"*Crisis of Legitimacy in Global Governance* constitutes a valuable addition to the literature on global governance from a critical perspective. Major conceptual issues, the role of key actors, and principal issues involved are examined by a good mix of established and young scholars. It will be useful to scholars and practioners as well as students of international relations and international political economy".

Ziya Öniş,
Professor of International Political Economy,
Koç University, Istanbul, Turkey.

"Gonca Oguz Gok and Hakan Mehmetcik have put together an impressive edited collection tackling a core topic relating to the future of institutional cooperation in the 21st century. Interrogating the question of legitimacy under conditions of multi-dimensional crisis, including Covid-19, is an ambitious enterprise. However, benefiting from the input from a number of high-profile scholars, the volume fills a major gap in the literature on Global Governance in both a substantive and timely fashion and deserves a wide readership."

Andrew F. Cooper,
University Research Chair, Department of Political Science,
and Professor, the Balsillie School of International Affairs,
University of Waterloo.

"What makes multilateral institutions consequential actors in global governance? As world order becomes more fragmented, the forces that can sustain the legitimacy and efficacy of global and regional cooperation are captured in this invaluable collection of essays which should be of considerable interest to scholars and policymakers."

Amitav Acharya,
Professor, American University, Washington, D.C.

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The Crises of Legitimacy in Global Governance

Examining the interplay between the domestic, regional and global aspects of the crisis of legitimacy of global governance, this book theoretically questions and empirically analyses the "crises of legitimacy" in global governance with respect to various mechanisms, actors, and issues.

It expertly sheds lights on contemporary legitimacy contestations and crises by analysing conceptual, theoretical and empirical aspects of the legitimacy in global governance. The specific issues and case studies collected in this volume survey the evolving nature of legitimacy and legitimization processes in global governance with historical, and theoretical analysis. Perspectives on specific actors and issues provide vital insights for understanding several commonalities and differences of legitimacy crises faced at various global governance mechanisms.

Improving the understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of current global governance bodies by showing several legitimacy contestations and crises at global and regional level, this book will be of great interest to scholars of international relations, globalization, international Political Economy, regionalism, and general global governance studies.

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The Crises of Legitimacy in Global Governance

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Contents

List of figures and tables ix
Notes on contributors x
Foreword xv
List of abbreviations xvii

Global governance and crises of legitimacy: An introduction 1
Gonca Oguz Gok and Hakan Mehmetcik

Part I
Theoretical and conceptual 17

1 Legitimacy, crises of global governance, and international relations 19
Richard Falk

2 COVID-19 and the legitimacy crisis of global governance 37
Michael Zürn

Part II
Actors 53

3 Growing G20 legitimacy 55
John Kirton

4 The UN's legitimacy crises in global governance and the COVID-19 pandemic 72
Gonca Oguz Gok and Radiye Funda Karadeniz

BK-TandF-GOK_9780367652470-210987-FM.indd 7 29/07/21 4:27 PM

5 Regional organizations and legitimacy 89
Ayşegül Sever and Hakan Mehmetcik

6 From a legitimacy deficit to an existential crisis: The unfortunate case of the World Trade Organization 107
Amrita Narlikar

7 Assessing NATO's legitimacy in global governance: A three-layered framework 122
Emel Parlar Dal, Samiratou Dipama and Ismail Erkam Sula

8 Transnational actors in global governance: What legitimacy for multinational corporations? 139
Merve Özdemirkiran-Embel

Part III
Issues 157

9 The limits to cooperation: Global governance and the challenge of climate change 159
Mark Beeson

10 African rising powers and human rights: Nigeria and South Africa on the UN Human Rights Council 176
Eduard Jordaan

11 'Contested legitimacy' of the responsibility to protect in an era of humanitarian crises 193
Pinar Gözen Ercan

12 Constitutive legitimacy crisis of the neoliberal migration governance 209
Suna Gülfer Ihlamur-Öner

Conclusion 227
Gonca Oguz Gok and Hakan Mehmetcik

Index 237

4 The UN's legitimacy crises in global governance and the COVID-19 pandemic

Gonca Oguz Gok and Radiye Funda Karadeniz

Introduction

> The UN was not created to bring us heaven, but to save us from hell.[1]
>
> Dag Hammerskjold, UN Secretary General (1953–1961)

> We face a foundational moment … Today, we face our own 1945 moment.[2]
>
> Antonio Guterres, UN Secretary-General (2017–)

Today, after 75 years, the UN preserves to occupy a unique position in world politics. It is still the only truly global institution with 193 member states. Its purpose of "saving succeeding generations from the scourge of war" embraces universality. Not only the global membership and purpose, but the UN's resolutions have also been a frequent reference point for states, international organizations (IOs), and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in world politics since its establishment. In Ramesh Thakur's (2012, 47) words, "UN votings and resolutions have been crucial because of the sustaining political significance attached to the perception of the UN as the closest we can get to an authentic voice of humanity." However, the discussion has long ago shifted from the UN's legitimacy to the sources of its illegitimacy (Franck 1984; Donnelly 1988; Caron 1993; Thakur 1993) and the crises of its legitimacy in world politics (Armstrong, Farrell, and Maiguashca 2006; Reus-Smith 2007; Charlesworth and Coicaud 2010). The criticisms towards the world organization are not new, and calls for reform go back to its establishment (Lee 1947; Wilcox and Marcy 1956).

However, the legitimacy crises of the UN in global governance has become a more heated debate in the last decade with rapid transformations in world politics (Binder and Heupel 2015; Oates 2016; Stephen 2018; Dellmuth, Scholte, and Tallberg 2019; Karns 2020; Troy 2020). Firstly, there has been a remarkable decline in supporting multilateralism from the states like the US towards the UN system. Although attacking the UN is not entirely new at all, as David Lake (2018, 15) puts it, the US under President Donald Trump appears to regard disruption of the procedural limits of multilateralism "as a

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useful end in itself." This era of decreasing support on the side of states like the US towards the UN system coincides with a period in which, more than in any other period of modern history, rising states have become more "willing" in pressing for change at the UN (Acharya 2014; Abdenur 2019, 48). The non-P5 rising powers have become more vocal about contesting norms, including peacekeeping and development (Esteves and Assunção 2014; Abdenur 2019). The revival of big power rivalry between the US and China blocks the UN Security Council (UNSC) when cooperation is most needed.

Secondly, the world organization's *laws and procedures* are increasingly challenged on its grounds of not serving primary *purposes* of peace, human rights, and development. The increasing human suffering emanating from civil wars in many parts of the world strengthened criticism towards the UN's laws of immunities supported by ample evidence of UN personnel's harms in its peacekeeping missions (Pillinger, Hurd, and Barnett 2016; Billerbeck 2017). Human rights, which are championed through the UN system, are under pressure worldwide. It seems that the UN has been pushed into the margins of many of the most worrying human rights situations today (Malone and Day 2020, 289–290). Regional organizations emerged as relatively more reliable and *effective* peace providers (Coning and Mateja 2019). NGOs' role proved to be more fast and active also in delivering aid compared to the UN's bureaucracy and technical functioning. In addition to the slowness regarding bureaucratic procedures of providing aid, the UN's development pillar has been criticized for its failures to create a more "egalitarian system" (Weiss 2010, 38).

Therefore, the deepening tension between the 3Ps—purposes, procedures and performance—of the UN system increasingly challenges its legitimacy in global governance. Most recently, the UN's legitimacy in global governance is being tested in the COVID-19 pandemic. As Margret Karns asserts, it is "a pivotal moment not just in the UN's history, but in global governance itself" (Karns 2020, 280). What makes this "a crisis," Richard Haass (2020) recently argues, is that there are no unilateral solutions to global problems anymore, and the need for international cooperation is more significant than ever. The words of Dag Hammarskjold describing the UN's "rescue" role from the international community spilling over the hell in the 1950s is recurring nowadays with the pandemic crisis presenting it another 1945 moment to perform this role again.

Having said that, this chapter "does not" attempt to analyze the legitimacy crises of the world organization. Any attempt to do that should first ask legitimacy of "which UN" and legitimacy "for whom?" The UN is a complex system composed of various actors with multiple audiences, and this would be a futile exercise in this chapter's scope. Instead, this chapter aims to provide a theoretical and analytical overview of the UN's legitimacy crises in global governance with specific reference to its policies in the most recent COVID-19 pandemic. To do that, the first part of the paper provides a brief theoretical overview of the legitimacy crises of the UN in

global governance within the analytical framework of procedural (input) versus performance (output) legitimacy. The second part analyses explicitly the UN's response to the pandemic within the framework of formulation of response (procedural legitimacy) and the impact of response (the performance legitimacy). The paper concludes that the legitimacy debate of the 3Ps—purposes, procedure, and performance—of the UN system will not dissolve in the future. The pandemic has made tension between procedural and performance legitimacy of the world organization more visible especially among its intergovernmental mechanisms. However, the performance of the "UN Family" of epistemic community and civil society in formulating and implementing response strategy increased the hopes of resolving the UN's legitimacy crisis.

Legitimacy of the UN in global governance: A theoretical and analytical appraisal

It is well-established in International Relations literature that legitimacy *does* affect global politics. The main discussion on the concept of legitimacy has shifted to *how* the *presence* and the *absence* of legitimacy affect various actors and issues in global governance (Hurrell 2005; Buchanan and Keohane 2006; Bernstein 2011; Brassett and Tsingou 2011; Welsch and Zaum 2013; Zürn 2018; Tallberg, Bäckstrand, and Scholte 2018; Hurd 2019; Dingwerth K.A. et al. 2019; Dellmuth and Schlipphak 2020). However, legitimacy is still a highly ambiguous concept to study in international relations. There is not a consensus on the definition of it. Legitimacy, Ian Clark (2007, 17) argues, is "less a single concept and more a whole family of concepts, each pulling in potentially different directions." The question of legitimacy in global governance is even more complicated since there is not a sovereign central authority, but rather "Spheres of Authorities (SOA)" in Rosenau's words (Rosenau 2007, 89–93). Thomas Franck (1990, 3) once famously argued that the absence of a central authority was the international level's main strength to test the legitimacy factor. In other words, given the voluntary element in rule-following in the international system, governance is even more dependent on legitimacy beliefs on the part of the "ruled" (Steffek 2003, 260).

Yet the question of the "ruled" or the "addressee" of legitimacy claims in global governance in general and the UN, in particular, is very complicated. First of all, "there is not one UN, but three UNs," quoting Weiss (2010, 4). The first UN is the intergovernmental mechanism of member states; the second UN is staff members and secretariat; the third UN is NGOs, experts, commissions, and academics. Weiss (2010, 4) also elaborates on a "Fourth UN in the making"—a private, for-profit sector. Therefore, different sources of legitimacy matter for these different actors of the UN. To make the picture even more complicated, the UN deals with a multi-level audience. There is not only one actor or a central authority to judge the procedures and

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performance in global governance. States create the UN, so its legitimacy depends mostly on how it performs in the states' eyes (Junne 2001, 191). However, NGOs and public opinion have also become significant players in generating acceptance or rejection in legitimacy claims (Finnemore 2005, 205). As the UN's decisions affect individuals' daily lives, it becomes more difficult to exclude them from legitimacy claims (Steffek 2007, 186; Johnstone 2008, 277). Therefore, any attempt to study the UN's legitimacy crises faces the challenge of UN's *complex identities* and *multiple audiences*. It is even hard to find a consensus between different actors and audiences about the nature of the problems the institutions have, as Haas (1992, 29) used the term long ago. At this point, the UN is not an exception.

Yet in literature, some theoretical, analytical, and methodological classifications help researchers analyze the UN's legitimacy in global governance.

Although from different theoretical aspects, scholars mostly agree that legitimacy is central to the UN's role in world politics. Inis Claude (1966), from a *power-based perspective*, wrote as early as the 1960s that the UN's role in world politics could best be described by the "collective legitimization" function given by states. For Claude (1966, 368), "politics is not merely a struggle for power, but also a contest over legitimacy." When states act multilaterally and comply with the UN norms, their policies acquire legitimacy, supporting their positions and foreign policy choices in international relations. Collective legitimization through the UN is not an answer to what the UN *can do*, but to the question of how it *can be used* (Claude 1966, 373). From an *interest-based approach*, Eric Voeten (2005, 529) argues that UN approval provides a green light for states to cooperate. Its absence triggers a coordinated response that imposes *costs* on violators. Joseph Nye (2007) contends that the UN has considerable *soft power* that arises from its ability to legitimize states' actions, particularly regarding the use of force. When states violate UN resolutions, Nye argues, it triggers *costs* to violators. Alexander Thompson (2006, 3) uses the term "strategic information transmission" for analyzing the UN's role. In other words, states strategically use the UN decisions to signal benign intent (information) to foreign audiences-foreign leaders, which further their foreign policy goals since domestic politics often constrain leaders. Similarly, Terrence Chapman (2009) and Songying Fang (2008) assert, while acting with IOs like the UN, states aim to send a message to their domestic audience that their policies will be successful.

From a *knowledge-based perspective*,[3] on the other hand, Barnett and Finnemore (2004, 6–7) argue that IOs like the UN do more than control information. They use their "authority" to transform information into "knowledge," to construct information in ways that give the world its meaning. According to Weiss (2010, 10–15) the UN's diffusion and construction of ideas on issues like development and human rights helped alter how global issues are perceived and thus "changed history." New ideas led to creating various new institutions with an enormous bureaucracy whose legitimacy

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and authority are derived from technical expertise and knowledge. These UN's specialized agencies and programs introduced a wide array of "innovations" in global governance, including global commons, sustainable development, and human security (Karns 2020, 280–283). By setting widely accepted "targets" like Sustainable Development Goals (SDG), Malone and Day (2020, 289) argue that the UN has restored its legitimacy (if not always its effectiveness) as an "actor" on development issues.

Having said that, as an actor, the UN's legitimacy and thus its authority derives from at least two primary sources: whether their *procedures* are viewed proper and correct (procedural legitimacy) and whether they *perform* well in pursuing purposes that are consistent with the values of the broader community (substantive legitimacy) (Barnett and Finnemore 2004, 166). In other words, the former derives legitimacy from commitment to *proper procedures* (input legitimacy) and the latter from *performance* in achieving its purposes (output legitimacy) (Dellmuth and Tallberg 2015, 455). Similarly, Billerbeck (2017, 287) argues that while the *normative* UN derived legitimacy from the purposes, appropriate procedure, and behaving in ways that respect institutional principles, the *operational* UN needs to demonstrate that it has delivered concrete, quantifiable *outputs*. Vivien Schmidt, regarding EU, added another dimension called "throughput legitimacy" to strictly separate "processes" (throughput) from the "procedures" (input) and "performance" (output) to further emphasize the crucial role of *deliberative quality*, *inclusiveness, transparency, and accountability* of governance process (Schmidt 2013, 7).

On the other hand, Barnett and Finnemore (2004, 38) long ago identified the essential tensions among these legitimacy dimensions. The UN is often looked for leadership in *normative* matters with its rules, routines, and standard operating principles. Its ongoing adherence to the promotion and construction of principles has become one of the main ways to justify its continued relevance and authority (Cronin and Hurd 2008, 6). Yet the greater emphasis on procedures relative to performance creates a type of "dysfunctional" or "phytological" behavior. Rules and routines may come to obscure overall missions and broader social goals. It is asserted that, as they become routinized with bureaucratic procedures and technocratic actors, their social distance to their addresses is increasing (Barnett and Finnemore 2004, 38). Building on a similar dichotomy, between normative role versus performance of the UN, Thomas Weiss (2010, 18), argues that "recalling vision and ideas of the UN offers no defense for its inefficiencies or justification for its weaknesses."

When forming opinions about the legitimacy of the UN, in their recent study, Dellmuth and Tallberg (2015, 470) found that citizens are influenced first and foremost by the real or anticipated policy *output* of the UN like capacity to solve problems and generate benefits (performance legitimacy). On the other hand, concerning states, Binder and Heupel (2015, 238) underline that states mostly care about the UN's *procedures* while the misgivings

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regarding *performance* ranks in second place. Yet still, the question of which dimension of legitimacy—procedural or performance—or which constituent actors should be the focus, continue to frustrate UN reform debates (Oates 2016).

More recently, the UN's legitimacy is being challenged with the COVID-19 disease, which "triggered a global pandemic and economic contraction, unlike anything seen for a century" (Lipscy 2020, 1). What makes this "a crisis," Richard Haass (2020) recently argues, is that there are no unilateral solutions to global problems anymore, and the need for cooperation is more significant than ever. Crisis is defined as "a critical turning point in which the imperative to adopt is heightened by the imminent possibility of death, collapse, demise, disempowerment, or decline into irrelevance" (Reus-Smith 2007, 167). The three elements of "threat, urgency, and uncertainty" are defining characteristics of crises (Lipscy 2020, 2). It is common to regard the emergence of concerns about any system's declining legitimacy as it indicates some failure within it and this tends to be associated with the "politics of crisis" (Clark 2003, 75). COVID-19 once again highlighted the severity of "non-militarized crises" for global governance, blurring the divisions between political economy and security. In this regard, pandemic presents an opportunity to re-focus scholarly attention on the "politics of crisis" (Lipscy 2020, 1–2). The next part will discuss the UN's legitimacy crises concerning its response to the current pandemic by applying procedural and performance legitimacy framework.

Deciphering the legitimacy crises of the UN in global governance: The UN's COVID pandemic response

The UN has met with unprecedented health, human security, and economic crisis in the year of its celebrated 75th birthday. The pandemic crisis opened up new legitimacy debates on the UN's purposes, procedures, and performance in global governance. As Guterres stated, like the international community chose to cooperate under the UN's umbrella and opted for multilateralism in the aftermath of the Second World War, today, the community has arrived at a crossroads. The UN faces another "1945 moment" to decide whether to act alone or together to mitigate the effects of COVID-19 (Guterres 2020). This decision will have ramifications for the future of the UN endurance as an IO.

During the pandemic, the UN has been accused of not making the international community prepared for the global health threat and hence fulfilling its purposes and providing inadequate response to combat the virus spreading. The UN has declared its response in the report launched in June and updated it in September 2020. The Comprehensive Response to COVID-19 reports underline that the UN has followed a strategy to combat the pandemic based on three pillars: Health Response, Humanitarian Response, and Recovery Response (UN Comprehensive Response, June and

September 2020).[4] Yet this response strategy is still the subject of debates. The UN was not alone in taking critics since, as Gasbarri (2020) stated, the COVID-19 pandemic has shown that IOs are "ideal scapegoats." In this case, most of the critics targeted other global governance actors like the World Health Organization (WHO) and the European Union (EU). What makes these critiques to the UN important for global governance is the UN's Security Council's being "potentially the most powerful supranational organ in the world" and the UN's being "the most powerful international institution" in the system (Binder and Heupel 2015, 238). The COVID-19 crisis has the potential to change its status in the eyes of its members and the international community. With its uncertainties and challenges, the crisis accelerates the ongoing debate on the UN's depreciating legitimacy.

Critics on the COVID-19 crisis response by the UN were affiliated both with "what it did" and "what it did not" during the pandemic. Haass (2020) argued that "the UN has disappointed owing to great power rivalries and member countries" reluctance to cede their freedom of action.' Therefore, he thinks that the UN has failed to achieve its goals "to maintain international peace and security, develop friendly relations among nations, and achieve international cooperation in solving international problems" in the pandemic (Haass 2020). Hooi (2020) says, "the UN runs the risk of letting strong governments continue to act solely without global responsibility," and Acharya, thus, underlines the need for a norm of "responsibility to inform" to make the Security Council more effective and make P5 act more responsible (Acharya 2020). Former Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon also asserted that "the UN has failed the world over the pandemic" (Harding 2020). On the other hand, Harman stresses that COVID-19 showed "some positive gains made in global health security," which decreases the dependency away from UNSC and WHO (Harman 2020, 373). She claims that "the lack of early Security Council involvement may not be a bad thing" since "various UN programs and specialized agencies have responded rapidly to identify and mitigate the wider impacts of the pandemic" (Harman 2020, 376–377).

Given this ongoing debate in the academic and policy circles, in this section, the UN's response to COVID-19 will be analyzed in terms of the formulation of the response (procedural legitimacy) and the impact of the response (performance legitimacy).

Formulation of the response: Procedural legitimacy

Since WHO declared COVID-19 as a pandemic on March 11, 2020, at three levels within the UN, General Assembly, Security Council, and the Secretariat, different types of efforts for formulating the crisis's response had been witnessed. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres announced a global ceasefire immediately on March 23, 2020 (Secretary General's Appeal for Global Ceasefire 2020) and then the General Assembly passed the resolution

74/270 "Global solidarity to fight the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19)" on April 2, 2020 (A/RES/74/270 2020). However, the Security Council has entered into a gridlock during negotiations of the resolution. The call for a global ceasefire by the Secretary-General was put into action after three months. Resolution 2532 underlined the pandemic's impact on the world, especially on the countries damaged by armed conflicts, in post-conflict situations, and affected by humanitarian crises. It also highlights the UN as a key coordinating actor in global international response and calls for immediate cessation of hostilities (S/RES/2532 2020).[5] However, this "late" action by the UNSC had been criticized because it made the Council remain passive in the fight against the COVID-19 (Ulusoy 2020). Charbonneau (2020) also asserts that the UN was "useless" to combat the pandemic's impact on international peace and security. He states Secretary-General Guterres has shown leadership, and the resolution's call for a global ceasefire were very important since it had been a historical first. Still, the UNSC failed in acting on time, and "the momentum" has been lost (Charbonneau 2020).

Although the ceasefire proposal of Guterres has been on the agenda since March 2020, as Gowan and Pradhan (2020) state "rather than seizing the moment to back the initiative, the Council stumbled into fighting about it" and the decision-making mechanism at the UN became locked into great power rivalry until July 2020. Members of the Council welcomed the call in principle. However, the US and Russia insisted on continuing their counter-terrorism operations. The US and China disagreement appeared on "whether the resolution says something nice about the World Health Organization" (Gowan, 2020)[6] and the Council has not played the role it has done in previous health crises of HIV/AIDS and Ebola.[7]

Gowan and Pradhan (2020) underline that COVID-19 crisis has shown two weaknesses in the Council's capacity to deal with global health crises. Firstly, compared with the Ebola outbreak in 2014, the COVID-19 has caught the UN as unprepared with "its different scale and nature," and this revealed that the Council's "toolkit is limited in practice." Secondly, the Council's decision-making *procedure* in "confronting a truly global threat like the virus" brought to light that politics prevails over policy (Gowan and Pradhan 2020). Hence, it can be concluded that UN Security Council is facing a crisis of legitimacy, unable to play a decisive role envisaged for it by the UN's founders (Malone and Day, 2020; 286). As Charbonneau (2020) argues, the COVID-19 crisis once again highlighted the "structural inequalities" in the relations between UNSC, the UN Secretary-General, and the UN General Assembly, and the centrality of the UNSC within the UN system.

On the other hand, Harman (2020, 373) stresses that the UN's formation of the response towards COVID-19 also demonstrated a "subtle shift" from the dependence on the UNSC towards the growing legitimacy of the actorness of the global civil society and epistemic community of health research and expertise. In this regard, the procedural legitimacy crises of

the state-based UNSC have so far paved the way towards the growing legitimacy of the *second and third* UN that is derived from the technical expertise, research, and knowledge. In the absence of an impartial, transparent, and accountable UNSC, the epistemic community and civil society have so far monitored domestic and international responses, transparently shared the information with the public, and aided those affected by the pandemic (Harman 2020, 375). Therefore, it is starting to be believed that the UNSC resolution could be more feasible for health crises of epidemic scale that lack political attention. The COVID-19, in contrast, was already a high-level political issue. Further, UNSC involvement would have intensified existing political tensions and damaged the possible "gains" acquired from civil society's performance, epistemic community of research, and advocacy of many UN programs and specialized agencies (Harman 2020, 376–377).

Impact of the response: Performance legitimacy

It is still early to make straight-cut judgments on whether the international community is satisfied with the output of the UN response to the COVID-19 crisis. For instance, as the pandemic widens worldwide, other than on rhetorical reflection of concern, "it was not entirely evident what the Security Council could do about it" (Gowan and Pradhan 2020). In practical terms, the secretary-general's global ceasefire call has brought less than expected since the ceasefire call had little effect on the overall level of violence worldwide (Gowan 2020). Yet to evaluate the UN's response as a whole, it is essential to analyze all three UNs.

Despite the critiques for the UN member states' late action, it can be asserted that the UN system did work during the crisis. Harman underlines that global health security necessitates a governance network system in the broader UN system between civil society and the epistemic community of research and advocacy. The UN had successfully coordinated this network during the pandemic (Harman 2020, 377). As stated before, the General Assembly approved Resolution 74/270, and it underlines the importance of "solidarity and renewed multilateral cooperation" in combating the virus. In line with this, the secretary-general has mobilized more than fifteen policy initiatives such as debt relief, the pandemic's impact on women and children, and a verified campaign on trusted factual COVID-19 information. With its partners, the UN family created joint response strategies in health, humanitarian, and development fields. The efforts were coordinated with different partners, with various UN agencies, and civil society: COVID-19 Strategic Preparedness and Response Plan with more than 200 partners, Global Humanitarian Response Plan with more than 60 partners, and UN Socio-Economic Response Framework with more than 165 partners (United Nations Comprehensive Response to Covid 19 June 2020, 3). In humanitarian and development pillars, the vulnerable and most affected segments of the international community from the virus—households, child and women protection, refugees and migrants and internally displaced

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persons—were provided with assistance (United Nations Comprehensive Response to Covid 19 September 2020, 9–10). In addition to these, under the Secretary-General's leadership, the UN system worked well in mitigating "infodemic of misinformation" such as a war on science, a surge of stigma and hate by launching "verified campaign on misinformation" (United Nations Comprehensive Response to Covid 19 September 2020, 7). Funding response is highly critical to put these efforts into action. In this regard, the "UN family" support achieved on the ground since the pandemic's outbreak needs to be highlighted. As of September 3, nearly $5 billion had been gathered for the response (United Nations Comprehensive Response to Covid 19 June 2020, 9–10). To measure the UN's progress in the COVID-19 response, *a global indicator framework* with 18 indicators is used and *publicly reported* through the COVID-19 data portal (United Nations Comprehensive Response to Covid 19 September 2020, 71).

Other than these efforts of the secretary-general and various UN agencies, the UN's performance in the COVID-19 test may be more visible in the already complex peacekeeping operations. The pandemic will increase the need for peacekeeping operations since the socio-economic results of it will make conflict-prone countries more unstable (Hunt and Day 2020). Therefore, the Covid-19 crisis could provide an opportunity to renegotiate purposes, procedures, and the performance of the UN's peacekeeping operations.

Above all, the pandemic is at least a potential motive for opening up a new contestation of the UN system's legitimacy in global governance. As Hurd (2007, 19, 141) underlined, the social consensus about an institution's meaning or a norm is never absolute. Also, the construction of a legitimate institution is always under construction.

Conclusion

Challenges towards the legitimacy of the UN is not new at all. One of the most pressing challenges towards the legitimacy of the UN in global governance continues to be in regards to the questions of "whose interest do the rules serve," "who are the winners and the losers of the rules" (Hurd 2019, 725). As Richard Falk (2021), in this volume, asserts the legitimacy crisis arises not only from the ineffectiveness of the political organs of the UN but also from a *normative decline* concerning the authority of human rights norms and international law and the UN. In this volume, Michael Zürn (2021) reminds us that the crises of global governance institutions are not exogenous, but endogenous and the UN is not an exception. The UN was founded to build a more "just" world- to foster a family of nations on a fair and level playing field (Jain 2020, 351). In a word, in which the "legalization" itself frequently proves to be the primary source of the problem, the UN's legitimization through minor procedural reforms does not seem to be a long-term solution. Since the UN's response to the 1993 Rwandan genocide, adherence to principles and rules to "protect" the organization and

"avoid failures" proved to result in the further loss of legitimacy because of ineffectiveness (Cronin and Hurd 2008, 11).

Today, what makes these procedural and performance-related legitimacy challenges deeper than the previous ones is that the need for multilateral solutions to global problems is more significant than ever. Covid-19 pandemic once again demonstrated the structural inequalities and procedural weaknesses of the first UN to find collaborative solutions to the world's pressing problems when it is most needed. The UNSC once again proved to be the central forum for power struggle. US criticisms towards WHO and the arguments regarding Chinese manipulation of WHO increased the validity of claims that these institutions are arenas for big power rivalry. Within this context, the UN's procedural legitimacy has been depreciated more with this competition between permanent actors in the Security Council, and the tension between procedural and performance legitimacy of the UN system has become more visible.

The UN has frequently been criticized as being a bureaucratic "monster" (Jain 2020, 351) or "sprawl" (Malone and Day 2020, 290) with its underfunded, impotent, political, and dysfunctional agencies, programs, and funds. Interestingly, the COVID-19 seems to have proven the opposite so far. In the absence of leadership or cooperation of big powers in the first UN's political organs, civil society, the epistemic community of research and advocacy of many UN programs and specialized agencies have stepped in to support the organization. This brings us to think more about the "throughput" legitimacy of the UN system as a phase between procedure and performance. Throughput legitimacy is a third distinct pillar of legitimacy besides the input and output legitimacy, which underlines accountability and transparency of international institutions' governance processes and how they are prone to information sharing, inclusiveness, and open to "civil society" (Schmidt 2013, 7). If we only focus on the tension between input and output legitimacy, we could fall into the trap of analyzing the UN from the first UN view. However, as we underlined in the chapter, the UN performance should be based on the "UN family," which in the pandemic case includes the epistemic community of research and civil society. The second and the third UN has relatively been successful in managing information-sharing concerning the pandemic and coordinated the efforts of various UN agencies with different civil society partners. Therefore, formulating the response, the throughput legitimacy was mostly provided. As Debre and Dijkstra (2020, 22–24) found in their most recent study, IOs with large bureaucracies might be better able to resist member state challenges. In other words, in large and institutionalized IOs like the UN, secretariat staff fights hard to survive and adapt. Therefore, "large IOs with significant bureaucratic resources are here to stay" (Debre and Dijkstra 2020, 1).

All in all, the most recent ongoing COVID-19 pandemic is both a crisis and an unprecedented opportunity to open up a "new contestation" over the UN's purposes, procedures, and performance for creating a more

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"egalitarian" system. Steffek (2003, 250) reminds us that international governance cannot be enforced and is open to *renegotiation*. Coupled with decreasing willingness of the states like the US towards multilateralism and growing willingness and commitment of rising and middle powers towards change, the UN might provide more space for proposing "normative innovation." The "inputs" from rising and middle powers might also push for renewed commitment to multilateralism in the UN platform with its unique universal character. As Thakur (2020, 305) asserts, Global North must invest in the Global South as an essential partner. By this way, the UN system may find more space for democratic and inclusive deliberation over the fundamental re-think and "re-form" (Narlikar 2021 Tharoor and Saran 2020) of the organization.

As Caron (1993, 588) stated, long ago, the problem of legitimacy will continue. For any effort at legitimate governance, effectiveness requires a "process" involving ongoing participation and debate, among other things. To the degree that the UN and its members can learn from the resulting debates, the challenges expressed in terms of legitimacy hopefully might be met. In the words of President of the UN General Assembly Volkan Bozkır (2020), at the 75th anniversary of the UN Day Concert, "*what better than now to start reimagining, rebalancing and restarting*" and the pandemic brings, with Guterres' words, "a new 1945 foundational moment" as an opportunity to start reimagining the future of the UN.

Notes

1 Press Release SG/382, Address by Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld at University of California Convocation, Berkeley, California, Thursday, May 13, 1954, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/1291161
2 UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres Address to the Opening of the General Debate of the 75th Session of the General Assembly, September 22, 2020, https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2020-09-22/address-the-opening-of-the-general-debate-of-the-75th-session-of-the-general-assembly
3 This three-leveled classification: power-based, interest-based, and knowledge-based, is adopted from Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger (2000).
4 The first pillar is a large-scale, coordinated, and comprehensive health response by the WHO and Strategic Preparedness and Response Plan prepared by WHO on February 4, 2020. In line with this plan, the UN supports vaccine research, diagnostics, and treatment 'affordable and available to everyone. Secondly, the UN deals with efforts to address the crisis's socio-economic, humanitarian, and human rights aspects by initiating the Global Humanitarian Response Plan. Thirdly, a recovery process to build back better to address the climate crisis, inequalities, exclusion, and gaps in social protection systems and the many other fragilities and injustices that have been exposed (The UN Comprehensive Response June 2020, 1–2).
5 The Resolution underlines the ceasefire's "excluding military operations against the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as Da'esh), Al Qaeda and Al Nusra Front (ANF), and all other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al Qaeda or ISIL, and other terrorist groups, which have been designated by the Security Council".

6 The Trump Administration accused China of not declaring the WHO on time and labeled it as "Wuhan virus," since the virus was first detected in Wuhan city of China. On the other hand, China did not accept the accusations and asserted first coronavirus case was detected in the US. In this context, the politicization of the virus by the US and China has been visible in the Security Council. For this narrative fight, see: Huang, 2020.
7 'In Ebola case, the UN's first-ever emergency health mission was established with the unanimous adoption of General Assembly Resolution 69/1. The Security Council also decided with Resolution 2177(2014) by declaring for the first time a public health problem as a threat to international peace and security adopted unanimously and supported by the highest number in the history of the Council' (Ulusoy, 2020).

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