullandığı Enstrümanlar

AB'nin Ortadoğu bölgesine yönelik uyguladığı Komşuluk Politikası stratejisi ve kullanılan araçların analizine geçmeden önce Avrupa- Akdeniz ortaklık Antlaşmalarına kaynaklık eden Barselona sürecine değinmek, konunun akışı itibariyle doğru olacaktır. Avrupa- Akdeniz ilişkilerine baktığımızda, ilişkilerin temeli tarihsel bağlara dayanmaktadır. Diğer bir ifadeyle ilişkiler sömürgecilik geçmişine dayanmaktadır.[382] Sömürgeciliğe dayalı bu ilişkiler 1960'lardan sonra yerini yapıcı diyaloglara bırakmıştır. Avrupalı devletler, bölgedeki istikrarsızlıklardan dolayı, stratejik olarak

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[381] Çağlar Söke, "Ortadoğu Devrimleri Sürecinde Avrupa Birliği," http://www.uiportal.net/ortadogu-devrimleri-surecinde-avrupa-birligi.html, 07.11.2013.

[382] Erhan Akdemir, "Arap Dünyasındaki Dönüşüm Süreci ve Türkiye-AB İlişkileri," *Ortadoğu Analiz* Cilt: 4, Sayı: 48 (2012), s. 32.

bölgenin siyasi, ekonomik ve sosyal alanlarda yeniden planlanmasını amaçlamışlardır. Hatta bölgedeki bu değişim sürecinin hızlanmasına en çok etki eden faktör, AB'nin gerçekleştirdiği genişleme dalgalarıdır. Özelikle 1970'li yılların başında İngiltere, Danimarka ve İrlanda'nın AET' ye tam üye olmasıyla birlikte süreç oldukça hızlanmıştır. Bu ülkelerin üyeliği ile birlikte AET, ticaret politikalarında değişiklik yapma zorunluluğu hissetmiştir. Enerji ve petrol ihtiyacını güvenli bir şekilde karşılayabilmek için bölge ülkeleriyle ikili ilişkileri geliştirme kararı almıştır. İkili ilişkileri geliştirme amaçlı olarak 1960–1970 yılları arasında Global Akdeniz politikasını benimsemiştir. Global Akdeniz Politikası (GAP) ile şunlar hedeflenmiştir: a) Sanayi mallarının serbest ticareti, b) bazı tarım ürünlerinde gümrük tarifelerinin azaltılması, c) teknik ve sanayi alanlarında işbirliği.[383] GAP politikası ikili anlaşma yapılan bölge ülkelerine ticari kolaylıklar ve ayrıcalıklar tanımaktaydı. Fakat GAP, bir yandan AET'nin uyguladığı bazı önleyici tedbirlerden dolayı, diğer yandan Arap İsrail çatışmalarından dolayı başarılı olamamıştır.[384]

1973 petrol krizi ve 1980'li yılların başlarında yaşanan ekonomik bunalımdan dolayı Akdeniz bölgesinden Avrupa'ya işçi akımı olmuş ve göç birlik ülkelerini olumsuz etkilemiştir. Bu gelişmeler karşısında AET, 1981 ve 1986 yıllarındaki genişleme dalgası sonrası, bölgede siyasi ve ekonomik tedbirler almak zorunda kalmıştır. Bölgeyle daha da yakından ilgilenerek bölgeye yönelik yardım programları başlatmıştır. Böylelikle AET, Avrupa-Akdeniz Ortaklığının da temelini atmış oldu. 1990'da AT komisyonun sunduğu bildiriyle AT'nin yeni Akdeniz politikası belirlenmiştir. Bu program "Yenilenmiş Akdeniz Politikası" olarak kabul edilmekle birlikte kalkınma projelerinin desteklenmesi, bölgesel işbirliğinin geliştirilmesi ve bölgenin kalkınması için mali yardımlar yapılması gibi konuları kapsamaktadır.[385] Yenilenmiş Akdeniz Politikası, Global Akdeniz Politikası gibi yardım paketlerinin ötesine geçememiş, AT, bu yeni politikası ile de başarılı olamamıştır. Bütün bu gelişmeler ardından AB Konseyi, (Zirve)

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[383] Serpil Kahraman, "AB Akdeniz Bölgesel Politikaları ve Türkiye'nin Uyumu" *Journal of Yasar University* (2008), s. 1733.

[384] Narin Güle, "Barselona Süreci ve Akdeniz için Birlik", İzmir Ticaret Odası (2010), s. 2-3.

[385] Zeliha Balcıoğlu, "Avrupa Topluluğu'nun Akdeniz Politikası," *Ekonomik Yaklaşım* Cilt: 4, Sayı: 11 (1994), s.51

Komisyon(un)dan Akdeniz politikası ile genel bir değerlendirme yapmasını istemiş ve değerlendirme sonuncunda komisyon Doğu Avrupa ile Akdeniz arasında dengenin sağlanması ve bu hususta uzun vadeli bir strateji geliştirilmesi gerektiğini raporlamıştır. Komisyonun raporu sonrasında 1995 yılında AB ve Akdeniz ülkelerinin dışişleri bakanları Barselona'da bir araya gelerek, Avrupa-Akdeniz Ortaklığı olan, iki ve çok taraflı veya bölgesel işbirliğini kapsayan süreci başlatmışlardır.

Akdeniz bölgesinin güvenliğini garanti altına almayı hedefleyen bildirgede, Avrupa-Akdeniz Ortaklığı üç temel amaç çerçevesinde toplanmaktadır. Bunlar; siyasi diyalog ve güvenlik ortamının artırılması yoluyla ortak bir barış ve istikrar alanı oluşturmak, 2010 yılına dek bir Avrupa-Akdeniz serbest ticaret alanı kurmak, sosyal ve kültürel alanlarda, karşılıklı dinsel ve kültürel hoşgörü temelinde dayanışmayı geliştirmektir.[386]

Avrupa Birliği, komşuluk politikasını hayata geçirebilmek için Barselona süreci bağlamında şu üç temel stratejiyi benimsemektedir. İlk olarak siyasi ve diplomatik ilişkiler kapsamında Ortadoğu bölgesinde AB'nin temel değerleri çerçevesinde barış ve istikrar ortamı oluşturacak ve bu çerçevede devletler siyasi, idari ve hukuki reformları hayata geçirirken normal ilişkiler kuracaktır. İkinci olarak, AB ile bölge ülkeleri arasında serbest ticareti öngören ekonomik reformlar gerçekleştirilecektir. Ekonomik ve sosyal reformlar, bölgede sürdürülebilir ve dengeli kalkınmayı sağlayacaktır. Ekonomik reformlar tam olarak sağlandığında ise taraflar arasında serbest ticaret alanı oluşturulacaktır. Böylelikle bölge ülkelerinde demokrasi ve iyi yönetim ve hukukun üstünlüğü sağlamlaştırılacaktır. Üçüncü ve son strateji ise kültürler arası diyalogun oluşturulmasıdır. Bu strateji ile bölge halkı ile AB vatandaşlarının hoşgörü çerçevesinde birbirine yakınlaştırılması amaçlanmıştır**.** AB bu stratejilerin uygulanmasında iki temel ilkeyi benimsemektedir. Bunlar komşuluk ve sosyalleşmedir. Komşuluk ilkesi çerçevesinde AB, bölge ülkelerinden hangisi veya hangileri kendilerinden istenilen reformları kısa bir süre içerisinde gerçekleştirirse, o ülkelere daha çok mali ve teknik yardım sağlayacaktır. Sosyalleşme ilkesiyle ise bölge ülkelerinin AB'yi model olarak benimsemelerinin sağlaması amaçlanmıştır.

386 "Barselona Konferansı" (Barselona Conference) http://www.ikv.org.tr/sozluk.asp?bas_harf=B&anahtar=&sayfa=&id=1026#kancasosluk1026, 11.11.2013.

Sosyalleşme ile AB bölge ülkelerin vatandaşlarına örnek teşkil edecek ve bölge halkları AB'de yaşam standartlarını hissederek, ülke yönetimine reformların yapılması yönünde istek ve baskıda bulunacaklardır.[387] Bu stratejilerin hayata geçirilebilmesi için AB bölge ülkeleri ile Avrupa-Akdeniz Ortaklığı çerçevesinde ikili veya çok katılımlı antlaşmalar imzalamıştır. Bu antlaşmalar, enerjiden güvenliğe pek çok alanda (taşımacılık, terörle mücadele, iletişim, kitle imha silahlarının yayılmasını önlemek, kriz yönetimi ve çatışmaların önlenmesi gibi) işbirliği öngörmektedir. Bu gelişmeler sonunda ise AB Serbest ticaret alanı oluşturmayı hedeflemişti. Fakat 2010 yılı vuku bulan Arap Baharı bu süreci olumsuz etkilemiştir. Bu gelişmeler sonrasında, Arap dünyasında yaşanan halk hareketlerinin AB dış politikasına nasıl yansımıştır ve AB'nin bölge politikasında nerede durmaktadır sorularının cevabı bir sonraki bölümde analiz edilecektir.

AB'nin Arap Baharına Bakışı

Arap dünyasında patlak veren ve domino etkisi yaratan halk ayaklanmaları, bölgede etkinlik gösteren diğer aktörler gibi AB'yi de derinden etkilemiştir**.** Arap baharının patlak verdiği ilk dönemde, ekonomi ve kimlik gibi sorunlarla uğraşırken bölgedeki halk hareketlerinin vuku bulması AB'yi dış politikada hazırlıksız yakalamıştır. 2009 Lizbon Antlaşmasıyla faaliyete başlayan AB Dışişleri ve Güvenlik Politikası Yüksek temsilcisi henüz dış politikada kendi eksikliklerini gidermeye fırsat bulamadan kendini bölgedeki halk ayaklanmasının içerisinde bulmuştur.[388] Fakat bölgedeki halk ayaklanması ne kadar da AB'yi hazırlıksız yakalamış olsa da AB için dış politikada yeni fırsatlar yaratmıştır. Bölge halkının demokrasi talebi, daha önce bölgedeki otoriter rejimler tarafından tahrip edilen, AB'nin savunduğu değerlerin düzeltilmesi için bir fırsat doğurmuştur. Bu gelişmeler AB'nin bölgeye yönelik dış politikasında revizyona ihtiyaç olduğunu göstermiş, fakat AB önceki dönemlerdeki sergilediği parçalı dış politikasına devam etmiştir. Özellikle üyeler arasında ulusal çıkarlar ön plana çıkartılarak etkisiz bir görüntü sergilenmiştir.

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387 Efegil ve Musaoğlu, s, 169.

388 Müjge Küçükkeleş, "AB'nin Ortadoğu Politikası Ve Arap Baharına Bakışı," *SETA Analiz* Sayı: 63 (2013), s. 10.

AB bölge ülkelerinin değişim çağrısına isteksiz bir tavır sergilemiş, hatta üye ülkeler kendi ulusal ekonomi ve siyasi çıkarlarını göz önünde bulundurarak, bölgedeki rejimlere destek vermişlerdir. Öneğin, Zeynel Abidin Bin Ali iktidarı Fransa tarafından desteklenmiş, Mübarek rejimine karşı ise ayaklanan halkı İngiltere, Almanya ve Fransa, desteklemekten uzak durmuşlardır. Fransa, Almanya, İngiltere gibi AB üyesi ülkeler statükonun korunması taraftarı olmuşlardır. AB üyesi ülkelerin bir birinden farklı dış politika sergilemeleri, AB Dışişleri ve Güvenlik Politikası Yüksek temsilcilisin politikasına yansımış, 2010 yılında Yüksek Temsilci bölgedeki gelişmelere yönelik açıklamaları geç yapmış, herhangi bir rejime karşı yaptırım kararı alamamıştır. Sadece itidal çağrısında bulunmuştur. Mısır'daki Mübarek rejimi sonrası yapılan seçimlerde serbest ve adil seçim yapılmasını istemiştir. AB Tunus ve Mısır'ın devrik liderlerine iktidarı bırakmaları hususunda herhangi bir çağrıda bulunmamıştır.[389]

AB bölgedeki gelişmelere bekle-gör politikası kapsamında bakmış ve AB halkın direnişinin önüne geçilemeyeceğini anlayınca, kendi dış politikasını revize ederek bölgedeki değişimin tarafların ekonomik ve siyasi ilişkilerine ve çıkarlarına zarar vermemesine dikkat etmiştir. AB bölgeye yönelik ilk ciddi adımını Komşuluk Politikalarını yeniden gözden geçirerek, 8 Mart 2011 tarihinde Komisyonun kabul ettiği, "Güney Akdeniz ile Demokrasi ve Ortak Zenginlik İçin İşbirliği" belgesiyle atmıştır. Belgede demokratik dönüşüm, sivil toplum ortaklığı, sürdürülebilir kalkınma gibi konuların üzerinde durulmuştur.[390]Güney Akdeniz ile Demokrasi ve Ortak Zenginlik için İşbirliği belgesindeki taleplerini halk ayaklanması öncesi pek çok kez dile getirmiştir. Bu belgenin özü, AB'nin bölge ülkelerine sağlayacağı mali ve teknik yardımları bir koşulluluk ilkesine bağlamasıdır. Demokratik reform sürecini hızla tamamlayan ülkeler AB'den yardım alabilecek ve reform sürecini yerine getiremeyen ülkelere ise öngörülen ekonomik ve teknik yardımların miktarı azaltılacaktır. AB için önemli olan değişim sonrası ülkelerde yapılan seçimlerin serbest ve adil yapılmasıdır.

AB Komisyonu, 8 Mart 2011 tarihinde yayınladığı Güney Akdeniz ile Demokrasi ve Ortak Zenginlik için İşbirliği belgesinden sonra Mayıs ayında yeni bir girişimde bulunmuş ve "Değişen Bölgeye Yeni Yanıt" adlı belgeyi

[389] ibid, s.10.
[390] ibid, s.11.

yayınlamıştır. Bu belge ile AB, daha önceki yayınlanan belgeye sadık kalarak, daha fazla mali yardım yapılmasını öngörmektedir. 2011–2013 yılları arası AB bölgeye, demokratikleşme, istihdam, ekonomik kalkınma, sosyal politika, yoksullukla mücadele gibi konularda kullanılması üzere, çoğunluğu değişik fonlardan olmak üzere 4 milyar Avro yardımda bulundu. Bu yardımların amacı kısa vadede bölgenin ekonomik koşullarını iyileştirmek, uzun vadede ise bölge ülkelerinin AB pazarına açılmalarını sağlamaktır. Diğer bir deyişle serbest ticaret alanı oluşturmak istemektedir. Bu amaç doğrultusunda 2010 yılında Mısır, Ürdün, Fas ve Tunus ile başlaması gereken ticari müzakereler Aralık 2011 yılında başlamıştır. Bu müzakereler sonunda taraflar arasında serbest dolaşımın önünün açılması beklenmektedir.

Avrupa Birliği Ortadoğu'daki gelişmelere nasıl bir tepki göstermiştir? AB'nin bölgedeki halk ayaklanmalarına ve bu ayaklanmaları şiddetle bastırmaya çalışan otoriter rejimlere karşı başta etkisiz kalması ve nedeni yukarıda belirtilmiştir. Daha sonraki gelişmeler karşısında, özellikle otoriter rejimlerin sivil vatandaşlar üzerinde sert tedbirler ve önlemler alması ve bu önlemlerin insanların hayatını kaybetmesine neden olması nedeniyle, AB sessizliğini bozararak bir takım önlem ve tedbirler alarak tepkisini göstermiştir. Bu tepkiler ticari ilişkilerden, diplomatik yaptırıma, insani yardımdan askeri müdahaleye, mali yardımdan ekonomik yaptırıma kadar varmıştır. AB, Tunus'taki gelişmelerde izlediği bekle-gör politikasını Kaddafi'ye karşı terk etmiştir. Kaddafi'ye karşı ekonomik ve askeri yaptırım kararları almıştır. Kaddafi'nin Libya'da meşruiyetini yitirmesi ardından, Libya ulusal konseyini destekleyerek, Libya'da dış temsilcilik açmıştır. Ayrıca AB, Libya'ya mali yardımlarını artırmıştır. Finlandiya gibi İskandinav ülkeleri Libya lideri Kaddafi'nin mal varlığının dondurulması ve seyahat yasağı gibi yaptırımlar önerirken, İtalya ve Çek Cumhuriyeti "Kaddafi'nin devrilmesinin daha büyük felaketler doğurabileceğini savunarak temkinli davranılması yönünde tavır koymuştur.[391]

Suriye'deki gelişmelerde AB, krizin başladığı yıllarda muhalifleri sözlü olarak desteklemiş ve Esed rejimi eleştirmiştir. Esed rejimini göstericilere karşı güç kullanmaması için uyarmıştır. Krizin başlarında, AB'nin desteği ve

[391] Elvan Eda Karaismailoğlu, "Orta Doğu'da Yeni Bir Denklem mi?" http://www.academia.edu/1281328/Orta_Doguda_Yeni_Bir_Denklem_Mi 14.11.2013.

eleştirisi para yardımı, yaptırımlar ve kınama gibi askeri olmayan tedbirlerle sınırlı kalmıştır. Nisan 2012 tarihi itibariyle mevcut iktidarın muhalefet ve sivil halk üzerinde baskı ve şiddeti artması üzerine, AB Konseyi, iktidarın halk üzerinde kullanabileceği araç, mal ve teknolojilerin ihracatına ek kısıtlamalar getirme kararı almıştır. Konsey ayrıca lüks malların AB'den Suriye'ye ihraç edilmesini de yasaklamıştır. Ülkedeki çatışmalardan dolayı ülkesini terk eden Suriye vatandaşlarına, AB Konseyi 7 milyon civarında maddi yardım yapılmasını öngörmüştür.[392] 2012 yılının Temmuz ayında sivil halka ağır silahlarla ateş açan Esed rejimini kınamış ve sorunun barışçıl yollarla çözülmesini istemiştir. Başta ABD ve AB'nin bu uyarılarını dikkate almayan Esed rejiminin, 2013 Ağustos ve Temmuz aylarında sivil halka karşı kimyasal başlıklı füzeleri kullanması bardağı taşıran son damla olmuştur. AB Dış İlişkiler ve Güvenlik Politikası Yüksek Temsilcisi Catherine Ashton, Suriye'deki kimyasal saldırıdan Esad rejimini sorumlu tutarak,[393] Esed iktidarının sivil halka karşı bir insanlık ayıbı işlediğini belirterek, Fransa ve İngiltere'nin savunduğu askeri müdahale seçeneği desteklediklerini belirtmiştir. Ashton, Suriye'deki kimyasal saldırıyla ilgili uluslararası bir askeri müdahale öncesinde BM raporunun beklenilmesi gerektiğini ifade etmiştir. Uluslararası kamuoyunun askeri müdahale üzerine uzlaşması sonucu Esed Rejimi geri adı atmış, ABD ve Rusya'nın kimyasal silah stoklarının listesini bir hafta içinde sunma talebini ve kimyasal silahların 2014 yılının ortalarına kadar imha edilmesi kararını kabul etmiştir.[394] AB alınan bu kararda sağlanacak gelişmelere karşı bekle-gör politikası uygulamaktadır.

Sonuç: Komşuluk Politikasının Başarı Olasılığı

AB'nin Ortadoğu politikasının geçmişine baktığımızda, AB'nin olumsuz bir karneye sahip olduğu görülmektedir. AB'nin karnesinin olumsuz olmasının bir taraftan AB'nin kendisinden kaynaklanan, diğer taraftan da bölge ülkelerinden kaynaklanan nedenler bulunmaktadır. Bölge ülkeleri

[392] Bilgehan Öztürk, "Avrupa Birliği'nin İran ve Suriye Politikasının Türkiye'ye Etkisi," *Ortadoğu Analiz* Cilt: 4, Sayı: 48 (2012), s. 45.

[393] "ABD ile Rusya Suriye Konusunda Anlaştı," *Hürriyet*, http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/planet/24709740.asp 15.11. 2013.

[394] "ABD ve Rusya Suriye'nin Kimyasal Silahları Konusunda Anlaştı," *Bugün*, 14 Eylül 2013.

analiz edildiğinde görülmektedir ki, sözkonusu ülkeler otoriter rejimlerce yönetilmiş ve yönetilmektedirler. Bölge ülkelerinde siyasetten, ekonomiye ve askeriyesine varıncaya kadar bütün denetim ve kontroller bu otoriter rejimlerin kontrolü altındadır. Ortadoğu bölgesindeki otoriter rejimler ülkelerini kapalı bir kibrit kutusu içerisine hapsetmiş, gelişmelere kapalı bir politika uygulamaktadırlar. Ekonomik sistemleri petrol ürünlerine dayalıdır ve yine rejimin kontrolü altındadır. Bölge ülkelerinde sivil toplumun ve sendikaların faaliyetleri, hakları kısıtlandığı için yok denecek kadar azdır. AB'nin değişik antlaşmalar ve planlarla kurduğu ilişkilerde, ülkelerden, demokratikleşme, serbest pazar ekonomisi, siyasi diyalog, insan haklarına saygı ve hukukun üstünlü gibi ilkeleri talep etmesi, iktidarların ülkelerinde güç kaybetmesi ve ülke gelirlerinden mahrum olması anlamına gelmektedir. Öncelikle AB'nin bu sorunu aşması gerekmektedir. Fakat AB'nin bu sorunu aşması zor görünmektedir. Çünkü bölge halkının, AB'nin komşuluk politikası kapsamında talep ettiği konular hususunda oturmuş bir alt yapısı yoktur. Var olan sistemi değiştirmek kolay olmadığı için AB'nin kısa ve orta vadede başarılı olması zor görülmektedir.

AB'nin kendinden kaynaklanan soruna bakıldığında, AB ekonomik alanda gösterdiği başarıyı dış politikada gösterememektedir. Maastricht ve Amsterdam Antlaşmaları kapsamında oluşturulan, Ortak Dışişleri ve Güvenlik Politikasında ortak çıkarlar doğrultusunda hareket etmesi gerekirken, AB üyesi Fransa, Almanya ve İngiltere gibi birliğin ileri gelen ülkeleri bir birinden farklı, ulusal çıkarlar doğrultusunda dış politika uygulamaktadırlar. AB'nin ortak çıkarlar doğrultusunda, dış politikada ortak tavır ve eylem kararı alabilmesi için 2009 Lizbon antlaşması ile Avrupa Birliği Dışişleri ve Güvenlik Politikası Yüksek Temsilcisi makamı oluşturulmuştur. AB bu makamın, dışa dönük eylemlerinde birlik ve uyumun daha büyük ölçüde gerçekleştirilmesine katkıda bulunmasını beklemekteydi. Fakat bu gelişmelere rağmen AB üyesi ülkelerin, örneğin gerek 2003 yılında ABD'nin Irak'a müdahalesinde gerekse 2010 yılı içerisinde Arap dünyasında gerçekleşen halk ayaklanmalarında farklı tutum sergilemiş olmaları, AB'nin dış politikada birliği sağlamadığının göstergesidir.

Ayrıca AB bölgede istikrarı bozacak eylemlerden uzak durmaya çalışmaktadır. AB ne kadar bölge ülkeleri ile farklı antlaşmalar yapmış ve bu antlaşmalar ile kendi değerlerini ön plana çıkarmış olsa da, pratikte ticari ilişkilere önem vermektedir. Özellikle ticaret ve enerji alanlarındaki

işbirliğine halel getirilmesini istememektedir. AB bu çekincesini 2003 Irak Savaşında göstermiştir. Bilindiği gibi AB, ABD'nin Irak operasyonuna destek vermemiş ve sorunun barışçıl yollarla çözülmesini istemiştir. Irak Savaşında AB bölgede otoriter rejimlerin desteklenmesi ve bölgede istikrarın bozulmaması gerektiğini düşünmüştür. AB bölgede istikrarı sağlarken istikrarsızlığa neden olmak istememektedir. Bu ise birliğin bölgedeki baskısını ortadan kaldırmaktadır. Birlik bir taraftan bölgenin demokratikleşmesini isterken, diğer taraftan ise bu yönde adım atamakta çekinmektedir. Bu ise AB'nin dış politikasında ikili yaratmakta ve başarısızlığı getirmektedir.

AB'nin bölgeye yönelik dış politikasındaki başarısızlığının diğer bir nedeni ise İsrail-Filistin çatışmasıdır. Filistin İsrail sorunun çözülememesi AB'nin bölgedeki etkinliğini engellemektedir. Çünkü yıllardır bölgedeki otoriter rejimler, Arap milliyetçiliğini ön plana çıkartarak, halkı İsrail ve yandaşlarına karşı kullanarak, kendi rejimlerini meşrulaştırmıştır. Başka bir deyişle, kendi iktidarlarını ve halk üzerindeki egemenliğini bu Filistin-İsrail çatışmasını kullanarak sağlamışlar/sağlamaktadırlar. Bölgede barış ve istikrarın sağlanmasını istiyor ise öncelikle AB'nin İsrail'e verdiği desteği sonlandırarak taraflar arasında adil bir çözüm bulunması için çaba sarf etmesi gerekmektedir. Fakat daha önce belirtildiği gibi AB üyesi bazı ülkelerin (İngiltere, Fransa, Almanya, İtalya gibi) hem dış politikaya hem de Filistin-İsrail çatışmasına farklı pencereden bakmaları, AB'nin soruna kalıcı bir çözüm üretmesini zorlaştırmaktadır.

Bölgeye yönelik AB'nin uyguladığı dış politikanın başarısız olmasının diğer bir nedeni ise Ertan Efegil'in de belirttiği gibi AB'nin enerji ihtiyacıdır. Bilindiği gibi AB enerji bakımından dışa bağımlıdır. AB'nin kendi enerji kaynakları yok denecek kadar azdır. AB vatandaşına güvenli bir şekilde enerji sürekliliğini sağlayabilmek için bölge ülkelerine karşı temkinli davranmakta ve ülkeler üzerinde ABD gibi baskıcı politika uygulayamamaktadır.

Sonuç olarak söyleyebiliriz ki, AB'nin bölgeye yönelik politikalarının asıl amacı öncelikle AB vatandaşlarının ve birliğin güvenliğini sağlamak ve üye ülkelerin enerji ihtiyaçlarını sorunsuz olarak gerçekleştirmektir. Hiç bir zaman AB'nin dış politikası içinde bölgede harita değişikliğine gitmek ve bölgede öngörülen rejim değişikliğini askeri güçle veya operasyonla sağlamak olmamıştır. AB, ABD'den faklı olarak yumuşak dış politika araçları

kullanmayı tercih etmektedir. Bu tercih edilen yumuşak dış politikaya rağmen AB'nin gerek komşuluk politikası olsun gerekse genel olarak bölgeye yönelik dış politikalarının hayata geçirilmesinde olsun bir takım zorluklar vardır. Bu sorunların AB açısından aşılması kısa vadede kolay gözükmemektedir.

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ENERGY AND THE PIPELINES

Changing Geometry of the Pipelines: Gas and Politics in the Wider Black Sea

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Introduction

Oil and gas fields are usually situated in close proximity to each other. Russia and the Caspian Republics have both – oil and gas fields. Nevertheless the political geography of the oil deliveries differs from that of the gas deliveries. What is the reason? Why should the geopolitics in regard of the oil deliveries be different from that of the gas deliveries? The oil market is a global one while the gas market is a local one. The oil is mainly delivered in tankers by sea while the gas comes mainly via pipelines. In the course of the recent several years the volume of the LNG has been rapidly increasing, its share in the overall gas deliveries though is still much under 50% of the total volume of the gas deliveries (25% of the total gas import in EU in 2011).[395] Therefore it is not possible to talk of energy security in general but the geopolitical aspects of the oil and gas deliveries have to be analyzed individually.

Real and Potential Players at the Black Sea Gas Market

The main players in the Black Sea gas market can be divided into two groups: the importers represent the first one, and the producers and exporters of natural gas – the second one. All Balkan states belong to the first group, while Russia and the Caspian Region gas producers are in a position to supply the Southern Corridor: Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Iran and Kazakhstan, form the second one. Two transit countries – Georgia and

[395] "Eurogas Statistical Report 2012," http://www.eurogas.org/uploads/media/Statistics_2012_21.11.12.pdf (01.08.2013)

Turkey, have their part to play in the future gas business between the Caspian republics and Europe.

Russia is the chief gas player in the Black Sea Region. The EU countries and Turkey are Gazprom's main export market. In 2013 Russia exported to Turkey and Europe (excluding the former Soviet republics) 161,5 bcm. The first three places in the Russian gas export belong to Germany – 40,2 bcm, Turkey – 26,6 bcm and Italy – 25,3 bcm.[396]

Russia also exports gas to the ex-Soviet East European Republics but they are not very reliable as payers. For several years there have been talks about building two new gas pipelines to export Russian gas to China but Moscow and Beijing have not been able so far either to agree about the price of the gas or the parameters of the "take or pay" provision. Owing to a number of economic, geographical and purely technological reasons it is hardly probable that China will become a more important market for Russian gas than Europe. For the time being Russia cannot count on a market better than the European one.

Rumania is the first Black Sea country which in 1979 began to receive gas from the USSR. Presently, through it, Russian gas is transported to Bulgaria, Greece, Macedonia and Turkey.

Natural Gas Proved Reserves, Gas Production and Gas Consumption in the Countries of the Black Sea-Caspian Region (2012)

	Proved reserves(tcm)	Production (bcm)	Consumption (bcm)
Russia	32,9	592	416
Turkmenistan	17,7	64,4 (66,1 in 2008)	23,3
Kazakhstan	1,3	19,7	9,5
Azerbaijan	0,9	15,6	8,5

396 **"**Gas supplies to Europe," *Gazpromexport Official Web-Site*, http://www.gazpromexport.ru/en/statistics/ (21.01.2014)

Iran	33,6	160,5	156,1
Ukraine	0,6	18,6	49,6 (67 in 2006)
Romania	0,1	10,9	13,5 (18,1 in 2006)
Bulgaria	Insignificant	0,68	2,7
Turkey	Insignificant	0,684	46,3

Source: "BP Statistical Review of World Energy", June 2013 http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/statistical-review/statistical_review_of_world_energy_2013.pdf

Russia has at its disposal another export gas pipeline which crosses the Black Sea and through which gas is delivered to Turkey directly without passing through the transit countries – Blue Stream. It was built in 2003 and its capacity is 16 bcm per annum. Through this pipeline 14,7 bcm Russian gas was delivered to Turkey in 2012, and 13,7 bcm in 2013.[397]

Russia's main purpose is to keep and if possible to increase its share at the European gas market. During the last several years the position of Russia was challenged by the increasing deliveries of LNG as well as by the deliveries of such traditional gas producers as Norway. Russia is unable to affect in any way either the Norwegian or Algerian deliveries of gas to the EU. Russian chances to stop the LNG deliveries are even smaller. That is why Gazprom is concentrating its efforts toward the Black Sea region, more precisely - the Wider Black Sea is the geopolitical zone in which Russia can prevent the appearance at the European market of a new and dangerous competitor – the Caspian gas.

The Caspian country having the richest natural gas deposits is **Iran**. The Iranian portion in South Pars gas field is estimated to contain some 14 tcm of gas reserves.[398] In theory this quantity would be enough to feed a pipeline of

[397] Поставки по "Голубому потоку" в Турцию в 2013 году сократились на 7%; http://caspianbarrel.org/?p =7231 (21.02.2014)

[398] "South Pars Gas Field" *Alexander's Oil & Gas Connections***,** 21.01.2009,

the capacity of Nabucco for a period of 467 years. However, the Iranian gas fields are in the Persian Gulf which means it is far from Europe. There are two main reasons because of which Iran will not be able to export gas to Europe. The first of them is that Iran has almost no surplus of gas as its gas production is practically equal to its gas consumption. The second reason is that the USA has put Iran into a tight belt of political isolation. A USA veto quickly and efficiently discourages any European company that might show an interest to do gas business with Iran.

There might be a change in this situation as a result of the Geneva interim agreement signed at the end of 2013 according to which Iran agreed to a freeze of portions of its nuclear program in exchange for decreased economic sanctions. But even if the economic sanctions were fully lifted, Iran would not be in a position to begin exporting gas to the European countries before the third decade of the 21st century.

Another Caspian republic rich in gas resources is **Turkmenistan**. Because of its intermediary geographical position, Turkmenistan has many alternatives for gas exports and can turn its pipelines to the all four directions of the world. At the same time the country is landlocked and far away from the big gas markets, which is the reason for the high transportation costs of the Turkmenian gas. By the beginning of 2009 nearly all gas export from Turkmenistan was orientated to Russia, this export being secured with a long-term contract. But in the beginning of 2009 the re-export of Turkmenistan gas became unprofitable for Gazprom. Using as excuse an industrial accident in the *Central Asia–Center* gas pipeline system Gazprom discontinued its purchases of Turkmenistan gas in April 2009. The gas flow from Turkmenistan to Russia was restored only in January 2010 but the contract conditions between Gazprom and Ashgabat were changed leading to a decrease in the quantities of gas Russia would buy. In the years after 2010 Gazprom has bought on the average only 10 bcm of Turkmenistan gas per year – almost 5 times less than the quantities Russians bought before 2009.[399] Meanwhile at the end of 2009 the Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline was set into exploitation as well as a second gas pipeline between Turkmenistan and Iran. China became the main export market for Turkmenistan gas.

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http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/ frame_ntm_news.htm (21.01.2009)

[399] Туркменский козырь. РБК Daily, 24/05/2009

But having in mind the size of European gas market, Turkmenistan has a very serious incentive to work on the opening of a route to the West for its gas export – through the Caspian Sea and the Caucasus toward the EU.

At the moment Turkmenistan is building East-West trunk gas pipeline with its own funds; it will be completed by the middle of 2015 at the earliest.[400] Transporting the Turkmenistan gas to the Caspian coast does not yet mean that it will cross the Caspian Sea and via Azerbaijan and Georgia will flow into Southern corridor. Instead it may take a course to the North into the Caspian Coastal Pipeline planned with Gazprom.

Regarding its export of natural gas, **Kazakhstan** is also nearly fully dependent on Russian routes. Though there is a project for constructing a Trans-Caspian pipeline from the Kazakhstan coast to Baku, for the time being its construction is not topical. That is why Kazakhstan can participate in the Trans-Caspian pipeline and in Southern corridor respectively only if Turkmenistan participates in them too.

Azerbaijan is the only country that can be both a supplier and transferor of gas from Caspian Sea region. It is curious that before 2007 Azerbaijan was not an exporter but an importer of gas, from Russia. For the time being Azerbaijan is connected via gas pipelines with three of its four neighbors – Russia, Georgia and Iran. Until the beginning of 2010 all Azerbaijani gas export has gone along the pipeline from Baku through Georgia to the Turkish town of Erzurum.

At the end of June 2009 the gas deal between Baku and Moscow was agreed. Gazprom and **the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic (**SOCAR) signed an agreement under the terms of which the Russian company will purchase at least 500 million cubic meters of gas from Azerbaijan in 2010. Azerbaijan is going to sell Russia 1 bcm gas in 2010, 2 bcm have been agreed for 2011.[401] From strictly economic point of view Russia has no need of Azerbaijani gas, not now or in the next few years. From strategic point of view, though, it is very important for Gazprom to

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400 "Turkmenistan Starts Construction of East-West Gas Pipeline," *RIA Novosti* 31/05/2010; http://en.rian.ru/ exsoviet/ 20100531/ 159233492.html (21.09.2010)

401 "Russia to Buy 2 bcm of Gas from Azerbaijan in 2011," *Reuters* Sep 3, 2010; http://www.reuters.com/article/ idUSWLA211820100903 (03.09.2011)

direct the Azerbaijani gas to the North and to prevent its entering the Southern gas corridor passing through Turkey.

In January 2010 Alexei *Miller* announced that his company Gazprom is prepared to buy from Azerbaijan "as much gas as the country is in a position to supply". Russia has offered the total quantity of the Phase Two of Shah Deniz gas to be bought by Gazprom at market prices based on a long-term contract, but this proposal was rejected. For the time being the deliveries of Azerbaijani gas to Russia are insignificant: 1,6 bcm in 2012 and 1,37 bcm in 2013.[402]

Though **Turkey** has nearly no gas production of its own, it is one of the key players in the Black Sea gas game. Turkey is not only one of the three largest foreign customers of Russian gas, but it is also an inescapable transit territory through which the pipelines carrying the Caspian gas to Europe must necessarily pass. The Turkish program-maximum is to start transferring to Europe the gas coming from all of its three present suppliers – Russia, Azerbaijan and Iran, plus Iraq and possibly Turkmenistan and Israel.

There is an important difference in the standpoint of the EU and that of Turkey in regard of the gas pipelines role. EU insists that they are to be supranational technical facilities to be used by any company that pays the relevant gas transportation fare. Turkey, however, views the gas pipelines as an important geopolitical trump card for the country through whose territory they pass.

Georgia is an important transit corridor for the Caspian gas. Its attitude is rather predictable – Tbilisi supports all projects of gas pipelines to pass through its territory but it cannot take part in their financing.

Rumania and **Bulgaria** in particular are dependent on Russian gas imports and that is why they are looking for diversification in regard of their gas suppliers. For this reason they have showed a full support to Nabucco but had neither geopolitical nor financial power to be a decisive factor for speeding up the implementation of this project. A plan-minimum for Bulgaria and Rumania, in case they will not be able to diversify their suppliers, is to at least diversify the delivery route of the Russian gas. And that can be achieved by means of the South Stream pipeline. Though they have sea outlets, the two

[402] Объем поставок газа из Азербайджана в Россию в 2013 году снизится на 14%. Rusenergy.com. 27/12/2014.

countries' possibilities to import LNG are limited because the Black Sea is a semi-enclosed sea. The likely passage of gas-tankers through Bosphorus is difficult and expensive and that is why to build its own LNG terminals for Bulgaria and Rumania is justified but the gas should come from another Black Sea port. Thus the potential suppliers are reduced in number to two – Azerbaijan (through a Georgian port) or Russia.

At present **Ukraine** is the most important corridor of the Russian gas export intended for the EU. More than half of the Russian gas export to Europe goes through the territory of Ukraine (86 out of 161,5 bcm in 2013). At the same time Ukraine is one of the major buyers of the Russian gas. During the last several years the Russian-Ukrainian relations in the gas business field were subject to dramatic changes. After the Orange Revolution in Kiev in the beginning of 2005 Russia has gradually given up its former policy of selling Ukraine gas at preferential prices. Now, after Russia has launched the South Stream project, Ukraine is also threatened with losing the bigger part of the transit stream passing through its territory. That is why the main target in the gas strategy of Ukraine has been obstructing the construction of the South Stream and convincing Russia that a modernization of the Ukrainian gas transporting network is a much cheaper alternative to the project of building a new gas pipeline passing under the Black Sea. From strictly financial point of view it is true. However, the issue is not only economic but also geopolitical. The gas business has always been one of the key sources of financing the Ukrainian political parties and their campaigns. For that reason the Ukrainian politicians are rather unwilling to allow a foreign control over the gas transporting network of their country.

On their parts, both – the EU and Russia would not accept to invest billions of Euros without obtaining such control as a guarantee for a return on their investments.

Certain Special Features of the South-East and East-European Gas Market

As a whole the EU cannot boast of having a joint energy market. However, its weakest point is the gas import because it is extremely dependent of trans-border pipelines and very often it originates from a single supplier, i.e. Gazprom.

It was declared by the leaders during the EU summit in Brussels from February 2011 that "the internal market should be completed by 2014 so as to allow gas and electricity to flow freely". A new North-South energy corridor should be created. The strategic concept behind the North-South natural gas interconnection is to link the Baltic Sea area (including Poland) to the Adriatic and Aegean Seas and further to the Black Sea, covering Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania, as well as possibly Austria and EU hopeful Croatia.

In the longer term, the European Commission foresees an extension of this integration process to non-EU signatories in the Energy Community Treaty (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Serbia and Kosovo).[403]

Thanks to the North-South corridor, the Commission expects the region of Central and Eastern Europe to become less vulnerable to a supply cut through the Russia/Ukraine/Belarus route. Among the projects mentioned are planned Croatian and Polish Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) terminals, the Constanta LNG terminal in Romania and other LNG and compressed natural gas (CNG) projects in the wider Black Sea region. Other projects cited are plans to further promote Nabucco and NETS, a Hungarian project to unite Central and South Eastern Europe's natural gas transmission networks by creating a common gas transmission system operator (TSO).

All these intentions of the EU seem very good but they will probably fall through when the matter of financing is raised. In 2009 the EU included among its priorities the Nabucco gas pipeline and Bulgaria-Greece and Bulgaria-Rumania interconnectors and promised a financial aid of € 200 mln, 45 mln and 9 mln for them respectively. However, to this day Nabucco project is dead, the construction of the Bulgaria-Greece interconnector has not yet begun, and only Bulgaria-Rumania short pipeline is going to be completed in 2014. As a matter of fact the observation made at the EU summit in Brussels regarding the new projects of the future corridor North-South can be applied to those projects as well: they are"justified from a security of supply/solidarity perspective, but are unable to attract enough

[403] "Prime Ministers to Seal North-South Gas Corridor," *EurActive.com* 01.02.201 http://www.euractiv.com/en/energy/prime-ministers-seal-north-south-gas-corridor-news-501765 (21.02.2011)

market-based finance."[404] The point is who and why will choose to cover the financial shortage?

It should be made clear that though the EU has a Commissioner for Energy, it does not either buy or sell or transport natural gas. It is not done by the individual countries-EU members either. This is carried out only by trade companies some of which are subject of state control while others are private. At the same time the responsibility for the gas deliveries at national or all-European level can not be only trade companies' responsibility. Here actually is the main contradiction – the energy security can be guaranteed only with enough auxiliary infrastructure which is to play the part of insurance in case of force-majeure circumstances like the cutting of the Russian gas transit via Ukraine in 2009. Business is unwilling to invest in the construction of pipelines or LNG terminals which serve as insurance policy and under normal conditions do not work to full capacity. Most of the facilities of the planned new North-South gas corridor are actually a kind of insurance policy and not a main route for gas supply to Central and South-East Europe. The East-European and the Balkan countries are not rich enough to pay such insurance and because of it they appeal to the "solidarity" of the EU.

The problem has geopolitical dimensions too. Up to now the East and Central Europe was supplied with gas through pipelines orientated to direction East (Russia)-West. Promoting the North-South corridor means appearance of vertically situated transferring infrastructure and a possibility to include in it gas of North Sea origin and LNG produced by Arab and African producers. It is logical for Russia to oppose this alternative, relying also on its strong energy relation with Germany.

Another initiative, announced at the EU summit of February 2011, might prove to be of more important consequence to the EU gas market. According to this initiative EU member states are to inform the commission from 1 January 2012 "on all their new and existing bilateral energy agreements" with foreign countries. "The commission will make this information available to all other member states in an appropriate form, having regard to the need for protection of commercially sensitive information. The high representative is invited to take fully account of the energy security dimension in her work.

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[404] Valentina Pop, "EU Leaders Set Deadlines for Energy Market," http://euobserver.com/9/31756 (11.05.2011)

Energy security should also be fully reflected in the EU's neighbourhood policy," EU leaders said.[405]

The exchange of such information among the EU states may deprive Gazprom from its privileged position to negotiate with each of the countries separately, refusing reductions already granted to some others of its customers. This point will grow in importance on the background of the increased pressure applied on Gazprom with the requirement that a part of the delivered gas should be paid at the actual spot market prices, decreasing at the same time the share of the deliveries paid according to the take-or-pay clause.

Projects for gas transportation in Wider Black Sea

Southern Corridor

For a long time the Nabucco gas pipeline had been considered as the key project of the EU's Southern Gas Corridor. Like all major pipeline projects Nabucco is not only of economic but also of geopolitical importance. Though Nabucco has been favoured with the strong support of the European Commission, it is not a project of the European Union. Nabucco's shareholders are five commercial companies from five EU countries and one from Turkey. Even if it would be constructed, the new pipeline will provide no more than 10% of the EU gas import. It is not very important market share but as it has already been said there is no common European gas market. Therefore, it was important that Nabucco could transport gas to the countries of the South-East and Central Europe which now are with the lowest level of diversification of the deliveries. On the other hand this fact is also a shortcoming of the project since the biggest and most influential EU countries have no direct interest in the construction of Nabucco. But it will be hard to complete the project without an institution to pay a certain "geopolitical bonus" which will make the pipeline total value acceptable for the investors. The European Commission included Nabucco in the list of the subsidised energy projects and promised to allocate 200 million Euro but it's not enough. The Russia-Ukraine gas crisis of the beginning of 2009 stimulated the search for new gas resources for deliveries in Europe but this

[405] ibid.

stimulating effect was to a significant degree neutralized by the raging of world economic crisis at the same time.

It is a well known fact that Nabucco has a big problem with securing its sources of gas. For the time being Turkmenistanian gas cannot reach Nabucco because the unregulated legal status of the Caspian Sea which makes any laying of pipelines on the seabed rather risky.[406] There is no doubt whatsoever that because of the obstruction on the part of Iran no agreement in regard of the legal status of the Caspian See would be reached in the foreseeable future. Such an agreement would also be against the interests of Russia. It is very unlikely that the tension in the Caspian region would escalate to a military conflict but still the fact to be taken into consideration is that the countries with the strongest naval forces on the Caspian Sea are no others but Russia and Iran, both opponents of the Trans-Caspian pipeline projects. The second important obstacle for the Transcaspian pipeline is bad bilateral relations between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan. The two countries had old disputes concerning unshared oil and gas fields along their sea borders.

The main hope for Nabucco was the Phase Two of the development of Azerbaijani Shah Deniz gas field but in June 2013 the members of Shah Deniz consortium chose to transfer their gas via Trans-Adriatic pipeline.

Turkey was willing to include Iran and Russia in the Nabucco project and thus to diversify the supplies for this pipeline in a way most convenient for itself.[407] EU, on the other hand, because of the American embargo, is unwilling to do business with Teheran. Iran more than once offered the Europeans to deliver gas for the Nabucco project but for explicable reasons these offers were met with icy silence. It is a paradox that the USA, the main promoter of the opening of a new route for the Caspian gas towards Europe,

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406 More about the legal status of Caspian Sea see at: Rovshan Ibrahimov, "The Caspian Sea Status and the Nabucco Project: the Development of the Relations Between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan," *Eurasia Home*. *Analytical Resource*, 5.05.2008.

407 For detailed analysis about Turkey's ambition to play a role of energy hub see at: Vladimir Socor. "Turkey's Stalling on Nabucco Hurts Europe, Azerbaijan, and Itself: Part One and Part Two," *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 6 Issues: 42-43; http://www.jamestown.org (21.01.2014)

at the same time keep Iran out of the European gas equation, thus de facto working in favour of Russia. Also, including Russia in Nabucco looks illogical as one of the purposes of this project is to decrease EU's dependency on the Russian gas.

Till 2008 it was considered that there would be no problem with agreeing the price of the bought by Turkey Azerbaijani gas and the conditions of its transit via Turkish territory as Ankara and Baku were close political allies. Actually the respective negotiations have been prolonged until 2011 and the energy supply relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan have had many turns influenced also by the zigzags in the political relations between the two states. For the period from April 2008 to November 2009 only thirteen rounds of the negotiations took place. One of the main causes preventing agreement was that Turkish side was unwilling to pay for the Azerbaijani gas at the regional market prices. Actually, the problems (to a degree unexpected) met at the negotiations with Turkey have induced Azerbaijan to seek other export routes for the Shah Deniz gas, or at least to open public discussions on such possibilities, thus aiming pressure on Ankara in regard of its negotiation positions.

Azerbaijan's decision to start exportation to the Russian and Iranian gas markets was expression of its bitter disappointment with its key ally in the region. The complicated situation of its gas trade with Turkey pushed Baku toward launching on such exotic ides like the export of LNG/CNG through Georgian ports to Romania and/or Bulgaria.

Turkey had an important position at the negotiations about building the Nabucco gas pipeline. Turkish company Botas is a shareholder in it together with five other companies from Bulgaria, Rumania Hungary, Austria and Germany. However, as no company extracting gas in the Caspian region was among the associates, this shareholder structure proved to be unproductive. Originally Nabucco relied on gas from Iran and Turkmenistan, later on – from Iraq. However, Iran had to be excluded because of the American embargo; Turkmenistan too, as Turkmenistan gas cannot cross the Caspian Sea and Iraq simply does not produce enough gas to be able to export some. It became obvious by 2010-2011 that till the end of the 2010s at least no more than 10 bcm per year can enter the EU's Southern Corridor. That was the end of Nabucco, planned to supply 31 bcm per year. Later on this project was transformed into Nabucco-West, a pipeline to start at the Turkish-

Bulgarian border and reach Austria transporting the additional 10 bcm annually promised by Azerbaijan. But the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) which is to pass through Greece and Albania and end in Southern Italy was contending for the same 10 bcm.

In order to reach Europe the gas of Shah Deniz-2 should at first unavoidably cross the whole territory of Turkey from Georgia-Turkey border to the Turkey–European Union border. In 2011 Azerbaijan and Turkey signed an agreement about the construction of Trans-Anatolia gas pipeline (TANAP). Presently Turkey holds 20% of TANAP while the remaining 80% are meant for the Azerbaijan's State Oil Company (SOCAR) which however declares that it will decrease its share (but will keep not less than 51%) in favour of BP, Statoil and Total. It became clear in 2014 that the Statoil and Total were rejecting the option to obtain shares in the TANAP, so that Turkey's share in that project would be increased. According to Baku's and Ankara's plans the first gas flow will enter TANAP in 2019 (when Shah Deniz-2 production is due on stream). It is possible afterwards to scale up TANAP's capacity to 16 bcm per year by 2020, 23 bcm by 2023, and 31 bcm per year by 2026, at an estimated cost of $7 billion for reaching the 31-bcm capacity.[408]

Actually, besides Shah Deniz Azerbaijan has other gas fields which will be set into exploitation after 2020[409] but with TANAP's capacity increased to over 25 bcm annually the pipeline will be feasible only if Turkmenistan gas will also flow into it. However, it can hardly happen in the course of the next decade.

By the mid 2013 it became clear that the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) is the only big project from Southern corridor that will be completed in the second decade of the century. TAP is supported by the EU as a TEN-E

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[408] Vladimir Socor, "Azerbaijan Drives the Planning on Trans-Anatolia Gas Pipeline Project," *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 9 Issue: 164; http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=39827 (21.01.2014)

[409] Vladimir Socor, "Beyond Shah Deniz: Azerbaijan's Next-Generation Gas," *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 11 Issue: 18, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=41887&no_cache=1#.Uu04MBB_u5-(21.03.2014)#

project (Trans European Networks – Energy). The project is designed to expand transportation capacity from 10 to 20 bcm per year depending on throughput. In addition, TAP will offer an underground storage facility, which it is currently investigating in Albania, as well as reverse flow capability of up to 8.5 bcm.[410] TAP's strongest card in the game was possibly the fact that one of its three initial shareholders was the Norwegian company Statoil. Statoil was the biggest shareholder in the Shah Deniz project (together with BP) until the end of 2013 and hold the position as Chairman of the Shah Deniz Gas Commercial Committee.[411] In contrast both Nabucco and ITGI have had no shareholders involved in the Shah Deniz project.

There are some other projects for gas transportation in the Black Sea region like AGRI and White Stream but they have no chances to be implemented in the short and mid-term. Commenting on Turkey's participation in the projects for gas transfer to the EU Mitat Çelikpala pointed out that a shift from projects that provide for cooperation with consumers to projects that aim toward collaboration with producers is obvious."[412] It is right but this tendency did not originate in Ankara, it was imposed by the gas market situation in the Caspian-Black Sea region. The main reason for producers' (Azerbaijan and the private companies participating in the Shah-Deniz gas extraction) increasing gravitas for that of the consumers (the EU countries) is that the available gas quantities are extremely insufficient for accomplishing all South Corridor projects. By the end of the 2000s it was obvious that a total demand for over 50 bcm (Nabucco+TAP+ITGI+AGRI) per year was against an offer of 10 bcm per year. In this situation it is reasonable that the gas pipeline positioning is to be dictated by the producers and Turkey should just take into account the new circumstances.

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410 Official web-site of the project: http://www.trans-adriatic-pipeline.com (21.01.2014)

411 At the end of 2013 the Statoil sold part of its shares in Shah Deniz to the BP and SOCAR and from the beginning of 2014 the share of the Norwegian company in the project is 15,5%.

412 Mitat Çelikpala, "The New Energy Politics of the Black Sea Region" *Euxeinos: Culture and Governance in the Black Sea Region* 6 (2012), pp. 23-27.

Projects for Export of Russian gas - South Stream pipeline

During the last years Russia has had serious problems with its transit gas pipelines passing through Ukraine. That is why Russia has been adopting the so called "alternative route strategy". In order to guarantee the secure deliveries of Russian gas to Central and Western Europe two new undersea routes for the Russian gas are to go round Ukraine, Byelorussia and Poland. They are the North Stream going along the bottom of the Baltic Sea and the South Stream passing under the Black Sea towards Bulgaria.

It is wrong to believe that South Stream was promoted only because Victor Yushchenko was the President of Ukraine between 2005 and 2010. This project was not abandoned in the period 2010-2014 when the president of Ukraine was Victor Yanucovych who had pro-Russian sympathies. The gas pipeline exploitation period is many times longer than that of any political cycle in Kiev. Russia believes that the problems related to the gas transit via Ukraine are structural and not personal and that is why it will never give up the South Stream.

After 2008 the competition between the South Stream and Southern Corridor became even more severe. Till that time it was mainly concerned with the gas sources, i.e. – whether the Caspian gas would start flowing toward Sothern Corridor or a bigger part of it would enter the South Stream via Russia. However, in view of the fact that the gas consumption in the EU is in a period of stagnation, in the nearest and foreseeable future the South Stream and Southern Corridor will be competitors for the gas buying customers in Europe. By the end of 2012 it seems the routes of Southern Corridor and the South Stream will not cross each other. Nabucco (Nabucco-West respectively) failed and Caspian gas will not go to the Central Europe. In the same time the southern branch of South Stream (Bulgaria-Greece-Italy) without a word disappeared from the official web-site of the project.[413]

After a year of hesitations at the end of 2010 the new Bulgarian government agreed to take part in the South Stream project and the gas pipeline route has now emerged clear – through the Black Sea, coming out in Bulgaria and branching there toward the Central Europe and Italy. If Bulgaria had refused the project, it would not have been possible for the South Stream

[413] South Stream project official web-site - http://www.south-stream.info/en/maps/ (21.01.2014)

to come out of the sea in Rumania as it would have meant its passing through the territorial waters of Ukraine.

At the end of 2013 it became clear that the European Commission had serious objections against the Intergovernmental Agreements, signed by several European states with Gazprom for the construction of the South Stream. European commissioner for energy Oettinger declared the agreements in question as breaching EU law and threatened with infringement procedures. He then summoned ministers from Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Greece, Slovenia and Serbia, and was mandated to renegotiate the IGAs in conformity with existing EU rules.[414]

The fate of the South Stream project will to a serious degree depend on the outcome of the controversy on matters of principle between the Commission and Gazprom concerning the conditions in observation of which the Russian company will operate on the gas market of the EU.

On 4 September 2012, the European Commission antitrust branch opened formal proceedings against Gazprom for allegedly violating European Union competition rules, in particular – blocking rival suppliers, preventing re-export of its gas, overcharging customers. The European Commission's investigation against Gazprom would most probably not be finished soon, and at the beginning of 2014 an agreement on this matter between Brussels and Moscow looks less and less possible.

The Ukrainian crisis and the Russian annexation of Crimea are changing fundamentally the energy geopolitics in the Black Sea region. EU's intention to impose economic sanctions on Russia has proved to be unworkable, owing mainly to Europe's strong dependence on the import of Russian energy resources. For that reason the matter of reducing this dependence was once again subject of discussion at the European Council which took place on 20-21st March 2014. The European states are not in a position to decrease immediately their import of gas from Russia but in long and midterm it will probably happen. The EU will try to secure import from other sources, and the crisis in the relations with Russia will accelerate the implementation of the shale gas extraction projects in some of the Black Sea countries, like Ukraine and Rumania. At the same time the investment programs of

[414] D. Betchev, "The South Stream Saga Continues," *ECFR Blog*, 14/01/2014. http://ecfr.eu/blog/entry/ the_south_stream_saga_continues (14.01.2014)

Gazprom and the independent Russian gas companies will be put under doubt owing to their limited access of credits from the West.

The South Stream prospects are becoming more and more doubtful. In March 2014 the EU Energy Commissioner, Guenther Oettinger declared that he was to delay talks with Russia on the South Stream.[415] Several days later the chief executive of Italian oil major ENI, Paolo Scaroni said that the future of the pipeline is "somewhat gloomy". The ENI is the main shareholder (with 20%) in the offshore section of the South Stream together with Gazprom (German company Wintershall Holding and French EDF hold 15% each).

In the circumstances of aggravated relations between Russia and the EU it is obvious that the originally announced term of accomplishing the building of the first of the four parallel lines until the end of 2015, will not be observed. There is a very slim possibility that the South Stream will reach its full project operational capacity of 63 bcm annually by the end of the current decade.

Conclusions

The Black Sea region is the zone where the export routes of the Russian and the Caspian natural gas cross. In regard of the natural gas all Black Sea states have two main objectives: 1. to secure for themselves stable and advantageous gas deliveries; 2. to attract transit gas streams through their territories.

The struggle among the different projects for transfer of gas in the Black Sea region is an equation with many unknown quantities. Purely economic arguments cannot answer the question which of the projects will be accomplished and which one will not. Some of the projects have negligible chances for fulfillment but even the discussions on it influence the plans and the actual moves of the geopolitical players in the region.

In the circumstances of stagnation at the EU gas market that was going on after 2008 the project for new gas pipelines from Russia and the Caspian

[415] "EC to Delay Russian South Stream Gas Pipeline Talks," *Reuters* March 10, 2014;
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/10/ukraine-oettinger-pipeline-idUSL6N0M70PV20140310 (21.03.2014)

region are gaining an increasingly stronger geopolitical ingredient while the strictly economic considerations loose some of their importance.

The increasing LNG and CNG deliveries further the globalization of the gas market and begin to influence the new regional gas pipeline projects. The prices at the gas spot-market in Europe will be an important indicator of the feasibility of the major gas pipeline projects.

In the nearest and foreseeable future (till 2020-2025) Russia will preserve its position of domination in regard of the gas deliveries to the Central and South-East Europe and will prevent the appearance of its competitor, Caspian gas, at these markets. However, the middle and long term perspectives are that Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan will attain the possibilities for direct sales at the EU gas market.

Potential game-changers in the Black Sea gas game could be: 1. The newly explored gas field in the Eastern Mediterranean; 2. The exploration and extraction of shale gas reserves in the Black Sea countries, mainly in Ukraine; 3. The exploration and development of offshore gas fields in the Black Sea (Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria, Ukraine).

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ANNEX

Map 1: South Stream Pipeline



Map 2: Nabucco West Pipeline



Transportation as a Competitive Advantage: Linking Black Sea to the Rest of Europe in the West, to the Asia through South Caucasus in the East

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Introduction

"[T]he Black Sea region is a strategic bridge connecting Europe with the Caspian Sea area, [and] Central Asia …", as it was put in the European Parliament resolution on an EU Strategy for the Black Sea.[416] However, that was not the case for many decades, not until the end of the Cold War: before that, with the exception of Turkey, it was comprised of socialist states of the Eastern Bloc led by the Soviet Union and was cut off from the outside world. It was not a region linking the areas around it: rather, it separated them. The Black Sea region was a periphery where the socialist world ended and before the capitalist world started, with no interaction between these worlds. In other words, the Black Sea region was more a 'strategic wall' than a 'strategic bridge'. Only since the dissolution of the Eastern Bloc, interactions have started between the areas situated to the east and west of the Black Sea region. That has created an opportunity for the region to take the role of a 'strategic bridge' between these areas. This role is naturally assigned to it by its geographical and geostrategic position; it is a role which gives it a competitive advantage as a transportation corridor and can produce significant benefits, both economically and politically.

The Black Sea became a region suffering from the legacies of its socialist past and from the painful transformation from a planned to a market

[416] European Parliament Resolution of 20 January 2011 on an "EU Strategy for the Black Sea," - 2010/2087 (INI), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2011-0025+0+DOC+XML +V0//EN&language=EN.

economy. It was the region most badly hit by the global financial crisis, since post-socialist recovery was mainly based on the inflow of foreign financial resources that almost stopped after the crisis; it is a region that is energy-poor and dependent on imports, with primarily one source accounting for most of the supply. But, at the same time, the Black Sea became a region with a competitive advantage as a transportation corridor for hydrocarbon resources from the Caspian Region to Europe, as well as for freight and passenger transportation between the East and West. The benefit of transportation of hydrocarbons through the Black Sea region will be twofold: it will be an alternative source of energy supply, and countries will also benefit from the transit of these resources through their territories further into Europe. In general, the materialization of this advantage will contribute to the economic recovery of the region and provide at least one major source for the sustainable economic development that the region greatly needs. Hence, the transportation capacities of the region, and the developments and initiatives for the realization of these capacities will be discussed in this paper. But, prior to that, attempts will be made to understand the geographical situation of the Black Sea region and the countries it comprises; its economic (under)development and energy dependence; and the historical opportunity that its competitive advantage offers for exploitation. Only then will developments in regard to transportation be highlighted, including: pipeline projects to and through the Black Sea region for the transport of oil and gas; Black Sea port infrastructures, which are crucial as nodes of land and sea routes; European Union initiatives to encourage development in the region by supporting transport projects; initiatives by the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization; and multilateral initiatives by the regional states. At the end, all these parts of the puzzle will be brought together in a summative and generalizing manner to see the whole picture.

Defining Black Sea Region: Who is in?

It is a difficult task to define strict borders for the Black Sea region and to identify the countries within it. Geographically, the neighboring regions are nested and to draw firm lines between them is impossible; historically, the composition of states in the region and the character of relations among them have changed over time; and last, but not least, defining the region is in itself

a political act, since those who define the region do so in accordance with their own political interests.

Geographically, the Black Sea region includes the Black Sea and territories surrounding it. The region stretches from the Balkans in the west to the South Caucasus in the east and from the Eurasian steppes in the north to Anatolia in the south. But, as already noted, it is difficult, if not impossible, to draw strict lines between these neighboring regions, since they are nested. For instance, one can hardly draw a clear boundary between the Black Sea region and either the South Caucasus or the Balkan regions, since the shores of both the latter are washed by the Black Sea. That makes Georgia and Bulgaria members of the South Caucasian and Balkan countries respectively, and also at the same time Black Sea littoral states. Furthermore, the borders of the region can change depending on the criteria one chooses. In ecological terms, for instance, the region stretches from Central Europe to the Ural Mountains, since the rivers that run into the Black Sea cross through the territories of twenty-two countries and what rivers carry from these countries affects the sea's ecology.[417] But if the criterion to define Black Sea countries is, instead, to have a border on the Black Sea itself, then the region includes only six littoral countries.

Historically, and politically as well, the earliest instance of modern Black Sea regionalism goes back to the post-World War I period, when four independent states existed on the coasts of the Black Sea: the Soviet Union, Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania. For three of these states, the central strategic question was how to deal with the existence of the fourth. The dominant ideology of nationalism in Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey was in conflict with a Soviet ideology that denied the notion of nationality and called for liberation from imperialism and capitalist exploitation. In this regard, political leaders in each of the non-Bolshevik states came together to form 'a political movement that represented the first modern attempt to think about the Black Sea as a distinct political unit'.[418] The movement, called the

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[417] Charles King, "The Wider Black Sea Region in the Twenty-First Century," in Hamilton, Daniel and Mangott, Gerhard (eds.), *The Wider Black Sea Region in the 21st Century: Strategic, Economic and Energy Perspectives* (Washington, D.C: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2008), http://transatlantic.sais-jhu.edu/publications/ books/Wider_Black_Sea.pdf, p.8.

[418] ibid, p. 9.

Promethean project, was initially dedicated to the liberation of the captive peoples of the Soviet Union. In the 1930s, the Prometheans called for the creation of a political and economic alliance of Black Sea states, including Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria, as well as a would-be independent Ukraine and Georgia.[419] However, the Promethean project eventually failed, since World War II started, and in the end Communism was triumphant in Romania and Bulgaria. In the following decades, during the Cold War, the region—composed of the Soviet Union and its satellites—was closed to the outside world, except for Turkey, which was taken under the defensive umbrella of the West.

New regional initiatives had to wait until the end of the Cold War and gained momentum again only in the early 1990s. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine and Georgia emerged as independent states and the number of littoral states bordering the Black Sea reached six. In June 1992, on the initiative of Turkey, the heads of state of eleven Black Sea littoral countries and their neighbors met at a summit meeting in Istanbul. Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine signed the Summit Declaration and the Bosporus Statement, giving birth to the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC). On 1 May 1999, with the entry into force of its Charter, BSEC was upgraded to the status of an international organization: Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation.

As seen, the initiative was not limited to the littoral states and included their neighbors as well, mainly for political reasons. For instance, during the establishment of the organization, Turkey supported Albania's inclusion, while Russia had an interest in Greece's membership in order to balance Turkey. In 1996, and later in 2005, Cyprus submitted an application for observer status in the BSEC. But Turkey blocked Cyprus' application, since Turkey does not recognize the independence of Cyprus because of the dispute over Turkish-controlled northern Cyprus. With the accession of Serbia and Montenegro in April 2004, the Organization's Member States increased to twelve. In 2006 Montenegro separated from Serbia, but its application as an independent state for BSEC membership was vetoed by Greece. As a response to Turkey's veto against Cyprus' membership, Greece

[419] ibid.

opposed all membership applications to the BSEC. Hence, because of the political interests of Russia and Turkey, the membership expanded beyond littoral states to include the South Caucasus, Greece, Albania and Serbia, while at the same time, the expansion was limited, and the membership applications of the Greek Cypriots and Montenegro were turned down due to the political disagreements between Turkey and Greece.

In addition, the US and EU also made attempts to conceptualize the region. For the US, the region is the wide area stretching from the Caspian Sea to the Black Sea to the Baltic Sea.[420] The US supported the concept of the 'Wider Black Sea' region through the German Marshall Fund, which gathered officials and scholars from the countries of the region as well as from Europe and America to a series of seminars on the Wider Black Sea region.[421] The EU, in its turn, commenced the Black Sea Synergy regional initiative in a conference in Kiev (Ukraine) in 2008. The EU was also interested in the inclusion of the South Caucasus in the Black Sea concept due to its energy, security, and transportation concerns, while not including Albania and Serbia since they are referred to in the EU's Western Balkans policies.[422]

Hence, it is difficult to define the region for historical and geographical reasons; what is more, such definitions are politically charged, and the goal of this paper is to make an academic contribution. We will therefore refrain from offering a strict definition of the borders of the region and instead offer

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[420] Zeyno Baran, "Turkey and the Wider Black Sea Region," in Daniel Hamilton and Gerhard Mangott (eds.), *The Wider Black Sea Region in the 21st Century: Strategic, Economic and Energy Perspectives*. (Washington, D.C: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2008), http://transatlantic.sais-jhu.edu/publications/books/Wider_Black_Sea.pdf,pp.87-101.

[421] Svante E. Cornell, Anna Jonsson, Niklas Nilsson, Per Häggström, "The Wider Black Sea Region: An Emerging Hub in European Security," *Silk Road Paper,* http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/Silkroadpapers/0612Blacksea_P.pdf, p.16.

[422] Panagiota Manoli, "Black Sea Regionalism in Perspective," *Neighborhood Policy Paper*, December 2011, http://www.khas.edu.tr/cms/abaum/dosyalar/files/NeighbourhoodPolicyPaper(02)(1).pdf.

flexible one. This flexibility lies in that the countries of reference will depend on the regional initiative in question and on which counties that particular initiative covers. For instance, when the topic is the Black Sea Ring Highway (BSRH), all BSEC members will be referred to, since BSRH is a BSEC initiative and all member countries are involved in the project.7

Economic Underdevelopment: Post-Communist and Post-Crisis Legacies

The International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook Database published in April 2013 demonstrates how Black Sea countries lag behind other European countries, according to their economic indicators.[423] In the ranking of the Richest and Poorest Countries in the World, according to Gross Domestic Product Based on Purchasing-Power-Parity (PPP) Per Capita, 10 out of the 13 poorest countries in Europe are members of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization. Moldova, Armenia, Georgia, Ukraine, and Albania are the poorest countries in Europe. Additionally, Bulgaria and Romania are the poorest EU members, according to the report. Turkey, although a G20 member according to the nominal GDP, is the 13th poorest country in Europe according to GDP Based on PPP Per Capita, since Turkey has a large population.

Economic underperformance is considered mainly a legacy of the Socialist past. The collapse of the Eastern Bloc was marked by a sharp decline of the economies of the Black Sea countries. Countries suffered from the collapse of planned economy, of old system of production and consumption, financial difficulties, inflation, and even hyperinflation in some countries. 1991-1994 was characterized by hard recession: GDP decreased by 20% and employment and income rates dropped.[424]

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[423] Valentina Pasquali and Tina Aridas, "The World's Richest and Poorest Countries," *Global Finance,* 04.2013, http://www.gfmag.com/component/content/article/119-economic-data/12529-the-worlds-richest-and-poorest-countries.html#axzz2ZhYaQnu9.

[424] BSTDB Annual Report 2010, p. 11, cited in, Galina Selari, "The Black Sea region: Challenges and Lessons of the Global Financial Crisis," *The Black Sea Peacebuilding Network, Regional Meeting*, Istanbul, 9-11 December 2011, http://www.cisr-md.org/pdf/BSea-region_En.pdf.

In the second half of the 1990s, Black Sea countries could, to an extent, prevent further decline and stabilize their economies, but only after 2000 was the stabilization followed by a period of sustained and high level growth. Painful transformation from centrally planned economies into market-oriented ones and intense structural reforms started to bear fruits in terms of rapid economic development and political stability. Economic transformation and growth were driven mainly by privatization and the restriction of state control. The region's economic orientation shifted towards the European Union, and stability helped to lower country risk levels, improve sovereign credit ratings, and encourage Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).[425] As a result, FDI increased each year and in the years between 2000 and 2008, the Black Sea countries registered annual economic growth of between 5 and 8 percent.[426]

The economic development was highest in Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania. These countries were not only economic leaders in the Black Sea region, but also were among the world's fastest growing economies.[427] International financial institutions like IMF and the EU played an important role, providing guidance for reforms and economic policies.[428]

However, starting from the last quarter of 2008, economic growth was hampered by the international financial crisis. One of the fastest developing regions in the world now became one of those suffering most severely from the crisis. Although the effects of the crisis were different form country to country, it covered the entire Black Sea region. In the beginning of 2009, GDPs started to drop down in all countries, 'reaching its lowest point in the middle of the year. The biggest dropdown of production was recorded in Ukraine (15.1%).[429] The crisis hit especially badly those countries whose

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425 The Commission on the Black Sea, "The Current State of Economic Development inthe Black Sea Region Policy Report I," 2010, http://www.harvard-rgp.org/static/files/411/black_sea_policy_reporti_economy.pdf.

426 "Economic Development and Security in the Black Sea Region", *CSIS New European Democracies Project*, 2006, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/070103_blacksea.pdf.

427 ibid.

428 ibid, p.3.

429 Selari, p.3.

economic development was most vulnerable to the inflow of international capital. Those countries had to face difficulties such as current account deficit and a large amount of foreign debt and borrowing, since external financing became difficult, if not impossible, to obtain. The amount of FDI in the Black Sea region decreased sharply. To compare, while from 2000 to 2008 FDI in the Black Sea Region[430] increased sixteen-fold, from US $8 billion to US $130 billion, after the financial crisis that amount shrank to around 60 billion US $.[431]

Along with vulnerability to foreign capital inflow, the main cause of the crisis was the unsustainable economic growth before 2008, "based mainly on the consumption of imported goods, financed by foreign money".[432] "The growth till 2008 only encouraged sectors of lesser importance to the economy, such as sales in the real-estate, automotive and home appliance industries. The economy was not fed, and once foreign financing stopped for these sectors, they began to collapse. "Downturns of 60 to 70 percent could not be blamed on the crisis, as they were the result of anomalies that existed before the crisis began."[433]

Post-crisis recovery is far from what has been desired. Although moderate post-crisis recovery was observed in 2010[434] and 2011,[435] the growth slowed down in 2012, being below 1% in Romania, Bulgaria, and Moldova. The worst situation is in Greece, which suffers from increasing external debts and drop in GDP (-6%).[436]

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430 Here Black Sea region implies South Caucasian Republics too.

431 The Commission on the Black Sea.

432 Daniela Luminita Constantin, Zizi Goschin, and Aniela Raluca Danciu, "The Romanian Economy from Transition to Crisis: Retrospects and Prospects," *CNCSIS Project*, 2010, http://www.wbiconpro.com/224-Aniela.pdf.

433 ibid.

434 Selari, p.3.

435 "Addressing the Current Financial, Energy, Political and Commercial Challenges in The Region of the Black Sea Towards the Creation of A Network of Intra-Regional Trade, Investment Opportunities and Energy Security," *RhodesMRC* 2012, http://www.rhodesmrc.org/2012/docs/bsec_topic_b.1.0.pdf.

436 See, http://www.indexmundi.com/greece/gdp_real_growth_rate.html.

Vladimir Papava explains the economies of the Black Sea region with reference to the concepts of the "necroeconomy", legacy of the communist past, and the "zombie-economy", legacy of the global financial crisis. Necroeconomy implies uncompetitive industries (the "necrocompanies") that are remnants of the command economy. As for "zombie-economy", it is when the "bankrupt firms continue to operate despite their 'mortality' with the support of the banks that, themselves, supported by the government".[437]

To change this situation, to attain better financial conditions and to stabilize the economy, the countries cooperate with international financial institutions: IMF, World Bank and European Union. In return for financial aid, the countries have had to follow unpopular austerity policies: cutting budget spending, increasing taxes and privatizing state-controlled companies which were being subsidized by the government before.

This time, however, the economic difficulties followed by austerity policies fostered social unrest and undermined political stability in the region. Tough austerity measures launched by the Romanian government led to street rallies and clashes with police in January 2012, which brought down the government and ushered in a period of political instability.[438]Similarly, in Bulgaria, in February 2013 the austerity policies led to violent protests against high energy costs and foreign-owned privatized companies, and the government had to resign.[439] In Greece, the situation is much worse since the economic and political crisis is deeper.[440]

Thus international uncompetitiveness, structural weaknesses, and dependence on international financial and economic conditions hinder the

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[437] Vladimer Papava, "The Economic Development Complex in the Black Sea Area: The Impact of the Global Financial and Economic Crisis," *Xenophon Paper,* International Centre for Black Sea Studies (ICBSS), http://icbss.org/media/113_original.pdf.

[438] Claudia Ciobanu, "'Reforms' Legacy Rocks Romania Again," *Inter Press Service (IPS),* 07.07.2012, www.ipsnews.net/2012/07/reforms-legacy-rocks-romania-again/.

[439] See, "Bulgaria Profile," *BBC News Europe* http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-17202996.

[440] "Greece's Crisis: Shifting from Financial to Political," *Stratfor,* 03.15.2012, http://www.euractiv.com/euro-finance/greeces-crisis-shifting-financia-analysis-511286.

economic development of the Black Sea economies. In this regard, along with increasing the competitiveness of its production and conducting structural reforms, new sources of revenue should be developed and the existing ones improved.

One of the main contributions to economic development could be the effective use of the main competitive advantage of the Black Sea region: its transportation capacities (see next sections for transportation projects). Development of transportation capacities will mean the implementation of regional projects, infrastructure development, significant investment, and the creation of new jobs. After the realization of the projects, they will serve as a source of revenue in terms of transportation fees and will encourage other sectors of the economy such as service. Furthermore, Black Sea countries will have an opportunity to develop trade relations with the neighboring regions that will encourage production in the region. All these, in their turn, will contribute to sustainable economic development in the Black Sea region.

Energy Dependence of the Black Sea Countries

Black Sea countries are poor in energy resources with insignificant domestic production and rely on imports, chiefly from Russia. For some countries, it is even the case that Russia is the only supplier of oil and natural gas. These relations in the energy sphere of the Black Sea region are largely a legacy of the Cold War period (except for Turkey and Greece). Satellites of the Soviet Union (Bulgaria, Romania) and republics within it (Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia) were supplied with oil and natural gas, which was abundant in Soviet Union and available at a discounted price. Having once been an advantage, it now turned out, after the collapse of the Eastern Bloc, to be one of the sensitive issues for these countries. The two gas crises between Ukraine and Russia in 2006 and 2009, and especially the second, demonstrated how vulnerable the countries in the Black Sea region are. The supply was most seriously jeopardized in Romania, Bulgaria, Moldova, and Greece.[441]

[441] M.Z Milanovic, "Energy Security in South-East Europe in Light of Russian Energy Policy," *International and Security Affairs Centre* 2010,

In Bulgaria, natural gas is the main source of energy in the petrochemical industry; without gas, the factories would simply have to close and petrochemical products have to be imported.[442] Annual consumption of natural gas in Bulgaria is about 3.2 billion m³. Under a new 10 year agreement that came into force from January 2013, Russia supplies 2.9 billion m³ of gas, annually. The remaining 300 million m³ is covered by domestic production. Additionally, demand in Bulgaria is expected to grow to 4.4-6 billion m³ by 2020.[443]For instance, although in Bulgaria only 2% of households are gasified, the government plans to increase this to the EU average level (30-50%), which will drive up the domestic demand.[444] Besides this, Bulgaria imports all of its crude oil and considerable quantities of refined products from Russia. Crude oil imports in 2010 were around 7.5 million tons, which was processed at Russian oil company Lukoil's Neftochim refinery and petrochemicals works, located on the seaside near Burgas.[445]

In Romania, although a traditional oil and natural gas producer and an oil exporter for a long time, domestic production is declining rapidly and is far beneath the domestic demand. Romania imports half of its total oil consumption (10 million tons), and about 20 % of its total natural gas consumption (13 billion m^3).[446] Although the percentage of imported gas relative to the total consumption is not high, its volume is considerably large: more than the total gas consumption in Bulgaria, for instance.

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http://www.isac-fund.org/download/06e-Dr.%20Zorana%20Mihajlovic%20-%20Energy%20security%20in%20SEE%20in%20Light%20of%20Russian%20Energy%20Policy.pdf.

442 ibid.

443 See, "Bulgaria to Buy Azeri Gas," *Argus News* 29.01.2013, http://www.argusmedia.com/pages/NewsBody. aspx?id=832349&menu=yes.

444 See, "In Bulgaria," *Bulgarian Association Natural Gas*, http://www.naturalgas.bg/en/pages/index/page/ in_the_country.

445 Ruslan Stefanov et al, "The Energy Sector of Bulgaria," *CSD Policy Briefs* (22/2010).

446 "Oil and Gas Prospects," *WEC/RNC Conference, Romania*, April 25, 2013, http://cnrcme.ro/evenimente/2013/25_April_Energy_Trilemma/presentations/Mark%20Beacom%20-%20Sterling.pdf.

In Ukraine, natural gas is the main source of power generation and energy for households. That puts Ukraine in first place for the Black Sea region, and 16th in the world, for the consumption of natural gas. Annual gas consumption in Ukraine was 53 billion m^3 in 2010 (85 billion m^3 in 2007, before the global financial crisis) and only 19 billion m^3 of that was produced domestically.[447] With respect to oil, Ukraine produces domestically only one third of the total consumption (15 million tons) and imports the remaining part, mainly from Russia.[448]

Moldova is completely dependent on imports for all its coal, natural gas, and oil supplies, again imported mainly from Russia.[449] Annual consumption of oil and natural gas is 1 million ton and 3.1 billion m^3, respectively. Moldova is also one of the transit countries for Russian gas supplies to Europe and often finds itself in disputes with Russia over gas prices.[450]

Similarly, Georgia is poor in energy reserves and relies on importing oil and gas. Georgia was importing all its gas from Russia until 2006, when relations between them strained. Georgia's luck lay in its proximity to Azerbaijan and in the timely completion of the new South Caucasus Pipeline (see pipelines section) that connected it to Azerbaijan. Those made it possible for Georgia to switch to Azerbaijani gas, after Russia's Gazprom increased prices and a series of blasts cut gas flow from Russia.[451]

Turkey and Greece, which do not share the socialist past of the other Black Sea countries, are, comparatively, in a better condition in terms of their diversification of supply sources. Turkey's strategic position and infrastructure allows it to diversify oil and gas imports, accessing supplies

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447 See, "Ukraine," *CIA World Factbook*, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ up.html.

448 See, "Ukraine," *US Energy Information Administration*, http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips= UP.

449 "Central and Eastern European Shale Gas Outlook," *KMPG International* 2012, http://www.kpmg.com/Global/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/shale-gas/Documents/cee-shale-gas-3 .pdf.

450 See, "Russia to Moldova: Choose Cheap Gas," *EurActiv* 13.09.2012, http://www.euractiv.com/europes-east/ russia-moldova-chose-cheap-gas-e-news-514769.

451 "No Plans to Import More Russian Gas," *Natural Gas Europe* 21.05.2013, http://www.naturalgaseurope. com/georgia-russian-gas-imports.

from the Middle East, Caspian Sea, Russia, and Africa.[452] Yet, that is a relative advantage only, since they import more than half of their consumed natural gas from Russia. Furthermore, like the other Black Sea countries, they are almost completely dependent on the import of oil and gas. In 2010, oil consumption in Greece was 18.5 million ton and gas consumption 2.8 billion m^3 while in Turkey oil consumption was 32 million ton, and gas consumption was 28 billion m^3.[453] Imports account for more than 90% of consumed oil and gas in both countries.

The prospect of shale gas development is one of the hopes for future energy independence in the region. However, that can only be a reality in the medium and long term, at best. Among the Black Sea countries, Bulgaria, Romania and Ukraine are estimated to have large shale gas reserves. However, due to the socioeconomic, technical, environmental and political problems, the production of a significant amount of gas is not expected: not in the short term, at least. In early January 2012, Bulgaria introduced a complete ban on the exploration and production of shale gas.[454] In Romania too, the government announced a moratorium on all prospecting work in May of 2012. Although after the December elections the government raised the ban on prospecting, years will be needed just for the estimation of the country's reserves. In Ukraine, the first production of shale gas is expected for 2017, if everything goes as planned. However, it is not unexpected that reality will not meet expectations, especially when it comes to shale gas production, which is a new sphere for Ukraine—and globally as well. Besides this, at best, it is planned for shale gas to meet only around 20% (10 billion m^3) of the current natural gas consumption, which means Ukraine will still need to import a significant amount of gas.[455] Thus, although shale gas is expected to contribute to the energy security of Bulgaria, Romania and Ukraine in the future, it cannot be considered as an alternative to

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[452] Vlad Popovici, "Black Sea Region Stands at Energy Crossroads," *Oil&Gas Journal*, 12/07/2009, http://www.ogj.com/articles/print/volume-107/issue-45/transportation/black-sea-region-stands.html.

[453] See country profiles, Turkey and Greece, *Index Mundi* http://www.indexmundi.com.

[454] "Shale Gas in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Romania," ibid, pp. 8-13.

[455] "Central and Eastern European Shale Gas Outlook," pp. 55-6.

conventional gas and these countries will neither turn into gas exporters nor be self-sufficient in energy.

Hence, being dependent on external sources, and mainly on one source, namely Russia, Black Sea countries are looking for alternative sources to diversify their supply. In the hope of reducing its dependence on Russian gas, Bulgaria kept the right in its contract about gas imports from Russia to further renegotiate volumes and price in 2018.[456] That is the date when it was planned to start exporting gas from the Shahdeniz-2 field of Azerbaijan to Europe (now it is expected to be in 2019). Bulgaria seeks to buy gas from Shahdeniz-2 when production starts. Although the Nabucco West pipeline project failed, there is still a chance for Bulgaria to import Azerbaijani gas via interconnectors (see pipelines section). The primary direction, in which Romania turned, was also the South Caucasus and Central Asian region. To this end, Romania developed bilateral relations and conducted negotiations with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, and became a strategic partner with Azerbaijan. But since the failure of the Nabucco West gas pipeline, which was to carry gas through Romania (see pipelines section), Romania has been reconsidering its energy strategy. In particular, Romania hopes to rely on the new gas field discoveries in the Black Sea sector. Ukraine, too, is willing to import oil and gas from the Caspian Basin. Indeed, it has already imported a small amount of oil from Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. Azerbaijan stopped oil exports in 2012.[457] Ukraine was also importing natural gas from Central Asia through Russian territories until 2006. But due to the conflict with Ukraine, Russia refused to be a transit country only, and since then, itself re-exports Central Asian gas to Ukraine. Moldova is seeking to import gas from Azerbaijan as well.[458] Turkey and Georgia are currently importers of gas from Azerbaijan, and Turkey plans to increase the volume in future. Greece imported gas from Azerbaijan in 2011 and is also considering restoring imports and in higher volumes. For the Black Sea countries to be able to

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456 See, "Bulgaria to Buy Azeri Gas."

457 See, Aynur Jafarova, "Azerbaijan says ready to resume oil exports to Ukraine," *Azer News* 05.04.2013, http://www.azernews.az/oil_and_gas/51801.html.

458 "PM: Moldova seeks imports of Azeri Gas," *Azer News* 18.01.2012, http://www.azernews.az/oil_and_gas/ 40371.html.

diversify their energy supply sources, realization of the necessary transport infrastructure is crucial.

Competitive Advantage of Black Sea Region as a Transport Corridor

With the globalization of trade, manufacturing companies have changed their production and distribution strategies, relocating their production to Eastern Europe or Asia This has brought a major shift in the flow of goods, and a significant increase in the volumes of transport.[459] These trends in industrial growth and location patterns create significant opportunities for the Black Sea region, since it is geostrategically situated between Europe and Asia and can account for a considerable portion of the transportation between the continents.

During the last six years (2007-2013), the EU trade with Asian countries has increased by 50%.[460] Moreover, transport volume between the EU and the neighboring regions is expected to grow by 100% in 2020, compared with 2010.[461] By 2015, containerized transportation from Asia to Europe and from Europe to Asia is expected to reach 26.1 million TEUs and 17.7 million TEUs, respectively, according to the estimations of the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP).[462] Until now, transport

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459 "Strategic Intermodal Research Agenda 2020," *European Intermodal Association* 2005,
http://www.eia-ngo.com/eirac.html.

460 Shada Islam, "Asia-Europe Relations in a Changing World," *ASEM*, 03.2013, http://www.aseminfoboard.org/ 2011-12-20-06-03-03/announcements/item/1215-asia-europe-relations-in-a-changing-world.html.

461 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, "Extension of the Major Trans-European Transport Axes to the Neighboring Countries," "Guidelines for Transport in Europe and Neighboring Regions," SEC (2007) 98 and SEC (2007) 99,
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52007DC0032:EN:NOT.

462 M. Emerson and E. Vinokurov, *Optimisation of Central Asian and Eurasian Trans-Continental Land Transport Corridors*, *EUCAM* Working Paper No. 07.12. 2009,
http://www.fride.org/download/EUCAM_WP_Optimisation_Transport_Corridors_ENG_dec09.pdf.

of goods between Europe and Asia has been realized through the sea routes, with only 1% of it being transported through the inland routes: more precisely, mainly by trans-Siberian railways (150 000 TEU/Year).[463] But it is expected that the Suez Canal will soon reach its maximum capacity for container vessels, which will mean a growing demand for land routes.[464]

The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that by2050 global passenger and freight transportation will be double that of 2010 levels.[465] According to estimates, in order to adapt to this growth, an additional "25 million paved road lane-kilometers" and "335 000 rail track kilometers" will be needed. Moreover, it is estimated that between 45 000 and 77 000 square kilometers of new parking spaces will need to be added to accommodate vehicle stock growth.

Furthermore, despite all the benefits of transport by sea, land transportation routes between East Asia and Eastern Europe provide almost three times faster delivery compared with the sea routes linking these regions.[466] While the advantages of the transportation of transit cargo by sea are "low delivery cost, established relationships with customers and high standards of service", "the competitive advantage of land transit routes is the

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[463] Alain Rathery, "Policy Actions for Developing Efficient Inland Transport Links between Asia and Europe," *Meeting of BSEC Ministers of Transport, Istanbul, Turkey*, 05.07.2007, http://www.internationaltransportforum.org/IntOrg/ecmt/eurasia/pdf/ARistanbulBSEC07.pdf.

[464] Emerson and Vinokurov.

[465] John Dulac, "Global Land Transport Infrastructure Requirements: Estimating Road And Railway Infrastructure Capacity and Costs to 2050," *International Energy Agency (IEA*) *Information Paper*, http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/TransportInfrastructureInsights_FINAL_WEB.pdf.

[466] Thomas Kusch, Gunnar Prause, and Kristina Hunke, "The East-West Transport Corridor and the Shuttle Train "VIKING"," *Wismar Discussion Papers* 13.11.2011, http://www.wi.hs-wismar.de/documents/wismarer_diskussionspapiere/2011/1113_Kuschua.pdf, p. 4

speed of delivery".[467] If the Black Sea and Caspian Sea routes considered together, the most efficient and shortest combined transport route from west to east would be to link their maritime routes and ports with road and rail systems.[468]

What is more, the EU's enlargement will also positively influence the Black Sea regions' development as a transportation hub. The enlargement of the EU in 2007, with the inclusion of Romania and Bulgaria as members, extended the EU's external borders further to the east, reaching the Black Sea coasts. Thus the Black Sea is a point of entrance to the EU area. Both of these factors—enlargement towards the east (the Black Sea region) and increasing trade with Asia—are driving forces, and create an opportunity, for growing transportation volumes and greater dynamism in the Black Sea region.

To benefit from this advantage, it must be exploited through cooperation between the Black Sea countries, and also between the countries of the Black Sea region and countries in the neighboring regions: Central and Eastern Europe in the west and South Caucasus and Central Asia in the east. However, as mentioned above, a small percentage of transportation through these regions is by land routes. This is because there are a number of physical and non-physical barriers to the realization of land routes' transit potential. Physical barriers include underdeveloped motorways, railways and related infrastructure. For instance, it is a case where out-of-date rolling-stock is an obstacle in increasing speeds and volumes of transport, where existing roads do not meet international standards, and where border crossing points and logistics centers have limited throughput capacity. Non-physical barriers include difficult permit systems, unreasonable delays at border crossing points, different charges and taxes imposed by regulatory and local authorities, etc. Removal of these barriers is a lively issue, since the time lost because of these barriers does not only result in loss of money and customer trust, but also the loss of the main competitive advantage that land transit

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[467] Evgeny Vinokurov, Murat Dzhadraliyev and Yuriy Shcherbanin, "The EurAsEC Transport Corridors," *MPRA Paper* No. 20908, March 2009, http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/20908/, p.5.

[468] Hulya Zeybek and Muhtesem Kaynak, "What Role for Turkish Ports in the Regional Logistics Supply Chains?" *International Conference on Information Systems, Logistics and Supply Chain, Madison, Wisconsin*, 27.05.2008, http://www.muhtesemkaynak.com/56.pdf.

through the Black Sea (and South Caucasus and Central Asian) regions has over sea transit and other land transit routes.[469]

Estimated growth in demand for transportation globally will be a driving force for the development of existing and new alternative routes; the competitive advantage of land routes through the Black Sea region compared to sea routes, in terms of time and distance, makes the Black Sea region potentially one of those regions that can account for a considerable share of the estimated growth, as well as of current transportation volumes that can be rerouted.

Historical Opportunity: Integration Westwards/Eastwards

Today, as never before, the countries in the Black Sea region have opportunities to use and benefit from the advantage of the region's geostrategic situation between the East and West. Historically, however, that was not the case. The Black Sea region has always been a place of competition between great powers for domination of it and has been a backyard of one power or the other, which caused it to be closed to the outside world for many years. That was the case during the Cold War, when the Black Sea was surrounded by the Soviet Union and its satellites (except Turkey). The Black Sea region, on the eastern side of the Iron Curtain, was largely cut off from neighboring regions. It was only the fundamental geopolitical changes brought by the end of the Cold War and the lifting of the Iron Curtain that led to a new kind of relations in the Black Sea area and opened up the possibility of diversified foreign economic and political relations. Hence, there is now a historical opportunity to link the Black Sea area with the wider geographic areas of the South Caucasus, Central Asia and Eastern and South Eastern Europe, and that is of geostrategic importance "when dealing with political and economic security and stability of the region."[470]

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469 Vinokurov, Dzhadraliyev and Shcherbanin.

470 Mustafa Aydın, "Europe's Next Shore: the Black Sea Region After EU Enlargement," European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) *Occasional Paper*, No.53, 01 June 2004, http://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/detail/article/europes-next-shore-the-black-sea-region/.

Western/European integration has become a top issue in the agendas of the Black Sea countries since the end of the Cold War. The first institutional instance was membership in the Council of Europe. While Greece and Turkey were among the earliest members, Bulgaria and Romania were the first post-communist Black Sea countries that joined the Council of Europe, on May 1992 and October 1993, respectively. They were followed, in 1995, by Moldova (July) and Ukraine (November). The Russian Federation became a member on February 1996 and the most recent Black Sea country to join the Council of Europe was Georgia, on April 1999. This sequence of membership holds true in integration with other western institutions too.

NATO arrived at the Black Sea shortly after the alliance's creation, with Turkey's and Greece's accession in 1952. However, the Black Sea never played a significant role in Cold War conflicts, remaining a peripheral region.[471] Since the end of the Cold War, much has changed. Most of the states in the Black Sea region rapidly expressed an interest in working with NATO through the framework of its "Partnership for Peace" program, and many followed this up with more intensive partnership agendas. Bulgaria and Romania joined the alliance in 2004. Ukraine and Georgia, after cooperation with NATO within the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP), applied for Membership Action Plans (MAPs) in 2008. In Ukraine, although the "NATO membership" goal was excluded from the country's national security strategy in 2010, "European integration" is still part of national security strategy, and co-operation with NATO was not excluded.[472]

Finally important are the relations with the European Union, which achieved the highest point of integration in Europe. The sequence of integration and membership is similar to what we observed in regard to the Council of Europe and NATO. The exception is Turkey, which is still not a member of the EU. For a long time, Turkey has had the status of candidate country. Greece, however, as in the previous cases, became a member of the EU in 1981, long before the other Black Sea countries. The signing of the EU

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[471] Volodymyr Dubovyk, "NATO's Role in the Wider Black Sea Area," *PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo,* No. 11 August 2008, http://ponarseurasia.org/sites/default/files/policy-memos-pdf/pepm_011.pdf.

[472] See, Valentina Pop, "Ukraine Drops Nato Membership Bid," *EU Observer* 04.06.2010, http://euobserver.com/ defence/30212.

accession treaty on 25 April 2005 paved the way for Bulgaria and Romania's full-fledged EU membership on 1st January 2007. The other Black Sea countries, Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia, are not considered to be future members but are cooperating with the EU through different initiatives (Neighborhood Policy, Eastern Partnership). In addition to the improvements in institutional and multilateral relations, Black Sea countries developed their relations on bilateral bases with individual states in Europe such as Germany and with the United States.

The end of the Cold War encouraged the development of relations between the Black Sea countries and eastern neighboring regions like the South Caucasus and also Central Asia. Until then, Turkey and Greece were members of the western world and had no communication with the members of the Eastern Bloc, which is understandable. Interestingly, however, the level of relations between Black Sea socialist satellite states and republics within the Soviet Union were likewise not high. Although these regions were, for a long period, parts of the Soviet Union or Eastern Bloc, all states had their faces turned to Moscow but not to each other. During the soviet period each satellite country, or republic within the Soviet Union, had vertical relations with the center, Moscow.[473] The case of Romania was different; it was pursuing autonomous political and economic policies, detached from the Soviet Union.[474] However, even relations between longtime neighbors Bulgaria and Romania were underdeveloped.[475] COMECON, which was founded in 1949 as an alternative to the Organization for European Economic Co-operation in non-communist Europe and should have fostered economic relations among the socialist states, was inefficient, as well.[476]

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[473] Rovshan Ibrahimov, "Interview," Baku, Azerbaijan, 09.01.2013.

[474] Decebal, "Romania and the Soviet Union 1965-1989," *All Empires History Forum*, http://www.allempires.com/article/index.php?q=Romania_and_the_Soviet_Union_1965-1989.

[475] "Challenges of Cross Border Cooperation in Romania and Bulgaria," *Critical Geography-Wordpress* 15.08.2011, http://criticalgeography.wordpress.com/2011/08/15/challenges-of-cross-border-cooperation-in-romania-and-bulgaria/.

[476] Maria Mureşan, "Romania's Integration in COMECON: The Analysis of a Failure," *The Romanian Economic Journal*, Year XI, No. 30 (4) 2008,

The situation started to change, though very slowly, after the collapse of the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc. Black Sea countries are interested in strengthening relations with South Caucasian and Central Asian countries that are either potential energy sources (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan) or future important energy transit countries (Georgia, Azerbaijan).[477] Turkey has developed strong ties with newly independent Turkic republics of South Caucasus and Central Asia. Turkey, together with Georgia, has established themselves as reliable partners in the transportation of hydrocarbon resources from the Caspian shores. Romania is a strategic partner with Azerbaijan[478] and China, and it has taken significant steps to strengthen its relations with the Central Asian republics, particularly with Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.[479] Romania has held bilateral diplomatic relations with all five Central Asian states for two decades now, both as a sovereign state and as a member of the EU, NATO and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).[480] Also noteworthy is the fact that Turkey and Romania were among the first countries that recognized the independence of the South Caucasian and Central Asian republics after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Although not a thing to exaggerate, it is, at least, what the statesmen in these countries put particular emphasis on during diplomatic visits. Bulgaria, Ukraine and Moldova are also keen to cooperate with South Caucasus and Central Asian countries, especially in regard to energy issues. By no means is the cooperation limited to the energy sphere. Black Sea, South Caucasus and Central Asian countries serve as a natural continuation of each other as the transport corridor between Europe to Asia.

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http://www.rejournal.eu/Portals/0/Arhiva/JE%2030/JE%2030%20-%20Maria%20MURESAN.pdf.

477 See, Krisztina Vida, Zsuzsa Ludvig and Tamás Szigetvári, "Hungary is Looking to the East," *Institute for World Economics of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences* http://www.eu-27watch.org/?q=node/601.

478 Ministry of Foreign Affairs-Romania, http://www.mae.ro/en/node/2186.

479 Georgiana Marin, "Romania and Central Asia," *Policy Brief* 24/03/2013, http://www.fride.org/publication/ 1114/policy-brief, p.1.

480 ibid.

Pipelines to and through the Black Sea Region

The realization of the oil and gas pipeline projects from South Caucasus and Central Asia to/through the Black Sea region is crucial, if not determinant, for the fulfillment of the above discussed comparative advantage of the Black Sea region as a transportation corridor and of the Black Sea countries' goal to diversify their sources of energy supply. However, the Black sea countries' interests do not always overlap with regard to transportation routes. Romania, Bulgaria, Georgia and Ukraine are supporters of the shipment of oil from the Georgian ports to the terminals in Odessa, Constanta and Burgas, and from there to the rest of the Europe.[481] Turkey is against the increased shipping through the Bosporus due to the environmental and security risks and, instead, is interested in oil and gas transportation through its territories to Mediterranean coasts.[482]

The earliest direct pipelines to the Black Sea region from the Caspian Basin were those from Azerbaijan's Caspian shores. The first one was the Baku – Novorossiysk (BN) oil pipeline (also known as the Northern Route Export Pipeline) from the Sangachal Terminal near Baku, going through Russian territories to its Novorossiysk terminal on the Black Sea coast. The construction of the pipeline was completed in 1997, and transportation of oil started. Although it was the first pipeline bringing oil to the Black Sea coasts from an alternative source, it did so by crossing over Russian territories. The first pipeline bringing oil from alternative sources, and also through alternative routes, was the Baku-Supsa (BS) pipeline. Completed in 1998 and inaugurated the following year, BS carries oil from the same Sangachal terminal in Baku to Georgia's Black Sea Terminal of Supsa, bypassing Russia. However, those were early oil transport projects and the capacities of the pipelines were limited. The main export pipeline from Azerbaijan's sector of Caspian is the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline that goes through the Black Sea region, but unlike previous pipelines, not to the Black Sea coasts. It crosses through Georgia and Turkey and reaches Ceyhan port on the Mediterranean coast. The construction of BTC was completed in 2005

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481 Charles King, "Is the Black Sea a Region?" in *TheBlack Sea Region: Cooperation and Security Building*, Oleksandr Pavlëiìuk, Ivanna Klympush-Tsintsadze (eds.) (N.A: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), p.23.

482 ibid.

and the first oil reached Ceyhan terminal the following year. The other pipeline delivering hydrocarbons to the Black Sea from the eastern part of the Caspian region is the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) (a consortium and a pipeline). CPC's construction was completed in 2001, when the first oil shipment also occurred, and two years later its regular operation was in place. It transports oil from Kazakhstan to the Novorossiysk-2 Marine Terminal on Russia's Black Sea coast.

Thus, three (BN, BS, CPC) of the above mentioned pipelines deliver oil to the Black Sea ports of Supsa, in Georgia, and Novorossiysk, in Russia, and the fourth one (BTC) to the port of Ceyhan on Turkey's Mediterranean coasts. From the Black Sea ports the Caspian oil is accessible to all littoral states by tankers. But to reach the rest of the European and global markets, which is important to increase the region's role as a transport corridor, it needs to be carried, by tankers, through the Black Sea and the Turkish straits of Bosporus to the Mediterranean, and from there to international markets. That is the only route to deliver oil beyond the Black Sea littoral states since the necessary pipeline infrastructure is not there.

One of the initiatives, in this regard, was the Odessa-Brody-Plock-Gdansk pipeline project to transport Caspian oil further, from the Black Sea ports of Ukraine to Poland and from there to other countries via European pipeline networks. The idea of creating a new route appeared in Ukraine in the early 1990s. The main goal was to increase the energy security of Ukraine and to strengthen its position as a hydrocarbon transit country. With that purpose, the Pivdenny Marine Oil Terminal was constructed after a presidential decree signed in 1993. The construction of the Odessa-Brody oil pipeline, which was fully financed by Ukraine from its own resources, was completed between 1996 and 2002. But the link to Poland was missing. In 2003, the Odessa-Brody-Plock Oil Transportation Project was declared a Project of Pan-European importance by the European Commission.[483] In a trilateral declaration, Ukraine, Poland and the European Commission supported the

[483] Communication from The Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the "Development of Energy Policy for the Enlarged European Union, Its Neighbors and Partner Countries," 13.05.2003, http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2003:0262:FIN:EN:PDF.

project. In 2004 the state oil pipeline operation companies of Ukraine, Ukrtransnafta, and Poland, PERN Przyjazn SA, established the Sarmatia International Pipeline Company. However, the route, which is planned to transit annually 14 million tons of Caspian oil to Europe, has not been used because of a failure to link the pipeline to Poland and to find oil suppliers. Hence, Ukraine had to accept a Russian proposal to use the pipeline in the reverse direction to transport Russian oil to Black Sea coasts.

Since then, Ukraine has tried to restore the pipeline's originally planned function. In 2006 negotiations were conducted to export Kazakhstan's oil from Black Sea further, to Europe (as mentioned above, Kazakhstan's oil crosses Russian territories via the CPC pipeline before it reaches the Black Sea coasts). However, Russia blocked this, laying down the condition that all oil volumes reaching the Black Sea from Kazakhstan over Russia have to be allocated to export routes other than the Odessa-Brody pipeline.[484] Still another attempt was to export Azerbaijani oil. In 2007 at the Energy Summit in Krakow, in joint Communiqué, the Presidents of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Lithuania, Poland, Ukraine and the special representative of the President of Kazakhstan declared support for the Project. The energy companies of Azerbaijan (SOCAR), Georgia (GOGC) and Lithuania (Klaipedos Nafta) joined the Sarmatia shareholders. However, at this time, too, no practical steps were taken for the realization of the original purposes of the project, to ship Caspian oil from the Black Sea to Europe. In 2013, the EU gave consent for assistance in the form of 120 million Euros for the completion of the pipeline linking Odessa-Brody to the Polish city of Plock. However, getting EU assistance needs the written consent of all EU member states to finance the project, since the EU aid covers only 30% of the expenses for the implementation of the project. The other condition is completion of the pipeline construction by the end of 2015. Without these guarantees, Sarmatia will not be able to apply to the European Commission for assistance, and 2013 is the last year to apply.[485] That is why Ukraine is seeking to encourage

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[484] Vladimir Socor, "Odessa-Brody-Poland Oil Transport Project Shelved Indefinitely," *Center for Transatlantic Relations-John Hopkins University*, http://transatlantic.sais-jhu.edu/transatlantic-topics/Articles/energy-security/energy/odessa-brody-poland_oil.pdf.

[485] "Ukraine Initiates Multilateral Negotiations on Odessa-Brody-Plock Project-Sarmatia Head," *UKRinform* 01.06.2013,

multilateral negotiations and sign an intergovernmental agreement between participating countries: Azerbaijan, Georgia, Ukraine, Poland and Lithuania.

As regards natural gas pipelines to the Black Sea region from the Caspian region, it took much longer for them to be built than the oil pipelines. Until 2006, only Ukraine was importing gas, from Turkmenistan, but via the Russian pipeline systems.[486] The first direct gas pipeline to the Black Sea region was the South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP) (also known as the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum Pipeline, BTE) that carries gas from Azerbaijan's Shahdeniz field in the Caspian to Georgia and Turkey. In 2006, its construction was completed and the first gas deliveries took place. Since its completion, Azerbaijan has become the major supplier of gas to Georgia. Only 10% of Georgia's consumption is met by Russia now, which it takes as a transit fee for the transportation of gas from Russia to Armenia over its territories. Georgia also established itself as an important transit country. Following the oil pipeline BTC (see above), the gas pipeline (SCP) has now reached Turkey by crossing over Georgian territories. It has also contributed significantly to Turkey's diversification of energy supply sources and delivers annually 6 billion m^3 of gas. Greece had also been importing about 700000 m^3 of Azerbaijani gas, annually, until 2012. In the first years, Turkey was re-exporting Azerbaijani gas to Greece. In 2011, Greece started to purchase gas on a direct purchase contract with Azerbaijan.[487] With the development of the Shahdeniz-2 field in Azerbaijan, the volume of deliveries via this route will increase. Turkey's imports will double with another 6 billion m^3, Greece can restore its imports and, though the volume is not determined, it is expected to be increased. And mostly importantly in the development of Shahdeniz-2, after production starts the number of importers will increase, and include other Black Sea countries and countries in the neighboring regions. However,

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http://www.ukrinform.ua/eng/news/ukraine_initiates_multilateral_negotiations_on_odessa_brody_ plock_project___sarmatia_head_304643.

[486] Peter Leonard, "Ukraine, Turkmenistan Agree Tentative Gas Deal, Including Plans for Onward Sales to Europe," *Associated Press*, 2013, http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/02/13/ukraine-turkmenistan-agree-tentative-gas-deal-including-plans-for-onward-sales/.

[487] See, "Greece to Buy Gas Direct from Azerbaijan," *ICIS* 02.02.2011, http://www.icis.com/heren/articles/2011/02/02/9431887/greece-to-buy-gas-direct-from-azerbaijan.html.

for this to be realized new pipeline infrastructures in the Black Sea region need to be constructed and the existing ones improved. The existing SCP delivers gas only as far as Turkey's Erzurum city and its capacity is limited (8.8 billion m^3).[488] It is expected that gas transmission capacity in the existing SCP pipeline system will be increased by an additional 16 billion m^3 to create a total system capacity of 23 billion m^3.[489] Additionally, to transport natural gas from Turkey onwards, it is necessary for new pipelines to be built as a continuation of the SCP pipeline.

The first initiative to this end was the Nabucco pipeline project, which was the most discussed, debated, and written about since 2002 until it was recently ceased (June 2013). It was planned to start in Turkey as a continuation of the above-mentioned SCP, in Turkey, and to reach the Baumgarten gas transmission system in Austria, crossing through the territories of Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary. The idea was to supply the Black Sea region and, crossing through it, the other countries in Central and Eastern Europe. If realized, it would deliver gas from alternative sources (mainly Central Asia, but it is planned for Azerbaijan to contribute as well) and through alternative routes (bypassing Russia). Preparations started in 2002, when the first talks took place between Austria's OMV and Turkey's BOTAŞ, and later that year were joined by three other companies: MOL Group of Hungary, Bulgargaz of Bulgaria, and Transgaz of Romania. These five companies established a joint venture in 2005. The following year, RWE Company of Germany joined the venture. Since the idea came to the fore, feasibility studies have been conducted, many documents signed (protocols, memorandums of understanding, intergovernmental agreements, etc.), and bilateral and multilateral meetings and negotiations held, but with no tangible results. There is more than one reason for this failure. Central Asian gas needs to pass through the Caspian Sea first, in order to reach Azerbaijan and then be delivered via the SCP pipeline to the planned starting point of the Nabucco pipeline in Turkey. To cross the Caspian, a new

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488 See, Anthea Pitt, "Shah Deniz Taps Primed," *Upstream* 14.09.2006, http://www.upstreamonline.com/live/ article1128141.ece.

489 "South Caucasus Pipeline Expansion Project, Georgia – Environmental and Social Impact Assessment," *South Caucasus Pipeline Company*, May, 2012, http://www.bp.com/sectiongenericarticle.do?categoryId=9041506 &contentId=7074946.

pipeline called the Trans-Caspian pipeline needs to be built. Nabucco Consortium members have largely ignored the realization of this project and left it to the Caspian states (Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan) to deal with. Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan have been reluctant to realize the project on their own due to geopolitical concerns, since political guarantees were not provided against Russia's and Iran's opposition.[490] Furthermore, the source of finance for the realization of the Nabucco pipeline was itself not clear. The EU was very reluctant to contribute significantly to the realization of the multibillion project and the financial conditions of neither Nabucco Consortium member companies nor the countries they represented let them contribute significantly. Last but not least, there were disagreements about the price, volume and transit fees of the transported gas to and through Turkey, since Turkey was looking to be a re-exporter of gas, but not only a transit country.

Following these difficulties the focuses shifted. Although it became clear that, at least in the short term, Central Asian gas will not reach and pass through the Black Sea region; hopes to import gas from Azerbaijan still remained. Unlike the central Asian countries that were transporting their gas through Russia, Azerbaijan was in need of new transport projects to be able to tap its Shahdeniz-2 gas field. Thus, ideas about the realization of alternative and smaller-scale projects to bring gas from Azerbaijan to the Black Sea countries gained momentum. The White Stream project was one of them. It was first put forward in 2005 by Ukraine, which was struggling to cease its dependence on Russia. Later Romania, Poland and Lithuania supported the project. It was planned to build a pipeline under the Black Sea, linking Georgia with Ukraine and Romania. In 2008, the EU declared White Stream a 'Flagship Project'.[491] Discussions were activated when the focus shifted to alternative and small-scale projects as the Nabucco project was delayed. However, the transportation of LNG (or CNG) via ships over the Black Sea was preferred, rather than via a pipeline under the Black Sea.[492]

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[490] See, http://www.1news.az/authors/ribrahimov/20120210042404884.html.

[491] Roberto Pirani, "White Stream™: A Priority Project of the EU and Integral Component of the Southern Gas Corridor," *OSCE – Ashgabat*, May 2010, http://www.osce.org/ashgabat/67922.

[492] Ariz Hüseynov, "*AGR*I - Cənub Qaz Dəhlizindəki Layihələrdən Biri Kimi: Tərəflər, Maraqlar, Mövqelər və İmkanlar," *Academic View*, June 2013,

Therefore, in 2010, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Romania and Hungary agreed on the realization of the AGRI project, which considers the transportation of gas from Azerbaijan through Georgia and the Black Sea to Romania, and then further to Hungary and other countries.[493] The gas will be transported via an expanded South Caucasus Pipeline up unto Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia, and through a new pipeline to the LNG Terminal, which is planned to be built on the Black Sea coast. From the terminal, liquefied gas will be carried, by ships, to the Constanta port of Romania, where a regasification plant will be built. After it is regasified, it will be transported via the existing pipeline network of Romania and via the interconnector Arad-Szeged to Hungary. Within the project, there is consideration of building two terminals, one in a Georgian port (Poti or Kulevi) and the other in a Romanian port (Constanta), on the coasts of the Black Sea. Along with Romania and Hungary, Bulgaria, Ukraine and Serbia have also expressed a desire to purchase gas within the AGRI project. What is more, Turkmenistan is seeking to join the project. Turkmenistan is looking for ways to export LNG gas through the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan and via railroad to Georgia's Black Sea coast, from where it can be delivered to Romanian ports.[494] The realization of the project is being delayed, and has still not started. However, it continues to exist, although not as an alternative but rather as a complementary option for gas transportation to the Black Sea region. However, when realized, this project, if only for its limited capacity, would not be the main export route.

Thereafter, in 2011, Azerbaijan agreed with Turkey about the construction of the Trans-Anatolian pipeline (TANAP) as a main export route, through the territories of Turkey to its European borders. On 26 June 2012, Azerbaijan and Turkey signed a binding intergovernmental agreement

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http://academicviews.qu.edu.az/az/articles/%E2%80%9CAGRI%E2%80%9D---C%C9%99nub-Qaz-D%C9%99hlizind%C9%99ki-Layih%C9%99l%C9%99rd%C9%99n-Biri-Kimi%3A-T%C9%99r%C9%99fl%C9%99r%2C-Maraqlar%2C-M%C3%B6vqel%C9%99r-v%C9%99-%C4% B0mkanlar-83.html.

493 ibid.

494 H. Hasanov, "Turkmenistan Studies Possibility of Liquefied Gas Export through Azerbaijan," *Trend*, 08.08.2012, http://en.trend.az/capital/energy/2054555.html.

on the pipeline. Construction of the pipeline is planned to start in 2014 and be completed by 2018.[495] 2018 is the date when production from the Shahdeniz-2 field is expected to start. However, as said, the TANAP pipeline will stretch only as far as Turkish borders, and to carry the gas from there onwards new pipelines will be needed. To this end, four initial pipeline projects, in two directions, were proposed: the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP); the Interconnector Turkey-Greece-Italy (ITGI); the Nabucco West (NW), and the South Eastern Europe Pipeline (SEEP). In the western direction, TAP was designed to carry gas from the Turkish-Greek borders to Italy through Greece, Albania and the Adriatic Sea; ITGI was planned to carry gas in the same direction and link Turkey, Greece and Italy, but not crossing through Albania. In the northern direction, NW (an updated version of the above-mentioned original Nabucco project) was proposed. The differences were: NW was shorter and planned to start from the Turkish-Bulgarian borders (but follow the same route, i.e. Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Austria); its capacity was reduced from 31 billion m^3 to 10 billion m^3 (later expandable to 20 billion m^3); and it was planned to transport Azerbaijani gas, not Central Asian. The second option in the northern direction was SEEP, which was meant to carry gas through the same countries but not via direct pipeline: it was planned to use the existing pipeline networks of the countries and interconnectors. In February of 2012, ITGI, and later that year in June SEEP, lost their bids in a competition to transport Azerbaijani gas from Turkey onwards. Finally, in June 2013, it became clear that TAP was the winner against Nabucco West.[496] Taking into account all existing and planned gas pipelines, gas from the Shahdeniz-2 field of Azerbaijan will be transported to Georgia and Turkey via the expanded SCP pipeline, through Turkish

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[495] Vladimir Socor, "Aliyev, Erdogan Sign Inter-Governmental Agreement on Trans-Anatolia Gas Pipeline to Europe," *Eurasia Daily Monitor,* Volume: 9 Issue: 122, June 27.06.2012, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=39545&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=27&cHash=2e9f386bf569ef7ea670cde5a5c3784c.

[496] "BP Confirms TAP to Carry Azeri Gas to Europe," http://www.todayszaman.com/news-319461-bp-confirms-tap-to-carry-azeri-gas-to-europe.html.

territories to its Turkish-Greek borders via the planned TANAP pipeline, and from there to Greece, Albania and Italy via the TAP pipeline.

In conclusion, Black sea countries, along with having a chance to diversify their energy imports, will also gain economically and strategically from the transit of these resources through their territories further onto other parts of Europe. These projects will be among the largest sources of foreign investment in the respective countries and provide a major source of revenue. The construction of the pipelines will stimulate employment in a range of direct and indirect industries, including manufacturing and utilities, transport, communications, and financial and business services. It will also contribute to the development of roads and other infrastructure.[497] In short, this will help to materialize the region's geostrategic positioning as a transport corridor, its main competitive advantage.

Hence, the gain of Black Sea countries from the realization of these projects will be twofold. On the one hand, they will have the conditions to diversify sources of imports and decrease dependency on one source. On the other hand, they will benefit in terms of economic revenues and political dividends. Economically, realization of the capital-intensive pipeline projects will mean the inflow of significant amount of investments to the region. Furthermore, the countries will receive revenue in the form of fees for the transit of oil and natural gas through their territories. Job creation will be another positive effect of these developments and will serve to strengthen social and economic stability in the region. Politically, the Black Sea countries will increase their geostrategic importance in their relations with both producer and consumer countries. Henceforth, the Black Sea region will firmly establish itself as a transport corridor.

European Initiatives

TRACECA – Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia

The first EU initiative towards exploitation of the region's competitive advantage was the TRACECA Program, aimed at "supporting the political

[497] "Government of Albania and TAP finalize Host Government Agreement," *TAP, Media Release*, 05.04.2013, http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/content/10907/TAPipeline%205_04_2013.pdf.

and economic development in Black Sea Region, Caucasus and Central Asia by means of improvement of the international transport"[498]. It was also considered as "an opportunity for participant countries to expand their economic ties with Europe and integrate more closely amongst themselves in the sphere of transport"[499].

The Program was initiated at the Conference in Brussels, in May 1993. Initial signatories of the TRACECA were only South Caucasian and Central Asian countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Later, however, the Black Sea countries started to join the program: Ukraine and Moldova in 1996, and Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey in 2000. Thus, the Black sea countries became incorporated into the TRACECA program along with the South Caucasus and Central Asian countries. The project drew the attention of other international actors too. At an International Summit in Baku in September 1998, along with TRACECA member states, 32 other states expressed their interest in restoring the Silk Road—including USA, UK, France, Germany, China, Japan, India, Mongolia, and Turkey (not a signatory then).That makes evident that TRACECA is not only important for the regional states' exports and imports and that the transport route is of intercontinental importance. It includes the Dostyk (Kazakhstan) – Tashkent (Uzbekistan) – Ashgabad (Turkmenistan) – Turkmenbashi (Turkmenistan) – Baku (Azerbaijan) – Tbilisi (Georgia) – Poti (Georgian port on Black Sea coast) route, with sea ferry connections to the ports of Ilyichevsk (Ukraine), Varna (Bulgaria), Constanta (Romania) and Istanbul (Turkey). The ultimate goal was to link a railway from the Chinese port of Lianyungang on the Yellow Sea to this route, with access to Georgian Black Sea ports as well as to Turkey's railroad

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498 "TRACECA Interested in Development of Central Asian Logistical Transport Centers, Chains," *HighBeam Research*, 19.07.2013, http://www.highbeam.com.

499 Alexandros Petersen, "Integration in Energy and Transport Amongst Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey," PhD Thesis, The London School of Economics and Political Science, http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/532/1/Petersen_Integration%20in%20Energy%20and%20Transport%20Amongst%20Azerbaijan%20Georgia%20and%20Turkey.pdf.

network and the Marmara Tunnel under the Bosporus, and linking to Western European transport networks.[500]

The Program initially was commenced and funded by the EU through the TACIS program. However, its financial support was limited. The EU financed 62 technical assistance projects worth 105 million Euros and 14 investment projects worth 52 million Euros.[501] To compare, the EU allocated 106 million Euros for the construction of only one bridge (not a TRACEA project) between Bulgaria and Romania.[502] Especially since early 2000, the EU began to reduce financial support to the program, leaving greater financial responsibilities to TRACECA member states in funding the activities of the permanent secretariat and its operations.[503] Since 2009, the secretariat has been entirely financed by member countries.

TRACECA countries signed a number of documents on particular benefits and reduced tariffs to increase the competitiveness of the route. For instance, parties agreed on a 50% discount on rail freight and ferry transportation of empty wagons and, in addition to this, taxes and fees on transit cargoes were raised and each state took measures to enhance the safety of passengers, cargoes, carriers and vehicles.[504] However, realization of the route is far from at its full capacity. At the moment, the route is mainly used to transport oil and oil products from Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, and cotton and grain from Uzbekistan, to the Black Sea coasts. At the Port of Poti, in Georgia, a grain terminal with an annual capacity of 1.5 million tons, a container terminal with an annual capacity of 200 thousand TEUs, and large storage facilities are under construction. The potential capacity of the Batumi – Poti – Ilyichevsk ferry line is estimated to be 15-20 million tons

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500 ibid.

501 "Caucasus/Central Asia," *EU Website*, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/energy_transport/international/regional/caucasus_central_asia/baku/transport_en.html.

502 "Bulgaria-Romania New Danube Bridge Named 'New Europe'," *Novinite.com* 15.06.2013, http://www. novinite.com/view_news.php?id=151275.

503 Petersen.

504 Emerson and Vinokurov.

annually. However, its annual transportation capacity at the moment is no higher than 0.9 million tons (using two ferries).[505]

Still, the volume of trade among TRACECA member countries and between TRACECA member countries and the EU have risen since the initiation of the project.[506] Moreover, connectivity is being improved between Central Asian countries and China's booming economy that makes the route attractive for East-West transportation. With 13 members and three observer countries potentially interested in joining the program, TRACECA's enlargement may eventually include Afghanistan. The US is interested in involving the Afghanistan and Pakistan in the transport corridor for the region's development and stability in the post-2014 withdrawal of US troops from the region. TRACECA's secretariat also plans to link the route with the EU's Trans-European Networks (TENs) program. Thus, from the perspective of the Black Sea region, the TRACECA is the first significant initiative to improve the region's links with Europe in the west and South Caucasus and Asia in the East, although not determinant and with shortfalls.

Pan-European Transport Corridors and Areas

The EU has developed the concepts of Pan-European Transport Corridors and Transport Areas, linking, among other regions, the Black Sea region to the rest of Europe. The EU's goal was to achieve the improvement and integration of its own transportation systems through establishment of transport networks extending to other European countries. Pan-European Transport Corridors and Transport Areas evolved at Crete (1994) and Helsinki (1997) Pan-European Transport Conferences.[507]

These development corridors are different from the Trans-European Transport Networks, which was a European Union project and included all major established routes within the EU borders before the enlargement.

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505 ibid.

506 Alena Moroz, "The TRACECA Train Is Still Here: Boarding Continues," *Region Plus*, http://www.regionplus. az/en/articles/view/39.

507 N. Güler, "Black Sea Maritime Transport Corridors in Relation with EU Projects," in *Maritime Heritage and Modern Ports*, R. Marcet et al (eds.), http://library.witpress.com/pages/PaperInfo.asp?PaperID=14724, p. 296.

However, most of the countries involved in the Pan-European Transport Corridors and Transport Areas are now members of the EU, which is why there are proposals to combine the two systems. The pan-European transport corridors and areas form the basis for linking the Trans-European Transport Networks with the Central and Eastern European states. They are a further-developed form of the Western European transport network's major transport arteries.

In certain areas, particularly those adjacent or linked to marine basins, it has been revealed that the corridor concept does not adequately meet needs. Therefore, the more extensive approach of pan-European transport areas were defined, which reflect the complex structure of the transport requirements in these regions.[508]

Thus, ten multimodal Pan European Transport Corridors and four Transport Areas have been identified. Four of the corridors are related to the Black Sea region. First, Corridor IV, which consists of more than 3600 km of road and 4340 km of railways, is one of the most important east-west corridors. The corridor crosses over from Germany to Romania, Greece and Turkey, via Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Austria and Bulgaria. Second, Corridor VII (the Danube) passes through 11 countries. The use of the Danube river route, together with upgraded transport via Black Sea ports, can be significant. Third, Corridor VIII connects the Black Sea and the Adriatic. Its development is considered significant for the economic development of the countries involved. Fourth, Corridor IX is the longest of the Pan European Transport Corridors, from Helsinki (Finland) to Bulgaria and Greece, with a branch to Odessa (Ukraine); it is a historic European Corridor, serving both the Mediterranean and the Black Sea basins, with high freight flows, in a north-south direction.

In regard to pan-European transport areas, the EU defined four of them: sea basins of the Mediterranean; Black Sea; Adriatic/Ionic seas; and the area of the Barents sea/the European part of the Arctic.

The Black Sea Pan-European Transport Area, which is of interest to the paper, aims to link the coastal countries of the Black Sea: with each other,

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[508] See, http://www.bmvbs.de/SharedDocs/EN/Artikel/IR/pan-european-transport-corridors-and-transport-areas. html?linkToOverview=js.

with the Central and Eastern European countries through the Pan-European Transport Corridors, with the Caucasian Isthmus, towards Central Asia, and also with the Mediterranean Pan-European Transport Area.[509]

For those purposes A Memorandum of Understanding on the development of the Black Sea Pan-European Transport Area has been signed, "to promote the international transport of passengers and goods in a regionally integrated multi-modal transport network". The completion of maps for each country and a regional map of The Black Sea Pan-European Transport Area has been started.[510]

The EU Strategy for the Danube Region

Another initiative by the EU is the Danube Region Strategy (EUSDR) that encompasses, among other things, the development of the water, rail, road and air ways and sustainable energy in the areas around the Danube. The Strategy covers the areas stretching from the Black Forest (Germany) to the Black Sea.

The idea to develop a strategy similar to the other regional strategies by the EU, such as the Baltic Sea or Mediterranean Strategies, was put forward by Germany, which considers the Danube region important for its economic interests.[511] Romania and Austria were the active supporters and promoters of the strategy among the EU Member States and third countries in the Danube basin.[512] In 2009, the European Council accepted the initiative and asked the European Commission to develop a strategy for the Danube region. Final approval of the European Commission's document by the European Council came in 2011, during the presidency of Hungary (which as a Danube region country had an interest in the Strategy) in the Council. However, it should be noted that the EUSDR does not provide funding but seeks, instead, coordination between existing national, bilateral and multilateral policies and

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509 Güler.

510 Güler.

511 See, "The Danube Strategy," *German-Foreign-Policy.com* 01.06.2010, http://www.german-foreign-policy. com/en/fulltext/56309.

512 "EU Strategy for the Danube Region," Ministry of Foreign Affairs-Romania, http://www.mae.ro/en/node/ 2136.

initiatives taking place across the Region and efficient use of existing funding mechanisms.

That initiative is important for the Black Sea region in that it improves the connection of the region with Western Europe through Central and Eastern Europe. Although it does not cover all Black sea countries, Romania and Bulgaria are members and Ukraine and Moldova have the status of **Neighborhood Countries** of the Danube Region. The other Black Sea countries can still develop their connectivity with European countries if they improve their connectivity to the Black Sea countries of the Danube Strategy. Moreover, from the Danube Strategy countries, Austria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Germany, Slovakia are Observer Nations and Hungary, Montenegro and Slovenia are Sectoral Dialogue Partner Countries in the organization for the Black Sea Economic Cooperation. Hence, as the Danube is a natural continuation of the Black Sea, the projects in the Danube region must be seen as a continuation of the projects around the Black Sea.

The Danube Strategy covers a wide range of issues divided into **4 pillars** and **11 priority areas** (see image below). However, important, for the purpose of this paper, is the first pillar of the strategy, Connecting the Region, and especially the priority areas of Mobility and multimodality, and Sustainable energy.

The priority area 'Mobility and multimodality' aims: first, "to improve mobility and inter-modality of inland waterways"; and second, "to improve mobility and inter-modality - rail, road and air." The 'waterways' section is coordinated by Romania and Austria. Projects cover waterway infrastructure and management, ports and freight transport, fleet modernization, river information services, education and jobs. The 'Rail, road and air' section is coordinated by Slovenia and Serbia. Under these sections EUSDR has targets, among others, to: increase the cargo transport on the river by 20% by 2020 compared to 2010; establish waterway infrastructure management by 2015; develop multimodal terminals at Danube ports and to connect inland waterways with rail and road transport by 2020; reduce travel times for competitive railway passenger connections between major cities; implement 4 Rail Freight Corridors crossing the Danube Region within 3 or 5 years and possibly with inclusion of a new corridor connecting the EU and non-EU member states' railway networks.

The priority area' Sustainable energy' is coordinated by Hungary and the Czech Republic. The goal under this priority area is to contribute to the energy security of the region through the development of energy infrastructure that includes gas storage facilities, interconnectors, and transmission systems. It also seeks the development of the energy market in the region. Energy efficiency and renewable energy are also a focus of concern in the Danube strategy for sustainable energy. However, projects realized under the priority area lag behind the stated ambitions in the strategy, including projects such as improvement of the power transmission system in Bulgaria and effective use of geothermal sources.

Priority projects for Bulgaria are: modernization of the railway line Vidin-Sofia-Kulata, which is part of the TINA network and the Trans-European Transport Corridor IV; improvement of navigation along the River Danube; and construction of the Struma motorway to the borders of Greece, which is part of the Pan-European Corridor IV and is also part of E79, which runs from Miskolc (Hungary) to Thessaloniki (Greece), via the Romanian cities of Deva and Craiova. As for Romania, the priority projects include, among many: building the Danube-Bucharest canal and the Budapest-Bucharest-Constanta speed rail line; retooling the Danube ports of Romania; and building two new road bridges over the Danube to Bulgaria. The construction of one of these bridges, named New Europe Bridge, has recently been completed. The inaugural opening of the bridge took place in June 2013. Linking Bulgaria and Romania and, in particular, the neighboring regions of Vidin and Calafat, New Europe Bridge is only the second bridge on the 630 km Romanian-Bulgarian border along the Danube. The only other existing bridge, which connects Ruse and Giurgiu regions, was completed in 1954.

The bridge is of strategic importance for the EU, for which it allocated €106 million. It is part of the Pan-European transport corridor IV and will serve as a key link stretching from Northern Europe, the Baltics, through Central Europe, Romania and Bulgaria, and to Greece. Additionally, it will reduce, significantly, the travel time for passengers and freight between South East Europe, Turkey and Central Europe. It is expected to reach its full potential when linked with upgraded rail and road networks.

Furthermore, on the 11th of October 2012, Romania and Bulgaria signed a 'Memorandum of Understanding on setting up an Inter-ministerial

Committee for sustainable development of inland waterway transport' on the common sector of the Danube. The Committee works on the adoption of an action plan for common projects on the Danube and revision of the legal framework to this end.

BSEC Initiatives: The Black Sea Ring Highway

Members of the BSEC Organization, Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Turkey and Ukraine have started to pay more attention to transport facilitation in the Black Sea region in the last decade. In 2002, in Kyiv, Ukraine, the member states signed The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Facilitation of Road Transport of Goods in the BSEC Region, which entered into force on 20 July 2006. It was similar to a memorandum signed by the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI) countries on the facilitation of international road transport of goods in the SECI region in 1999, in Athens.[513]

According to the BSEC MoU, "the signatory governments undertake to facilitate road transport by gradual liberalization of the road transport market, simplification of procedures, harmonization of charges and facilitation of professional driver visas".[514] With this regard, for implementation of this MoU the member states set up a Steering Committee, which held its first meeting in Istanbul on March 2007.

On 19 April 2007, the BSEC governments signed another, more concrete BSEC MoU on Coordinated Development of the Black Sea Ring Highway, in Belgrade, Serbia, and soon after, it entered into force, on November 1 2008. The Black Sea Ring Highway project anticipates a ring highway system nearly 7700 km long and four-lane that links all BSEC member states with

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[513] "Memorandum of Understanding on the Facilitation of International Road Transport of Goods in the SECI Region," *Southeast European Cooperative Initiative*, http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/trans/old_new_tir/seci/documents/mou-fin.pdf.

[514] "The Black Sea Ring Highway Caravan Delivers," *International Road Transportation Union*, http://www.iru-nelti.org/index/en_bsc_about_index.

each other. It makes a circle around the Black Sea with vertical access to Azerbaijan, Serbia and Albania (which are also BSEC members).The main goal of the project is to develop "an international road artery, through maintenance, reconstruction, rehabilitation, upgrading and construction of non-existing connections of the main and secondary road infrastructure".[515] It has been initially decided, in the MoU, that the Ring Highway will cross through the subsequent cities: Tirana (Albania); Yerevan (Armenia); Baku (Azerbaijan); Haskovo, Sofia (Bulgaria); Batumi, Poti (Georgia); Alexandroupolis, Komotini (Greece); Chisinau (Moldova); Bucharest, Constantza (Romania); Novorossiysk, Rostov-on-Don, Taganrog (Russia); Nish, Belgrade (Serbia); Edirne, Samsun, Trabzon, Istanbul (Turkey); Mariupol, Melitopol, Odessa (Ukraine).[516] BSRH will also strengthen links among the EU, Black Sea, South Caucasus and Asian countries. It will promote co-operation in the development of a multimodal transport infrastructure that will serve to have adequate road interconnections with the Trans-European, Pan-European, and Euro-Asian Transport Networks.

Thereafter, in 2007, the BSEC Secretary General initiated the Black Sea Ring Highway Caravan. It was supported by the BSEC member states and organized International Road Transport Union (IRU) and the Union of Road Transport Associations in the BSEC Region (BSEC-URTA) in cooperation with the national road transport associations of member states. 12 trucks, one from each of the BSEC member countries, carried goods through the territories of the member countries along a 7500 km route. The Caravan aimed: to promote the BSRH, and the BSEC organization itself, to people living in the Black Sea region; and to collect necessary information to contribute to the evaluation of the existing physical and nonphysical obstacles within and between the BSEC countries and present proposals for their improvements.

So far, Turkey has completed, unilaterally, the construction of the section of the highway in its territories that stretches from its eastern borders with Georgia to its western borders with Bulgaria. Greece has also finished

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[515] Apostolos Goulas, "The Black Sea Ring Highway," http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/trans/doc/2009/wp5/ECE-TRANS-WP5-GE2-03-pres05e.pdf.

[516] ibid.

construction of the highway in its territories: the Egnatia highway links the Ionian Sea coasts of Greece with its borders with Turkey.

Two bodies were created to institutionalize the realization of the project: the Steering Committee; and Joint Permanent Technical Secretariat. The secretariat is managed by Egnatia Odos, the leading public company of Greece. In September 2011 the Steering Committee included in the future project of the Master Plan the idea of developing the Model Highway along the Black Sea Ring Highway sections. It decided to cooperate with IRU in conducting the feasibility study on the Model Highway Initiative project. This Initiative targets the development of modern highways and the improvement of supplementary road infrastructure to the highest European standards. It was proposed on September 2011 in Yalta, Ukraine, and on October of that year in Batumi, Georgia, and IRU was proposed to function as the secretariat on the development of the project. On March 2012 in Greece, the BSEC, IRU and Black Sea Trade and Development Bank (BSTDB) held a Workshop on Investment, Financial and Technical issues of the Model Highway Initiative and its implementation in the Black Sea Ring Highway sections.

The third memorandum of understanding relating to the development of transport in the region is the Development of the Motorways of the Sea in the BSEC region. It is directed at strengthening the maritime links among the ports of the BSEC member states. Activities within this project include the upgrading of port facilities, identification of projects of common interest and securing free and fair competition in international shipping.

Thus, the three major BSEC transport-related memorandums of understanding—on the Development of the Black Sea Ring Highway project, on the development of the Motorways of the Sea and Facilitation of Road Transport of Goods in the BSEC region—are expected to increase intra-BSEC trade as well as tourism, infrastructure and transport investments and economic prosperity among the countries of the region. It will also contribute to linking the Black Sea region with neighboring regions.

Regional Initiatives: Railroads To and Through the Black Sea Region

Baku-Tbilisi-Kars Railway Project

Important in this regard is the other railway project, Baku-Tbilisi-Kars (BTK), linking Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey. Further, it can have access to European railway networks through the Turkish railway system and Marmaray undersea rail tunnel under the Bosphorus strait, which is planned to be completed by the end of 2013.The goods carried via this route can have access to the abovementioned Viking railroad and the other railroads as well, linking Black Sea countries with other parts of the Europe. The idea of the project has been discussed since 1993 but, because of political and economic instabilities in the South Caucasus and lack of funding, it became impossible to realize the project. In 2005, however, the presidents of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey once again invoked the idea of building the railway line. The construction of the railway commenced in 2007 and it is scheduled for completion by the end of 2013.

In total, 105 kilometers of new line will be built to link Turkey and Georgia, with 76 kilometers within Turkey and 29 kilometers in Georgia. The railway line between Georgia and Azerbaijan already exists and will be modernized only. Its total length will be 826 kilometers and it will be able to transport in a year 1 million passengers and 6.5 million tons of freight during the first stage. In the following years, its capacity is planned to reach 3 million passengers and over 15 million tons of freight.

Actually, BTK can be considered as a missing link with respect to the railroads between the Black Sea and Caspian regions (South Caucasus and Central Asia), and if looking more broadly, between Europe and Asia. A railway connection between Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey, with a further European connection, could dramatically increase the flow of goods between Europe and China through the Black Sea and South Caucasus and via the Caspian Sea ferry connection to Central Asia, thereby creating the opportunity to ship rail cars from Europe all the way to China. For that to happen, realization of the related projects is important. In the east, it is important to develop projects connecting the railway system of Kazakhstan to China and of Turkey with Europe, which are currently underway.

Taking into account the rapid development in the western regions of China, with a population of 300 million and multibillion dollars of investment in the last few years, the possibility of having access to this region

is potentially a very attractive opportunity for the producers and service providers in Europe.[517]

Marmaray Project

The Marmaray project includes the construction of a 13.6 kilometers undersea rail tunnel under the Bosporus strait and upgrading of 63 kilometers overland railroads, as a continuation of the undersea rail tunnel, along the Sea of Marmara from Halkali (on European side) to Gebze (on the Asian side).[518] Upon completion, it will be the deepest undersea immersed tube tunnel in the world.[519] The tunnel will have three tracks. Two of the tracks will serve as a high capacity commuter rail system and the third one will serve for intercity passenger and freight trains between Asian and European continents.[520] The planned capacity of the lines is 75, 000 passengers per hour in each direction.[521]

The constructions started in 2004 and, initially, was planned to be completed in 2009. But after multiple delays the opening ceremony is expected on 29 October 2013, the date of the 90th anniversary of the Turkish Republic.[522] It will be the inauguration of the rail tunnel and the completion of the overland links to Halkali and Gebze is planned for later dates. The delays in the completion of the tunnel are related mainly with the discovery of Byzantine-era archaeological discoveries on the proposed site of the

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517 Mamuka Tsereteli, "The Black Sea/Caspian Region in Europe's Economic and Energy Security," *CACI-SRSP Silk Road Papers*, p. 53.

518 See, *Marmaray Website*, http://www.marmaray.com/html/gen_obj.html.

519 Vahan Tanal, "World's Deepest Immersed Tube Crossing," *DPC: Dredging & Port Construction* October 2005, http://connection.ebscohost.com/c/articles/18667639/worlds-deepest-immersed-tube-crossing, p31.

520 See, http://www.uic.org/com/article/update-on-the-marmara-project?page=thickbox_enews.

521 "Rails under the Bosporus," http://www.railwaygazette.com/news/single-view/view/rails-under-the-bosporus.html.

522 See, http://www.railway-technology.com/projects/marmaray/.

European tunnel terminal.[523]The total cost of the project is estimated at approximately 4.6 billion USD, which includes costs such as engineering and consulting services, land acquisitions, archaeological excavations, etc.[524]A major part of financial support for the project was provided by The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and the European Investment Bank.[525]

The project is important from the perspectives of the development and realization of the transport capacities of Turkey and the Black Sea region, as a whole, and will contribute to the consolidation of transport connections between Asia and Europe. After the completion of two other projects integrated with the Marmaray Project, Ankara-Istanbul high speed line and Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway projects, it will be possible to have a fast, economic and seamless railway connection starting in London, in the west, and extending to China, in the east. It will be possible to carry out non-stop block train transport between east and west and freight coming from all along Kazakhstan and from the north of China will arrive in Europe through the shortest and fastest route. *These projects will make the countries on the two continents prefer Black Sea routes for freight and passenger transport between Europe and Asia.*[526]

Viking Project

The development of the railroads is among the priorities for the realization of the transport capacities of the region. A significant step

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523 "Tunnel Links Continents, Uncovers Ancient History," *CNN.com,* http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/09/21/turkey.bosphorus.tunnel.marmaray/index.html#cnnSTCOther1.

524 See, http://www.uic.org/com/article/update-on-the-marmara-project?page=thickbox_enews.

525 See, "Marmaray Completion Delayed to 2013, Cost Increases by $500 mln," *TodaysZaman* 30.12.2009, http://www.todayszaman.com/news-196986-100-marmaray-completion-delayed-to-2013-cost-increases-by-500-mln.html.

526 Elena Ilie, "Turkey Aims to Realize the "Restructuring and Strengthening of Turkish Railway Sector" Project in 2013," ***Railway Pro***, http://www.railwaypro.com/wp/?p=11650.

forwards was the initiation of the Viking project linking the Black Sea and Baltic Sea, which is being developed in order to link with other neighboring regions as well. The train connects the Port of Klaipeda (Lithuania) on the Baltic Sea with the Port of Illichevsk (Ukraine) on the Black Sea, as well as the capitals of countries it crosses: Vilnius, Minsk and Kiev. The Viking train is a sea-rail-(road)-sea intermodal Ro-Ro (Roll-on/Roll-off) and a Lo-Lo (Lift-on/Lift-off) transport solution with trains that carry 20-, 40- and 45-feet universal and special containers, trailers, trucks and semi-trailers. The freight is sent from Scandinavia and Western Europe as well as via the Mukran-Klaipeda ferry-line via the Baltic Sea to Klaipeda port, and then carried on by Viking train to Belarus, Ukraine and further on to Caucasus via Illichevsk and Odessa sea ports. The railcars with containers can be transported to their destination in Georgia via two ferry lines: Illichevsk (Ukraine) – Poti (Georgia) or Illichevsk (Ukraine) – Batumi (Georgia). Those going to Turkey can be shipped via the Illichevsk (Ukraine) – Derince (Turkey) ferry line.[527]

The project was initiated in 2002, with an agreement signed among the railway companies of Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania about transport between the three countries. The railway companies of these countries signed an agreement on the organization of operating and organizational aspects of railway transport between them. In 2003, the transport service was launched. The Viking route is 1, 734km long and takes 52 hours. The biggest advantage of the Viking train is its price for transportation. The tariffs for containers and trailer-trains are lower when compared with those of truck companies.[528]

As a result, the volume of freight transported via the Viking route has been rising sharply each year from the beginning of the operation of the Viking train in 2003 up to 2007. In 2007, the train transported 40, 066 TEU which is about 70% more than in 2006. In 2008, the transportation volumes decreased by 17%, since trade was disturbed by the global financial crisis. As a response, in 2009 Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine decided to cut the Viking tariffs by 15%. This enabled the Viking project to retain its competitiveness

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[527] Antanas Zenonas Kaminskas, "Shuttle Train VIKING-Success Story of Intermodality," 27.06.2008, http://www.hollandintermodal.com/resources/userfiles/File/CIPROC-VIKING.pdf.

[528] Kusch, Prause, Hunke.

in the period of crisis.[529] Measures bare fruits: freight volume rose to the level of 2007 and the positive trend has continued in the following years.[530]To keep pace with increasing freight volumes, three initiator countries of the project have kept the tariff conditions unchanged since 2008.[531]The volume of carried freight has increased 100 times, reaching 58.9 TEUs in the 10 years (2003-2013) since the launch of the Viking project.[532]

Moreover, the success of this service has been proved not only by the continuous increase of freight volumes, but also by the intention of member countries to enlarge the geographical area of the route to the other countries in the Black Sea and neighboring regions. Georgia and Moldova joined the Viking freight transportation project in March 2011.[533] In December 2012, the BZhD-Cargo Railway Company of Bulgaria joined the VIKING project. Following this, in February of 2013, Romania signed a memorandum of cooperation and joined the project in April.[534]

Furthermore, Turkey is also going to join the Viking project soon. A related memorandum on cooperation was signed by the Transport Ministers of Lithuania and Turkey on 4 April 2013. Two ways have been suggested for Turkey to join the project: by overland and combined routes. The overland route would cross the territory of Belarus, Ukraine, Romania and Bulgaria to reach Turkey. The multimodal route would cross through Belarus, Ukraine and from the Illichevsk port in Ukraine to the Samsun port in Turkey via the Black Sea.

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529 "Priorities of Belintertrans," http://www.deliverjournal.com/en/journal/archive/section.php?ELEMENT_ID=2085.

530 Kusch, Prause, Hunke.

531 Pamela Luică, "*Viking Train* and *Cargo 10*. Two Projects with Significant Potential in Attracting Freight to Railways," *Railway PRO*, 04.23.2013, http://www.railwaypro.com/wp/?p=12221.

532 ibid.

533 "Georgia and Moldova join Viking Project," *Railway Insider* 22/03/2011, http://www.railwayinsider.eu/ wp/archives/16255.

534 "Romania Has Joined the Successfully Operating Project of the *Viking,*" *Black Sea News* 04.03.2013, http:// www.blackseanews.net/en/read/58120.

Another objective of this project is to attract freight to railways on the Europe-Caucasus-Asia axis and freight from Turkey to Northern Europe (and vice-versa). It is estimated that convenient options for railway transit to Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and China may be offered.[535]The initiators have already invited Azerbaijan to join the Viking project, and Azerbaijan in its turn has expressed its interest in the project.[536] To sum up, the Viking route has already connected the Black Sea with the Baltic Sea and expanded its geography to include other Black Sea countries, and expansion is expected to continue to cover the countries in Caucasus and to be linked with Asian networks. Hence, the Viking railroad will connect Scandinavia with the Black Sea, South Caucasus, Central Asia, and China.[537]

Conclusion

Since the collapse of the Eastern Bloc, the Black Sea region has been suffering from economic underdevelopment and has had to deal with the legacies of its socialist past. When it seemed that the countries could deal with those difficulties, and the successful transformation from planned economy to market economy was underway, the international financial crisis proved that the region is still vulnerable and the growth witnessed was not sustainable. To this end, one of the major contributors to sustainable development of the region could be its development as a transport corridor between Europe and Asia. For the Black Sea region to materialize its competitive advantage as a transport corridor, it needs its connectivity to be improved: on its west side, with Central and Eastern Europe, which will provide an access to Western Europe as well; and, on its east side, with South Caucasus and Central Asia, which will provide access further onto China and other Eastern Asian republics. It has been observed that there are initiatives

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535 Luică.

536 "Грузия и Молдова присоединились к проекту «Викинг», куда приглашен и Азербайджан", *Aze.az*, 16.03.2011, http://www.aze.az/news_gruziya_i_moldova_53987.html.

537 Nicklas Norling, "Viking Railroad Connects Scandinavia With South Caucasus, Central Asia, and China," *Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst*, 11.02.2011, http://old.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5656/print.

and infrastructural projects that will serve this goal, some of which have been realized and others which are under development.

Oil and gas pipelines provide major links tying the Black Sea region with South Caucasus and Central Asia in order for these regions to serve together as a transport corridor for hydrocarbon deliveries to Europe. These links contribute to the energy security of the Black Sea countries themselves, as well. The pipelines (BN, BS, BTC, and CPC) from Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan deliver oil to the Black Sea ports of Russia and Georgia and the Mediterranean port of Turkey. The only natural gas pipeline (SCP) delivers gas from Azerbaijan to Georgia and Turkey. However, pipeline links to tie the Black Sea region with Central and Eastern Europe are missing, limiting the region's role as a transportation corridor. An attempt to solve this by carrying oil through Ukraine and Poland then further on to Europe did not bear fruits. However, oil is being carried from Black Sea ports to international markets through Turkish straits to reach the Mediterranean, which still serves to increase the importance of sea ports and sea routes and, in general, to foster realization of the transport potential. Furthermore, it is planned to build new natural gas pipelines (TANAP and TAP) that will serve to deliver gas beyond the Black Sea countries to the western European markets. These pipelines are increasing the geostrategic importance of the Black Sea region; they bring significant investments for their construction; they are sources of revenue for transit; and they serve the diversification of supply sources, in terms of which the region is heavily dependent on one source. Black Sea port infrastructures have become crucial for oil transportation in South Caucasus and Central Asia. Black Sea ports are important not only for the transportation of hydrocarbons but also in freight, as well as passenger transportation. These ports display huge potential, many still with a capacity to be enlarged significantly, to serve as nodes between land and sea routes. They are crucial points in the East-West transport corridor's development.

The initiatives to develop the transport routes through the Black Sea region unfold into three categories: those initiated by the European Union; regional initiatives within BSEC framework; and projects of regional importance realized through multilateral intergovernmental cooperation. The EU initiatives are not primarily focused on the Black Sea region. While all Black Sea countries are involved in TRACECA, which includes South

Caucasus and Central Asia, the others (the Danube Strategy and Pan European Transport Corridors and Areas) cover the Black Sea region in part. The EU TRACECA initiatives, which date back to the years shortly after the Eastern Bloc's dissolution in the early 1990s, seek technical assistance to develop the transport corridor between Europe and Asia across the Black Sea, the South Caucasus, the Caspian Sea and the Central Asian countries. That initiative is important for the Black Sea region because of its inclusiveness in terms of linking it to Europe, especially in times when no Black Sea country was an EU member and the region was lacking those links to the EU; at the same time it links it to South Caucasus and Central Asia, with which it was lacking connections although it shares a similar social history with these regions. Although it created a framework, support by the EU, especially financial support, was limited. That did not hamper the region's western connectivity with Europe as much as it had implications for its eastern connectivity, due to other initiatives by the EU that focused primarily on linking the Black Sea to the EU. The EU was more concerned about its connectivity with immediate neighbors in Central and Eastern Europe, which includes some of the Black Sea countries. The Pan-European Transport Corridors and Areas were identified by the EU to integrate Central and Eastern Europe into the Trans-European Transport Networks. This connectivity began to be of more concern, especially after the EU enlargement to include Romania and Bulgaria, Black Sea countries, as EU members, after which its borders reached the Black Sea. The EU developed a strategy for the Danube Region. The Danube Strategy in its turn serves to improve the connectivity in the areas stretching from Germany to Black Sea shores along the Danube River, through the development of inland waterways, railways, roads and airways.

Thus, with the EU paying more attention to links between the Black Sea region and itself, and only to selective countries of the region, those countries not included have to struggle to develop transport routes among themselves and also to develop routes in an eastern direction towards the South Caucasus and Central Asia, in cooperation with the countries from those regions. For instance, the Black Sea countries within the BSEC organization frameworks, agreed to develop the Black Sea Ring Highways around the Black Sea with access to the Caspian Sea through South Caucasus. Furthermore, through multilateral cooperation Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey commenced the

Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railroad project, at their own expense, which is a crucial link connecting the Black Sea with Central Asia through South Caucasus. The other national and multilateral projects were Marmaray and Viking rail, but these projects also serve the development of routes in a western direction, linking the Black Sea to Europe.

Hence, to conclude, there is a competitive advantage in transportation for the Black Sea countries, and there are initiatives and projects being implemented to realize this advantage. However, more attention needs to be paid to the development of the links between the Black Sea and South Caucasus and Central Asia, or as much attention as is paid to link the Black Sea region to Europe. That is important to waive the problems with transportation of hydrocarbons, freight and passengers from South Caucasus, Central Asia and East Asia, and to establish the Black Sea region as a transport hub between Asia and Europe.

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LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: PROBLEMS AND REFORMS

How to Catch Flies with Honey[538]

Ana Vasilache
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The Context

Addressing corruption is a priority for many countries and international donors and for good reasons. Corruption is directly linked with poverty and poor economic conditions, generates deep social inequalities and creates dysfunctional societies, in which citizens do not trust, nor respect, their public authorities and leaders.

Administrative decentralization of different forms, happening in many countries, brought also the decentralization of corruption. Devolution of more responsibilities and financial resources to local levels made local governments more vulnerable to corruption, presenting public officials with temptations and opportunities to misuse their positions for private gains.

The anticorruption global movement began with making development agencies and governments be no longer in denial and address corruption in an open and systematic way, and followed with setting standards through international conventions such as the UN Convention against Corruption. But the phase that is following logically, the implementation and enforcement of these standards, is the most difficult and by far the most challenging: literally thousands of people and hundreds of organizations all around the globe, both in and out of government, should be reached and involved.

We have developed a successful methodology for galvanizing improvements in local governments, by addressing corruption in a practical

[538] An old wisdom that proved to be useful for Mayor of La Paz, Ronald MacLean Abaroa, when addressing corruption in his city and local government: "You can catch far more flies with honey, in a far more effective way, than going after them, one by one!"

and strategic way. This methodology provides some of the tools and instruments for that to happen.

Most of the national anticorruption strategies focus on the centralized, top-down control of corruption, mainly by creating or strengthening anticorruption legislation, empowering the institutions of law and order, enlarging the judicial and investigative systems, and encouraging the capacity of civil society to play "watch-dog" roles. The general aim of all these strategies is to intimidate by increasing the probability of discovering corruption, and enforcing severe penalties that will hopefully deter future corrupt activities. Even if more control, more laws and more pressure are necessary for public officials to behave ethically, *they are not sufficient* for effectively addressing corruption and for making significant changes in the way public institutions perform. Neither people nor institutions really change solely under outside pressure, as no illness can be cured without the patient's active involvement; change needs the willing participation of those affected by it. The anticorruption methodology we developed focuses on the process of change, providing the necessary tools and instruments for making change happen, with the active participation of those who are the problem, by allowing them to become the source of the solution.

The Anti-corruption Methodology

The anticorruption methodology we developed is based on the assumption that most people are basically honest, if the system allows them to prosper within the realm of the law. Except for the corrupt who ride the system for their private gain, there are potentially honest public officials willing to address corruption and improve the way their organizations (and themselves) perform, given that they could receive proper recognition, and reasonable monetary incentives. There are capable, intelligent public managers and civil servants, knowledgeable about their organizations' problems and goals, willing to engage in positive change, if given the opportunity. People will behave honestly, provided that the system will reward that behavior.

Indeed we witness that many public officials win their mandates on anticorruption electoral platforms and many public managers/civil servants are concerned about corruption. But most of them fail to address it effectively because their strategies are exclusively based on imposing more controls,

more regulations, more intimidation and fear of punishment; hunting isolated corrupt individuals or focusing too much on enforcing codes of ethics.

We propose to these public leaders and managers a new approach, a rational/strategic methodology, based on which they can identify and treat with priority the most dangerous forms of corruption, can focus on changing not (only) corrupt individuals but the public policies and organizational systems that breed corruption, can "break the taboo" and start talking openly about corruption and its dangerous effects, involving in the process of change staff as well as outside affected stakeholders. In fewer words, we propose that they act as institutional reformers rather than judges or prosecutors.

We offer them, also, the support of *skilled social entrepreneurs/anticorruption practitioners*, that are able to design and facilitate strategic, participatory planning processes, aimed at treating and preventing the vulnerability to corruption and beyond this, increasing integrity, efficiency, accountability and transparency of activities and public services delivery.

These social entrepreneurs/anticorruption practitioners are fundamentally different from civil society activists[539]: Historically, activists have proceeded largely as outsiders to power and by contrast social entrepreneurs frequently combine outside and inside oriented tactics to bring change. Outside activists have convinced institutions that they need to change; social entrepreneurs working on the inside show them what to do and help them do it.

The strength of this anticorruption methodology does not rely solely in identifying vulnerable activities to corruption, which are similar in many countries and public organizations; or on prescribing what should be done, as many libraries have plenty of books with solutions; it relies primarily on the participatory process power to bring the planned changes into existence, and on the transformation of the organizational design, to liberate public functions from the yoke of corruption.

Through the involvement of public leaders, managers and employees, trust and commitment are created for the implementation of planned changes; people connect to each other as human beings with real concerns and issues;

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[539] David Bornstein and Susan Davis, *Social Entrepreneurship: What Everyone Needs to Know,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).

discussions focus on what they can do, and not on what others can or need to do for them; and last but not least, a deeper, shared understanding of the corrupt systems in place emerges and a treatment plan is developed, for curing and prevention, that no outsider could better do. Even if surprising, this is possible as long as the assumption is that corruption is not (just) a problem of bad people but of bad systems; that corruption is only a symptom of organizational malfunctioning and that addressing corruption is only the entry point in the process of reinventing a better and fairer public organization.

This novel anticorruption methodology was applied successfully in La Paz, Bolivia by Mayor Ronald MacLean Abaroa and his Harvard mentor, Professor Robert Klitgaard. They named it *a therapeutic approach to a sick institution*[540]. Starting his mandate in the context of Bolivia's worst economic crisis ever, where corruption was everywhere and public authority and public services were collapsing, Mayor Ronald MacLean Abaroa and his team, within the first two years of his administration, was able to successfully restore and improve the municipal government services, multiply city revenues, increase investments in public works tenfold while regaining the city's international creditworthiness. Last but not least, he was democratically voted back to office four times.

After MacLean's fourth and last stint as mayor, he went back to Harvard to develop new approaches to governance and anti-corruption, based on his previous academic collaboration with Professor Klitgaard, and his decade-long practical experience as mayor.

FPDL Work in CEE/SEE

Since 2004, through the close collaboration with Ronald MacLean Abaroa, working at WBI Ana Vasilache and her team from FPDL[541], have

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[540] Robert Klitgaard, Ronald MacLean Abaoa and Lindsey Parris, *Corrupt Cities: A Practical Guide to Cure and Prevention* (Oakland, CA: World Bank Publications, 2000)

[541] FPDL – Partners Foundation for Local Development is a Romanian NGO, established in 1994 by a group of experts in urban planning, public administration and organizational/community development, having as mission to enhance the democratic processes of governance, to support civil society development, to

developed a replicable application of the anticorruption methodology, which was successfully disseminated, adapted and applied in CEE/SEE local governments, attracting the interest of many mayors, practitioners and academics. To many public and civil society leaders who were thinking that nothing could be done about corruption, the results proved that with the appropriate approach, their commitment and participation, corruption could be cured and prevented, during their life time in public office.

FPDL proved that the successful reform and anti-corruption strategy applied in La Paz, could be replicated and scaled-up worldwide. Our dissemination strategy was guided by the experiential learning principles: successful experiences can be replicated if you are able to understand the concepts on which they relied and have the capacity to apply them in new experiences.

Given a politically willing mayor, FPDL set to develop the critical element in a reform process in the role of a *social entrepreneur*/*change agent* able to guide and assist the process of change, as an honest outsider facilitating the collaboration of mayors, and their fellow municipal collaborators. Armed with the appropriate conceptual tools, mayors, and municipal employees can embark in a reform process, supported by trained *external change agents/anticorruption practitioners,* assisted by a local organization, NGO or consulting firm staffed with certified anticorruption practitioners.

FPDL focused its activities on three main directions:

(1) Supply-side: building the capacity of change agents/anticorruption practitioners

FPDL started by building the capacity of "*change agents*" - FPDL Regional Program[542] network members, to become anticorruption

promote a new culture of change and conflict management in Romania and worldwide, through capacity building activities.

[542] In 1998, FPDL with LGI/OSI support, started the Regional Program "Working Together" a capacity building program for CEE/SEE and since, it succeeded to build a network of trainers and training institutions from more than 50 countries and 4 continents, the capacity of more than 1800 trainers, facilitators or consultants involved in the public administration reform in their countries,

practitioners, able to support courageous mayors and civil servants who wanted to address the vulnerability to corruption of their organizations.

A comprehensive learning program is provided, PAP* - *Program for Anticorruption Practitioners,* having three components: (1) Knowledge Building (2) Skills Building, (3) Real-life application in local governments

***(1) Knowledge Building*:** based on self-study and on-line distance learning, including readings and papers writing, it aims at deepening practitioners understanding and improving their knowledge in the field of curing and preventing corruption in Local Governments organizations. It has 4 learning modules.

- Module 1: Understanding Corruption in Organizations
- Module 2: Understanding Organizations
- Module 3: Understanding Local Governments Organizations
- Module 4: Understanding Change Management in Organizations

In each module participants study the provided readings, apply the concepts in specific situations, elaborate Papers and receive Tutors' feedback and evaluation.

(2) Skills Building: is an interactive training program, during which participants gain new knowledge, skills and self-confidence, as consultants, facilitators and trainers, the three roles they will play when supporting mayors/public managers, initiating interventions in local government organizations, aimed at curing and preventing corruption.

(3) *Real-life application in local governments*: the best participants receive professional and financial support to work with mayors/local governments and apply the anticorruption methodology.

More than 40 anticorruption practitioners from 14 countries finalized PAP* components, gaining knowledge, skills and self-confidence. They worked with more than 20 local governments in the region. Case studies describing their work results can be seen at FDPL website.[543]

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disseminating high quality training manuals and interactive/participatory training methodologies

[543] "Anticorruption Methodology", Partners Foundation for Local Development Website

We developed Training materials in English, supported translation/printing in other 10 languages; they can be accessed for free from www.fpdl.ro (among them the book "Corrupt Cities", FPDL Manual "Restore the Health of Your Organization", the Multimedia Interactive Learning Course – MILC developed on La Paz case, other case studies from the region).

(2) Demand-side: raising awareness of public leaders/managers

To raise the awareness and interest of public leaders/managers Ana Vasilache and her team from FPDL with Ronald MacLean Abaroa from WBI, as well as the anticorruption practitioners, disseminated/promoted the anticorruption methodology in front of more than 400 mayors during their associations' general assembly or workshops organized in Romania, Moldova, Macedonia, Montenegro, Kosovo, Slovakia, Serbia, Ukraine, Croatia, Bulgaria, Armenia, BiH and Albania. The translated book and manual, as well as FPDL handbook developed for mayors and public managers, were provided, to deepen participants understanding on the main concepts on which the anticorruption methodology relies, and its main results.

(3) Supply and Demand sides: working together: FPDL/Ronald MacLean Abaroa offered professional and financial support for the best anticorruption practitioners, to work with willing public leaders/managers selected through competitive processes, as well as to share experience and network.

The professional support included mentoring/coaching the anticorruption practitioners while working with local governments in Albania, Armenia, BiH, Bulgaria, Croatia, Georgia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenego, Poland, Romania, Serbia, and Slovakia. The financial support was secured from different funding sources (LGI/OSI, FOSIM – Open Society Foundation Macedonia, UNDP Moldova, World Bank Institute).

Since 2004, FPDL organized Regional Annual Meetings to offer opportunities for exchanging ideas and experience in adapting/applying the anticorruption methodology. Each year the number of anticorruption practitioners and countries entering the network increased.

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http://www.fpdl.ro/services.php?do=anticorruption_strategies (20.11.2013).

The meetings were attended also by local governments' representatives, presenting their achievements and being proud to become role models in the region. In countries that developed National Anticorruption Strategies, the methodology proved to be an effective way to support its implementation at local level.

Where We Are Now and Where We Want To Be

Where We Are Now

The journalist David Bornstein, in his book *"How to Change the World: Social Entrepreneurs and the Power of New Ideas"* identified the features of social innovations that became successful large movements. The process of developing and disseminating the anticorruption methodology has similar features.

Not one of David Bornstein's examples started as a government or large-system-sponsored program. Each initiative began with little funding and no fanfare. Is exactly how we started, compared with the multi-million USAID or EU sponsored anticorruption programs.


The author observed that changes that began on a large scale, initiated from the top and driven to produce quick wins, inevitably produced few lasting results. Sustainable changes occurred locally on a small scale and happened slowly. This is what happened in our case also.

Another of his conclusions is that each successful innovation was driven by deeply committed and self-chosen leaders focused to make a difference and bring something new into the world. He describes them as *social entrepreneurs*, patient enough to give their ideas time to evolve and find their own way of operating. He find out that years were spent to learn what the best steps/approaches are and identify the types of people required to being successful. That is what we and the anticorruption practitioners did in the last 7 years

Changes were brought based on the principles that people are accountable and committed to what they have a hand in creating and that they have the collective wisdom to solve their problems and create their future. These are exactly our assumptions also.

And finally, his conclusions give us hope for a successful future of our efforts. He found out that only after the initiative has evolved and succeeded on its own terms that it began to grow, gain attention and achieve a level of scale that touched a large number of people. Similarly, the anticorruption methodology we developed evolved and it is recognized as a world best practice.





It gained international recognition in 2011 when the UN Committee of Public Administration Experts selected Martin/Slovakia and Craiova/Romania to receive the *UN Public Service Award*, under the category "Preventing and Combating Corruption in the Public Service". Both cities applied this strategic and participatory methodology and worked with anticorruption practitioners trained by FPDL/Ronald MacLean Abaroa - WBI.

It gained national recognition in 2010 in Romania: the National Agency for Civil Servants recognized it as a best practice in the category "Strengthening public service integrity, transparency and accountability", awarding the 1st prize to Craiova Local Government that applied it with FPDL support

Where We Want to Be

Following the pattern of valuable and successful social innovations, our *goal* is to scale up the use of this anticorruption methodology in the Black Sea Region by increasing the number of countries, anticorruption practitioners and local governments that apply it successfully, improving activities based on lessons learned from previous experience and keeping the quality that may be in danger to be diluted in the growth process.

The activities will build sustainability - the capacity of local actors to disseminate/apply the anticorruption methodology, without our support, in more and more local governments, keeping the quality of their work.

The outcomes will be tangible: local governments with improved public works and services, greater citizen trust and satisfaction, better municipal balance sheets and more efficient management of public assets; capacity to replicate a methodology that shows how improvements can be made, sequenced and institutionalized. Successful local governments and mayors will become a critical mass of role-models, to be followed by their peers.

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The Impact of the Council of Europe's Conditionality on Party Law in Turkey[544]

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There are several factors in promoting democracy in a given country, such as domestic and international ones.[545] It is also argued (Przeworski et al. 2000) that citizens' experience with democracy and authoritarian regimes also influence the likelihood of democratic transitions. Although political change requires powerful domestic actors, the international component has become equally vital recently.

The European Union's (EU) carrot and stick policy is a quite easy and effective method to influence the countries which are dependent on the EU in terms of trade and development assistance and/or anticipate becoming an EU member state in a foreseeable future. According to the Copenhagen criteria, membership of the EU requires 'that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure

[544] This paper is slightly modified version of the paper presented at 4th Blue Black Sea Conference, 26 November 2014, Marmara University, İstanbul.

[545] Geoffrey Pridham, "The International Dimension of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective", in Richard Gunther, P. Nikiforos Diamandouros and Hans-Jürgen Puhle (eds.), *The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective*, (Baltimore, MD and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), pp.166–203 and Karen Remmer, "New Theoretical Perspectives on Democratization", *Comparative Politics* 28 No.1, (1995), pp.103–22.

and market forces within the Union'.[546] The Council of Europe (CoE) norms and standards enshrined in the Conventions and other documents serve as the benchmarks for political criteria for EU accession.

In this respect, the European neighborhood policy's "political conditionality" underlines that the neighbors' progress in reforms shall be assessed in accordance with "the ratification and implementation of international commitments which demonstrate respect for shared values, in particular the values codified in the UN Human Rights Declaration, the OSCE and Council of Europe standards."[547] It also refers to the CoE conventions as well as the reports and recommendations of the CoE bodies. Moreover, the Accession Partnership for the current candidate countries and the European partnerships for the potential candidates adopted in 2008 refer to the CoE conventions and compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights obligations as a part of the country's commitments on the path to an eventual accession.[548]

The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) which was signed between the EU and the CoE in 2007 opened a new phase for enhanced co-operation and political dialogue between the EU and the CoE was established by the Treaty of Rome in 1957.[549] The MoU states that the EU and the CoE "will

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[546] European Council, *Presidency Conclusions,* Copenhagen, 21-22 June 1993. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/ec/pdf/cop_en.pdf, accessed on September 15, 2014.

[547] European Commission,*Wider Europe— Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations without Eastern and Southern Neighbours*, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Brussels, 11.3.2003, COM(2003) 104 final, p. 16.

[548] See for example, "Partnership for the Accession of Turkey," http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/ enlargement/ongoing_enlargement/community_acquis_turkey/e40111_en.htm and "European Partnership with Bosnia and Herzegovina," http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1411712548642&uri= URISERV:r18012, accessed on September 15, 2014.

[549] *Memorandum of Understanding between the Council of Europe and the European Union*, 117th Session of the Committee of Ministers (Strasbourg, 10-11 May 2007), CM(2007)74.

develop their relationship in all areas of common interest, in particular the promotion and protection of pluralistic democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, the rule of law, political and legal co-operation, social cohesion and cultural interchange'. The document reiterates the CoE's role as 'the benchmark for human rights, the rule of law and democracy in Europe."[550]

Republic of Turkey is a founding member of the CoE and currently a candidate country for the EU membership. Moreover, Turkey's geographical location in the southern cone of Europe and economic relations with Europe historically require a closer and mutual interaction. On the other hand, Turkey's obligations as a founding and candidate country in compliance with the norms and standards set by the Conventions and other documents are to be assessed as prerequisites.

This paper is a preliminary attempt to examine the role played by the CoE in the promotion of democracy in Turkey with special reference to Turkey's Party Law since 2002 when the Justice and Development Party came to power with the idea of more democracy, transparency and accountability. First, it describes the political conditionality principle of the CoE. Second, it highlights the relationship between the CoE and Turkey. Third, it briefly analyzes the role played by the CoE, by means of the GRECO unit, in monitoring Political Party Law in Turkey with special reference to political funding.

Political Conditionality in European Perspective

Political conditionality is defined as "a strategy of reinforcement used by international organizations and other international actors to bring about

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https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=CM(2007)74&Language=lanEnglish, accessed on September 15, 2014.

[550] The MoU refers to good mutual use of such bodies of the CoE as the Venice Commission, the Forum for the Future of Democracy (NGO cooperation), the Council of Europe Congress of Local and Regional Authorities as well as the Centre of Expertise on Local Government Reform.

change and stabilize political change at the state level".[551] According to another definition "political conditionality entails the linking, by a state or international organization, of perceived benefits to another state (such as aid), to the fulfillment of conditions relating to the protection of human rights and the advancement of democratic principles".[552] Political conditionality can be categorized as positive incentives and negative sanctions for compliance.

Especially during the process of eastern enlargement, a positive "political conditionality" has been used as a strategy to promote political and economic reforms in the candidate countries. Consolidation of democratic institutions and respect for human rights and protection of minorities are the main components of this strategy.[553] The European Commission assesses the candidates' progress in fulfilling the basic criteria for accession, and it frequently examines the compliance of the candidate country's commitments to the CoE recommendations.

International standards relevant to the financing of political parties and election campaigns are found principally in the United Nations (UN) Convention Against Corruption[554] and, since the regulation of the financing of political parties affects the freedom of association of political parties and their members, in Article 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and

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[551] Frank Schimmelpfennig, "European Regional Organizations, Political Conditionality, and Democratic Transformation in Eastern Europe," *East European Politics and Societies*, 21 No.1, (2007), pp. 126-141.

[552] Karen E. Smith, "The Use of Political Conditionality in the EU's Relations with Third Countries: How Effective?" *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 3 No. 2, (1998) pp.253-274.

[553] European Commission (2005). Communication from the Commission - 2005 enlargement strategy paper {SEC(2005) 1433 } {SEC(2005) 1421 } {SEC(2005) 1422 } {SEC(2005) 1423 } {SEC(2005) 1424 } {SEC(2005) 1426 } {SEC(2005) 1428 } /* COM/2005/0561 final, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52005DC0561, accessed on September 15, 2014.

[554] "UN Convention Against Corruption" adopted on 31 October 2003, ratified by Turkey on 20 December 2005, available at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/Convention/08-50026_E.pdf

Political Rights,[555] and Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)[556] protect the freedom of association. The right to free elections guaranteed by Article 3 of the First Protocol to the ECHR is also of relevance. This opinion further takes OSCE commitments into consideration, in particular on the protection of the freedom of association (Copenhagen 1990, par 9.3) and free and periodic elections (Copenhagen 1990, par 5, 6, 7 and 8).[557]

In addition, soft-law standards in this area can be found in the recommendations of UN, Council of Europe and OSCE bodies and institutions. These include General Comment 25 of the UN Human Rights Committee on the right to participate in public affairs, voting rights and the right of equal access to public service,[558] Council of Europe Committee of Ministers Recommendation 2003 (4) on Common Rules Against Corruption in the Funding of Political Parties and Electoral Campaigns,[559] as well as the Joint Guidelines on Political Party Regulation issued by OSCE/ODIHR and the European Commission for Democracy through Law of the Council of

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555 "The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights" (adopted by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) on 16 December 1966). This Covenant was signed by Turkey on 15 August 2000 and succeded to on 13 September 2003. https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20999/volume-999-I-14668-English. pdf

556 "The Council of Europe's Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms," entered into force on 3 September 1953. The Convention was ratified by Turkey on 18 May 1954.

557 Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on The Human Dimension of The CSCE, http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/14304?download=true

558 UN Human Rights Committee General Comment 25, *The Right to Participate in Public Affairs, Voting Rights and the Right of Equal Access to Public Service*, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.7, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/453883fc22.html.

559 Council of Europe Committee of Ministers Recommendation 2003 (4) on *Common Rules Against Corruption in the Funding of Political Parties and Electoral Campaigns*, available at: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/economiccrime/cybercrime/cy%20activity%20interface2006/rec%202003%20(4)%20pol%20 parties%20EN.pdf.

Europe (Venice Commission).[560] Reference will also be made in this Opinion to reports by the Council of Europe's Group of States against Corruption (GRECO).[561]

The Council of Europe and Turkey Relations

The CoE is the oldest intergovernmental organization in Europe with 47 Member States, including all EU member states. The CoE principally aims to safeguard democratic principles and ideals among member states and promote the members countries' economic and social development.[562] The Statute of 1949 which establishes the CoE, its functions and operations was signed by ten founding members, Greece and Turkey joined them later in the same year. Besides the Statute, Resolution of the Committee of Ministers, Statutory Conventions and Final Declarations of Summits are the basic documents of the CoE.[563] States wishing to join the Council of Europe are today required to sign certain Council conventions, such as the European Convention on Human Rights (ECtHR), and then ratify them within a reasonable time. The organization is composed of two bodies, namely the Committee of Ministers and the Parliamentary Assembly (PACE), as well as three special agencies, namely the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, the Commissioner for Human Rights and the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, and finally specialized bodies based on partial agreements the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), the Development Bank, the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) and The European Audiovisual Observatory.[564]
Soon after the establishment of the CoE Turkey joined it in August 1949 and is regarded as a founding member. Turkey has become an active and

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560 OSCE/ODIHR and Venice Commission *Guidelines on Political Party Regulation*, available at: http:// www.osce.org/odihr/77812.

561 Available at http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/default_en.asp.

562 Florence Benoît-Rohmer and Heinrich Klebes, *Council of Europe Law Towards A Pan-European Legal Area*, (Strasbourg Cedex: Council of Europe Publishing, 2005), p. 20.

563 ibid., pp. 27-34

564 The European Court of Human Rights is not considered as a Council of Europe agency in the strict sense simply on the ground that it is not based on the Statute. ibid., footnote 99.

supportive member of the CoE in terms of integration and construction of the European ideals through several mechanisms including the Parliamentary Assembly of the CoE (PACE). Following the military intervention of September 12, 1980 until 1987, Turkey's relations with the CoE faced some difficulties. Even some of the members raised the question of suspension of Turkey's membership in the CoE. Later, ex-Prime Minister Turgut Özal introduced reforms and made the first application for EU membership in 1987 and then the relations between Turkey and the CoE was stabilized. Turkey has become party to approximately half of the 212 Council of Europe's conventions.

Turkey admitted the right to individual application to the ECtHR in 1987. Until recently the Court's decisions against Turkey were not taken well due to restrictive structures and regulations. Between 1987 and 2001, the ECHR decided against Turkey in over 2,400 cases, finding at least one violation in 87 percent of these cases. However, Article 90 of the Turkish Constitution was amended in 1999 in case of a conflict between international agreements in the area of fundamental rights and freedoms duly put into effect and the domestic laws, due to differences in provisions on the same matter, the provisions of international agreements shall prevail. Thus, the jurisdiction of ECtHR was accepted by the Turkish authorities constitutionally. The Court dealt with 9,198 applications concerning Turkey in 2013, of which 9,008 were declared inadmissible or struck out. It delivered 124 judgments (concerning 190 applications), 118 of which found at least one violation of the European Convention of Human Rights.[565] Ten percent of the Court's much criticized current case-load – over 16,000 cases – consists of Turkish issues.[566]

The comprehensive constitutional amendments and reform packages which were adopted in the late 1990s and further in the early 2000s including the Civil Law and Turkish Penal Code, the abolition of death penalty, fight against torture, reform of prisons and detention houses, freedom of thought and expression, freedom of association and reunion, freedom of religion,

[565] European Court of Human Rights, Press Country Profile Turkey, http://www.echr.coe.int/documents/ cp_turkey_eng.pdf

[566] Başak Çalı, "Turkey's Relations with the European Court of Human Rights", http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/ europpblog/2012/03/14/turkey-echr/

functioning of the judiciary, civil-military relations, economic, social and cultural rights, fighting against corruption, strengthened Turkey's relations with the CoE.[567]

Turkey ratified the Council of Europe Civil and Criminal Law Conventions on Corruption and became a member of the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO), in 2003 and 2004 respectively. Turkey also ratified the Council of Europe's Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime (1990) in 2004.[568] Turkey also signed the Additional Protocol to the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption in 2012.

GRECO's objective is to improve the capacity of its members to fight corruption by monitoring their compliance with Council of Europe anti-corruption standards through a dynamic process of mutual evaluation and peer pressure. It helps to identify deficiencies in national anti-corruption policies, prompting the necessary legislative, institutional and practical reforms. GRECO also provides a platform for the sharing of best practice in the prevention and detection of corruption. As 1st phase evaluation period was completed when Turkey became a member to GRECO.

1st and 2nd phase Mutual Evaluation Report was composed of 21 recommendations which were accepted by 27th General Assembly which was held on 6-10 March 2006.[569] 3rd Round Convenience report was accepted in 54th General Board Meeting which was held in 20-23 March 2010. According to the GRECO Report on Theme II on Transparency of Party Funding, it was advised that political parties should submit their annual accounts including all entities relevant to the political parties. Secondly, standardization of accounts and review should be developed. Moreover,

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[567] Ergun Özbudun and Ömer Faruk Gençkaya, *Democratization and the Politics of Constitution-Making in Turkey*, (Budapest: CEU Press, 2009).

[568] Muhittin Acar and Kadir Dede, "Bir Kamu Politikası Olarak Türkiye'de Yolsuzlukla Mücadele: Yasal-Kurumsal Çerçeve," in *Kamu Politikaları* M. Yıldız and M.Z. Sobacı, (eds.), Ankara: Adres Yayınları, 2013.

[569] GRECO, Joint First and Second Evaluation Round Evaluation Report on Turkey Round, Adopted by GRECO at its 27th Plenary Meeting (Strasbourg, 6-10 March 2006), http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round2/GrecoEval1-2(2005)3_Turkey_EN.pdf

campaign finance for local, national and presidential elections, and transparency and publicity of the party/candidate accounts should be regulated. Furthermore, monitoring of political funding must be coordinated by all relevant agencies including law enforcement authorities and sanctions against the violations of the rules should be proportionate.[570]

The Venice Commission provided an opinion that the provisions in Article 68 and 69 of the Constitution and the relevant provisions of the Law on political parties together form a system which as a whole is incompatible with Article 11 of the ECHR as interpreted by the ECtHR and the criteria adopted in 1999 by the Venice Commission and since endorsed by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.[571] According to this opinion "the basic problem with the present Turkish rules on party closure is that the general threshold is too low, both for initiating procedures for prohibiting or dissolving parties." Therefore, it does not comply with the European democratic standards, and be in breach of the ECHR, as demonstrated in the many Turkish cases before the European Court of Human Rights. Any reform to the Turkish rules on party closure "can be done either as a separate process, confined to changing the relevant provisions of the Constitution, or as part of a more comprehensive constitutional reform. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) in Resolution 1622 (2008) advocated the latter approach, referring to the fact that the 1982 Constitution still bears the marks of the 1980 military *coup d'état*.

The EU documents in relation to Turkey's accession also occasionally refer to the need for reform in the party law. Progress Reports regularly underlined the transparency in election campaign finance. For instance, Progress Report of 2002 stated that "[a]ccountability and transparency in

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[570] GRECO, Third Evaluation Round Evaluation Report on Turkey on Transparency of Party Funding (Theme II)
Adopted by GRECO at its 46th Plenary Meeting (Strasbourg, 22-26 March 2010), http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round3/GrecoEval3(2009)5_Turkey_Two_EN.pdf

[571] European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission) Opinion on the Constitutional and Legal Provisions Relevant to the Prohibition of Political Parties in Turkey Adopted by the Venice Commission at its 78th Plenary Session (Venice, 13-14 March 2009)

election campaign financing is to be improved, notably by amending the Political Parties Law, so as to oblige parties to disclose their sources of financing and setting upper limits to contributions. It is planned to amend the relevant legislation on compulsory declaration of resources (Declaration on Wealth, Bribery and Anti-Corruption) in order to increase public access to financial disclosure statements by public officials."[572] The Progress Report of 2005 pointed out that "[n]o progress has been made concerning the transparency of the financing of political parties. The auditing of political parties remains weak. Although public officials are required to submit asset declarations, there is a need to extend the scope and frequency of declarations.[573]

Starting from 2006 in the European Council decisions on the principles, priorities and conditions contained in the Accession Partnership with Turkey, the phrase **"**improve legislation on transparency in political party and election campaign financing" has been added to the list.[574] Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2008-2009 document underlines "the importance of amending the rules governing political parties so as to ensure transparent financing mechanisms and to bring the provisions on the closure of parties in line with European standards and best practices."[575] Later, Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2011-2012 document reemphasized "the lack of transparency of political party financing and the scope of immunities

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572 Commission of the European Communities, 2002 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession, Brussels, 9.10.2002 SEC(2002) 1412 http://www.abgs.gov.tr/files/AB_Iliskileri/Tur_En_Realitons/Progress/Turkey_Progress_Report_2002.pdf

573 European Commission, Turkey 2005 Progress Report, Brussels, 9 November 2005 SEC (2005) 1426, http://www.abgs.gov.tr/files/AB_Iliskileri/Tur_En_Realitons/Progress/Turkey_Progress_Report_2005.pdf

574 Accession Partnership, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/candidate-countries/turkey/key_documents_en.htm

575 Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2008-2009**,** Brussels, 5.11.2008 COM(2008) 674 final, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/press_corner/keydocuments/reports_nov_2008/strategy_paper_ incl_country_conclu_en.pdf

remain major challenges" and "the lack of transparency in political party financing and the scope of immunities remain major shortcomings."[576]

Similar points on transparency of political financing and lack of campaign finance have been repeatedly mentioned in 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013.[577] In 2012, the Report added that Turkish citizens abroad are unable to vote, and the 10% national threshold for obtaining seats in parliament remains the highest among Council of Europe member states. There has been no progress in aligning the law on the closure of political parties or laws on the financing of political parties and election campaigns with European standards." Moreover, the Law on Presidential Elections adopted in January 2012 introduced some rules on transparency of financing for presidential candidates during elections; however, the Report referring to GRECO stated that "recommendations of the Third Round have been implemented only partially or not at all." Furthermore, the 2011 amendment to the Law on the Constitutional Court authorized the Court of Accounts to audit technical aspects of political parties' finances. The 2013 Progress report also underlined that especially the "adoption of a law addressing GRECO recommendations in the field of financing of political parties and regulating prohibited funding sources, donation ceilings, obligations on candidates to disclose their assets and to submit specified financial information during a campaign, is a priority." No progress has been achieved on alignment with European standards of laws on the closure of political parties or on the financing of political parties and election campaigns." The 2014 Progress Report basically referred to the joint international observation mission of the OSCE and the PACE that the use by the Prime Minister- presidential candidate of his official position as well as over-biased media coverage, giving him a 'distinct advantage' over other candidates.[578] Besides, campaign

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[576] European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council
Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2011-2012, Brussels, 12.10.2011 COM(2011) 666 final,
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/komisyon/abuyum/belgeler/2011/2011_2012_genisleme_strateji_kagidi.pdf

[577] See the relevant documents at http://www.abgs.gov.tr/index.php?p=46224&l=2

[578] European Commission, Turkey 2014 Progress Report, Brussels, 8.10.2014 SWD(2014) 307 final,

finance, comprehensive reporting, and sanctions which limit the transparency and accountability are in need of reform. The Report welcomed the amendments to the Law No. 2820 and Law No. 298 included political campaigning in languages other than Turkish, eased the rules governing the local organization of political parties and expanded the scope of funding to political parties that received more than 3% of votes in the previous parliamentary elections.

Recent Developments in Political Party Regulation in Turkey

Legal framework for political party regulation in Turkey is basically consisted of the Constitution (Articles 68, 69 and 149), Law No. 298 on Basic Provisions of Elections and Electoral Registry dated 1961, the Law No. 2820 on Political Parties dated 1983, the Law No. 2839 on Deputies Elections dated 1983, and the Law No. 2972 on Elections for Local Administrations, Neighbourhood Headmenships dated 1984. Especially Law No. 2820 and 2839 were the products of military government period. Especially, the Law No. 2820 still traces the residues of the authoritarian approach, *uniform*, *centralized* and *controlled* party life.[579] Since then Law No. 2820 was amended twenty times, five of them took place since 2002, [580] and one phrase of Article 117 was annulled by Constitutional Court decision in 2012. The Law No. 298 on Basic Provisions of Elections and Electoral Registry was adopted in 1961 and amended 38 times. 11 of them took place since 2002,[581] Law No. 2839 was amended 14 times, five of them took place

http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2014/20141008-turkey-progress-report_en.pdf

[579] Ömer Faruk Gençkaya, "Impact of Party Regulation on Small Parties and Independent Candidates in Turkey," *Working Paper Series on the Legal Regulation of Political Parties* No. 41, (2014) http:// www.partylaw.leidenuniv.nl/uploads/wp4114.pdf

[580] http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.5.2820.pdf

[581] www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.4.298.doc

after 2002[582] and Law No. 2972 was amended 21 times, 5 of them took place since 2002.[583]

Following the early election, an Emergency Action Plan, including priorities for combat corruption, was issued by the 58th Turkish government, on November 16, 2002. Among others it included increased transparency in the financing of political parties. In the field of democratization and legal reforms, political parties and elections laws were to be reformed in order to open political parties to the public, to increase the public scrutiny on political parties and to increase internal party democracy and transparency in party funding.[584] A Commission on Increasing Transparency in Turkey and Enhancing Good Governance in Public Sector was established by the circulars of the Prime-Ministry (2003/17 and 2007/23).[585] "Strategy for Enhancing Transparency and Strengthening the Fight against Corruption" was issued by the Prime Ministry on December 5, 2009 as a decree (2009/19) and put into the force.[586] Within the scope of the Strategy, a subcommittee on Political Financing which was composed of bureaucratic and academic, prepared a report for the Ministerial Committee which responsible for coordinating the activities.

First (2001) and Second (2003) National Programs of Turkey for the Adoption of the EU Acquis emphasized on the harmonization of party law and political finance specifically.[587] It was stated that "[e]fforts to fulfill the

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582 http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.5.2839.pdf

583 http://www.ysk.gov.tr/ysk/content/conn/YSKUCM/path/Contribution%20Folders/Mevzuat/2972.pdf

584 T.C. 58. Hükümet Acil Eylem Planı (Emergency Action Plan, AEP), 03 Ocak 2003, http://www.kalkinma.gov.tr/Lists/EylemVeDigerPlanlar/Attachments/13/58.H%C3%BCk%C3%BCmetAcilEylemPlan%C4%B1.pdf

585 Ömer Faruk Gençkaya, "Conflict of Interest" in *Academic Research Report: Ethics for the Prevention of Corruption in Turkey*, Ankara: Council of Ethics for Public Officials, CoE and EU, 2009.

586 Official Gazette, 22 February 2010, Issue: 27501.

587 National Programme of Turkey for the Adoption of the EU Acquis, December 2008, http://www.ab.gov.tr/files/ardb/evt/2_turkiye_ab_iliskileri/2_2_adaylik_sureci/2_2_2_ulusal_program/2_2_2_3_2008/ulusal_program_2008_eng.pdf

recommendations of First and Second Round Evaluation Report on Turkey of The Council of Europe's Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) will continue in an effective way." In order to improve the standards of legislations on political parties and financing of politics, the works regarding the "Draft Law on the Amendment of Fundamental Principles for Elections and Electoral Registry" would be completed in priority.

The extensive amendments to the Law No. 2820 were made by the Law No. 4445 in 1999 and these changes included several new provisions or repeal of some provisions exclusively on financial matters and party dissolution. In 2002, in order to harden party closure, a new provision added to Article 101 of the Law No. 2820 which is also relevant for party funding: "Constitutional Court, in the cases mentioned in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of the abovementioned paragraph, may decide to deprive the relevant political party from the last yearly State aid amount partially or completely according to the severity of the acts subject to the case instead of permanent dissolution; if the aid has been paid completely, then it may decide that the same amount shall be refunded to the Treasury." Moreover, two paragraphs of Article 102 on Procedure applied where the requests of the Chief Public Prosecutor's Office are not complied with was amended, a new paragraph was added to Article 103 on where a political party is the centre of prohibited acts.

In 2003, Law No. 4778 made some amendments to the Law No. 2820 such as membership, donations and dissolution of political parties exclusively. In this respect, a new phrase was added to Article 66 on donations that "to allow the use of their –non eligible natural and legal parsons- publications." In 2005, both the government and the main opposition party -in a two party parliament- agreed to delete the Additional Article 16 on state aid to smaller parties who did not enter the last general elections or established later and have less than 20 members in different categories.

The 2010 "Strategy for Enhancing Transparency and Reinforcing the Fight Against Corruption" preparatory work in view of strengthening transparency in the financing of political parties and election campaigns has been conducted by the government. It has been broadly inspired by GRECO's recommendations.

In 2011, Law No. 6111 introduced new provisions on party funding and review of party funding; however these were different than the GRECO

recommendation in essence. No receipt shall be required for a donation which was deposited on the party's bank account directly. The Constitutional Court's compliance review shall not narrow the scope of party activities or review the "suitability" of these activities. Financial accounts of a political party which was dissolved by the Court shall be reviewed by the Court inclusive of the date of dissolution. Political parties can make any spending for their activities and can use any method of purchasing and may use invoice or equivalent documents or the copy of an invoice for reporting to the Court. Political parties can pay the social security insurance of the persons who works as permanent or temporary employee and his/her travel expenses. Political parties can report the fee paid for the contracts and the court processes as "expense."

In January 2012, the Constitutional Court annulled Article 117 of Law No. 2820 with a majority. Thus, individual who violated the prohibitions stipulated under the Part 4 of the Law No. 2820 shall be sentenced to imprisonment. Another reform in this area took place by the resubmission of a government draft on presidential election and the Law No. 6217 was adopted by the parliament on January 26, 2012. This law regulates the campaign finance for presidential candidates, a further step in meeting the GRECO recommendations yet was limited in itself.[588] Recently, Law No. 6529 which was adopted on March 12, 2014 introduced some changes in Law No. 298 and 2820 that political parties which secured 3 percent of the valid votes in the last parliamentary elections were enabled to receive annual state aid and political parties and candidates to conduct political campaigning in languages other than Turkish.

A General Assessment

The CoE's conditionality is generally perceived as weak because the CoE offers expertise, persuasion, and social incentives rather than political and material. Besides there is no sanction and membership suspension is very unlikely. Therefore, such recommendations should be taken by the EU units,

[588] Ömer Faruk Gençkaya, *Cumhurbaşkanı Seçim Kampanyasının Finansmanı: Adiliyet, Şeffaflık ve Hesap Verebilirlik (Campaign Finance of Presidential Election: Fairness, Transparency and Accountability)*, Demokrasi Barometresi Raporu1, İstanbul: DDA, June 2014.

the Commission, and enforced by more effective mechanisms. Therefore, the GRECO Reports should be assessed together with the EU documents.

The major issues in political funding in Turkey are campaign finance of political parties and candidates at local and parliamentary elections with special reference to transparency, accountability and publicity. In this respect, the GRECO recommended to ensure that annual accounts of political parties include income received and expenditure incurred individually by elected representatives and candidates of political parties for political activities linked to their party, including electoral campaigning, and as appropriate, the accounts of entities related, to political parties or otherwise under their control. First of all, the Constitution (Article 69/last) requires the lawmaker to regulate a campaign finance law for political parties and candidates; however, since 1995 no regulation has been adopted. The law No. 6271 on Presidential Election is the only progress but limited to candidates for presidential elections. Secondly, although the expenditures made by the party units are included in the integrated annual accounts of political parties, in many instances party accounts does not identify the source of income and the subject of expenditures in detailed itemized manner. Thirdly, this recommendation especially refers to the non-party organizations such as associations, foundations, and platforms which may have a link with the party central/local organizations during and outside the campaign period and their campaigning in favor or against party/parties. This is especially significant due to the fact that except few indirect provisions in Law No. 298, "third party" campaign activities are not regulated in Turkey. This phenomenon is related to individual and or institutional linkages and their indirect contribution to political parties and candidates which constitution a great portion of "soft money" issue. Finally, despite a great deal of improvement in the format and substance of the political parties' annual account reports has been achieved, the GRECO recommendation on the "measures to ensure that annual accounts of political parties provide more detailed and comprehensive information on income and expenditure, including the introduction of a standardized format backed up by common accountancy principles, as well as the provision of guidance to parties by the monitoring body which is essential for a thorough review by the Constitutional Court" has not been achieved fully.

In conclusion, both the GRECO Evaluation Reports and the European Commission's annual Progress Reports, including other recommendations provided by the European organizations, contributed partially towards improving a more open, transparent and accountable campaign finance regulations in Turkey. Turkey has to regulate a separate campaign finance framework for political parties and candidates at local and parliamentary elections in priority. This will enhance transparency and accountability of individual candidates' campaign activities which constitute the major loophole in political funding in Turkey.

Promotion and Practices of Interaction: Local Government at District Level and Civil Society in Bulgaria

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Introduction

The local government is the closest institution to the needs and problems of the citizens. As such, it is called without delay to answer to them and to their expectations at every step of social development. At the same time, the transformation of the society is supported by the efforts for administrative reforms and decentralization. The local authorities are facing the challenge to be transparent and open, to address administrative effectiveness and efficiency, to achieve sustainability in the process of decision-making and policy implementation. Good governance requires joining these principles. The paper reviews the initiatives of the past few years to promote interaction and partnership between district local authorities and civil society that are public and have a similar scope of research. In recent years the Bulgarian local government encourages and is more open to collaboration with civil society, scholars, business and activists in seeking its own way of progress. It is expected to address European context and dimension but also the new political culture.

In the first part, the focus is on main strategic and regulation framework of public relations related to regional policy, local government, local administration and civil participation in Bulgaria. The second part takes into account the principles of good and democratic local governance. The main principles for the purpose of this work are: transparency in civic involvement, openness and transparency of possibilities for citizens' involvement and decisions, responsibility for communicating and explaining decisions, accountability, efficiency and effectiveness. The third part examines the promotion of active citizenship through programs and projects, and civil

society inclusion in local governance process. The study is limited to forms of dialogue and interaction between civil society and local government within the metropolitan and the cities with district division and does not cover all possibilities of interaction, information, dialogue, consultation and feedback receiving from civil society. The aim is to achieve a complete and complementary range of information in this track on citizens' participation at the district local government level in Bulgaria.

1. Strategic and Regulation Framework

1.1. Strategic Framework

The Bulgarian government policy enforces the achievement of a balanced and sustainable development of the regions of the country and addresses the intra-regional and interregional differences and inequalities. This public policy is developed in the context of European integration and especially, the European policy for convergence and attainment of inclusive, sustainable, and smart growth. The strategic framework for the Bulgarian regional and local policy is defined by the *National Regional Development Strategy*.[589] The actual strategic document is for the period 2012-2022.[590] This basic document sets the long-term objectives and priorities of the regional development policy in the three direction of economic, social and territorial cohesion. It contributes to the coordination and synchronization of the sector's policies. The partnership principle and the awareness and transparency ensuring are embedded. The mechanisms for applying them are structured. The partnership is "*understood as an active participation of all defined target groups in the process of planning, programming, financing, monitoring and assessment*", "*as well as joint decision making and shared*

[589] "National Regional Development Strategy 2012–2022," adopted by Decision of the Council of Ministers No 696/2012 http://www.mrrb.government.bg/docs/627cf3c359259d1a3f3efdd91f9c558e.doc (December 2013). The previous strategic document is for the period 2005-2015.

[590] Specialized programmes, such as Operational Program "Regional Development" and Territorial Cooperation Programmes, should lead to creation of conditions for development of the regions in Bulgaria, also in increased cross-border economic cooperation with neighbor countries, tourism promotion and development of border areas.

responsibility."[591] The forms of interaction are settled as information[592], consultation and coordination[593] and, involvement or active participation.[594]

Aiming at the implementation of the strategy's goals and priorities, the local governments should mobilize "*local financial resources, including these of the private and non-governmental sector, for the implementation of the measures in the adopted development plans and programmes and for carrying out local initiatives*".[595] They must ensure the public awareness of the actions related to local development.

At regional level[596], there are *Regional Development Plans* which are strategic planning documents. At this level, both approaches for development study and forecasting are used from the European and national level to the regional level and also when the initiatives are coming from the municipalities and regions. The Regional level best characterizes the state of European territorial communities regarding the implementation of the European Cohesion Policy. The Plans are developed in accordance with the provisions of the "National Regional Development Strategy", and those of the "National Development Program Bulgaria 2020."[597] In a broader context, the Regional plans reflect the priorities and objectives of the Europe 2020 Strategy and observe the evolution of the Cohesion Policy of the European Union. They incorporate the regional policies in fields of economic development, social sphere, and protection of environment, territorial structure and development. In rare cases it is mentioned that the overall organization and coordination of Plans implementations is based on the principle of civil participation in planning process.

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[591] Ibid, p. 194

[592] Information preparation and provision to all stakeholders.

[593] Engagement of target groups in continuous exchange of information, consultations and coordination.

[594] Target groups and participants in partnership.

[595] "National Regional Development Strategy 2012–2022," p. 198

[596] Level 2-NUTS 2 according to European Statistical classification.

[597] "National Development Programme Bulgaria 2020," approved by Decision of the Council of Ministers No 1057/2012. http://www.strategy.bg/StrategicDocuments/View.aspx?lang=bg-BG&Id=765 (December 2013).

At the local level[598], there are *Local Development Plans* in the elaboration of which stakeholders and active civil society are attracted to take part in public discussions in the process of planning. Still, concerning the subsequent interaction between local government and citizens, the approaches are defined generally.

Due to the incumbent European trends towards decentralization and regionalization, the role of the regional and local government increases.[599] In Bulgaria, in order to improve the regional and local governance and to answer to these trends to increasing the role of local governments, the *Decentralization Strategy* for the period 2006–2015[600] is stated. It aims at the implementation of the national policy and sets the guidelines for the distribution of powers and financial resources between the central, regional and local levels of government. The Strategy is implemented through four-year programmes with specific measures to achieve the strategic objectives and priorities. According to the results of the recent analysis[601] on its implementation in the period 2011-2012, the decentralization process goes in a "*slow and inconsistent pace*."[602] The measures due in 2012 and 2013 to provide citizens and their associations to participate in discussions of local government's acts are still not accomplished.[603] The conclusions emphasize and confirm the perception that there is "*not* a real and deep conviction that

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598 Level 3–NUTS 3 according to European Statistical classification.

599 Maria Velikova, "Local Self-Government and Governance, Regionalization," (Varna: VSU Press, 2008), p. 5.

600 "Decentralization Strategy 2006–2015", updated version approved by Decision of the Council of Ministers No 454/2010 http://www.strategy.bg/StrategicDocuments/View.aspx?lang=bg-BG&Id=616 (December 2013).

601 "Report on Implementation of Decentralization Strategy and Program", approved by Decision of the Council of Ministers No 719/2013 http://www.strategy.bg/StrategicDocuments/View.aspx?lang=bg-BG&Id=616 (December 2013).

602 No development or delays in revenue transfer to local government, regulatory amendments in fiscal decentralization, reforms at regional level, decentralization of relation municipalities–mayoralties. Positive development for transfer of state property, revenues transfer from concessions to municipalities, culture and social welfare services.

603 ibid, p. 29.

the country needs to conduct a process of effective decentralization. The issue of decentralization is outside the focus of the government in the period 2011-2012."[604] It should be stated that the specific decentralization policy spreads over the political, administrative and financial aspects. Yet, in terms of territorial, functional and institutional boundaries within which a process of decentralization is conducted, the "*decentralization is not merely a matter of clear objectives, principles and noble intentions, but much more needs institutions who have the mechanisms, tools, resources and administrative capacity and, incentives to achieve its political goals and objectives*."[605] Also, "*along with the transfer of powers and responsibilities it must be built mechanisms, inherent in decentralized systems, such as conditions of transparency in management, systems to assess the quality of services; civic participation and control, independent monitoring and more. Without them, the decentralization is the transfer of power, "from the king to the local lords*"".[606]

So, on one hand, the partnership and transparency principles are incorporated in strategic documents concerning regional and local development policy through the planning process but, on the other hand concrete measures for citizens' participation and relevant transparency are not completely or even are not at all introduced. More, obviously decentralization progress in Bulgaria does not fully reflect European trends and it could be hard to say that it represents the same priority as it is at European level. In this aspect, the role of local governments is still low. The strategic framework which should be the basis for development of an active civil citizenship at local level is still lacking.

1.2 .Regulation Framework

In Bulgaria as in most countries of the world the continental system (French system) is spread based on the combination of direct state government (local state government) and local self-government. The

[604] ibid, p. 80.
[605] Velikova, p. 27-28
[606] ibid, p. 28.

established administrative-territorial system[607] includes regions, municipalities, mayoralties, etc. In terms of local government at district level, within the Bulgarian three cities (municipalities) of district division – the Capital Sofia, Varna and Plovdiv, the total number of districts is 35.

According to the *Local Self-Government and Local Administration Act*[608] that regulates the public relations relevant to local self-government and local administration, the citizens can participate in local government directly aside from elected local authorities to resolve all issues of local importance. Such issues could be in the fields of local government administration, properties, public works and utilities, finance, local taxes and fees, territorial planning and development, education, health, culture, social welfare services, protection of environment, tourism, and sports.

Under the Bulgarian law, the responsibilities of the mayor at the district level are defined in terms of implementation of the budget of the municipality (in the part of the district), the management of human resources in the district administration, management of municipal property (management of properties, set by the Municipal Council), representation of the district before the local population, social and political organizations and other districts or mayoralties, organizing the implementation of the Municipal Council's and mayor's acts, referring to the territory and citizens of the district, and more. The areas of activity of the mayor at district level include conducting public works, utilities and other events; improvement and rehabilitation of the environment and the organization of the Police/security properties; keeping records of the population and civil status (citizens registry); maintaining public order, including certain powers under the Ministry of Interior affairs' Act; protection of the population in case of disasters and accidents; administrative service delivery to citizens and businesses. The mayor of the district participates in an advisory capacity at meetings of the Municipal Council and must be heard in the discussion of issues relating to the district.

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[607] In Bulgaria, the administrative-territorial structure includes 28 Regions, 264 Municipalities, 2545 Mayoralties, 5304 Settlements, 253Towns, 5051 Villages, according to *Administrative Atlas: Republic of Bulgaria*, (Sofia: Global Agro, 2008), p. 6-7.

[608] "Local Self-Government and Local Administration Act," *Promulgated State Gazette* SG No 77/1991, http://www.lex.bg/bg/laws/ldoc/2132580865 (December 2013).




Figure 1. Legal forms of Citizens' Direct Participation at Local Level

The conditions, the organization and the rules for the direct participation are settled in the *Citizens' Direct Participation in Government and Local Government Act*.[609] Since 2012, the Act introduces the measures for the implementation of the European Regulation on the Citizens' Initiative.[610] The four principles for direct participation of citizens in the governance are free expression of will, general, equal and direct participation by secret ballot, equal access to information on issues in process of solving and equal conditions for statement submission. Concerning the local government at district level, the possible forms of stated direct participation are local

[609] *Promulgated State Gazette* No 44/2009

[610] "Regulation (EU)," No 211/2011, *Official Journal of the European Union*, L065/2011, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:L:2011:065:SOM:EN:HTML, (December 2013).

referendum, citizens' initiative and local general assembly as shown in Figure 1.

All three forms[611] of direct citizens' participation are held to address issues of local importance and consist of all citizens with rights of voting and permanent address on the territory of the district. The citizens of the district have the right to initiate local citizens' initiative. The organization of local citizens' initiative shall be decided at a meeting of not less than 50 citizens and they make a proposal to the mayor through a petition organized by an initiative committee within the respective district. The Committee organizes the information campaign and the public discussions. The local general assembly refers to areas with population of less than 10 000 citizens.

Another form of participation regulated by the law is the local cooperation form. In this form of civil participation are involved both active citizens and organizations. An association should be set-up to meet objectives of common interest. Also, an agreement should be signed and approved by Local Government Council. The fields of activities are fixed to better quality of service delivery, public services delivery or effective use of resources. This form of civil participation is based entirely on volunteering. It is provided to work under the principles of mutual interest, active choice, flexibility and dynamism, transparency and responsibility.

During the research no evidence has been found regarding structured information, respectively use of the above forms of direct citizens' participation at local district level. Generally, in 2007 the interaction between local governments and citizens is brought out as the first main problems area speaking out of the inefficiency of the regulations concerning the forms of direct democracy.[612]

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[611] The costs to hold a local referendum or a citizens' general meeting is covered by the municipal budget. However, the citizens and the legal persons who are involved in the initiative fund it in the part for the organization of the signatures' gathering.

[612] See, National Association of Municipalities in the Republic of Bulgaria, *Guidelines to Newly Elected Mayors and Municipal Advisors, Mandate 2007-2011*, (Sofia: National Association of Municipalities in the Republic of Bulgaria, 2007), p. 10

Thus, the local governments at district level have clearly defined even limited fields of activity and responsibility. The regulated forms of direct citizens' participation concern the district level. But the introduced legislative basis for civil involvement and further the interaction with local district government is some more a possibility on paper.

2. Local Government and Good Governance Principles

The democratic governance in a wider context is defined as the largest single area of investment for the United Nations Development Program as the institutions of democratic governance, such as local governments, are part of the efforts to achieve the Millennium Development Goals.[613] Focus areas are civic engagement and local governance, as well as access to information and democratic and responsive public administration. The building of a stronger community is intended for poor people, women and minorities on inclusive principle by their participation in the communities' development and influence of the decision-making processes. This civic participation enhances the democracy. It is perceived as fundamental aspect of a democratic state. It relies on the possibility of the citizens to engage and influence public processes in order to achieve civic goals. Furthermore, the democratization extent is a mirror of the decentralization degree. The last one corresponds tight to the level of socio-economic development of a country and its national specificities, traditions and maturity of civil society (Velikova, 2008).

Still, one of the fundamental rights of the European citizens is exactly the right to good administration and good governance.[614] Good governance is where the rule of law, responsiveness, openness and transparency, and

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[613] "The Millennium Development Goals" are eight: to Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, Achieve universal primary education, Promote gender equality and empower women, Reduce child mortality, Improve maternal health, Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases, Ensure environmental sustainability, Global partnership for development. More information available at http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals (December 2013).

[614] "Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2010)," *Official Journal of the European Union* (2010/C 83/02) http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do%3Furi%3DOJ:C:2010:083:0389:0403: en:PDF (December 2013).

accountability is. Due to the importance of providing local good governance twelve principles[615] are formulated and adopted at European level, recommended to be known and implemented by the local authorities. In this respect a practical learning tool[616] is created to assist local governments in improving the local governance. Bulgaria is one of the first countries implementing it. On this basis, Bulgarian local governments are assessed in good governance since 2011. With regards of civil participation, it should be stated that according good governance principles, all people can have a voice in decision-making and these voices should be heard and taken into account in the process. The local administrations are expected to adapt their objectives and processes to the needs and expectations of the citizens. There should be public access to the information and information on decisions, policies and results of their implementation are expected to be available to citizens effectively, including explained and reported.

Such principles as accessibility, openness and transparency, consistency and predictability through publicity of internal rules, practices, criteria and more, are introduced in Bulgarian legislation[617]. It regulates the basic principles of good governance and good administration, and it is mandatory for the public administrations, including local governments, to respect them. The application of these good governance principles is basic to improve the quality of life, especially at local level.

Thus, at the international, European and national level are stated good governance principles leading to that the local communities and citizens should be equally fully informed, encouraged and engaged to participate and contribute to the overall responsible local development in public interest.

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615 "Strategy for Innovation and Good Governance at Local Level (2007)," Valencia Declaration, Council of Europe, MCL-15 (2007), http://www.coe.int/t/dgap/localdemocracy/strategy_innovation/

616 "The European Label of Governance Excellence" is a part of the Strategy for Innovation and Good Governance.

617 "Administrative Procedure Code," *Promulgated State Gazette* No 30/2006, http://www.lex.bg/bg/laws/ ldoc/2135521015, (December 2013); "Regulation on Administrative Service Delivery", *Promulgated State Gazette* No 78/2006, http://lex.bg/en/laws/ldoc/2135535261/ (December 2013).

3. Promotion of Active Citizenship and Civil Society inclusion in Local Governance process

3.1. Promotion of active citizenship and civil society inclusion through programmes and projects

Traditional forms of direct participation, stipulated in legislation and described above, have limited value. Citizens "*are less trusting of elected officials and professionals to make decisions for them*."[618] This is related with flexible management and new-wave management.[619] The promotion of active citizenship and civil society inclusion in local governance process is part of the new political culture, expecting citizens to participate. Moreover, "*the manager (ed. mayors) and the manager's staff can help strengthen the policy-making capabilities of the governing body by thinking strategically to guide decision-making*", "*using citizens input and expertise*"[620] notably if they step on all previous awareness achievements and experiences.

In Bulgaria, over the past few years more initiatives to promote cooperation and involvement of local communities in the discussion of issues concerning the district are observed. The Metropolitan Municipality launches a specialized program in 2009 to developing the civil society.[621] The program aims at promoting the cooperation between the municipality and the active citizenship. It is an instrument to establish European best practices in community life and the approved principles of good governance at local level. Thus, it is an example of introduction of one of the good governance principles of innovation and openness to change seeking readiness to pilot and experiment new programs and to learn from the experience of others. Also, this initiative is aiming at a climate favorable to change in the interest of achieving better results.

In order to promote the role and the importance of consultative mechanisms and forms of interaction with the public in the implementation

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618 *The Effective Local Government Manager*, (Washington: International City/Country Management Association, 2004), p. 61.

619 Desmond S. King and Jon Pierre (Ed.). *Challenges to Local Government*. SAGE Modern Politics Series, Vol. 28 (London: SAGE Publications, 1990).

620 ibid., p. 59

621 Named "European Projects and Development of Civil Society," funded by the municipal budget.

of public policies of Sofia Municipality, one[622] of the projects, funded under the Program, introduces an electronic catalog of Public and Consultative Councils in Metropolitan Municipality[623] with the purpose to inform citizens and other stakeholders on the opportunities and mechanisms for civil participation in the consultation process within the Capital Municipality, including its districts. From nine Councils[624] listed in the catalog, two are Public Councils to Sofia's district mayors[625].

Another project[626] designed to strengthen the role of the civil society within the Metropolitan Municipality, including its districts, proposes Procedure Rules on Public Councils. The draft regulation[627] settles subject, objectives and principles of the Councils, their tasks and activities, rights and responsibilities, constitution, establishment, management bodies, meetings and procedures for submission of materials and attendance. The Public Councils are divided by types. The Councils to the Districts' mayors are defined as Public Councils with Common Focus in each district. The proposed regulation includes the initiative to create the Council, composition, functions and fields of activity.

One of the three priorities of the next program: the Europe Program[628] is related to the European dimension of the Sofia's Local Government in

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622 "Support to the Consultation Process in the Sofia Municipality."

623 http://erox.throwbeans.com

624 Public Board of Education to the Mayor of Sofia, Advisory Council on Tourism in Sofia Municipality, Advisory Council "Children of Sofia" Advisory Board of Mental Health, Regional Drug Council – Sofia, Public Council on the implementation of Local Agenda for the Decade of Roma Inclusion in Sofia 2007 - 2013, Public Council for Social Policy, Council on Traffic Safety of children in Sofia and Socio-expert Council on Culture. Available at http://erox.throwbeans.com, November, 2013.

625 Public Council - Advisory body to the Mayor of Poduyane District and Citizens' Consultative Council to the mayor of Lozenets District. The interaction practice of another body – Slatina District Council, is studied but not listed.

626 Named "Research, Systematization and Adaptation of Existing Practices For the Operation of the Public Council in Bulgaria and Making Rules for the Interaction between Sofia Municipal Council and the Public Councils in Sofia"

627 Not officially adopted by Municipal Council

628 The successor of "European projects and development of civil society" Program.

Bulgaria. It promotes the interaction between Local Government and Civil Society in designing, implementing and promoting policies and practices. In 2012, a project[629] is funded under the Program, aiming at the contribution to improving the visibility and awareness of the local community, encouraging collaboration and cooperation of the district administration of one of the districts in the capital with the local civil society through the application of the principles of good governance in local government. As one of the results, it establishes Public Council to the mayor of Ovcha Kupel District in Sofia.

Introducing good governance principle of innovation and openness to change through the mentioned programs, in same time, other principles that rather neglected are openness and transparency, and accountability. Apart from projects' visibility and publicity activities, there is only fragmentary information[630] available in an effective manner. Other programmes, such as Operational Program "Administrative Capacity" for the period 2007-2013,[631] are in their early stage. The one under the European Economic Area Financial Mechanism[632] in its part of inclusion of civil society is in the process of policy formulation and decision-making together with the institutions at local and regional level, aim at strengthen the civil society and encourage it for an active civil participation. For example, concerning the matter under consideration, a Good Practices Compendium is issued[633] under the first one with best practices from Bulgaria and European Union. At

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629 Named "Together Ahead"

630 For funded projects in 2009 and list of beneficiaries in 2011 see, http://www.sofia.bg/display.asp?ime=ei_project_eu&title=%CF%F0%EE%E3%F0%E0%EC%E0%20%C5%E2%F0%EE%EF%E0&pathtitle=%C5%E2%F0%EE%EF%E5%E9%F1%EA%E8%20%EF%F0%EE%E3%F0%E0%EC%E8%20%EF%F0%EE%E5%EA%F2%E8%20%E8%20%EF%F0%E5%E4%F1%F2%E0%E2%E8%F2%E5%EB%F1%F2%E2%E0

631 Financed by the European Social Fund and the National Budget.

632 The donor states are Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway.

633 In 2009, as a product of the project "Public Council: The Live Link Between Citizens And Local Government."

district level, there are three examples of established Councils[634] in all the three cities with district division in Bulgaria.


Thus, since more than 5 years there are visible purposeful initiatives for promotion of active citizenship and civil society inclusion in local governance process, which have resulted in development of the above-mentioned products such as Electronic Public Catalogue, Good Practices Compendium, Draft Rules on Public Councils in Sofia's Local Government - Districts Local Government, establishment of functioning Public District Council. They also resulted in published White Paper on the Citizens' Participation in Bulgaria and other projects' results, such as Minimum Standards on the interaction between institutions and citizens, Standard Documents on the establishment of Local Councils (ex. Draft Procedure Rules, guidelines, templates of main documents). It is a sufficient basis for further progress of democratic civil participation. However, more efforts need to be put on transparency and accountancy issues, especially in consideration of systematization and effectiveness of provided information to citizens.

3.2. Initiatives for Cooperation and Citizens Involvement in Local Government Decision-Making Processes at District level in Bulgaria

Directly or indirectly, as result of the promotion of active citizenship and civil society; the Public Councils, Local or Consultative Councils, Civil Advisory Councils and others are introduced operating as a form of dialogue with citizens and as body of interaction in the process of consultation and decision-making, as well as for information, coordination and accountability at the district level. This is a direct form of citizens' participation. This practice of information and interaction between local government and civil society fully corresponds to the principles of good governance and good administration. The bodies operate entirely voluntarily and they unite citizens in support of the development of the district. The initiative for their creation stems from the district mayor or the civil society and active citizens.

[634] Public Advisory Council to Lozenets District (Sofia), Public Council to Primorski District (Varna), Public Council to Trakia District (Plovdiv). Actually, there is public information only about the functioning of the last one.

Figure 2. Established and Functioning Public Councils to Local Governments at District Level in Bulgaria



Public Councils are established to the District mayors[635] in several of the 35 districts as a general rule with the relevant regulations on organization and procedure, and/or concrete realized initiatives and projects. From quantitative point of view, as shown in Figure 2, from all districts only in 8 of them, the initiative of interaction between civil society and local government at district level has resulted in establishment of Public Councils, of which only 2 have recent initiatives and active interaction with citizens and partnership with stakeholders is functioning. The other could be indicative for inoperative structures, formal ones or in deep lack of transparency, feedback and accountability. The last are among the assumptions for repulsion of citizens from active dialogue with local governments together with lack of sufficient publicity and formal public discussions, low awareness of the citizens on their rights and on legal possibilities for their influence on local governments.[636] But from another perspective, the issues related to the discouragement of local governments to promote civil participation "*given the low* interest of the public", also on overcoming the syndrome of "*passive* consumption and total criticism" should be mastered by involving the citizens


[635] According to public information from different sources. Only five Public Councils have information published on official websites of respective district administration or have their own website.

[636] National Association of Municipalities in the Republic of Bulgaria, p. 10-11.

as a "*permanent* participant in the dialogue to solve problems by generating ideas and suggestions as partner in their implementation".”[637]

From the next figure (Figure 3) it is clear that in 77 % of the Local Governments at District level in Bulgaria, there is neither experience nor practices of direct civil participation of the here-described form of regular dialogue with local communities. Although, such practices are largely widespread in other European Metropolitan municipality.[638] Also, even that there are some initiatives of interaction with civil society and realized promotion, these forms of civil partnership are still rather unstable and challenging to withstand over time. Moreover, having into account that the initiatives of cooperation and partnership reach almost a quarter but few of them continue to be operative in the time, it could be indicator that the above-mentioned assumptions to master the described syndromes and discourages are not passable.

Figure 3. Percentage of Functioning and Non-functioning Public Councils (PC) to Local Government at District Level in Bulgaria



637 Velikova (2008), p. 145

638 Such examples are Paris, France and Brussels, Belgium.

From 24 districts within the Metropolitan municipality, five of them have introduced Public Councils since 2007. Three[639] of them have visibility through official information about Procedure rules, organization and management, agendas and meetings, decisions and initiatives, and others. Another three District Public Councils are implemented within the Varna Municipality and Plovdiv Municipality, two of them in Varna[640] and one[641] in Plovdiv[642]. All are listed in the following **Table 1**.

As shown in the above Table 1, the practice of established District Public Councils varies largely. The Councils' names differ; the legal form is both formal (registered non-government organizations) and informal (not registered bodies), the year of establishment is in the period 2007-2012[643] with one exception. The similarities concern the constitution; generally they are established following Constituent Assembly; and commonly introduced rules on organization and procedure. Characteristics for the rules are that all the elements incorporated in the above-mentioned draft with slight variations, usually in purpose, fields of activity, composition, managing board, rights and obligations, duration, procedures and so on. Mostly, it is a joint initiative of the mayor, citizens of the district and civil society organizations. Such example is the District Public Council to the mayor of Primorski District in Varna[644]. In all cases the work is done on a voluntary basis[645].

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639 Ovcha Kupel, Poduyane and Sredets.

640 From totally 5 districts, namely Asparuhovo, Vladislav Varnenchik, Mladost, Odesos and Primorski.

641 Information on web address http://trakia-plovdiv.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=87&Itemid=85, (December 2013).

642 From totally 6 districts, namely Central, East, West, North, South and Trakia.

643 Including for Poduyane District Public Council.

644 One of the initiator and member of the Council is the NGO Association "Green Varna".

645 Volunteerism as defined by Ann O'M. Bowman and Richard C. Kearney, "form of participation in which individuals or groups donate time and money to a public purpose, a means of bringing fresh ideas and energy, whether physical or financial, into government while relieving some of the service burden." *State and Local Government* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2002), p. 104

Municipality				SOFIA		VARNA		PLOVDIV
District	*Lozenets*	*Mladost*	*Ovcha Kupel*	*Poduyane*	*Sredets*	*Vladislav Varnenchik*	*Primorski*	*Trakia*
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Public Council	Citizens Consultative Council	District Public Council	Public Council	Public Council	Citizens Consultative Council	Civic District Council	Public Council	Civic Council "Trakia"
Visibility	Compendium	NGO Register	District's website	Website	Website	Website	Compendium	Website
Legal form	Not legal entity	Legal entity	Not legal entity	Not legal entity	Not legal entity	Not legal entity	Not legal entity	Legal entity
Constitution	Constituent Assembly	Constituent Assembly	N/A	N/A	Constituent Assembly	Constituent Assembly	Constituent Assembly	N/A
Year of Establishment	*2009*	*2007*	*2012*	*N/A*	*2010*	*2010*	*2001*	*2007*
Procedure Rules published	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	N/A	Yes	N/A

Table 1. Public Councils in Local Government at District Level in Bulgaria

Concerning the transparency, it should be noted that there is a significant lack of information, the information is not published on official websites of District Local Government, or even published information is not consequently structured. As public bodies established in public interest, it is of high importance for the active citizens' involvement to have sufficient and well organized, easy to find information about these forms of regular dialogue. Good but diverse examples in this direction are functioning Metropolitan Districts Public Councils at Poduyane and Ovcha Kupel Districts. In the first case, publicity is provided by its own website[646] with focus on the news and initiatives. In the second one, there is complete visibility, including the constituent process, Procedure Rules, meetings, initiatives, on the internet site of the respective district administration.[647]

The objectives of the District Public Council are multiple but commonly limited[648] to the restricted powers of the District mayors. All of them are established with clear purpose and listed fields of activity. Generally, they are set out to unite the community in support of the district's development; to serve as a structured form of dialogue between local government and active citizenship; to promote active citizenship and civil participation with ideas, suggestions, initiatives and more; to participate and assist in the formulation and implementation of policies and practices throughout the district related to the fields of activity of the Council; to provide expert support in benefit of the local community, citizens and society. The objectives and the main fields of activity are presented in **Table 2.**

The practices of organization and management are not uniform, as well as for selection/election and representativeness. The Councils are carried out by President, Vice-president, Coordinator and/or Secretary, elected by their members.

[646] Available at http://www.os-poduiane.org/index.html (December 2013).

[647] Available at http://www.ovchakupel.bg/index.php/bg/ (December 2013).

[648] Usually in the fields of Economic Development, Territorial Development and Public Works, Environment and Ecology, Education and Youth activities, Culture, Civil Society and Rule of Law, Public Order and Security, Health and Social Work.

Municipality	SOFIA					VARNA		PLOVDIV
District	*Lozenets*	*Mladost*	*Ovcha Kupel*	*Poduyane*	*Sredets*	*Vladislav Varnenchik*	*Primorski*	*Trakia*
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Public Council	Citizens Consultative Council	District Public Council	Public Council	Public Council	Citizens Consultative Council	Civic District Council	Public Council	Civic Council "Trakia"
Objectives	Expert support, contribution to policies elaboration and implementation, civil participation, consultations	Participation of wide range of representatives of civil society, information, coordination, lobbing	Support of district development, structured form of dialogue and active citizenship, participation with ideas, suggestions, initiatives, formulation and implementation of policies and practices, expert support	To Unite and coordinate the potential of wide range of organizations and institutions to effectively solve the problems of the district	Consultations, cooperation and coordination, policy formulation and implementation in priority areas	Effective civil control and active citizens' position	Collaboration in decision-making for problematic issues, transparency of Municipal Council's decisions	Compensation of lack of officially elected District Council through the mechanism of civil society
Main fields of activity	Local policies, Quality of administrative service	Economic development, Territorial development and public works, Environment and Ecology, Education and Youth activities, Culture, Civil society and rule of law, Public order and security, Health and social work	Economic development, Territorial development and public works, Environment and Ecology, Education and Youth activities, Culture, Civil society and rule of law, Public order and security, Health and social work	Culture	Environment protection, Green spaces, Public works, Quality of administrative service, Youth and sports, Culture, Civil society and rule of law, Public order and security, Integration in sicial and culture life of elderly and disadvantaged people	N/A	Regional development, social support, culture, sports, youth	Infrastructure, Public works, Priorities formulation

Table 2. Objectives and Fields of Activity of Public Councils to Local Government at District Level in Bulgaria

In some cases, the mayor of the district is the principal of the Public Council (Poduyane) and carries out direct supervision of the work of the Council, in others it is President (Ovcha Kupel). Representatives of the district administration participate in the meetings. In **Table 3** the different approaches are compared.

As shown in Table 3, most of the Councils have stated the possibility to form permanent and temporary expert working groups upon necessity. The only exception with three working groups is Poduyane District formed on the topics: Education, Culture and Sport; Transport, Infrastructure and Architecture; Landscaping and Ecology. However, there is no evidence of such practices incorporated. Generally, the Councils are open widely to active citizens. This includes active poor people, women and minorities participation as pointed out in relation with the above-mentioned Millennium goals. Members are representatives of public, private and NGO sector. There are three cases in which the composition is homogenous (NGOs or House managers). A common other characteristic to the last ones is that there is not visibility for recent initiatives and activity. As for the activity, only four of the eight councils have announced projects or concrete initiatives realized. More, two of them have a working plan without any subsequent reports. Even if the Councils, according to their Procedure Rules, meet at least once every two months to four times annually, the agenda is not pre-announced with one exception.

The initiatives held by the Councils are mainly in the fields of culture, green areas, protection of environment, some of them on project basis. Such examples are the charity events (Charity concert, painting exhibition for young talent, projection of the documentary "From sea to the empyrean" in relation with Summer Olympics, Spring Art Salon by artists of different generations), also green or ecological initiative for better urban environment. The first ones are supported by private and local public member-organizations; the last one is developed and performed as project funded by external non-government source. Thus, this form of civic partnership aids financially and provides expertise for local governments in pursuing common district development causes and objectives as stated generally in the Regional Development Strategy.

Municipality	SOFIA				VARNA		PLOVDIV	
District	*Lozenets*	*Mladost*	*Ovcha Kupel*	*Poduyane*	*Sredets*	*Vladislav Varnenchik*	*Primorski*	*Trakia*
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Public Council	Citizens Consultative Council	District Public Council	Public Council	Public Council	Citizens Consultative Council	Civic District Council	Public Council	Civic Council "Trakia"
Managing Board	President and Secretary	President, Vice-President and Secretary	President, Vice-President, Coordinator and Secretary	President, Coordinator and Secretary	President, Vice-President and Secretary	Secretary	N/A	N/A
Members	NGOs, House manager (totally 11)	NGOs, Business, politics, Initiative Committees' representatives, Experts	NGOs, State bodies, Local bodies, Experts, Active citizens, House managers (totally 15)	NGOs, Business, State bodies, Local bodies, Experts, Active citizens	NGOs (totally 11)	NGOs, Business, State bodies, Local bodies, Experts, Active citizens, House managers (totally 43)	N/A	House managers (totally 39)
Expert Working groups	N/A	Permanent and temporary	Permanent and temporary	Three experts councils	Permanent and temporary	Permanent and temporary	N/A	N/A

Table 3: Aspects of Management and organization of Public Councils to Local Government at District level in Bulgaria

In some of the initiatives, such as public discussions and ideas and information exchange, two of the Councils are cooperating.[649] It is also worth to mention a quite different activity is the one related to the infrastructure, introducing construction program in Trakia District in 2009 and 2010.[650] Council's members have the control functions on the implementation of planned expenditure and their powers include notifying the Mayor in identifying inconsistencies and need for corrective action. Moreover, the mayor should report at the end of the year to the Public Council on the implementation of the budget and planned activities. But no follow-up is evident, neither public reports.

So, founded Public Councils, Civil District Councils or Consultative Councils are created as forms of regular and structured dialogue with local community meant at information, coordination, consultation, cooperation and accountancy. Usually they seek publicity, communication and promotion of civic participation in public life, social and economic development of the district, respectfully of the metropolitan area or city. But except some incomplete information mainly about establishment, Procedure Rules and/or one early activity, in most cases there is no further evidence for activity and concrete initiatives, projects and accountability. Common for all Public Councils is that they are not political structures and do not engage in political and/or religious activities. Their purpose remains the union of citizens to support the development of the relevant district.

Conclusion

The study of the interaction between the local government at district level and civil society showed that over the past few years in Bulgaria there are attempts to develop cooperation and partnership with the local community and to increase its awareness. First, there is regulation of social relations associated with local government and local administration is developed to include the direct participation of citizens and particularly the citizens' initiatives and local cooperation; and second, there are initiatives to

649 Ovcha Kupel and Poduyane

650 Information on web address http://trakia-plovdiv.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=87&Itemid=85, (December 2013).

encourage activity of civil society and interaction with local government exist.

As a result of the study, it should be mentioned the findings of occasional initiatives for citizens' involvement initiated both by civil society and local government at district level as a form of direct civil participation mainly in the period 2007-2010. Also, the deficiency of unified practices, rules and approaches as well as volunteering must be noted as common traits. The Bulgarian practice of promotion and interaction between civil society and local governments at district level till nowadays is characterized by empathic lack of sustainability. From eight Public Councils established for interaction with civil society, studied as a result of various initiatives and sources, few of them seem functioning at present. There is an obvious shortage of consistency and stability in terms of activity even since the first steps of establishment of such councils. This directly and significantly have an impact on the possibility of citizens to engage and influence public processes to achieve civic goals to district local government level.

Moreover, characteristic is the insufficient transparency and openness, both in relation with the establishment of the Councils, either within their period of activity. None or limited initiatives are public, usually implemented at the very beginning phase. In rare cases there is public information on the action plans, agendas, decisions, initiatives, etc. The information needs to be better structured. Once there is an initiative for publicity in a well-structured manner, the data is not up-dated and the need for actual and complete information is still there. It reflects on the efficiency of the provided information ensuing from different reasons, such could be bad organization, poor delegation of duties, lack of administrative capacity, even lack of organization and indolence. In any case, the timely, accessible and full information to provide is a must, in order to create basic conditions for active citizenship. Other findings are related with unaccountability and formal citizens' involvement, passive citizens' participation and few tangible results. This shows that the varied attempts for promotion and interaction initiatives are not stable and result-oriented in long-term. Also, this is quite indicative for shortcoming of introduction or failure of number of principles of good and democratic governance at local district level.

However, despite the weaknesses noted, the cooperation between both active Public Councils at district level in Metropolitan municipality could be examined as good European practice.

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Citizens' Involvement in the Local Governance Processes in Georgia: Tbilisi Case Analyzes in Direction of Cultural Heritage

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Introduction

In current political reality in Georgia, activeness of civil society is very crucial. You all know about the political changes in Georgia, but the local government elections are yet to come. So I decided to discuss the importance of society involvement regarding cultural heritage processes of Tbilisi in direction of local government.

"Cultural heritage is the part of culture, which established, maintained and recovered the importance of values in society development process and transfers through generations." (The Law about Cultural Heritage, Georgia).

"Local Government is the right and the opportunity of Georgian citizens, to manage local issues through legislative processes and local government institutions, in cooperation with local citizens." (The Law about Local Government, Georgia)

Citizens' involvement in executing local governance is very significant principle of democracy. Local government, which represents the closest branch to the population, must accomplish the governance in terms of pursuing the interests of citizens. The citizens, themselves must be interested in controlling the local branch in order to achieve the desired outcome.

According to the international experiences and the principle of subsidiarity, which itself considers the decentralization of power between the governmental branches in order to execute the implementation more effectively, the local government institutions better regulate the issues regarding cultural heritage. This means that decisions are made on local level

in cooperation with citizens, which itself, increases the probability of successful outcomes in decision making process.

I must admit that lately cultural heritage has become a luxury matter in Georgia, as there are many general problems, which are considered more important for the country; but still problems regarding cultural heritage is the case when civil society has to realize that we carry enormous responsibility to the future generation and we must defend and take care of our cultural values.

Throughout the paper I will try to concentrate on the rehabilitation process in Tbilisi and the importance of cooperation between citizens and local governmental institutions (in our case Tbilisi City Hall).

Case Analysis

I will start the case analysis with the legislative changes in this direction. In 2008 amendments were made in the "Law about Cultural Heritage of Georgia". According to these changes, the responsibility and authority on the cultural heritage of Tbilisi was granted to The City Hall, which previously was the prerogative of Ministry of Culture and Monuments Protection of Georgia (The Law about Cultural Heritage, Georgia). On the one hand, it seemed as an optimized decision and had its positive aspects. However, I will discuss three different cases, which outline the importance of society involvement in governmental processes and on the other hand, the duty of the local governance institutions - motivation of the population in direction of participation in social and political activities.

The Reconstruction of Davit Aghmashenebeli Avenue

Davit Aghmashenebeli Avenue is one of the oldest avenues in Tbilisi. It is located on the left bank of the river Mtkvari in the old part of the town. Most of the buildings located there have monumental statuses. Tbilisi city hall conducted a research, which has shown that the buildings were in drastic conditions, they needed urgent base reinforcement, framing of the windows, facades and etc. In 2009 Tbilisi city hall launched the rehabilitation works, reconstruction of the buildings and restoration of the facades. [651]

[651] The official Web Site of Tbilisi City Hall http://www.tbilisi.gov.ge/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=5062

Total amount of the budget, spent on architectural works, was 634 000 000 GEL[652]. It is notable that citizens' participation was not envisaged in the rehabilitation process. Project was completed without considering any of demands of the population. The involvement of the civil society was on its lowest point. It is remarkable that during the restoration process lots of methodological omissions emerged, which are completely unacceptable and technically irreparable; cultural heritage is the matter that requires acknowledged steps, otherwise, it will lose the authentic appearance.

For the result, the rehabilitation is completed; but on the background of nonexistence of cooperation between the local government and the society, we faced an unsatisfied population, a lost cultural heritage, and no economic benefit. In my opinion, local managing power must stimulate the civil society into symbolic involvement in revitalization process, because we face its significance in final results. Based on international experience, the involvement could be accomplished in the way of symbolic co-funding; local population could take participation in restoration process. When the level of participation increases the filling of national identity is strengthened, the risk of omissions is decreased and the citizens are determined to defend and maintain their properties which carry cultural values. Prerequisites of citizens' involvement should be motivation of the population to manage the economic outcome: "rehabilitation for rehabilitation" stands for nothing, it should be in chain reaction with the economic outcome. Government should initiate and conduct special workshops for the population to maintain the knowledge about managing economic benefits.

Of course it's progressive when local governmental institutions initiate the rehabilitation of cultural heritage monuments, but if there is no civic involvement and the restoration is being conducted beyond the needs and demands of the population, we always get unfavorable result.

After the legislative changes that mentioned above, Tbilisi City Hall seemed to have a policy, which was oriented on foreign investors and thus, to say it slightly, paid less attention to the monuments of cultural importance of the city. The City Hall had the privilege to remove the monumental status to the buildings, which simplified the destruction of monumental buildings and gave the opportunity to build new skyscrapers and hotels. So the result of the

[652] The Research of "Georgian Young Lawyers Association" (GYLA)

legal changes was that The City Hall had the conflict of interest among the attraction of the investors and defending the cultural heritage. The balance was lost between the two above mentioned issues; the representatives of City Hall announced that the attraction of the investors was the matter of higher priority. They connected this to the development of tourism, which itself contributes to the economic growth. This approach is of course acceptable as a general policy of the country but not in the context of total loss of cultural heritage of the city, and the state should have the foreseen management strategy of the "Economics of Cultural Heritage". In this direction I would like to discuss one very important case of civic activeness and society involvement in cultural and social processes:

Gudiashvili Square

This is the case which signifies the importance of citizens' involvement in local government processes. The square of Gudiashvili is the only square in 21-st century in Tbilisi which has preserved the authentic style. The buildings located on this square have monumental statuses and are on the balance of Tbilisi City Hall. In 2008 the city hall drafted a contract with an Austrian-Georgian investing company "Irao Magnat Group" about the property privatization. It's notable that the contract didn't include the part about the square's monumental status and historical values. The investing company has announced the international tender and published the winner project on the web-site[653]. The project scheme was the de-montage of old buildings and construction of new modernistic buildings, which of course would have caused the loss of the cultural values and heritage of the square.

The published project attracted the public interest. Non-governmental organization "Tiflis Hamkari" initiated the protest manifestations on the square. This was the first case throughout the city, when manifestation didn't have only the protest form. The organizers of the manifest arranged informative exhibitions of the old photos of the buildings, arranged social and cultural activities on the square; the information was spreading fast through social networks, television and press. People gathered on the square selling handicraft, wines, vintage collections, organized different performances and

[653] Georgian Analytical Magazine "Liberali" (In Georgian) http://www.liberali.ge/ge/liberali/articles/ 106052/

etc. The collected money was being used to organize the next manifestation. The slogan for the protest activity was "Minifest for Manifest". These social activities took place twice a month during a year.[654]

In 2011, the investing company refused to implement the project approved by the city hall. Because of dynamic social activities, they faced the fact that the de-montage of the buildings wouldn't bring the positive outcome. Long-term manifestations expressed the society's strict and sensitive attitude to their cultural values. They realized that they have the right and responsibility to be involved in social activities and to manage the civil processes in direction of their interests in terms of defending and taking care of their cultural heritage.

As for the present situation, the civil society demands from the City Hall to transfer the historical property to an investing company for a symbolic price, in terms of budget saving that will be expended in authentic rehabilitation process.

The last case reveals the importance of stimulation and motivation of the society as the necessity of their involvement in social, political and cultural activities and significance of participation on the international level.

Betlemi District

The district of Betlemi is located in mid-century center of Tbilisi. The buildings represent best samples of nationality, churches and towers of universal values. In 2000 the sociological research was conducted in the district and the strategy of reconstruction was developed. The research revealed that the population didn't realize the importance of authentic restoration and because of severe conditions of the buildings they preferred to demolish the old buildings and reconstruct them in a new way. In 2004 ICOMOS Georgia (International Council on Monuments and Sites) initiated a project. The aim of the project was to develop the management model which would encourage local population to participate in rehabilitation process and raise their awareness about the importance and historical values, which carried the district they lived in. ICOMOS started organizing the introductory meetings with the population. The project was funded by

[654] "Tiflis Hamqari" (In Georgian) retrived through http://www.scribd.com/Hamqari

embassy of Norway in Georgia. Once in a week the population gathered and got information about their cultural history by different activities. The aim of the project - mobilization of local population and raising the level of their activeness - was achieved. [655]

Local population got involved not only in the development process of the rehabilitation but also in monitoring and directly took part in construction process. They became actively engaged in the process. Many of them obtained knowledge in restoration and did it by themselves. It's notable that for that time appeared new workplaces for the local population, they got the economic benefit by building and decorating cafes, galleries, restaurants and nowadays it's one of the most visited places in Tbilisi.

The Rehabilitation process still continues; ICOMOS is permanently working on fund raising by international donor organizations. Raised awareness of the population about cultural heritage and their produced cautious and sensitive attitude to the historical territory of their property, strengthened the filling of national identity and raised their responsibility to defend and take care of our cultural heritage.

Conclusion

After all the above mentioned, we may say that, it's very important that activities in direction of cultural heritage should be initiated by local government institutions as they represent the closest branch to the population and appear to be the facilitators of public interest.

The state should form a policy to stimulate the society and emphasize the significance of their involvement in civic activities. Additionally the state must establish the managing system of the "Economics of Cultural Heritage", which is one the most essential steps for further economic development of the country, in terms of emerging cultural heritage administration. We must take international experience into consideration; the state must create favorable conditions for private sector and encourage their contribution in taking care of the values of the city.

Historical restoration of the territory must bring the economic outcome to the city, and generally to the county. Because of inaccurately planned policy

[655] N. Cincabadze, *Tbilisi, Revitalization of Betlemi District* (2011) p. 14

and not envisaging the risk factors, we face unsuccessful outcomes in rehabilitation process. Regrettably, Georgia has experienced several cases when restorations of monumental cities have drastic results which are contrary to international experience. Local government sector must initiate the rehabilitation process in direction of needs and demands of the population in order to avoid unfavorable results.

It's also worth mentioning that City Councils, grass root based organizations that should be the facilitators of society's requirements, have been rather closed entities, which mostly used to lobby interests of different business organizations and enterprises, absolutely disregarding the importance of cultural heritage and civic participation. So as a reasonable and efficient alternative we can consider the formation of open and transparent city councils, which should be initiated and established to work in coordination with local governance institutions. The city councils must consist of competent people: architects, experts of culture, active citizens, employees of the City Hall and other civil society or non-governmental institutions.

As I previously mentioned the government of Georgia is still in the process of formation. In 2012 the population of Georgia re-elected the government. Because of the policy of Tbilisi City hall, which was completely in conflict with the decentralization process, the Ministry of Culture and Monuments Protections of Georgia had to make the amendments in the "Law about Cultural Heritage " in 2013 and take back the responsibility about cultural heritage of the city. In 2014 Local Government elections will be held and the existing managing power will be replaced; legislative changes in cultural heritage are predicted again…

Meanwhile, the current situation Georgia is that the civil society is very active, I'm glad to admit that citizens seem to have realized their influence and responsibility of participation in decision making processes. Different sociological researches are being conducted, which will reflect the situation in cultural heritage of the town. The requirements will be revealed and hopefully, by sharing the international experience, activeness of civil society and organized steps of newly formed government, we will receive the desired outcome.

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"Fundamental Problems of Local Government in Georgia"

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Introduction

The decentralization process is the basics of democratic development. Usually central governments of different countries try to avoid wide power distribution but still it is the process which is irreversible for modern democracies. This process itself consists of many factors, such as administrative arrangements, delimitation of competences, financial and property issues, structural formation processes, control instruments, etc. The paper is concentrated on the administrative-territorial arrangements what occur to be the main obstacles in development of local governance in Georgia. (Caucasus Institute for Peace Democracy and Development)

According to the Georgian Organic Law "On Local Government and Self-Government", article 1; Local governance is the right and the opportunity of Georgian citizens to manage local issues through legislative processes and local government institutions in cooperation with local citizens.

Generally speaking local governance has 4 functions, which are:

1. State Service Distribution;
2. Decrease of the distance between governance and citizens;
3. Development of local political elites;
4. Enactment of the decentralization process opposite the disintegration.

Local Governance is considered to be communal governance as it is the closest state agency to the population, with one main purpose: to solve the problematic issues of citizens from the closest position via distribution of different services. Delivery of proper social programs and services is of great importance and influence, and the government can achieve citizens' loyalty

and trust using this mechanism. But what happens when the communication and interaction between the citizens and government is indirect and inefficient, or when local governance is not capable to fulfill its functions? Georgian local governance has undergone through various reforms and territorial and structural changes since 1991. The last reforms have widened the borders of municipalities, which as a phenomenon has its positive and negative outcomes. These rearrangements of administrative-territorial borders have changed the communication process between citizens and the state. Nowadays a new wave of the reform is coming through the changes in the organic law "On Local Governance and Self-Governance". As the changes have not been adopted yet (though are being discussed widely), main points of the paper will be those indirect cooperation processes between the local governance units and local population today.

Without proper administrative and territory reform local governance is just a formality. Academic research about Georgian territorial arrangement model has not been yet conducted. The paper presented is an attempt to raise awareness regarding this issue.

Historical Discourse

After the collapse of Soviet Union Georgia has undergone through several administrative and territorial reforms changing the territorial arrangement throughout the country (time frame from 1991 to 2005).

During the Soviet era, institutions of local self-governance existed only in the form of puppet organizations. Neither the Constitution nor legislation acknowledged the concept of self-governance. Furthermore, there was no separation of competencies between different administrative levels. According to the Constitution, all soviets had similar competencies and responsibilities. (D. Losabreidze [et al], p. 270)

Local administration from 1990 to 1991 generally functioned on two levels. The first level was constituted by villages, settlements and towns. The representative body was the local council (Sakrebulo), elected for a three years term. The head of local administration (Gamgebeli) was nominated by the prefect and validated by the local council. The law also specified the following categories of local government: district, town, city district, community, settlement and village. In 1993-1995 nine regions have been

introduced and "The Envoy of President of State" (a special position) was appointed in each region. A strong administrative hierarchy has been established as special governors worked in absolute coordination with the central state. In 1995, after the enactment of Georgian Constitution, the issue of territory arrangement was left open as the jurisdiction was not complete through the country, because of conflict zones. (Vano Khukhunaishvili Center for Effective Governance System and Territorial Arrangement Reform)

Georgia applied for membership to Council of Europe (COE) in 1997 and agreed to conduct free and democratic local elections no later than autumn 1998. This year was also notable as the organic law "On Local Governance and Self-Governance" was adopted in August 1997. In November 1998 local election was held in 1031 administrative units, out of which 971 were self governing units and 60 – local governing unit. (National Parliamentary Library of Georgia)

Between 1998 and 2002, twenty seven units were added to the whole aggregate according to new territory reform as little settlements dissociated from the villages. Accordingly on the 2nd of June in 2002, local elections were held in 998 self governing units. To go through the territory arrangement of 2005, there were following levels of governance. (Vano Khukhunaishvili Center for Effective Governance System and Territorial Arrangement Reform):

1. 9 Regions – out of which there was Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia and 2 autonomous republics. The above mentioned level was not concretely isolated by the rule of law;
2. Middle level – 65 districts and 6 cities, which were not in the submission of the region;
3. Lower, third level – 1004 units (Villages, tribes, settlements and cities).

The above mentioned were the only legitimated local governance levels. After the "Rose Revolution" the reform of local governance came out to be the priority for the new government and in 2005 President of Georgia issued the edict no. 136 by which the "territory reform state commission" was established to decentralize managerial system and implement the new reform

for the effective management and local governance (National Parliamentary Library of Georgian)

Problem Formulation

2006 was the year of essential changes in terms of country's administrative-territorial arrangement. After the declaration of the election results, the lower level local governance units (villages, tribes, settlements and cities) were abolished. The only governing unit in the district came out to be the municipal unit. The villages were deprived of legal entity status and the "Gamgebeli" nominated the village governor, direct elections were abolished. The principles of local and central governance were not properly separated, even though the difference between these two is rather significant. By the local government concept public officials must be elected, which are obliged to represent the needs and demands of their own villagers, the population in their territorial unites. But after the reform the picture we had was, with the exception of the mayor of Tbilisi who is directly elected, all local governance officials were appointed to their positions directly by the central government. (Caucasus Institute for Peace Democracy and Development)

After the abolishment of their legal entity status and the territorial rearrangements, the village units were left without their own budgeting and property. Experts had different views about the enlargement of the municipality units. Those who declared that larger municipal units would be more efficient used the economical power and sustainability of larger units as an argument. After the process of border widening, the mobilization of financial resources would be much easier and, as a result, this would have caused development of municipal services. Also another positive aspect would be the formation of municipal offices with more qualified and competent public officials and the bureaucracy processes would become easier to manage, which itself would positively contribute to the optimization of the administration in general.

On the other hand, the opponents of the boarder enlargement convinced that, this kind of change would increase the distance between local citizens and weak local government units. Villagers often have to visit administrative center of the municipality to solve the problems of their villages, what in

conditions of poor infrastructure is rather problematic, especially for the alpine villages. With poor resources and budgeting, local government units became absolutely dependent on the center financially, instead of decentralization. In 2005-2006 this types of financial influence from the center was unofficial, and it 2007 with new law changes and legislative acts this mechanism was in the new legal framework.

The power concentrated on the highest levels of government caused the threats of politicized processes. After the territorial border enlargement policy, the central government differentiated municipalities because of diverse infrastructure and opportunities and all this was also very tightly connected to the political objectives: "to please the municipality were the electorate is more numerous, to gain the loyalty of the citizens and votes for the elections."

After the territorial rearrangement the population in terms of municipal units increased dramatically. If the population of first level local government unit was 4 354 before the reform, the number of average citizens per municipal unit raised to 48 380. The new statistics is absolutely different from the countries of European Union: in 40 out of 47 EU members and also in numerous developed countries the number of average citizens in a municipal unit is between 7 to 18 thousand inhabitants.

EU responded rather critically about the above mentioned changes and gave rather strict recommendations. In the EU resolution no. 1415 (2005), resolution no. 1477 (2006) and in document no. 10779 (2006) we can see the following criticism: "the municipal level in Georgia is too large for the existing local governance, as they do not have resources to accomplish the authority, what itself causes the threat of the politicized government." The document also underlines that the euphoria of "Rose Revolution" has already passed and the integration of Georgia in EU processes depends on real and strategic plans and actions in direction of local governance development. (Caucasus Institute for Peace Democracy and Development)

The administrative-territorial reform and its outcomes, not only violated the fundamental processes of local governance, but it is also against the "European Charter of Local Self-Government" and its articles, which the parliament of Georgia ratified on 26th of October, 2004. From 14 articles of the Charter Georgia has ratified 10, out of which the 4th article of the document is about the subsidiary principle, which is defined as follows:

*"*Public responsibilities shall generally be exercised, in preference, by those authorities who are closest to the citizen. Allocation of responsibility to another authority should weigh up the extent and nature of the task and requirements of efficiency and economy." The excerpt implicates the most important democratic and constructive principle that authority should be built "from bottom to top." (Vano Khukhunaishvili Center for effective Governance System and Territorial Arrangement Reform)

Since 2006 central government unofficially gained more and more authority, while decreasing the authority of the municipalities on the local level, in terms of exclusive authority realization, such as communal issues (water and sewerage), and the Ministry of Regional and Infrastructure Development came out to be the executive public agency in this type of services.

With the removal of local budgeting process and property management from villages to larger municipal centers, village has lost its functions. To improve the situation, Ministry of Regional Development and Infrastructure established "Village support program" what in its very beginning has been a populism oriented project. In 2009 by the government's ordinance #41 – 50 million Georgian Laris were supposed to be allocated among 3900 villages, which could not even solve the problems of low priority of the local villagers. Corruption and inappropriate spending followed the establishment of the "Village support program".

With the optimization of administration, financial and human resources were centralized in municipal centers. This kind of changes stimulated migration processes from the villages to the district centers and cities. The population of the villages has decreasing trend. According to the statistics of 2002, out of 3900 villages (Mtskheta-Mtianeti Information Center):

- 162 villages are absolutely abandoned;
- 152 villages are populated with citizens from 1-10;
- 169 villages are populated with citizens from 11-25;
- 224 villages are populated with citizens from 22-40;
- 360 villages are populated with citizens from 51-100.

To sum up the problem formulation: there are directions of problems which are important to be solved, such as territorial arrangement, conformity to international standards, budgeting, election processes and decision making.

Democratic forms of governance at the local level were not established; there is still no clear strategy and orientation about the territorial arrangement; existing local governance principles are not capable to ensure socio-economical development; social awareness about local governance is rather low and all new initiatives come from international experience, which is not tailored and adapted to Georgian reality.

Conclusion

Territorial rearrangements brought limited financial sustainability to the municipal units. It is also rather problematic and obscure in terms of time and resource consuming as new boundaries, positions of officials (some citizens don't even understand whom they should contact: the "Gamgebeli", The Ministry of Regional and Infrastructural Development, or appointed village governor) and administrative centers are distanced from citizens. As a result villagers and former small municipalities have limited financial autonomy and insufficient own revenues; frequent interventions from regional governors into local affairs; not clear regional development strategy; underdeveloped local economy; nonexistence of institutionalized interest groups (David Melua).

From the other point of view in this model government officials easily implement new policies, spend less time on negotiations, are financially more certain and stable and heads of local executives are accountable to local elected officials.

With the changes is the organic law "On Local Government and Self-Government", the number of self-governing cities will increase as city status will be given to settlements with population more then 15 000. Also the budgeting system and the fiscal policy will be more decentralized. Village councils will be established, for the local policy to be more flexible and adequate to the needs of local population. This draft law is initiated to be discussed at the parliamentary sessions nowadays.

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ECONOMY AND DOMESTIC POLITICS

Long Waves of Regional Co-Operation in Black Sea Region: Challenges and Opportunities for Turkey's Energy Security

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Introduction

Regional cooperation among developing and developed countries that very important nowadays has the potential to support national development strategies, and to some extent fill the gaps in the global economic governance system. In order to do so it has to extend beyond liberalization to include policy areas that strengthens the potential for growth and structural change. There appears to be an untapped potential for closer regional cooperation among developing countries in these areas, like Black Sea region which could also add policy options to those available at the national level. Ideally, regional integration and cooperation should not to show the balance power of domination of one country, but should become the focus key of development strategies.

Economic integration within a national economy is associated with expanding domestic markets, a shifting pattern of employment away from rural activities and an increasing industrial division of labor that leads to a dense network of input-output linkages between sectors. Strong national strategy are also required to forge the social-political consensus needed to mobilize and channel resources into productive investment and to manage the trade-offs incurred along a dynamic development path, including those arising from increased external integration. Regional cooperation seek to integrate into the world economy in the expectation that this will help accelerate output growth and productivity and improve living standards through increased trade, technology, and capital flows. In order to derive such benefits from external integration, similar conditions have to be fulfilled as for internal integration (Bianchi, 1998); they must have a certain level of local production capacity, skills, and technological sophistication, an array of market supporting institutions and good infrastructure.

Regional cooperation occurs in various forms and degrees, and is in general aimed at increasing cross-border linkages and deepening interpenetration of economic activity for the mutual benefit of economies within a geographic region. Regional cooperation can provide some means to help countries cope better with globalization.[656] The main forces that have shaped the process of globalization over the past two decades have also dominated recent trends in regional cooperation.

The Black Sea region is one of the areas in Southeast Europe that being best practice about regional cooperation in the world. The Black Sea region has been occasionally the periphery of significant units: an extension of the either the Mediterranean, the backyard of the Ottoman and the Russian empire, an extension of the Soviet zone or the frontier of Europe (Workshop Report of IBSS, 2011). On the other hand, the geographic limits and distinctive features (geography, economy, culture, etc.) of the region have not been clarified. The academic definitions, often overlapping, reflect the diversity in envisaging the Black Sea region on a political level and the disparate and often rival initiatives in cooperation. The Black Sea area represents a dynamic peripheral environment and a crucial place of production and transit of consistent energy supplies (Figure 1). A number of pipeline projects developed crossing the Black Sea region have already proven the significance for the countries around this region.

Energy stands at the significant role of the latest international developments and constitutes a principal issue for international external affairs and security policies. The uncertainty about the capability of covering future international demand has intensified the efforts to control over new and existing reserves, transfer routes, industrial and commercial chain of transport, and finally the speculative exploitation of this uncertainty in international market. Energy issues are significant for the Black Sea region since half of the energy imports to Europe transit to this region. To secure the region's fuel supply and production networks, Black Sea region countries should maintain an active approach towards ameliorating the access to the new energy sources, expanding alternative routes and enabling the transit

[656] 'Globalization' is commonly used as a shorthand way of describing the spread and connectedness of production, communication and technologies across the world. (infed.org)

between Western markets, and Caucasus and Central Asian producing countries.

The Southern Corridor creates an essential route of access for Caspian resources to the European market. Azerbaijan is on board and the fact that this country has made another step in supporting approach on energy. Diversification of transit routes and sources, development of renewable energies, energy efficiency and conservation are areas where regional actors can improve their cooperation (Aurescu, 2011). The opening of new gas routes from the Caspian region to Europe through the Black Sea area, as well as the construction of LNG terminals on the Black Sea shore have to be mentioned. These projects underscore the emerging profile of this region as an axis of energy diversification projects and for energy security in Europe. Bes and J. Poblome (2006) consider transport as another building block for integrating our region into the increasingly globalizing world. Transport corridors should contribute to the design of broader perspectives that address today's social and economic context. Without effective, reliable and efficient transport, regional trade is hampered and international investments lag.

In case of Turkey, Turkey is a consumer and a transit country. Turkey's increasing demand for energy and its dependency on foreign resources places it in a different position. Despite some commonalities in approaching regional issues in Black Sea region, Turkey has distinguished itself on such issues as security and regional configurations with its collaborative actions with the United States (US) and other Western powers. Despite all of these, since the early 2000s Turkey has developed an economic and regional partnership among Black Sea region member countries. Energy, on the other hand, brings regional dimension as the driving force of this regional cooperation.

Theoretical Concept

Regional Co-operation

Access to a larger market as a means of achieving scale economies and diversifying production has also been a long-standing rationale for regional arrangements among developing and developed countries (Park, 2006). Industrial and economy differentiation broadens the potential for expanding intra-industry trade. Among countries with similar economic structures and technological capabilities, firms that cross various thresholds in terms of size,

productivity performance and technological know-how tend increasingly to trade abroad, giving rise to an interactive and cumulative process between internal and external integration. Exports allow scale economies to be further exploited, which can also attract FDI. At the same time a growing outward orientation exposes firms to new products and processes, and to new sources of competition. These considerations apply to outward orientation generally, but for many countries that are at an early stage of industrial development, a regional orientation involving countries at a similar level of development may be considered a more viable option. This is because the initial foreign competition within the region may be less difficult to handle, the technological gap vis-à-vis competitors from more advanced countries outside the region may be easier to close, and the probability of finding a level playing field is greater.

Formal regional cooperation can be accompanied by very different degrees of effective regional integration, and this has sometimes occurred among countries without the prior conclusion of formal trade arrangements or other far-reaching policy cooperation (Higgott, 2002). Formal agreements on trade liberalization or other forms of regional cooperation are not a precondition for de facto integration; in general there is a two-way dynamic interaction between the two. Once external linkages reach a certain level of intensity, there will be pressure from producers to lower or remove the various barriers to intraregional trade, including bureaucratic red tape and conflicting legal restrictions and administrative procedures, as well as demands for better transport and communications infrastructure.

Energy Security

When talking about national security in our days, one should also have in mind the crucial component of energy security which in rough terms refers to reliable, affordable, and sustainable flow of energy. However, the subject not only implies multiple definitions on different levels, but it also stands for a complexity that produces many challenges to be faced and considered, such as: major consumers increasingly rely on energy imports; many producer countries are politically and economically unstable; there is a dependency on a limited number of oil and gas pipelines; price volatility; there are geopolitical problems and then there is climate change (Torbakov, 2007).

Energy, in general, is defined in all the documents as vulnerability, and the way of handling it is through regional cooperation, where have the next reference, as well as in the partnership working. Energy security is considered more of a domestic issue. Some of international organization, including EU, at the decision-making level identified energy security as an integral part of the internal security of the state. The first European Security Strategy in 2008 devoted little attention to energy security, stating only that "energy dependence is a special concern for Europe", the more so because it represents the largest importer of oil and gas, with imports accounting for 50 % of total consumption[657].

Energy security was attributed "an important role in guaranteeing national security" from a socio-economical perspective, the means for accomplishing this task being the operational adaptation and optimization of the structure of the consumption of primary resources, as well as increasing energy efficiency[658]. The guidelines for energy security is general and repetitive, illustrating an interest that was only in its initial phase and also an attempt to align to country perception, but includes some particular elements due geographical position and its socio-economic stage of development.

Methodology and Research Question

Methodology of Research

This paper tried to investigate the impact of regional co-operation in Black Sea region through a literature review approach using economical and sociological methodologies. Basically, this paper used an analysis on the documents of Black Sea countries mostly of Turkey as the main object and international organizations related about this topics, and check on the functionality of those subjects, meaning it relevance as well as the way the provisions are applied by the implementation from Black Sea region in practice.

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657 "A Secure Europe in a Better World – European Security Strategy," Brussels, 12 December 2002, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf , p. 3

658 "National Security Strategy," Bucharest, 2007, http://www.presidency.ro/static/ordine/SSNR/ SSNR.pdf p. 18.




Figure 2. Conseptual Framework of Paper (Wiggan (2011); modified by author)

Then, the second step included examination and classification of some data in order to have first the real perception of these issues as well as to evaluate the capacities of collecting data to elaborate and apply of output. Main findings of this research will address the role of Turkey in Black Sea region and considers the challenges and opportunities related about Turkey's energy security in this region. Both of them give directly on the topic at hand and also seek to maintain broader perspective, as other papers focus on same topics in Black Sea region issue. The result of this paper hopes to prove the viability of the research on those countries from the Black Sea region and give added inputs and integrated the results in a regional approach as well as in a common format.

Data Source

The objectives of this paper is to identify and address all related determinants in economy, politic, and energy of Black Sea region which have correlation with role of Turkey in energy security issues. The study of this paper is using data from authorized and legal sources, from journals, books, working papers, and articles. The data obtained from various publication databases. Sample size was determined by the data availability which, in turn, dictated the number of determinants to include in the study.

Research Question

Against from the background, this research has several number of questions related to address about regional cooperation in Black Sea region and role of Turkey in energy security. Collaboration in the area has taught a twofold lesson: on one hand, there is the co-operation that develops naturally among Black Sea region countries on geography and political issues. On the other hand, on questions dealing with economy and energy, it would be a serious mistake not to approach co-operation in a much broader sense, including countries that, due to economic, geographical or historical ties, are linked to the Black Sea region. This is why Turkey has a significant role of this region, referred to as the Wider Black Sea, including countries which share historical moments, geographic proximity as well as a strong desire to cooperate in order to improve national goals.

Turkey is unmistakably a key regional player. Turkey can and will bring, for sure, added value to the process, given all the heritage of the Turkish Republic, its expertise and geographic proximity to the target-states of the Eastern Partnership. Moreover, the question of this research will take a part as regional co-operation in Black Sea region, how strategic position of Turkey in Black Sea region can beneficial for their energy security system, and what are challenges and opportunities in order to achieve the goal of the process.

Discussion and Findings

Black Sea Region: From Regional Co-operation to Geopolitical Energy Competition

Faster growth and expansion of industry on low-and middle-income countries has increased their energy needs. An efficient energy infrastructure is a precondition for economic development in general, and for industrial development and diversification in particular. Yet it is very capital-intensive and often requires large-scale investment, which many developing-country governments find difficult to finance. Mobilizing such financing through privatization may not always to be compatible with long-term strategic consideration. Moreover, energy supply and distribution is largely determined by the natural endowments of each country, and only a few countries can meet their energy needs without cooperation with neighboring countries.

The Black Sea region is a distinct geographical region, rich in natural resources, which generates a series of opportunities and challenges at both regional and international levels, being a market under expansion. Moreover, the area has always been considered as having high developmental potential, particularly in key sectors such as transport, environment, and mostly, energy resources (Teodorescu, 2013).

Black Sea region have launched as a regional initiative in the midst of a regional transformation for promoting economic cooperation in this region. The Black Sea region altogether represents 7.6 % of the world's economy. Its GDP grows 6 % annually and total GDP amounts to 3.4 trillion USD along with an intra-trade volume which amounts to almost 300 USD (BSEC, 2012). It has a total population of 350 million, endowed with rich hydrocarbon

resources, a strong scientific and technological base and high quality human resource. There is still a vast potential for cooperation that remains untapped and room for further improvement. In short, the goal for regional cooperation should be removing all banners before economic, commercial, and humanitarian interaction among the Member States. The oil depots in the Black Sea region are well-known even nowadays, proving to be a vital corridor for natural gas and oil transportation, presently 40 % of the oil being transported towards the Western Europe, while up to 70 % increase being estimated for 2020. Regardless of this aspect, there is no doubt that the Black Sea region itself has substantial energy resources, very few of them being explored and exploited.

Consequently, the need for energy security in the Black Sea region may lead to increased interdependence between Eastern and Western Europe, being significant to emphasize that, on NATO agenda, energy security and challenges in the Black Sea region are considered to be issues of major interest. Under a great variety of dimension that continued to characterize the geopolitical conflicts of interest in the Black Sea region, the economic aspect to be the most important, thus generating powerful competition at diplomatic level.

According to a press statement on 3 February 2009 – "the EU energy policy: the energy security first" – the European Parliament analysis of the EU energy situation. Consequently, for the purpose of ensuring energy security, the establishment of hydrocarbon transport routes has generated a real competition with the participation of the EU, a consequence of the fact that the Russian Federation, as the main gas supplier for the EU states, is directly interested in the energy game in the Black Sea region. Moscow considered that the "*energy vector"* represents the only way to keep Europe under pressure and it would not allow losing the leading position it currently holds in this competition.

In the geopolitical context, one idea is certain – the Russian Federation and Turkey will continue to compete for influence and control upon the Black Sea region, this matter belonging to their vital interests to prevent alternation in the current power equation in the region through political interference of any kind in the Black Sea region. Providing energy security in the Black Sea region represents a key element of the regional security. Moscow will continue to use its energy resources and export capabilities as

means of political pressure, thus aiming at counteracting the EU efforts for a common energy policy that would lead to strengthening its negotiation power comparing to the Russian authorities. Considering the current geopolitical competition in Black Sea region, the Russian Federation continues to exploit the opportunities created, and it is in the process of regaining the strategic initiative in the region.

Turkey's relations with Russia in the energy field have been compatible with Russia's expectations until now. Although this situation has placed a heavy financial burden on Turkey's shoulder, it has been caused by necessity. Energy accounted for 23 % of Turkey's total imports in 2011 (Çelikpala, 2013). In other words, more than one-fifth of Turkey's import bill comes from energy imports, with Russia providing the largest amount. The natural gas agreements which were signed recently indicate that Turkey has taken affirmative steps in, at least, the energy field. Thus energy co-operation has been the backbone of Turkish-Russian relations in general. It could be assessed positively to date, although it could lead to negative implications for relations between the two countries in the future. For the most part, the states that hug the littorals of the Black Sea region are overwhelmingly dependent on Russia for a significant portion for their energy needs, and especially natural gas.

For Turkey, energy relationship with Russia has had its own complication. Despite being one of the largest buyers of Russian hydrocarbons, periodic trade disputes have plagued the partnership. In 2008, shortly following the 2008 war between Russia and Georgia, Turkey-bound exports were unexpectedly curbed by Russia, which many analysts said was a punitive measure for Ankara's permission for two U.S. warships to transit the Bosphorus. In 2011, Turkish state gas pipeline operator, *Botas* canceled its contract with Russian state gas giant *Gazprom* over the latter's stubbornly above-market rates and rigid terms.

These various episodes have not gone unnoticed throughout Europe, either, which has been affected either directly or indirectly by periodic energy crisis. Among the Black Sea region, this sensitivity has been especially heightened, as they are generally the most directly-affected by extended uncertainty posed by Russian energy delivery.

Turkey's Strategic Position in Co-operation of Black Sea Region

Turkey is a transcontinental country, stretching across Anatolia in the western Asia and Thrace in the southeastern Europe. With its strong historical, cultural, and economic influence in the neighborhood, it has a multi-dimensional importance in the energy scene of the region including parts of the EU, Russia, Caucasus, Central Asia, the Middle East, and Africa (Ediger, 2008).

Turkey has a strategic position as an oil and gas transit country, providing secure energy transit geography of increasing importance between energy-producing and consuming countries in the region (Figure 3). The number of pipeline projects developed crossing or ending in Turkey have already proven the significance of Turkey's "geo-energy space". The well-known Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan crude oil pipeline, which is one of the biggest energy infrastructures of the decade, has been operating since May 2006 as the second oil pipeline of the country after the Kirkuk-Ceyhan. The Russian – Turkey (Western), Novorossiysk – Samsun (Blue Stream), Baku – Tbilisi – Erzurum (Shah Deniz), and Turkey – Greece (European) pipelines are the natural gas pipelines extending in north-south and east-west directions. The Samsun-Ceyhan crude oil pipeline and Turkey-Austria (Nabucco), Trans-Caspian, and Iraq-Turkey natural gas pipeline projects are in the planning or implementing stages at present.

Turkey has been very successful in developing energy consumption capacity for last decades (Ediger, 2003). For this, it is often recognized as one of the most important emerging markets in the world's energy sector. Turkey's importance in the world's energy scene thus does not depend on its strategic location only, but also on its economic development performance resulting from the reform efforts of more than two decades. Turkey, which is a founding member of the OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) and the G-20, is also a member of trade organizations such as WTO (World Trade Organization), BSEC (Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation), and D-8 (Developing Eight).

At present, Turkey has the 17th largest economy in the world with an average GDP growth rate of around 6.6 % but falling down to 2.2 % in 2012. As a result of such a strong and stable growth coupled with large privatization and structural changes in economy, Turkey succeeded in attracting a significant amount of FDI and is expected to attract a higher

figure in the years to come. Turkey has been applying policies based on the contribution to supply stability in this region, by taking the leading role in significant regional oil and natural gas projects.

Turkey is one of the best placed to contribute to the security and prosperity of Black Sea region. Turkey is sophisticated enough to recognize that there are shortcomings at the level of regional cooperation. Turkey ended 2011 with the signing of two important energy agreements. The first one was the agreement signed on 27 December for the construction of the Trans-Anatolia Gas Pipeline (TANAP) which will transport Azeri natural gas to Europe. The second agreement, signed in Moscow on 29 December, calls for cooperation within the field of natural gas to the construction of South Stream. Needless to say, this result yields significant impact for strengthening confidence in expended regional cooperation and also enhancing Turkey's energy security.

Challenges and Opportunities for Turkey's Energy Security in Black Sea Region

Currently, energy security is an integral part of each national security strategy, and the challenges brought about by the globalization process should be taken into account, and malfunction or vulnerability from one side of the globe (related to an energy source) indirectly affecting other consumers from other areas of the world.

Turkey is dependent on energy imports, 581.000 barrels of oil are imported per day, 737 million kWh of electricity, and 38.4 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually (CIA World Fact Book, 2012). This constitutes approximately 65 % of Turkey's energy imports and this figure is projected to increase over the next two decades to approximately 75 % due to Turkey's growing population (Baran, 2005). Turkey does not own any significant energy sources and imports gas from Russia and oil from the Middle East on a large scale. As mentioned before, almost 65 % of Turkey's natural gas imports now come from Russia. Moreover, its dependence on foreign energy suppliers is increasing continuously. Therefore, Turkey wants to decrease its dependence on imported gas and oil resources by mechanism of energy security.

Turkey's energy consumption is growing and will continue after. Turkey is especially dependent on foreign countries for oil and natural gas. The domestic natural gas production rate in total consumption is around 3 %. Because of insufficient natural gas resources, Turkey compensates for its increasing natural gas consumption by importing 95 % of the total demand from neighboring countries. Turkey's main goal related about energy security is to avoid dependency on Russian energy supply and to seek alternative energy supplies that could satisfy its growing consumption, thus diversifying its supply of energy resources (Soyhan, 2009).

Energy security should be important for Turkey, as it aspires to be a regional energy hub. Turkey will be the key for Azerbaijan in transporting natural gas but the gas must first pass across Georgia to reach Turkey. The Russian gas game should also be a factor, because what is good for Turkey is good for the European Union in terms of hydrocarbon transit, but bad for Russian business, i.e. Russia's attempt at a monopoly on the European gas market. Because of Turkey's ever growing need for natural gas and Russia's ability to supply Turkey.

Recently, Turkey has begun a number of major pipeline projects in order to meet its rising domestic energy demand and provide transport to the European Union. These major pipelines are enhancing Turkey's role as an important transit country, helping bring stability and prosperity in the Black Sea region, and contributing the energy security for European Union.

There are opportunities related to the energy deposits of the Black Sea and the role of this region as both a resource-rich area and producer corridor for carrying petroleum and gas to Europe. EU member states have increasing economic interests in this region, a potentially attractive place for foreign direct investment including Turkey as a transit country. Therefore, conflict resolution should be regarded as a prerequisite for securing energy export routes. Turkey, unfortunately, sees its fair share of terrorism by dissident groups from within – most notably, the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) – which is a threat to the pipelines in the eastern part of the country (Eissler, 2012). Turkey does not have special task force to solve this problem. The Turkish State under the Ministry of Interior undertakes the security and protection of the pipelines (Grigoryan, 2011). The fact that Turkey does not have a specific security force for its vast network of pipelines is costly for Turkey. The losses taken in Turkey's pipeline network have already

indirectly affected the countries that are either supplying or receiving the hydrocarbons.

Pipelines are economic bridges as well as political tools, and they are also expected to attract infrastructure and foreign direct investment (FDI). In this framework, the Nabucco pipeline for example, will promote long-term economic interests of whole countries in the Black Sea region. It will encourage foreign investment in the energy sector and regional development, and contribute to higher level of competition. The Nabucco project now not only allows Turkey to assert itself as a regional power, but also makes Turkey indispensable to the West. It also allows Turkey to entice countries in its near-abroad with economic incentives-primary energy transportation – and thus expand its role in the Middle East. Nabucco pipeline's considered to be prospective contribution to its aim of becoming the regional energy hub. In general, political stability is another precondition for the development of energy security, as is its internal equivalent, if the development of vital energy and infrastructure projects is to be processed (Efe, 2011).

Conclusion

With its geographic location between large energy markets and major oil and gas producer countries, Turkey can create an important role for itself in the Black Sea region (Efe, 2011). Improving the energy cooperation between Turkey and member states of Black Sea region paves the way for the establishment of a competitive and transparent market within the region. In Black Sea region, the strengthening of cooperation in the energy sector will contribute significantly to the importance of regional cooperation and national energy security. Consequently, the construction of these oil and gas pipelines as economic bridges will break the political and energy dominance of Russia and, in this respect, will be essential for the region's integration with the West (European Union). It will also stabilize the region by building economic links between the countries, and trade and capital flows will increase Black Sea region and open up new possibilities for bilateral and regional cooperation in the future.

Furthermore, for the sake of economic and regional co-operation in energy security which is important for Turkey, it involved and creates stronger policy and trust. On the other hand, challenges and opportunities, for

example, closer economic and commercial ties but higher for the risk of the conflict, must made Turkey to develop instability in the short and long term for save and keep the national energy security, thus in order to bring the achievable collaboration in the Black Sea region.

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Appendix A




Figure 1. The Route Map of Pipelines in Black Sea Region (Wigan, 2011).

Appendix B




Figure 3. The Strategic Importance of Turkey's Location for Europe's Oil and Gas Security (Ediger, 2008).

Gelişmekte Olan Sanayi Bölgeleri Bağlamında Kentsel Nüfus Büyümesi

(Urban Population Increase within the Context of Developing Industrial Districts)

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Giriş

Kentleşme, fabrika üretim sisteminde ürünlerin imalatı, bu ürünlerin alımı ve satımına olanak veren pazarın ortaya çıkması gibi diğer toplumlarla olan geleneksel ilişkilerin değişmesine, banker, tüccar gibi, çeşitli sosyal zümrelerin ortaya çıkmasına, farklılaşmaya ve nüfusun yoğunlaşmasına sebebiyet veren toplumda bir dizi geniş ölçekli değişikliğin genel adıdır. (Tilly, 1964: 16-17, Aktaran Vries, 1995: 44)

Kentleşme aynı zamanda demografik, ekonomik ve toplumsal değişim sürecidir. "Kentleşme sanayileşmeye koşut olarak kent sayısının artması bugünkü kentlerin artması sonucunu doğuran toplum yapısında artan oranda iş bölümü ve uzmanlaşma yaratan insan ve davranış ilişkilerinde kentlere özgü değişikliklere yol açan nüfus birikim sürecidir." (Keleş, 2008: 24)

"Türkiye'nin kentleşme çizgisinde köklü yapısal değişim 2. Dünya Savaşı'ndan sonra başlar." "1950 sonrasındaki kırsal alandaki köklü dönüşüme paralel olarak artan göç kentlerin nüfusunu hızla artırmıştır." (Okutan, 1995: 21) "Tarım arazisinde ekilebilir toprakların sınırına hızla erişilmesi, tarımda işgücünün yoğun kullanımını sınırlayan makinanın başlaması, topraksızlığın ve yeterli toprağı olmayanların artması" kırdan kente göçü tetiklemiştir "Tarımsal olmayan üretim teknolojisi, topraktan kopma hızına ayak uydurabilecek bir hızla değişmediği için işsizlik sorunu ortaya çıkmıştır." (Okutan 1995: 22) Kırsal alandaki çözülmeye karşın kentlerdeki iş olanakları yetersiz kalmış sanayileşme ve tarımda modernleşme ile kentleşme aynı hızda gitmemiştir. Yine 90'lı yıllarda benzer

bir şekilde güvenlik ve işsizlik sorunları sebebiyle doğudan batıdaki kent merkezlerine göç yaşanmıştır. Türkiye sanayinin önüne geçen bir kentleşme süreci yaşamıştır. % 20' lerde seyreden kentleşme oranı günümüzde % 80'lere yaklaşmış, günümüze kadar uzanan çarpık yapılaşma kentlileşme vb. sorunlara yol açmıştır.

Kentleşme süreci ile birlikte ortaya çıkan kentsel sorunların çözümsüzlüğü kent huzurunu bozar ve kentte güvenlik sorunlarına da yol açar. Bu kentsel sorunların belli başlıları, rant, yanlış toprak kullanımı ve verimli arazileri inşaat sektörüne açma, yanlış ve çarpık yapılaşma, kent merkezlerinin kontrolsüz büyümesi, gecekondulaşma, trafik sorunlarının büyümesi, çevre kirliliğin artması, hızlı tüketim ve kent merkezlerinin tüketim merkezleri haline gelmesi olarak sıralanabilir. Yalçındağ, (1995: 73) kentsel sorunları, planlama ve kent toprağının kullanılmasındaki aksaklıklar, bunların yarattığı kontrolsüz ve plansız büyüme, konut ve arsa yetersizliği, kentsel toprak rantı ve rant paylaşımındaki yanlışlıklar, kent-içi ulaşım yetersizliği, yoğunluğu artan kent merkezi ile eklenen yerleşim yerlerinde alt yapı ve öteki belediye hizmetlerinin istenen boyutta sağlanamaması, kent kimliği sorunu, toplumsal huzursuzluklar, güvenlik sorunları, bireylerin birbirlerine, sivil toplum örgütlerine ve kent yönetimine yabancılaşmaları, ve çevre kirlenmesi olarak ifade eder.

Kentleşme politikası söz konusu sorunların çözümüne veya sorunların ortaya çıkmadan önce önlenmesine yönelik uygulamalara yöneliktir. Kentleşme politikası "köylerden kentlere olan nüfus akınlarının hızını, biçimini, coğrafi dağılışını ülkenin kalkınmasına yardım edecek biçimde etkileyen koordineli politikaların tümü" dür. (Keleş, 2008: 52) Kentleşme ile birlikte hem kamu hizmetlerine, hem kamunun güvenliğini sağlayacak örgütlenmelere daha çok ihtiyaç duyulmaya başlanmıştır. Bu konulara ilişkin önlemlerin alınması, kentleşmenin sosyal maliyetini azaltarak, düzenli yerleşimi sağlar, planlı ekonomi politikalarının ve planlı kentleşme politikalarının üretilmesini gerekli kılar. Kalkınma planları raporlarında benimsendiği gibi il ve ilçe kademe örgütlenmelerine kadar kurumsallaşan bir planlama anlayışı oturtulmaya çalışılmaktadır. Yukarıdaki söz konusu sorunlara paralel olarak ortaya çıkan, ruhsatsız yapılaşma vb. yasadışı uygulamalara kamu gücü ile müdahale edilir, yerleşme düzeninin sağlanması gözetilir. Tersine, gecekondu afları, kontrolsüz yapılaşma sonrasında çıkarılan imar kanunları vb. uygulamalara da başvurulmuştur. Kentleşmeye

etki eden bu uygulamalar daha ziyade kentleşmenin mekânsal boyutuna ilişkindir. Fakat kentleşmenin planlamaya ilişkin mekânsal ve sosyokültürel boyutu başlı başına bir çalışma konusu olduğu için, çalışmada Ordu ili verilerinden yararlanılarak kentleşmenin ekonomik ve demografik boyutları üzerinde durulacaktır. Çalışmada mekânsal boyut sadece organize sanayi bölgeleri ve siteleriyle sınırlıdır.


Avrupa kentsel şartına göre ideal kent, kentli haklarını koruyarak, iyi yaşam koşullarını sağlayarak, halkına iyi bir yaşam biçimi sunarak, değerini çalışan ve orada yaşayan insanlardan alan, ticaret, eğlence, eğitim, kültür faaliyetlerinin yer aldığı, çalışma ve dinlence gibi birçok sektör ve aktiviteyi bir arada, uyum içinde barındıran yaşam yeridir. (Yücesoy, 2000: 30) Kamu hizmetlerine olan ihtiyaç artmakta, ideal kente ulaşmada ve kentleşmenin negatif etkilerini bertaraf etmede başta belediyeler olmak üzere yerel yönetimlere önemli görevler düşmektedir.

Düzenli kentleşme ve kentleşme sorunlarının çözümü kentleşmenin ekonomik ve sosyal maliyetini azaltmaktadır. Kentleşme sorunlarının çözümünde karar alma mekanizmaları tarafından kent bilgi sistemlerinin desteği ile kentleşme sorunları da minimum düzeye indirilebilir veya ortaya çıkabilecek kentsel sorunlara ilişkin önlemler alınabilir. Çalışmada Ordu ilinin sanayi yapısı, organize sanayi bölgeleri ve dış ticaret yapısı ortaya konulacak, kent nüfusu ve kentleşme oranları sunulacaktır. Çünkü bir kentin sanayisi, tarımsal üretimi, toprak kullanımı, işletmelerin kuruluş yerleri, kentleşmeyi etkilemektedir. Burada kent ekonomik işlevleri ve son yıllardaki demografik değişimi açısından değerlendirilecektir.

Ordu İlinde Tarım ve Gıda Sektörüne Dayalı Ticaret

Kentin ekonomik işlevleri sanayi, ticaret, ulaşım ve turizmdir. İşgücü ve iş alanlarını belirler. Bir anlamda bu işlevler, insan kaynakları ve sermaye kentin ekonomik kaynaklarını oluşturur. Ordu'da sanayi, ticaret, insan kaynakları ve sermaye unsurunda ve de bu kaynaklara paralel olarak şekillenen istihdam yapısında tarım ve gıda sektörünün ağırlıklı olduğu görülmektedir. Elde edilen göstergelerden Ordu ilinin bir tarım ekonomisi olduğu ortaya çıkmaktadır. Nitekim arazi kullanımında da bitkisel üretimin ağırlığı göze çarpmaktadır.

Grafik 1: Ordu İli Genel Arazi Dağılımı



Kaynak: OTSO, 2012, Rakamlarla Ordu

Dünya fındık üretiminin % 75'inden fazlasını karşılayan üretiminde "Türkiye'de 38 ilde fındık yetiştiriciliği yapılmasına rağmen, ticarete konu olan yetiştiriciliğin tamamına yakını Ordu, Giresun, Samsun, Trabzon, Düzce, Sakarya, Zonguldak, Artvin, Bartın, Kocaeli, Sinop, Gümüşhane, Kastamonu ve Rize illerinde gerçekleştirilmektedir" (www.tmo.gov.tr). Bölgenin % 80'inin dağlık olması ve erozyonu önlemesi sebebiyle fındık üretim alanı ve miktarı yüksektir. Görüldüğü üzere Merkezde, Fatsa, Ünye'de tarımsal alanlar oldukça yer kaplamaktadır. Fatsa Ünye ve Merkezdeki arazilerin fındık yetiştiriciliğine elverişli olması halkın geçim kaynaklarının arasında fındığın önemli yer tutması ile fındık arazilerinin bol ve randımanının yüksek olması ve çeşitli sanayi kollarının da ortaya çıkmasıyla birlikte organize sanayi bölgesine olan ihtiyacı artırmıştır. Bu sebeple Ordu'da ve Fatsa'da hem üretici hem tüketici, hem çevresel sorunların aza indirgenmesi için, 90'lı yıllarda organize sanayi bölgelerinin kurulması gerekli görülmüştür.

Tablo 1: İlçelere Göre Fındık Üretim Miktarı (ton)						
	2009-2010		2010-2011		2011-2012	
İlçe Adı	Üretim Alanı(da)	Üretim Miktarı(ton)	Üretim Alanı(da)	Üretim Miktarı(ton)	Üretim Alanı (da)	Üretim Miktarı(ton)
Merkez	205.000	9.533	270.763	28.050	270.763	18.400
Akkuş	90.000	5.100	60.000	5.100	55.000	1.830
Aybastı	82.000	2.726	82.000	4.060	89.401	3.014
Çamaş	46.118	2.882	46.118	2.882	70.126	3.711
Çatalpınar	48.000	4.710	55.000	5.181	48.655	2.189
Çaybaşı	52.000	2.600	52.000	2.600	63.258	3.978
Fatsa	216.630	13.041	216.630	21.662	269.690	19.496
Gölköy	32.000	1.760	140.677	9.207	140.000	6.591
Gülyalı	33.420	2.005	33.420	4.010	32.482	1.925
Gürgentepe	177.250	5.956	101.284	3.370	101.284	2.652

Kaynak: OTSO, 2012, Rakamlarla Ordu

Tablo 2: İlçelere Göre Fındık Üretim Miktarı (ton)						
	2009-2010		2010-2011		2011-2012	
İlçe Adı	Üretim Alanı(da)	Üretim Miktarı(ton)	Üretim Alanı(da)	Üretim Miktarı(ton)	Üretim Alanı (da)	Üretim Miktarı(ton)
İkizce	86.500	5.624	86.500	4.759	94.321	4.906
Kabadüz	72.100	6.092	72.100	6.092	86.443	3.328
Kabataş	52.500	6.300	52.500	3.150	46.687	1.772
Korgan	70.411	6.923	77.757	7.529	87.493	3.224
Kumru	105.555	5.830	102.110	7.436	117.740	6.048
Mesudiye	33.266	0	30.439	1.359	30.439	1.172
Perşembe	106.852	5.717	193.300	17.669	193.300	12.455
Ulubey	162.630	6.912	176.745	15.200	176.745	9.544
Ünye	289.000	28.900	296.712	35.605	296.712	21.779
Toplam	1.961.232	122.611	2146.055	184.922	2.270.593	128.041

Kaynak: OTSO, 2012, Rakamlarla Ordu

Ülkemizdeki kentleşme esas olarak üç model üzerinde gerçekleşmiştir. Bunlar sanayi, turizm ve güvenlik kaynaklı kentleşme modelleridir. (Işık, 2006: 67) Bu kent modellerinin kentin dokusunu, doğal yapısını, çevresini, denizini, bozmaması öncelikli olabilmekte, sanayi modeline dayalı kentleşme ve sanayi bölgelerinin artması karar alıcılar tarafından uygun bulunmayabilmekte ve bazı yörelerde turizm kaynaklı kentleşme modeli takip edilmeye çalışılmaktadır.

"Organize sanayi bölgeleri birbiriyle üretim yapan küçük ve orta ölçekli sanayi kuruluşlarının planlı bir alanda ve ortak yapı hizmetlerinden yararlanacak şekilde standart fabrika binalarında toplanmasıdır." (Ertürk ve Sam, 2011: 76) Organize sanayi bölgeleri dengesiz kentleşmenin başlıca sebeplerinden olan kente göçü ve yığılmayı engeller, küçük ve orta ölçekli sanayilerin teşvik edilmesini ve istihdamı sağlar. İstihdam edilen toplum gelir ve satın alma gücüne sahip olur. Bilindiği gibi 'tüketim' kavramı da bir ekonomide çarkların dönebilmesi için zorunlu faktörlerdendir. İstihdam arttıkça gelir sahibi insanlar ve dolayısı ile tüketim artar. Tüketimin artması da satışların artmasına, satışların artması da daha fazla üretime, daha fazla üretimde yine istihdam piyasasının büyümesine sebep olur ki bu unsurlar da ekonomik büyümeyi canlandırır.

Organize sanayi bölgeleri aynı zamanda sanayinin yer seçiminin yönlendirildiği, toplanma ekonomilerinin yaratıldığı, kentleşme sürecinin ve biçimlenmesinin denetim altına alındığı, bölgesel dengesizliklerin giderilmeye çalışıldığı ve çevre koruma önlemlerinin yaygınlaştırıldığı rasyonel bir mekân kullanım aracıdır. Bu bağlamda da organize sanayi bölgelerinin kuruluşunda en uygun kuruluş yeri seçimi, sadece firma düzeyinde yapılmayıp aynı zamanda ekonomik kalkınma bölgesel dengesizlikler kentleşme ve çevre koruma etkenleri de dikkate alınarak ulusal düzeyde de yapılmaktadır. (Ertürk ve Sam, 2011: 79) Organize Sanayi Bölgeleri uygulaması makro ölçekte kentleşme politikası aracı olmasının yanı sıra kent ölçeğinde de yerleşme biçimini düzenleyici bir araçtır. Kent merkezindeki sanayi kuruluşlarının kent dışına taşınarak derli toplu bir yerleşkede faaliyet göstermesini sağlar. Böylelikle sanayinin yarattığı kirlilik vb. çevre sorunlarının yanı sıra üreticinin maliyetlerinin indirgenmesini sağlar. Kentlerin çevre alanlarında uygun yerlerde kurulması gereken OSB'ler işletmelerin bölgelere yönlendirilmesi için vergi kredi teşvik ve tedbirlerin uygulanması gerekir. Kendileri için uzmanlarca çevresel,

topografik ve meteorolojik koşullar açısından uygun bulunan, en uygun kuruluş yerine kavuşan firmaların, teknik donanımı ve altyapı unsurlarının hazırlanması, teşvikler ve üretimdeki tamamlayıcılık ilişkileri sebebiyle ulaşım ve enerji maliyetleri azalır, işgücü temini kolaylaşır. (Ertürk ve Sam, 2011: 76-79, Cansız, 2010: 30)

Ordu'da "15.07.1996 tarihinde Bakanlar Kurulu Kararı ile (7/12207) kurulması kararlaştırılan Organize Sanayi Bölgesi Merkez ilçe Karapınar Mahallesinde 548.425 m2 alan üzerinde yerini almıştır" (www.sp.gov.tr). Ordu Organize sanayi bölgesinde en büyük parsel sayısı gıda işletmeleri tarafından kullanılırken ikinci sırada orman ürünleri firmaları gelmektedir. Örneğin Ordu Organize Sanayisinde gıda sanayinde tahsisi yapılan parsel sayısı 35 iken, üretime geçen parsel sayısı 35, tahsisi yapılan sanayici sayısı ise 29'dur. Gıda sanayiyi orman sanayi takip etmektedir. Orman sanayinde tahsisi yapılan parsel sayısı 13, üretime geçen parsel sayısı 10, tahsisi yapılan sanayici sayısı 10' dur. Sanayi sicil kayıtlarına göre Ordu ilinde çalışan personel sayısının %38'i gıda ürünlerinin imalatı (özellikle fındık işleme işletmeleri) sektöründe, %18'i giyim eşyası imalatı kürkün işlenmesi ve boyanması sektöründe istihdam edilmektedir. (OTSO, 2012: 56) Bunun dışında Fatsa ilçesinde olmak üzere bir organize sanayi bölgesi daha bulunmaktadır. "Fatsa Organize Sanayi Bölgesi'nin toplam büyüklüğü 50 hektardır. Bölgede toplam 30 adet sanayi parselinin 21 adedi, 21 firmaya tahsis edilmiştir. 14 firma üretime geçmiş, 4 firma inşaat aşamasında ve 3 firma da proje aşamasındadır. Üretimde olan firmalarda toplam 1.120 kişilik istihdam sağlanmaktadır. Sanayicilerin inşaat ruhsatı, yapı kullanım izin belgesi, deşarj izni, iskân ruhsatı ve iş yeri açma ruhsatı işlemleri Bölge Müdürlüğü tarafından yapılmaktadır." (Ordu Valiliği Tek Adımda Yatırım Bürosu, 2012: 24)

Küçük sanayi siteleri en az işyerinden oluşan daha çok imalat ve tamiratla oluşan küçük işletmelerin yer aldığı alt yapı hizmetleri ile idare çırak okulu satış dükkânıyla donatılmış işyeri topluluklarıdır. (Cansız, 2010: 31) Organize sanayi bölgeleri dışında, 2 tanesi Ordu Merkez'de olmak üzere, Fatsa Ünye ve Mesudiye'de olmak üzere 1127 adet iş yeri barındıran, 3559 adet çalışana sahip olan 5 adet küçük sanayi sitesi (KSS) bulunmaktadır (Ordu Valiliği Tek Adımda Yatırım Bürosu, 2012: 24). İstanbul Sanayi Odası (İSO) tarafından hazırlanan 2011 yılı "Türkiye'nin En Büyük 500 Sanayi Kuruluşu" listesinde Ordu'da kurulu ve faaliyet gösteren 4 sanayi kuruluşu,

ikinci 500 listesinde de yine 4 sanayi kuruluşu bulunmaktadır. Dolayısıyla organize sanayi bölgeleri ve sanayi siteleri Ordu kentinin ekonomik işlevini artırmıştır. Sanayi faaliyetlerinin yapıldığı bölgelerdeki nüfus artmaktadır. Ordu Merkez 1. Küçük Sanayi Sitesi şehrin en kalabalık nüfusunun olduğu Yenimahalle'dedir. Ünye Organize Sanayi Bölgesi Projesi de gelişme aşamasındadır. Sanayi alanlarının ekonomiye getirdiği canlılığın yanı sıra belediyelerce coğrafi bilgi sistemlerinden yararlanılması, Ordu'nun turizme açılması konusundaki girişimler, üniversitenin kurulması, ziraatçilerin ve öğretim üyelerinin fındık vb. bitkisel üretim rekoltesini artırmaya yönelik yetiştiricileri bilinçlendirmeye yönelik çalışmaları, valiliğin bu konudaki çalışmaları ile dolaylı olarak istihdam olanakları artmış ve de daha önceleri negatif seyreden net göç ortalaması, pozitif değer almış, 2012 yılı itibariyle Ordu doğu Karadeniz bölgesindeki illere nazaran, göç alan bir bölge haline gelmiştir. Ordu ilinin geçirdiği kentleşme süreci köylerden kent merkezine olan göçün sonucu olarak gözükmektedir.

Tablo 3: 2011-2012 TR 90 Bölgesi Net Göç Verileri (2011-2012)

2011-2012	Ordu	Trabzon	Artvin	Giresun	Rize
Toplam	741,371	757,898	167 082	419 555	324,152
Aldığı Göç	48,240	21 864	7 286	18 027	12,335
Verdiği Göç	26,595	25 478	7 612	17 861	13,856
Net Göç	21,645	- 3 614	-326	166	-1,521
Net Göç Hızı (‰)	29,6	-4,8	-1,9	0,4	-4,7

Kaynak: TUİK, 2012, Adrese Dayalı Nüfus Kayıt Sistem Sonuçları'dan derlenmiştir

Tablo 4: TR90 Bölgesi Kır ve Kent Nüfusu (2010-2012)					
Yıllar	**Toplam**	**İl-İlçe**	**Köyler**	**Merkez**	**Köy**
TR TÜRKİYE					
2010	73 722 988	56 222 356	17 500 632	76,3	23,7
2011	74 724 269	57 385 706	17 338 563	76,8	23,2
2012	75 627 384	58 448 431	17 178 953	77,3	22,7
TR90	**ORDU, TRABZON, GİRESUN, RİZE, ARTVİN, GÜMÜŞHANE**				
2010	2 516 167	1 414 065	1 102 102	56,2	43,8
2011	2 513 021	1 437 943	1 075 078	57,2	42,8
2012	2 545 274	1 467 952	1 077 322	57,7	42,3
TR902	**ORDU**				
2010	719 183	404, 390	314 793	56,2	43,8
2011	714 390	409,288	305 102	57,3	42,7
2012	741 371	423,295	318 076	57,1	42,9

Kaynak: TUİK, 2012, Seçilmiş Göstergelerle Ordu

Kırsal kalkınmayı destekleme amacıyla "2005 yılında İçişleri Bakanlığı (Mahalli İdareler Genel Müdürlüğü), Maliye Bakanlığı ve Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı (DPT) koordinasyonu ile başlatılan Köylerin Altyapısını Destekleme Projesi (KÖYDES) kapsamında köylerin içme suyu, küçük su kaynaklarının değerlendirilmesi, kanalizasyon ve yol gibi alt yapı sorunlarının çözümlenmesi ve köyde yaşayan insanların yaşam kalitelerinin yükseltilmesi hedeflenmiştir. Proje her yıl farklı yatırımlarla devam etmektedir. Zira göçü tersine çevirebilme amacını taşıyan ilk Köy-Kent projesi de Ordu'nun Mesudiye ilçesinde Çavdar ve yöresi köyleri kapsamında gerçekleştirilmiştir. Altyapıyı merkezileştirme amacı güden projelerden farklı olarak, halkın aktif katılımı amaçlanmıştır. (Çolakoğlu, 2007:196) Fakat Karadeniz sahil kesiminde denize bakan yamaçlar üzerinde yer alan köylerde kırdan kente göç devam etmektedir. Diğer Doğu Karadeniz kıyı şehirlerinin bazılarında yaşandığı gibi sahil köylerinin tarım alanları

genelde arsalaşmakta, göçün etkisi şiddetli hissedilmemektedir, çünkü bu alanlar yeni yerleşimciler tarafından doldurulmaktadır. Göçlerin yönü öncelikle kıyı kentleri ve batıdaki büyük şehirlerdir. (Yılmaz, 2010: 147, 152) Gıda sanayi işletmeleri yıllara göre değişen mahsul miktarına da bağlı olarak istihdamı karşılayamamakta, dışarı göçü engelleyememektedir. Sahil şeridinin yapılması da kente göçü tetiklemiştir.

Kentleşme dar anlamda kent nüfusunun artması şeklinde ele alınırsa, Ordu kent nüfusu artmakta, nüfusun artış oranında da bir artış gözlenmektedir. Doğu Karadeniz illerinde kentleşme ortalaması benzer bir şekilde seyretmektedir. Ordu kent nüfus oranı % 57,10 ile Türkiye ortalamasının altındadır.

Tablo 5: Kır ve Kent Nüfusları (2009-2012)

2009-2012	Şehir	Köy	Toplam
2009	399,050	324,472	723,507
2010	404,390	314,793	719,183
2011	409,288	305,102	714,390
2012	423,295	318,076	741,371

Kaynak: TUİK, 2012, Adrese Dayalı Nüfus Kayıt Sistem Sonuçları'ndan derlenmiştir

Ordu kentleşme oranı % 57,10 ile Türkiye ortalamasının (% 76,30) altında fakat kır nüfusunun üzerindedir. Kır nüfusu da % 42,10 oranı ile kent nüfusuna göre düşüktür. Ordu İlinin nüfusu 1965'te 543.863 iken 2000'li yıllara kadar yılda % 7-%9 civarlarında artış göstermiş ve 2000 yılından sonra tekrar düşmeye başlamıştır. 2007 yılında 715.409'a düşen nüfus tekrar artmaya başlamıştır. 2008, 2009 yıllarında artış göstermiş 2009 yılından sonra tekrar düşmeye başlamıştır. 2009 yılında 723, 507 olan nüfus 2010 yılında 719.183'e düşmüştür. 2011 yılında da 719.183'den 714. 390' a düşmüştür. (TUİK, 2012) Fakat 2012 yılında 741.371'e çıkmıştır. 2013 yılında da benzer bir şekilde büyükşehir belediyesi olma çalışmalarının hız

kazanmasıyla Ordu nüfusu 771. 960 olmuştur. Doğu Karadeniz illerinde kentleşme ortalaması benzer bir şekilde seyretmektedir. Ordu ilinin dağınık köy yapısı, engebe sebebiyle köylere hizmet götürmenin zor olması, ilçe olarak başka bir ilçeden kopma dolayısıyla köy sayısının azalması, belediye sayısının azalması vb. idari bölünmelerden kaynaklanan nedenler de kır ve kent dengesine etki etmiştir. Tarımsal ürünlerin rekoltesi bazı ilçelerde daha yüksektir. Yükselti ve üretim yetersizliği bazı ilçelerin diğerlerinden daha az gelişmesine neden olmuştur. Okullaşma, çalışma gibi sebeplerle Ordu, Fatsa, Ünye gibi kıyıda bulunan kent merkezlerine talep devam etmektedir. "1990 yılında Cumhuriyet, Kumbaşı ve Kuğukent çevresinin planları yapılarak uygulamaya geçilmiştir. Bu bölgelerde plan yapılmasının ana hedefi daha önce plan olmayışından kaynaklı oluşan kaçak yapılaşmaların önüne geçmek olmuştur. Bu hedefte de başarılı olunsa da söz konusu dönemin koşullarının getirdiği kısıtlılıklar sebebiyle birinci derece tarım arazileri imara açılmış ve şehir olması gerektiğinden çok daha fazla bir alana yayılmıştır."(www.sp.gov.tr) Belediye sayılarındaki değişme de kır ve kent dengesini etkilemektedir. 6360 sayılı 14 ilde Büyükşehir ve 27 İlçe Kurulması Hakkında Kanun ile büyükşehir kapsamına alınan Ordu kır ve kent nüfusu değişim içerisindedir. Kanundan faydalanmak için az bir nüfus artışına ihtiyaç duyan Ordu'da Büyükşehir çalışmaları kapsamında takviyeli bir nüfus artışı söz konusudur.

Kent, kent çalışmacıları tarafından tarım dışı faaliyetlerinin yer aldığı, üretim ve dağıtımın denetlendiği, çeşitli istihdam biçimlerinin ortaya çıktığı yerler olarak tanımlanmaktadır. Kentte hizmetler sektörüne kayış söz konusudur. İl genelinde tarım sektöründe çalışanların toplam istihdam oranı Türkiye ortalamasının üzerindedir. Kentlerin gelişmesindeki en önemli etken, kendi kendine yeten hatta kendi tükettiğinden fazlasını üretebilen bir kırsal kesimin varlığıdır. Ordu ili de fındık üretiminde ürettiğinden fazlasını ihraç eden bir ildir.

Ordu İlinin Tarım Sektöründeki Dış Ticareti ve İhracat Rakamları

Bilindiği gibi kentleşme ve sanayileşme arasında sıkı bir ilişki bulunmaktadır. Türkiye'de sürekli bir artış yaşanırken, Ordu ilinde ihracatçı firma sayısında yıllar içinde inişli çıkışlı olarak artışlar ve azalışlar yaşanmıştır. 2003'te 57 olan ihracatçı sayısı 2005'de 46'ya düşmüş, 2008'de 58'e yükselmiş ve 2012'de 54'e düşmüştür. 96 adet fasıl gruplarına göre

ihracat rakamları incelendiğinde Ordu İlinin toplam 366.474.835 dolarlık ihracat hacminde "yenilen meyveler, kabuklu yemişler, turunçgil ve kavun kabuğu" faslında 127.431.505 dolarlık ihracat gerçekleştirilmiştir. "Sebze, meyve, bitki parçaları, sert kabuklu yemiş konserveleri" faslında ise 195.125.499 dolarlık bir ihracat söz konusudur. Ordu ili dış ticaret yapısı ile dış ticaret fazlası veren, ihracatı ithalatından (79.098.036 $) fazla olan bir ildir. Ordu ilinin tarımsal ürünler ihracatın da en büyük ticaret ortağı ve en büyük fındık alıcıları Almanya ve daha sonra İtalya'dır. Ordu ilinde yapılan ihracatın çoğu Avrupa Birliği Ülkeleri'ne yapılmaktadır. Ordu ilinde en büyük ihracat kalemini fındık ve fındık mamulleri oluşturmaktadır bu sebeple ihracat rakamları genellikle fındık hasatı ayı olan ağustos ayından sonra artış göstermektedir. (OTSO,2012: 75) 2012 TUİK verilerine göre, Ordu İli 104.245 $'lık ithalat ile 37. sırada, 334,142$'lık ihracat ile 27. Sıradadır. (TUİK, 2012:39)

DPT 2013 yılı kentleşme ve yerleşme vizyonu, "[b]ölgeler, yerleşmeler arası ve içi eşitsizlikleri azaltılmış, doğal ve kültürel mirasın korunup geliştirildiği, yaşam ve mekân kalitesi iyileştirilmiş, riskleri azaltılmış, toplumsal cinsiyet eşitliği sağlanmış, yarışma gücü kazandırılmış, dengeli, tamamlayıcı, çok merkezli (yığılmayı önleyici) ve sürdürülebilir, bir yerleşme sistemine ulaşma"; planlama vizyonu ise "kentleşme ve yerleşme vizyonunu gerçekleştirmeye yönelik eşgüdüm ve kademeli birlikteliği sağlanmış, kamu yararını gözeten, uygulama araçları geliştirilmiş, bütüncül, kurumsallaşmış ve katılımcı bir planlama sisteminin oluşturulması" olarak tanımlanmıştır. (DPT, 9. Kalkınma Planı)

Karadeniz bölgesinde başlıca kentsel çevresel sorunlar atıklar, hava ve su kirliliğidir. Karadeniz Bölgesinde toplam 18 il bulunmakta olup bunlardan Çorum, Kastamonu, Tokat, Bayburt, Zonguldak, Bartın, Karabük'te hava kirliliği, Bolu Giresun, Gümüşhane, Ordu, Sinop, Trabzon, Düzce'de atıklar, Amasya, Artvin, Rize, Samsun'da su kirliliği birinci öncelikli çevre sorunudur. (www.csb.gov.tr) Ordu ilinde ısınma kaynaklı kirlilik sonucu yakacak kalitesinin artırılması birincil öneme sahip olsa da sanayi bölgeleri ve çevresinde yer alan hava kirliliği düşük düzeyde olmakla birlikte şu an için risk arz etmemektedir. Her ne kadar OSB'ler çevre mevzuatı ve yönetmeliklerine uygun kapasitede ve ilgili olumlu raporlar sonrasında faaliyet göstermekteyse de dengeli gelişme ve büyümenin itici gücü olmakla birlikte yörenin hava kalitesini ve su kalitesini etkileyebilmektedir. Gıda

dışında farklı sektörlerde faaliyet gösteren firmaların çoğalması, arazi sıkıntısının aşılarak takviye bölgelerin kurulması ile birlikte, kent merkezine yakın olan OSB çevrelerinde hava ve su kalitesinin bozulması muhtemeldir. Arazi sıkıntısını, Ordu ilinin bitkisel üretim potansiyelini ve kent sakinlerinin yaşam kalitelerini de göz önünde bulunduran karar alıcılar için Ünye'de proje aşamasında olan 3. Organize Sanayi Bölgesi'nin kuruluş yeri seçimi güç olmaktadır.

Ordu ilinin geçirdiği yapay bir kentleşme süreci değildir. Kıra ve tarımsal istihdama bağımlılığa alternatifler geliştirilmeye çalışılmaktadır. Ordu kırdan kopma toplumsal ekonomik bir dönüşüm içerisinde de değildir. Genelde kent nüfusu yıllar itibariyle rasyonel bir şekilde artmıştır. Kentleşmecilerin tanımladığı ölçüde üretim tekniklerinde de bir dönüşüm söz konusu değildir. Sanayide geleneksel ve modern üretim teknikleri bir arada yer alır. Ordu kenti güçlü bir tarım ekonomisidir. Birkaç ürün üzerine yoğunlaşılan bölgede ürün yelpazesi artırılmaya, fındığa olan bağımlılık azaltılmaya çalışılmaktadır. Fındık, bal, kivi üretiminde Türkiye'de başı çeken Ordu ilinin geçim kaynakları arasında balıkçılık da önemli bir yer tutmakta gıda sanayisini güçlendirmektedir. Bunun dışında mısır patates tahıllar gayrisafi milli hasılaya katkı sağlayan diğer ürünlerdir. Bu bağlamda bitkisel üretim ve ihracata dayalı Ordu'nun hava, toprak ve su kaynaklarının korunması zorunludur.

Ordu İlinin Sanayi Yapısı

Ordu ili tarıma dayalı gıda sanayisini güçlendirmektedir. Ordu ilinin sanayisi daha çok fındığa bağlı yatırım ve girişimlerden oluşmaktadır. Fındık sanayisi dışında sıvı yağ, çikolata ve gofret, MDF, seramik, çimento, meşrubat sanayi, ayakkabı, metal mamulleri üretimi, su ürünleri entegre işletmeciliği gibi sanayi kolları da gelişme içerisindedir. (TUİK, 2011: 14) Ordu'da sanayi gıda sektörü başta olmak üzere gelişme aşamasındadır. Mevcut tesislerin tamamı yörenin doğal kaynak zenginliğini değerlendirmeye yönelik olarak kurulmuştur. İlk sanayi yapılanması temel tarımsal ürün olan fındık ile başlamıştır ve bugün de fındık işleme sektörü il imalat sektörünün önemli bir bölümünü oluşturmaktadır. Ordu'da ülkemizin ilk 500 büyük sanayi kuruluşları arasında yer alan büyük işletmeler bulunmaktadır. Fındık dışında çikolata-gofret, şekerleme helva, süt ürünleri, yem, sıvıyağ, çay gibi gıda sektöründe faaliyet gösteren işletmelere taş ve toprağa dayalı sanayi,

agrega tesisleri, tekstil (özellikle penye dikim, triko ve dantel ile plastikten mamul mallar (poşet-su boruları vb.), kauçuktan mamul mallar (taban ökçe, sıcak kaplama, oto lastik sıcak kaplama) ve gıda makineleri imalatı, demir çelik sac makine imalatı ile PVC doğrama sistemleri, su ürünleri ve bal mumu imalatı gibi işletmelere, LPG Dolum tesisleri dâhil edildiğinden gerek il gayri safi milli hasılasının oluşmasında ve gerekse il istihdamının yaratılmasında sanayi işletmelerinin etkisinin arttığı görülmektedir.

Ordu'da sanayi sektörüne yönelik diğer özel yatırımlar gıda, orman ürünleri ve mobilya sanayi, tekstil, madencilik ve toprağa dayalı sanayi, çimento ve hazır beton imalatı sektörlerinde yoğunlaşmıştır. (www.sp.gov.tr) "Tekstil ürünleri imalatı Ordu'da son yıllarda en fazla gelişme gösteren sektördü". Gıda sanayi yatırımlarının çoğu fındık kırma, işleme ve fındık mamulleri üretimine yöneliktir. Fındık işleme sanayinde çalışan işçilerin çoğunluğunun mevsimlik olarak istihdam edilmesi, sanayinin istihdam olanaklarını ve ekonomiye katkısını önemli ölçüde kısıtlamaktadır. Üretim yapısı bağlamında gıda sektöründe, özellikle de fındık işlemede geleneksel üretim yapısı söz konusu iken aynı sektörde modern üretim tekniklerini kullanan işletmeler de mevcuttur. (Ordu Valiliği Tek Adımda Yatırım Bürosu, 2012: 21)

Ordu İlinde Tarım Ürünleri İmalatı Yapan Firma ve Gıda Sanayi İşletmelerinin Sektörel Dağılımı

Ordu ilinde gayrisafi yurtiçi hâsılasının önemli bir bölümünü 378.937, 11 TL ile tarım sektörü oluşturmaktadır. Bu rakamı 348.213.121 TL ile çiftçilik ve hayvancılık takip etmektedir. İşletmelerin büyük bir bölümü KOBİ olup, sermaye yapıları risk üstlenebilecek nitelikte olmayan, optimal ölçekte üretim faaliyetinde bulunmayan, yoğun olarak sezonluk çalışan aile işletmesi şeklindedir. (TUİK, 2011:14. Ordu ilinde tüm sektörler arasında gıda sektörü ağırlıklı olarak ön plana çıkmaktadır. Ordu ilinde bulunan sanayi işletmelerinin sektörel dağılımı incelendiğinde %34 gıda ürünlerinin imalatı ile ilk sıralarda olduğu görülmektedir. Bunları sırasıyla % 9 ile madencilik ve taş ocakçılığı, % 9 ile giyim eşyası ve kürkün işlenmesi ve boyanması, % 7 ile ağaç ve mantar ürünleri imalatı, % 6 ile fabrikasyon metal ürünleri imalatı takip etmektedir (OTSO, 2012: 81,53). Ordu ilinde bulunan sanayi işletmelerinin büyük kısmı üretim kapasiteleri ve istihdam olanakları düşük, küçük ve orta boy işletme niteliğine sahiptir. Çoğu gıda, orman ürünleri ve

tekstil sanayinde olmak üzere 100'ün üzerinde işçi çalıştıran 17 adet işletmenin bulunduğu Ordu'da mevcut tesislerin tamamına yakını yörenin doğal kaynak zenginliğini değerlendirmeye yönelik olarak kurulmuştur (Ordu Valiliği Tek Adımda Yatırım Bürosu, 2012: 21).

Kamu Yatırımları

Ordu ili 2011 yılı sonu itibari ile kamu yatırımlarından yararlanan 42. il konumundadır. Fakat kamu yatırımları tarım sektörü için değil, daha ziyade eğitim alanı için (48.063 TL) yapılmıştır. Bu yatırımları ulaşım ve haberleşme yatırımları (21.814 TL) takip etmektedir. Eğitim ve ulaşım-haberleşme den sonra, enerji (6167 TL) sağlık (5200 TL), ve maden sektörü ve bu sektörlerden sonra tarım sektörü (2100 TL) gelmekte ve tarım sektörünü turizm sektörü takip etmekte ve son olarak da en düşük payı konut sektörü (1207 TL) almaktadır. 2011 yılında 36.400.287 milyon TL'lik kamu yatırımlarından en fazla payı, İstanbul, Ankara, Diyarbakır, Şanlıurfa, Artvin, İzmir, Trabzon, Bursa, Mardin Konya almış olup, en az yatırımı, Ardahan, Yalova, Bilecik, Bayburt ve diğer iller almaktadır. Ordu ili bu sıralama içinde 137.880 TL'lik pay (binde 3,8) ile 42. Sıradadır. (OTSO,2012: 77-78)

Sonuç

1990'lı yıllarda otomobil kullanıcı sayısı, okullaşma oranı, ticaret hacmi gibi, sahip olduğu doktor öğretmen sayısı ve enerji kullanımı gibi kalkınmışlık düzeyi göstergeleri itibariyle Ordu ilinin iktisadi kalkınma düzeyi düşüktü. 1990'lı yıllarda kentleşme düzeyi, Türkiye'de % 60 iken, Ordu'da % 40'dı. Sanayileşme, teknoloji ve fındık sektöründe ülke genelinde önde gelen ihracat firmalarının ve sde anayi tecrübesinin artması, nüfus artışı ve kırdan göçün neticesinde kent nüfusu % 57,10'a çıkmıştır. TUİK (2012) verilerine göre, Ordu ihracat açısından Türkiye'de 37, ithalat açısından da 27. sıradadır. Kırsal kesimde yaşam, Doğu Karadenizlinin ve Ordulunun benimsediği bir yaşam biçimidir. Fındık hasadının yapıldığı Ağustos ayında kentten kıra geçici göç yaşanır. Ordu ili engebeli yüzeysel özellikleri sebebiyle, toplu yerleşim biçimine sahip değildir. Bu da kentleşme düzenini etkilemektedir. Geleneksel yerleşme biçimine göre, tepede ev aşağı doğru da bahçe vardır. Fakat 1990'lı yılların sonlarından itibaren bu yapı çözülmeye başlamıştır. Ayrıca engebeli arazi sebebiyle, yol su elektrik, taşıma

kanalizasyon gibi alt yapı sorunları ve fındık bahçelerine bağımlılık diğer hizmetlerin karşılanmasını da güçleştirmekte ve sanayileşme ve kentleşme olgusuna etki etmektedir. 1990'lı yıllarda nüfus artış oranı Doğu Karadeniz bölgesine, (verimli ovaları ve kısmen de o yıllarda sanayiye sahip olan Samsun hariç) göre yüksek, Türkiye ortalamasına göre düşüktü. Şu anda hala İstanbul, Ankara gibi sanayileşmiş şehirlere ve de coğrafi yakınlık sebebiyle Giresun, Samsun, Trabzon'a göç vermekte ise de, son yılda kent merkezi göç alan bir konuma gelmiştir. Tarım kolunda çalışanların oranının toplam istihdam içindeki payı Türkiye ortalamasının üstündedir. Ordu ilinin dezavantajlı olduğu hususlar sanayi tecrübesindeki aksaklıklar, sermaye sorunu, pazara uzaklık olarak görülmektedir. Kalkınmada öncelikli ilerden biri olan Ordu, genel ve bölgesel teşvikler ile büyük ölçekli ve stratejik yatırımlara sağlanan teşviklerden yararlanmaktadır. Sanayi tecrübesinin artması, gıda ve orman ürünlerine yönelik sanayi tecrübesinin çeşitlendirilmesi ihtiyacı ortaya çıkmıştır. Mevcut Organize Sanayi bölgelerindeki doluluk oranı yüksek olduğu için gelen yatırımcıya yer sağlama konusunda da sıkıntılar yaşanmaktadır. Yeni sanayi sitelerinin varlığı ile, orta-uzun vadede bu söz konusu sorunların bertaraf edileceği savunulmaktadır.

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Conceptual Foundations of Human Development

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Introduction

At the turn of 21st century, it was clear that economic growth was not the only factor to measure development and sustainability of societies. Revenues collected from societies can be used in programs dedicated to help the poor, defense spending, the development of education and economically unbeneficial projects. Gross domestic product (GDP) may be unevenly distributed. Consequently, the level and the growth rate of GDP cannot be the main criterion of measurement for the progress and success. From this understanding, it enabled us to formulate a new approach - the concept of human development. By the year 2012, the process of human development in global, regional and national promulgated in over 600 reports reflecting the process in 183 countries.

The aim of this paper is to provide a brief overview of the historical evolution of ideas leading to human development. It analyzes how development discourses vary from human well-being to human's public roles and situates that analysis within the historical and political context of debates. The article contains literature overview on human development and sustainable development. The research based on analysis of scientific literature and research publications. The development theories and their methods of statistical data analysis are comparatively analyzed. There are a lot of definitions of sustainable human development which have been discussed by many authors and organizations.

The article can be summarized as follow; world's human development was analyzed as a whole concept. The data of Human Development Index for the last two decades was used to explain the countries' progress periodically.

The Human Development Concept

Indian economist Amartya Kumar Sen made a huge contribution to scientific papers on human development and won a Nobel Prize in the year 1998. Pakistani economist Mahbub ul Haq became the initiator and one of the authors of its first report, "Human Development Report ", prepared by United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in the year 1990. Moreover, almost all the nations of the world prepared and published annual regional and national reports based on the human development concept. The Human Development Reports have a direct role in the presentation of information and they are also relevant for policy response-by contributing to the effort to bring informed discussion to bear on challenging questions (Anand and Sen, 1994). In this period, the concept of human development has become a recognized international paradigm of social progress. In other words, it is not just a theoretical construct or a scientific development but a comprehensive model of the development of society. An advance in the context of human development is now widely recognized as the main criterion of success of the country and its chosen strategy.

Human development as an approach is concerned with the basic development idea: namely, advancing the richness of human life rather than the richness of the economy in which human beings live, which is only a part of it. Purpose of the development is to improve people's lives by expanding their choices, freedom and dignity. Human development is about people, about expanding their choices to live fully in life, introduce creative lives with freedom and dignity – expanding people's choices (*Haq, Mahbub ul, 2003, pp. 17-21).* Human development is about the expansion of humans' freedoms to lengthen their life span, and to live beneficial lives: to advance other goals they have reason to value and to engage actively in shaping the development equitably and sustainably on a shared planet. Furthermore, people are both the beneficiaries and drivers of human development both as individuals and in groups.

Essential conditions for Human Development**:**

- environmental sustainability
- equity – especially gender equity
- enabling global economic environment

The human development paradigm covers all aspects of development – whether economic growth or international trade; budget deficits or fiscal policy; savings, investment or technology; basic social services or safety nets for the poor. No aspect of the development model falls outside its scope, but point of reference remains the widening of people's choices and the enrichment of their lives. All aspects of life –economic, political or cultural – are viewed from that perspective. Economic growth therefore has become one subset of the human development paradigm.

On some aspects of the human development paradigm, there is fairly broad agreement. Development must put people at the center of its concerns and the purpose of development is to enlarge all human choices and not just income. The human development paradigm is concerned both with building human capabilities through investment in people and with using those human capabilities more fully through an enabling framework for growth and employment. It regards economic growth as essential but emphasizes the need to pay attention to its quality and distribution its link with human lives and questions its long-term sustainability.

The human development paradigm not only defines the ends of development but also analyses sensible options for achieving them.

Key capabilities for human development are living a long and healthy life, being educated, having a decent standard of living, enjoying political and civil freedoms to participate in the life of one's community.

Global Human Development Reports and Sustainable Development

The themes of annual global Human Development Reports are:

2013 "The Rise of the South: Human Progress in a Diverse World"

2011 "Sustainability and Equity: A Better Future for All"

2010 "The Real Wealth of Nations: Pathways to Human Development"

2009 "Overcoming Barriers: Human Mobility and Development"

2007/2008 "Fighting Climate Change: Human Solidarity in a Divided World"

2006 "Beyond Scarcity: Power, Poverty and the Global Water Crisis"

2005 “International Cooperation at a Crossroads”

2004 “Cultural Liberty in Today’s Diverse World”

2003 “Millennium Development Goals: A Compact among Nations to End Human Poverty”

2002 “Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World”

2001 “Making New Technologies Work for Human Development”

2000 “Human Rights and Human Development”

1999 “Globalization with a Human Face”

1998 “Consumption for Human Development”

1997 “Human Development to Eradicate Poverty”

1996 “Economic Growth and Human Development”

1995 “Gender and Human Development”

1994 “New Dimensions of Human Security”

1993 “People’s Participation”

1992 “Global Dimensions of Human Development”

1991 “Financing Human Development”

1990: Concept And Measurement Of Human Development (Human Development Report: The Rise of the South: Human Progress in a Diverse World, 2013).

There is no tension between human development and sustainable development. Both are based on the universalism of life claims. (Human Development Report, 1994) Human development has main essential pillars: equality, sustainability, productivity and empowerment (Figure 1).

Productivity: people should be able to productively participate in the development process, in income generation and receive decent pay for their work. Full participation of people in the process of income generation and gainful employment.

Efficiency: minimizing the resources for achieving certain outcome or maximizing the outcome from the given resources.




Figure 1: Human Development Pillars

Source: Developed by the author from the data of UNDP

Equity: all people should have equal opportunities. Special emphasis is placed on equity of human development between men and women and various social groups

Sustainability: access to resources and opportunities cannot be at the expense of next generations' opportunities. The goal is meeting the needs of today without compromising the ability of satisfying the same by future generations.

Extending opportunities and participation: development is not just for people but by the people. People should be involved in decision-making processes that affect their lives. Participation and belonging to communities and groups is considered as a means of mutual enrichment and a source of social meaning.

The characteristics of the human development paradigm can be summarized as follows:

a) It is under construction, it is not a finished theory, new and complex.

b) It is multidimensional as it accomplishes different values according to different contributors: Haq advocates a "holistic" view while Sen advocates a "pluralist" one.

c) It is critical, as it questions prevailing neo-liberal theory.

d) It is inter-disciplinary, as it involves political philosophy, economics, statistics, social sciences, social policy, sociology, political theory

e) It is pragmatic, because it is born out of the UN in dialogue with governments which aims at changing the existing conditions.

Human development is a process of enlarging people's choices. The most critical ones are to lead a long and healthy life, to be educated and to enjoy a decent standard of living. Additional choices include political freedom, guaranteed human rights and self-respect.' (Human Development Report, 1990) It puts human beings at the centre, not incomes. According to human development paradigm, '[p]eople are the real wealth of a nation. The basic objective of development is to create an enabling environment for people to live long, healthy and creative lives' (Human Development Report, 1990). In Kant's words the aim is to 'act as to treat humanity, whether in their own person or that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as a means only'.

Sustainable development is the development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs' (WCSD, Brundtland).

It contains two key concepts within itself: **a)** the concept of 'needs', in particular the essential needs of the world's poor, to which overriding priority should be given; and **b)** the idea of limitations imposed by the state of technology and social organization on the environment's ability to meet present and future needs. (WCED, 1987)

Sustainable development also means "to increase the quality of human life without overstepping the carrying capacity of supporting ecosystems". (IUCN et al., 1991)

Brundtland's definition is needs-oriented. It is based on the notion that to overcome unjust wealth distribution economic growth is needed and there are no biophysical limits to growth (Hopwood, Mellor and O'Brien, 2005).


But the IUCN definition is well-being-oriented and based on the concept of carrying capacity. The "development is about removing the obstacles to what a person can do in life, obstacles such as illiteracy, ill health, lack of access to resources, or lack of civil and political freedoms" (Fukuda-Parr, 2003). Thus the Sustainable Development Paradigm consists of the following two components: 1) Sustainable Human Development, and 2) Environmental Sustainability. (Hasegawa, 2001)

Human Development Index as Measurement of Development

The Human Development Index is a summary measure for assessing long-term progress in three basic dimensions of human development:

1) A long and healthy life measured by life expectancy.

2) Access to knowledge measured by: a) mean years of adult education, which is the average number of years of education received in a life-time by people aged 25 years and older; and b) expected years of schooling for children of school-entrance.



	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Turkey	60.30	61.98	64.63	67.59	69.97	70.34	70.67	70.95	71.19	71.40	71.57	71.74	71.90	72.06	72.23
Russian Federation	67.46	68.27	67.87	65.93	65.03	64.92	64.90	64.99	65.18	65.46	65.81	66.18	66.55	66.89	67.21
Ukraine	69.26	70.05	69.70	67.84	67.38	67.46	67.57	67.68	67.80	67.93	68.04	68.17	68.31	68.45	68.62
Georgia	69.69	70.04	70.51	70.77	71.36	71.45	71.50	71.53	71.54	71.55	71.57	71.63	71.72	71.86	72.04
Bulgaria	71.07	71.31	71.22	70.86	71.39	71.64	71.90	72.16	72.41	72.65	72.88	73.10	73.32	73.53	73.75
Romania	69.60	69.62	69.40	69.40	70.48	70.81	71.14	71.47	71.77	72.04	72.29	72.53	72.76	72.99	73.21

Figure 2: Life Expectancy in Black Sea Region Countries

Source: developed by the author from the data UN (2010). World Population Prospects: 2008 Revision. New York

3) Standard of living measured by Gross National Income (GNI) per capita expressed in constant 2005 PPP$. (See Figure 3)

Sustainable human development is a comprehensive concept. It includes, as mentioned, education, health, income, equity, etc. and it cannot be measured by a single measurement such as GDP per capita. Human development index (HDI) was created with the aim to go beyond narrow/economic definition and measurement of human well-being. Human development Index in countries, particularly in Turkey, Russian federation, Georgia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Romania from 1980 till 2012 have been described in Figure 4.

Sustainable human development creates an environment in which human security is guaranteed and individual human beings can develop their full potential and lead a life of dignity and freedom. (Hasegawa, 2001)




Figure 3: GNI per capita (constant 2008 PPP US$) Source: developed by the author from the data of HDRO calculations




Figure 4: HDI Trends

Source: developed by the author from the data of Human Development Reports (HDRO calculations based on data from UNDESA (2011), Barro and Lee (2011), UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2012), World Bank (2012) and IMF (2012)

Conclusions

Human development is closely related to other human-centered concerns. The central purpose of development is the creation of an enabling environment in which all can enjoy long, healthy and creative live meeting basic needs. Human development is the development of total human - centered concepts. Human Development represents an important alternative paradigm to the economic/market paradigm generally adopted by World Bank. Interpretation of Human Development is very wide: it relates to all features of society that promote human flourishing, or prevent it. New aspects still being developed 20 years after report started

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Marka Şehirlerin Oluşturulmasında Dış Ticaretin Önemli Rolü: Sakarya Örneği

(The Important Role of Foreign Tradein Creating Brand Cities: Sakarya Case)

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Giriş

Rekabet ve marka, sermaye ve işgücü mobilitesinin daha yoğun olduğu günümüzde üniversiteleri, sanayileri, şehirleri kısaca ürün ve hizmet üreten kamu ve özel ayrımı yapmaksızın tüm oluşumları etkisi altına almıştır. Özellikle son sonra dönemlerde şehirlerin markalaşması üzerine akademik çalışmalar başlanmıştır.

Önceleri ulusal kalkınma çabalarının bir parçası olarak görülen kentlerin gelişmesi ve/veya kentsel kalkınma, artık kent yönetimlerini işlevi olarak görülmeye başlanmıştır. Kamu hizmetlerinin yürütülmesine karar vermekten ekonomik kalkınmaya, sosyal devlet uygulamalarından çevre korunmasına kadar bir dizi hükümet yetkisi, yerel yönetimlere aktarılmıştır. Bu gelişmeler, kent yönetiminin artık kente ve kentlilere ait olduğu anlamını taşımaktadır. Kamu hizmetleri, kalkınma, sosyal hizmetler, çevrenin korunması gibi birçok fonksiyon kent yönetiminin görevi (amacı) olmuştur. Böylece kentler, gündelik yaşamın temel belirleyicileri haline gelmiştir**.** Gündelik yaşamın belirleyicisi de hemşehrilerinin yaşamını kolaylaştırıcı fonksiyonu, kaynakların kıt olduğu dünyada kentleri rekabete sürüklemektedir. Sosyal, kültürel ve ekonomik alanlarda kalkınmayı sağlamak amacıyla hem diğer ülke kentleriyle hem de komşu kentlerle rekabet etme gereği öne çıkmaktadır. (Eken ve Tuzcuoğlu, 2008:1079)

İşletme literatüründe genelde firmalar için söylenen, "belirsizliğin hüküm sürdüğü çevrede sürekli rekabet üstünlüğü sağlayan güvenilir bilgidir" sözü şehirler için de geçerlidir. Firmaların rekabet biçimine benzer şekilde rekabet eden şehirler için de bilgi ve onun yönetilmesi oldukça önemlidir. Diğer şehirlere oranla rekabette daha yüksek performans sergileyen şehirlerde, genelde şehri oluşturan resmi ve resmi olmayan birimler arasındaki bilgi akışı

ve tecrübe paylaşımın çok iyi sağlandığı gözlemlenmektedir. (Geyik ve Coşkun, 2004: 677)

Küresel çapta bir şehirsel sistem meydana gelmiştir. Şehirler artık, sınırların ortadan kalkması sonucu giderek belirsizleşen konumları ile değil, birbirleri ve küresel akışlarla kurdukları ağ tipi ilişkiler üzerinden tanımlanmaktadır. Kurulan ağlar ile değişen etkileşim biçimi yoluyla egemenliğin ulus devletten, uluslar üstü kurumlara ve yerel yönetimlere devredilmesi, şehirlere daha fazla hareket yeteneği kazandırmakta, onlara ulus devletten nispeten bağımsız olarak dış ekonomik politika belirleme, uluslararası işbirliği ve rekabet arenasına girme imkânı tanımaktadır. (Marangoz et al, 2010: 697)

Eken ve Tuzcuoğlu'nun yapmış olduğu "Kentsel Rekabet ve Türk Dünyası Kentleri" çalışmasında yerel yönetimlerin sadece kentsel altyapı hizmetleri yürütmediği, yoksullukla mücadeleden ekonomik kalkınmaya katkıda bulunmaya kadar bir dizi yeni görevler üstlendiği ve her şeyi merkezi hükümetten bekleyen bir anlayışın geçerliliğini kaybettiği kentlerin rekabette asgari (alan yönetimi ve imar düzeni), alt yapı, kent hizmetleri, nitelikli sosyal sermaye) koşulları yerine getirerek rekabet gücü (farklılıkların ortaya çıkması, yerel yönetişim uygulaması, kentsel strateji belirlenmesi ve sürdürülebilir kalkınma) faktörleri ile mümkün olabileceği fakat bazı engellerin (uzun süre gerektirmesi, stratejik düşünme eksikliği, kentsel rant ve kentlerin doğurduğu artı değerleri paylaşamama, politik ve ideolojik çatışma, kent bilincinin eksik olması ve her şeyin kamu kesiminden beklenmesi) olduğu üzerinde durulmuştur. McKinsey Global Institude firmasının 2011 yılında "Building Globally Competitive Cities: The Key to Latin American Growth" başlığıyla yayınlamış olduğu diğer bir çalışmada, nüfusları 200.000 ve üzeri olan şehirler gayri safi hasılalarının büyüklüğüne göre sıralanıp ilk 10 ve ilk 50 şehir listeleri yapılmış ve genç nüfusun üzerinde çalışılan kentlerin kalkınmasında önemli bir potansiyel olduğu üzerinde durulmuştur.

Şehirler çeşitli endekslerle karşılaştırılarak şehirlerin rekabetçilik analizi yapılabilmektedir. Uluslararası Rekabet Araştırmalar Kurumu'nun İllerarası Rekabetçilik Endeksinde yer alan (1) beseri sermaye ve yasam kalitesi alt endeksi'ne ait degiskenler, agırlıklandırmalar, hesaplama yöntemleri ve basvurulan kaynaklar, (2) markalasma becerisi ve yenilikçilik alt endeksi'ne ait degiskenler, agırlıklandırmalar, hesaplama yöntemleri ve basvurulan

kaynaklar, (3) ticaret becerisi ve üretim potansiyeli alt endeksi'ne ait degiskenler, agırlıklandırmalar, hesaplama yöntemleri ve basvurulan kaynaklar ve (4) erisilebilirlik alt endeksi'ne ait degiskenler, agırlıklandırmalar, hesaplama yöntemleri ve başvurulan kaynaklar olarak sınıflandırmalar yapılarak kentin illerarası rekabetçilik endeksi belirlenmektedir. Özellikle 2 ve 3 numaralı endeksler markalaşma ve sanayi yapısını incelemektedir.

Dış ticaret ile markalaşması planlan şehirden beklenilen süreklilik arz eden ülke lehine dış ticaret yapısının oluşturulmasıdır. Tüm bu çalışmalar ışığında Sakarya'nın dış ticaret ile markalaşabilmesi ve dış ticarette bilginin tabana yayılarak uzun dönemde daha hızlı ve etkin bir dış ticaret ile "dış ticaret ağı" oluşturabilmesi yönünde analiz yapılacaktır.

1. Marka ve Kentlerin Markalaşması

Marka bir teşebbüsün mal veya hizmetlerini bir başka teşebbüsün mal veya hizmetlerinden ayırt etmeyi sağlaması koşuluyla; kişi adları, sözcükler, şekiller, harfler, sayılar, malların biçimi ve ambalajları gibi çizimle görüntülenebilen veya benzer biçimde ifade edilebilen, baskı yoluyla yayınlanabilen ve çoğaltılabilen her türlü işaretlerdir. (Pekanlar, 2003: 23) Bu tanımdan yola çıkarak kentler de benzer unsurlarla marka haline gelmiştir.

Son dönemlerde şehirlerin markalaşması üzerine akademik çalışmalar yapılmıştır. Markalaşmasını hedeflediğimiz kent'in çeşitli tanımları bulunmaktadır. Türk Dil Kurumu İnternet sitesinde bilim ve sanat terimleri sözlüğünde "sürekli toplumsal gelişme içinde bulunan ve toplumun, yerleşme, barınma, gidişgeliş, çalışma, dinlenme, eğlenme gibi gereksinmelerinin karşılandığı, pek az kimsenin tarımsal uğraşılarda bulunduğu, köylere bakarak nüfus yönünden daha yoğun olan ve küçük komşuluk birimlerinden oluşan yerleşme birimi" olarak tanımlanmıştır.

Marangoz ve diğerleri ise yapmış oldukları "Şehirlerin Markalaşması ve Şehir Markası Oluşturmada Sembol Yapılar: Çanakkale Örneği" çalışmasında şehirlerin kendilerine has mimari yapıları ile marka olabileceği ve turist çekme potansiyeline sahip olduğu üzerinde durmuşlardır.

Marka kent tercihi yapılırken ileri düzeyde bir analiz yapılmadığı görülmektedir. Marka kent tercihinin dayandığı gerekçeler, kentlerin tarihi ve kültürel potansiyeli ile sınırlı kalmaktadır. Ancak kapsam dışı bırakılan illerin

potansiyeli ile karşılaştırıldığında, bu gerekçenin de soru işaretleri ile dolu olduğu görülmektedir. (Tek, 2009:177)

6.6.2012 tarih ve 28322 sayılı Resmi Gazete'de "2023 Türkiye İhracat Stratejisi" yayınlanmış olup ihracatın artırılmasına yönelik hedefler belirlenmiş, paydaşlar ve paydaşların sorumlulukları açıklanmıştır. Sınırlı kaynakların olması sebebiyle şehirlerin uzmanlaşması ve uzmanlaşma sonucu şehirlerin markalaşması hedeflemektedir. Verimlilik açısından uzmanlaşma günümüzde kaçınılmaz hale gelmiştir. T.C.Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı'nın 2007'de yayınlanan "Türkiye Turizm Stratejisi 2023"de ise doğal olarak turizm yatırımları yer almaktadır. (http://www.ktbyatirimisletmeler.gov.tr/TR, 11699/turkiye-turizm-stratejisi.html) Yükseköğretim eğitimi alanında ise uluslararası öğrenci sayısını artırarak eğitimde markalaşma adına bir çalışma bulunmaktadır. Bununla birlikte Sakarya Üniversitesi eğitim kalitesini artırmak adına yüksek lisans düzeyine yayın şartı ve akademisyenlerin zorunlu yurtdışı çalışması gibi rekabette üstünlük sağlayıcı adımlar atmaktadır.

2. Kentlerin Markalaşmasını Etkileyen Faktörler

Şehrin bünyesinde yer alan, şehrin denetim gücünün görece yüksek olduğu ve şehir performansını etkileyen faktörler bütünü olarak adlandırabileceğimiz iç faktörler şunlardır: coğrafi konum, insan sermayesi, eğitim altyapısı, girişimci kültür, doğal yapı, yerel yönetimin kalitesi, teknolojik potansiyel, toprak kalitesi, merkezi hükümet nezdinde şehrin temsil gücü, endüstriyel altyapısı, yatırım iklimi, şebekeleşme, vizyon birliği. Yine şehrin iletişim/etkileşim içerisinde olduğu, kendi denetim alanı dışında olan ve performansını etkileyen faktörler bütünü olarak adlandırabileceğimiz dış faktörler şunlardır: ülkenin genel ekonomik şartları, ülkenin genel siyasi şartları, çevre iller (rakipler), müşteriler (üretilen ürün ve hizmete talip olanlar), bölgede sanayi kümelerinin varlığı, bölgenin gelişmişlik düzeyi, uluslararası aktörler. (Geyik ve Coşkun, 2004: 681)

Marangoz ve diğerleri en rekabetçi şehirleri, "varlıklarından" en yüksek geri kazanımı elde eden şehirler olarak tanımlamaktadır. Şehir markalaşma sürecinin de, bu varlıkların neler olduğunu, hangilerinin ekonomik anlamda yeterli sonuç verme potansiyeline sahip olduğunu, hangilerinin kentin değer ve sosyal inançlarına uygun olduğunu tanımlaması gerektiğini belirtmekte ve

şehir markası geliştirme sürecini üç asamaya ayırarak incelemektedirler. Bunlar;

1. Şehir kimliğini anlaşılır kılma
2. Şehir kimliğini imaja dönüştürme
3. Uygulama; şehir imajının yayımı

Bu üç aşamalı kurgu, birbiri içine sızan ve birbirini tamamlayan, etkileşim içindeki süreçlerden oluşmaktadır. Bu süreçleri kesin çizgilerle birbirinden ayırmak mümkün değildir. (Marangoz ve diğerleri, 2010: 685) Bu çalışmada ise Sakarya'nın dış ticareti analiz edilerek dış ticarette rekabet gücü ve markalaşma potansiyeli incelenecektir.

3. Sakarya Ekonomisinin Genel Görünümü

TUİK verilerine göre iller itibariyle Gayri Safi yurtiçi Hasılasında Sakarya'nın cari fiyatlarla 2001 yılında Türkiye'deki payı %1,1; 2000 yılında %1,1; 1999 yılında yine %1,1 olarak gerçekleşmesine rağmen 1999 yılında cari fiyatlarla gelişme hızı %38,80 iken 2000 yılında %62,90 ve de genel görünümü ise gelişme hızı artan bir özelliğe sahiptir.

TUİK verilerine göre 2013 yılı Ocak-Eylül dönemi ihracatı olan 1.717.684.298 USD ile Türkiye ihracatındaki payı %1,526, 2012 yılında 1.820.384.182 USD ihracat ile Türkiye ihracatındaki payı ise % 1,19, 2011 yılında ise 2.011.777.807 USD ihracat ile ülke payı %1,49 olarak gerçekleşmiştir. İstikrarlı bir ihracat yapısına sahip konumundadır.

TUİK verilerine göre 2011 yılı istihdamı 281.000 ve işsizlik oranı % 8 olarak gerçekleşmiş olup Türkiye istihdam sıralamasında 24. sırada yer almıştır. Türkiye 2011 yılı işsizlik oranı ise %7,90 olarak gerçekleşmiştir.

URAK 2009-2010 İllerarası Rekabetçilik Endeks'inde 2009-2010 Genel Endeks sıralamasında 21,71 birim değer ile 26. sırada ve 2008-2009 Genel endeks değeri 21,67 değer ile 24. sırada yer almıştır.

4. Sakarya Dış Ticaret Yapısı

TUİK verilerine göre Sakarya'nın 2013 yılı Ocak-Eylül dönemi 1.717.684.298 USD ihracat ile Türkiye ihracatındaki payı aynı dönemde

%1,526 olarak gerçekleşmiştir. 2012 yılında negatif olan ihracat artış hızı Eylül 2013 itibariyle pozitife dönmüş bulunmakta ve ihracatın il bazında 2013 yılı sonunda son yıllarda aşılması güç olan 2 milyar dolar seviyesini aşması beklenmektedir. Rakamsal olarak ihracat il bazında 2004 yılında en yüksek artış yakalamış sonraki dönemlerde ise bu artış hızı istikrarsız şekilde artış ve azalışları yaşamıştır. Sakarya için en olumlu gelişme ihracatın ithalatı karşılama oranın yüksek çıkmasıdır. Bu sonuç Türkiye ekonomisi için de olumlu bir gelişme teşkil etmektedir. Türkiye'nin ihracatın ithalatı karşılama oranı en yüksek seviyesini 2009 yılında ithalatın ihracattan daha yüksek düzeyde düşüşünden kaynaklanan gelişme neticesinde gerçekleşebilmiştir. Türkiye ihracatının ithalatı karşılama oranı en düşük 2011 yılında yaşanmış ve aynı yılda ithalat Türkiye tarihinin zirvesini gerçekleştirmiştir. Türkiye ihracat ve ithalat artışı paralellik gösterirken Sakarya ithalat ve ihracat artışı aynı yönde değildir. Sakarya İhracatı daha hızlı artarken ithalatı daha yavaş artmakta ya da yıllar itibariyle azalmaktadır.

Sakarya ve ülke ithalat ihracat hızlarındaki değişimlerin yönü yıllar itibariyle değişiklikler göstermiştir. 2003-2005 yıllarında Sakarya'nın ihracat hızı ülkenin ihracat artış hızından daha yüksek bir ivmeye sahip olmasına rağmen sonraki dönemlerde 2009 yılı dışında bu artış olmamıştır. İlin ihracat artış hızı en yüksek 2004 yılında en düşük 2009 yılında, ülkenin ise en yüksek ihracat artış hızı 2004 yılında olmuştur. İlin ithalat hızı bazı yıllarda ülke artış hızından daha düşük olmuştur. İlin en hızlı ithalat artış hızı 2004 yılında gerçekleşmiş olup, ülkenin ithalat artış hızı da 2004 yılında en yüksek gerçekleşmiştir. 2012 yılında ise ilin ihracat artış hızı düşmüş fakat 2013 yılı Ocak-Eylül döneminde ihracat 1,7 milyar doları aşmıştır ve 2013 sonu itibariyle 2 milyar doları geçmesi beklenmektedir.

Tablo 1. Dış Ticaret Göstergeleri Sakarya-Türkiye (2003-2012)								
	Sakarya					Türkiye		
YIL	İhracat Usd (*1000)	İhracat Artış Hızı	İthalat Usd (*1000)	İthalat Artış Hızı	İhracat/ İthalat	İhracat Usd (*1000)	İthalat Usd (*1000)	İhracat/ İthalat
2002	428.029		527.904		0,811	36.059.089	51.553.797	0,699
2003	843.017	0,970	751.905	0,424	1,121	47.252.836	69.339.692	0,681
2004	2.093.253	1,483	1.193.817	0,588	1,753	63.167.152	97.539.765	0,648
2005	2.712.959	0,296	1.555.407	0,303	1,744	73.476.408	116.774.150	0,629
2006	2.981.394	0,099	1.930.986	0,241	1,544	85.534.675	139.576.174	0,613
2007	3.522.654	0,182	2.018.569	0,045	1,745	107.271.749	170.062.714	0,631
2008	2.912.889	-0,173	1.708.866	-0,153	1,705	132.027.195	201.963.574	0,654
2009	1.722.374	-0,409	908.949	-0,468	1,895	102.142.612	140.928.421	0,725
2010	1.678.285	-0,026	1.005.238	0,106	1,670	113.883.219	185.544.331	0,614
2011	2.011.777	0,199	1.368.469	0,361	1,470	134.906.868	240.841.676	0,560
2012	1.820.384	-0,095	1.149.584	-0,160	1,584	152.461.736	236.545.140	0,645

Kaynak: TUİK, İl bazında 2002 ve sonrası verileri bulunmaktadır.

Tablo 2. Sakarya ve Türkiye Karşılaştırması; İhracat İthalat Değişim Hızı (2003-2012)				
	Sakarya	**Türkiye**	**Sakarya**	**Türkiye**
Yıl	**İhracat Artış Hızı**	**İhracat Artış Hızı**	**İthalat Artış Hızı**	**İthalat Artış Hızı**
2003	0,970	0,310	**0,424**	**0,345**
2004	**1,483**	**0,337**	**0,588**	**0,407**
2005	0,296	0,163	0,303	0,197
2006	0,099	0,164	0,241	0,195
2007	0,182	0,254	0,045	0,218
2008	**-0,173**	**0,231**	**-0,153**	**0,188**
2009	-0,409	-0,226	**-0,468**	**-0,302**
2010	-0,026	0,115	0,106	0,317
2011	0,199	0,185	0,361	0,298
2012	-0,095	0,130	**-0,160**	**-0,018**
Kaynak: TUİK				

4.1. Sakarya İthalatında İlk 10 Fasıl

2012, 2011, 2010 ve 2005 yılları Sakarya ilk 10 İthalat faslında 1, 8, 44, 73, 28 fasıl ürünler son 3 yılda ilk 10 a giren fasıllardır. Diğer fasıllarda bir değişiklik olmamış hatta büyük çoğunluğunun sırası da değişmemiştir. 2005 yılında ise tek farklı fasıl 27 numaralı fasıldır.

Sakarya ithalat yapısında önemli bir değişiklik olmamış yıllar itibariyle ithalat düzeylerinde değişmeler olmuştur. En yüksek ithalat 2012, 2011, 2010 ve 2005 yılında 84. Ve 87.fasılda olmuştur. Sakarya ikame ürün üretiminde ithalatın büyük kısmını oluşturan 84. ve 87. Fasıl ürünlerine yoğunlaşması ithalatı düşürücü etki gösterebilecektir.

Tablo 3. Sakarya - Fasıl Düzeyinde İthalat (2012)		
Fasıl Düzeyi	**Fasıl Açıklaması**	**Toplamı (USD)**
1	Canlı hayvanlar	22.124.458
8	Yenilen meyvalar ve yenilen sert kabuklu meyvalar; turunçgillerin ve kavunların ve karpuzların kabukları	55.639.223
39	Plastikler ve mamulleri	65.586.345
40	Kauçuk ve kauçuktan eşya	17.871.566
72	Demir ve çelik	47.544.628
84	Kazanlar, makinalar, mekanik cihazlar ve aletler, nükleer reaktörler; bunların aksam ve parçaları	283.091.945
85	Elektrikli makina ve cihazlar, ses kaydetme-verme, televizyon görüntü-ses kaydetme-verme cihazları; aksam-parça-aksesuarı	142.032.912
86	Demiryolu vb hatlara ait taşıtlar ve malzemeler, bunların aksam-parçaları; mekanik trafik sinyalizasyon cihazları	20.963.899
87	Motorlu kara taşıtları, traktörler, bisikletler, motosikletler ve diğer kara taşıtları; bunların aksam, parça, aksesuarı	276.931.758
90	Optik, fotoğraf, sinema, ölçü, kontrol, ayar, tıbbi, cerrahi alet ve cihazlar; bunların aksam, parça ve aksesuarı	57.919.423
Kaynak: TUİK		

Tablo 4. Sakarya - Fasıl Düzeyinde İthalat (2005)		
Fasıl Düzeyi	**Fasıl Açıklaması**	**Toplamı (USD)**
27	Mineral yakıtlar, mineral yağlar ve bunların damıtılmasından elde edilen ürünler; bitümenli maddeler; mineral mumlar	18.539.858
39	Plastikler ve mamulleri	28.614.205
40	Kauçuk ve kauçuktan eşya	21.231.670
72	Demir ve çelik	71.760.035
73	Demir veya çelikten eşya	24.000.043
83	Adi metallerden çeşitli eşya (kilit, kasa, mobilya tertibatı, vb.)	25.874.637
84	Kazanlar, makinalar, mekanik cihazlar ve aletler, nükleer reaktörler; bunların aksam ve parçaları	430.105.454
85	Elektrikli makina ve cihazlar, ses kaydetme-verme, televizyon görüntü-ses kaydetme-verme cihazları; aksam-parça-aksesuarı	207.499.365
87	Motorlu kara taşıtları, traktörler, bisikletler, motosikletler ve diğer kara taşıtları; bunların aksam, parça, aksesuarı	563.842.880
90	Optik, fotoğraf, sinema, ölçü, kontrol, ayar, tıbbi, cerrahi alet ve cihazlar; bunların aksam, parça ve aksesuarı	71.672.989
Kaynak: TUİK		

4.2. Sakarya İhracatında İlk 10 Fasıl

Fasıl düzeyinde ihracat, 2012, 2011, 2010 ve 2005 yıllarında önemli bir yapısal değişiklik göstermemiş sadece ihracat miktarlarında değişiklik olmuştur. İthalatta en yüksek miktara sahip olan 84. ve 87. fasıllar ihracat sıralamasında da ihracatta da yüksek düzeye sahip olmuştur. 2012 yılında 8 numaralı fasılda yüksek ihracat düzeyi gerçekleşmiştir. 2013 ve sonraki

dönemde 8. Fasıl ürünlerinin dönemlik olup olmadığı anlaşılabilecektir. 87. Fasıl düzeyinde en yüksek ihracat 2005 yılında gerçekleşmiştir. 2012 ve 2011 yılında 40.fasıl ürünlerin ihracatı ilk 10 içinde yer almamıştır. 85. fasıl ihracat toplamı en hızlı artış gösteren fasıllardan birisi konumunda bulunmakta olup 87. fasıl ürünleri yıllar itibariyle büyük dalgalanmalar göstermiştir.

Tablo 5. Sakarya-Fasıl düzeyinde İhracat (2012)

Fasıl Düzeyi	Fasıl Açıklaması	Toplamı (USD)
8	Yenilen meyvalar ve yenilen sert kabuklu meyvalar; turunçgillerin ve kavunların ve karpuzların kabukları	48.038.782
19	Hububat, un, nişasta veya süt müstahzarları; pastacılık ürünleri	16.432.767
32	Debagatte ve boyacılıkta kullanılan hülasalar; tanenler; boyalar, pigmentler, vb; vernikler, vb; macunlar; mürekkepler	36.930.887
39	Plastikler ve mamulleri	52.213.880
72	Demir ve çelik	39.934.388
73	Demir veya çelikten eşya	30.939.629
76	Aluminyum ve aluminyumdan eşya	39.221.785
84	Kazanlar, makinalar, mekanik cihazlar ve aletler, nükleer reaktörler; bunların aksam ve parçaları	60.402.575
85	Elektrikli makina ve cihazlar, ses kaydetme-verme, televizyon görüntü-ses kaydetme-verme cihazları; aksam-parça-aksesuarı	84.013.984
87	Motorlu kara taşıtları, traktörler, bisikletler, motosikletler ve diğer kara taşıtları; bunların aksam, parça, aksesuarı	1.324.431.873

Kaynak: TUİK

Tablo 6. Sakarya-Fasıl düzeyinde İhracat (2005)		
Fasıl Düzeyi	**Fasıl Açıklaması**	**Toplamı (USD)**
19	Hububat, un, nişasta veya süt müstahzarları; pastacılık ürünleri	10.269.268
27	Mineral yakıtlar, mineral yağlar ve bunların damıtılmasından elde edilen ürünler; bitümenli maddeler; mineral mumlar	14.121.292
32	Debagatte ve boyacılıkta kullanılan hülasalar; tanenler; boyalar, pigmentler, vb; vernikler, vb; macunlar; mürekkepler	6.411.820
39	Plastikler ve mamulleri	11.391.440
68	Taş, alçı, çimento, amyant, mika veya benzeri maddelerden eşya	9.636.922
73	Demir veya çelikten eşya	5.413.010
76	Aluminyum ve aluminyumdan eşya	10.462.288
84	Kazanlar, makinalar, mekanik cihazlar ve aletler, nükleer reaktörler; bunların aksam ve parçaları	147.728.733
85	Elektrikli makina ve cihazlar, ses kaydetme-verme, televizyon görüntü-ses kaydetme-verme cihazları; aksam-parça-aksesuarı	28.222.502
87	Motorlu kara taşıtları, traktörler, bisikletler, motosikletler ve diğer kara taşıtları; bunların aksam, parça, aksesuarı	2.437.798.588
Kaynak: TUİK		

4.3. Sakarya'nın İlk 10 İthalat - İhracat Ortağı

Sakarya 2012 yılında 80 farklı noktadan (ülke, serbest bölge, kesinleşmemiş ülke ve bölgeler) ithalat yapmıştır. Sakarya toplam ithalatının % 85'i ilk 10 ülkeden yapılmıştır. En yüksek ithalat Çek Cumhuriyeti'nden 237.838.783 dolar olarak gerçekleşmiştir. İhracatın ise ilk 10 ülkeye olan oranı % 73'tür.

Tablo 7. Sakarya-İlk 10 İthalat Ortağı-2012

Ülke adı	İthalat Dolar
Fransa	106.149.173
Hollanda	75.780.736
Almanya	136.824.818
İtalya	27.214.895
İngiltere	105.428.783
Çek Cumhuriyeti	237.838.301
ABD	55.803.626
Çin	36.119.030
Güney Kore	28.078.166
Japonya	170.079.950
Toplam	979.317.478
Genel Toplam	**1.149.584.868**

Kaynak: TUİK

Tablo 8. Sakarya-İlk 10 İhracat Ortağı 2012

Ülke adı	İhracat Dolar
Fransa	293.174.020
Almanya	271.955.737
İtalya	66.128.402
İngiltere	139.348.855
İspanya	160.578.292
Belçika	72.359.022
İsveç	102.731.453
İsviçre	35.380.061
Polonya	71.840.378
Rusya Federasyonu	116.356.469
Toplam	1.329.852.689
Genel Toplam	**1.820.384.182**

Kaynak: TUİK

İhracat ile ithalat ülkelerinin 4 tanesi örtüşmektedir. İlk 10 içinde ithalat partnerlerinin %60'ı Avrupa ülkeleri, ihracatta ise %90'ı Avrupa ülkeleri olmuştur. İhracatın belirli bölgelere yoğunlaşması politik risk açısından

değerlendirilmesi gerekmektedir. 2012 yılı ihracat ve ithalatında 10 ülke alınarak ihracat ve ithalat partnerlerinin örtüştüğü gözlemlenmiştir. İhracat pazar yoğunlaşması açısından, Türkiye ihracatçıları için Avrupa cazibesini korumaktadır. Daha sağlıklı değerlendirme için ileriye dönük pazar potansiyelinin çıkarılması açısından tüm ithalat ve ihracat ortaklarının yıllar itibariyle değerlendirilmesi gerekmektedir.

4.4. Sakarya'nın İhracat Odaklılık Endeksi

İhracat odaklılık göstergesi (İOG), ilin Türkiye ihracatı içinde aldığı payı toplam istihdam içinden aldığı paya oranlayarak hesaplanmasıdır. Bu göstergenin artması şehrin daha fazla ihracat odaklı olduğunu göstermektedir. Gösterge sıfıra yaklaştıkça ilin iktisadi aktivitesinde ihracatın önemi azalmaktadır. Gösterge değerinin birin üzerine çıktığı iller ise ihracat odaklı iller olarak adlandırılmaktadır. İhracat Odaklılık Göstergesi (İOG) aşağıdaki formülle hesaplanır.

$$\textbf{İOG} = \frac{\text{İlin İhracatı / Ülke Toplam İhracatı}}{\text{İlde İstihdam Eline Kişi Sayısı / Ülke Toplam İstihdamı}}$$

Sakarya 2011 yılı ihracatı 2.011.777 dolar, ülke ihracatı ise aynı yıl için 134.906.868 dolar olarak gerçekleşmiştir. Sakarya 2011 istihdamı 281.000 iken ülke istihdamı ise 24.320.000 olmuştur. Sakarya'nın ihracat odaklılık göstergesi 1'den büyük çıkmıştır. Sakarya ihracat odaklı bir şehir diyebiliriz.

4.5 İllerarası Rekabetçilik Analizi

En rekabetçi şehirleri, "varlıklarından" en yüksek geri kazanımı elde eden şehirler olarak tanımlamaktadır. Şehir markalaşma sürecinin de, bu varlıkların neler olduğunu, hangilerinin ekonomik anlamda yeterli sonuç verme potansiyeline sahip olduğunu, hangilerinin kentin değer ve sosyal inançlarına uygun olduğunu tanımlaması gerektiğini belirtmekte ve şehir markası geliştirme sürecini üç asamaya ayırarak incelemektedirler. Bunlar;

1. Şehir kimliğini anlaşılır kılma
2. Şehir kimliğini imaja dönüştürme
3. Uygulama; şehir imajının yayımı

Bu üç aşamalı kurgu, birbiri içine sızan ve birbirini tamamlayan, etkileşim içindeki süreçlerden oluşmaktadır. Bu süreçleri kesin çizgilerle birbirinden ayırmak mümkün değildir. (Marangoz ve diğerleri, 2010: 685)

2009-2010 İllerarası Rekabetçilik çalışmasında Sakarya, Genel Endeks Değeri: 21,71, Genel Endeks Sırasında 26, Beseri Sermaye ve Yasam Kalitesi Alt Endeksi Sırası: 29, Markalasma Becerisi ve Yenilikçilik Alt Endeksi Sırası: 17, Ticaret Becerisi ve Üretim Potansiyeli Alt Endeksi Sırası: 38, Erisilebilirlik Alt Endeksi Sırası: 21 olmuştur.

Ticaret Becerisi ve Üretim Potansiyeli Alt Endeksi'nde yıllar itibariyle geriledigi görülen Sakarya'nın 2007-2008'de 17., 2008-2009'da ise 24. oldugu saptanmıstır. İl, 2009-2010 Alt Endeks degerine göre 81 il arasında 38. sırada yer almaktadır. Alt endeksi meydana getiren degiskenler incelendiginde Sakarya'nın; Bir Önceki Seneye Göre Ilde Kapanan Sirket Sayısındaki Degisim Oranı'na göre 33. sırada yer aldıgı, İhracat Hacmi bakımından 7. sıradaki konumunu korudugu ve İldeki Toplam Kamu Yatırımına (Enerji ve Haberlesme-Ulastırma hariç) ait sıralamada 22. sıradan 41. Sıraya geriledigi saptanmıstır. Sanayi Elektrik Tüketim Miktarı bakımından 19. olan Sakarya, Dıs Ticaret Yapan Firma Sayısı'na ait sıralamada 16. Sırada yer almaktadır.

Beseri Sermaye ve Yasam Kalitesi Alt Endeksi'ni meydana getiren degiskenler incelendiğinde Sakarya'nın; Kisi Basına Düsen Uzman Hekim Sayısı'na iliskin sıralamada 2 sıra yükselerek 48. oldugu, Mesleki ve Teknik Okul Mezun Sayısı'nda 14. sıradan 11. sıraya yükseldigi, diğer taraftan Ilde Islenen Suç Sebebiyle Kisi basına Ceza Infaz Kurumu'na Giren Hükümlü Sayısı'na ait sıralamada 2 sıra ilerleyerek 18. sırada yer aldıgı tespit edilmiştir. (URAK, 2009-2010 Raporu)

İhracat ve ithalat fasılları detaylı incelenerek ithal ikamesine yönelik üretim ve etkin sektörlerin pazar paylarını artırılması için çalışmalar genişletilmelidir. Ticaret ve markalaşma endekslerinin de bu doğrultuda artması beklenmektedir.

Sonuç

Marka kent kavramının bir bakıma "moda" haline gelmesiyle birlikte, kapitalizmin geldiği aşama ve post modern yaklaşımın da katkısıyla "her şey gider" sloganın etkisi, daha fazla hissediliyor. Valiler illerini, belediye

başkanları da beldelerini "marka kent" yapacakları iddiasıyla ortaya çıkmakta ve vaatler sunmaktadır. Moda halini alan marka kent akımı çerçevesinde bir zemin, ölçü ve/veya ölçüt hazır olmadığından, bu akım içinde yer alan hemen her birey, kurum ya da örgüt aklına ya da işine geldiği gibi marka kenti ve marka kent etrafında biçimlenen süreci tanımlamaya ve biçimlendirmeye çalışmaktadır. Bu sürecin bu denli popüler olmasının altında ise daha çok bu süreçte oluşabilecek rant potansiyeli ve bu potansiyelden bir şekilde nemalanma düşüncesinin önemli bir payı olduğu düşünülmektedir. (Tek, 2009: 169)

Aynı pazar koşullarında bazı şehirlerin diğerlerine oranla daha yüksek bir refah seviyesine ulaşması ve bunu süreklileştirmesi, artık şehirlerin de stratejik bir analiz birimi olarak görülmesine neden olmakta ve bu konuda araştırmalar yoğunlaşmaktadır. Şehrin rekabet üstünlüğü elde etmesinde ve bunu süreklileştirebilmesinde elbette ki itici gücü firmalar oluşturmaktadır. Ekonomiye katma değeri yüksek olan firmalara sahip olmak, diğer şehirlere oranla daha yüksek bir refah seviyesine ulaşmanın ön şartıdır. Şehirdeki diğer kurum ve kuruluşların buradaki rolü, şehrin refahına katkı sunan bu firmalara destek olmak, bu firmalarda çalışan nitelikli insan gücüne sosyal ve kültürel açıdan yeterli kentsel imkanlar sunmak, potansiyel yatırımcılara uygun yatırım yerleri sunmak ve işlem sayısını azaltmaktır. (Geyik ve Coşkun, 2004: 684)

İhracat ve ithalat fasılları detaylı incelenerek ithal ikamesine yönelik üretim ve etkin sektörlerin pazar paylarını artırılması için çalışmalar yapıldıkça Sakarya rekabetçilik için önemli adımları atmış olacaktır. Sakarya için ithalat ve ihracat kalemleri tespit edildikten sonra ithalatın ikamesine yönelik çalışmalar Sakarya Üniversitesi ve Sanayi Odası arasında planlanmaktadır. Bu çalışma sonraki dönemlerde gerçekleştirilecek olan "Ticaret Ağı" düşüncesinin Karadeniz Bölgesi ülkeleri şehirleri ile mikro düzeyde etkin ihracat ve ithalatın alt yapısına yönelik olacaktır. Sonraki Mavi Karadeniz Kongrelerinde bu "Ticaret Ağı" fikrinin yaygınlaşmasına yönelik Karedeniz Ülkelerinin Üniversite ve Sanayi ve Ticaret Odalarını da kapsayan bütünlük arz edecek bir çalışma hedeflenmektedir.

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Post-Sovet Azərbaycanda Din və Kimliyin Dəyişən və Inkişaf Edən Təbiəti Haqda

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20-ci əsrin başlanğıcında Rusiya imperiyasının əsarəti altında olan Azərbaycanda bir kimlik axtarışı insanların şüuruna hakim kəsilmişdi.O dövrün aydınları yüz illlik zaman içərisində Rus işğalçılarının onlara verdiyi adın qondarma olduğunu dərk etmişdilər.Qazetlərdə qızğın mübahisələr doğuracaq məqalələr bu mövzuya həsr edilirdi.O,dövrdə Azərbaycan xalqının etnik kim olduğunu Azərbaycan Xalq Cümhuriyyətinin qurucusu M.Ə Rəsulzadə bu cür dəyərləndirirdi . Azərbaycanlılar milliyət etibarıilə türk,din etibarilə islam,mədəniyyəti- əsasiyyə etibarilə şərqlidirlər.Artıq sovetlərə qədər bu məsələ aydın idi.Fəqət sovet işğalı olmasaydı.

Azərbaycanda Sovet dövrü 1920-də aprel (nisan)ayının 28-də rus ordusunun ölkəni işğal etməsi ilə başladı.Ruslar Azərbaycana girdikdən sonra 1918-1920 illərdə Azərbaycan Xalq Cümhuriyyəti tarafından yaradılmış həm maddi, həm mənəvi dəyərləri talan etməyə başladı. Qısa bir vaxtda Azərbaycan sovetləşdirildi, zülümkar və allahsız bir rejim quruldu.Ölkə insanının malını qəsb etməkdən doymayan kommunist rejimi dini və kimliyi də qasb etməyə başladı.

15 may 1920-də Halk Maarif Komissarlığı tərəfindən vicdan azadlığı elan olundu.Vicdan azadlığı inanclı insanlara sərbəstlik verməli olduğu halda, bundan sonra məscidlər və ibadət evləri qapadıldı,dini ainlərin icrası qadağan edildi. İnsanların dini və milli hislərinə nəzarət etmək üçün Fövqaladə Komissiya, Ali İnqilabi Tribunal, yoxsul komitələri və allahsızlar cəmiyyəti quruldu.

Müsəlmanlara qarşı inamsızlıq açıq-açığına təbliğ olunurdu.Bəzən insanların müsəlman olduqları üzündən həyatları təhlükə altında qalırdı. Partiyada yüksək vəzifə tutan Lominadze AK(b)P-nin 2-ci qurultayında çıxışı

zamanı müsəlmanlara olan ayrı-seçkiliyi bu cür ifadə edirdi, "bizdə onlarla bəlkə yüzlərlə yoldaşlar deyirlər ki."müsəlmana etibar etmək olmaz". Ola bilsin ki, o,yaxşı kommunistdir,ancaq müsəlmandır, onun qəlbində müsavat ruhu vardır."

1920-dən 1937-yə kadar Azərbaycanda orta asırların inkivizisiyasından da güclü teror havası əsməyə başladı.Bu cür basqının yalanın və allahsızlığın qabağında duruş gətirmək o zamanın şərtləri daxilində olduqca çətin idi. Rusiyada Çar dönəmindən bilinirdi ki, bu ölkədə 160-a yaxın halk və etnik qurup yaşayır.Lakin1960-cı illərdə aydın oldu ki,bu xalqların sayı 100-dən azdır. Sovetler döneminde kominist ideologiyası Velikorus şovinizmilə birleşerek bu xalqların dilini,dinini elinden alaraq rus kimliyi altında görünmez etmişdi.Mehz bu gürünmezlik Azerbaycan türkünüdə daim təhdid etməkdə idi.

1920-1930-cu illərdə sovet rejimi tərəfindən dini temeller üzerine çok ciddi basqılar gerçekleşdirildi. 30-lu yılların sonlarından dine qarşı basqılar yerini etnik türk kimliyinə qarşı basqılara verdi. Kommunist rejimi Azerbaycanda türk kimliyini yok etmek üçün özünə hüquqi zəmin də yaratdı. Kommunistlər 10 mart 1937 ilində Azərbaycan Sovetlərinin IX qurultayında Rusiya Fedarasiyasının konstitusiyasını Azərbaycanın ikinci konstitusitası kimi qəbul etdirdilər. Bu konstitusiyaya görə Azərbaycan türk xalqı Azərbaycanlı adlandırılmağa başlandı.Həmin gün sovetlərin qurultayında çıxış edən Azərbaycan hökumətinin baş naziri Rəhmanov konstitusiyaya dair çıxışında 1918-ci ilin mayında Azərbaycanı Sovet Rusiyasından ayırmağa cəsarət etmiş Müsavat partiyasının üstünə düşür. "Müsavatçıların Azərbaycandakı hakimiyyətini tarixin ən qaranlıq dövrü " adlandırırdı. IX qurultaydan sonra Yuxarının göstərişlə bütün dərsliklərdə və elmi ədəbiyyatlarda, eləcədə pasport və sənədlərdə Türk dönüb Azərbaycanlı oldu. Azərbaycanın (başkendi) paytaxtı Bakı beynəlmiləl şəhər elan olundu. On minlərlə rus gəncləri mütəxəsis adıyla Bakıya və Azərbaycanın başqa yerlərinə köçürüldü. Türk dili həyatın bütün sahələrindən sıxışdırılmağa başlandı. Bakı Rusiyanın şəhərlərindən fərqlənməyəcək qədər ruslaşdırıldı. Əyalətlərdən Bakıya gələn şəxs özünü bir rus şəhərindəki kimi yad hiss edirdi. 1925-26-illərdə ruslaşdırma siyasətinə və ölkənin dövlət orqanlarının səlahiyyətlərinin çoxunun Moskvaya verilməsinə qarşı çıxan AKP baş katibi. Əyyub Xanbudaqov və yüksək vəzifəli bir sıra şəxslər millətçilikdə günahlandırılaraq tutduğu vəzifədən uzaqlaşdırılıb sürgünə göndərildilər.

1929-1939 yıllarında Azərbaycan SSR-də latın qrafikasına keçid başa çatdı. Ölkə rəhbərliyi Azərbaycan türklərinin Türkiyə Respublikası ilə yaxınlaşmasından rahatsız olaraq elə həmin il yeniden elifbanı deyişmek haqda gösteriş verdi. Onuda qeyd etmək lazımdır ki, Azərbaycanı idarə edənlər tərəfindən bir əsr ərzində Azərbaycan Türkləri üç dəfə əlifba dəyişikliyi etməyə məcbur edilibdir. Beləliklə 1939 yılında Azərbaycan Türkleri kiril əlifbasını qəbul etməyə məcbur edildilər.Kiril üç güney Kafkas ölkəsindən yalnız Azərbaycan SSR də qəbul etdirildi.

Bu qədər qısa zaman kəsimində tez-tez əlifba dəyişiminin nədənini öyrənməyə çalışsaq aydın olar ki, bu ölkenin insanları müsəlman Türklerdir ve onlar etnik Türk olduğunu bilmemelidir. Adı deyişdirilmiş, elifbası kril, kültürü proletalaşdırılmış dövlət orqanılarinda rus dilinde konuşan Azərbaycan Türk kimliyinə yad insanlar yetisdirilməyə başlandı. O dövrü M.Ə.Rəsulzadə bu cür dəyərləndirirdi; "Istilalar orqanları uzun müddət Azərbaycan təhsil sistemində "panturanizm"i təmizləməklə məşğul oldular. Ümumitürk dünyası ilə hər cür münasibətlər yaratmaq istəyən təmayülə 'panturanizm' deyilirdi".

Azərbaycanda yaşayan türklər və diger halklar siyasi-coğrafi baxımdan hamısı azərbaycanlıdırlar. Etnik kimlik baxımından bu xalqların hamısı öz etnik adlarını daşıyırlar. Onlardan Ləzgi, Avar, Tat, Lahıc, Udin,v.s. göstərmək olar. Lakin əhalinin90% -dən coxunu təşkil edən türklər nəyə görəsə öz etnik kimliklərini daşımağın qürurunu çox az yaşayıblar. Bu fasilələrlə 1918-37 və1993-95 illərdə olub. Ölke əhalisinin çoxunu təşkil edən türklər əvvəllərdə də sovet döneminde de, indi de müsalman, yada Azərbaycanlı adlandırılıblar.

1937-1990-illərdə yazılmıs istər tarixi ədəbiyyatda, istər dərsliklərdə, istərsədə elmi arasdırmalarda Azərbaycan türk kimliyinə toxunulmurdu. Azərbaycanlıların, yəni türklərin bəzən iran mənşəli bəzən qafqaz mənşəli bəzən də bu ikisinin törəmısi olduğu sübuta yetirilməyə çalışılırdı.

Sovet imperiyasının bütün tarixi boyu Türk kimliyinə kıskanclıqla yanaşılırdı. Bütün dövrlərdə istər Çar dönəmində, istər sovetlər vaxtında, türk kimliyinə dərin nifrət aşılanmaqda idi. İmperiya ərazisində yaşayan başqa xalqlarala muqayisədə müsəlman türklər iki qat əsarət altında yaşayırdılar. Bu ikiqat əsarətin birincisi və başlıcası onun türk olması,ikincisi isə müsəlman olması idi.

İkinci dünya müharibəsinin sonuna yaxın Sovetlər birliyində müsəlman türklərə qarşı yeni repressiya həyata keçirilməyə başlandı. Bu xalqlardan bəziləri öz tarixi yurdlarından zorla Sibir və Kazaxıstan çöllərinə sürgün edildilər. Bu sürgün yelləri Azərbaycan türkünündə başı üstə əsdiyi zaman bir möcüzə ilə ondan qurtuldular. Lakin bu sevinc uzun çəkmədi 1948-53 illərdə 150 mindən cox türk 1918-1920-illərdə olduğu kimi Ermənistandan öz baba torpaqlarından sürgünə göndərildilər. Buna.nədən isə həmişə olduğu kimi onların türk kimliyi oldu.

Azerbaycanı ərazisinde yaşayan türkler özlərini qeyri-rəsmi müsəlman adlandırdılar.Bu da ondan irəli gəlirdi ki, Çar dönəmində olduğu kimi Sovetlər də dinə milli kimlikdən dırnağ arası xüsusi hörmət göstərilirdi. Hətta 1829 da yaradılmış Müsəlman ruhanilərinin hüquq və vəziflərini müəyyən edən komitə Sovetlər imperiyası zamanında 1944 də Zaqafqaziya Müsəlmanlarının Ruhani İdarəsi adı altında öz fəaliyyətini davam etdirdi. Əslində Ruslar tərəfindən təyin olunan komitə rəhbəri və komitə üzvləri müsəlman əhali içərisində hökuməti təbliğ etməklə İslamdan çox hökumətə xidmət edirdilər.Həmin dindar təbəqə əhalini inandırmağa çalışırdı ki, sovet qanunları ədalətlidir,onun koustitusiyası Qurana bərabərdir, onun qurucusu isə qüsursuzdur. Yəni Azərbaycan Türklərinin müsəlman adlandırılmasında həmin din adamlarınında müəyyən rolu var idi. Hakim ideologiyanın maraqlarına uyğun gəldiyindən Sovet rəhbəliyi savadsız müsəlmançılğa yaşıl işıq yandırırdı. Bu ölkədə din rəmzi xarakter daşıyırdı,İslamın əsas şərtlərindən.olan kəlmeyi-şəhadət gətirməyi belə əhalinin 99% bilmirdi. Buna görədə camaat arasında yarızarafat deyirdilər ki, kafir kimi yaşayıb müsəlman kimi ölürük. Bu ölkədə din insan son mənzilə uğurlanarkən yada düşürdü.

Dini ainləri icra edən dindarların əksəriyyəti dinin mahiyyətini doğru-dürüst bilmir,qazanc xatirinə icra edirdilər. Dinin yerinə onabənzır cəhalət vardı. Hər kəs etnik kimliyini müsəlman bilsədə əksəriyyət ibadət nə olduğunu belə bilmirdi. 1937-dən sonrakı dövürü M.Ə.Rəsulzadə belə dəyərləndirirdi: “Azərbaycandakı yeni nəsil, deyə bilərik ki, dinə qarşı laqeyiddir. Dini mərasim və ibadətlərdən ən bəsit şeyləri belə bilmirlər.” Bəlkə də Azərbaycanda İslam dininin əsaslarının bu cür zəif olduğu bilindiyindən Azərbaycan Türkü müsəlman adlandırılırdı.

1953 -də Stalinin ölümü ilə Sovetlərdə qismən yumuşalma hiss olunmağa başladı. 21 avqust 1956 ilində Azərbaycan SSR Ali Sovetinin sessiyasında

Azərbaycan dili haqda xüsusi qərar qəbul edildi. 1920-lərdən dövlət idarələrində işlənməyən Azərbaycan türk dilinə dövlət idarələrində Azərbaycan dili adı altında işlənmə haqqı tanındı.

1981-1983-illərdə əsgərlikdə olarkən bizimlə birgə ruslardan başqa ermənlər, kazaxlar,özbəklər, qaqauzlar və demək olarki SSRİ-də yaşayan bütün xalqlardan adam var idi. Bizə hamı azərbaycanlı, yalnız ermənilər böyük nifrət hissi ilə türk deyərdilər. Ermənilər biz bilmədiyimiz şeyləri yəni 1915 il hadisələrindən ağızdolusu danışar və bizi suçlu çıxarardılar. Bu da onlarla bizim aramızda bıyük dava-dalaşa nədən olurdu. Ermənilər (Haylar) kimliyi soranda deyirdilər sən Haysan ya Türk. Öz etnik adlarınıda bizim etnik adımızıda ən düz tələffüz edən onlar idi.ilk dəfə bir erməni əsgər etnik mənsubiyyətimi sorduqda mən qeyri-iradi demişəm ki, türkəm. Hərbi hissədə rus dili işlətmədəndə əsgərlərin coxu bir-birini anlaya bilirdi. Çünki onlar etnik olaraq türklər idi. Amma hansından sorurdun milliyətin nədir hərə bir şey, biri kazax, biri qaqauz, biri tatar, biri balkar, biri kumık və sairə deyərdilər. Bizim hamımızı birləşdirən türk kəlməsini kimsə deməyi ağılına belə gətirmirdi. Demək ki etnik Türk kimliyinin qadğan olunmasi bütün SSRİ miqyasinda həyata keçirilmişdi.

Sovetlərin nəhəng təbliğat maşını həyatın bütün sahələrinə nüfuz etməyi bacarırdı. Dövlətin bütün məktəblərində, kollec və inistitutlarında dinə qarşı ateizm, milli kimliyə qarşı elmi kommunizm fənnləri tədris edilirdi. Ateizm fennii Allahı inkar edir, bütün dinləri heç sayır və dini farklılıqlara qarşı təbliğat aparırdı. Ateistlər Sovet dövlətinin qurucusu V.İ.Leninin bu sözlərini özləri üçün şüara çevirmişdilər: “Biz dinə qarşı mübarizə etməliyik. Bu bütün materializmin və deməli marksizmin əlifbasıdır. Lakin marksizm əlifba üzərində dayanan bir materializm deyildir. Marksizm daha irəli gedir.” Elmi kommunizmin nail olmağa çalışdığı, qarşısına qoyduğu məqsəd isə Sovetlər Birliyində vahid Sovet xalqı yaratmaq idi. SSRİ də tək mədəniyyət, tək xalq ,tək dil yaratmaq cəhdləri bu ölkədə yaşayan bütün qeyri-rusları narahat edirdi.

Bu çürük ideologiya müsəlman və türkdilli xalqlardan cox xristian və slaviyanları təhdid edirdi. Ona görə də milli azlıqların bu dövlətə heç bir inamı, etibarı qalmırdı. Milli azlıqlar öz milli kimliyini itirməyin güvənsizliyini yaşayırdılar. Kommunistlərin yeritdikləri basqıcı ideologiyanı qəbul edənlərdən cox ona qarşı həm gizli, həm aşikar gedənlərdə var idi. Artıq hər kəs bilirdi rəsmi göstəricilərlə həyatdakı reallıqlar bir-birinə uğun gəlmir.

1986 illdən SSRİ də başlayan Yenidənqurma (Perestroyka) Azərbaycanda bir cox məsələlərə aydınlıq gətirdi, o cümlədən də milli məsələyə. Azərbaycan türkü anlamağa başladı ki, əslində o cox uzun zaman icərisində etnik kimliyindən uzaq tutulub. Adına tatar, müsəlman,azəri,azərbaycanlı deyilsədə onun milli mənsubiyyəti türkdür və o,öz milli kimliyini haçan olsa təsdiq edəcəkdir.

Post -Sovet Azərbaycanda böyümüş yeni nəsil bütövlükdə kommunist tərbiyyəsindən qidalanmışdı. Türk dedikdə hələ də kafalarda kommunist cəmiyyətinə yad kapitalizm qayda-qanunları ilə yaşayan idoloji düşmən nəzərdə tutulurdu. Sovetlərin beyinlərə yeritdiyi anti türk planı qisməndə olsa öz işini görmüşdü. Türklük həm dərsliklərdə, həmdə başqa ədəbiyyatlarda düşmən obrazı kimi təqdim olunurdu. 1937 -ci ildən Azərbaycan Türklərinin milli kimliyi ləğv edildikdən bu yana o dövrü yaşamış insanlardan demək olar ki, həyatda qalan çox az idi. 80-ci illərin sonuna o dövr insanına nadirən təsadüf olunurdu.

1988 də Moskva şəhərində Xristianlığın Rusiyada qəbul olunmasının min illiyi qeyd olundu. Bu hadisə yetmiş ilə yaxın yasaq olmuş dini ayinlərin icrası üçün sanki siqnal oldu. Sovet tarixində ilk hadisə idiki bununla dinə qarşı olan soyuq buz təbəqəsinin əriməsi açıq-aşkar hiss olundu. Belə bir vaxtda sovet cəmiyyətində əvvəllərdə rastlanmayan şeylər baş verirdi. İndi sovet insanı da vicdan, din azadlığı, demokratiya, siyasi müstəqillik şüarlarını gündəlik həyatlarına daxil etmişdi.

1988-90 illərdə Sovetlərdə gedən prosseslər on illər ərzində Azərbaycanda insan üzünə həsrət qalmış məscid və kilsələrin fəaliyyətinin yenidən canlanmasına səbəb oldu. Sovet insanı mənəvi həyatda dinin böyük rol oynadığını dinə olan marağı ilə sübut etdi. Dinin ölüb getməsi haqqında aparılan bəsit təbliğatın yalan olduğu üzə çıxdı. Marksın, din xalq üçün tiryəkdir, kəlamı insanlar üçün öz mənasını itirmişdi. Dinə inam, ona olan maraq sübut edirdi ki, Allahsızlar təşkilatı, yaratmaqla, qorxu ilə milyonların şüur və qəlbindən Allah sevgisini çıxarıb atmaq olmaz. Bu illərdə ehtiyatla olsada dini ədəbiyyatların nəşrinə başlandı, dini məktəblər yaradıldı. 70 ildən sonra müqəddəs kitabımız Quran Azərbaycanda yenidən nəşr edildi. 90-cı illərdə çox qısa zaman içərisində Azərbaycan insanı öz dininə sahib çıxmağı bacardı.

Sovetlər Birliyinin sonuna yaxın milli problemlər də qabarıq şəkildə üzə çıxmağa başladı. Belə problemlə üzləşənlərdən birincisi elə Azərbaycan oldu.

Dağlıq Qarabağda Hay (Erməni) separatçılarının başlatdığı hərakat Moskva tərəfindən himayə edildikcə Azərbaycanda müstəqil dövlət yaratmağa yönəlik millətçilik artrdı. 1980 li illərin sonu 90 lı illərin əvvəllərində Azərbaycanda bir milli kimlik coşqusu, bir azadlıq hərakatı başladı. Bu elə bir tarixi dövrə düşdü ki, bu zaman bütün Sovetlər ölkəsinin hər yerində milli oyanış-milli özünü dərketmə prosesi gedirdi. Bütün bu olaylar 1991 də SSRİ adlı dövlətin dağılması ilə nəticələndi. Bundan sonra öz müstəqilliyini bərpa edən Azərbaycan hökuməti vətəndaşlarının milli kimliyinə yenə də toxunmadı.

1992 də Azərbaycanda kommunistlərin yetmişiki illik hakimiyyətinə son qoyuldu. Yerinə Əbülfəz Elçibəyin başçılığı ilə milli-demokratik qüvvələr gəldi. Elə həmin il 1992 nin 22 dekabrında Azərbaycan Respublikasının Milli Məclisi Türk adını geri qaytardıı.Türk dili rəsmi olaraq dövlət dili oldu. Bundan başqa Azərbaycan Respublikası ərazisində yaşayan bütün azsaylı xalqlara öz ana dilində yazıb-oxumaq, dini inanclarını sərbəst həyata keçirmək və mədəniyyətlərini inkişaf etdirmek imkanı tanındı. Bütün bunlar uzun sürmədi.

1993- cü ildə hərbi qiyam nəticəsində kommunistlər H.Əliyevin başçılığı altında yenidən hakimiyyətə gəldilər. Əski sovet rejiminə bənzər bir rejim Azərbaycanda yenidən quruldu. H.Əliyev12 noyabr (kasım) 1995 də Azərbaycana 1937 konstitusiyasına bənzər bir konstiitusiya qəbul etdirdi. Konstitusiyanın 21 ci maddəsindən Azərbaycan Respublikasının dövlət dili Türk dilidir cümləsi çıxardılaraq yerinə Azərbaycan Respublikasının dövlət dili Azərbaycan dilidir şəkilində qəbul etdirildi. Azərbaycan Türk kimliyinin isbatı və təsdiqi yolunda 1988-92 illərdə qalibiyyətlə nəticələnən bu mübarizənin nailiyyəti üzərindəm 12 noyabr 1995 konstitusiyası qara xətt çəkdi.

Bəlkə də Azərbaycan dünyada nadir ölkədir ki, öz konstitusiyasında işlətdiyi dövlət dilinin adını düzgün göstərməmişdir. Bəlkə də Azərbaycan türkləri dünyada nadir xalqdır ki, öz etnik kimliyini bilibdə başqa cür adlandırılırlar.

Azərbaycanda Türk kimliyini daşıyan kiçik bir xalq var ki,bunlarda Ahsıka Türkləridir. Onlar əsasən 1944 də Türk olduqları üçün Gürcüstan ərazisindən Kazaxıstana və Orta Asiyaya sürgün olunmuşlardı. 1950-90 illər arası yenə də türk olduqları üçün yaşadıqları yerlərdən Azərbaycana köçməyə məcbur edilibilər. Azərbaycan Türkü ilə Ahsıka Türkü arasında nə dini

baxımdan, nədə etnik baxımdan hec bir fərq yoxdur. Fərq AhsıkaTürklərinin uzun və məşəqətli sürgün yolu keçərək hələdə öz vətənlərinə dönə bilməməsidir. Ahsıkalılara vəAzərbaycanlılara baxsaq, bir tərəfdə milli kimliyini saxlayıb vətənindən olan türk digər tərəfdə vətənində yaşayıb milli kimliyindən olan türk görərik.

Post-Sovet Azərbaycanından fərqli olaraq ,indi insanlar dinin etnik kimlik olmadığını başa düşürlər. İndi ölkədə əsil din adamları sayıla biləcək insanlar fəaliyyət göstərir. Əvvəllər ölkə ərazisindəki məscid və ibadət evləri barmaq sayından az olduğu halda indi bütün bölgələrdə məscid və dini icmalar fəaliyyət göstərir, bütün dini mərasimlər, dini bayramlar qeyd olunur, ezanlar verilir, dindarlar cəmiyyətdə sərbəst fəaliyyət göstərə bilirlər. Sovetlər dönəmi ilə müqaisə etsək indi dinə daha dözümlü münasibət sərgilənir, etnik kimliyə münasibətdə isə elədə dəyişliklik hiss edilmir. Dinin böyük imperiyalar içərisində milli kimliyin qorunub saxlanmasındakı rolunu heç kim inkar edə biməz, lakin o da həqiqətdir milli kimliyidə heç bir din əvəz edə bilməz. Örnək olaraq müxtəlif dinlərə staiş edən türkləri göstərmək olar.