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FRATERNITY, PERPETUAL PEACE, AND ALLIANCE IN OTTOMAN-SAFAVID RELATIONS, 1688-1698: A DIPLOMATIC REVOLUTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The year 1639 constitutes a dividing point in the periodization of Ottoman-Safavid relations. The first period, if one excepts the House of Safi's pre-monarchy phase, goes from the launch of the Safavids' movement for sovereignty in 1500 to the peace of Zuhab in 1639, 140 years marked by conflict and the Ottoman conquest of Kurdistan and Iraq at the expense of Iran.[1] The period from 1639 to the collapse of Savafid rule in 1722, on the other hand, has been often addressed as eventless. This is the result of a war-oriented reading and a familiarity with the literature on this confrontational period. Scholarship has mostly suggested that once hostilities ceased, bilateral relations were marked by both parties' unwillingness to interact and contentment with the preservation of a peace solely based on non-aggression and observance of an imprecisely drawn border.[2] However, during these decades of peaceful neighborhood, the Ottoman

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1. The literature on Ottoman-Safavid relations until 1639 is rich. For an introduction at monograph level, see Sohrweide, "Der Sieg der Safawiden in Persien;" Bacqué-Grammont, *Les Ottomans, les Safavides et leurs voisins*; Allouche, *Ottoman-Safavid Conflict*; Bilge, *Yavuz Selim ve Şah İsmail*; Eberhard, *Osmanische Polemik gegen die Safawiden*; Posch, *Osmanisch-safavidische Beziehungen (1545-1550)*; Diyanet, *Amasya Musalahası*; Kütükoğlu, *Osmanlı-İran Münasebetleri*; Küpeli, *Osmanlı-Safevi Münasebetleri*.

2. See, for example, Tucker, "Ottoman-Iranian Diplomacy through the Safavid Era," p. 86-87.

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State and Safavid Iran engaged each other almost constantly via an active peacetime diplomacy. Through dozens of missions, they exchanged hundreds of correspondence, conducted negotiations, regulated an international hierarchy, struck deals, confronted each other, and went through crises. The content of this diplomacy was not only ceremonial, it also contained substantial stakes. Simultaneously, both states repeatedly tried to gain the upper hand along the common frontier by provoking insubordination, making tours de force with full-fledged armies, crushing rebellions, extending direct rule, disputing the demarcation, demanding compensation for violations, conducting espionage activities, etc.[3]

After the peace of Zuhab, it took the parties almost four years of intensive diplomacy to resolve the disruptions preventing the treaty from coming definitively into force. However, in the 1640s, due to unsolved border disputes and Venetian attempts to draw Iran into the Cretan War as an ally, a Sultanic Army (*Ordu-yı Hümâyun*) was fielded at the Iranian borderzone across Erivan, testing the soundness of this pacification. Nevertheless, peace survived not only these fragile moments but also the showdowns and reciprocal mobilizations between the Houses of Osman and Safi along the border to the east of Mesopotamia. It was such chronic developments and occasional diplomatic contacts addressing them that occupied the agenda of bilateral contacts over the course of the 1650s, 60s, and 70s. As had been the case since the later 1510s, all platforms on which Ottoman-Safavid relations were taking place continued to be marked by Ottoman superiority in hierarchy and in the balance of power.[4]

The present study explores the golden age in the history of Ottoman-Safavid relations (1688-1698) that was conjuncturally occasioned by the sequence of events that occurred in the wake of the formation of the anti-Ottoman Holy League (Germany,[5] Poland-Lithuania, and Venice – eventually also joined by Russia).

3. See below.

4. See my "Ottoman Empire and Safavid Iran," p. 24-236.

5. Using *Germany* for the Habsburg monarchy/state is anachronic in most instances, and the term *Habsburgs* corresponds well to *Ottomans*. Within the Holy Roman emperor's forces, there were moreover Hungarian, Czech, Serbian, Croatian, Italian, etc. elements. Accordingly, whenever the referent in this text is the monarchic state comprised of the crowns the Habsburgs held in personal union, the term *Habsburgs* is employed. However, this naming sometimes falls short of describing the referent. As a rule, the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation was not a state but a system in which, during the early modern period, sovereign states of various hierarchical positions operated. However, several of the Ottoman wars, due to their targeted geography, triggered the single clause of the "constitution" that could still bring about a relatively concerted action by most of these

In debt of gratitude owing to the shah's categorical rejections to join the Holy League and capture Mesopotamia, the Sublime Porte elevated the shah's international grade from royal to junior-imperial (while the padishah remained supreme). It also declared, responding to earlier remarks from the Safavid government, the peace to be permanent. Although indirect initiatives to form an Ottoman-Safavid military coalition against Russia remained abortive, the exchange of missions and correspondence between Adrianople-Baghdad and Isfahan furthered the emerging rapprochement. In the meantime, major rebellions broke out in Şehrizor and Basra, quickly spreading to Erdelân and Huveyze across the border. Because of the redeployment of peacetime military units from stations at the Iranian frontier to the theaters of war in Hungary, the northern Black Sea region, and Greece, an authority deficit struck the provinces along the borderline. Despite Ottoman liability, the damage Iran received therefrom did not disrupt both states's determined promotion of the convergence. In these eleven years, four ambassadors, one envoy, and one emissary as well as tens of missives were exchanged. The fact that the Iranians patiently respected the rebel-ridden borders of their western neighbor and at the same time conformed with the principle of Ottoman superiority in a continuous and unquestioned manner contributed to the building of mutual trust. The padishah's entrustment of the borders of his easternmost domains to the shah and the Safavids' moral support in the Ottomans' struggle against the Holy League soon resulted in the parties' proclamation of their *fraternity*, *perpetual peace*, and ultimately *alliance*. This unexampled concord between the Houses of Osman and Safi was crowned with the shah giving back to the padishah the entire province of Basra, which the Iranians had captured from rebels.

The Legation of Dal Ahmed Agha against the Holy League: the Sublime Porte elevates the Safavids' Rank and declares Fraternity, 1688-90

Following the disorderly retreat before the gates of Vienna in 1683, the Ottomans found themselves fighting full-fledged wars against the

otherwise separate German states: "the defense of the realm." This was the case in the Great Turkish War, in which not only the realms of the Habsburgs' composite monarchy were involved, but also the sovereign principalities of Bavaria, Saxony, Brandenburg, Baden, Hanover, etc. that sent commanders and sizable troops to the German imperial armies. The use of *Germany* in this text is not a translation of the Ottomans' *Nemçe*, but used for the sake of exactness whenever required by the occasion. The Hungarian element does not necessarily undermine this usage either, as Hungary, though not in equal shares, was present on both sides of the conflict in terms of geography, politics, dynasties, and manpower.

German Empire in Hungary; Poland-Lithuania in Podolia, the Ukraine, and Moldavia; and Venice in Dalmatia, southern Greece, and the Adriatic – soon to be joined by Russia on the Ukrainian-Crimean front. Early reports of the rout reached Iran exaggerating the already disastrous result, and caused the Iranians to rejoice and send out agents to incite rebellions with a plan to capture Mesopotamia.[6] Despite this initial reaction, eventually, the shah, with reference to the "permanent peace" with the House of Osman, categorically declined in 1686 the repeated invitations by the German Emperor, the Polish king, and the Pope to join the anti-Ottoman coalition. The Russian tsar's similar proposals were also rejected. The shah even turned down an offer of allegiance from an Ottoman vassal in Mesopotamia. The Sublime Porte reportedly secured the Safavids' neutrality by means of gifts, bribes, and promises given during concealed negotiations in 1684-85. This deal was also facilitated by the Safavids' adherence to their fundamental policy of avoiding hostilities with the Ottomans, even when the latter were too paralyzed to mobilize in the east. As proven by experience, momentary westward advances eventually cost Iran dearly. In the meantime, as of the end of 1686, the Ottomans had lost most of Hungary to the Habsburgs, and the Peloponnese to Venice. The reaction arising from these traumatic losses led to a coup that dethroned Mehmed IV and enthroned Süleyman (II) in 1687. In this most turbulent phase of the Great Turkish War that would last until 1690, the padishah's court tried to make sure that the unruly frontier elements between Kars and Erivan commit no violation of the Iranian border. At the fortress of Baghdad, ruined towers were rebuilt and damaged walls were renovated in 1687-88.[7]

In 1688, Sultan Süleyman Khan II sent an envoy to Shah Süleyman in declaration of his accession and reconfirmation of the current treaty. However, Osman Agha, the superintendent of the Council *çavuş*s,[8] who

6. Matthee, *Persia in Crisis*, p. 133-134.

7. See Eszer, "Sebastianus Knab;" Kaempfer, *Am Hofe der persischen Großkönigs*, p. 2, p. 57-58, p. 69-70, p. 208-212, p. 214; Meier-Lemgo, "Die Briefe Engelbert Kaempfers," p. 279; "Ludvig Fabritius's Kurtze Relation," p. 99-100; Jorga, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches* IV, 202; Mehdevî, *Revâbıt-ı Hâricî-yi İran*, p. 77; Ricaut, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, p. 177; Barker, *Vienna's Second Turkish Siege*, p. 160; Matthee, "Iran's Ottoman Diplomacy;" Matthee, *Persia in Crisis*, p. 133-134, Güngörürler, "Ottoman Empire and Safavid Iran," p. 239-249; Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), *Mühimme Defteri* 98, entry 37; Nazmizâde, *Gülşen-i Hulefâ*, p. 307-308; Matthee, "Administrative Stability and Change in the Late-17th-Century Iran."

8. *Dîvân-ı Hümâyun çavuşlar emîni*.

was chosen for this mission, died en route while in Baghdad. Governor-general Qoca Öküz Ömer Pasha immediately informed the padishah's court. In order not to prolong the delay, it was deemed more suitable after deliberations that the governor-gen. entrust the mission to an eligible man of his rather than the center dispatching a new envoy. After receiving the decree with these instructions in 1689, Ömer Pasha commissioned Dal Ahmed Agha to take over the legation. Probably in 1690, the substitute-envoy arrived in Isfahan, where he was received by the shah.[9]

In the prologue of his epistle[10] dated 27 September 1688 to "Shah Süleyman his Sublime Majesty, of Keyqubâd-grandeur, potentate of the orient, the chief-posited on the seat of world-keeping, resort of fraternity, world-possessor,[11]" the padishah asserted: "the Possessor of the Regnum made [Us] accede to the throne of the caliphate of world-keeping. It is necessary that [Our] vanquishing caliphate reach Your Kingly ears.[12]" Afterwards, he referred to the "ancient union[13]" between the Houses of Osman and Safi. With reference to the ongoing war against the Holy League, he declared, via the "august epistle of friendship and union,[14]" his departure from Constantinople to lead the campaign. Then, the padishah turned his focus to the long frontier shared with Iran: "Our domains that are adjacent Your domains shall be God's entrustment to Your fraternal person![15]" Süleyman II wished in farewell: " [Your] khaqanly grandeur shall forever shine![16]"

Like his predecessors, envoy Dal Ahmed Agha was hosted lavishly during his stay at the shahly court. Upon the completion of diplomatic business, the shah appointed Kelb-Ali (Xan-Beyg) Ziyâdoğlu-Qacar as his responsive ambassador.[17] Rejecting repeated alliance offers from the German Empire, Poland-Lithuania, Russia, and the Papacy had paid off for the Safavids. This epistle confirmed the commencement of the new path in Ottoman-Safavid relations, though it had already been heralded by

9. Fındıklılı Mehmed, *Zeyl-i Fezleke*, p. 1406.

10. BOA, *Nâme-i Hümâyun Defteri* 5, ent. 29; *Mecmua-i Mekâtîb*, f. 2b.

11. "*Âlî-hazret* [...] *Keyqubâd-şevket* [...] *şehriyâr-ı hâver-zemîn* [...] *mutasaddır-ı mesned-i cihân-bânî* [...] *uhuvvet-meab* [...] *cihân-dâr* [...] *Süleyman Şah*."

12. "*Mâlikü'l-mülk* [...] *zât...ımızı* [...] *serîr-ârây-ı hilâfet-i cihânbânî* [...] *qıldı... Hilâfet-i qâhire*[*miz*] [...] r*eside-i mesâmi'-i* [...] *keyânîleri olmaq gerektir*."

13. *"İttihâd-ı qadîm*."

14. "*Dûstî ve ittihâd için nâme-i hümâyun*."

15. "*Memâlik...leriyle* [...] *ittisâl olan memleketlerimiz zât-ı uhuvvet-simâtlarına Allah emâneti olsun!*"

16. "*Hemîşe* [...] *şevket-i hâqâni* [...] *dirahşân bâd*."

17. Fındıklılı Mehmed, *Zeyl-i Fezleke*, p. 1406.

Shah Süleyman's rejections in 1686. Even the very formation of the 1688-1690 legation was exceptional: according to the diplomatic convention, a dethronement-caused change of the Ottoman ruler occasioned the sending of not an envoy (of *agha*- or *efendi*-grade) but an agent (of *çavuş*-grade or lower), unless the envoy was dispatched as not an initiatory mission but one in response to the incoming congratulatory diplomat.[18] Yet, the necessity perceived by the Sublime Porte to boost the emerging rapprochement with the Safavids gave way to this remarkable exception.

Safavid rulers had never been designated officially so close in rank to Ottoman rulers. The shahs had normally been addressed as royal sovereigns[19] of Iran, but being addressed as *potentate of the Orient*[20] renders the shah superior to any other monarch of below-supreme dignity, indicating a clear elevation in rank. In the same vein, denoting the shah as *world-possessor* was meant to register his elevation to [junior] imperial grade.[21] Yet, the terminology identifying supreme-imperial[22] dignity remained reserved to the padishah, in order to highlight the still-existing inequality. In short, promoted one step upwards from royal to imperial grade, the shah became situated more closely to the Ottoman supreme monarch, while the latter remained paramount.[23]

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18. For the identification of the ranks of diplomats in Ottoman-Safavid diplomacy, see my "Fundamentals of Ottoman-Safavid Peacetime Relations," and my upcoming work "On Titulature, Hierarchy, Delegation, Protocol, and Status Quos in the Diplomacy of the Pre-Modern Middle East" for a more thorough treatment of the technicalities.

19. Some identifiers of royal rank in the early modern oriental context: [*âlî/vâlâ*-] *hazret*, *sultan*, *qaan*, *hümâyun*, dignity measured with names of ancient Iranian kings and celestial objects. Some identifiers of lesser-royal rank: [*âlî/vâlâ*]-*cenâb*, *saltanat*, *şah*, *ilhân*, *selâtîn*, *havâqîn* (the last two only when in plural form as a group name). Some identifiers of regal (below royal and above princely) rank: [*âlî/vâlâ*]-*cenâb*, *fermân/hükm - rân/fermâ*, *devlet*, *hân*, *melik/mülk/mülûk*, *pâdişah*, *şehriyâr*. The titles provided here and elsewhere were employed cumulatively in an upward manner, i.e. the titles of a lower rank were liberally used for an upper rank as well, but not vice versa.

20. See above.

21. Some identifiers of [junior] imperial rank in the early modern oriental context are: [*a'lâ*-]*hazret*, *cihân-bân*, *cihân-dâr*, *cihân/âlem - penâh*, *hâqân*, *qayser*, *kehfü'l-ümem*, *hilâfet*, *sâye-i re'fet-i Yezdân*, plus titles from the lower ranks of sovereigns.

22. Some identifiers of the supreme [i.e. senior imperial] rank in the early modern oriental context are: [*a'lâ*-]*hazret*, *şehinşâh*, *sultân-ı a'zam*, *saltanatü'l-uzmâ*, *sultânü's-selâtîn*, *hâqân-ı efham*, *hâqânü'l-havâqîn*, *fermân-fermâ-yı zemîn ü zamân*, *hıdîv-i cihân*, *tâc-bahş-ı hüsrevân*, *cihân-bahş*, *pâdişâh-ı rûy-i zemîn* / *İslâm*, *sâhib-qıran* / *qadr-qırân*, *kehfü'l-maşrıqeyn ve melâzü'l-hâfıqeyn*, *sânî-yi İskender-i Zü'l-Qarneyn*, *hilâfet-i kübrâ/uzmâ*, *zıll-ı* [*zalîl-i*] *Allah* [*fi'l-âlemeyn*] / *sâye-i Yezdân*.

23. In my upcoming article "On Titulature, Hierarchy, Delegation, Protocol, and Status Quos in the Diplomacy of the Pre-Modern Middle East," I show how each rulerly title should be read in different contexts in order to extract the case-specific hierarchical indication.

In addition to this reorganization in the hierarchy of rulers, the uninterrupted peace between Iran and the Ottoman monarchy since 1639 came to become spoken of as the *ancient union*, meaning that there was no anticipation for the breaking of the treaty. This confirmed the statement Shah Süleyman had made in 1686 about the stableness and durability of the peace agreement. Sultan Süleyman Khan II vividly expressed this when he openly stated that he relied on the shah for not attacking the monarchy's eastern provinces from behind when its armies were fighting against the Holy League on an overextended line of fronts. This represents unarguably the highest level of trust – on the part of the Sublime Porte – formally displayed to the House of Safi since this dynasty's rise to power at the beginning of the 16th century. The urgency of external circumstances certainly pushed the Porte to take this unprecedented step. That successive shahs consistently rejected anti-Ottoman alliance offers, which culminated after 1684, played an at least equally decisive role in bringing about this rapprochement by creating a favorable environment and paving the way for the formal perpetuation of the Ottoman-Safavid peace.

Even though both parties preferred to have each other as an intact neighbor, they would rather keep that neighbor under indirect fire. For example, in the epistle sent concurrently to the Uzbek Khan of Bukhara in October 1688, Süleyman II encouraged his addressee to attack Iran. By coincidence, Bukharan troops would march into Khorasan in 1690 and take the fortress of Bâlâ-Murghâb, and Sübhan-Qulu Khan would write back to the padishah to offer, in vain, an anti-Safavid alliance. Both sides tried to encourage one another to further engage the Safavids. In his epistle addressed to Sübhan-Qulu Khan in August 1691, Ahmed II would subsequently praise the Bukharans' 1690 Khorasan campaign, excuse himself for not having initiated the war against the Safavids, request military coordination, and promise to notify the arrival of Ottoman forces at the intended Iranian front. Sübhan-Qulu Khan would send a return embassy.[24] Shah Süleyman's establishing diplomatic contacts with Sübhan-Qulu Khan would soon lead to the cessation of hostilities in Khorasan. The manner in which the Ottomans approached the Uzbeks at this particular time did not differ from that of the Safavids to the Holy League. As long as the Safavids did not cooperate with the padishah's enemies, the Porte did not even give any consideration to the idea of opening an Iranian

24. Burton, "Khanate of Bukhara and Ottoman Turkey," p. 102-103.

front. The Porte's mention to the Uzbeks of a common Iranian offensive in 1688-1691 should only be read as a precaution taken to subdue the bythen very low possibility that Iran join the Holy League as the fifth great power. Otherwise, the post-1684 Ottoman-Safavid convergence was unfolding at full speed.

Shah Süleyman's reply to the epistle he received from Selim I Giray, khan of the Crimea, sheds more light on the extent of the Ottoman-Safavid diplomatic revolution. Selim I Giray communicated to the shah that the Russians had joined the Holy League and opened a new front over the Khanate, while the Crimean troops were actively taking part in the Hungarian, Polish, and Russian fronts. It seems that the khan also requested from the shah a counter coalition and dispatch of support troops. In his reply, Shah Süleyman said that the current war was indeed a golden opportunity for the House of Osman to see who was really foe and who was really friend, that he cherished friendship with the padishah, and that he would not let this friendship see any harm, because the consolidated peace between the Ottomans and the Safavids already necessitated aid and comradeship. With the expectation that Russia would cease hostilities, Shah Süleyman said that he deemed it necessary to declare to the tsar the khan's good faith, and he especially highlighted the incessant letters from Russia containing attractive offers. For this matter, the shah appointed a subject of his to act as intermediary; the emissary was to travel to Kazan and to the Muscovite court, declare there the Crimean khan's long-time candor towards the Safavids, and dissuade the Russians, with advice and promises, from joining the enemies of the "padishah the Shadow of God.[25]" In case the Russians would not be convinced, replied the shah, the military aid that the Crimea had requested was contingent upon fate: if it were destined to be, it would materialize – otherwise, not.[26]

This correspondence is from Selim I Giray's second reign (1684-1691) and the period when Moscovite missions were still shuttling between Russia and Isfahan, shortly after Shah Süleyman had isssued his definitive rejections in 1686, but before the Hüseyin Xan[27]-Beyg mission of 1690 to

25. "*Pâdişâh,* [...] *zıll-ı İlah*," inserted above the text body as an address of reverence.

26. *Mecmua-i Mekâtîb*, ff. 3b-4a.

27. Whenever used in its Safavid-devalued capacity rather than in its medieval or early modern regnal capacity, I spell this title as *xan* – as opposed to the spelling of the sovereign title *khan* – in order to facilitate differentiation.

Moscow was launched[28] – a mission referred to in the epistle as a prospective initiative. Accordingly, the khan must have received instructions from the Sublime Porte in late 1688 and written to the shah in 1689. Likewise, the shah's reply, with its reference to the prospective mission which would materialize in 1690, must also have been sent in 1689 or in early 1690 at the latest.

The implications of this contact can be better understood when the Crimea is situated within the framework of Ottoman-Safavid diplomacy. As of the 17th century, apart from matters concerning the internal affairs of the realm, the padishah enjoyed full sovereignty in appointing, deposing, and instructing the Genghisid-Giray khans of the Crimea.[29] At interstate level, Bahçesaray had retained the right to conduct limited diplomacy.[30] As far as the internal hierarchy was concerned, the Crimean khans ranked as regal (below-royal) monarchs,[31] second only to the padishah. In their correspondence with foreign, non-Ottoman rulers, the khans ranked as royal monarchs.[32] When necessary, the Crimean khans could well be employed as agents to indirectly achieve Ottoman diplomatic objectives. This was by virtue of the limited sovereign status the Khanate preserved, which continued to be asserted as an asset on international scale. It is quite unlikely for the Sublime Porte not to have regulated in advance the initiation and content of the abovementioned correspondence between the Genghisid-Girays and the Safavids – particularly in view of

28. The mission was to congratulate Peter [the Great]'s accession to tsardom. Arriving in Moscow on 20 March 1692, it also repeated the Safavid rejection of anti-Ottoman alliance offers. Matthee, "Iran's Ottoman Diplomacy," p. 165.

29. See Papp, "Die Inaugurationen der Krimkhane durch die Hohe Pforte;" İnalcık, "Kırım Hanlığının Osmanlı Tabiliğine Girmesi."

30. See Matuz, *Krimtatarische Urkunden*; Kołodziejczyk, *Crimean Khanate and Poland-Lithuania*; Augustynowicz, "Tatarische Gesandtschaften am Kaiserhof."

31. See the inscriptio used in the padishah's epistles and grand vizierial letters for the Crimean khan in the documents compiled in *Münşeat-ı Divân-ı Hümâyun*; Feridun Bey, *Münşeatü's-Selâtîn*. For the terminology of ranking used here, see footnote 20 above and my upcoming article "On Titulature and Hierarchy."

32. See the royal inscriptio (*free khan/tsar*, *brother*) and the apparently unopposed royal intitulatio (*ulu padişah*, *ulu han*, *hümâyun*, *âlî-hazret*, *hurşid-tal'at*) employed for the Crimean khans in Crimean-Polish diplomacy, as well as the khan's official address to the king (as *qarındaşım Leh qıralı*), in the documents published by Kołodziejczyk in his *Crimean Khanate and Poland-Lithuania*, p. 583, p. 860-861, p. 863, p. 871-872, p. 885, p. 895, p. 926, p. 948-849, p. 956-958, p. 960, p. 967-970, p. 973, p. 975. A few of these documents also feature the exceptional employment of one or two supreme or imperial titles (*hân-ı azam*, *hâqân-ı muazzam*) for the khans by the Crimean chancery, which were unilateral, uncomplied-with claims. See footnotes 19-22.

the overtly pro-Ottoman stance of Selim I Giray. It is very probable that this initiative belonged to the series of steps taken by the Ottomans in order to put the Russians out of action in the wake of the latter's participation in the Holy League.

The proposed Safavid intermediacy with the Russians was Shah Süleyman's alternative offer in substitution for sending troops against Russia. Despite not providing military aid, which would bring Iran into a state of war with Muscovy, it is still remarkable that the shah saw himself in a position to offer mediation between the tsar on one side and the khan, hence ultimately the padishah, on the other without running the risk of antagonizing the latter two. This atmosphere of cordial relations between Constantinople and Isfahan was the direct consequence of the post-1684 convergence. The shah's offer to act as intermediary between Muscovy and the Sublime Porte via the Crimea constituted its next step. Likewise, one can easily interpret this proposal as precursor to the prospective consummation of the shah's elevation in rank and the eventual initiation of the *perpetual peace in alliance* in Ottoman-Safavid relations. Having taken the first step in 1688, both parties were now so-to-say putting out feelers for going further. Accordingly, commissioning the Crimean khan was the safest possible way for the Sublime Porte to test the waters. If successful, the Crimean-Iranian correspondence of 1689 could be regarded as a fully official medium registering the second step of Ottoman-Safavid convergence. In the case of failure, this indirect diplomacy could be passed over, as the Sublime Porte would technically not have played a part in it.

As the Great Turkish War intensified, the transfer of resources from the Iranian frontier to the western and northern fronts to sustain the Ottoman war effort did not remain limited to the financial realm. As of 1689, Baghdad, Basra, Ottoman Georgia, Erzurum, and Kars began to contribute with Janissary companies and mercenaries, in addition to which the governors-general of Erzurum and Kars, together with their household troops, became regular participants in the annual sultanic campaigns in Hungary.[33]

33. For 1689 and 1690: *Mühimme df.* 98, ent. 732; *df.* 99, ent. 241; *df* 99, ent. 470; *df.* 99, ent. 112, 127. For 1691: *Mühimme df.* 102, ent. 26, 97; *df.* 101, ent. 320(314); *df.* 102, ent. 104. For 1692: *Mühimme df.* 104, ent. 516. For 1693: *Mühimme df.* 104, ent. 622; *df.* 105, ent. 144, 200, 382; *df.* 105, ent, 306, 382; *df.* 104, ent. 986, 1108.

These redeployments took place despite the emergence of disturbances at the frontier. In the autumn of 1689, it once again became obvious for the Ottomans that maintaining strong military presence along the Iranian frontier was crucial. In the vicinity of Akhaltsikhe, a contingent sent by the governor-gen. of Erzurum (Dursun Mehmed Pasha) intercepted and put to the sword a group of twenty fugitives from the entourage of mercenary-rebel Gedik Mehmed Pasha. After Gedik Mehmed's mercenary-turned-rebel army had been defeated and many of his troops had been executed, these men attempted to flee to Iran to save their lives. The governor-gen. left alive only the ringleaders and a captain – Zırhlı Bölükbaşı, whom he sent to the padishah's court, which was then encamping en route from Sofia to Adrianople.[34] Notwithstanding this incident, which demonstrated that the peacetime-normal size of forces stationed in the provinces neighboring Iran were actually needed there, the next governor-gen. of Erzurum was ordered to participate in the mobilization for the European front. This signified the absence of a vizierial household contingent across the Iranian north-west, and the security deficit that would arise therefrom.

Thus, the scope of the military redeployment had reached the farthest provinces that were neighboring Iran and keeping that frontier in discipline against internal disorder as well as external violations. The continuing drain of soldiery from these easternmost provinces would eventually lead to the outbreak of cross-border movements aimed at overthrowing Ottoman rule. In the meantime, for the Ottoman side, the Great Turkish War had acquired its gravest dimension. In 1689, Serbia was practically lost with the fall of Nish and Vidin. The borders of Rumelia, i.e. the core of Ottoman Europe – and in many respects the primary province of the monarchy, were breached, and its northwestern section occupied. In 1690, the last Ottoman foothold in western Hungary, Nagykanizsa, capitulated. However, a resurgent Ottoman war effort in 1690 managed to recover the entirety of Serbia including the key fortresses of Nish and Belgrade.[35] Rumelia remained thus intact in Ottoman hands. The war against the German emperor would continue to be fought not in the heart of the Balkans, but in Hungary.

34. Fındıklılı Mehmed *Zeyl-i Fezleke*, p. 1244, 1273; *Mühimme df.* 99, ent. 117-118.

35. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Târihi* III/1, p. 518-528; Parvev, *Habsburgs and Ottomans*, p. 85-98.

In the late summer/early autumn of 1689, Süleyman Bey [the younger], *bey* of the Baban[36] tribe of the Kirmanc Kurds, rose in disobedience and took over the provincial capital Kirkuk after killing the governor of Şehrizor, Alaybeyioğlu Dilâver Pasha. Encroaching upon Iranian territory, Süleyman also seized the control of the fort of Beytûş and appointed there a *bey*. Murad IV had captured this fort in 1638 but had left it under the control of its Safavid-vassal *bey*, with the condition of an annual tribute to the Ottoman-vassal *bey* of the Baban. Responding to the call by the inhabitants of Kirkuk, governor-gen. of Baghdad Baltacı Hasan Pasha appointed a proxy-governor to Şehrizor and issued an edict demanding unconditional obedience from Baban Süleyman. The centrally appointed governor, however, was denied entry to his province.[37]

While Baban Süleyman also expanded his encroachments over Iranian vassals, the Bedouins of the Mesopotamian Marshlands[38] allied themselves with the tribe Müntefiq in 1691 and marched onto the city of Basra. When governor-gen. Çiftelerli Osmanpaşazâde Ahmed Pasha went out to hunt down their 2,000 to 3,000-strong force with only a 500-men contingent supported by his household troops, he was killed in action. Mâni' b. Şebîb es-Saadûn, chieftain of the Müntefiq, entered the provincial capital, only to be expelled by the forces of the notables who subsequently nominated Hasan Cemâl from among themselves as proxy-governor. Hasan Cemâl would also die in action against the Marshland rebels by the summer of 1692.[39]

Apparently, it had become clear to the central government that the continuous redeployment of Court Corps [*Qapu-qulu*] contingents in the east to the western and northern fronts was undermining the security along the Iranian frontier. By 1692, this policy was partially reversed at least for the provinces in Iraq.[40] By then, the news of the rebellion in Basra had already reached the padishah's court. As an initial measure,

36. Ottoman sources of the period consistently spell the name of the tribe as well as the surname of its chieftain as *Bebe*. Here, I preferred the spelling *Baban* (*Bâbân*), with which this tribal-princely house has come to be known (the *Baban-zâde*s).

37. Uşşâkîzâde, *Târih* I, p. 397; Nazmizâde, *Gülşen-i Hulefâ*, p. 327-328; *Mühimme df.* 104, ent. 236. For the earlier stages of this rebellion under Deli Bekir Bey, lord of the Baban, of which the Ottoman court had been aware since as early as 1677, see Uşşâkîzâde, *Târih* I, p. 393-396. Also see Nasîrî, *Düstûr-i Şehriyârân*, p. 126-127.

38. *el-Cezâyîr*, literally *the Isles*, to the south of the Province of Baghdad and north of the city of Basra, a sub-province within the Governorate of Basra.

39. *Mühimme df.* 104, ent. 197; Nazmizâde, *Gülşen-i Hulefâ*, p. 329-331.

40. *Mühimme df.* 102, ent. 773.

the military deduction from Baghdad, the primary province that was to assert state authority along the Iranian frontier from the Persian Gulf to Azerbaijan, was aborted. The redeployment from the Caucasian borderlands, however, did not halt.[41]

The Embassy of Kelb-Ali Ziyâdoğlu-Qacar: the Safavids pay Repeated Homage to Ottoman Supremacy, 1691-92

Süleyman II, whose health had been deteriorating, passed away in Adrianople on 22 June 1691, and was succeeded swiftly by his brother, Ahmed (II). Two months later, the recent Ottoman resurgence was put to end with the defeat in the Battle of Slankamen against the German emperor's army; the architect of this resurgence, grand vizier Köprülü Fâzıl Mustafa Pasha, had been shot dead during combat. Recoveries in Serbia, however, remained intact.[42] In the meantime, other Ottoman armies on the Venetian, Polish, and Russian fronts continued to hold their positions against repeated offensives.

Kelb-Ali Ziyâdoğlu-Qacar,[43] Shah Süleyman's outgoing ambassador to Sultan Süleyman Khan II, soon heard, while in Erivan, of the latter's death and Ahmed II's accession. His trip was halted in the field of Kars; nevertheless, the governor-gen. of Erzurum communicated his arrival to the padishahly court. Having received permission from the Sublime Porte to proceed as the shah's ambassador to Ahmed II while carrying credentials addressed to the now-deceased Süleyman II, Kelb-Ali Qacar resumed his journey.[44] The 200-to-300-men embassy[45] reached Constantinople in

41. *Mühimme df*. 104, ent. 60; *df*. 104, ent. 92.

42. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Târihi* III/1, p. 531-535; Parvev, *Habsburgs and Ottomans*, p. 117-119.

43. The sources do not agree as to the name-attached title of Kelb-Ali Ziyâdoğlu-Qacar: Ottoman decree registers and the copy of the subsequent reply epistle call him *beyg*, all Ottoman chronicles call him *xan* and governor[-general] of Ganja [Qarabağ], while the surviving copy of the royal epistle, which could have been the overriding reference and contains his credentials, fails to record his title. Fındıklılı Mehmed Agha, with his unmatched minuteness for recording titles and cognomens, titles him *xan*. The royal epistle and Kelb-Ali Ziyâdoğlu-Qacar's subsequent diplomatic activities indicate beyond doubt that his rank was that of ambassador, according to which he must have been either *sültan* or *xan*. If he was the governor[-general] of Ganja, then he must have been *xan*.

44. Fındıklılı Mehmed, *Zeyl-i Fezleke*, p. 1406; Sarı Mehmed, *Zübde-i Vekâiyât*, p. 418; *Mühimme df*. 103, ent. 2 (the decree regulating his lodging on the way stations).

45. İtimâdü's-Saltana, *Târih-i Muntazam-ı Nâsırî* II, p. 994; *Anonim Osmanlı Târihi*, p. 33. The author of the latter chronicle seems to have confused Kelb-Ali Ziyâdoğlu-Qacar

late January 1692 after being ferried, together with the elephant it had brought along, from Scutari. The welcome and hosting were arranged as instructed by vice-grand vizier[46] Köprülü Amcazâde Hüseyin Pasha,[47] who was overseeing governmental business at the capital during the absence of the padishah and the grand vizier.

After a week of recreation in Constantinople, Kelb-Ali Qacar set off again, and reached the padishah's court at Adrianople on 6 February[48] 1692. A welcome procession conducted by Şehrî Mehmed Agha (marshal of the Sultanic Council[49]) took the ambassador to his residence, Qatırhanı Palace of late Merzifonlu Qara Mustafa Pasha. Reportedly, Kelb-Ali Qacar "did not like the sublime pavilions and regal rooms designed in an engineer-esque and architect-esque style by a tyrannical vizier of [haughty] nature such as [Merzifonlu] Qara Mustafa Pasha," and expressed that he found the "venue unhandsome," and that "in the shah's state," there were already plenty of such rooms/marquees covered with baldachin and cloth of gold which he enjoyed the comfort of. The Ottoman hosts are said to have found this unappreciation very "strange."[50] If true, the ambassador's disdain must have been a diplomatic move aimed at claiming

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with the later ambassadors, Ebulmasum Xan Şamlu and Rüstem Xan Zengene, in some respects.

46. *Sadâret qaymaqamı / rikâb-ı hümâyun qaymaqamı / âsitâne qaymaqamı*.

47. The ambassador, his entourage, and the shah's gifts were transported to Eminönü in Constantinople with a galiot (*çektiri/çektirme*). As the elephant that was brought along could not be mounted on this ship, a special pinnace (*palaşkerme*) had to be constructed and tied to the galiot ferrying the embassy convoy. At the pier, the deputy-marshal and *çavuş*s of the Sultanic Council welcomed the guests. On 29 January 1692, the padishahly court, which then resided at Adrianople, received the news of the embassy's arrival in Constantinople. At the capital, the embassy was accommodated in Fâzılahmedpaşa Palace. For more details, see Fındıklılı Mehmed, *Zeyl-i Fezleke*, p. 1384, 1404, 1406-1407; Üsküdârî, *Vâqıât-ı Rûzmerre* III, f. 89b; and below.

48. Fındıklılı Mehmed provides the date of Wednesday 8 Cemâziyülevvel 1103 and the eighth of midwinter (*hamsîn*). However, 8 Cemâziyülevvel 1103 was a Sunday, the eighth of *hamsîn* coincided with 6/7 February, and Abdullah Üsküdârî provides the date 18 Cemâziyülevvel 1103, which does coincide with Wednesday and 6 February 1692, leading to the conclusion that in the edited version of Fındıklılı's *Zeyl-i Fezleke*, "on" was omitted before "sekiz" when providing the date. See the references below.

49. *Dîvân-ı Hümâyun Çavuşbaşısı*

50. Üsküdârî, *Vâqıât-ı Rûzmerre*, ff. 96b-98a. The welcome ceremony, which began at Qarabayır/Solaqçeşmesi, was also attended by Kürd Ahmed Agha (*silah-dâr*) as well as one hundred *çavuş*s and *müteferriqa*s. Some from the embassy personnel were lodged separately at Hüseyinkethüdâ house-compound (*Hüseyin Kethüdâ büyûtu*, formerly known as *Abdullah Ağa hânesi*) together with the elephant. Sâlih, an apprentice (*şâgird*) or a vicar (*qalfa*) of the chief-accounting bureau, was appointed to keep the registers and deliver the daily allowances and subventions allocated to the Safavid embassy.

Safavid superiority in architectural and decorative arts as well as in wealth rather than being a genuine displeasure with his lodging arrangements, because an extraordinarily pompous grand vizier's palace re-decorated with regal equipment must have offered conditions much better than what a diplomat could actually expect.

On February 11, grand vizier Bahadırzâde Arabacı Ali Pasha hosted the ambassador at his own palace at a feast. During this audience, prime minister Muhammed Tâhir Qazvînî's letter and gifts to the grand vizier were delivered.[51]

Soon afterwards, Imre Thököly, Ottoman-vassal king of Upper Hungary who was trying to [re]capture his domain from the Habsburgs, came to Adrianople to hold deliberations. Using the presence of such high-profile guests at court as an opportunity, the Sublime Porte took the vassal-king and the shah's ambassador to residences overlooking the main road, and made them spectate therefrom the grand Friday procession of February 15 performed from the Palace of Adrianople to Selîmiye Mosque, and attended by Ahmed II himself. Of particular importance for the Iranian context, Ahmed II publicly rode with the bejeweled aigrette of Murad IV – the vanquisher of Iran – visibly exhibited on his head.[52] A certain member of the Safavid embassy who was skilled in literary composition noted the "grandeur of the House of Osman." It was determined that, after that day, this person would continue to record and compose the embassy's observations of the padishah's court in the manner of a work of history with a Persianate style in composition.[53]

The very next day, on February 16, an awkward situation occurred. Two slave traders, one of whom was professing lineage from Prophet Muhammad, had brought four-to-five prostitutes in disguise of slaves to the Iranians, and exacted a handsome amount of money from the embassy personnel involved. Not long after, "however, the prostitutes despaired to bear humping this many sons of Persia, [and] when they publicly expressed, with clamour and groans, that they were freewomen," the news broke

51. Üsküdârî, *Vâqıât-ı Rûzmerre*, f. 100b; Fındıklılı Mehmed *Zeyl-i Fezleke*, p. 1407. Kelb-Ali Qacar was taken to the grand-vizierial palace with a procession.

52. Various departments from the Inner and Outer Courts also attended. The ceremonial outfit worn by the padishah and his entourage was purposedly designed to amplify the guests' impressions of grandeur. It was ordered that Friday processions to various mosques be held in this manner as long as Kelb-Ali Qacar and Imre Thököly stayed in Adrianople.

53. Üsküdârî, *Vâqıât-ı Rûzmerre*, f. 102b-103; Fındıklılı Mehmed, *Zeyl-i Fezleke*, p. 1408.

out, and the government sentenced the Ottoman subjects involved.[54] As might be inferred from the fact that Kelb-Ali Qacar's name is not mentioned in this public scandal and that the Ottoman hosts spoke positively of his personal qualities, the incident most probably occurred in the second residence allocated to a part of the embassy personnel. The whole incident took place in a strikingly short time. Within the nine days that followed the mission's arrival and before the padishah's welcome audience, the involved embassy personnel and procurers in Adrianople established contact, made a plan to evade detection, concluded a deal, actualized it, and then became disclosed.

At Adrianople, former envoy Dal Ahmed Agha served this time as host-officer to the shah's ambassador. The padishah's welcome audience took place on 26 February 1692. During the reception, the royal epistle was held in the hands of an embassy member in a parcel made of a cloth of gold. When the forty-to-fifty-men delegation reached the Sultanic Council's[55] dome, the ambassador was brought to a seat below the *nişancı*[56]-pasha, conventionally reserved for diplomats. However, Kelb-Ali Ziyâdoğlu-Qacar "did not condescend to sit" there, and, reportedly, stated in hesitation: "now that my shah – Shah Süleyman – is Sunni, it is [an injury to] the reputation of the shah that [I] myself sit at a low-degree place like other ambassadors. I [shall] sit equally with the viziers of the monarch of the House of Osman." He was then authorized to sit below vice-grand-vizier Silahdar Ali Pasha at the viziers' council sofa. Out of deference to the shah's missive, the bearer of the royal epistle was permitted to stand behind the back of the ambassador. When entering the Audience Chamber, the ambassador kissed the epistle['s parcel], took it into his own hands, and removed the parcel before delivering it.[57]

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54. Üsküdârî, *Vâqıât-ı Rûzmerre*, ff. 103a-b.

55. *Dîvân-ı Hümâyun*.

56. Chancellor.

57. Üsküdârî, *Vâqıât-ı Rûzmerre*, ff. 111a-113b; *Anonim Osmanlı Târihi*, p. 33-34; Fındıklılı Mehmed, *Zeyl-i Fezleke*, p. 1408-1409, p. 1423; Sarı Mehmed, *Zübde-i Vekâiyât*, p. 418. Dal Ahmed Agha had been admitted to the Outer Court as *qapıcıbaşı* in return for his services as substitute envoy. Kelb-Ali Qacar was conducted into the padishah's presence after a procession led by the marshal of the Sultanic Council and customarily witnessing the distribution of the Court Corps's salaries at the Council. Before the delivery of the epistle, the ambassador handed over the shah's gifts, which were exhibited and itemized by the vicar of the bureau of protocols (Ali Efendi) under the supervision of the protocol master (Ahmed Efendi), and delivered under the superintendence of the master of presents (Hacı Osman) to the padishah's *qapıcıbaşı*s. After the audience, the ambassador and his entourage were invested with robes of honor by the Middle Gate.

Kelb-Ali Qacar's refusal to be preceded by the *nişancı*-pasha and demanding equal protocol with Ottoman viziers was a bold assertion, though such attempts by diplomats to enjoy higher protocol were not uncommon in early modernity. By alleging that Shah Süleyman was Sunni, as in Islam faith is grounded on bare declaration unless proven otherwise, the ambassador both prevented his move from constituting an insolence and attained his goal of enjoying higher protocol at the Council. Conceding the shah's ambassador a seating arrangement higher than what was conventional must have appeared to the Ottomans as a fair tradeoff, because in return, this presumedly Qızılbaş or Shiite ambassador demonstrated allegiance to Sunnism on behalf of the shah, which politically implied a more tangible subordination to the caliph-shahenshah and which Kelb Ali Qacar seems to have claimed out of his own initiative..

Shah Süleyman's epistle[58] to the padishah "his Most-Sublime Majesty, world-possessor, premier- and supreme-sultan, possessor of the supervision of nations, the second Alexander the Great, shelter of the two-orients and refuge of the two-horizons, exalted horizon of the Greater Caliphate"[59] was thoroughly imbued with the discourse of solidarity in the context of the ongoing war against the Holy League. The shah stated to have "commanded with heart and soul" to the Iranians that they "be praying" for the Ottoman "troops to attain victory" in their endeavor and "topple" their enemies.

This missive not only reconfirmed the "peace, friendship, amity, fidelity, and concord[60]" between the Houses of Osman and Safi but also consummated the elevation of bilateral relations to the level of "fraternity, ancient attachment, and coalition.[61]" Thus, in many ways, the shah's epistle of 1691 represents the peak of the first phase of the Ottoman-Safavid diplomatic revolution. It overtly honored the padishah's unconditional supremacy. Furthermore, the elevated status quo of *lasting fraternity* now came to qualify the relations, rather than the *friendly harmony* that had lasted for more than four decades. The Safavids also assured the Ottomans that Iranian frontier governors and viceroys would adhere fully to the treaty conditions. This meant that while fighting against the

58. *Nâme-i Hümâyun df.* 5, ent. 63; *Münşeat-ı Divân-ı Hümâyun*, p. 126-128.

59. "*A'lâ-hazret*, [...] *cihân-dâr* [...] *sultânü'l-a'zam ve'l-ekrem, mâlik-i rıqâbü'l-ümem,* [...] *sânî-yi İskender-i Zülqarneyn,* [...] *kehfü'l-maşrıqeyn ve melâzü'l-hâqıkeyn,* [...] *ufq-ı muallâ-yı Hilâfet-i Kübrâ*."

60. "*Sulh* [...] *dûstî* [...] *musâfât* [...] *sadâqat* [...] *yek-cihetî.*

61. "*Uhuvvet* [...] *meveddet-i qadîm* [...] *itilâf.*"

German Empire, Poland-Lithuania, Russia, and Venice, the padishah did not need to calculate in the possibility of an attack from his eastern borders. The shah communicated that ambassador Kelb-Ali Ziyâdoğlu-Qacar would orally submit additional matters.

Forty days after the orgy scandal with prostitutes, another awkward incident happened. Çoban Dede, reportedly a "false santon appearing in saintly guise," was publicly speaking in Adrianople:

> Now that from the Qızılbaş [i.e. Safavid Iran] an ambassador came, he praises his shah to the skies saying "our shah has 360 pieces of fortresses." Indeed, I roamed and traveled the Qızılbaş country entirely. He owns three fortresses. One is Erivan, [the other] one is Tabriz, and [the last] one is Nahçıvan. Other than these, [if] a fortress of his is found [to exist], I shall stick it in the shah's buttocks![62]

To make matters worse, as Çoban Dede was strolling around from door to door, the news of his public reviling of the shah of Iran with swear words quickly spread, creating an unpleasant atmosphere due to the presence of the padishah's court and the Safavid embassy in the city. He was summarily exiled to Bozcaada.[63]

Neither the prostitution scandal nor this *lèse-majesté* seems to have overshadowed the conduct of the diplomatic business. The former case was probably attributed to the non-diplomatic, service department of the ambassador's entourage, while in the latter case the step taken by the Ottoman government was decisive enough to preempt any allegation of allowing the shah to be publicly reviled. Yet, one should not rule out the possibility that the ambassador may have been spreading false information about the condition and number of fortresses in Iran. In this case, if we suppose that among the people, Iran's imagined fortresses became a subject of conversation in the co-capital of a better and more densely fortified empire, the Sublime Porte may well have opted for neutralizing the psychological effect of this rumor on the public opinion during an ongoing all-out war. If, in such a setting, a lunatic person was found to be cursing the shah and asserting that the shah does not possess more than three fortresses, it is not improbable that the Ottoman government let him talk here and there until the word spread so much as to counter the effect

62. "*İmdi ki Qızılbaş* [...] *tan elçi geliptir, 'bizim şâhımızın üçyüz altmış pare qalesi oluptur' diye şâhını uçurur. Ben ki Qızılbaş ülkesini bütün gezip seyahat eyledim. Üç qaleye mâliktir. Biri Revan, ve biri Tebriz, ve biri Nahçıvandır. Bunlardan gayrı bir qalesi bulunur [ise] şâhın dübürüne soqayım*!"

63. Üsküdârî, *Vâqıât-ı Rûzmerre*, f. 139b.

of the ambassador's exaggeration, and that it only then took action in accordance with "fraternal" relations.

In confirmation of his commission to orally submit additional matters, Kelb-Ali Qacar notified the Sublime Porte of a political asylum incident: viceroy/king George XI Bagrationi[64] of Kartli and his brother Archil[65] (formerly viceroy/king of Imereti and Kakheti) had escaped from their seats of government. Now, both brothers were allegedly hiding at the court of Atabeğli Salih Pasha (governor-gen. of Çıldır). As giving asylum to Safavid fugitives was in violation of the peace, the Sublime Porte decreed in mid-May 1692 their imprisonment and delivery to the shah's ambassador. Governor of Erzurum Bînamaz Halil Pasha was entrusted with overseeing the punctual implementation of this order and installing Alexander (IV), the newly nominated sovereign of Imereti, to his capital.[66] At the end of the month, when the ambassador was granted permission to depart, a follow-up decree was issued to the same addressees to inform them of the ambassador's return and that they should arrange the delivery formalities.[67] This was followed by yet another decree in early June forewarning the addressees to refrain from any possible default in the implementation of the order.[68]

It soon turned out that of the mentioned Georgian dynasts, only George was at the court of Çıldır. Upon the receipt of the cited decrees, he was imprisoned in Akhaltsikhe, but managed to escape before he could be deliverd to the shah's ambassador. Without any doubt, the padishah's court held Atabeğli Salih Pasha responsible for what had happened; he had been harboring a renegade who had rebelled against the Safavids and invaded the Ottoman protectorate of Imereti, whom he now also helped escape capture. In mid-September 1692, the new governor of Erzurum was commissioned, among others, to arrest and hand over the fugitives to Iran.[69] With help from Atabeğli Salih Pasha, Archil would also escape arrest[70] and reappear in 1693 in Imereti to seize control of the territory. The governors of Erzurum, Çıldır, and Kars would be commanded to

64. Also known as Şahnevaz Xan.
65. Also known as Shahnazar Xan.
66. *Mühimme df*. 104, ent. 62.
67. *Mühimme df*. 104, ent. 114-115.
68. *Mühimme df*. 104, ent. 144, 154, 183-184; Fındıklılı Mehmed, *Zeyl-i Fezleke*, p. 1436.
69. *Mühimme df*. 104, ent. 254-256.
70. *Mühimme df*. 106, ent. 1258.

jointly reinstate Ottoman sovereignty in this Georgian realm[71] when the bulk of the forces subordinated to them were actually in Europe.

Contrary to the norm, these internally communicated decrees contained a concise version of the Safavid monarch's titulature, which was normally omitted. In such documents, the Safavid ruler was otherwise simply referred to as *shah of Iran*. Here, for the first time since the peace of Zuhab, the shah was styled as *Most-Sublime Majesty*[72], referring to his promotion to junior-imperial rank. Apart from repeated references suggesting that harboring these fugitive Bagrationi brothers was contrary to the peace agreement, their "rebellion against the shah[73]" was also used as an additional argument to legitimize the prosecution. In a sense, this affair goes beyond the extradition of fugitives to a friendly state, as any petty offender could be extradited on these grounds. Hereby, rebellion against a friendly monarch is additionally introduced as a rationale for taking action, without a doubt a direct consequence of the recent rapprochement in Ottoman-Safavid relations.

One must consider the inclusion of titulature (though concisely) in a decree in general as the next step of the diplomatic revolution. "*Most*-Sublime Majesty" here can be seen as the forerunner of the eventual insertion of this title into the diplomatic *inscriptio*. The purpose must have been to inform the addressee, who could potentially correspond with the Iranian side, of the elavation of the shah's grade to make sure that he use the updated titulature. By consistently rejecting all anti-Ottoman alliance offers, the shah, now ranking not two but one level below the supreme-monarch, had saved the latter's monarchy from a potential disaster. The extradition of a fugitive kinglet was not an issue over which the Sublime Porte would jeopardize this unprecedented harmony with Safavid Iran.

Kelb-Ali Qacar's stay in Adrianople lasted around four months. Due to the "Persianate pied kerchiefs he muffled himself in, as well as the bizarre-ish turbans and the Persianate calpacs" of his and his retinue, the embassy was quite a spectacle of apparel. During his activities, the ambassador proved to be a man of "orderly discourse," [74] and "by virtue of being literate, learned, and well-versed in history, he met and conversed with the elegants of the Sublime [Ottoman] State.[75]" After completing

71. *Mühimme df.* 104, ent. 701, 959. See also *Mühimme df.* 150, ent. 376.
72. "A'lâ-hazret," instead of "âlî-hazret (sublime majesty)." *Mühimme df.* 104, ent. 62, 67, 75, 101.
73. *Mühimme df.* 104, ent. 255.
74. Üsküdârî, *Vâqıât-ı Rûzmerre*, ff. 96b-97a.
75. *Anonim Osmanlı Târihi*, p. 33.

his mission, which also included commercial matters, and receiving permission to leave, he was first invited to the grand vizierial farewell feast given on 15 May 1692. During this event, the ambassador was treated with "solemnness and regard for the dear sake of the shah of Persia."[76]

The farewell audience was held on May 29 at the Palace of Adrianople. Unusually, Kelb-Ali Qacar was conducted into the padishah's presence by the chief of the Privy-Guard[77] who grasped him from his right armpit and the marshal of the Sultanic Council from the left. Ahmed II addressed the ambassador: "say my greetings to the Shah, I was delighted by his epistle-of-servitude and gifts, his veracious friendship has become acknowledged and accepted by my August [Person]. The more he carries fidelity to excess, the more he shall also consider Our friendship.[78]" The ambassador said in reply: "the shah is thy genuine, faithful, true friend, and does not turn away from true friendship.[79]" Afterwards, the padishah's reply epistle was entrusted to him. From Saraçhane Pavillion, Ahmed II watched the departure procession. On June 3, the ambassador set off from Adrianople.[80] The departure of a flashy Iranian embassy after a

76. Üsküdârî, *Vâqıât-ı Rûzmerre*, f. 194a.

77. *Bostancıbaşı*.

78. "Şâh'a benden selâm eyle, gönderdiği ubûdiyet-nâmesiyle hediyeden hazzeyledim, hulûs üzere dostluğu malum [u] maqbûl-ı hümâyunum oldu. Ne denli sadâqatte ifrât ederse bizden dostluğu dahi ziyâde bilsin."

79. "Şah, hâlis muhlis sâdıq yahşı dostundur, yahşı dostluqtan dönmez."

80. The event was held in the canopied area of the Privy Garden (*Has Bahçe*) refurbished as audience hall, by the Su-Terâzisi Pavilion located at the banks of River Tunca across the bridge outside the Iron Gate (*Demir Qapı*). Kelb-Ali Qacar came to the audience with a procession from his residence. After the audience, the ambassador, his treasurer/second-ambassador, and the seven selected members of the embassy were invested with robes of honor. In addition to those admitted inside, fourty members of the embassy personnel waiting outside were also invested with simplier robes. Along with the permission to leave, the embassy was also granted a total of 25,000 *quruş* for its travel expenses. *Çavuş* Qara Hasan was appointed to accompany the ambassador as host-officer until the mission left Ottoman territory. Üsküdârî, *Vâqıât-ı Rûzmerre*, ff. 211a-212b, 220b; Fındıklılı Mehmed, *Zeyl-i Fezleke*, p. 1432-1433. See also Ibid. for the set-up of the audience. See Sarı Mehmed, *Zübde-i Vekâiyât*, p. 427 for a breakdown of the embassy's 25,000-*quruş* travel-allowance. For the rations of foodstuff the embassy was allocated during residence at Adrianople, whose daily cost for the state was 125 *quruş* (20,000 debased [*çürük*] *aqçe*), see the breakdown authenticated by the proxy-judge of Mahmudpaşa court at Constantinople, Sunullah Efendi: BOA, *Ali Emîrî – II. Ahmed*, doc. 917. For another breakdown of the same items in the pay order given to the Palace Kitchen superintendent, see BOA, *Cevdet – Hâriciye*, doc. 4402. As documented by a decree, apart from the handsome travel allowance, the embassy was also allocated a daily amount of 125 *quruş* – 20,000 debased *aqçe* as subvention to be disbursed by provincial authorities on behalf of the Central Treasury during the return journey. BOA, *Cevdet. – Maarif*, doc. 5390; *Cevdet – Hâriciye*, doc. 6749, doc. 3; BOA, *Yabancı Arşivlerdeki Belgeler* (04). *BLG. İST.* 3/66.

four-month stay at court, which, aside from diplomatic events, also occasioned scandals and unpleasantries, and imposed a considerable burden on finances during an all-out war, was a relief for the monarchy. Abdullah Üsküdârî, a financial secretary who witnessed the embassy, portrayed the departure of Kelb-Ali Qacar as the "elimination of the ambassador turmoil."[81]

In Ahmed II's reply to "Shah Süleyman his Most-Sublime Majesty, of welkin-potency, booster of the domains of Iran, the foremost one on the seat of Kings,[82]" titles conceding imperial dignity to the shah were remarkably omitted and literal and direct references to supreme dignity were reserved for the padishah. Yet, the current peace was defined as the zenith of the "ancient oaths,[83]" and the recently achieved status quo as "harmony and union, bipartisan concurrence and friendship, reciprocal cohesion and fraternization.[84]" Subsequently, via the citation of the verse "*fulfill the oath*, *indeed there is responsibility in oath*,[85]" adherence to the current Ottoman-Safavid treaty was declared to be a dogmatic obligation.

Ahmed II then asked for the shah's moral support in the ongoing war, and expressed his wish that the frontiers remain safe and that positive relations consolidate through long ages. He apparently signed the epistle as "Father of the Victorious – Sultan Ahmed Khan son of Mehemmed Khan.[86]" The Sublime Porte seems to have paid special attention to the wording of this missive. The composition was commissioned to *reisülküttab*[87] Qara Ebubekir Efendi of Şirvan, incidentally a born-Iranian.[88] The final text was presented "for the shahenshahly inspection." The extraordinary consistency in composition and eloquence in phraseology did not go unrewarded. In appreciation of the artistic skill displayed in this epistle to the shah, Ahmed II's autograph reconfirmed Qara Ebubekir

81. Üsküdârî, *Vâqıât-ı Rûzmerre*, ff. 211a-212b.

82. "*A'lâ-hazret, sipihr-iqtidâr*, [...] *revnaq-efzâ-yı memâlik-i Îrân, sadr-ârâ-yı mesned-i keyân* [...] *Şah Süleyman*."

83. "*Uhûd-ı qadîme*."

84. "*Tevâfuq u ittihâd* [...] *muvâfaqat u müvâlât-ı cânibeyn* [...] *müvâlefet u müvâhât-ı tarafeyn*."

85. *Quran*, 17:34.

86. *Mecmua-i Mekâtîb*, f. 1b.

87. The chief secretary of the state, whose office evolved into that of a minister of foreign affairs.

88. See Resmî, *Halîqatü'r-Rüesâ*, ff. 31a-32b; Süreyyâ, *Sicill-i Osmânî* II, p. 430-431 [ent. "Ebubekir Efendi (Kara), Şirvanlı"].

Efendi as *reisülküttab* in perpetuity on 6 April 1692, an unprecedented act in Ottoman history – though later repealed.[89]

Until the 1680s, each occasion had slowly consolidated peaceful relations, no structural change to their nature had however taken place. Reconfirmation had remained essential for the treaty to remain in force. From 1686 onwards, novel concepts on bilateral platform were gradually introduced. It was now time to consolidate this new accord not only in writing but also in deed; any reason to doubt the mutual well-wishing intentions was to be eliminated. The Ottoman-Safavid peace was no longer perceived to be bounded by renegotiation and reconfirmation upon the accession of rulers, or subordinated to the changing policies of succeeding chief ministers. It carried now all attributes and even the description of an eternal peace, as testified by Ahmed II's wish to perpetuate it, lacking only the official designation *eternal*. Both sides seemed determined to observe the new rules of the game which helped bring relations to this level: the shah was to assure the padishah about Iran's neutrality even when the padishah was fighting a multi-front war against a grand coalition in the west, which was forcing him to redeploy troops from the Iranian frontier to Hungary. In return, the shah was to be promoted in rank, friendly inter-state relations were to be elevated to the level of fraternity, and Safavid requests regarding some religious and commercial issues were to be granted.

During Kelb-Ali Qacar's embassy in Adrianople, the turmoil at the east Iraqi frontier continued to escalate. In early July 1692, a petition from the inhabitants of Kirkuk, which mentioned the Kirmanc rebels' killings and plunders in villages across the border on Iranian territory, reached the government. In response, a decree gave Ahısqalı Ahmed Pasha, the new governor-gen. of Baghdad, full authority to determine the best course of action in this "most important affair," and neighboring provincial dignitaries were immediately summoned to report under his command. After restoring order and the judicial process, injured parties, which included Iranian subjects, were to be recompensed.[90]

Due to successive deaths of incumbent governors, an interregnum ensued in Basra during the Marshland uprising,[91] leaving the province

89. Üsküdârî, *Vâqıât-ı Rûzmerre*, ff. 153a-b; Sarı Mehmed, *Zübde-i Vekâiyât*, p. 422; *Anonim Osmanlı Târihi*, p. 40.

90. Death and imprisonment sentences were also to be executed. *Mühimme df.* 104, ent. 235-239.

91. Sarı Mehmed, *Zübde-i Vekâiyât*, p. 436; Fındıklılı Mehmed, *Zeyl-i Fezleke*, p. 1454.

defenseless and without leadership. This, in turn, let the insurrection expand further.[92] On the road from Adrianople to Baghdad, Ahısqalı Ahmed Pasha received the news that the Bedouin coalition would soon target the principal cities of the province, namely Basra and Qurna. The state then sent decrees to relevant officials subordinating them to the governor-gen. of Baghdad, who was appointed *serasker*[93] at the southern flank of the Iranian frontier.[94]

The Baghdad-centered Diplomacy during Cross-Border Revolutions: the Sublime Porte declares Alliance and perpetuates the Peace, 1692-96

In the coalition, the Bedouin of the Marshlands, the Ma'dân, the Müntefiq, and the Âl-i Serrâc, among others, were involved. In August 1692, they besieged the city of Basra, blocking the traffic between it and Qurna, while pursuing their plundering and killing throughout the countryside. From then on, from the center's point of view, dealing with this problem had become a "matter of state."[95] The riots in Basra were no longer seen as repercussions of a struggle for ascendancy among provincial power-holders. The Marshland coalition had attained the character of a rebellion directed against the very presence of the Ottoman State in the province, with direct implications for Ottoman-Safavid relations. The campaign of 1693 was nevertheless undersized, and ended in disaster. Probably around the turn of the year, the new governor-gen. of Basra, Bezirgân Qapıcı Halil Pasha, at the head of 3,000 troops still managed to run a blockade and enter the governorate's capital. This arrival had been much awaited by the inhabitants who had recognized the governor-gen. *in absentia* beforehand, declaring, with a collective petition, that "the dominion is the padishah's."[96]

Towards mid-1692, the shah had written a follow-up epistle to the padishah in complaint of Baban Süleyman's encroachments. The courier carrying the epistle had reached the returning Safavid ambassador in Kars

92. Sarı Mehmed, *Zübde-i Vekâiyât*, p. 454; Râşid, *Târih*, p. 444-445.

93. In Ottoman terminology, the capacity of *serasker* approximately corresponds to that of *serdâr* in Safavid terminology.

94. Fındıklılı Mehmed, *Zeyl-i Fezleke*, p. 1476-1477.

95. *Mühimme df.* 104, ent. 473-497, 768.

96. BOA, *Sadâret Mektûbî Kalemi Belgeleri*, 4/5; *Cevdet – Askeriye*, 37480; Fındıklılı Mehmed, *Zeyl-i Fezleke*, p. 1493; Sarı Mehmed, *Zübde-i Vekâiyât*, p. 454-455; Râşid, *Târih*, p. 445; Floor, *The Persian Gulf*, p. 577.

possibly in August, and Kelb-Ali Qacar had forwarded this correspondence to the Sublime Porte with his own men.[97] Meanwhile, Baban Süleyman had in a way come to terms with the new governor of Şehrizor, but as a result, his destructive incursions were hereafter more directed towards Iranian territory than before. In late February 1693, Ahısqalı Ahmed Pasha was re-commissioned to restore order at this section of the Iranian border. The padishah's decree issued by this occasion stressed that the expediency of the monarchy was in the satisfaction of the "Shah his Majesty," the stabilization of the demarcated borders, and the observance of the peace conditions.[98] The Kirmanc affair in northeastern Iraq thus grew to become an international, destabilizing, and anti-state movement on both sides of the border.

Yet, the planned punitive operation of 1693 against the Kirmanc also could not be undertaken. The contingents that were ordered to participate in operations in Şehrizor were indeed the same as those mobilized for the disastrous Basran campaign. This is one of the most obvious demonstrations of how the redeployment of troops from the Iranian frontier to European fronts had grave consequences. The Sublime Porte took Baban Süleyman's transgressions in Iran no less seriously than his lawlessness and killings in Ottoman territory. Still, it is quite extraordinary for Ottoman diplomatics that, in a decree issued to a governor-gen., which was not foreign correspondence and hence was not to be viewed by the Safavids, appeasing the anxiety of the shah, also referred to with unconventional honorary titulature, was formulated as the principle rationale. The House of Osman must have greatly appreciated the Iranians' full adherence to the treaty and preservation of their positive neutrality at a time when it could not respond to a potential offensive at its eastern borders. Accordingly, these acts of good will by the House of Safi were not to be abused in such times of dire need.

At the turn of the year, Baghdad witnessed an interregnum caused by the untimely death of the governor. Soon after, in April 1694, the fortress of Baghdad underwent repair works.[99] Not much later, on July 29, Shah Süleyman died, apparently due to a health failure originating from

97. Uşşâkîzâde, *Târih* I, p. 398.

98. *Mühimme df.* 104, ent. 686-688; Uşşâkîzâde, *Târih* I, p. 398. The decree was forwarded by a *Dergâh-ı Âlî qapıcıbaşısı*, Hamdiefendi-emmizâdesi Ali Agha.

99. See BOA, *Büyük Kale Kalemi Defterleri* 32246 for the register of wages paid to the craftsmen commissioned with the repair of the fortress of Baghdad, April 1694.

decades-long heavy drinking and debauchery.[100] With the active support of the deceased shah's sister and wife of the chief judge[101] – Meryem *Begüm*, prince Sultan-Hüseyin smoothly acceded to the throne.[102]

Like in the case of the Marshland uprising in Basra, as of 1694, the cross-border Kirmanc insubordination was also recognized as an independence movement[103], and thus a direct rebellion against both the padishah and the shah, rather than one aiming at attaining a better share of power against central authority. Baban Süleyman, not contenting himself with undertaking raids and returning to his base, directly seized control of the Iranian forts Mekri, Mesbuş, Oraman, and their adjunct countryside. These localities, he claimed, had once been attached to Şehrizor, which he now possessed. From these new footholds, he also began encroaching into Urûmiye. Upon these developments that had coincided with his father's last days, the new shah decided to send an army against the invaders, and had his frontier governors write to the new governor-gen. of Baghdad, Qalaylıqoz Ahmed Pasha, that the Safavid expeditionary force inevitably had to pass through Ottoman territory, and that the Ottoman side should in no way perceive this as a violation.[104]

The shah's rescript created governor of Urûmiye Canı[-pek] Xan the general commander of the mobilized forces. They were however routed in the first encounter, and Baban Süleyman expanded his Iranian zone of occupation to Kirmanşah. In response, another rescript commissioned an army under the command of Murtazâ-Qulu Beyg Zengene (son of the chief of the royal guard, Şah-Qulu Xan Zengene), who managed to recover fort Şemiran. But soon, the Ottoman vassal-turned-rebel also defeated this second Safavid force.[105]

Following these defeats, the governor of Kirmanşah – Süleyman Murtazâ-Qulu Xan –, presumably instructed by the shah's court, sent a letter to Baghdad, along with an emissary of the shah. He stated that because the Ottomans had not undertaken the necessary operations against the Kirmanc in due time, they had fallen short of adhering to the

100. Roemer, "The Safavid Period," p. 309-310.

101. Saf. *sadr*; Ott. *Qazasker*.

102. Newman, *Safavid Iran*, p. 104.

103. *Huruç* – it literally means *exiting* or *emerging*. In political or religious contexts, it was employed to identify the act of a leader who, after an outwardly passive period of waiting and preparation, launched his campaign to achieve power, recognition, independence, or sovereignty.

104. Nasîrî, *Düstûr-i Şehriyârân*, p. 128; Fındıklılı Mehmed, *Zeyl-i Fezleke*, p. 1592.

105. Nasîrî, *Düstûr-i Şehriyârân*, p. 128-131; Uşşâkîzâde, *Târih* I, p. 398-399.

peace conditions, and that the Safavids would now give Baban Süleyman, condemned by both sides, his due retribution. He also affirmed that the pursuing army's path would cross from Ottoman territory out of necessity, but neither the Ottoman side nor any informed party could or should interpret this move as a violation, and that Baban Süleyman's removal was rather to be regarded as the fulfillment of the union between the Houses of Osman and Safi. Upon hearing of the shah's intention, the grand vizierate issued orders to Baghdad to intervene before Iran would.[106]

In response, Qalaylıqoz Ahmed Pasha sent a letter[107] accompanied by an emissary agha directly to Shah Sultan-Hüseyin seated on "the throne of world-possession.[108]" He expressed his condolences for Shah Süleyman's death, congratulated Sultan-Hüseyin on his "august accession [to the] eternity-joining sultanate,[109]" and stressed that "between the Two Eternal States, friendship [was] durable, and the alliance [was] firm."[110]

The padishah had heard of Baban Süleyman's misdeeds, which were labeled an "encroachment to Both Sides at that frontier of well-known borders," probably in order to give the impression that the Sublime Porte was no less disturbed than the Iranian government was. As it was indispensible to uphold whatever the treaty conditions necessitated, wrote the governor-gen., the padishah had sent his autograph with one of his privy men-at-arms,[111] [Sarı[112]] Muslu Agha, by which he had created Qalaylıqoz Ahmed Pasha *serdar*[113] and subordinated to him the Baghdad Local Corps, the governors-gen. of Van (Firârî-Yeğeni Beyzâde Ali Pasha), and of Mosul, along with their provincial and Kurdish-tribal troops. At the time of the arrival of this decree, the shah's emissary was already in Baghdad,

106. Nazmizâde, *Münşeat*, f. 32b; Fındıklılı Mehmed, *Zeyl-i Fezleke*, p. 1593; Râmi, *Münşeat*, ff. 133a-133b.

107. Nazmizâde, *Münşeat*, ff. 30b-33b. The copied text of the letter in this compilation contains a factual mistake: the name of the Ottoman ruler is given as Süleyman instead of Ahmed. However, Fındıklılı Mehmed Agha's first chronicle recounts in more detail each event and name that one comes across in this letter, thus leaving no doubt as to its sender, dating, and occasion. Also, unlike what is suggested in this probably miscopied version of Nazmizâde's compilation, Murtazâ-Qulu Xan was actually not the shah's envoy but the governor of Kirmanşah. See Râmi, *Münşeat*, ff. 133a-133b

108. "*Serîr-i cihân-dâri*."

109. "*Cülûs-ı hümâyun*, [...] *saltanat-ı ebed-peyvend*."

110. "*Devleteyn-i Müebbedeyn miyânında* [...] *dûstî* [...] *pâyidâr ve* [...] *ittifâq üstüvâr olmağla*."

111. "*Hassa silahşor / silahşor-i şehriyâri*."

112. Fındıklılı Mehmed, *Zeyl-i Fezleke*, p. 1384, 1389, 1393, 1405, 1435.

113. *Serdâr* in Ottoman terminology denotes a capacity comparable to that of *sipehsâlâr* in Safavid terminology.

and thus had first-hand knowledge of the Sublime Porte's close attention to this matter. To give further assurance, the *serdar* had opted to write this letter directly to the shah himself: he had officially inaugurated the campaign on 25 October 1694, and would move to the operation zone in order to "give [Baban Süleyman] his deserved punishment." Whichever territories he might have seized from Iran were to be restored to the shah's officials in accordance with the border protocol; it was "not necessary that the evidently-honorable shah attend to the expulsion of the mentioned bandit, or bother himself with anything else."

The governor of Kirmanşah's statement that the impending Safavid pursuit of Baban Süleyman would be legitimate action without constituting a violation of peace must have alarmed the governor-gen. of Baghdad, even beyond the degree suggested by his letter to the shah. As he might have wanted more precise instructions to follow in the case of such a development, he had immediately forwarded Süleyman Murtazâ-Qulu Xan's letter to the grand vizierate, (seemingly along with the shah's emissary[114]). The grand vizier, in an unprecedented and isolated move, made *reisülküttab* Râmi Mehmed Efendi compose a letter directly to Süleyman Murtazâ-Qulu Xan "his Highness, gauge of magistracy[115]". In the letter, he stated that to the "caliphal padishah, shahenshah, sultan of the sultans on the Earth, Shadow of God in Both Globes,[116]" he had submitted the incoming letter concerning the crimes Baban Süleyman had committed in the realms of the "Shah his Most-Sublime Majesty, refuge of sultanate.[117]" The grand vizier communicated that Baban Süleyman was currently in check, and that a *qapıcıbaşı* of the Sultanic Court had been sent with decrees to the neighboring governors to make sure that he stay in check; if he would not remain tame, he would meet his due punishment with the troops to be dispatched. The grand vizier declared it impossible that the "time-honored covenant" be injured by "such minuscule incidents." However, especially at a time when Ottoman armies were preoccupied on the European fronts, a "violation of the border [by the Safavids],

114. See *Ali Emîrî –II. Ahmed*, doc. 917 for the treasury note dated 24 June 1694 – the payment order for the ghee, meat, bread, and other items that were allocated as bouche to an unnamed emissary from [the shah of] Iran and his retinue, who were to stay in Adrianople from June 24 to July 23.

115. "*Cenâb-ı xâniyet-meâb, hükûmet-nisâb.*"

116. "*Hilâfet-mekân,* [...] *pâdişah,* [...] *şehinşah,* [...] *sultân-ı selâtîn-i rûy-i zemîn,* [...] *zıllullah fi'l-arzeyn.*"

117. "*A'lâ-hazret*, [...] *saltanat-penâh*, [...] *şah*."

which had no precedent," while not ruining the cordial relations, would still distract these armies fighting the foe. It was communicated that dealing with this matter was to be left exclusively to the padishah's state, and that the shah's side was to give up the intention of pursuit.[118]

The Ottoman authorities' inability to prevent Baban Süleyman from killing Iranian subjects in 1693, as well as pillaging their properties, and seizing control of Iranian territory, forts and villages, justified the Safavid claim to the right to stop these encroachments. The Kirmanc rebellion now carried implications that went much beyond a security deficit and the Ottomans' conjunctural impotence to implement state authority in northeastern Iraq. Remarkably, the Safavids made no attempt to turn this development into an advantage. Otherwise, they could have justifiably accused the Sublime Porte of not taking the necessary measures to prevent Iran from being attacked by unruly Ottoman vassals coming from Ottoman territory. However, the Safavids knew that, because almost all of the padishah's available resources were employed in the ongoing war against the German Empire, Poland-Lithuania, Venice, and Russia, he was unable to intervene with sufficient force. Therefore, they tried to negotiate a mutually consented pursuit of the Kirmanc in order for the Sublime Porte not to perceive this as a violation of the concord.

That the shah did not attempt to draw more benefits from this situation indicates how vital he deemed the perpetuation of the current cordial relations with the Ottoman State, which was inherently stronger than Safavid Iran. If Iranian forces were to cross the border in a pursuit, this would undermine the current convergence. Moreover, the Ottoman State possessed the capacity to reassert its power once the war of the Holy League was over, and the Iranian government had every reason to prefer that this assertion not be aimed against its own interests. Probably in view of all these, the Safavids only planned to defend their territory and subjects, and did not strategize to crush the rebel headquarters across the border, despite being in the right. The gains to be made from such an adventure would be temporary, but the losses that would ensue from alienating the Ottoman State would have long-term effects.

On the other hand, the Ottoman side was well aware that the Safavids had every right to intervene. In response to the forewarning that the Iranians were about to conduct an operation, the grand vizier remarkably declared, as seen above, that a crossing of the border by the Safavids,

118. Râmi, *Münşeat*, ff. 133a-134b.

though a violation, would not break the peace. The Sublime Porte did not legally have the right to protest when it was not in a position to impose its authority along a border stretch across which Iran was receiving harm. This awareness was also reflected in the abovementioned hurried decrees sent to Baghdad and its neighboring provinces that they intervene before the Iranians, as only this would remove the legal base of the otherwise justified course of action declared by the Safavids. Additionally, the shah's crushing of a rebellion by the padishah's rebel vassals in Ottoman territory would indeed cost more than land, tax, lives, or superstructure, and have serious consequences regarding the legitimacy of Ottoman rule in the region.

Lastly, the letters by the *serdar* to the shah (1694) and by the grand vizier to the governor of Kirmanşah (1695) show that, just as in 1692, Ottoman authorities along the frontier were given instructions to adapt to the revised status quo in their correspondence. Qalaylıqoz Ahmed Pasha adhered to the shah's elevated rank. The steps taken towards the eternalization of the peace also left clear marks on the wording. As precursor to an eternal peace, both parties had to recognize one another's justified existence as unbounded by time and conjuncture, a recognition which the Safavids had been conceding to the Ottoman State since the establishment of bilateral relations. This letter makes clear references to the permanence of the peace and to the Ottoman recognition of the Safavids as an equally *eternal state*. Thus, *perpetual peace*, which had begun to be uttered in 1686, now entered into diplomatic correspondence. Also, the grand vizier's reference to the *time-honored pact* was a milestone on the road to the perpetuation of the peace, which had until then been indefinite in terms of time but subject to renewal at each occasion.

This rapprochement also brought about the first mention of *alliance* in official correspondence. One should take this new level in relations as a rather passive alliance which prescribed not taking advantage of the other party's difficult situation during an ongoing war against a third party, and even indirectly aiding the other party by assuring it of the safety of its borders so that it would not have to invest militarily to the common frontier concurrently while mobilizing for other fronts. This novelty in Ottoman-Safavid relations would continue to receive reference, showing that such wording by the *serdar* in his letter to the shah was not coincidental. Rather, it was the very first occasion, preceding the next inter-monarch correspondence, in which the latest accord was featured. Again, the padishah's primacy vis-à-vis the shah, despite the latter

being elevated to junior-imperial dignity, was strictly observed in both letters. Lastly, the grand vizier's writing to the governor of Kirmanşah was more of a friendly warning from above to below than part of the conventions of interstate correspondence.

As the state authority at various sections of the Iranian-Ottoman frontier collapsed, an espionage attempt in Constantinople was revealed. Mehmed Taqî of Baghdad, a merchant active in the trading house Vezir-Hanı located in Çemberlitaş, sent written messages to the Bedouin chieftains of the Basran countryside and to the shahly court. Emphasizing that the House of Osman was completely preoccupied with the enemy offensive in Hungary, he urged the chieftains to seize Basra, and the Safavids to capture Baghdad. The Sublime Porte intercepted these papers. Upon grand vizier Sürmeli Ali Pasha's submission of the case to Ahmed II and the subsequent autograph by the latter, Mehmed Taqî was brought to Adrianople and, charged with high treason, executed before the palace gates on 29 January 1695.[119] Neither the intercepted papers nor any other extant report suggests that Mehmed Taqî of Baghdad was spying on behalf of the Safavid State. Thus, this could be a unilateral initiative undertaken with an expectation of reward. His transportation from Constantinople to Adrianople hints at further interrogations by the padishah's government to extract more information. Seemingly void of a Safavid connection, this failed attempt did not affect bilateral relations.

On 6 February 1695, after several years of minor advances and setbacks on all fronts in the Great Turkish War and the transformation of the turmoils in eastern Iraq into cross-border coalitions led by the Müntefiq and the Baban, Ahmed II passed away. His nephew, Mustafa (II), succeeded him, and immediately resolved to assume personal command on the Hungarian front against the German emperor's forces.[120] Again in the same year, the Republic of Venice sent a letter to the shah and reawakened the proposal that Iran ally itself with the Ottomans' foes.[121] In a parallel attempt, Pope Innocent XII wrote to Shah Sultan-Hüseyin in a brief dated 30 April 1695: "joining with the arms of the Christian princes against the Turks Your awe-inspiring might, you will unite to destroy it altogether and also vigorously oblige it to restore provinces which it has appropriated up till now." Nevertheless, this new wave of offers too could not

119. Fındıklılı Mehmed, *Zeyl-i Fezleke*, p. 1589; *Anonim Osmanlı Târihi*, p. 106.
120. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Târihi* III/1, p. 555-557.
121. Rota, "Safavid Persia and Venice," p. 152.

prompt the Safavids to reconsider their answer. As of 5 October 1696, a missionary would report from Isfahan: "there is not a word, nothing mentioned, of any war against the Turks."[122] Unlike in 1684-1685, the Ottomans were now not alarmed at the possibility of a positive reply by the Iranian government. The manner in which the Holy League's attempt to draw Iran into the war in 1695 failed shows how firm the post-1684 Ottoman-Safavid rapprochement was.

The decree dated 13 June 1695 appointing Beyzâde Ali Pasha governor-gen. of Baghdad with full authority in all security- and frontier-related decisions also charged him with strictly upholding the conditions of peace with the shah.[123] In October, the process of redeploying troops from Iraq to European fronts showed the first concrete signs of reversal.[124] By then, the state center had understood through bitter experience what disastrous consequences could result from decreasing its military presence at the Iranian frontier to a level lower than the peacetime norm.

By 1695, contrary to the earlier promises given to the Safavids, the Ottomans could still not undertake an effective operation against the Kirmanc, and Baban Süleyman continued his destructive activities on both sides of the border.[125] On the other hand, as of 1695, the Safavids also began to no longer perceive the Kirmanc rebellion as one stemming solely from the lack of authority on the Ottoman side of the border. Encroachments to Erdelân and Urûmiye had reached such a degree that the rebel chieftain was no less influential there than he was at his base in Şehrizor. As of 1694-1695,[126] in parts of Safavid Kurdistan too, the Kirmanc rebellion attained the quality of an independence movement, and it also grew stronger due to the Safavids' inability to crush it within Iran. This situation required a closer coordination between Adrianople and Isfahan than before, and to avoid any sort of accusations of non-fulfillment of contractual responsibilities.

Upon the worsening of the situation, the Iranian government deemed it necessary to implement measures against the Kirmanc rebellion in coordination with its new "ally." Because the upholding of the treaty conditions was prioritized, further operations against the Kirmanc were temporarily halted, as these would require military activity on both sides of the

122. *Chronicle of the Carmelites in Persia*, p. 494-495.
123. *Mühimme df.* 106, ent. 563-566.
124. *Mühimme df.* 106, ent. 1229-1231.
125. Fındıklılı Mehmed, *Zeyl-i Fezleke*, p. 1593.
126. Nasîrî, *Düstûr-i Şehriyârân*, p. 125.

border. Diplomatic initiatives began in order to have the Sublime Porte issue an official permission authorizing the Safavids to undertake cross-border operations against Baban Süleyman. Ebulmasum Xan Şamlu, former governor of Khorasan, was appointed Shah Sultan-Hüseyin's ambassador to congratulate Mustafa II's accession, and commissioned with relating the details of the Kirmanc occupation in the Safavid Kurdistan. He was also charged with the notification that the central army had not been sent to crush him on the grounds that he was the padishah's vassal; that if the Ottoman side honored the peace as much as the Safavids did, it was then the padishah's responsibility to deal with the issue; and that otherwise, the shah would order his troops to march and crush the rebels.[127]

Concurrently, the city of Basra surrendered to the rebels in July/August 1695 following a brief siege, because the Ottomans had failed to capitalize on a setback inflicted upon the Marshland coalition. Mâni es-Saadûn had Bezirgan Halil Pasha along with his 700-men household shipped off to Iran – across the Shatt-el-Arab to Bûşehr, and massacred the 500-strong Court Corps contingent within the fortress.[128] Fearing punishment for having surrendered and implicitly acquiesced to the massacre of the padishah's servitors, Bezirgan Halil Pasha remained in Iran in order to convince the shah to intercede, via the outgoing ambassador, for Mustafa II's pardon.[129]

As Basra was falling, Mustafa II pushed the main theater of war with the German armies back to Hungary in the summer of 1695. After entrenching his position in Temesvar, the principal fortress of the Ottoman-held southern Hungary, he took the surrounding forts back and defeated the German emperor's army in the Battle of Lugos.[130] Soon after the

127. Nasîrî, *Düstûr-i Şehriyârân*, p. 132-133; BOA, *İbnülemin – Hâriciye*, doc. 424; Râşid, *Târih*, p. 533.

128. Fındıklılı Mehmed, *Nusretnâme*, p. 131. The Carmelite chronicler dates Sheikh Mâni's seizure of Basra to 1694. It is inaccurate, as documented by the consistent chronology of events as presented in *Nusretnâme*. Fındıklılı Mehmed Agha's entries note the news' dates of occurrence and of reaching the padishah's court. The Carmelite chronicler cannot date the event exactly as well, providing instead a tentative period, from March to September. This supports my interpretation that he confused the chronology in this specific entry. See *Chronicle of Events*, p. 412; *Chronicle of the Carmelites in Persia*, p. 1170.

129. Matthee, "Basra," p. 74. Apparently, he was later granted the pardon, as he reappeared in state service. Süreyyâ, *Sicill-i Osmânî* II, p. 584 [entry: "Halil Paşa (Bezirgân)"].

130. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Târihi* III/1, p. 555-560; Parvev, *Habsburgs and Ottomans*, p. 121-124.

padishah's triumphal entry to Constantinople in November, a victory epistle was sent to the shah of Iran, among other Muslim rulers, via a diplomatic agent.[131]

In late December 1695, Beyzâde Ali Pasha was created *başbuğ*[132] of the campaign for recapturing Basra. In the meantime, Mâni es-Saadûn further expanded the support base of the rebellion among the Bedouin.[133] The operations in 1696 could not be undertaken as planned. Only a quarter of the mobilized forces could actually gather, and the rebels defeated them in battle. The result was the loss of Ottoman control in the entire province of Basra, with direct consequences regarding neighboring Iran. In confirmation of this loss, Mâni initiated attempts to expand his influence to the Bedouin across the border with the aim of also rallying under his banner Safavid vassals. Concurrently, with letters dispatched via emissaries to the Iranian government, he offered to recognize the shah as suzerain. Sultan-Hüseyin did not issue an acceptance, and instead instructed the Mushasha viceroy of Huveyze, Seyyid Ferecullah Xan, not to intervene militarily into Ottoman territory.

The Ebulmasum Şamlu Embassy during the Collapse of the Border: the Shah's Obeisance to the Padishah seals the Accord, 1696-97

As the abortive campaign of Basra was still underway, Shah Sultan-Hüseyin's ambassador to Mustafa II had set off, and arrived in Erivan in mid-1696. Here, with the shah's orders, an agent of the governor-gen. of Çuqursaad (centered at Erivan), a certain Mehemmed Beyg, joined the embassy with instructions to gather intelligence, independently from the ambassador, about the state of affairs in the war-ridden monarchy. Upon return to court and before Ebulmasum Şamlu himself would be received in audience, this agent was to inform the shah of his observations not only on the Ottomans but also on the conduct of the ambassador himself. In Constantinople, where the people had gathered to behold the embassy's entry during the welcome ceremony, a diplomatic crisis

131. Hammer, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches* VI, p. 615.

132. A term in the same capacity as *serasker*.

133. Sarı Mehmed, *Zübde-i Vekâiyât*, p. 575; Râşid, *Târih*, p. 516; *Mühimme df*. 108, ent. 2-43, 281-294, 393-394, 841-843, 846-848; 1344-1349; BOA, *Dîvan-Beğlikçi Kalemi Belgeleri*, 240/94, 240/96.

reportedly occurred: vice-grand-vizier-at-Constantinople[134] Çerkes Osman Pasha had sent a fully equipped horse with his officer of the ceremonies[135] as a gift, but, getting off the ship, the ambassador chose to mount his own horse. In reaction to this insult in the presence of the gathered public, the vice-grand-vizier refused to meet the ambassador during the latter's twelve-day stay in the capital.[136] We are not in a position to know whether this story was made up by the ambassador back in Iran in order to boost his own image or, if true, what really caused Ebulmasum Xan Şamlu to reject a gift by Çerkes Osman Pasha, who was officially substituting the grand vizier. In any case, in Adrianople, the ambassador would not reject the same gifts from dignitaries ranking both lower and higher than vice grand vizier.

As the embassy approached the court, Mustafa II, again on campaign in 1696, was busy with relieving Temesvar in Hungary, then besieged by the German army under the command of prince-elector Frederick Augustus I of Saxony (also king of Poland as Augustus II after 1697). The padishah's army repelled the offensive. The court-on-campaign departed for Adrianople after reinforcing the garrison in southern Hungary.[137] When Mustafa II received the word of Ebulmasum Şamlu's arrival in Constantinople, he ordered his grand vizier to host the ambassador in an extraordinarily generous manner. Accordingly, the accommodation arrangements in Constantinople were "regal.[138]"

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134. *Istanbul/Âsitâne qaymaqamı*, an office created when not only the grand vizier but also the padishah was outside the capital, separately from and in parallel with the vice-grand vizier of the sultanic court (*rikâb-ı hümâyun qaymaqamı*).

135. *Selam ağası*.

136. Nasîrî, *Düstûr-i Şehriyârân*, p. 165. The embassy personnel was recruited from among royal court officials, royal guards, the household of the governor-gen. of Çuqursaad, the clans/tribes of Afşar, Kengerlu, and Qacar, and self-evidently the Şamlu. After entering Ottoman territory from Çuqursaad, the embassy began to receive its daily subventions and was welcomed by the host-officer who accompanied them for the next twelve days until Erzurum, where another host-officer appointed by the Sublime Porte took over. Another change of host-officers took place in Tokat. However, this last one deserted the convoy for some reason several days after departure.

137. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Târihi* III/1, p. 561-563; Parvev, *Habsburgs and Ottomans*, p. 124.

138. "Mülûkâne." Hacı Seyfi Agha, formerly steward of Merzifonlu Qara Mustafa Pasha and currently in Elmas Mehmed Pasha's retinue, was appointed as the ambassador's host-officer at court and during the return journey. As was the convention, a janissary company led by a *çorbacı*-captain and three-to-four Sultanic Council *çavuş*s were attached to the embassy in order to prohibit contact with unwanted inhabitants, a measure taken to

On 1 December 1696, the embassy arrived in Adrianople,[139] coinciding with Mustafa II's triumphal return from Hungary.[140] Following several days of welcoming events,[141] at the meet-and-feast conventionally held by the padishah's absolute deputy for the shah's ambassador, grand vizier Elmas Mehmed Pasha waited seated in the reception hall, exchanged – while seated – words of courtesy with the ambassador entering by foot, and only then stood up to take several steps towards Ebulmasum Xan Şamlu. As both dignitaries stood, Ebulmasum Xan delivered the Iranian prime minister's letter, which the grand vizier passed on to the *reisülküttab* standing by.[142]

On December 18, Mustafa II summoned the ambassador to the welcome audience.[143] Following the customary Sultanic Council session, the ambassador, with the marshal of the Council to his left and an embassy member carrying the royal epistle over the head to his right, saluted the present janissaries and shared their ceremonial soup. In the subsequent feast, the grand vizier seated him below the vice-grand-vizier-at-Adrianople,[144]

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prevent the embassy from keeping its finger on the pulse of the affairs of the padishahly court and matters of state. Teşrifâtîzâde, *Defter-i Teşrifât*, ff. 106b-107b.

139. The date calculation is based on the data given in *Cevdet – Hâriciye*, 6698, which agrees with the date provided by Fındıklılı Mehmed in his *Nusretnâme*, p. 243. Teşrifâtîzâde Mehmed provides the date for the arrival in Adrianople as 12 December 1696 in his *Defter-i Teşrifât*, f. 108a.

140. Outside the city, a committee led by marshal of the Sultanic Council – Küçük İbrâhim Agha welcomed the guests and escorted them to their residences. Ebulmasum Xan Şamlu was quartered in Defterdarahmedpaşa Palace in the vicinity of Selimiye Mosque, and his retinue at Ayşehatun Hanı. *İbnülemin – Hâriciye,* doc. 424 – the innkeeper's petition for the refund of his expenditure, the chief-accounting bureau's calculation, and the grand vizier's edict that the *defterdar* attend to the remittance. Also see Fındıklılı Mehmed, *Nusretnâme*, p. 243.

141. Several days after the arrival of the embassy, the commander of the Janissary Corps sent gifts to the ambassador's residence, which was followed by official visits from various dignitaries. Lastly, grand vizier Elmas Mehmed Pasha invited Ebulmasul Şamlu with gifts and gave a feast in his honor. The commander of the Janissaries and the grand vizier each presented the ambassador with a fully equipped and gold-interwoven-saddled horse. The padishah's eventual summons was made via a dispatch of thirty fully equipped horses. Nasîrî, *Düstûr-i Şehriyârân*, p. 165-166; Sarı Mehmed, *Zübde-i Vekâiyât*, p. 604; Râşid, *Târih*, p. 533; *Nâme-i Hümâyun df.* 5, ent. 100.

142. Teşrifâtîzâde, *Defter-i Teşrifât*, ff. 108a-110b. See ibid. for the ceremony.

143. Fındıklılı Mehmed, *Nusretnâme*, p. 243 – the dating here is accurate. Teşrifâtîzâde Mehmed provides the date as 21 December 1696, however, calls the day itself as a Tuesday, conforming to Fındıklılı Mehmed's mention of Tuesday, December 18. *Defter-i Teşrifât*, f. 111a-b.

144. *Edirne/rikâb-ı hümâyun qaymaqamı*, created when not only was the grand vizier absent from the padishah's court but also was the padishah outside the capital, particularly

Moralı Damad Hasan Pasha. At the audience hall, the shah's epistle was taken over from Ebulmasum Xan Şamlu by the present viziers, who passed it on hierarchically upwards among themselves, and ultimately the grand vizier presented it to the padishah. After the delivery of the shah's gifts, conventional ceremonies, and brief conversations in which the ambassador orally conveyed the shah's affectionate and friendly greetings, the session dissolved.[145]

In the epistle[146] to "Sultan Mustafa Khan his Most-Sublime Majesty, the conqueror-caesar, shahenshah of the world, sovereign of the Earth and the age, of the supreme-sultanate, world-bestower, custodian of the regnum of the living, of the Greater Caliphate,[147]" the shah requested a continuous exchange of missions and correspondence, which he deemed crucial for maintaining the current concord. For this reason, he announced the dispatch of this embassy to be "out of affection and honesty.[148]" The shah both acknowledged and expected the new padishah to command his magistrates along the border, with his "quasi-destiny decree,[149]" to prohibit the transgressions violating the contracts of the previous monarchs, and to contribute to the consolidation of the "alliance." The ambassador would communicate the rest of the matters orally. With the first official Safavid reference to alliance, which the Ottoman diplomatic correspondence had begun to feature as of late 1694, the initiation of this new level in bilateral relations was sealed.

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when residing at Adrianople, separately from and in parallel with the vice-grand vizier of the capital (*Istanbul/Âsitâne qaymaqamı*).

145. The master of ceremonies (*teşrifatçıbaşı*) registered the shah's gifts, and the master of presents (*pişkeşçibaşı*) exhibited them before taking them away. Ninety-one men from the embassy personnel were customarily invested with robes of honor in front of the treasury. Teşrifâtîzâde, *Defter-i Teşrifât*, ff. 111a-113b; Fındıklılı Mehmed, *Nusretnâme*, p. 243; Sarı Mehmed, *Zübde-i Vekâiyât*, p. 604; Râşid, *Târih*, p. 533. Contrary to Teşrifâtîzâde Mehmed, Nasîrî relates that First Moralı Hasan Pasha and then the commander of the Janissary Corps, Delibaltazâde Mahmud Pasha, separately attempted to take over the shah's epistle, but Ebulmasum Xan Şamlu abstained therefrom, and instead delivered it to the grand vizier, who then presented it to the padishah – this version must be the distorted report of the ambassador submitted in order to save face once he was back in Isfahan. Nasîrî, *Düstûr-i Şehriyârân*, p. 166.

146. *Nâme-i Hümâyun df*. 5, ent. 99; Râmi, *Münşeat*, ff. 14b-16a; *Esnâd ü Mükâtebât 1105-1135*, p. 117-120.

147. "*A'lâ-hazret* [...] *kişver-gîr qayser*, [...] *şehinşâh-ı cihân*, [...] *fermân-fermâ-yı zemîn u zamân* [...] *saltanatü'l-uzmâ, es-sultân bin es-sultân ve'l-hâqân bin el-hâqân*, [...] *Sultan Mustafa Han*, [...] *cihân-bahş*, [...] *velâyet-gîr-i mülk-i zindegânî,* [...] *Hilâfetü'l-Kübrâ*."

148. "*Ez* [...] *muhabbet u sadâqat*."

149. "*Fermân-ı qazâ-rüsûm*."

In the winter of 1695-1696, the Sublime Porte attempted to coopt Baban Süleyman by inviting him to join the planned Basra campaign,[150] which was no doubt a move to temporarily keep the Kirmanc rebellion in check until more resources could be mobilized to the east. In his epistle nevertheless, Shah Sultan-Hüseyin did not refer to the Baban question, which had become a bleeding wound. By only inserting an additional line about border officials into the part emphasizing his assurance of the new padishah's unconditional support for the preservation of the current concord, the shah managed to draw attention to the ongoing transgressions without formally raising the complaint that the Ottoman State could not so far reestablish authority in Şehrizor.

This is a clear indication that the Iranian government would in no way let the Kirmanc rebellion harm relations, which were now faring better than ever. Having the Ottoman State step into action and settle the problem was the ultimate objective. The ambassador would orally communicate more, which was apparently meant to convey his mission objective: convincing the Sublime Porte to undertake a definitive campaign and issue official approval for a Safavid intervention. The mention of this matter in the shah's epistle without its content confined it to negotiational diplomacy without making its way into the inter-monarch correspondence, which could not be overshadowed by anything else than the current concord. In a double gesture of good will, the Müntefiq overthrow of Ottoman authority in Basra was not even implicitly referred to. The shah thus gave the message that he would have nothing to say on an internal affair concerning the House of Osman's directly governed domains.

On 29 December 1696, Mustafa II told his grand vizier: "We have observed in illustrated books the polo game played in Persia, it is my august will to see it exactly; among the men of the ambassador of Persia if there are able ones, he shall send them to my august presence." To the grand vizier's message, the ambassador replied: "even though acclaimed men worthy of the sublime field are unavailable, they will be provided as well as possible." On 2 January 1697, the field facing the Hunt Gate by the banks of River Tunca was prepared as a playing ground. After the ambassador's thirty men arrived and stood at attention, Mustafa II, with an outfit and cortege emphasizing his distinction as victorious war veteran, rode out, saluted them, and seated himself on the throne under the erected canopy. First, the padishah's Inner Court and the present

150. See *Mühimme df*. 106, ent. 1281; *df*. 108, ent. 392.

pashas' households competed in javelin- and spear-games, marksmanship, and wrestling.[151] Reportedly, the Iranian team(s) composed of the Qacar, Kengerlu, and Afşar Qızılbaş[152] could not stage a satisfactory polo performance and attributed this to the snow sitting on the ground. After the games, four outstanding Iranian participants were awarded gold and robes of honor.[153] The commander of the Janissary Corps, the vice-grand vizier, and Ebulmasum Şamlu himself later separately feasted the top two Iranian participants who had been awarded by Mustafa II.[154]

At the behest of the grand vizier, various dignitaries hosted and entertained the ambassador during his stay in Adrianople with utmost hospitality and diligence, as Ebulmasum Xan Şamlu was deemed to be more "preeminent" than other ambassadors who had recently come to the padishah's court. Among these occasions, apart from the grand vizier's entertaining the ambassador several times, the noteworthy ones include the state-organized night event held by the vice-grand-vizier-at-Adrianople, the feast by the commander of the Janissaries, the ambassador's counter-feast to the commander of the Janissaries with grand vizierial approbation, and several feasts by grand-mufti Seyyid Mehmed Feyzullah Efendi. As Ebulmasum Xan Şamlu, apart from his political career, was indeed a distinguished litterateur, his company pleased his hosts, particularly the grand vizier. In view of the previous missions from the shahs, no ambassador was thusly gratified and treated, and the case of Ebulmasum Xan Şamlu set a new precedent of high standard for future Safavid ambassadors to be satisfied with their hosts.[155]

While at court, Ebulmasum Xan Şamlu also submitted to the Sublime Porte the shah's request for permission to renew the sarcophagi of the tenth and eleventh Imams Ali el-Hâdî (d. 868) and Hasan el-Askerî (d. 874) at their mausolea located in Samarra.[156] This shows how firm Isfahan perceived the post-1684 Ottoman-Safavid concord to be. If this request had been submitted in an atmosphere other than that of absolute assuredness of mutual good-intentions, the Ottomans could have suspected that an attempt to make inroads into their sovereign rights be behind this

151. Fındıklılı Mehmed, *Nusretnâme*, p. 254-255. Refer to this source for a more exact description of Mustafa II's ceremony of arrival and the games.
152. Nasîrî, *Düstûr-i Şehriyârân*, p. 166.
153. Fındıklılı Mehmed, *Nusretnâme*, p. 255.
154. Nasîrî, *Düstûr-i Şehriyârân*, p. 166.
155. Teşrifâtîzâde, *Defter-i Teşrifât*, ff. 110b, 114a-115a.
156. *Mühimme df*. 111, ent. 1694.

initiative. As no available information hints thereat, it can be assumed that the request was rather the result of the newly achieved level in relations, i.e. alliance.

The farewell audience was held on 17 January 1697 in the Privy-Chamber Pavillion. After being admitted to the padishah's presence, "charmed and speechless[157]" presumably in adherence to the oriental diplomatic etiquette of a diplomat paying homage to a monarch superior in rank to the sending ruler, the ambassador said prayers, and Mustafa II addressed him: "say my greetings to the felicitous Shah his Majesty. The epistle and gift[s] he sent have arrived and been accepted by my August [Person]. May thou prosper, for thou have mediated [this] by way of diplomacy, and served well.[158]" Mustafa II handed over his reply epistle to the present chief-eunuch, the chief-eunuch to the grand vizier, and the grand vizier to the ambassador.[159] Following this, the session dissolved and gifts to the shah were delivered. Special attention was paid to pleasing the ambassador via gifts of extraordinary value to his person for this occasion.[160]

After the padishah's farewell audience, the following reception by the grand vizier marked the end of the ambassador's business at court. Elmas Mehmed Pasha's reply letters to the shah and to the prime minister, signed and sealed, were handed over to Ebulmasum Xan Şamlu at this session.[161] Ottoman observers found the total cost of hosting this embassy to the Central Treasury too extravagant.[162] The ambassador's last public

157. "*Gözleri qamaştı* [...] *nutqu tutuldu*."

158. "*Saadetlü şah hazretlerine benden selâm eyle. Gönderdiği nâme ve hediyesi gelip maqbûl-i hümâyunum olmuştur. Sen dahi risâlet tarîqıyla ara yerde bulunup güzel hizmet ettiğinden berhudâr olasın*."

159. The empress-mother also watched the event. See Fındıklılı Mehmed, *Nusretnâme*, p. 255-257 and Teşrifâtîzâde, *Defter-i Teşrifât*, ff. 115b-119b for an exact description of how the place of audience was furnished to impress and how the ceremonies were organized to boost the image of the monarchy's might. The latter source provides the date of audience as 22 January 1697. According to Fındıklılı Mehmed, Ebulmasum Şamlu took over the epistle from Mustafa II's own hands.

160. Râşid, *Târih*, p. 534; Nasîrî, *Düstûr-i Şehriyârân*, p. 167.

161. Teşrifâtîzâde, *Defter-i Teşrifât*, f. 120a.

162. Apart from the lavish gifts given from the Privy Treasury, the embassy's accommodation, subvention, and allowance costs amounted to a total of 130,750 *quruş* covered by the Central Treasury. Before departure from Adrianople, the embassy was given a total of 25,000 *quruş* as allowance (15,000 to the person of the ambassador, 5,000 to his entourage, and another 5,000 to the [shah's?] chief-equerry "serzendâr"). Sarı Mehmed, *Zübde-i Vekâiyât*, p. 605. Thus, the remaining 105,750 *quruş* were spent for billeting the embassy throughout its presence in Ottoman territory. Râşid, *Târih*, p. 534. The breakdown of each

appearance in Adrianople took place on 31 January 1697 during the public games held on the Pole Field outside the Procession Pavillion. In addition to the main attraction of a marksmanship contest between janissaries, various pasha-household soldiers, and privy guard, the Qızılbaş from the embassy once again played polo, though reportedly again failing to distinguish themselves.[163] The ambassador departed on February 15[164]. The Porte prescribed him to return via the route of Erzurum,[165] as a journey over Baghdad would necessitate the caravan to cross from regions that were close to Baban Süleyman's sphere of activity, which posed danger. Receiving a subvention of almost the double amount of what Kelb-Ali Qacar had been allocated, he returned home via the route of Van.[166]

Even a cursory comparison of the total cost of the Ebulmasum Şamlu embassy to the Ottoman State with the former cases of the same kind reflects the upward trend in Ottoman-Safavid diplomacy. It is noteworthy that the state itself opted for making this extraordinary expenditure. Despite the Ottoman State's inability to intervene with full force in frontier

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expenditure item was entered into the Chief-Accounting Bureau registers kept at the Central Treasury, Teşrifâtîzâde, *Defter-i Teşrifât*, ff. 121a-121b. As was the convention, a host-officer was also appointed to accompany the embassy during the return journey on Ottoman territory.

163. Fındıklılı Mehmed, *Nusretnâme*, p. 266.

164. See *Cevdet – Hâriciye,* 6698, which is a breakdown of the state provisioning of the embassy during the first two months of its stay at court and the estimation made for the remaining 16 days until its planned departure, involving correspondence between the chief-accounting bureau (*başmuhasebe*) and the grand vizierate. For the transactions involving grain and straw allocations and their transportation from state warehouses to the ambassador's residence, which involved correspondence between the barley-superintendent (*arpa emîni*), the deputy-*defterdar*, and the grand vizier, see *Cevdet – Hâriciye*, 6821. For transactions involving the bread-makers' guild, the chief-*defterdar*, and the grand vizier concerning the embassy's daily bread allocation while residing at court, see *Ali Emîrî – II. Mustafa*, doc. 1550. For the meat allocation, see the treasury-note (*tezkire*) involving the chief-butcher (*kasapbaşı*).

165. Fındıklılı Mehmed, *Nusretnâme*, p. 257.

166. See in *Cevdet – Hâriciye*, doc. 6749 and *İbnülemin – Hâriciye*, doc. 425 the decrees to and correspondence with magistrates on the road from Scutari to Van regarding the disbursement to the embassy, on behalf of the Central Treasury, of a daily amount of 200 *quruş* as subvention, which in practice was found insufficient and increased to 241,66 *quruş* (29,000 non-debased [*sağ*] *aqçe*). Compare this with the daily 125 *quruş* (20,000 debased *aqçe*) that had been allocated as subvention to the Kelb-Ali Ziyâdoğlu-Qacar embassy. Indeed, the Ebulmasum Şamlu embassy had been receiving a daily subvention of 240 *quruş* since its entry to Ottoman territory, and this was raised to 540 *quruş* as long as it resided at court. Nasîrî, *Düstûr-i Şehriyârân*, p. 165-166. Also see *Ali Emîrî – II. Mustafa*, doc. 2753. See *İbnülemin – Hâriciye*, doc. 479 for the bill dated 20 April 1698, issued by superintendent of the Palace Kitchen Hacı Mehmed Efendi for the daily amounts he spent on the Ebulmasum Şamlu embassy during the latter's stay at court.

encroachments, the Iranian government had not questioned the Sublime Porte's continued commitment to the treaty, and cooperated with its ally in furthering it. With extravagant gifts, extraordinarily gratifying hosting, and lavish expenditure, the Ottomans both implicitly thanked the Safavids for their cooperativeness and displayed generosity in a manner that would befit the dignity of supreme monarchy, to whose primacy the shah's court paid unconditional homage.

That the subvention received by this embassy was almost the double of what had been paid to the previous one gives a clue as to the comparative sizes of personnel. This, on the other hand, sheds light on yet another trend in the Safavids' Ottoman policy. Because of the Basran upheaval, of the Kirmanc rebellion, of the elevation of the shah's rank, and of the initiation of the *perpetual peace in alliance* in bilateral relations, this mission must have been regarded by the shahly court as much more than just an accession-occasioned contact; therefore, it necessitated the dispatch of an embassy which would exceptionally impress the receiver. As almost all Safavid missions to the Ottoman court since 1639 were embassies, a further promotion of the mission's formal rank was not possible. Thus, the desired effect was to be created by expanding remarkably its size, thus forming a grand embassy.

Once back at court (approximately in spring 1697), the spy of the governor-gen. of Çuqursaad, who had gathered intelligence under the disguise of an embassy member, first informed the shah. After him, Ebulmasum Xan Şamlu concisely reported the course of the Great Turkish War in 1695 and 1696. Separate but concurrently with the ambassador, the governor of Kirmanşah also submitted an account of the affairs of the Ottoman State in 1695 based on the intelligence gathered by the spies he had previously sent to the Sultanic Army. In addition to relating the ineffective measures taken against the Müntefiq coalition in Lower Mesopotamia, the latter report also involved information concerning the Hungarian front.[167]

In general, by marginalizing the importance of the Ottoman resurgence under Mustafa II in 1695-1696 against the Holy League and exaggerating the consequences of the already-crucial Russian conquest of Azow (1696),

167. Nasîrî, *Düstûr-i Şehriyârân*, p. 163-164. Nasîrî, or the later copier, wrote down the events with a one to two year shift between the real dates and the date given in chapter titles. When using this chronicle as source, I reconstructed the chronology with the help of other chronicles and archival sources that are consistent and precise in both the dating and the sequence of events.

these reports painted an even darker image than what had already occured. In any case, the Safavids' intelligence-gathering activities in 1695-1697 demonstrate the utmost relevance that the state of affairs in the Ottoman monarchy had for Iran. The shahdom did not deem superficial updates via the embassy sufficient. Surprisingly, even the exaggerated accounts did not initiate a revision of the Safavids' foreign policy. The policies based on the internalized conviction that the empire of "Rûm" was inherently too strong for Iran to take on would be continued with increased intensity.

Once the intelligence reports were submitted, the ambassador handed in the official correspondence he had brought. In his reply[168] to "Shah Hüseyin his Most-Sublime Majesty, of heavens-shadow, means of world-posession, shah of Iran, dominator of the regnum of Persia, of Kings' hearth, the sultanate-titled,[169]" Mustafa II spoke in length of the all-out land and naval offensives against his empire by the enemy coalition. The padishah attributed the protraction of the war and the monarchy's inability to oust all of its enemies to the overwhelming numbers of the Holy League's fielded troops. Then, he thoroughly related the victories won in 1695 and 1696 on the Hungarian front against the German emperor with the Sultanic Army under his personal command, and thus asserted the House of Osman's hereditary, rightful, and "sublime caliphate.[170]" Assuming the due responsibility, stressed Mustafa II, his "caliphal Highness[171]" took action *in propria persona*, following the example of his forefathers.

The padishah then repeated his predecessor's statement regarding the obligatory nature of the Ottoman-Safavid contractual relationship by adapting a verse, "*and fulfill the oath when you pledge it*,[172]" – in evocation of Shah Safi's oath instrument in ratification of the peace of Zuhab in 1639, and added that he considered this contract unbreakable. Along the same lines, he described the nature of the current correspondence with reference to the verse "*the faithful are but brothers*.[173]" As Mustafa II concluded his word, he expressed his "hope that his Highness [the Shah] also

168. *Nâme-i Hümâyun df*. 5, ent. 100; *Münşeat Mecmuası*, ff. 9a-15b.

169. "*A'lâ-hazret,* [...] *gerdûn-sâye*, [...] *vâsıta-i* [...] *cihân-dârî*, [...] *şeh-i Îrân, hıdîv-i mülk-i Acem*, [...] *dûdmân-ı keyân*, [...] *saltanat-unvân* [...] *Şah Hüseyin*."

170. "*Hilâfet-i aliyye*."

171. "*Cenâb-ı hilâfet-meâbımız*."

172. Adapted from *Quran*, 16:91.

173. *Quran*, 49:10.

become a co-rider [to the padishah in the endeavor] with [an] army of prayers." The contribution of Ebulmasum Şamlu's embassy and Sultan-Hüseyin's epistle to the existing "alliance[174]" between the Houses of Osman and Safi also received emphasis, following which Mustafa II expressed his wish that relations see no harm and that neighborhood rights continue to be observed. Regarding the second matter, the padishah wrote of his strict instructions to his frontier officials, a precaution that he also expected of the shah. In titulature, the Ottoman chancellery observed the new accord, according to which the padishah enjoyed the supreme dignity and the shah ranked at junior-imperial grade.

In this correspondence, the parties did not mention the upheaval and the ongoing encroachments in eastern Iraq. Nevertheless, Mustafa II, through narrating his victories in Hungary and mentioning his strict instructions to border officials, wanted to assure Shah Sultan-Hüseyin that he, as the new monarch of the House of Osman, was not only determined but also capable to reinstate order. In other words, the cross-border chaos in eastern Iraq was soon to be dealt with. Mustafa II must have been delighted to see that Sultan-Hüseyin had not even directly referred to these troubles. Seeing that Iran did not attempt to take advantage of the unprecedented difficulties that the monarchy had to shoulder throughout the Great Turkish War, Mustafa II gladly emphasized the recently initiated *alliance*. This was no coincidence; the Safavids' observance of the borders despite receiving serious harm from attacks by Ottoman vassal-rebels with bases in Ottoman territory could not be expected from an only *non-hostile* or *friendly* state. Such patience could only be displayed by an *ally*.

Keeping up with the convention of the Ottoman grand vizier's right to correspond with the Iranian monarch, Elmas Mehmed Pasha too had handed over Ebulmasum Xan Şamlu his letter[175] to Shah Sultan-Hüseyin the "banner-bearer of autocracy in the orient, builder of world-keeping, dominator of Greater Iran, residence of the Exalted [Safavid] Sultanate, meridian of the Gorgeous [Safavid] State, his Sublime Majesty, refuge of sultanate.[176]" The content of this letter does not divert substantially

174. "*İttifaq*."

175. *Nâme-i Hümâyun df*. 5, ent. 112; *Münşeat Mecmuası*, ff. 20b-25b; Râmi, *Münşeat*, ff. 9a-11b (misdated). The composition of the letter belongs to Hâşim[î]zâde Mehmed Efendi.

176. "*Alem-efrâz-ı fermân-rânî-yi* [...] *hâverî*, [...] *bânî-yi* [...] *cihân-bânî*, [...] *hıdîv-i Îrân-zemîn*, [...] *maqarrü's-saltanati's-seniye, zuhrü'devleti'l-behiye, âlî-hazret*, [...] *saltanat-penâh*."

from the above-mentioned epistle. After congratulating Sultan-Hüseyin for taking up the reins of the "Safavid State," Elmas Mehmed Pasha committed his side to and expected from the other side the observance of "the established ancient covenant and friendship, and the bilateral concord." This message was boosted with the grand vizier's description of the Ebulmasum Şamlu embassy as the "statement of Your [i.e. Sultan-Hüseyin's] hereditary affection[177]" to the House of Osman. Likewise, he too asked for Iran's moral support in the ongoing struggle against the Holy League. As far as titulature is concerned, the letter conforms to the new accord. Junior imperial titles were used at various instances for both monarchs. The padishah, on the other hand, preserved his primacy via styles such as "universe-conqueror[178]" and a rich set of other titles referring to his supreme imperial mandate.

Thus, the grand vizier's letter brought emphasis to the concept of *ancient peace* that had already been initiated in the previous inter-monarch correspondences. It is of critical importance that Elmas Mehmed Pasha highlighted not only the ancient but also the hereditary character of this peace. Since 1686, the current treaty had no longer been bounded to re-negotiation each time a succession took place in one of the states.[179] It is true that each Ottoman accession still triggered a formal reconfirmation process (unlike Safavid accessions which did not occasion this process, a diplomatic manifestation of Ottoman supremacy), yet explicit references marked the peace between the Houses of Osman and Safi as ancient and hereditary. According to the new accord, reconfirmations, which had involved serious renegotiation until 1686, were now being made just as a matter of form.

In late 1696, the rebel-chieftain Mâni es-Saadûn's brother and chief-of-staff, Cafer, assembled the coalition partners, which coincided with the Ebulmasum Şamlu embassy. After having brought the entire province of Basra under his control, Mâni es-Saadûn moved on to expand his zone of control into Iran, and terminated his coalition with the viceroy of Huveyze. A group of around 5,000 under the command of Seyyid Mahmud (the viceroy's nephew) from the Mushasha tribe – the Bedouin dynasty ruling

177. "*Muhabbet-i mevrûse...lerin ızhâr*."

178. "*Gîtî-sitân*."

179. This is not comparable to the similar developments in the Sublime Porte's contemporary diplomacy with various European states. The precedents, conventions, formalities, terminology, ceremonies, practices, and references in the Ottomans' diplomacy with the orient were quite different from that with the Occident.

over Huveyze as Safavid vassals, had already joined the Müntefiq movement prior to Mâni's seizure of Basra. Crossing the Iranian border, the army led by Cafer es-Saadûn attacked Huveyze, but suffered a heavy defeat. Having lost considerable prestige, the Marshland coalition began to gradually lose its support base. Seeing Mâni es-Saadûn's weakening power, the inhabitants of Basra and the province's notables forwarded a collective-petition to Baghdad asking for the installment of the nominated governor-gen., Kethüdâ Hasan Pasha.[180]

Beyzâde Ali Pasha, however, did not find the incoming news reliable. To inquire into the situation, he sent the head of the Baghdad Local janissaries, Derviş Agha, formally as emissary to Seyyid Ferecullah Xan. Derviş Agha, however, secretly undertook intelligence-gathering activities in Huveyze, which was his real commission. Once back in Baghdad, he reported that the Basran inhabitants had indeed invited Beyzâde Ali Pasha to send a delegation to take over the control of Qurna, the principle fortress of the province of Basra; this act would remove any potential doubts as to the accuracy of the news. The 300-strong contingent of the Basran Local Corps, whom Kethüdâ Hasan Pasha had recruited from Huveyze (Iranian territory) and sent out in accordance with Derviş Agha's intelligence report, soon arrived in Qurna under the command of Rûmî Abdi Agha. There, the chieftain of the Sabihoğlu Bedouin welcomed this contingent, and then together with his followers, ousted Mâni's Müntefiq garrison. In doing so, he delivered the fortress back to the authority of the House of Osman.[181]

The news of Qurna's recovery reached Baghdad the next day via carrier pigeons. Thirteen days later, the notables and the Rufâiye chieftains residing in Basra forwarded letters to Kethüdâ Hasan Pasha, inviting him to march at the head of a 1,000-strong contingent and enter his seat of governorate. Long deprived of his province and the revenues attached to it, however, Hasan Pasha lacked the financial resources to raise such a force. Surprisingly enough, Beyzâde Ali Pasha displayed disinterest and refrained from financing the enterprise. This meant that after the effortless recovery of Qurna, the governor-gen. of Baghdad relinquished the

180. Nasîrî, *Düstûr-i Şehriyârân*, p. 144; Râşid, *Târih*, p. 549; Sarı Mehmed, *Zübde-i Vekâiyât*, p. 628-629; Matthee, "Basra," p. 74.

181. Râşid, *Târih*, p. 549; Nasîrî, *Düstûr-i Şehriyârân*, p. 145. A comparison of these two sources reveals that Seyyid Ferecullah presented this development to the government as his own feat of taking of Qurna, rather than as an action taken by Kethüdâ Hasan Pasha's Basran Local Corps.

opportunity to reinstate Ottoman authority in the city of Basra without facing serious resistance. Monitoring the inactivity despite the circumstances that were favorable for an intervention, viceroy of Huveyze Seyyid Ferecullah sent an emissary to Baghdad and made Beyzâde Ali Pasha an unusual offer: "let us seize Basra for thee in accordance with [our] friendship." Even more strangely, Beyzâde Ali Pasha, despite not having mobilized Baghdad's resources to recover the city of Basra, apparently sent papers to Seyyid Ferecullah Xan in approval of this offer.[182]

In the meantime, the involvement of Ottoman- and Safavid-vassal elements in encroachments on both sides of the border peaked. Ferecullah Xan's son Seyyid Abdullah captured the Basran fortresses of Süveyb and Qurna, ousting the Ottoman Local Corps there. Instead of fleeing, the chief of the Locals Corps at Qurna, Rûmî Abdi Agha, opted for taking refuge at the Huveyzan Mushasha camp. The viceroy tactically presented his capture of Qurna to the shah's court as operations undertaken against Mâni es-Saadûn. Supposing that the viceroy had expelled those in rebellion against the padishah from two fortresses and thus contributed to the concord with the Ottomans, Sultan-Hüseyin even praised Seyyid Ferecullah. Rûmî Abdi Agha himself was no less influential in presenting the course of events as such; he stated to have appealed to Seyyid Ferecullah for military aid against Mâni. Manipulating his suzerain's misinformed praise, the viceroy raised a sizeable army and fielded it across the border. First, he intercepted Mâni's supply lines along the Shatt-el-Arab. Fearing annihilation, Mâni shut himself to the fortress of Basra and began preparations to withstand a siege. But Ferecullah Xan's army proved too strong for the Müntefiq chieftain, who since the previous year had lost most of his confederates and was now defending the fortress of Basra with only several hundred men of his. Once the general assault began, Mâni fled, and the Safavid-vassal prince entered the capital of the padishah's province on 26 March 1697.[183]

The Ottoman governor-gen. of Baghdad thus ended up having refused to take initiative in a relatively effortless recovery of Basra. As a result,

182. Sarı Mehmed, *Zübde-i Vekâiyât*, p. 628; Râşid, *Târih*, p. 549.

183. Nasîrî, *Düstûr-i Şehriyârân*, p. 145-150; Sarı Mehmed, *Zübde-i Vekâiyât*, p. 628; Râşid, *Târih*, p. 549; *Chronicle of Events*, p. 413; *Chronicle of the Carmelites in Persia*, p. 496-497; Rencber, *Muşaşaiyân*, p. 330-331. Some of the information found in Nasîrî's *Düstûr-i Şehriyârân* is contradictory with the rest of the sources. What I relate here is the result of a comparative weeding and filtering. The same chronicle also reports events after 1696 mistakenly as belonging to the previous year(s).

and seemingly without protest from the governor-gen., Iranians were now in full control of this Ottoman province that had been in rebel hands throughout the last several years. The capture of Basra by the Huveyzens took place without orders from the shahly court. Since 1639, Ottoman and Safavid subjects had confronted each other on occasions, but in each case, one group was in rebellion against its suzerain, hence not representing the state authority. In this respect, one could not speak of an Ottoman-Safavid confrontation for the events of 1697.

Soon, Mâni es-Saadûn raised a contingent from his former Marshland allies with promises of share in government, and besieged Basra. However, Seyyid Ferecullah's 7,200-strong garrison supported by the Iranian governor of Devraq, İbrâhim Xan, successfully repelled the assault. On the eve of definitive failure, a collaborationist from within the fortress informed Mâni of a weak point by the southern walls. Mâni ordered a feigned offensive: concentrating the defenders' attention to another spot, he entered the city from this gap. Yet, Ferecullah Xan's garrison responded swiftly, and expelled the intruders. In retaliation, Mâni regrouped his supporters to besiege the fortress of Huveyze, the very heart of the Mushasha principality holding Basra. When the viceroy sent a relief force under the command of his son, Seyyid Abdullah, Mâni quickly returned and seized instead the fortress of Süveyb. İbrâhim Xan repelled Mâni's next assault directed at Qurna.[184] Probably as news arrived from Iraq, the padishah's court sent out a series of decrees to make sure that at least the province of Baghdad, where the state authority in the region was concentrated, remain safe and stable.[185] By 1697, the insurrection in Lower Mesopotamia had reached its climax: the shah's manipulative vassal had captured the padishah's province, while the padishah's vassal-turned-rebel besieged the capital of the shah's vassal.

184. Nasîrî, *Düstûr-i Şehriyârân*, p. 179-180.

185. See in *Mühimme df*. 110, ent. 699-700 the decrees issued in early November 1697 to the governors of Mosul and Şehrizor that they be on the watch for Baghdad's security and respond to any calls from Beyzâde Ali Pasha; *Mühimme df*. 110, ent. 693 – the decree issued in early November 1697 to a chieftain that he performs military duty for Baghdad's security. *Mühimme df*. 110, ent. 741 – the decree, issued in late November 1697, communicating Beyzâde Ali Pasha that his services in Baghdad were praiseworthy and that a robe of honor (of sable fur) was dispatched with Yusuf [Agha], a *qapıcıbaşı*. Beyzâde Ali Pasha had full authority in taking action regarding his duty of keeping the province of Baghdad secure, which included the regulation of the affairs of the Iranian frontier. *Mühimme df*. 110, ent. 782-794 – decrees in the same direction to various *bey*s. *Mühimme df*. 110, ent. 1257 – decree to Beyzâde Ali Pasha issued in early February 1698, requesting updates regarding whether the assigned military forces, dispathed provisions, and the governmental commissary Maraşlı Ahmed (Agha, a *qapıcıbaşı*), arrived.

Simultaneously, in Mustafa II's third campaign on the Hungarian front (1697), the German army led by Prince Eugene of Savoy routed the Ottomans at the Battle of Zenta. The grand vizier was killed in a tumult when trying to stop his fleeing troops. Thus, the Ottomans' plan to reconquer the lost Hungarian provinces failed. Nevertheless, control of the Balkans and southeastern Hungary remained intact, and until 1698, contingents in the north led by the padishah's commanders and Selim Khan I Giray of the Crimea successfully held against Polish offensives, even reacting with effective counter-raids. However, the Venetians did manage to breach the borders in Dalmatia/Bosnia and preoccupy the Sultanic Navy with sea battles and sieges, while continuing to hold the Peloponnese, from where it battled for the control of central Greece. After defeating the 1695 Russian attack, and resisting again in 1696, provincial and Crimean contingents, whose strength was divided due to the concurrent fighting on the separate front against Poland-Lithaunia, this time failed to prevent the fall of the fortress of Azow to the Muscovites, which was the first serious loss on the extended Russian front.[186] The news of Basra's capture by the Huveyzans reached the padishahly court in September/October 1697 at Belgrade, when Mustafa II was on his way from Hungary to Adrianople.[187]

The Rüstem Zengene Embassy: the Rapprochement reaches its Zenith, 1698

At each new development concerning the insurrection in Lower Mesopotamia, Seyyid Ferecullah lost no time in reporting to Isfahan what had come to pass, most probably continuing to misrepresent the course of events. Praised and rewarded, he was left in charge of the affairs in Basra. However, it should be noted that his presence in the padishah's territory as an Iranian actor was officialized not before but after his capture of Basra and the subsequent submission of what had come to pass to the shahly court.[188] Sultan-Hüseyin's immediate move after finding Basra under his vassal's control shows that Iran had no intention of keeping this domain for itself. It did not want a confrontation with its western neighbor even for the sake of a complete province. Thus, the shah lost no time

186. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Târihi* III/1, p. 563-583; Uebersberger, *Russlands Orientpolitik*, p. 53-56; Parvev, *Habsburgs and Ottomans*, p. 123-126; Davies, *Warfare on the Black Sea Steppe*, p. 183-187.

187. Sarı Mehmed, *Zübde-i Vekâiyât*, p. 626-629.

188. *Chronicle of the Carmelites in Persia*, p. 496-497; Nasîrî, *Düstûr-i Şehriyârân*, p. 150, 180.

in presenting it back to the padishah. In observance of the "peace, friendship, and alliance,[189]" and apprehensive that the recent events might be retold at the Sublime Porte by third parties with a negative, manipulated narrative,[190] Sultan-Hüseyin consulted his ministers. This consultation brought forth the decision of restituting Basra to the padishah with the maxim that "this is the ultimate friendship to the Ottomans.[191]" Accordingly, he dispatched a forty-five-carat diamond symbolizing the keys of Basra and what the Ottoman court called an "epistle-of-servitude[192]" to Mustafa II via his extraordinary ambassador Rüstem Xan Zengene.[193] Expanding the Iranian domains with a fait accompli by seizing the opportunity to appropriate Basra, which had fallen on the Safavids' lap, could have led to a war. The shah must have judged that he could not triumph in such a face-off. Instead, he chose to affirm the current rapprochement via this utmost gesture of good will.

After arriving in Tokat in Anatolia, Rüstem Xan Zengene, as was the convention, dispatched to the grand vizier the letter-of-introduction announcing his mission, notifying his rank, and presenting his credentials. Upon receipt, the grand vizier replied with a letter-of-welcome officially recognizing the ambassador of the "Shah his Sublime Majesty, the ruler of the regnum of Iran, refuge of sultanate.[194]" Şeyhî Mehmed Agha, superintendant of the Council *çavuş*s, was appointed host-officer.[195] The unusually high rank of the host-officer, who normally would be a *çavuş* (i.e. bailiff), or at most a *qapıcıbaşı agha* of the Sublime Court, indicates the importance the Sublime Porte attached to this mission.

Reaching Constantinople on 5 March 1698, the ambassador set out again on March 15,[196] and arrived in Adrianople on March 23. He first

189. "*Sulh* [...] *dûstî* [...] *ittifaq*."

190. Nasîrî, *Düstûr-i Şehriyârân*, 213; *Chronicle of the Carmelites in Persia*, p. 496-497.

191. "*Osmanlı'ya bundan özge dostluq olmaz*."

192. "*Ubûdiyet-nâme*."

193. Fındıklılı Mehmed, *Nusretnâme*, p. 368; also see Râşid, *Târih*, p. 554.

194. "*Âlî-hazret*, [...] *fermân-revâ-yı* [...] *mülk-i Îrân*, [...] *saltanat-penâh*, [...] *şah*."

195. Râmi, *Münşeat*, ff. 136a-136b.

196. In Constantinople, *çavuş*s of the Sultanic Council welcomed the ambassador. He was given accommodation at Fazlıpaşa Palace, and the superintendent of the *çavuş*s continued to serve as host-officer during the ambassador's stop at the capital. He departed for Adrianople with an escort of twelve *çavuş*s. *İbnülemin – Hâriciye,* 522. All dates are calculated or estimated, and all names are taken from this internal correspondence series for each separate expense item accrued during the embassy's stop in Constantinople and journey therefrom to Adrianople, such as: an edict to deputy-*defterdar* Hacı Hüseyin Agha on February 18 to take care of the preparations for the expected arrival of the embassy,

met grand vizier Köprülü Amcazâde Hüseyin Pasha and then grand-mufti Seyyid Feyzullah Efendi, in both occasions to discuss official business. That Mustafa II sent him confectionaries on March 29 augured the positive mood of the upcoming talks. The welcome reception took place on April 20 in the Audience Hall. There, the ambassador delivered to the padishah the forty-five-carat diamond symbolizing the keys of Basra, the shah's accompanying epistle, and gifts. Contrary to the conventions of the event, Rüstem Xan Zengene orally conveyed Sultan-Hüseyin's complaints about Baban Süleyman and request of his extermination, in response to which Mustafa II gave the command: "it shall be discussed with my ministers; whatever its remedy is, shall be seen to.[197]"

In his epistle[198] to Mustafa II "his Most-Sublime Majesty, the over-generous world-bestower, caesar, shahenshah, sultan of the sultans of the world, khaqan of the khaqans of the age, qaan of the Two Continents and the Two Seas, the second Alexander the Great, Greater Shadow of [God] the Merciful the Compassionate, [199]" the shah wrote:

> As [my] determination is always conforming to the tradition of our fathers and forefathers in consolidating the steady structure of fidelity, union, and friendship with the friends of that [i.e. Ottoman] monarch and hostility with the foes of that [i.e. Ottoman] Dynasty, the commission by the paradise-residing monarch, conqueror of domains, Sultan Süleyman Khan [II], that he had requested the paradise-abiding khaqan, my shah-father [Shah Süleyman] that the borders be guarded and the [Ottoman] dominions adjoining the Protected Domains [of Iran] be in entrustment during [Sultan Süleyman Khan II's] preoccupation with campaign, has been taken into account, and supreme effort is devoted to it.[200]

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a breakdown petition and a reimbursement edict of expenses during accommodation at Fazlıpaşa Palace, a petition of reimbursement from as well as an affirmative edict to the bread-makers at Tavuqpazarı, a breakdown of provisioned items during the journey from Constantinople to Adrianople, a reimbursement of the expenses made by horse and beasts-of-burder suppliers, travel-allowance allocations to the *çavuş*s escorting the embassy from the capital to the court, etc.

197. "*Vükelâm ile söyleşilsin, ilacı ne ise görülsün.*" Fındıklılı Mehmed, *Nusretnâme*, p. 368; also see Râşid, *Târih*, p. 554 and Uşşâkîzâde, *Târih* I, p. 400. Officially welcomed in Adrianople with a procession led by marshal of the Sultanic Council [Gedikli] Mustafa Agha and the chiefs of the Sublime Court Cavalry, Rüstem Xan Zengene was lodged at Defterdarahmedpaşa Palace. The audience dissolved with the customary investment of robes of honor.

198. *Nâme-i Hümâyun df.* 5, ent. 120; *Esnâd ü Mükâtebât 1105-1135*, p. 127-130.

199. "*Cihân-bahş-ı deryâ-dil,* [...] *qayserî,* [...] *şehinşah,* [...] *sultânu's-selâtîn-i cihân,* [...] *hâqânu'l-havâqîn-i zamân,* [...] *qaanü'l-berreyn ve'l-bahreyn,* [...] *sânî-yi İskender-i Zülqarneyn,* [...] *zıll-ı zalîl-i Rahîm-i Rahman.*"

200. "*Çûn hemvâre qarâr-dâd* [...] *iqtifâ be-sünnet-i* [...] *ebâ ve ecdâd* [...] *der teşyîd-i binâ-yı dîr-pâ-yı sadâqat u ittihâd ve dûstî bâ dûstân-ı ân pâdişâh* [...] *ve muâdât bâ*

> [I,] since the day that [my] accession to the shahly throne took place, have strived to consolidate more than ever the predecessor monarchs' peace, which have remained preserved from the corruption of the passing of ages. In this three-to-four years, during which that seditionist [Mâni es-Saadûn] repeatedly sent petitions of trickery with his own son to the [Safavid] Court stating the commitment that he hand over [to us] the dominion of Basra and [perform] other services, [these solicitations] have not been taken into consideration.[201]
>
> This Friend [i.e. Sultan-Hüseyin], who is faithful to the concord, deemed it necessary, due to the union and alliance, to make manifest each truth about what have come to pass, as they have come to pass. This plan [i.e. Ferecullah Xan's capture of Basra from Sheikh Mâni] was not executed by way of taking possession in the domains that belong to Your Most-Sublime Highness [Mustafa II]. The mentioned country [of Basra] belongs, as in the past, to You, the high-posited dominator [Mustafa II]. With regards to restituting [to its owner] what, by way of entrustment, is under the control of the viceroy of Arabistan [i.e. Huveyze], it has been prescribed to him that he act in whatever way required by [Your] decree of destiny-power.[202]

By way of this epistle, Sultan-Hüseyin also kindly asked that a definitive decree be issued to Ottoman officials in Iraq to deal with the Kirmanc rebellion. Additionally, "further friendly words" would be submitted orally by the ambassador. It is noteworthy that the shah designated the subjects of both sides collectively as one people with reference to the Ottomans' war against the Holy League.

The shah's epistle was in line with the general policy the Iranian government had been adhering to since 1639 and with the novelties introduced since 1684. First and foremost, it gave an explicit definition of the *consolidated*, *perpetual peace* between the Houses of Osman and Safi.

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a'dâ-yı ân hânedân [...] *est, sifâriş-i sultân-ı firdevs-nişîn-i memâlik-sitân* [...] *Sultân Süleymân Hân* [...] *râ ki der heyn-i iştigâl be-gazâ* [...] *hâhiş-i hıfz-ı sugûr ve emânetdârî-yi vilâyât-ı muttasıle be-memâlik-i mahrûse ez* [...] *hâqân-ı tûbâ-âşiyân* [...] *Şâh Babam* [...] *nümûde bûdend manzûr-ı nazar-ı itibâr dâşte eâli-i himmet* [...] *be-dân maqsûr est.*"

201. "[...] *Ez rûzî ki* [...] *cülûs ber evreng-i* [...] *şâhî rûy dâde, bîşter ez pîşter istihkâm-ı* [...] *sulh...-i selâtîn-i* [...] *selef ki be-mürûr-ı dühûr* [...] *ez* [...] *halel mahfûz* [...] *mânde kûşîde* [...] *Der în se çehâr sâl ki mükerrer ez ân fitne-engîz arâiz-i hîle-âmîz müş'ir ber taahhüdât-ı teslîm-i vilâyet-i Basra ve hidemât-ı dîger bâ veled-i* [...] *hud be-derbâr* [...] *firistâd,* [...] *melhûz* [...] *negerdîd.*"

202. "[...] *İn dûst-i sâdıqü'l-vifâq ez* [...] *yegânegî ve ittifâq lâzım dânest ki* [...] *her haqîqat-ı vâqiî-i muqaddime* [...] *râ hasbü'l-vâqı zâhir sâhte* [...] *encâm-ı în meram ne ez râh-ı tasarruf der memâlik-i müteallıqe be-ân a'la-cenâb* [...] *bûde* [...] *ülke-i mezbûr kemâkân nisbet be* [...] *ân hıdîv-i bülend-mekân dâred. Der bâb-ı sipurden-i ân ki ber sebîl-i emânet der zabt-ı vâlî-yi Arabistân est, be-müşârun ileyh muqarrer şüde ki her nahv ki be-muqtezâ-yı fermân-ı qader-tüvân bâşed be-amel âvered.*"

In recognition thereof, Sultan-Hüseyin had no choice but to designate the Iranian presence in Basra as an entrustment; the province was standing by for the padishah to take over. Given the chronology and calendar of the latest developments, it can safely be said that the shah had not entertained another thought about the fate of the province since he had happened to find it under his indirect control. In an alternative setting, his government could well have argued that because Mâni es-Saadûn had already ousted the Ottoman monarchy from Basra and that Seyyid Ferecullah had taken the province from rebels and not from the monarchy, the shah had a legitimate claim in keeping it – this is almost exactly how the last Ottoman-Safavid war (of 1623-1639) had broken out over Baghdad. The nature of the Ottoman-Safavid interaction from 1639 to 1686, defined by *non-hostility* and mere *friendly* relations, would probably not have prescribed the restitution.

The first inhibitory principle that ruled out this possibility was that Basra, once a tributary government, had been first converted to an autonomous fiefdom and finally to a regular province back in the late 1660s. Therefore, the padishah could jusitifiably assert that he did not seek to reinstitute a lost suzerainty, but rather to reclaim his own possession, which was a much stronger argument. Secondly, the recent rapprochement in Ottoman-Safavid relations left no room for the possibility of non-restitution, unless the Safavids ventured a war. The move by the shahly court to present Basra back to the Ottomans was the proof of the Safavids' commitment to the maxims of the post-1684 accord. This moreover crowned their previous rejections of the Holy League's repeated offers and their dedicated harmony with the Ottomans throughout the rebellion in northeastern Iraq. Thus, in word and deed, it was once again proved that after 1684, Ottoman-Safavid relations had gone beyond mere *peace* and *friendship*, and attained first *fraternity* and then *perpetual peace in alliance*, regardless of whether the parties were making these statements cordially.

While Rüstem Xan Zengene was still traveling towards the Ottoman court, the parties to the Great Turkish War had agreed in early 1698 to initiate peace talks after sixteen years of full-scale fighting. The urgent need to deal with the insurrection in eastern Iraq was a contributing factor in Mustafa II's acceptance of the grand vizier's inculcations for peace.[203] When the Safavid ambassador was in Adrianople, the definitive negotiations for peace with the Holy League were about to begin.

203. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Târihi* III/1, p. 588-589.

Notwithstanding the shah's gesture of friendship, the Ottoman State blamed Beyzâde Ali Pasha and Kethüdâ Hasan Pasha, because the Sublime Porte now owed a debt of gratitude to the Safavids due to the fact that it had to receive Basra from them, instead of taking it directly back from the rebels. Displeased with the conduct of government in Iraq,[204] Mustafa II conferred the province of Baghdad to Çelebi Hacı İsmâil Pasha with his autograph in mid-April 1698. This occurred in concert with repeated mobilization orders sent out to Diyarbekir, Şehrizor, Mosul, Raqqa, and Van. The objective was to completely expel the rebels and reinstate order in the affected areas. The new governor-gen. was also briefed about the current formal status of Basra and the state of affairs in northeastern Iraq, in line with the information provided by Rüstem Xan Zengene. The nominated governor-gen. of Basra, Kethüdâ Hasan Pasha, was reconfirmed in office. As much as 1,000 Janissaries in seven companies were assigned to Basra as the post-recovery Court Corps garrison.[205] Considering that the ambassador was still in Adrianople when the composition of the padishah's reply epistle was in progress as of April 30, [206] these enactments must have been aimed at giving the Safavids the assurance that the necessary measures were now actually being taken.

The Ottomans knew well that Sultan-Hüseyin's gesture of extraordinary good will in presenting Basra as ready for takeover could not be taken for granted. Regardless of whether Iran was capable of keeping Basra, it was also possible for the shah not to renounce so willingly his claims from a province that his vassal had captured from a usurper. Thus, the Ottomans deemed it suitable "to respond with the courtesy worthy of the glory of the Sublime State in accordance with such candor displayed to the Sublime State by the shah of Persia."[207]

This appreciation soon translated into action. In compliance with Mustafa II's orders that his ministers discuss Sultan-Hüseyin's complaints regarding the Kirmanc issue, a consultative session convened at the grand-vizierial residence after April 20, and dissolved with the following resolutions: firstly, Baban Süleyman was to be exterminated and replaced.

204. Sarı Mehmed, *Zübde-i Vekâiyât*, p. 638; Râşid, *Târih*, p. 555.

205. *Mühimme df*. 110, ent. 1570-1590, 1599-1601, 1607-1609, 1620; Fındıklılı Mehmed, *Nusretnâme*, p. 371.

206. *İbnülemin – Hâriciye,* doc. 426, the expenditure petition for, and the affirmative edict to, purchasing and crafting the (white and yellow) silver-thread, satin, purse, and the mounting of the epistle. The total cost for these items was 129 *quruş* and 3 *para*.

207. Râşid, *Târih*, p. 555.

Secondly, to enforce these measures, a Sultanic Army was to be assembled under the command of the governor-gen. of Baghdad who was to be created its *serdar*. Thirdly, cleansed of opposition, Iraqi provinces were to be reordered. Fourthly, instead of conveying the reply correspondence to the Safavids with the returning Rüstem Xan Zengene, an extraordinary mission was to be sent, for which Ebuqavuq Yeğen Hacı Mehmed Bey-Efendi,[208] former *reisülküttab* and incumbent superintendent of the State Registry, was appointed ambassador as pasha with the temporary degree of governor of Rumelia. Submitted to Mustafa II, these decisions were enacted[209] as decrees on 1 May 1698 at the latest.[210]

Apart from the official mission, it appears that Rüstem Zengene also brought letters and gifts from Ebulmasum Xan Şamlu, former Safavid ambassador to the padishah's court and the incumbent governor-gen. of Azerbaijan. One of the addressees was the grand vizier, while the other one was apparently the *reisülküttab*, Râmi Mehmed Efendi. Both responded to Ebulmasum Şamlu's letters and gifts via the agency of the outgoing ambassador, Ebuqavuq Mehmed. Amcazâde Hüseyin Pasha, who most probably had not met Ebulmasum Şamlu "his Highness, resort of xanship[211]" during the latter's embassy but received gifts and a letter as courtesy, named the exchange an ancient tradition. In conformity with the relevance of his office rather than his person in this correspondence, he emphasized the ancient, hereditary, traditional, and continuous character of the friendship between the two states. He also mentioned in this courtesy reply that Ottoman ambassador Ebuqavuq Mehmed Pasha was sent to consolidate the alliance and facilitate cooperation against the rebels.[212] Râmi Mehmed Efendi's letter was more intimate and less formal than the grand vizier's, lacking the references to interstate relations and instead focusing on the personal friendship between the correspondents, which must have

208. See Süreyyâ, *Sicill-i Osmânî* IV, p. 1077-1078 [entry: "Mehmed Paşa (Yeğen) (Ebu Kavuk)"]; Fındıklılı Mehmed, *Zeyl-i Fezleke*, p. 1023; Resmî, *Halîqatü'r-Rüesâ*, ff. 29b-31a.

209. See Fındıklılı Mehmed, *Nusretnâme*, p. 370-371 for the list of the provincial dignitaries who received mobilization orders for this campaign.

210. *Ali Emîrî – II. Mustafa*, doc. 1866 – petition by the fifteen Sultanic Council *çavuş*s who were to escort ambassador Ebuqavuq Mehmed until the Iranian border, the to-be-allocated travel-expenses, and its approval by the grand vizierate on 2 May 1698 with referral to the financial departments. Also see *Ali Emîrî – II. Mustafa,* doc. 1867, 4570, 4609 – decrees issued on 9 May 1698 to provincial magistrates for the providing of treasury subventions to the embassy from Adrianople until the Iranian border.

211. "cenâb-ı xâniyet-meâb, fütüvvet-nisâb."

212. Râmi, *Münşeat*, ff. 21b-22a.

developed thanks to the possible collaboration during Ebulmasum Şamlu's time as ambassador at Adrianople.[213]

Without delay, Ebuqavuq Mehmed Pasha's household and ceremonial equipment was accordingly set up with state resources,[214] and regalia lent out from the [Privy] Treasury,[215] probably from its diplomatic[216] department. The farewell audience was held on 26 May 1698 in the Sultanic Marquee,[217] as a mark of the start of the campaign season and the padishah's decision to lead it once again in person. The grand vizier prescribed the two ambassadors to travel together over the route of Erzurum. Mustafa II said: "say greetings to Our friend the Shah. The more he displays fidelity, a thousand times [of it] shall he consider from Us [Our fidelity]. And, thou have also served well, thou shall prosper![218]" Rüstem Xan Zengene set out for Iran on June 2.[219] Entrusted with the reply correspondence and gifts on May 30 during a separate audience in the Throne-Tent[220], Ebuqavuq Mehmed followed Rüstem Zengene after

213. *Münşeat 1050-1140*, ff. 149b-151a; Râmi, *Münşeat*, ff. 22b-23a. Ebulmasum Şamlu's gift to Râmi Mehmed Efendi had been brought by a certain Ebulhasan Agha along with the letter, probably within the scope of Rüstem Zengene embassy.

214. Râşid, *Târih*, p. 555.

215. *Anonim Osmanlı Târihi*, p. 132. The ambassador's regalia consisted of a bejewelled sword, dagger, and quiver. The chronicler notes that the ambassador's household lacked a military-band. Again, the chronicler confuses the Safavid ambassador present in Adrianople, Rüstem Xan Zengene, with the previous one, Ebulmasum Xan Şamlu.

216. Unat, *Osmanlı Sefirleri*, p. 24-25.

217. *Otağ-ı Hümâyun*.

218. "*Şah dostumuza selâm eyle. Dostluğunda ne denli ızhâr-ı sadâqat eder ise bizden bin qat ziyâde bilsin. Ve sen dahi güzel hizmet eyledin, berhudâr ol.*" After this farewell audience, the ambassador also received a 25,000-*quruş* travel-allowance / largesse. Fındıklılı Mehmed, *Nusretnâme*, p. 371; *Anonim Osmanlı Târihi*, p. 133. See both sources for the setup of the audience.

219. *Cevdet – Hâriciye*, doc. 4506 – the judicial deed issued by Ahmed Efendi, judge of Adrianople, on 2 June 1698 to vouch for the payment of amounts due by the state straw superindendent, Seyyid Osman Agha, to the porters who had supplied straw to Rüstem Xan Zengene, whose seventy-day residence had come to an end. See in *İbnülemin – Hâriciye*, doc. 440 the bill issued on 24 February 1699 concerning the subsidies and other costs the Central Treasury covered for the returning Rüstem Zengene embassy from Scutari until the Iranian border. Also see *İbnülemin – Hâriciye*, doc. 532, 555, 628, and 683 for other Central Treasury expenditures made for ambassador Rüstem Zengene's stay at court and journey within the monarchy. Senior [*gedikli*] *çavuş* Hacı Seyfi was attached to the returning embassy as host-officer: *Mühimme df*. 110, ent. 1916, 1932.

220. *Başçadır*. Separate from the *Otağ-ı Hümâyun* and the grand vizier's marquee, the *başçadır* was where the Sultanic Council, war councils, and state audiences were held when the padishah was personally leading a campaign or when the grand vizier was substituting his monarch as commander-in-chief. Sarı Mehmed, *Zübde-i Vekâiyât*, p. 637; *Mühimme df*. 110, ent. 1917.

June 3[221] with his 400-men retinue.[222] On July 12, a new series of decrees were sent to the governors and magistrates of Baghdad, Mosul, Van, Şehrizor, İmâdiye, and Hakkâri regarding the resolved campaign.[223]

A comparison between the daily subsidies given to the Rüstem Zengene embassy and those of the two previous Safavid missions leads to the estimation that its size was larger than Kelb-Ali Qacar's embassy and smaller than Ebulmasum Şamlu's [grand] embassy.[224] Besides, that Ebuqavuq Mehmed was sent as pasha and with the rank of ambassador testifies to the cruciality of the occasion and the Ottomans' will to make an exceptional display of gratitude to the Safavids, because throughout the eighty-four years of peaceful relations from the Peace of Zuhab until the collapse of Safavid rule in Iran (1722), he was the only ambassador-ranking Ottoman diplomat to the shahly court.

Conclusion

Mustafa II's dispatch of an ambassador to the shah both constituted the responsive step of the zenith of the Ottoman-Safavid rapprochement, and initiated in the triangle of Baghdad, Constantinople, and Isfahan the coordination of the eventual campaign. With a Sultanic Army, however,

221. *Ali Emîrî – II. Mustafa*, doc. 1868 – the ambassador's petition to the grand vizier requesting extra funds and twenty pack-horses in addition to the fifty that he had already been given. The grand vizier approved the request on 3 June 1698. Also see the decree issued to the ambassador in late May / early June 1698 charging him with maintaining the discipline in the mission and empowering him with full authority over the entire Court personnel in the embassy, *Mühimme df.* 110, ent. 1929, 1931. Sixty to seventy of those in the Ottoman embassy were guardsmen; Nasîrî, *Düstûr-i Şehriyârân*, p. 215. See also *Ali Emîrî – II. Mustafa,* doc. 6459 and 6460; *İbnülemin – Hâriciye,* doc. 439, 531, and 559.

222. Matthee, "Basra," p. 75.

223. Uşşâkîzâde, *Târih* I, p. 400. The chronicler erroneously provides the year h.1109, which should have been h.1110. The decrees were conveyed by *qapıcıbaşı* Abdurrahman Agha.

224. See in *İbnülemin – Hâriciye*, doc. 521 the decree issued on 16 June 1698 to all provincial magistrates from Scutari until the Iranian border to provide a daily subsidy of 190,64 *quruş* (22,877 non-debased *aqçe*) for the embassy, billable to the Central Treasury. This amount corresponds with the daily subsidy the embassy had been receiving since arriving in Constantinople, and is close to the amount that had been paid from its entry to Ottoman territory until arrival in Constantinople, 179,44 *quruş* (21,533 non-debased *aqçe*, see *İbnülemin – Hâriciye*, doc. 522 for the amount and the conversion rate of 120 non-debased *aqçe* per *quruş* [Dutch thaler]). This document series also includes judicial-deeds from several judges documenting the disbursement and deduction of this amount from the taxes due. There are also several documents of the same type regarding the Ebulmasum Şamlu embassy.

the Ottomans would not only crush the secessionist tribal confederations in eastern Iraq but also make an explicit show of force against Iran. From 1702 onwards, the relations between the Houses of Osman and Safi would begin to deteriorate. After the expiration of the international circumstances that had led to an unprecedented concord between the two states and the coming to power of an anti-Ottoman government in Iran, relations would be characterized by a sharp escalation of tensions manifesting themselves in the form of diplomatic insults at courtly level and cross-border conflict along the frontier. Nevertheless, although the achievements of the 1684-1701 rapprochement would be partially undone by degrees, the parties would still, on some occasions, pay lip service to their *fraternity*, *alliance*, and *perpetual peace*. The Ottoman-predominant nature of the bilateral hierarchy as well as the balance of power would remain intact, and interstate hostilities would not ensue until the very end.[225]

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Selim Güngörürler, *Fraternity, Perpetual Peace, and Alliance in Ottoman-Safavid Relations, 1688-1698: A Diplomatic Revolution in the Middle East*

As a legacy of a war-oriented reading of the Ottoman-Safavid relations before the treaty of Zuhab, the peacetime after 1639 is considered to have transpired uneventfully. Contrary to this assumption, for eighty-four years the two states maintained an active diplomacy and intensively dealt with each other in a range of substantial matters both on courtly platform and along the common frontier. This article focuses on the culmination of the harmony between the Sublime Porte and the Iranian government (1688-1698). This unique convergence between the Houses of Osman and Safi materialized due to third-party factors as well as bilateral dynamics. In this decade, the two monarchies entrusted the safety of their shared border to each other, exchanged game-changing correspondence via successive missions, and declared their *fraternity*, *perpetual peace*, and *alliance* – all without breaching the hierarchical inequality in their relations.

Selim Güngörürler, *Fraternité, paix perpétuelle et alliance dans les relations osmano-safavides, 1688-1698 : Une révolution diplomatique au Moyen-Orient*

En raison d'une lecture guerrière des relations osmano-safavides avant le traité de Zuhab, on a tendance à considérer que la période de paix qui suivit 1639 ne connut aucun événement d'importance. Pourtant, les deux États, au cours de ces 84 ans, ont entretenu une active diplomatie et ont réglé des questions importantes tant à la Cour que sur la frontière. Cet article est consacré à cette période où

règne la meilleure harmonie entre la Sublime Porte et le gouvernement iranien (1688-1698). Cette convergence unique entre les maisons d'Osman et de Safi s'est matérialisée à la fois en raison de facteurs extérieurs et de dynamiques bilatérales. Dans cette décennie, les deux monarchies ont collaboré pour la défense de leur frontière commune, ont échangé des correspondances novatrices par des missions successives et ont entretenu de fraternelles relations de paix et d'alliance perpétuelles, le tout sans rupture de l'inégalité hiérarchique dans leurs relations.