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**SUPERVISOR**
**DOÇ. Dr. GONCA OĞUZ GÖK**

**İSTANBUL, 2022**

# ÖZET

## ÇATIŞMA ÇÖZÜMÜNDE ECOWAS'IN ROLÜ: LİBERYA VE SİERRA-LEONE ÖRNEKLERİNİN KARŞILAŞTIRMALI ANALİZİ.

Bu tez karşılaştırmalı vaka analizi ile Liberya ve Sierra Leone iç savaşlarında başlangıçtan barış ve güvenliğin sağlanmasına kadar olan dönemde ECOWAS'ın çatışma çözümündeki rolünü analiz etmeyi hedeflemektedir. ECOWAS neden 1990'dan itibaren siyasi derinleşmeyi seçti ve Batı Afrika'da yaşanan iç savaşların çözümünde rolü nedir? ECOWAS'ın Liberya ve Sierra Leone ihtilaflarını çözmek için kullandığı mekanizmalar nelerdir? Liberya ve Sierra Leone iç Savaşlarında ECOWAS'ın çatışma çözümü rolünü uluslararası, bölgesel ve yerel düzeylerde etkileyen nedensel faktörler nasıl değerlendirilir?

Bu araştırmayı gerçekleştirmek için karşılaştırmalı vaka çalışması metodolojisi kullanılmıştır. Neofonksiyonel yaklaşım, bölgedeki ekonomik entegrasyon süreçlerini anlamak için bir çerçeve görevi görür. Bu nedenle de ECOWAS'ın bir ekonomik entegrasyondan çatışma çözümü rolüne evrimine ikna edici açıklamalar sunmaktadır. Ancak Batı Afrika'da bölgesel ekonomik entegrasyon süreci, ekonomik kalkınma ile siyasi istikrar arasında sıkı bir ilişki olduğu için; barış ve güvenlik garantisi olmadan yürütülemez. Dolayısıyla Batı Afrika'nın bölgesel çok taraflılığı, ECOWAS'ın Liberya ve Sierra Leone örneklerinde olduğu gibi üye ülkelerdeki çatışma çözme misyonlarının başarısını etkileyen nedensel faktörler ile de yakından ilişkilidir. ECOWAS'ın Liberya ve Sierra Leone'de yaşanan çatışmaların çözümü misyonlarını etkileyen uluslararası, bölgesel ve yerel düzeydeki nedensel faktörlerin analizinde ise sırasıyla realizm, sosyal inşacılık ve üçüncü dünya yaklaşımı ikna edici açıklamalar sunar.



**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Batı Afrika Ekonomik Topluluğu, İç Savaşlar, Liberya, Çatışma Çözümü, Sierra-Leone, Batı Afrika Ülkeleri.

## ABSTRACT

## THE ROLE OF ECOWAS IN CONFLICTS RESOLUTION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY ON THE CASES OF LIBERIA AND SIERRA-LEONE.

This thesis aims to analyze the role of ECOWAS in conflict resolution by conducting a cooperative case study on Liberia and Sierra Leone civil wars. Why did ECOWAS opt for political deepening from 1990 and what was its role in West Africa? What are the conflict resolution mechanisms that ECOWAS used to resolve the Liberian and Sierra Leonean conflicts? How to assess the causal factors affecting the ECOWAS conflict resolution role in Liberia and Sierra Leonean Civil Wars at the International, regional and domestic levels?

To carry out this research, the comparative case study methodology is used. Neofunctionalism serves as a framework for understanding the processes of economic integration in a region. That's why it provides persuasive arguments for explain the evolution of ECOWAS from an economic integration to adopting conflict resolution roles. However, the process of regional economic integration in West Afrika has been tied to peace and security since there is a strong correlation between economic development and political stability. Therefore regional multilateralism of West Africa could better be understood by analyzing the casual factors that affect the ECOWAS conflict resolution role at international, regional and domestic level. Realism, Social Constructivism and Third World Approach provides persuasive explanations for the successes and failures of ECOWAS conflict resolution role in Liberia and Sierra Leone civil wars at international, regional and domestic level.



**Keywords:** Economic Community of West Africa, Civil Wars, Liberia, Resolution, Sierra-Leone, West African Countries**.**

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Finally, I glorify Almighty Allah, the Creator of the heavens and the earth for granting me the health, strength, courage, patience, and life to carry out this research.

## DEDICATIONS

I dedicate this thesis to:

My parents: ISSAKA Soumanou, ISSAKA Fousséni, MAMAM Mariama;

My late grandfather BODI Issaka and my late grandmother KINDOU Azétou for their wisdoms which they taught me during all the years that I lived by their side;

My junior brothers and sisters: ISSAKA Idrissou, ISSAKA Moubarak, ISSAKA Latifath and my late junior sister ISSAKA Sadiath;

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All governmental and non-governmental, regional, continental, and global organizations, and all actions of individuals or collectively who do everything to ensure that peace and security reigns in the world because without peace and security, human life would be hell.

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## LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

**ACHPR**: African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights

**AEC:** African Economic Community

**AEF**: French Equatorial Africa

**A / MLS**: Army / Sudan Liberation Movement

**AFDB**: African Development Bank

**ALALC**: Latin American Free Trade Association

**AMU**: Arab Maghreb Union

**AOF**: French West Africa

**AU**: African Union

**BCEAO**: Central Bank of West African States

**BOAD**: West African Development Bank

**CAEU**: Council of Arab Economic Unity

**CDDA**: Community for the Development of Southern Africa

**CE**: Agreement Council

**CEA**: Economic Commission for Africa

**CEAO**: Economic Community of West Africa

**CFA**: African Financial Community

**COMESA**: Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa

**CPM**: Standing Mediation Committee

**DDU**: Single customs declaration

**EAC**: East African Community

**EBID**: ECOWAS Investment and Development Bank

**ECB**: European Central Bank

**ECCAS**: Economic Community of Central African States

**ECOWAS**: Economic Community of West African States

**ECOMICI**: ECOWAS mission in Côte d'Ivoire

**ECOMIL**: ECOWAS mission in Liberia

**ECOMOG**: Economic Community of West African States Cease-fire Monitoring Group

**EU**: European Union

**FRANC (CFA)**: Franc from the French colonies in Africa

**GDP**: Gross domestic product

**GATT**: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

**GDP**: Gross Domestic Product

**GRC**: Management and conflict resolution of African Union

**ICJ**: International Court of Justice

**IGAD**: Intergovernmental Authority for Development

**IMF**: International Monetary Fund

**IR**: International Relations

**JEM**: Justice and Equality Movement

**LDF**: Lofa defense force

**MICECI**: ECOWAS Mission in Côte d'Ivoire

**MINUCI**: United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire

**MONUL**: United Nations Mission in Liberia

**MINUS**: United Nations Mission in Sudan

**MFDC**: Movement of democratic force of Casamance

**MPELA**: Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola

**MUAS**: African Union Mission in Sudan

**NAFTA**: North American Free Trade Agreement

**NEPAD**: New partnership for development in Africa

**NGO**: Non-governmental organization

**NPFL**: National Patriotic Front of Liberia

**OCMP**: Central body of the prevention mechanism

**OECD:** Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development

**ODA**: Official development assistance

**OERS:** Organization of riparian states of Senegal

**OMVS**: Organization for the development of the Senegal River

**ONUCI**: United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire

**OAU**: Organization of African Unity

**PAFMECA**: Pan African Freedom Movement for East and Central Africa

**PCASED**: Security and Development Coordination and Assistance Program

**PSC**: Peace and Security Council of the African Union

**PRSP**: Poverty Reduction Strategic Framework

**PUP**: Party of Unity and Progress

**RUF**: Revolutionary United Front

**SACU**: Southern African Customs Union

**SADR**: Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic

**SADC**: Southern African Development Community

**SDN:** League of Nations.

**SDR**: Special drawing rights

**USA:** United States of America

**UDEAO**: Customs and Economic Union of West Africa

**UDHR:** 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights

**UK:** United Kingdom

**ULTIMO-K**: United Liberation Movement in Liberia- Kranh

**UN**: United Nations Organization

**UNAMID**: United Nations and African Union Hybrid Mission in Darfur

**UNAMSIL**: United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone

**UNCTAD:** United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

**UNHCR:** Through the assistance of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

**UNMIL**: United Nations Mission in Liberia

**WAMA**: West African Monetary Agency

**WTO**: World Trade Organization

**WWI:** First World War

**WWII:** Second World War

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## INTRODUCTION

## 1. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The wind of independence that blew in the 1960s[1] in almost all countries of Africa brought a new dynamism in creating post-independence regional integrations. In the general context in Africa, the first regional integrations appeared just after independence. Regional organisations were created in four regions of Africa (East Africa, West Africa, Central Africa and the southern part of Africa). In East Africa, the East African Community (EAC) was established in 1967. In West Africa, the Customs Union of West African States (UDEAO) was created in 1966. In Central Africa in 1961, the Bank of the Central African States (BEAC) was created but became the Economic and Customs Union of Central Africa UDEAC in 1964. Finally, in the southern part of the African continent, the Southern African Customs Union (SACU created in 1889, became the Common Monetary Area (CMA) in 1969. All these regional organizations have for objectives a sustainable economic development after independence by achieving common markets for the free movement of people and goods. The African Union (AU), the Organization of African Unity (OAU), was created in 1963 for political coordination in all African countries.[2] Therefore, the OAU, which became AU in the 2000s, has a political implementation in Africa as the main goal.[3]

Over time, the regional integrations have undergone multiple transformations in these four regions of Africa (East Africa, West Africa, Central Africa and the southern part of Africa). This is why in East Africa, the East African Community (EAC) which was created in 1967 has since 1996 become the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). In West Africa, the Customs Union of West African States (UDEAO) created in 1966 became the current Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 1975. In Central Africa,

[1]Keller, E. J. (1995). Decolonization, independence, and the failure of politics. *Africa*, vol. 3, 156
[2]Padelford, N. J. (1964). "The Organization of African Unity." *International Organization* 18, no. 3, 526.
[3]Murithi, T. (2017). *The African Union: pan-Africanism, peacebuilding and development*. Routledge, 12.

the Bank of the Central African States (BEAC) created in 1961 became in 1964 the Economic and Customs Union of Central Africa (UDEAC) and later on, in 1994, the Economic and Monetary Union of Central Africa (CEMAC). Concerning the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) created in 1889 which became Common Monetary Area (CMA) in 1969 for the region of South Africa, another alliance was signed with the region of East Africa, leading to (COMESA) Common Market for Eastern in 1993 to achieve in the same year the Southern Africa Cross Border Initiative (CBI). In the North of the African continent, the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) was created in 1989 to facilitate economic development among member states. This was how in the four corners of Africa, regional economic integrations began by making their appearance. Most of these regional integrations were oriented toward the economic issues of its member states. It was the desire to consolidate the economic pillars to boost the development of each region of Africa. Thus the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) emerged from the genius of West African countries on May 28, 1975, in Lagos, Nigeria, with 15 member states at the beginning.[4] Its main task is to bring economic well-being to the region by providing a free trade area with free movement of people and goods. But in the 1990s, with the advent of democratic rule in African countries, another mission was assigned to ECOWAS.[5] The prevention, management and resolution of civil wars in its member countries was the second mission of ECOWAS when the young democratic countries of West Africa began by experiencing political instability. Since the 1990s, it has intervened in several member countries to bring peace and security. Countries like Liberia and Sierra Leone were the first on the list to benefit from its conflict resolution services.[6] To better understand regional organizations in Africa, Table 1 summarizes the different regional integrations that have been created in Africa.

[4]Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), concluded at Lagos on 28 May 1975, Accessed May, 15, 2020 , https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/5560/download .

[5]Nwogu, N. (2007). "Regional integration as an instrument of human rights: reconceptualizing ECOWAS." *Journal of Human Rights* 6, no. 3, 2007, 348.

[6]Conteh-Morgan, E. (1998). "Conflict and Regional Peacekeeping: ECOMOG's Hegemonic Role in Liberia and Sierra Leone." Liberian Studies Journal 23, no. 2, 78-92.

**Table 1: Summary of regional organizations in Africa and their creation periods**

| Regions of Africa and Members States | Regional Organizations | Creation Periods |
|---|---|---|
| Est Africa | East African Community I (EAC) | 1967 |
| Republics of Kenya, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania, Republic of Burundi and Republic of Rwanda. | Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) | 1986 |
| | Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) | 1996 |
| | East African Community II (EAC) | 1999 |
| West Africa | Customs Union of West African States (UDEAO) | 1966 |
| Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. | Economic Community of West Africa UMOA West African Monetary Union (CEAO) | 1973 |
| | Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) | 1975 |
| | West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) | 1994 |
| Central Africa | Bank of the Central African States (BEAC) | 1961 |
| Gabon, Cameroon, the Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, the Republic of the Congo and Equatorial Guinea. | Economic and Customs Union of Central Africa (UDEAC) | 1964 |
| | Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS or CEEAEC) | 1983 |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| | Economic and Monetary Union of Central Africa (CEMAC) | 1994 |
| Southern Part of Africa | Southern African Customs Union (SACU) | 1889 |
| Angola, Botswana, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eswatini, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. | Common Monetary Area (CMA) | 1969 |
| | Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) | 1980 |
| | Preferential Trade Area (PTA) | 1981 |
| | Southern African Development Community (SADC) | 1992 |
| | Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) | 1993 |
| | Cross Border Initiative (CBI) | 1993 |
| North Africa | Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) | 1989 |
| Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia | | |

**Source:** Prepared by the author based on the literature on regional organizations in Africa.

Currently, the African continent has six functional regional organizations Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS-CEEAEC), Economic and Monetary Union of Central Africa (CEMAC), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Southern African Development Community (SADC) and West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU).

Liberia and Sierra Leone were the first countries that experienced civil wars in the West African part because of social concerns linked to economic and political problems. These two neighboring countries share a long border whose people have a linguistic

interpenetration.[7] They have similar ethnic groups (Kissi, Mandingo, Mende and Vai) in the two countries that lived together. The inadequate distribution of wealth and the maintenance of a large part of the population in poverty for years in a country generates uprisings that lead to civil wars. Especially, when minority or majority ethnic groups are deprived of the benefits and power management in a country, it can often trigger a civil war. For this reason, it is crucial to understand better the aspects of these civil wars in these two countries to know how ECOWAS accomplished its conflict resolution missions.

Civil wars are often painful periods in the life of a country. Because they cause deaths, displaced persons, refugees, famine, and severe poverty, they also handicap the development of affected countries. In the case of Liberia, the civil war began in 1989 because power was still concentrated in the hands of a lodge of people known as Americano-Liberians.[8] In both countries, the economic and political powers conservation was the source of the civil war. In the case of Sierra Leone, the civil war began in 1991 because certain ethnic groups (Mende and Temme) in the country did not enjoy the same privileges of economic and political powers as the Krios ethnic group who had control of the country since its independence.[9] In these two crises, ECOWAS, with the help of the AU and the United Nations, played a decisive role in bringing peace and security. The Liberian civil war that began in 1989 ended in 1997, and that of Sierra Leone lasted from 1991 until 2002.[10] This research focuses on the ECOWAS conflict resolution missions by studying the Liberia and Sierra Leone civil wars. By using first-hand sources and in-depth interviews, this dissertation attempts to provide an insider perspective towards the strengths and limitations of ECOWAS in resolving civil wars.

In the theoretical framework, to explain the process of economic integration neo-functionalism serves as the basic theory.[11] In other words, this theory serves as a framework

[7]Fearon, J. D., & Laitin, D. D. (2003). Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war. American political science review, 97(1), 75-90.
[8]Mgbeoji, I. (2004). "Liberia's Civil War: Nigeria, ECOMOG, and Regional Security in West Africa." European journal of international law= Journal europeen de droit international 15, no. 1, 218-225.
[9]Ndumbe, J. A. (2001). "Diamonds, ethnicity, and power: The case of Sierra Leone." Mediterranean Quarterly 12, no. 4, 90-105.
[10]Obi, C. I. (2009). "Economic community of West African states on the ground: Comparing peacekeeping in liberia, sierra leone, guinea bissau, and côte D'ivoire." African Security 2, no. 2-3, 119-135.
[11]Gehring, T. (1996). "Integrating integration theory: Neo-functionalism and international regimes." Global Society: Journal of Interdisciplinary International Relations 10, no. 3, 236.

for understanding economic integration processes in a region. Neofunctionalism also provides persuasive arguments for explaining the evolution of ECOWAS from an economic integration to adopting conflict resolution roles. However, the process of regional economic integration in West Afrika has been tied to peace and security since there is a strong correlation between economic development and political stability. So the conflict resolution missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone are part of the regional integration process. Therefore regional multilateralism[12] of West Africa could better be understood by analyzing the casual factors that affect the ECOWAS conflict resolution role at international, regional and domestic level. Realism (classical and neorealism),Liberalism, Social Constructivism and Third World Approach provides persuasive explanations for the causal factors that affect the successes and failures of ECOWAS conflict resolution role in Liberia and Sierra Leone civil wars at international, regional and domestic level.

The regional organizations in the four cardinal points in Africa divide the African continent into five regions. These regions bring together countries that are often close in terms of language and especially history. So, the following integrations Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS-CEEAEC), Economic and Monetary Union of Central Africa (CEMAC), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Southern African Development Community (SADC) and Economic Community of West Africa (UEMOA) draw a map of Africa with regional borders.[13] Map 1 shows the different integrated regions in Africa.

[12]Caporaso, J. A. (1992). "International relations theory and multilateralism: the search for foundations." International organization, 599-632.
[13]Fawcett, L. (2008). "Regionalism in world politics: Past and present." In Elements of regional integration, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, 13-28.

**Map 1: The different regional organizations in Africa with their member states.**




**Source:** Map of Africa regional organizations with their member states, https://atlantablackstar.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/africa-trade-regions.jpg

The different regions that this African continental map presents, followed by groupings of states, is proof of African regionalism. The different zones created by these regional integrations constitute trade zones for free trade and the free movement of people and goods. The main objective is the achievement of common African markets and a common policy in these various regions. Regional integrations are created to promote multilateral agreements for common sustainable economic development. Also, they aim to establish common economic, social and political policies. The following part contains the formulation of the research topic.

## 2. SUBJECT OF THESIS

By a comparative study, how to evaluate the achievements and failures of ECOWAS conflict resolution in Liberia between 1989 and 1997, and in Sierra Leone from 1991 to 2002 by taking into account the influence of international organizations in international level, the failures of ECOWAS leaders in regional level, and state weakness and role of individual leaders in a domestic level? Theoretically and empirically, this study aims to provide answers to the subject of this research. Explicitly, this study aims to expose the similarities and / or differences of causal factors that exist between the missions of ECOWAS conflict resolution in Liberia and Sierra Leone civil wars. To better conduct this research, the following part presents the literature review.

## 3. LITERATURE REVIEW

Several authors have directed their research on the questions of civil wars in West Africa. Through the studies of these researchers, we find that there are several causes that cause civil wars. Among these causes there are tribalism, ethnic and religious differences, poverty and often bad governance of state power where democratic system is weak. There is also discrimination in the distribution of wealth that comes from the natural resources (petroleum, uranium, natural gas, gold, diamonds and others).

The first part of this literature review takes into account the actors who are involved in conflict resolution. These are African regional organizations, missions of African and international armed forces, the African Union and certain organizations of the international community such as the UN and the EU, which intervene in civil wars to bring peace and security in countries in crisis. In West Africa, ECOWAS is recognized as the most visible integration in this sense. Its armed force ECOMOG ensures peacekeeping and security missions in its member countries. In this perspective, Adebajo, A., (2002), in his study on

the civil war in Liberia, demonstrated Nigeria and ECOMOG's role in restoring peace and security.

Similarly, in Sierra Leone, peacekeeping and security missions were also sent by ECOWAS. In moments of crisis, ECOMOG is the force that can play this role. Nowrot, K., and Emily, W. S., (1998) expose in their research the use of Force to Restore Democracy with the implication of the ECOWAS in Sierra Leone. This tells us about the need for ECOWAS during civil wars in its member countries. Often, it sends simultaneous missions when peace is threatened in several of its member states. In the work of Obi, C. I. (2009), we note the maintenance of peace by ECOWAS in four different countries such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, and Ivory Coast. These are examples of successful resolution of civil wars by this community. It should be noted that during these periods of peacekeeping by those of ECOWAS (ECOMOG), several other continental and international actors came to support. Among these actors, we can mention the African Union, the UN forces, and the European Union's logistical support. There are also humanitarian organizations (the Red Cross, “Médecin sans Frontière”, and others) that intervene to bring relief of various orders to countries at war. Kabia, J. M., (2013), addressed the importance of humanitarian interventions and conflict resolution in West Africa. Here, the researchers have concentrated their studies on the issues of conflict prevention, management and resolution, taking into account all the actors involved. They have led to the results that regional organizations are more effective in resolving conflicts because they are closer to their member states and better understand the causes of wars to find solutions. The research by Yakubu, N. S. (2015) was to know how effective the ECOWAS Parliament is at preventing conflict in West Africa. Despite its weaknesses, it demonstrates that through the promotion of democratic norms and diplomacy, ECOWAS is an example of regional integration that plays an important role in the prevention of conflicts in its area.

Touray, M. (2019), in his thesis entitled "The Role of the Economic Community of West African States in Counterinsurgency and Conflict Resolution." referred to the role played by ECOWAS in resolving the conflict in Sierra Leone to restore peace. Above all, he emphasized post-war peacekeeping because if the period of transition to peace is not well

managed, the country may fall into war again. So, peace is a permanent quest that requires concrete actions to guarantee security. ECOWAS has succeeded in conflict resolution and peacekeeping during and after the civil war in Sierra Leone.

The second part summarizes the issues of civil wars in West Africa discussed by some authors. According to Fearon, J. D., and David D. L., (2003), Ethnicity is often a source of civil war between the citizens of a country. Their study demonstrated that in the same space, certain ethnic groups consider themselves to be the most favored either because they are in the majority or because of a minority ethnic that holds all the political and economic powers of a country. This marginalization of a social layer of a country causes discontent, which often leads to civil wars. For Hegre, H., Gudrun, Ø. And Clionadh, R., (2009), Poverty is an important reason that plunges certain peoples into civil wars. In the case of Liberia, poverty had contributed greatly to the revolt. Other authors, such as Douglas, I., (1999) and Hirsh, J., (2001), have tackled the problem of the poor distribution of the diamond's wealth, which creates civil wars in certain countries like Sierra Leone. To all this must be added the exclusive policy in the exploitation of certain agricultural forests in the same country. The results of their research teach us that people go to war because of social, political and economic injustices. Nwankwo, C., (2014), in his doctoral thesis entitled "Legitimation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS): a normative and institutional inquiry", first demonstrated that ECOWAS is legitimate in its space because of its creation treaty signed by its member states in 1975. That is why it has the right and the duty to carry out missions to promote democratic standards. Above all, the researcher put human rights and fundamental freedoms forward among the missions of ECOWAS. Finally, his research led to the fact that ECOWAS is making efforts in its missions but there is much to be done to strengthen democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Gandois, H., (2009) in his doctoral thesis research whose subject is "The emergence of regional security organizations. A comparative study on ECOWAS and SADC", sheds light in the first place on the security missions played by ECOWAS and SADC, respectively in their member countries. It demonstrates that regional security is based on multilateral agreements in the signatory states of each regional organization. Regional security is a matter

of collective action. In addition, it compares the functioning of security missions through the implementation of democracy and humanitarian interventions between ECOWAS and SADC. It notes that ECOWAS has a good regional security model because democratic values are better respected in its member states. However, at the beginning, the SADC was a regional organization that fought against apparthed in the south of Africa. Until now, insecurity is still present even if SADC is making efforts to eradicate it. In his PhD thesis, Touray, M. (2019) studied “The Role of the Economic Community of West African States in Counterinsurgency and Conflict Resolution”, came to the findings that ECOWAS is an organization fighting against the resurgence of conflicts in its space. The doctoral research topic of Nwankwo, C. (2014) is titled "Legitimation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS): a normative and institutional inquiry." He demonstrated that on the normative and institutional levels ECOWAS is not yet well structured. Gadagbui, A. D. S. (2006) focused his study on "ECOWAS/ECOMOG Military Intervention in Liberia and Sierra Leone: Lessons Learned" where he set out the shortcomings of ECOWAS in resolving the Liberian and Sierra Leonean conflicts. Jooji, T. I. (1998), in his doctoral thesis entitled "ECOWAS: Conflict resolution and building a system of regional cooperation, achievements and failures" demonstrated that ECOWAS is a conflict resolution organization and a system of economic cooperation in its space.

In this literature review above, the authors have not made comparative studies on the role of ECOWAS in conflict resolution in its member states by taking into account the causal factors that affect its role in conflict resolution in three levels: international, regional and domestic. It is this void that this thesis attempts to fill by focusing on the role of ECOWAS in the resolution of the Liberian and Sierra Leonean conflicts by knowing the causal factors that affect its role in conflict resolution in these two targeted countries at the international, regional and domestic levels. Therefore, this study has the merit of making a comparative analysis of the role of ECOWAS in the conflict resolution of the Liberian and Sierra Leonean conflicts at three levels of causal factors: international, regional and domestic. How can we define aims and objectives of this thesis?

## 4. AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THESIS

### • Global objective

The motivation for this research is based on the curiosity to understand the causal factors affecting the accomplishments and failures of EOCWAS in conflict resolution missions. Also, it is for the contribution to the broad literatutre and regional organizations and resolution of civil wars. For Amina MOHAMMED, without peace no development is possible in any country in Africa.[14] Therefore, it is important or even necessary to highlight the achievements and failures of ECOWAS conflict resolution in Liberia and in Sierra Leone without forgeting the influence of international organizations in international level, the failures of ECOWAS leaders in regional level, and state weakness and role of individual leaders in a domestic level.

### • Specific objectives

Specifically, our objectives are as follows:

- The aim is to better understand the origins of civil wars that come from ethnicity in West Africa countries like Liberia and Sierra Leone;

- To study the mechanisms of conflict resolution by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Liberia and Serra-Leone to bring peace and security;

- To prove that there are similarities in the appreciation of the Liberian and Sierra Leonean civil wars and the involvement of external forces in these two civil conflicts;

- To investigate domestic, regional and international level causal factors that affect ECOWAS conflict resolution role towards Liberia and Sierra Leone.

[14] Amina Mohammed, deputy secretary-general of the United Nations, delivers a speech during the One Planet Summit in Nairobi, Kenya, on Thursday, March 14, 2019, accessed June 02, 2020, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201903/26/WS5c992582a3104842260b2740.html

The global objective fixes on the final goal pursued by the research. The specific objectives show the aspects of the subject that we want to study. To better understand our objectives, the global objective will be detached from the specific objectives. The motivation for this research is based on the curiosity to understand the Causal factors affecting the accomplishments and failures of EOCWAS in conflict resolution missions. These objectives will allow us to provide scientific work for the benefit of the universal advancement of science. It is important to note that on the continental level in Africa the African Union (AU) is recognized as the largest organization whose mission is to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts. The AU is often supported by the United Nations (UN) in its missions. Given its heaviness in these missions characterized almost by failure, regional organizations were born for more efficiency in the missions of prevention, management and resolution of civil wars. In the four regions of Africa (East, West, North and South), there are regional integrations. However, the parties most affected by civil wars often use these regional organizations to play the role incumbent on the African Union. East Africa uses IGAD: Intergovernmental Authority for Development and West Africa involves ECOWAS for conflict prevention, management and resolution missions like in the case of the Somali civil war in 1991.[15] Likewise, Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) has played an important role in resolving the crisis in Sudan since the 2000s.[16] These two integrations play capital roles each on its field of action in this sense.

There are several studies on the issues of prevention, management and resolution of civil wars in West and East Africa by ECOWAS and IGAD which are two important regional integrations in Africa in general. But this research did not address the aspects of comparative study of the origins of civil wars between two or more countries. It is for this reason that our research is oriented on a comparative study of the origins of civil wars and the missions of prevention, management and resolution of conflicts by ECOWAS which is a West African

[15]Lakew, F. (2004). “THE ROLE OF IGAD IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN THE HORN OF AFRICA: THE SOMALIA CASE.”, 27.
[16]Mersha, B. (2004). "Sub-Regional Approach to Conflict Resolution in Africa: The Case of IGAD’s Mediation Role in the Sudan’." Addis Ababa University, 18.

integration since 1990.[17] In this study we want to highlight the similarities and differences in the origins of civil wars that may exist between countries like Liberia and Sierra Leone. Thus, we can better understand the missions of prevention, management and resolution of conflicts by ECOWAS in these two border countries.

## 5. IMPORTANCE OF THESIS

In this comparative study, we want to focus on comparing civil wars and methods of conflict resolution by ECOWAS in the two chosen countries: Liberia and Sierra Leone. We chose these two countries because they are the first two neighbouring countries that experienced the first dark periods of civil wars in West Africa from the 1990s.[18] Initially, ECOWAS aimed to pursue economic integration between its member states. Since 1990, the founders of ECOWAS were convinced that it was better placed to understand its space's political, social, and economic problems. Comaparative study of civil wars resolution missions in West Africa is a novelty. But to the best of our knowledge, there are some doctoral Theses (PHD) on comparative study on "The ECOWAS Parliament as a Tool for Conflict Prevention in West Africa" done by Nansata Saliah Yakubu in 2015 and on "ECOWAS/ECOMOG Military Intervention in Liberia and Sierra Leone: Lessons Learned.", Acadia University, done by Gadagbui, Anthony Dennis Segbey in 2005.This is the reason which justifies that this thesis will bring new conclusions on the nuances which are necessary to know about ECOWAS civil wars resolution. Our research will serve as a benchmark for others willing to work in a similar field. For this reason, we find it interesting to explore this field of study.

Another advantage is that we have the skills to carry out this research because for master's thesis in 2014, our research was also in the same field "Regional Organizations of Conflict Resolution in Africa: The case of ECOWAS" but for a slightly more limited target. So, now

[17]Adeleke, A. (1995). "The politics and diplomacy of peacekeeping in West Africa: The Ecowas operation in Liberia." The Journal of Modern African Studies 33, no. 4, 573.
[18]Howe, H. (1997). "Lessons of Liberia: ECOMOG and regional peacekeeping." International Security 21, no. 3, 145-176.

for our doctoral (PhD) thesis, we consider a more extensive study for more convincing results. All these realities mentioned above constitute solid arguments for investing in this research on the resolution of civil wars by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in West Africa. Theoretically, democratization and neoliberalism theory promote norms and denounce anarchy based on regional integration. For this reason, ECOWAS was mandated to settle the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone. What can be the theoretical discussion of this research?

## 6. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Sometimes, in research, a single theory does not cover the theoretical outlines of the subject of study in social sciences, especially in International Relations (IR). In the context of this research neofuctionalism provides persuasive arguments for explain the evolution of ECOWAS from an economic integration to adopting conflict resolution roles.

However, the process of regional economic integration in West Afrika has been tied to peace and security since there is a strong correlation between economic development and political stability. Therefore regional multilateralism[19] of West Africa could better be understood by analyzing the casual factors that affect the ECOWAS conflict resolution role at international, regional and domestic level.

Realism (classical and neorealism), Liberalism, Social Constructivism and Third World Approach provides persuasive explanations for the causal factors that affect the successes and failures of ECOWAS conflict resolution role in Liberia and Sierra Leone civil wars at international, regional and domestic level. (See Chapter 5) The following table summarizes the theories that are used to explain the casual factors that affect the ECOWAS Conflict Resolution role in Liberia and Sierra Leone civil wars.

[19]Caporaso, J. A. (1992). "International relations theory and multilateralism: the search for foundations." International organization, 599-632.

**Level of analysis according to the causal factors in ECOWAS conflict resolution role and the theories corresponding to each level of analysis.**

| **Level of Analysis** | | **Causal Factors** | **Theories of Each Level of Analysis** |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Countries** | **International Organisations And Former Colonizers** | - Systemic change : end of Cold War<br>- Role of great powers and IOs<br>* UN<br>* US<br>* UK<br>* France<br>- Role of continenatal actors<br>* AU<br>* Libya | => Structural Neo-realism<br>=>Classical realism/Neo Realism |
| **Liberia And Sierra Leone** | | | => Classical realism/Neo Realism |
| | **Regional Actors** | - ECOWAS members states common interests<br>- ECOWAS as an institutional source of common identity<br>- The Role of Regional hegemon<br>* Nigeria | => Liberalism<br>=> Social Constructivism<br>=> Classical Realism |
| | **Domestic Actors** | - State weakness<br>- Role of individual leaders | => Third World approach |

**Source**: Autor's elaboration based on the frawork developed by Helene Gandios (2009)[20]

## 7. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

In the context of regionalism, what should we understand from the Liberian and Sierra Leonean civil wars and what role ECOWAS had played in the resolution of these civil wars in these two neighboring countries?

So, the main questions that will guide this research are stated as follows:

- Why did ECOWAS opt for political deepening from 1990 and what is its role in West Africa?

- What are the origins of civil wars in ECOWAS member countries, mainly in Liberia and Sierra Leone?

- What are the mechanisms that ECOWAS used to resolve the Liberian and Sierra Leonean conflicts?

- How to assess the involvement of ECOWAS in the civil wars and its weaknesses in Liberia and Sierra Leone?

Specifically, general questions above are accompanied by sub-research questions for a better understanding and treatment of the problematic of this thesis.

-How to explain the causal factors affecting the ECOWAS conflict resolution role in Liberia and Sierra Leonean in three level of analyses (International, Regional and Domestic)

-At International level how the involvement of super-powers and former colonizers affected ECOWAS conflict reolution role in Liberian and Sierra Leonean civil wars?

[20]Gandois, H. (2009). The emergence of regional security organisations. A comparative study on ECOWAS and SADC. [PhD thesis]. Oxford University, UK, 94.

-At International level, how IOs like UN and continental actors like AU involvement affected ECOWAS conflict resoluıution role in Liberian and Sierra Leonea civil wars?

- At regional level what are the effects of lack of common interest and identity on ECOWAS conflict resolution role in these civil wars?

-At regional level, how can we explain the role of regional hegemon, Nigeria in ECOWAS conflict resolution role?

-At domestic level, what are the effects of individual state leaders and state weaknesses in ECOWAS conflict resolution role in these civil wars?

## 8. STRUCTURE OF THESIS

To minimize repetitions and circumscribe the subject of this thesis in its writing to achieve good results, it will be developed through five chapters. It is necessary to add to these five chapters, two other parts like the introduction in the beginning and the general conclusion at the end, which are obligatory for a thesis. So, the first chapter (chapter 1.) addresses the theoretical part of the research topic and how to theorize civil war and conflict resolution. This first chapter has two parts. The first part will be about some popular theories and their limits to explain or not civil wars and conflict resolution. In the second part of this first chapter, conflict resolution will be theorized better to decode this concept in theory and practice.

The second (chapter 2.) is entitled sitting the empirical ground: research design, methodology and methods is a chapter reserved for the description of case study methodology. This chapter will describe the essential parts of the methodology chosen for this study. These are the documentation, the survey and the analysis.

The third (chapter 3.), which assesses regional organizations' actorness in conflict resolution: the case of ECOWAS is also composed of four parts. In the first part of this chapter, the

origins and objectives of ECOWAS will be known, the second part will describe the structure and the political foundations of ECOWAS, the third part will focus on the ECOWAS role in conflict resolution, and finally, the fourth part of this third chapter will discuss the origins and types of conflicts in ECOWAS member states.

Chapter 4, which focuses on the role of ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone civil wars, has two main parts. The first part is the study of the Liberia civil war. This part will highlight four sub-parts. These sub-part concern the origins and actors, reasons, different impacts and the actions of prevention, management and resolution of Liberia civil war by ECOWAS. The development of the last sub-part will address the prevention, management and resolution actions of the Liberian civil war by ECOWAS. In this sub-part, there are three sub-parts too. The first sub-part concerns the Liberia civil war's prevention, management, and resolution mechanisms. The second sub-part is humanitarian interventions in Liberia's civil war. And the last sub-part is the importance of the Liberian constitution during this crisis. The second part of this (chapter 4.), which deals with the Sierra Leonean civil war, also has four sub-parts. Under this second main part which describes the civil war in Sierra Leone, there are sub-parts like the origins and actors, reasons, impacts and the preventive actions, management and resolution of the Sierra Leonean civil war by ECOWAS. In the last sub-parts, there are three other sub-parts: prevention, management and resolution mechanisms, humanitarian interventions, and the importance of the Sierra Leone constitution in resolving this crisis. In this cases studies we will see if there are any similarities and/or differences between the civil wars of the two target countries. The closure of this (chapter 4.) will require a partial conclusion.

The fifth chapter of this thesis (chapter 5.) whose title is Level of Analyzes - The Causal Factors Affecting the ECOWAS Conflict Resolution Role in Liberia and Sierra Leonean Wars constitutes the last chapter of this thesis. In this last chapter, there are three essential levels of analysis, including the international, regional and domestic levels. The analysis of the international level addresses three main parts: systemic change: end of the cold war; role of former colonizers and great powers and role of continental players: Libya. At the regional level, it is about showing the role of regional hegemon-Nigeria; interest of member states and

regional organization as an institutional source of common identity. The final level of analysis concerns domestic factors. At the domestic level, it is a question of analyzing the role of individual leaders and the state weaknesses'. The last part of this fifth chapter presents the findings and assessment. Like any scientific research, a general conclusion will close this work. In this general conclusion, there will be the presentation of the problem and the objectives of this thesis, the research hypotheses, the discussion of the results and the theoretical implications, the limits and recommendations, and finally, contributions, suggestions and limitations of research. The development of this thesis begins with what follows (chapter 1.), entitled setting up the theoretical ground: theorizing civil wars and conflict resolution.

# CHAPTER 1. SETTING THE THEORETICAL GROUND: THEORIZING CIVIL WARS AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Scientific studies in International Relations, as in other disciplines, use theories to understand better and explain certain vital phenomena. Because without theories, it will be difficult to study facts scientifically. To do this, theories provide frameworks that make analyzes easy for researchers. So, automatically no scientific research is possible without the theoretical framework. For this reason, the theories in the academic field are like a light that illuminates the path of the researchers in a scientific study for results that participate in the development of science. Theories are also guides that allow researchers to stay within the framework of the engaged research. So this study is also part of the same process by targeting certain theories of International Relations to understand and explain civil wars.[21] In this case, social constructivism is chosen as the basic theory for this research. But, several other theories will also come to enlighten on the phenomenon of the civil wars to have critical points of view on this fact of society. There are neofonctionalism, regional multilateralism, social constructivism, realism, liberalism and the theory of post-colonialism, which will bring their critical views on civil wars.[22] So, how to theorize on the phenomenon of civil wars with these different theories mentioned above?

## 1.1. THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO CIVIL WARS

Civil wars, a social phenomenon that takes shape in certain countries or states, must be studied within the framework of social sciences with theories specific to International Relations. This is the goal of this subsection of this research. It shows how each of the

[21]David S., J. (1961). "The level-of-analysis problem in international relations." World Pol. 14, 77.
[22]Uglea, C. T. (2015). Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki and Steve Smith (eds.), International Relations Theories. Discipline and Diversity , Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013. Romanian Journal of History and International Studies, 2(2), 285-289.

theories mentioned above interprets civil war events. We know that a civil war arises in a state when there is a disagreement between two camps. The origins of these disagreements between the opposing camps are diverse. So, to know the opinion of the theorists of International Relations on these civil conflicts, let's base this study on neofonctionalism, regional multilateralism, social constructivism, realism, liberalism, neorealism, neoliberalism and post-colonialism to theorize them. Through these different theories, we will see at three levels of analysis (micro, meso and macro) the various actors and their roles in civil wars.[23] What are the arguments of the theory of neofonctionalism about civil wars?

### 1.1.1. NEOFONCTIONALISM

Neofunctionalism is a theory that focuses on the process of cooperation between states.[24] In other words, it is a theory that interprets the integration process. This theory explains the functioning of regional economic integrations created by certain states to boost their economic development by creating common free trade areas. States are coming together to solve their economic problems to build a robust and competitive economy. Neofunctionalism demonstrates that regionalism advocates the common interests of integrated countries. Intergovernmental relations, also called multilateral relations between several states and bilateral between two states, are based on win-win agreements. The states opt for regional integrations to form an economically strong block. This is why, in order to have larger consumer markets, countries cooperate to have free trade zones that regional organizations materialize as institutions promoting a common identity through the free movement of people and goods. Therefore, neofunctionalism does not directly focus on understanding the functioning of states but instead forces itself to explain the economic phenomena of integration and the policy implemented to succeed in this economic integration.[25] In this

[23]Temby, O. (2015). "What are levels of analysis and what do they contribute to international relations theory?." Cambridge Review of International Affairs 28, no. 4, 721-742.
[24]Schmitter, P. C. (2004). Neo-neofunctionalism. Na, 2.
[25]Sandholtz, W. and Sweet, S. A. (2012). "Neo-functionalism and supranational governance." The Oxford Handbook of the European Union 18, 33.

context, ECOWAS suit well the model of this theory in terms of economic cooperation because it was created primarily for the economic development of its member countries. The political agenda of ECOWAS based on the promotion of democracy, human rights, and fundamental freedoms comes from the objective of guaranteeing peace and security in its member states. It sends its military force (ECOMOG)[26] and multinational mediators to resolve conflicts in member countries. Therefore, regional integrations are more powerful than a state taken in isolation because they are supranational organizations that defend the member countries' common interests.[27] The supranational authorities, the states must lose part of their sovereignty for the common good. It is not the individual sovereignty of each country that counts but the common interest which results in what each country gains by being in an integration. In general, neofunctionalism fits in the same direction as institutional neoliberalism and intergovernmentalism.[28] Intergovernmentalism is profitable relationships (agreements) that governments sign for comparative advantages. In sum, neofuctionalism provides persuasive arguments for explain the evolution of ECOWAS from an economic integration to adopting conflict resolution roles.

### 1.1.2. REGIONAL MULTILATERALISM

In international relations, when two countries cooperate for their economic, socio-cultural and political developments, it is called bilateral relations. All agreements between two states are considered bilateral agreements.[29] So these relations between two countries or states are bilateralism in international relations literature. But multilateralism in the discipline of international relations is when three or more countries achieve regional integration.[30] It is a

[26]Economic Community of West African States Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) is a military force created by ECOWAS in 1991 and became a standby force in 1999.
[27]Sandholtz, W. and Sweet, S. A. (2012). "Neo-functionalism and supranational governance." The Oxford Handbook of the European Union 18, 33.
[28]Malamud, A. and Schenoni L. L. (2016). "Neoliberal Institutionalism and Neo-functionalism in Latin American Security." Routledge Handbook of Latin American Security, 44-55.
[29]Goyal, S., & Joshi, S. (2006). Bilateralism and free trade. International Economic Review, 47(3), 749-778.
[30]Ruggie, J. G. (1992). "Multilateralism: the anatomy of an institution." International organization, 561-598.

concept used to define interstate relations. The purpose of multilateralism is the establishment of standard rules between states for better development. Because, the cooperation is based on several agreements, which can be in the economic, socio-cultural and political fields. States opt for regional integrations to broaden their economic and political appetites because there can be no good economic development without a good common policy. However, any solid development needs lasting peace. It is for this reason that in some existing regional integrations like ECOWAS, there is a multilateral agenda for peace. This manifests itself in member states by promoting democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms for political stability and social equality.

However, there are times when peace and security are threatened in a country that is part of regional integration. Some states fall into civil wars for economic, social, and political reasons.[31] However, a nation at war is a threat not only to peace but also to the development of its neighbors. Therefore, in regional cooperation, the other members must embark on regional multilateralism to resolve the conflict. So, regional multilateralism can be understood as the addition of military forces, mediators, conflict resolution logistics, and other means to bring peace and security to the country at war. In the ECOWAS region, the military forces of ECOMOG composed of the armies of most member countries is evidence of multilateralism.[32] In addition, diplomats-mediators and humanitarian organizations which intervene in times of war in an integrated country are multinational. Thus, multilateralism may well explain the conflict resolution missions by ECOWAS in its member countries. This concept can also be understood as common actions that the states in a regional integration lead together.[33] Here, it is the multilateral military agreement for peace and security in the member countries of ECOWAS. Thus, to have peace and security, all member States must make collective efforts to minimize the risks of war.

[31]Martin, L. L. (1992). "Interests, power, and multilateralism." International Organization, 1992, 765-792.
[32]Kabia, J. M. (2013). Humanitarian intervention and conflict resolution in West Africa: from ECOMOG to ECOMIL. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 25.
[33]Sessay, M. A. (1996). "Civil war and collective intervention in Liberia." Review of African Political Economy 23, no. 67, 35-52.

### 1.1.3. SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVISM

The theory of social constructivism is based on intangible things (subjective objects), unlike some theories like realism and liberalism, which rely on the material (objective objects). For a state, it is not only military and economic power that must count, but also social realities that impact people's lives.[34] Social constructivism claims that social reality is socially constructed and that international relations as social reality are also a social construct. According to Alexander Wendt, one of the thinkers and founders of social constructivism, international anarchy does not exist naturally by itself; anarchy is something that states do.[35] This is to indicate that each state is the reflection of the acts and actions of its society. Military and economic power make a state strong, but it can fall into civil war if it does not have strong social cohesion. Ethnic and religious differences, tribalism, social discrimination are intangible social realities that require special attention for a stable and peaceful state. Among the philosophers of social constructivism, Nicholar Onuf and Freidrich Kratochwil hold the same opinion as Wendt.

According to social constructivism, concepts such as sovereignty, security, anarchy, interest, which are not questioned and accepted as natural in international relations are social phenomena that must be explained.[36] Unlike other theories, they emphasize on the social dimension in studies of social constructivism, the roles and effects in the processes of social construction are important. They never make a point of honor on material elements. According to the social constructors, international relations have no objective and immutable reality. International relations in historical and social contexts are changeable like all other realities because they depend on the behaviors of those who make them. Constructivism remains an effective theory in many branches of the social sciences. Its intellectual origin is in the philosophy of science and social theory. There is a general view that basically claims that social reality and knowledge are socially constructed. It all started with the construction

[34]Wendt, A. (1999). Social theory of international politics. Vol. 67. Cambridge University Press, 224.
[35]Wendt, A. (1995). "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics (1992)." In International Theory, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 129-177.
[36]Agius, C. (2013). "Social constructivism." Contemporary security studies 3, 87-103.

of the language; from this point of view, international relations as a type of social relations are a language game with its own rules, grammar and semantics.

Neorealism and neoliberalism were two theories discussed in the 1980s as part of the discussion of positivism and post-positivism.[37] Unfortunately, they both ignored international relations' historical, social, and cultural dimensions. They did not include the socio-cultural infrastructure of international anarchy, the identities and cultures of the actors in their theories. Especially with the end of the Cold War, social constructivism's critiques of those two main theories that could not explain the new order were justified.[38] The basic assumptions of social constructivism are based on a meta-theoretical (ontological and methodological) approach that rejects the materialism and individualism of rationalism. The philosophers of constructivism adopt an idealistic and holistic ontology and consider the consequences of these ontological assumptions on social research. There are many different social constructivist assumptions, but they all converge towards five common denominators: idealism, founding theory and holism, the social construction of identity and interest, and finally, sociological explanation.[39]

For materialists, the basis of society is nature and material factors; therefore, intellectual factors are secondary. Materialist approaches in international relations are rationalist theories that emphasize material power and interest. However, idealism is an ontological perspective that states that social reality is formed by the structure of social consciousness with nature.[40] Social constructivists look in the same direction as idealists and give importance to the primordial role of intellectual elements in the emergence and establishment of international relations, actors and structures as a social world. So, there is not a single meaning, not a single truth. While rationalist theories primarily seek answers to the why question and develop an explanatory theory by establishing a cause and effect relationship, social constructors

[37]Thies, C. G. (2004). "Are Two Theories Better than One? A Constructivist Model of the Neorealist–Neoliberal Debate." International Political Science Review 25, no. 2, 159-183.
[38]Baldwin, D. A. (1993). Neoliberalism, neorealism, and world politics. 1993, 11.
[39]Mann, D. (2006). Structural idealism: a theory of social and historical explanation. Wilfrid Laurier Univ. Press, 81.
[40]Pippin, R. B. Hegel's idealism: The satisfactions of self-consciousness. Cambridge University Press, 1989, P. 26-46.

develop an explanatory theory by seeking answers to questions of what and how it happened. Because, rationalist theories do not take the actors and the interests as fixed data to try to understand how they were born. They don't consider themselves to be socially constructed. Therefore, it is based on an individualistic ontology. In contrast, according to social builders, doers and structures are holistic entities that emerge as a result of mutual interaction.[41] Constructivism has an understanding that can explain change in this context.

Thus, it is a theory that can effectively explain the phenomenon of civil wars in a country. Especially in Africa civil conflicts have their origins more in intangible social realities such as religions, ethnicity, tribalism and other forms of social discrimination. On the micro level, civil wars often begin with the frustration of a politician of an ethnic, religious group and the discrimination of a minority or majority tribe in the management of state affairs.[42] The civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone are part of the same perspective. On the meso level, when the consequences of this frustration spread at the national level within a given social group, it is a situation that is not yet beyond the borders of the country concerned. However, at the macro level, civil wars negatively impact the whole country, beyond the country and become an international concern. This involves the interventions of regional and continental and global organizations. The involvement of these various organizations explains the complexity of civil wars. It is often not easy to restore peace and security in a country at war without having recourse to international bodies.[43]

With regards to specifically civil wars and conflict resolution, Social Constructivist focus on the beliefs, attitutes and perceptions of parties in a conflict. In other words, they focus on the role of "identities" in conflicts. Some social constructivist scholars also argue that "elites" play a significant role in constructing hostile identities between ethnic groups.[44] Social constructivist literature also focuses on conflict "agents" or conflict "enterpreneurs". These

[41]Wiener, A. (2006). "Constructivism and sociological institutionalism." In Palgrave advances in European Union studies, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2006, 35-55.
[42]Braathen, E., Bøås, M., & Sæther, G. (2000). Ethnicity kills? Social struggles for power, resources and identities in the neo-patrimonial state. In Ethnicity Kills? Palgrave Macmillan, London, 3-22
[43]Fortna, V. P. (2004). "Does peacekeeping keep peace? International intervention and the duration of peace after civil war." International studies quarterly 48, no. 2, 269-292.
[44] Richard Jackson, (2009) "Constructivism and Conflict-Resolution" (içinde) Jacop Bercovitch et. al. *The Sage Handbook of Conflict Resolution,* Sage, London, 172-191.

actors are generally elites- political, military, religious, local etc. [45] This in fact is crucial for understanding the domestic level casual factors and specifically the perception and identity of ECOWAS leaders in civil wars, in our case the Liberia and Sierra Loenea civil wars. Social construction explanations are also persuasive in terms of explaining the casual factors such as lack of common normative identity in ECOWAS as compared to other regional organizations that affected in conflict resolution roles in civil wars.

### 1.1.4. REALIST THEORIES

#### Classical Realism

Realism is considered the world's oldest theory of International Relations[46] despite International Relations do not have their own theories, but use theories of other social sciences to explain the phenomena of International Relations. So to better understand the meaning of realistic theory in the discipline of International Relations, it is essential to know the five fundamental bases which forge the tradition of this theory:[47]

- First, it knows that the nature of international relations is struggle and rivalry as in the case of the Peloponnesian War of Thucydides Athens and Spata, the rivalry of Sparta with the fear of power in Athens.

- Second, the main characteristic of the environment of international relations is anarchy which means the absence of international rules to regulate the abuses of states. Lowes Dickinson was the first to define the concept of anarchy for the International Relations environment.[48] According to Thomas Hobbes, the state of nature is anarchic because human

[45] Richard Jackson, (2009) "Constructivism and Conflict-Resolution" (içinde) Jacop Bercovitch et. al. *The Sage Handbook of Conflict Resolution,* Sage, London p: 180.
[46]Forde, S. (1992). "Classical realism." Traditions of international ethics 17, 62.
[47]Gözen, R. (2014). (Ed.). Uluslararası ilişkiler teorileri. İletişim Yayınları, 166.
[48]Donnelly, J. (2015). "The discourse of anarchy in IR." IT 7, 393.

beings are born free. Society limits this freedom by standards to avoid interpersonal and interstate quarrels.[49]

- Third, the main actor in international relations is the state. In this argument, Max Weber said that "The State is the one which has the legitimate monopoly of physical violence on a given territory".[50] According to realists, states are the only ones that make International Relations because these states make national and international politics. Through their acts and actions, we have the facts of International Relations. So, they can be a source of peace or civil wars because it all depends on how they use their power.

Fourth, the main goal of the main actor in international relations, which is the state, is to survive in an anarchic environment. This means that the state must do everything to safeguard its sovereignty. Even if it is necessary to wage war, all means are good to protect power.

Fifth, the main tool used by the state in international relations to achieve its goal is power. Because, politics is a struggle for power to govern human beings, it is for this reason that power is the primary goal, whatever its objective. Likewise, the acquisition and maintenance of power determine the techniques of political action. So power is seen as a difficult goal for classical realists, and a difficult tool for neo-realists, according to Hans Morgenthau.[51]

Some philosophers of classical realism are Thucydides, Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes, Clausewitz, Edward Carr, and Hans Morgenthau. It was through the ideas of these thinkers that classical realism was born. Concerning Thucydides (431-404 BC) The Athenian general had written on the Peloponnesian war between Athens and Sparta and faced with the fear of the power of Athens, Sparta asked for help from the city of Corinth and Sparta waged war in Athens for 29 years which war Athens lost.[52] He described the effect of statesmen on war in a certain causal relationship, views, strategies, balances, power relations, diplomacy in

[49]Evrigenis, I. D. (2014). Images of Anarchy: The Rhetoric and Science in Hobbes's State of Nature. Cambridge University Press, 63.
[50]Uphoff, N. (1989). "Distinguishing power, authority & legitimacy: Taking Max Weber at his word by using resources-exchange analysis." Polity 22, no. 2, 295-322.
[51]Behr, H. and Heath, A. (2009). "Misreading in IR theory and ideology critique: Morgenthau, Waltz and neo-realism." Review of International Studies, 327-349.
[52]Tsakiris, T. G. (2006). "Thucydides and Strategy: Formations of Grand Strategy in the History of the Second Peloponnesian War (431–404 BC)." Comparative Strategy 25, no. 3, 173-208.

parliament in favor of peace and war. The Florentine officer Machiavelli also had written the work dedicated to the sovereign of Florence Lorenzo De Medici in which he said that there are two types of competition, one by law and the other by force, and it is necessary to to use force in competition because the legal method is often insufficient. The manager must act according to the real, not the ideal. So, for the survival of the state, the governor can act against general moral understanding. Thomas Hobbes had translated the Peloponnesian War from Greek into English which produced the Leviathan as his first political theory.[53] Human beings struggle for the state of nature, insecurity-competition-glory. Clausewitz is a German officer who was promoted to general in the Prussian army and served in the Napoleonic wars. In his book "On War" he gave a detailed description of war's theory, nature, and elements. According to him, war is divided into a theoretical war on paper and a real war as a practical war. Although not all politics are wars, every war is political. For 20 years (1919-1939), Edward Hallett CARR studied the causes of WWII and talked about utopianism because of the prevailing view after WWI and concludes that the idealist-liberal theory has largely failed to bring peace.[54] Finally according to Morgenthau, the theory only serves to express why one should prefer one alternative to the other and what will be gained if this is done. For this reason, in response to Morgenthau's assertion, neo-realism emerges, asserting that International Relations is a universally valid dynamic that does not change with conditions.[55]

**Neorealism**

Neorealism is a theory born from the critique of classical realism, which promotes the survival of the state through military and economic power only. However, for the philosophers of neorealism, the frantic race of this power engages the states in competition, which generates anarchy.[56] Anarchy is a disorganization of the social structure, leading to

[53]Evrigenis, I. D. (2014). Images of Anarchy: The Rhetoric and Science in Hobbes's State of Nature. Cambridge University Press, 125.
[54]Carr, E. H. and COX, M. (1946). The twenty years' crisis, 1919-1939: an introduction to the study of international relations. London: Macmillan, 11-22.
[55]Behr, H. and Heath, A. (2009). "Misreading in IR theory and ideology critique: Morgenthau, Waltz and neo-realism." Review of International Studies, 327-349.
[56]Bull, H. (1981). "Hobbes and the international anarchy." Social Research, 717-738.

political and, therefore, civil wars. As heads of state are the possessors of power, they can misuse it to strengthen their position and maintain power. It is a national and international question here because no state lives in isolation. The world is interconnected; therefore, there are interactions between states. For this, the neorealist Kenneth Waltz (1979) in his International Political Theory, attempted to reveal the differences between the national system and the system of international relations and the similarities between the political system and the economic system.[57] According to him, the structure of the international system is organized by itself between its three elements, that is to say that there is no hierarchy here and that the principle of regulation of the structure of international relations is anarchy. The units of the international system do not differ from each other in terms of functions, that is, if there is a hierarchy in the national system and each unit assumes its own task, there is no hierarchy in the international system and parts of the system are similar in terms of functionality. However, capabilities may be different between units, that is, they differ from each other in terms of population, area, natural resources, economic, military strength, and political stability. A balance of power is necessary to prevent anarchy from becoming chaotic in the international system.[58] Power being a useful tool, leaders should use it wisely. The ultimate goal of the state should be security. Power is the means, not the end of providing security. Waltz argues that state goals, policies and actions cannot be valid generalizations.[59] So neoclassical realism claims that valid logical generalizations can be made on the contrary.

For neoclassical realism, the most crucial factor that determines international relations is the structure of the state.[60] Because when the structure of the state is not well organized, it has repercussions in social life. This bankruptcy of the state structure can cause an imbalance at the social level leading this state into a civil war. The thinkers who support neorealism are Stephan Walt, Jack Snyder, and Fareed Zakaria, among others. Critics of the realistic theory

[57]Waltz, K. N. (1990). "Realist thought and neorealist theory." Journal of International Affairs, 21-37.
[58]Stremlau, J. (2013). "Antidote to anarchy." Washington Quarterly 18, no. 1, 27-44.
[59]Quinn, A. (2013). "Kenneth Waltz, Adam Smith and the Limits of Science: Hard choices for neoclassical realism." International Politics 50, no. 2, 159-182.
[60]Ripsman, N. M., Taliaferro, W. J. and Lobell, E. S. (2016). Neoclassical realist theory of international politics. Oxford University Press, 1-15.

are opposing views that accept a realistic theory assumption and are written about realism through it. According to liberal theory, the international system is anarchic, but cooperation and competition and struggle are possible. This is the basic acceptance of liberal theory.[61] According to the British school, the international system is anarchic, but the international system is evolving towards international society, and therefore the shift from an anarchic system to an anarchic society is the fundamental acceptance of the British school.[62] According to constructivist theory, the international system is anarchic, but anarchy is built by the state, so this is the fundamental acceptance of constructivist theory. Neorealists emphasize anarchy because it is the behavior of states causing this anarchy. It is a point of view that highlights the weaknesses of realism that take power as an end. However, power is first of all a good internal organization of the state and social structure before being a question of power or competition on the international level. This means that a nation in civil war will not have enough power to play a balancing act. So, one can also understand anarchy as a state in internal conflict in which a small or a large part of the state's power escapes the political leaders.

Realist literature in civil wars also provide crucial conceptualizations and explanations. For instance, Posen (1993) argues that the collapse of imperial regimes in many parts of the world can be viewd as "emerging anarchy" in which regardless of internal characteristics of states, as sovereigns disseppear, a host of less cohesive ethnic, religious and and cultural groups emerge as being more "offensive". [63] Kaufman also contends that if anarchy reaches to a point in which the government can not control its territory efffectively enoughto protect its to protect people while the ethnic-based organizations can, then the ethnic based organizations/ groups can create a security dilemma. [64] Furthermore, Brial conceptualizes the casual factors of civil wars as "insecurity dilemma" as compared to "security dilemma" in which "national security, defined as regime security by state authorities, becomes pitted

[61]Grieco, J. M. (1988). "Anarchy and the limits of cooperation: a realist critique of the newest liberal institutionalism." International organization, 485-507.
[62]Buzan, B. and Buzan, G. B. 2004). From international to world society?: English school theory and the social structure of globalisation. Vol. 95. Cambridge University Press, 184.
[63] Posen, Barry R. 'The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict'. Survival 35, no. 1 (1993): 27–47.
[64] Kaufman, Stuart J. 'An "International" Theory of Inter-Ethnic War'. Review of International Studies 22, no. 2 (1996): 149–71.P:151.

against the incompatible demands of ethnic, social, and religious forces." [65] Brian, for instance, specifically adresses the problems and prospects for security in the Third World in the 1990s.[66] Similarly, Roe intoduces the concept of "societel security dilemma" that captures best the certain casual dynamics between different ethnic groups that lead to civil wars. [67]These concept of "emerging anarchy" and "insecurity dilemma" and "societal security dilemma" are crucial in explaining the emerging "offensive" ethnic rivalries and national security calculations of ECOWAS member state authorities which had been incompatible with the demands of ethnic forces in Liberia and Sieerea Loeıne civil wars (See Chapters 4 and 5).

### 1.1.5. LIBERAL THEORIES

#### Idealism

Idealism is a theory that fits in with liberal theories because it advocates the creation of a global society in which all states together will find solutions to their problems to guarantee international peace and security. This theory emerged as a theory of international relations in the period between the two world wars.[68] Its fundamental concern was the prevention of wars and the establishment of peace. But very in this period, idealism is often seen as utopianism, Wilsonianism, liberalism instead of idealism.[69] Some idealistic philosophers like Keynes and David Mitrany argue that only a large institution like the League of Nations could bring peace

[65] Job, Brian. 'The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States'. In The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States, 11–35. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992.
[66] Ibid.
[67] Roe, Paul. Ethnic Violence and the Societal Security Dilemma. London ; New York: Routledge, 2004, p: 57.
[68]Palan, R. P. and Blair, B. M. (1993). On the idealist origins of the realist theory of international relations. Review of international studies, 19(4), 385-399.
[69]Thies, C. G. (2002). "Progress, history and identity in international relations theory: the case of the idealist-realist debate." European Journal of International Relations 8, no. 2, 147-185.

to the world.[70] So, they agree that a world body bringing together all states is an effective solution to avoid wars between states. They were convinced that within the League of Nations member states could discuss their differences in order to have agreements. Likewise, it is important to know that international peace and security have positive impacts at the level of each member state because it is the economic and political stability of each state which generates international peace and security.

The pioneer who first used the word idealism is Birkenhead, a Rector of the University of Glasgow who presented an article at a conference in 1923. But in International Relations, public opinion thinks that the word Idealism was first used by Edward Carr in his work published in 1939.[71] Idealism has two forms, within the framework of philosophical idealism and international relations: philosophical idealism is the opposite of realism, which defends the idea that the physical universe is made up of the material world on which experiences are based, and claims that the source of existence is thought and abstract. For the idealism of international relations, ideas and projects are put forward to orient the actual international conditions to an ideal situation with a visionary project. Commonly, it is said that realism expresses what should therefore be the ideal situation, not what is real, so it is normative rather than realistic.

Regarding Wilsonism, Woodrow Wilson was the American president from 1913 to 1921 who presented his ideas for the establishment of a new world order, after the First World War, starting from a few principles whose content is non-collusion between states, the free trade, non-armament, non-colonization, self-determination, freedom of the straits and finally the creation of an international organization including the League of Nations.[72] Woodrow Wilson wanted to save the world's citizens a second world war.[73] But sadly, the ardor of states like

[70]Steffek, J. (2015). "The cosmopolitanism of David Mitrany: Equality, devolution and functional democracy beyond the state." International Relations 29, no. 1, 23-44.
[71]Carr, E. H. and Cox, M. (1946). The twenty years' crisis, 1919-1939: an introduction to the study of international relations. London: Macm, MACMILLAN & CO. LTD, 22.
[72]Ambrosius, L. E. (2003). "Woodrow Wilson and World War I." A Companion to American Foreign Relations, 149.
[73]Knock, T. (2019). To End All Wars, New Edition: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order. Princeton University Press, 148.

Hitler's Germany was not in the same dynamic as the former US president. However, it should be pointed out that there are differences between idealism and liberalism:

- Liberalism aims at the individual and his freedom but idealism proposes ideas based on an international order based on the State;

- Liberalism is nothing other than a theory of political science, because it advocates the formation and functioning of the State, but idealism is its application at the international level;

- liberalism has been focusing on the political economy since Adam Smith, while idealism has made political suggestions to prevent wars and establish peace after the First World War;

The origins of liberalism come from the medieval period and the Age of Enlightenment while the origins of idealism came from Wilsonism just after the First World War and came from the first formations of human societies. Idealism appeared in International Relations in the 1920s and 1930s to set up a world government that was a League of Nations, bring pacifism into international relations, create an international police army to promote disarmament, and establish an international legal order and create a mandate system.[74]

According to idealists, the reasons for the First World War can be understood as follows: types of state regimes, the balance of the United States, struggle and balance of power between states of alliance and understanding, excessive armament, lack of dialogue, Germany which has initiated its territorial expansion, the question of power between France and Great Britain, unfair competition between states, the separation of the Balkans and the Middle East from the Ottoman Empire and the problem of partition.[75] According to idealists, if there was an international organization and law that could intervene in this struggle for the balance of power, World War I could have been avoided.[76] All these arguments show that what is possible at the international level is also possible at the national level. Especially the

[74]Ashworth, L. M. (2002). "Did the realist-idealist great debate really happen? A revisionist history of international relations." International Relations 16, no. 1, 33-51.
[75]Choueiri, Y. M. (2002). "The Middle East: Colonialism, Islam and the Nation State." Journal of Contemporary History 37, no. 4, 649-663.
[76]Herz, J. H. (1950). "Idealist internationalism and the security dilemma." World Politics: A Quarterly Journal of International Relations, 157-180.

lack of dialogue in a state can lead to civil war. Often, this dialogue is lacking between certain ethnic, religious, and tribal groups for a harmonious living together. Without a dialogue between the different components of a society, there will always be interpersonal and intergroup quarrels that will culminate in civil wars. This is why dialogue remains the most powerful weapon for social cohesion in a state. However, sometimes for political reasons, certain leaders use the wrong technique of social division to play on social sensibilities favorable to their objectives. This leads to severe consequences in the country by social frustrations of some parts of the people. These social frustrations which come from repetitive discrimination are the origins of some civil wars in poor countries. Liberal internationalism approaches the subject of civil wars from which perspectives?

**Liberal Internationalism**

Liberalism as a political theory tries to respond to the emergence of the state. Franz Oppenheimer's theory of conquest is the basis of state organization, the desire of semi-nomadic tribes to occupy the lands of settled farming communities and be permanent there.[77] Like Thomas Hobbes, Oppenheimer believes that the state grew out of violence and conflict.[78] People are at war in the pre-stage situation, giving up their freedom and transferring them to the state institution in order to achieve peace. So, with the invention of the state, interstate anarchy automatically arose. Friedrich Engels' state is a property system based on the monopoly of force.[79] With the development of agriculture and the increase in production needs, the need for labor increased and prisoners of war were employed in exchange for their lives. The emergence of the state will lead to conflict and exploitation because the owners of properties want to protect them.

Contrary to all these views, liberal theory explains the formation of the state through the process of voluntary association and cooperation. In other words, a number of people begin

[77]Claessen, H. J. M. and Skalnik, P. (1978). "The early state: theories and hypotheses." The early state, 3-29.
[78]Greenhill, K. M. and Oppenheim, B. (2017). "Rumor has it: The adoption of unverified information in conflict zones." International Studies Quarterly 61, no. 3, 660-676.
[79]Kitchen, M. (1977). "FRIEDRICH ENGELS'THEORY OF WAR." The Journal of Military History 41, no. 3, 119.

to decide to act together on a number of issues and prepare the ground for the formation of the state. Liberal theory is opposed to realism and Marxist theory with the concept of voluntary association because man is not man's wolf and will not prevent conflict.[80] The argument against Engels is to express that those who control the state are not the owners of the properties but the state that controls the owners. According to the liberals, Engels does not read things well, so he read backwards. Liberal theory is called utopian because it views state behavior with a peaceful eye.

There are some rational propositions of non-utopian liberal philosophers. Liberal Normative Theory Until behaviorism takes over in the philosophy of science, the theories cited above will remain liberal normative theories. For John Locke, the state of nature is peaceful, but the state was necessary because the disproportionate criminal authority had to be taken from the people.[81] The purpose of the state is to protect the innate rights of individuals. Unlike Hobbes' condition, which turned into a carnivorous animal. So Locke has a limited and responsible state principle. The natural situation experienced before the state continues after the state is established. There may also be disproportionate power relations in interstate relations, but this should in no way lead one state to occupy or exploit another. War does not mean a state of nature. Emmanuel Kant, author of Perpetual Peace in 1795, argues that no one, including the state can violate the right to property.[82] In order to guarantee individual rights, a constitutional republic must be established. States ruled by the republic will naturally display a different attitude in the system of international relations. So, three conditions are needed for international peace, including the adoption of the republican regime, the establishment of international law , and the adoption of the principle of universal hospitality. That is to say, the individual is not a political element and does not have to suffer from it in the country it travels, but also for colonization.[83]

[80]Linklater, A. (1990). Beyond Realism and Marxism: Critical theory and international relations. Springer, 27.
[81]Simmons, A. J. (1989). "Locke's State of Nature." Political Theory 17, no. 3, 449-470.
[82]De Ville, J. (2019). "Perpetual Peace: Derrida Reading Kant." International Journal for the Semiotics of Law-Revue internationale de Sémiotique juridique 32, no. 2, 335-357.
[83]Petersman, E. U. (1998). "How to constitutionalize international law and foreign policy for the benefit of civil society." Mich. J. Int'l L. 20, 1.

Positive liberal theory is also called behavioralism, which is an empirical process of identifying similarities in human behavior to produce general laws. It is necessary in political science because the theories were insufficient to explain the society and the wars. Thus, in liberal theory, it is no longer a question of "what states should do" but "what states do".[84] So, positive liberal theory has three essential assumptions:

-This theory claims that the individuals in the country are considered the main determinant of politics. In other words, it is based on the behavior of the decision-makers;

- it examines the link between social actors and the state;

- it makes a point of honor on a causality between the style of regime of the theory of the voters and the behavior of foreign policy of the states.

The study of liberalism took another turn with positive liberal theory. The proof is that in 1990 Robert Keohane examined liberalism in his article on Rethinking International Liberalism in four different stages: Republican Liberalism, Commercial Liberalism, Regulatory Liberalism, and Sociological Liberalism.[85] As a critic of liberal theory, realists consider liberalism to be utopian. According to realists, the cooperation advocated by liberalism has not brought world peace. In addition, non-state actors do not exist without the consent of the state and it is the state that inspects the owners of property so for this reason the state is often the object of criticism. If for liberalism, civil wars can emanate from the nature step of human beings, from the struggle for the protection of its goods against the exploitation of the state and the failure of states to establish national and international social standards , then, the post-colonial theory advances which reasons for the emergence of these political crises?

[84]Dower, N. (2007). World ethics: the new agenda. Edinburgh University Press, 191.
[85]Keohane, R. O. (2002). "International liberalism reconsidered." Power and Governance in a Partially Globalized World 39, 39.

### 1.1.6. POST-COLONIALISM

Postcolonialism is a theory which is introduced in international relations just after the independence of the colonized countries of Africa and the rest of the world.[86] In reality, this theory signifies the continuity of colonization in other hidden forms. It should be remembered that colonization is a foreign territorial occupation and cultural domination. In contrast, imperialism is instead economic exploitation and political involvement of a foreign country in the internal affairs of another country without a physical installation. In both cases, the dominated countries are not really independent because they do not have the fullness of the politics of their countries in hand. Beyond, in the postcolonial or imperialist situation, there are always indigenous leaders who favor this exploitation or domination for their interests and for those of their colonialist and imperialist friends.[87] This control over certain countries slows down their development and creates social divisions.[88] Because, often certain social groups are more favored in this situation than others. It is from this favoritism of a number of ethnic, religious, tribal or other groups that frustration in frustration of civil wars surface because it is a political game. Clearly, it must be said that the postcolonialists play on ethnic, religious, tribal and other sensitivities to achieve their objectives which are to sign bilateral contracts that benefit them largely. Groups that demand complete independence and justice in the management of state affairs are forgotten and often mistreated by heads of government in several countries.

So, theorists of postcolonialism in international relations like Henry Schwarz, Edward Said, Gayatri Spivak, Homi Bhabha, Aimé Cesaire, Frantz Fanon and Albert Memmi denounce the continuity of these colonial and imperialist practices.[89] If imperialism is a form of political and economic domination of one country by another, then colonialism is a grabbing of the

[86]Young, R. J. C. (2016). Postcolonialism: An historical introduction. John Wiley & Sons, 57.
[87]Larsen, N. (2000). Imperialism, colonialism, postcolonialism. A companion to postcolonial studies, no 23, 52.
[88]Seth, S. (2011). "Postcolonial theory and the critique of international relations." Millennium 40, no. 1, 167-183.
[89]Wilder, G. (2009). "Untimely vision: Aimé Césaire, decolonization, utopia." Public Culture 21, no. 1, 101-140.

territorial and people sovereignty of one country by another foreign country. These two phenomena directly affect the culture and identity of the victim countries. It must also be said that the vector that capitalism has used for its expansion is colonialism. Henry Schwarz distinguished between post-colonialism and colonialism with the period of collective independence in 1947, and studies of post-colonialism began after this period with the Bandung Conference of 1955.[90] The theory of post-colonialism is critical and normative. It examines through identity and culture. Examine the power relationship between west and east. The first work on colonialism was done by Marx and Engels.[91] And in 1950, Aimé Césaire's book on colonialism had been an inspiration for the writings of Marx and Engels.[92] In his book, he said that Western civilization is incapable of solving the problem of the proletariat and the colonies. He refused that colonialism was a means of civilization, so he argues that the colonizer formed the identity of the colony.

For Frantz Fanon (1952), in "The White Masks in Black Leather", it constitutes black-white identity, and black accepts it and tries to be a white man by living in an inferiority complex without questioning the costume that white made him, that he will never be.[93] Fanon's criticism is against the black man. The way to get rid of this complex is to pretend you are black and not be bothered by it. He shouldn't be trying to prove himself in black and white. Albert Memmi wrote the book, The Colonizer and the Settler.[94] Unlike Fanon, he blames the settler and tries to determine why the black man still loves the white man. There are two types of settlers, those who accept colonization and those who do not. When the person does not realize what they are doing, they may consider giving up. The real evil of the settler is that he did not teach the politics and administration of the colony, so after the period of independence the colonies suffered. The post-colonialist trio Edward Said, Gayatri Spivak and Homi Bhabha have addressed the East-West question regarding identity, culture, and

[90]Appadorai, A. (1955). "The Bandung Conference." India Quarterly 11, no. 3, 207-235.
[91]Larrain, J. (1991). "Classical political economists and Marx on colonialism and “backward’nations." World Development 19, no. 2-3, 225-243.
[92]Cesaire, A. (2001). Discourse on colonialism. NYU Press, 2001, 1-24.
[93]Fanon, F. (1952). "The fact of blackness." Postcolonial Studies: An Anthology, 15-32.
[94]Memmi, A. (2013). The colonizer and the colonized. Routledge, 45.

essentialism in their writings.[95] For Homi Bhabha, hybridity, mimicry, and instability are a mixture and integration of two cultures.[96] The West's imposition on the East is almost the same, though not entirely imitative, but the East will never be like the West. So postcolonialism and international relations can be seen as a critical and normative theory. Postcolonial theory opposes the idea that the modern international system emerged in Europe and then spread around the world because this process is the result of mutual interactions. Therefore the process of colonization is central to the modernization process.[97] Some critics of postcolonialism say that the understanding of British school history is Europe-centered, the international order is Europe-centered and stretches from Europe to the world. Neorealism ignores the level of analysis of non-European states. Therefore, for neorealism, the international order is Eurocentric and produces general and objective knowledge. Social constructivism has also contributed to the theory of post-colonialism through identity construction. After studying all of these aforementioned theories related to civil wars, Table 2 summarizes the arguments for each theory.

**Table 2: Summary of international relations theories on civil wars.**

| **Theories** | **Objectives** | **Motivations** | **Role of state in civil war** | **View of civil war** | **Civil wars' origins** |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Neofonctionalism** | Common economic development. | Build a strong economic area for | Multilateral aid for the country in civil war. | Anarchy and disengagement of states | Economic problems. |
| **Regional Multilateralism** | Common agreements for common actions | Common advantages or interests | Mutilateral actions in the time of war | Anarchy and disengagement of states | Economic, social and politics problems |

[95]Ålund, A. (1999). "Ethnicity, multiculturalism and the problem of culture." European Societies 1, no. 1, 105-116.
[96]Bhabha, H. K. (2012). The location of culture. routledge, 303.
[97]Marzagora, S. (2016). "The humanism of reconstruction: African intellectuals, decolonial critical theory and the opposition to the 'posts'(postmodernism, poststructuralism, postcolonialism)." Journal of African Cultural Studies 28, no. 2, 161-178.

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **social constructıvısm** | Promote cultural diversity, identity protection and norms | Safeguard of cultural, ethnic and tribal identity | Political use of the differences between social groups by some state leaders | Perpetual social reconstruction through the interaction of social groups. | Ethnic, religious, tribal differences, poverty and all forms of discrimination |
| **Classical Realism** | Increase military, economic and political power | Remain militarily and economically strong and survival | Do everything for their own interests | Anarchic | Civil wars arise from the anarchy of states |
| **Neorealism** | Search for new economic partners | Strengthen their geostrategic and economic interests | Do everything for their own interests | Anarchic | Civil wars originate from the anarchic system of states. |
| **Idealism** | Resolution of wars within a global organization | Intervention of a world organization in times of war. | Promote peace and security | Lack of union | Lack of dialogue |
| **Neoliberalism** | Promotion of Human Rights and multinationals (economic development) | Promote a liberal economy and Human Rights | Unprofitable economic agreements between multinationals and states | Anarchic | Failure of economic development and Human Rights. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Post-Colonialism** | Continue control of decolonized territories and populations | Have the monopoly of territorial control and of the populations of decolonized countries. | Governance in the colonial policy of states | Disengagement of states | popular frustration |

**Source:** Author's elaboration based on Documentation of International Relations Theories.

The table above summarizes the different theories described to better understand civil war and conflict resolution. In summary, the table provides information on the objectives, motivations, role of the state in civil war, view of civil war and the origins of civil wars. In the next section, it will be necessary to decode conflict resolution in theory and in practice.

## 1.2. DECODING CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE

Several theories are used to explain the concept of civil war. So, in this theoretical part, neofonctionalism is taken as the central theory of explanation of conflict resolution experienced by the target countries of our research. But, for a better quality of this work, several other theories are taken into account to understand the subject better. All these theories will allow us to have critical ideas on the phenomenon of conflict resolution. Their arguments will allow us to clearly define the different contours of conflict resolution in order to produce good results.

### 1.2.1. CONCEPTUALIZING CONFLICT RESOLUTION: THEORIES, ACTORS AND TOOLS

Conflict resolution occurs when there is a war between two opposing camps. When peace and security are no longer guaranteed in a country or a region of the world, state leaders through international or regional organizations intervene through diplomatic and military missions to resolve conflicts. The United Nations is the global organization recognized for its involvement in conflict resolution because its Security Council is dedicated to this task.[98] Likewise, NATO is a military organization of North Atlantic states which acts effectively in conflict resolution to bring peace and security.[99] But nowadays, it is the regional organizations that are involved in the foreground in the resolution of conflicts when peace and security are threatened in a member country. For good regional integration, states need a stable environment. When a country is in civil war, it loses its political, economic and social stability. Therefore, the economic development sought by regional integration will not be achievable if there are conflicts in a member country or between member countries.

Resolving a conflict brings peace and security back to where there was war. After the first and second world wars, democratic states no longer wage war on each other. So, civil conflicts are currently the most observed, especially in poor countries. For this reason, regional organizations are more involved in the resolution of conflicts in their areas of competence. In regional integration, member states are in neofunctional system[100]. It is neofunctionalism that better explains the process of regional integrations.[101] This regional integration process can go through common economic development, a common policy and the implementation of certain common social values. However, to achieve all this, it is

[98]Charter of United Nations, Chapter V: The Security Council (Articles 23-32), accessed 17, August 2020, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CTC/uncharter.pdf

[99]The North Atlantic Treaty (1949), Article (1), accessed August 18, 2020, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/stock_publications/20120822_nato_treaty_en_light_2009.pdf

[100]Sandholtz, W. and SWEET S. A. (2012). "Neo-functionalism and supranational governance." The Oxford Handbook of the European Union 18, 33.

[101]Schmitter, P. C. (2005). Ernst B. Haas and the legacy of neofunctionalism. Journal of European Public Policy, 12(2), 255-272.

necessary to promote peace and security in each member country of the integration. Without these elements, the regional integration process will not be successful. So, in the event of a breach of the peace in a member country, the integration process does not stop, on the contrary, it intensifies between the member countries to restore stability. The member countries of an integration are in a perpetual neofunctional dynamic because there will always be questions within the organization that require answers. Also, the fact that a regional space is made up of several countries is also seen in the form of the multilateral agreements that bind all the countries of the integrated region. It is true that within regional integrations, there are also bilateral agreements which only concern two countries in the region. So, in conflict resolution, there is the integration process that neofunctionalism explains and regional multilateralism, which is nothing other than agreements that allow the states of a region to solve regional problems together. In ECOWAS, regional multilateralism can also be explained by the fact that during conflict resolution missions, the ECOMOG army and diplomats are chosen and sent by each member state for joint actions in the country at war.[102]

The resolution of a conflict involves several national actors like the adversaries of war, the regional actors like the ECOWAS which contains within the diplomats and the army of the ECOMOG and the international actors like the UN and humanitarian organizations to bring assistance to people in danger. Each actor plays a decisive role in the return to peace and security. The diplomats do good offices missions so that the protagonists go to the negotiating table to start talks for the ceasefire. The armed forces protect the territory at war against the aggressors and have their disarmament. The UN often provides support through its diplomats and peacekeepers to strengthen regional missions. So a conflict is resolved through diplomatic and military missions.[103] These tools make it possible to bring peace and security to a country in war. So, how to assess the role of regional organizations in conflict resolution?

[102]Bertram, C. (1995). "Multilateral diplomacy and conflict resolution." Survival 37, no. 4, 65-82.
[103]Fisher, R. J. (1997). Interactive conflict resolution. Syracuse University Press, 1-15.

### 1.2.2. ASSESSING THE ROLE OF REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION

With the objective of having institutions that promote identity and common interests, the guarantee of peace and security through democracy, and finally resolving their problems that undermine development, states opt for regional organizations. There are five regional groupings on the African continent that materialize each region in Africa. These regional integrations are as follows: in the north, there is the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), in the Center, the Economic and Monetary Union of Central Africa (CEMAC), in the West, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), in the East, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and in the South, the Southern African Development Community (SADC). This regionalism shows the importance that states give to regional institutions to strengthen their governance by resolving together their weaknesses (economic, political and social) for better development.[104] It is for the same purpose that ECOWAS was created to find solutions to economic, political and social issues for the common development of its member states. However, to develop, we need stable countries without war in which peace and security reign. This is why ECOWAS is involved in peacekeeping issues through its conflict resolution missions in its member states. The following section will highlight regionalism.

Regionalism is a phenomenon that designates regional organizations created around the world. After the creation of the United Nations (UN) in 1945[105] which is a world institution, its Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)[106] is intended to settle economic and social questions in all its member states. But as the Economic and Social Council is often too busy and overloaded with the resolution of the problems of planetary economic and social development, the states are encouraged to create international economic and social

[104]Baldwin, R. E. (1997). "The causes of regionalism." World Economy 20, no. 7, 865-888.
[105]United Nations, accessed August 23, 2020, https://www.un.org/en/about-un/
[106]Charter of United Nations, Chapter 10, Articles (61-72), accessed August 17, 2020, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CTC/uncharter.pdf

cooperation by articles (55-60) in chapter 9 of the UN Charter.[107] Thus, regional cooperation organizations began by being created in all continents of the world. The historical example is the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951between European states that emerged after the Second World War. The result of this Community is the current European Union (EU)[108] which is a solid economic cooperation in Europe and the world.

Regionalism is, for several states, a solution for their economic development.[109] As cooperation institutions are closer to member states, they are better qualified to resolve their members' problems effectively. Also, regional integrations are like specialized institutions that seek solutions to the specific questions of their members. They are not large organizations like the United Nations. Here, regional cooperation has specific objectives and goals. Above all, most are oriented towards economic development which does not exclude the political and the social because the three sectors go together. In the African continent, all the regional integrations that exist are primarily economic, but political and social issues are not forgotten. ECOWAS is fully involved in the same dynamic for the economic development of its member states.[110] It also intervenes in the resolution of conflicts in times of war in its member countries because without peace and security, economic development efforts will be slowed down.

Several terminologies such as cooperation, regional regroupings, regional integration, regional movements, regionalism and many others are used to designate regional organizations. These concepts describe the same phenomenon which is nothing other than regional multilateral relations. In other words, regional organizations are still referred to as international organizations but with a limited number of member countries.[111] They are regional because their ambition is not to become universal. They are created for a specific agenda in order to respond effectively to their missions. It is important to point out that in

[107]Charter of United Nations, Chapter 9, Articles (55-60), accessed August 17 2020, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CTC/uncharter.pdf
[108]European Union, , accessed August 24, 2020, https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/history_en
[109]Olberding, J. C. (2002). "Does regionalism beget regionalism? The relationship between norms and regional partnerships for economic development." Public Administration Review 62, no. 4, 480-491.
[110]ECOWAS, accessed August 25, 2020, https://www.ecowas.int/about-ecowas/history/
[111]Jetschke, A. and LENZ, T. (2013). "Does regionalism diffuse? A new research agenda for the study of regional organizations." Journal of European Public Policy 20, no. 4, 626-637.

regional organizations, members are not only from the same region but also other countries of the world can join. Geographical location is not necessary in these kinds of organizations, but the solidarity of the members counts the most. The cooperation or solidarity that unites states can be economic, political, judicial, and social. The areas of cooperation are very vast, like the needs of states for their development. So, there is always a center of common interests between the cooperants. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)composition illustrates that some regional organizations are transcontinental. NATO is a military organization created to defend its member states in the event of an armed attack against one of its members. In the list of security organizations, there is also the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).[112] The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in Europe[113] is an integration exclusively for economic development within its member states. So regional organizations are numerous and multifaceted. They are the image of the mission for which they are designed. The Arab League for example, is an organization that brings together Arabs.[114] It is an ethnic integration that concerns only the Arabs. The Organization of American States is oriented towards purely political cooperation. It is a forum in which American states discuss political issues to strengthen their political governance.

Often, continental organizations are also qualified as regional because they are not open to all states of the world. The African Union (AU) and the European Union (EU) are considered regional integrations. But integrations like the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), in the Center, the Economic and Monetary Union of Central Africa (CEMAC), in the West, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), in the East, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and in the South, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) are seen from the perspective of sub-regional organizations because not all African states on the continent are members in every integration.[115] Generally, the vocabulary used

[112]Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), accessed August 28, 2020, https://www.osce.org/whatistheosce
[113]Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), accessed August 29, 2020, https://www.oecd.org/about/
[114]The Arab League, accessed August 30, 2020, https://arab.org/about-us
[115]Sıradag, A. (2012). "African Regional and Sub-Regional Organisations' Security Policies: Challenges and Prospects." Akademik İncelemeler Dergisi 7, no. 2, 231-255.

to talk about organizations located in a determined geographical space are sub-regional organizations or integrations or even sub-regional cooperation. Sub-regional integrations are much less extensive. It is a very limited multilateralism concerning the number of members. ECOWAS can be considered a sub-regional integration because it has only 15 member states, all from West Africa. The following section will explicitly list the reasons for regional organizations' existence.

Regional organizations exist because they are important for the states that create them. First, the solidarity that regional organizations promote between member states is a force for overcoming fatalities in a union.[116] So, regional integrations are institutions of living together for states. When states are in a circle, they share their problems to jointly seek lasting solutions. State problems can be economic, political and social without ignoring the problems of peace and security because it is difficult to achieve economic development without peace and security. Therefore, regional integrations are a springboard for states to consolidate and fight together against their problems. Clearly, the ultimate goal of creating a regional organization is to be a hegemonic regional institution.[117] It is to be powerful states economically, politically, socially and militarily for the well-being of the people. Therefore, in a regional organization, the members' common interest is very important and even obligatory because the cooperation must not cause the domination of some states over the others or even unfair competition on the economic level.[118] All member states are considered equal within the regional organization. Also, regional organizations give a common identity to the creative members.[119] Because, in several regional cooperation agreements, agreements on the free movement of people and goods exist. For example, in the case of ECOWAS, there is the common identity card and passport, which allows crossing the borders of all member

[116]Smith, J. (2002). "Bridging global divides? Strategic framing and solidarity in transnational social movement organizations." International sociology 17, no. 4, 505-528.
[117]Pedersen, T. (2002). "Cooperative hegemony: power, ideas and institutions in regional integration." Review of International Studies, 677-696.
[118]PADELFORD, Norman J. "Regional Organization and the United Nations." International Organization 8, no. 2, 1954, PP. 203-216.
[119]Thomas, D. C. (2017) "Beyond identity: Membership norms and regional organization." European Journal of International Relations 23, no. 1, 217-240.

countries.[120] For the EU, there is the Schengen visa which will enable you to travel to member countries of the European Union.[121]

Beyond all that has been said about regional organizations, we must mention democratic peace, which remains very important for states[122] because democratic countries do not wage war on each other. In addition, regional organizations strengthen democracy within member countries and avoid military attacks between them. Since the end of the Second World War, democracy has become compulsory to avoid further suffering to the human race as in the periods of the First World War (1914-1918)[123] and the Second World War (1939 -1945).[124] For this reason, democracy has become the regime of governance in many countries of the world. So regional organizations can be seen as institutions that face the weaknesses of states. They are decision-making bodies to improve state governance for the well-being of citizens. ECOWAS is part of the same vision through its economic, political and conflict resolution cooperation in its member countries. In the development of the next part, the role of ECOWAS in the civil wars in West Africa will be exposed. So what are the conflict resolution mechanisms of regional organizations by neofonctionalism approach?

### 1.2.3. CONFLICT RESOLUTION MECHANISMS OF REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS: A NEOFONCTIONALIST APPROACH

The initial ECOWAS initiative was solely for the purpose of economic development in the West African region. But in the 1990s, it added new missions of prevention, management

[120]Obi, C. I. (2012). "The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Quest for Community Citizenship: Any Lessons for the Greater Horn Region?." Regional Integration, Identity and Citizenship in the Greater Horn of Africa, 237-54.
[121]Bigo, D. and Guild E. (2005). "Policing at a distance: Schengen visa policies." Controlling frontiers: Free movement into and within Europe, 233-263.
[122]Pevehouse, J. C. (2002). "With a little help from my friends? Regional organizations and the consolidation of democracy." American Journal of Political Science, 611-626.
[123]Hardach, G. (1981). The First World War, 1914-1918. Vol. 2. Univ of California Press, 6.
[124]Weinberg, G. L. (1996). Germany, Hitler, and World War II: essays in modern German and world history. Cambridge University Press, 205.

and resolution of conflict in its member countries victims of wars because economic development is also a product of peace and security.[125] The triggering of the conflict resolution mechanism within ECOWAS member countries usually is straightforward. Two organs have the power to trigger the conflict resolution mechanism when a member state is at war.[126] These bodies are the Conference of Heads of State and Government and the President of the ECOWAS Commission. When there is a conflict in an ECOWAS member country, the Conference of Heads of State and Government convenes a meeting between the presidents of the member countries to discuss the decisions to be taken for the resolution of the crisis. Depending on the extent of the war, the Conference may decide to start talks between the warring camps. In this case, the diplomats of the Community are sent to start the discussions between the protagonists. But if the war is already causing several victims, it can send the ECOMOG military forces directly to protect people and property. This military force has the role of reinforcing the government's capacity under attack to secure the territory.

Often, the friendship between heads of state does not allow the Conference of Heads of State and Government to play its role quickly. Presidents do not agree to meet to decide in the face of a conflict in a member country. To avoid this delay, the President of the ECOWAS Commission has the power to immediately send a delegation of diplomats or ECOMOG military forces for conflict resolution. In emergency cases, the Executive Secretary has the same rights as the Conference of Heads of State and Government. But this power of the Executive Secretary is rarely exploited because some presidents always put pressure on him not to make a decision. The predominance of camaraderie between heads of state worsens the situation of some conflicts, and their resolutions often become complicated. As the President of the ECOWAS Commission is appointed through consultation with presidents, he is sometimes limited in his decision-making powers in war contexts. Therefore, the

[125]Dennis, P. M. and Brown L. M. (2018). "The ECOWAS: from regional economic organization to regional peacekeeper." Comparative Regional Integration. Routledge, 249-270.
[126]Essuman-Johnson, A. (2009). "Regional conflict resolution mechanisms: A comparative analysis of two African security complexes." African Journal of Political Science and International Relations 3, no. 10, 409-422.

separation of powers between the governing bodies is not a reality. This does not allow the proper functioning of the conflict resolution mechanism in times of war in a member country.

As the regional integration process of ECOWAS aims at the economic development of its member states, during a conflict in a member country, there is solidarity from other members to resolve the crisis because economic development is not possible without peace and security. Human, financial and material resources for conflict resolution are provided by the efforts of all member countries. The annual contributions of each member country provide an operating budget for ECOWAS and allow it to finance its actions for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. There is also foreign funding and financial aid which allows integration to increase its operating budget. The military interventions are regional multilateral because even the military forces of ECOMOG are made up of soldiers from member countries.[127] Therefore, for military interventions in times of conflict in a member country, the military forces of ECOMOG come from several member countries. If an English speaking country is in conflict, the choice of ECOMOG military forces targets English speaking countries for ease of communication during the conflict resolution mission.[128] The same logic is applied when it comes to a French-speaking country at war.[129] In this case, ECOMOG is preferably made up of soldiers from French-speaking countries to accomplish the mission.

Ultimately, the triggering of the conflict resolution mechanism by ECOWAS takes place at two levels: the Conference of Heads of State and Government and the President of the ECOWAS Commission. These are the two normal channels that activate the conflict resolution mechanism in the event of war in a member country. But often Nigeria's superpower as an influential integration member also creates problems for triggering the

[127]Burgess, S. F. (1998). "African security in the twenty-first century: The challenges of indigenization and multilateralism." African Studies Review 41, no. 2, 37-62.
[128]Olonisakin, F. (2000). "The Operational Dimensions of the ECOMOG Mission." Reinventing Peacekeeping in Africa. Brill Nijhoff, 145-188.
[129]Mortimer, R. A. (1996) "Senegal's Role in Ecomog: The Francophone Dimension in the Liberian Crisis." The Journal of Modern African Studies 34, no. 2, 293-306.

conflict resolution mechanism.[130] By affinity with certain presidents, Nigeria does not favour the conflict resolution mechanism's rapid triggering. Nigeria intervened in certain conflicts without consulting the other member countries to support a friendly power. Other ECOWAS member states have criticised Nigeria several times for its solitary intervention without consultation. However, for collective interventions, ECOWAS member countries unite to activate regional multilateralism.

## 1.3. CONCLUSION

To better understand the contours of civil wars, several theories have been used as support. These are social constructivism, realistic and liberal theories, and finally post-colonialism. Each of these theories has its arguments regarding civil wars. It is important to stress that social constructivism being a theory that is based on the intangible better explains the concept of civil wars. For it is a theory that studies social constructions through values, norms, ethnic, religious, tribal, and other intangible factors. However, in most of the civil wars experienced in the ECOWAS region, the origins are found in these intangible factors. It is the ethnic, religious, tribal differences, poverty, and discrimination of certain social strata in the governance of state affairs that cause civil conflicts in West African countries. Some misguided political leaders use these differences to find their way into politics. Therefore, the role of ECOWAS is to find political solutions on the one hand to prevent this spillage of civilians' blood and on the other hand in countries already at war to bring peace and security. As the final objective of ECOWAS is sustainable economic development in its space, the sine qua non condition to achieve promotion of peace and security. This allows the free movement of people and goods. It is for this reason that it was necessary for ECOWAS to also take on political attributes. Because there is never an economic development without a coherent policy. All the great common projects of the Community will only be realized if

[130]Shaw, C. M., Ihonvbere, J. O., Gray, K. R., & Dickens, B. (1996). HEGEMONIC PARTICIPATION IN PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS: THE CASE OF NIGERIA AND ECOMOG [with COMMENT and REJOINDER]. International Journal on World Peace, 31-66.

there is peace and security in each member state. So, peace and security become an everyday pursuit. Civil wars always have negative consequences with loss of human life and material damage. It is important to note that the omnipresence of the Conference of Heads of State and Government in the whole chain of decision-making handicaps the dynamism and the functioning of this integration. Because of the friendly relations between the political leaders of the member states, ECOWAS remains a community that requires restructuring and a good sharing of power between the organs in order to be more effective. For this, it is important to take all precautions to avoid it. We will see in the second part the origins of the civil war in Liberia and the role that ECOWAS had played for the return to political stability of this member country. In the following chapter 2 concerns setting the empirical ground: research design, methodology and methods.

## CHAPTER 2. SETTING THE EMPIRICAL GROUND: RESEARCH DESIGN, METHODOLOGY AND METHODS

For (Tellis, W., 1997), methodology is the path that allows reaching the objectives and the goal of scientific research.[131] To understand the role of ECOWAS in conflict resolution in West Africa, specifically in Liberia and Sierra Leone, several methodological steps must be followed.

First, our thesis research is based on the case study because we want to do a comparative analysis of the role of ECOWAS in conflict resolution for cases of countries like Liberia and Sierra Leone. Then, the documentation is the first documentary source, which makes it possible to collect enough information on the research already carried out within our research framework. It is a mandatory step for the literature review and to enrich our bibliography. The documentation considers all the documents that can allow us to obtain as much information as possible on the subject of our research. Finally, there is a survey of types of Word file questionnaires that can be sent to ECOWAS staff for their opinions on conflict resolution missions in general and in the cases of Liberia and Sierra Leone. The next phase is the exhibition of the case study of this research.

### 2.1. CASE STUDY METHODOLOGY

The case study is an empirical investigation that deeply and truly assesses contemporary facts in their contexts, especially when the evidence is not clear between the facts and the context (Yin, R. K., 2009)[132] . Among all the methods, the case study is the method that corresponds with this thesis research. According to Yin, R. K., (1994), when research is directed towards

[131]Tellis, W. (1997). "Application of a case study methodology." The qualitative report 3, no. 3, 1-19.
[132]Yin, R. K. (2009). "How to do better case studies." The SAGE handbook of applied social research methods 2, 254-282.

questions “how” or “why”[133] , to obtain information on a contemporary situation in a true context, case studies are the first choice to carry out the research. In this case, the researcher does not have enough control over the facts because it is a contemporary phenomenon that really happened. In addition, always for Yin, R. K., (1994), sometimes to better understand all the contours of the research subject, the “explanatory” case study should be followed by the “exploratory” and “descriptive” case studies.[134] The purpose of this research is to know if ECOWAS has been competent in accomplishing its conflict resolution missions in the cases of Liberia and Sierra Leone to restore peace and security to weigh the pros and cons. To answer the question “how” ECOWAS missions are carried out, questionnaires to the target audience would suffice, but to find answers to the question “why” ECOWAS missions are carried out, a methodology is needed to reach institutional services of ECOWAS to find out the real reasons. In a case study, each actor and the target institutions are considered separately in their role. This allows you to get the most out of information by observing attitudes, motivation and possible changes in behavior. This technique makes it possible to know the difference between information from field surveys and those large groups of data and official statistics. The case study maximizes the understanding of all gray areas of the thesis. For the time being, the effectiveness of ECOWAS conflict resolution missions remains unknown to the researcher. This is why (Lincoln, Y. S., and Guba, E. G., 2000), said that “it is difficult to imagine human activity without context.”[135] For this reason, the case study is a good choice to fully understand the subject of research in order to enrich and make research more original.

In accordance with the thinking of (Yin, R. K., 1994), who talks about an explanatory part of a research,[136] particular emphasis will be placed on the reasons for the political deepening of ECOWAS to grant itself a conflict resolution agenda in its member states that it was regional economic integration. Here, the case study is important because the research concerns

[133]Yin, R. K. (1994). "Discovering the future of the case study. Method in evaluation research." Evaluation practice 15, no. 3, 283-290.
[134] Ibid.
[135]Lincoln, Y. S. and Guba G. E. (2000). "The only generalization is: There is no generalization." Case study method, 27-44.
[136]Yin, R. K. (1994). "Discovering the future of the case study. Method in evaluation research." Evaluation practice 15, no. 3, 283-290.

ECOWAS diplomats who are involved in conflict resolution missions in this sub-regional space. For (Hakim, C., 2000), "Case studies are beneficial for investigations of social groups, larger groups with a common identity, common activities or interests like worker groups and lobbies."[137] (Hakim, C., 2000), also notes that the case studies contribute to the understanding of attitudes, beliefs, points of view, feelings, perceptions, meanings and interpretations attributed to facts and things without obscuring their behavior.[138]

In the same vein, (Kane, E., and O'reilly-De Brún, M., 2001), say that it is necessary to study attitudes and behaviors "a natural setting" to have a real appreciation.[139] (May, T., 2001), talks about the need for a theory for a social science study to be of value.[140] For that, (Eckstein, H., 2000), declares that a case study fulfills all the conditions to build a theory but it has limits in front of the theories which make it possible to make the tests.[141] However for (Babbie, E.,2010), since field surveys are often deductive, this is rare and often times a theory is not tested until it is abandoned.[142] Still for (Babbie, E., 2010), the researcher must create his own theories even if the several qualitative studies use the inductive approach instead of deductive.[143] Developing theories is a good thing, but they are worthless if they haven't been tested. (Baker, T. L, 1999)., argues that "the purpose of science is to produce theories to confirm or disprove and science must test the theories that exist with new evidence."[144] This is why (Robert, . E., 2005), asserts that "the case study does not mean a methodological choice, on the contrary, it is a choice of the object to be studied."[145] To say here that the researcher aims at a process, or a target group of cases not a person. However, (Flyvbjerg, B., 2011), expresses confusion of the case study by denouncing its method and sees as a mistake the fact of believing that general theoretical knowledge is more important than

[137]Hakim, C. (2000). Research design: Successful designs for social and economic research. Psychology Press, 66.
[138] Ibid, P. 34.
[139]Kane, E. and O'reilly-De Brún, M. (2001). Doing your own research. Marion Boyars, 215.
[140]May, T. (2001). "Social Research: Issues, Methods and Process 3rd edition ed.", 33.
[141]Eckstein, H. (2000). "Case study and theory in political science." Case study method, 119-164.
[142]Babbie, E. R. (2010). "The Practice of Social Research, Belmont: Wadsworth Pub.", 295.
[143]Ibid, P. 50.
[144]Baker, T. L. (1999). Doing social research. Boston: McGraw-Hill. Biernacki, 300.
[145]Robert, E. (2005) "Qualitative case studies.", 443-466.

knowledge of concrete cases.[146] So, for him, it is not possible to build a theory by a case study. The case study is also criticized for not being representative because it cannot be generalized like the field surveys. But with (Yin, R. K., 1994), such a criticism does not hold because a case study is generalizable to theoretical propositions.[147] In addition, (Gonna, G. M., and Lombaerde, P. D., 2010), explain that the case study offers is designed for tests and illustrations from theoretical points of view and considers it as a particular theoretical framework.[148] In this context, a case study is able to generalize on the theory but on the institution of ECOWAS and if the results of "two or more cases are verified to strengthen the theory, it is possible to claim the replication according to the vision (Yin, R. K., 1994).[149] In support of the previous idea, (Baker, T. L., 1999), focuses on the question of the generalization of a study from external validity on another sample.[150] He concludes that only replication can help to generalize. So, explicitly this is not research aimed at statistically generalizing by investigations on representative samples. It is just a study that opts for a theory's explainability since the examination must be done by empirical sources and not the representativeness of ECOWAS diplomats. This method for (Yin, R. K., 1994), is called "analytical generalization."[151] But for (Stake, R. E., 2005), it may have a repeat of some answers, some activities and some problems in a case study.[152] Therefore, the results of this study on conflict resolution missions by ECOWAS in the two target countries, namely Liberia and Sierra Leone, would shed light on the situation of other member countries.

### 2.1.1. EVALUATION OF SELECTED CASES

[146]Flyvbjerg, B. (2011). Case Study. The Sage handbook of qualitative research. N. K. Denzin And Y. S. Lincoln. Thousand Oaks, CA. Sage., 301-316.
[147]Yin, R. K. (1994). "Discovering the future of the case study. Method in evaluation research." Evaluation practice 15, no. 3, 283-290.
[148]Genna, G. M. and De Lombaerde, P. (2010). "The small N methodological challenges of analyzing regional integration." European Integration 32, no. 6, 583-595.
[149]Yin, R. K. (1994). "Discovering the future of the case study. Method in evaluation research." Evaluation practice 15, no. 3, 283-290
[150]Baker, T. L. (1999). Doing social research. Boston: McGraw-Hill. Biernacki, 300.
[151]Yin, R. K. (1994). "Discovering the future of the case study. Method in evaluation research." Evaluation practice 15, no. 3, 283-290
[152]Stake, R. E. (2005). "Qualitative case studies.", 443-466.

According to (Yin, R. K., 2009), a case study investigation:

- is faced with a singular technical situation when there are several variables of interest than data sources, and therefore,

- based on various sources of evidence and data which tend towards triangulation, then,

- uses already available theories to guide its data collection and analysis.[153]

In order to find a case study that reassures and ensures replication, the prior option chosen was to test several case studies, but the difficulty remained the exact choice of these cases. Without forgetting that the primary objective of the beginning of the research was to understand the conflict resolution missions by ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone and not on the institution of ECOWAS. So the cases were chosen at various levels.

- At first glance, by defining the exact subject of the research in accordance with the stated research objectives and questions, then know the place of the study to limit the scope of the investigations. In this logic, (Yin, R. K., 2009) and (Stake, R. E., 2005), find that it is not easy to limit the cases but a considered and prudent decision is obligatory. It is wise to make a good limitation so as not to miss its target in the research otherwise, the study will not be reasonable. As part of this study, there was also a problematic but intelligent decision to be made regarding the research case. Knowing that ECOWAS is made up of fifteen member states, it was reasonable to test the success or not of its conflict resolution missions on two neighboring countries being the first to know the civil wars in its region and especially the longest of nearly ten years.[154] Thus, other countries that were affected by civil wars after the 2000s were excluded from the study. The two target countries suffered from these civil wars between 1989 and 2002.[155] Otherwise, ECOWAS conducted its conflict resolution missions in several other member countries. But the cases of Liberia and Sierra Leone are particular

[153]Yin, R. K. (2009). "How to do better case studies." The SAGE handbook of applied social research methods 2, 254-282.
[154]Mitton, K. (2012). "Irrational actors and the process of brutalisation: Understanding atrocity in the Sierra Leonean conflict (1991–2002)." Civil Wars 14, no. 1, 104-122.
[155]Ibid.

in that they were also the first two conflict resolution missions of ECOWAS after its political deepening at the beginning of 1990.[156] With regard to the target resource persons, the experiences of our Master thesis will be used to collect information from ECOWAS diplomats through Word questionnaires through emails.

### 2.1.2. RESEARCH POPULATION AND SAMPLING

The scope of this thesis is based on the problematic of the role of ECOWAS in the civil wars in West Africa. More precisely, it is to know what kind of actor ECOWAS was in the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Finally, in terms of analysis what are the different actions and mechanisms of ECOWAS in its missions of conflict resolution in Liberia and Sierra Leone?

As a sample for this study, the choice is made on the West African space. It is a comparative case study targeting two ECOWAS countries. In the following two tables, it will have all the member countries of this regional integration and in the second, the two countries targeted for this research. It should be noted that Liberia and Sierra Leone are two border countries that concern this study. These are countries affected by civil wars between the years 1989 and 2002. Therefore, they were the two brother countries to experience civil wars in the democratic period of the history of this part of West Africa. Likewise, in these two countries, we find almost similar ethnic groups. For this reason, these countries constitute an important target for understanding, case by case, the role of ECOWAS in their civil wars. Table 3 shows the list of all ECOWAS member countries.

**Table 3: ECOWAS member countries and their year of democratization**

| N0 | Countries | Independence year | Democratization year |
|---|---|---|---|
| 01 | Benin | 1960 | 1990 |

[156]Abe, O. O. (2014). "Deepening regional integration and organising world trade: the limits of ECOWAS." International Journal of Public Law and Policy 4, no. 1, 71-87.

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **02** | **Burkina Faso** | **1960** | **1991** |
| **03** | **Côte d'Ivoire** | **1960** | **1990** |
| **04** | **Gambia** | **1965** | **1965** |
| **05** | **Ghana** | **1957** | **1992** |
| **06** | **Guinea** | **1958** | **1990** |
| **07** | **Guinea-Bissau** | **1973** | **1994** |
| **08** | **Liberia** | **1822** | **2005** |
| **09** | **Mali** | **1960** | **1991** |
| **10** | **Niger** | **1960** | **1993** |
| **11** | **Nigeria** | **1960** | **1999** |
| **12** | **Senegal** | **1960** | **1990** |
| **13** | **Sierra-Leone** | **1961** | **1991** |
| **14** | **Togo** | **1960** | **1992** |
| **15** | **Cape Verde** | **1975** | **1992** |

**Source:** Prepared by author based on Building peace and democracy in West Africa, The Forum of Political Parties, the Media and Civil Society in West Africa Co-organised by the Sahel and West Africa Club and the Strategic Watch Club for Peace in West Africa Cotonou (Benin) 28 June -1 July 2005.

**Map 2: The regional map of ECOWAS member states with their flags on the left of the image.**




**Source:** Regional map of ECOWAS,

https://www.google.com/url?sa=i&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.change.org%2Fp%2Fecowas-heads-of-state-r%25C3%25A9f%25C3%25A9rendum-cedeao-des-peuples-referendum-ecowas-of-peoples-referendum-cedeao-dos-povos&psig=AOvVaw2JBFubNvvH6VWnXv6ufzVL&ust=1608219864182000&source=images&cd=vfe&ved=0CAIQjRxqFwoTCNDsto3s0u0CFQAAAAAdAAAAABAi

In general, African countries are young countries because most of them have 60 years of independence. In Table 3, we see that Liberia is the oldest country because it was independent in 1822, and the youngest country in terms of independence is Cape Verde in 1975. The wind of democracy blew in Africa from West Africa, in particular in the member countries of ECOWAS between the years 1990 and 2000. Except in the case of The Gambia, which experimented with it since its accession to its independence. Table 4 is reserved for the two countries targeted in this study to show the years of the start and end of the civil wars that took place in these countries.

**Table 4: The two countries of our case study and their years of civil wars.**

| N0 | Countries | Years of civil wars | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | Start | End |
| 01 | Liberia | 1989 | 1997 |
| 02 | Sierra-Leone | 1991 | 2002 |

**Source:** Prepared by the author based on Consolidating peace Liberia and Sierra Leone Published by Conciliation Resources, to inform and strengthen peace processes worldwide by documenting and analysing the lessons of peacebuilding, March 2012.

From Table 4, we notice that the civil war first began in Liberia on the eve of the 1990s. This war lasted almost eight years before ending in 1997. But the civil war in Sierra Leone is the longest with a duration of 11 years in West Africa. It started in 1991 and ended in 2002. It is very important to study the role of ECOWAS in the civil wars of these two countries because it was also its first missions. We can therefore describe its actions and mechanisms for resolving these conflicts. Below is an image montage combining the maps and flags of

Liébria and Sierra Leone. At the top of the maps, there is the flag of Sierra Leone on the left and that of Liberia on the right.

**Map 3: Montage of image of maps and flags of Liberia and Sierra Leone.**




**Source:** Prapered by the author based on maps and flags of Liberia and Sierra Leone.

On the image on the left side above, there is the flag of Sierra Leone and on the right side that of Liberia. The delimitation of the period taken into account by this research is naturally the beginning and the end of civil wars in each country targeted in this study. Two West African countries which were the first to experience political crises and for which ECOWAS was obliged to integrate a political agenda. Thus, this regional economic and political organization played its first role in the return of peace in Liberia between 1989 and 1997 and in Sierra-Leone between 1991 and 2002.[157] In this research, it is firstly a question of exposing the reasons for the political transformation of ECOWAS and evaluating the impacts of its enrollment in these two political crises. In the case of each country, it will be a question of understanding the missions of conflict resolution by ECOAWS in Liberia and Sierra Leone to bring peace and security. Likewise, the weaknesses of ECOWAS missions will be shown in both country cases. To carry out this research, it is necessary to define a sound methodology like triangulation.

[157]Gershoni, Y. (1997). "War without end and an end to a war: the prolonged wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone." African Studies Review 40, no. 3, 55-76.

### 2.1.3. TRIANGULATION

Triangulation is an exercise that requires having sources of evidence from multiple data. Because, when multiple information is available, it is possible to choose the best information from a reliable source. This is why (Sarantakos, S., 1994) affirms that triangulation is valued because it offers a higher level of validity and reliability. It is also based on the strength of each method overcoming the weaknesses of the other.[158] So, triangulation means further convergence which is according to (Castellini, M. A., Zanazzi, J. L., and Cabrera, G. P., 2017) "the combination of methodologies in the study of the same phenomenon".[159] For (Denzin, N. K., 1970), triangulation makes it possible to go beyond the weaknesses of a specific method to increase the validity of the results of a research.[160] In the same vein, (Lamnek, S., 2005), indicates that the researcher who chooses triangulation does not ignore other methods for a specific method.[161] In this context, (Patton, M. Q., 1999) evoke that triangulation has four essential categories: the first category concerns the triangulation of the methods that verify the logic of the results coming from the other data collection methods.[162] In this case, there are quantitative data that take stock of aspects that complement each other on the same fact. If the data are opposed, the qualitative researcher can draw as much information as possible.

In the second category, it is necessary to test the triangulation of sources by the logic of various data sources starting from a single method.

[158]Sarantakos, S. (1994). "Social Research Australia: MacMillan Education Australia PTY Ltd.", 155.
[159]Castellini, M. A., Zanazzi, L. J. and Cabrera, P. G. (2017). "Selecting working teams for information technology outsourcing projects through a combination of methodologies." Pesquisa Operacional 37, no. 1, 67-92.
[160]Denzin, N. K. (1970). "Problems in analyzing elements of mass culture: Notes on the popular song and other artistic productions.", 1035-1038.
[161]Lamnek, S. (2005). Qualitative social research: A textbook. Auflage. Beltz Verlag. Weihnhein, Basel, Retrieved July, 30, 2007.
[162]Patton, M. Q. (1999). "Enhancing the quality and credibility of qualitative analysis." Health services research 34, no. 5 Pt 2, 1189.

In the third category of triangulation, it is the choice of several analysts or observers to test the results. This method makes it possible to have different opinions on the data to be better informed.

The fourth category is theory/perspective triangulation which takes various theoretical perspectives to test and explain the data for validity. In this category, according to (Jick, T. D., 1979), adaptations to available theories are possible or the creation of new theories because often, the divergence of perspectives emanates from the nonconformity with a theory of certain aspects.[163] It is an approach that does not interest many researchers because of its time consumption and its feasibility is limited because several studies are not based on many hypotheses (Denzin, N. K, 1970).[164] It should be noted that triangulation also has criticism from certain thinkers, but it remains a non-negligible method for social science researchers.

Authors like (Flik, 2004) and (Thurmond, V. A., 2001) believe that despite the availability of information concerns, it may happen that in the case of single-method approaches, triangulation is not the appropriate method for all researchers and for research projects.[165] (Jick, T. D., 1979), finds that mixed methods are difficult for research because of the shape of the qualitative data and therefore, replication will often not be possible.[166] Knowing that the issue of conflict resolution is a sensitive mission for the regional integration of ECOWAS, particular attention has been paid to the information gathered from the target people to avoid an exaggeration in the responses. This is a way to avoid the collection of false information about conflict resolution missions by ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone. The triangulation made it possible to compare the results of the data received by word questionnaires addressed to ECOWAS diplomats and the ambassadors of the targeted countries (Liberia and Sierra Leone) and those of the data collected by telephone and Zoom interviews with former diplomats of the ECOWAS. Through the techniques of telephone and

[163]Jick, T. D. (1979). "Mixing qualitative and quantitative methods: Triangulation in action." Administrative science quarterly 24, no. 4, 602-611.
[164]Denzin, N. K. (1970). “Problems in analyzing elements of mass culture: Notes on the popular song and other artistic productions.”, 1035-1038.
[165]THURMOND, Veronica A. "The point of triangulation." Journal of nursing scholarship 33(3), 2001, PP. 253-258.
[166]Jick, T. D. (1979). "Mixing qualitative and quantitative methods: Triangulation in action." Administrative science quarterly 24, no. 4, 602-611.

Zoom interviews and word questionnaires, the triangulation method was applied to the results obtained from the two data collection techniques to choose the most appropriate for the objectives of this research.

## 2.2. DOCUMENTATION

In researching a thesis, it is essential to rely heavily on documentation. It is necessary to know the research already carried out on the subject that the researcher wants to investigate. It is an excellent source of inspiration to support one's argument in developing the research subject. This is why for (May, T., 2001), it is necessary to approach a text according to the ideas of its author and in the social context of its production.[167] In this context, the researcher has the opportunity to understand the context of the documents consulted in order to get an idea of the targets of the writings. This phase is capital and compulsory for the researcher because he cannot advance his research without consulting the documents. So, to understand the ECOWAS conflict resolution missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone, it is necessary to have recourse to the rich documentation. The choice of documentation must be made according to the objectives and purpose of the research. The documents are not taken as absolute events, especially as they are reliable records without part of facts, activities and circumstances being taken out. It is important to know that all research is done in time and space.

For this reason, Scott, W. R. and Davis, G. F., (2015) argue that it is an asset to know the stages of production of a document and its social and political context, which integrates it.[168] Again for (May, T., 2001), the documents do not simply and objectively describe social reality but particularly interpret facts and participate in constructing a version of social reality.[169] However, social, political and ideological factors impact the recordings as well.

[167]May, T. (2001). "Social Research: Issues, Methods and Process 3rd edition ed.", 184.
[168]Scott, W. R. and DAVIS, F. G. (2015). Organizations and organizing: Rational, natural and open systems perspectives. Routledge, 108.
[169]MAY, Tim. "Social Research: Issues, Methods and Process 3rd edition ed.", 2001, P. 33.

Therefore, research documents are necessary, although they are not perfect like any human work.

### 2.2.1. ECOWAS MISSIONS DOCUMENTATION

In this part of the documentation for this research, it was necessary to specifically target reports of ECOWAS conflict resolution missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone, protocols, declarations, articles, journals and books with a relevant link to the research topic. All these sources were useful in enriching this research. From the 1990s until today, academics have taken a keen interest in conflict resolution issues in Africa, particularly West Africa, by producing articles and books. But the most important thing is that ECOWAS offers documentation to researchers for all of its missions. This is a great asset for this research. The following documents illustrate the list of the various documentary consultations:

- ECOWAS reports on conflict resolution missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone;

- E-mails addressed to ECOWAS diplomats and Ambassadors of Liberia and Sierra Leone;

- Manuscripts from telephone conversations;

- Annual reports on peace and security;

- Survey results;

- Information documents;

- And archives.[170]

[170]Folder S-1834-0146-0005 - Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), accessed October 25, 2021, https://search.archives.un.org/economic-community-of-west-african-states-monitoring-group-ecomog-2

### 2.2.2. ARCHIVAL RECORDS

Generally, archives are documents kept in a place that is not open to everyone. Researchers are often allowed access to these hidden sources. So research also uncovers information hidden from the general public. Often it is through research that certain unknown information becomes popular. (Yin, R. K., 1994), states that documents regarded as archives as opposed to documentation are listed as survey data, service documents, maps, records, charts, lists and personal records.[171] In this perspective, the experiences of the research of the Master's thesis (2012 - 2014) on the same ECOWAS institution militated in favor of this research of the doctoral thesis (PHD). The researcher had already had access to several archives for his Master's thesis. So access to official ECOWAS documents and the original 1975 treaty were easy. Without forgetting especially, the treaty of the deepening of the economic integration with the political integration of 1990 which generated the missions of resolution of the conflicts with the establishment of the ECOMOG[172] , which is a multilateral armed force of the ECOWAS.

### 2.2.3. NEWSPAPER PUBLICATIONS ON ECOWAS

In the list of documentation, there are newspapers produced by the media. As part of this research, diaries written on the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone were also consulted. Nowadays, the power of the media is well established. Therefore, a researcher cannot ignore them in his investigations. Although media information can be taken with caution, it is also impossible to conduct research without consulting it. The important thing is that the researcher knows how to make the right sorting to avoid false sources of information from

[171]Yin, R. K. (1994). "Discovering the future of the case study. Method in evaluation research." Evaluation practice 15, no. 3, 283-290.
[172]Folder S-1834-0146-0005 - Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), accessed October 25, 2021, https://search.archives.un.org/economic-community-of-west-african-states-monitoring-group-ecomog-2

the newspapers. Because the media have positive impacts for research if they are used with great rigor.

## 2.3. SURVEY

Normally, field surveys are carried out by meeting with participants and respondents. With the Coronavirus or COVID-19 pandemic situation, the survey was conducted using questionnaires sent to email addresses previously chosen with the help of former contacts in the circle of ECOWAS diplomats.

### 2.3.1. QUESTIONNAIRES BY WORD FILE TO BE ANSWERED BY EMAIL

Concerning questionnaires established by Word file, these are two types of questions. The two questionnaires include separately for each country of study questions on the beginning, course and end of civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone. They also include questions on how ECOWAS manages the conflict resolution missions from the beginning until the achievement of the return of peace and security in these two target countries. Each questionnaire was sent to the email addresses of participants and respondents listed previously for this survey. Although the responses were optional, the researcher collected responses from several participants (ECOWAS diplomats and Liberia and Sierra Leone Ambassadors) by email. Their desire for anonymity or not was taken into account when establishing the questions.

### 2.3.2. TARGET PEOPLE FOR WORD QUESTIONNAIRES BY EMAIL

Considering that in conflict resolution missions by ECOWAS in each country, it is multilateral diplomacy that is used, the researcher had to have access to the email addresses of diplomats from the ECOWAS institution first. Then, the list extended to some diplomats from the African Union and the Ambassadors of Liberia and Sierra Leone who were kind enough to answer the questionnaires. We relied mainly on the Ambassadors of Liberia and Sierra Leone in Turkey or those in countries close to Turkey.

The survey began in July 2021 and ended at the end of September 2021. The following table mentions the number of target people who agreed to answer the survey questions by email. This survey aimed to collect information on the resolution of the Liberian and Sierra Leonean conflicts by ECOWAS.

**Table 5: The number of respondents to the survey questions by word file.**

| **Country** | **Liberia** | |
|---|---|---|
| **The number of respondents to the survey questions by word file** | The ambassadors | 01 |
| | ECOWAS diplomats | 11 |
| **Total respondents** | | 12 |
| **Designation of Survey Respondents for Liberia** | Anonymous L 1 to Anonymous L 12 | |
| **Country** | **Sierra Leone** | |
| **The number of respondents to the survey questions by word file** | The ambassadors | 02 |
| | ECOWAS diplomats | 13 |
| **Total respondents** | | 15 |
| **Designation of Survey Respondents for Sierra Leone** | Anonymous S 1 to Anonymous S 15 | |
| **Cumulative totals of respondents for both countries.** | 27 | |

**Source**: Prepared by the author based on questionnaires: (July 2021 -September 2021).

This survey lasted three months to collect as many responses as possible. All the respondents answered the questions fully although the questionnaires were a bit long. This length of the questionnaires is justified by the fact that the researcher wants to have more details in the answers in the absence of a face-to-face interview. Thus, at the end of the investigations for the two countries on the resolution of their conflicts by ECOWAS, for Liberia, there were one (01) Liberian ambassadors and eleven (11) diplomats from ECOWAS who answered questionnaires by email. In total, there were twelve respondents to the questionnaire on the resolution of the Liberian civil war by ECOWAS. In the case of Sierra Leone, two (02) ambassadors and thirteen (13) diplomats from ECOWAS responded by email to the questionnaires. The principle of anonymity is respected in these surveys to avoid possible prejudice to all participants. The sum of the respondents to the questionnaire on the resolution of the Sierra Leonean civil crisis by ECOWAS is fifteen (15). For the two different types of Liberian and Sierra Leonean conflict resolution questionnaires, the cumulative total of respondents is twenty-seven (27). In the table above, the classification of anonymous respondents to the questionnaires was made according to the date of return of their answers.

### 2.3.3. QUESTIONS BY EMAIL TO FORMER ECOWAS DIPLOMATS AS RESOURCE PERSONS

In the context of this study, one of the biggest supports is the contacts of former diplomats from Benin who worked in ECOWAS and who are currently retired. Their advice and contacts made it possible to reach several diplomats currently in office who agreed to accompany the researcher to gather information and have access to official documents. So the involvement of these former diplomats from Benin opened doors for the researcher and facilitated contacts with practising diplomats. In this Coronavirus or COVID-19 pandemic period, this technique has been handy to have information for the study. In a nutshell, former Beninese ECOWAS diplomats have used their connections to assist the researcher by connecting with current ECOWAS diplomats to facilitate the task of investigations and

information gathering in general. These former Beninese diplomats from ECOWAS were available to discuss with the researcher on the research subject. They also provided the researcher with the information available at their level on conflict resolution missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone by ECOWAS.

## 2.4. ANALYSIS

When the stage of collecting information ends, it must be categorized to make sense. It is a way of classification of the information gathered. It happens that certain categories are thought up before the investigations in the field in order to serve to process information afterwards. When research goals are clearly established, anticipation is possible in categorizing information. In the case of this study, to understand the conflict resolution missions of ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone, the necessary information for the subject is available; therefore, it is essential to categorize them. Above all, it was important to focus on information that concerns the target countries. By this technique, certain elements are conceived as titles of category and then chosen like titles of chapters. As a result of the study, categories and titles have undergone readjustments to become sub-titles and specific sections to reflect the data collected and also there are section titles within each chapter of this thesis. In the context of collecting information in the field, it is possible that the researcher leaves the formal framework for the informal framework if necessary. Various qualitative research methods were used in observations, document analysis, discussions, and notes throughout the data collection. So, for the study's relevance, the choice is focused on multidimensional analysis to better understand the conflict resolution missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone by ECOWAS.

### 2.4.1. ETHICAL PROBLEM

In research, several actors capable of providing information intervene to allow the researcher to carry out his study correctly and in-depth. In the phase of collecting data in the field, participants are more open to questions than others. This attitude also impacts the information that these survey participants give. Some people do not like to be very explicit in their answers to avoid revealing professional secrets. Others also want to remain anonymous so that their identity is not known to the general public. So, collecting information in the field is an exciting but also delicate phase. The researcher adapts to the moods of the people surveyed to respect their intimidated so as not to offend their sensitivity to certain questions that seem daring. Also, some participants worry about their safety if they provide certain information with their real identity. All these aspects are taken into account to collect as much information as possible in the greatest discretion but with great rigor. Participants are not hostile to questions when the researcher comes in contact with them and explains to them that it is for doctoral thesis research (PHD).

On the contrary, they show their willingness to participate in helping the researcher in his work. So the ethical questions are very real but do not hamper research. It is even part of this research because it limits the drifts in collecting information. So, (Bryman, A., 2012), announces that any researcher should consider ethical issues because they "are directly related to the integrity of research and the disciplines involved."[173] For this, it was important that the researcher did not trivialize ethical issues. With this in mind, the researcher committed to respecting ethical values such as identity publication, confidentiality, and the voluntary participation of target persons. This technique made it possible to avoid the mistrust and reluctance of those subjected to the investigation. As conflict resolution issues are delicate, anonymity was the choice of participants and respondents. It is no longer a secret that conflict resolution missions despite efforts to restore peace and security in steps of war, many moral and ethical criticisms are leveled against them. This is sufficient proof that the

[173]Bryman, A. (2012). "Social research methods: OUP Oxford.", 129.

ECOWAS participants and respondents who are diplomats involved in these missions remain anonymous. As the ambassadors of Liberia and Sierra Leone contacted declared that they represent the image of their countries, so they must be protected so as not to be guilty of revealing state secrets.

### 2.4.2. BENEFITS OF RESEARCH

The objective of all research is to achieve good results for a certainly added value. Therefore, the experiences of our Master thesis research in the same field of study made it possible to better define the outlines of the subject of this thesis. They were also a strength because the researcher relied on his former contacts and knowledge in the ECOWAS institution to accelerate the collection of information and above all to have access to the documents necessary for the research. Thanks to the advice of these former contacts, the researcher was able to have direct access to diplomats who deal with issues of conflict resolution missions by ECOWAS. So, all opportunities are surely an asset for the success of this study which will serve as a support to understand the conflict resolution missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone by ECOWAS. Also, this study will serve as a support for further research. Either way, the research aims to enlighten readers on the gray areas of a subject. It is a source of information that allows you to learn new things. It is also an opening of several questions by critics to provoke further investigations on the weak points of the study. Research can predict the future through recommendations. For future generations, it is a source of information on past events.

### 2.4.3. RESEARCH HANDICAPS

Since the end of 2019 and the beginning of 2020, the whole world has been living in a difficult period because of the Coronavirus pandemic called COVID-19. This pandemic not

only leads to the death of several patients but also limits usual travel. It is no longer possible to travel freely worldwide because of states' measures to limit contamination. In this sense, the researcher was obliged to make maximum use of the Internet to collect several information needed to enrich this study. Email messages, Zoom video conferencing, phone calls and WhatsApp questions were of great help in collecting the information. Moreover, the questions by Word file are submitted to participants and respondents by email addresses. However, despite all these difficulties, the important and necessary information that has been collected for the success of this research is not without criticism like any human work. Further development of this research announces (Chapter 3.) which will focus on assessing regional organizations' actorness in conflict resolution: the case of ECOWAS.

# CHAPTER 3. ASSESSING REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS' ACTORNESS IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION: THE CASE OF ECOWAS

Understanding the involvement of ECOWAS as an actor in conflict resolution within its member states must go through knowledge of its origin and objectives. The origins of ECOWAS will make it possible to know the circumstances and the reasons for its creation. The objectives of this West African community will give a clear idea of the orientations and missions that its creative members assign to it. So, what are the origins and objectives of ECOWAS in the context of its creation by its member countries?

## 3.1. THE ORIGINS AND OBJECTIVES OF ECOWAS

The origin of ECOWAS is a description of the process that led to the creation of this economic integration, the primary mission of which is to help member states develop economically. As economic development is only possible in peace and security, it also has the task of guaranteeing peace and security within its member countries. For this reason, it intervenes as an actor of conflict resolution in times of war in West Africa. How to describe the origins of ECOWAS, a West African regional organization that deals with economic development issues and conflict prevention, management and resolution?

### The Origins Of ECOWAS

In the aftermath of the independence days of many African countries in 1960, different kinds of regional groupings began to form on the continent. Some of these regroupings are purely economic, and others intend to develop the independent states' natural resources. In the same vein, West Africa had also taken the same path of creating regional organizations. Thus, the Customs Union of the West African States and the Community of West African States were

created. To promote the natural resources of each country, there were two organizations namely: the Organization of the Riverine States of Senegal and the Organization for the Development of the Senegal River.[174] The Customs Union of West African States was created in 1966 but given its slowness in carrying out its missions and its inability to deal effectively with the problems for which it was created, the Community of West African States replaced it in 1970. The founding countries of this community were Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Senegal. It was an organization that brought together French-speaking African countries to find common solutions to problems, particularly those in the agricultural and livestock sectors. For example, the common policy of cultivation techniques associated with breeding makes it possible to have fertile land naturally by the waste left by animals on the ground. Likewise, several disagreements arise very often between herders and farmers because certain herders in bad faith allow their animals to destroy the agricultural products of farmers. So, we had to find answers to all these questions for better returns in both sectors. In order to serve as a think tank for the search for solutions to the difficulties that States encounter and to play the role of referee between the opposing camps, the Community of West African States existed until 1975. It was within it that certain developments such as creating free trade zones and customs unions began to be developed. So, since the Community of West African States was already overwhelmed by many problems of its time, it will serve as a bridge for achieving a larger and more sustainable community with its strengths and weaknesses. It was on this model that the current ECOWAS regional integration was created. Gradually, the ineffectiveness of these various regional organizations in West Africa led to the creation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).[175]

The origins of the reflection and creation of ECOWAS were singularly economic. The first multilateral cooperation groups in Sub-Saharan Africa appeared in 1959 with the creation of the Council of the Entente. But between 1959 and 1975, the proliferation of this kind of

[174]Convention establishing the organization for the development of the Senegal River signed in Nouakchott (Mauritania) on March 11, 1972, consulted on September 16, 2020, http://www.fao.org/faolex/results/details/fr/c/LEX-FAOC091150/

[175]Economic Community of West African States(ECOWAS), consulted on September 16, 2020, https://www.ecowas.int/

cooperation was observed across the African continent. Some important integrations such as the Organization for the Development of the Senegal River in 1972, the West African Monetary Union and the Customs Union of West African States in 1966 and the Economic Community of the West Africa in 1970 are examples. Globally, in this region, they have existed since 1960 at least forty organizations grouping two or three states.[176] But, even considering the breadth and areas of cooperation that took place within these integrations, they were devoid of any dynamism. Also, they did not constitute a concrete step towards the integration of West Africa and Africa as a whole.[177]

In addition, these regional groupings were weakened by divisive factors as there were several organizations for limited areas of cooperation, while a well-structured and strong cooperation oraginasation would suffice to deal with the problems of integrated countries. It was precisely by trying to avoid this weakness of dynamism and the close relations that bind each country to its former colonizing country that is not favorable to inter-African and intra-African cooperation that ECOWAS was created. For the creative members, the advent of ECOWAS seems to be an innovation in the process of African integration. Considering the other former organizations, ECOWAS constitutes the broadest integration in the history of West African countries. It is an oraganization that has the vocation of a more general integration and has the option of integrating the sixteen countries of West Africa into a more solidified and unified political and economic federation. The idea of creating such a regional integration bringing together the English-speaking, French-speaking and later Portuguese-speaking countries was officially discussed for the first time in Accra, the capital of Ghana, in 1967, and the West African Economic Community Association clauses have been signed.[178]

In 1968, the Heads of State of nine countries met in Monrovia, Liberia to sign a protocol on the creation of the Regional Group of West Africa. Unfortunately, these different regroupings did not produce a concrete result. Thus, these various failures of regroupings culminated in

[176]Mazzeo, D. (1984). ed. African regional organizations. Cambridge University Press, 35.
[177]Söderbaum, F. and Tavares, R. (2009). Problematizing Regional Organizations in African Security. African security, 2(2-3), 69-81.
[178]Yansane, A. (1977). "The state of economic integration in north west Africa south of the Sahara: the emergence of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)." African Studies Review 20, no. 2, 63-87.

a ministerial meeting held in Lomé in Togo on December 14, 1973 with the participation of fifteen countries that had drawn up a timetable to be followed to achieve the objectives pursued by the community.[179] In this meeting, the participants gave a name to this community: ECOWAS and adopted two official languages, French and English, as the main languages of the organization. Although economic needs are the source of the creation of ECOWAS, the fact remains that political motivations also come later for the balance of this integration.

The political origins of multilateral cooperation within ECOWAS are seen only as an awareness through a self-criticism of the nationalist, ethnocentric and dictatorial policies practiced by the African Heads of State in power during the post-independence period. As they were new independent states without much experience in human and material management, the leaders frequently resort to force to impose certain reforms which the citizens of their countries do not appreciate. In addition, it is necessary to note a strong contestation of the international economic system, which was not favorable to the development of African countries. Therefore, the need to seek a new political platform favorable and compatible with the aspirations of sustainable and autonomous development of the States of Africa was on the agenda. The political leaders understood that their sovereign existence was not real and their nationalist policies were a vain work as long as they continued in the industrialised countries' movement.[180] In other words, it was a notorious dead-end that required the adoption of new guidelines to change the trend. This awareness has aroused political solidarity's will and obligation for effective economic cooperation. The ineffectiveness of development aid from rich countries to poor countries also served as reasons for African presidents to rely only on their own economic efforts by abandoning the international economic system during this period. In reality, African leaders had moved away from the international economic system because the establishment of this economic order did not take into account the grievances of Africa's development. So, they considered that the terms of trade were against the African continent, which only has natural resources to export.

[179]Report of the profile of the community of West African States (ECOWAS), Lomé 1978, PP. 1-2
[180]Adams, S. (2006). "The impact of privatization on economic growth and income inequality in Sub-Saharan Africa." The Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies 31, no. 3, 295.

Also, each devaluation of African currencies made the economy of African countries even more vulnerable. Under these circumstances, African politicians have judged that Africa in general and West African countries will never be developed in such an economic system that only benefits the rich.

These international trade inequalities led the West African States to think of inter-African multilateral cooperation to remedy their poverty situation, which is also a source of political instability in several countries. For some citizens, poverty stems from the mismanagement of a country's economic resources. Therefore, several uprisings often perpetrated by the opposition parties begin with this discrimination in state power management. It was a question of liberalizing political power so that each citizen finds himself in the management and development of his country. One of the missions of ECOWAS is to implement a good policy within its member countries for participatory management of state power to avoid the frustrations and exclusion of certain parts or groups of parts of the people in a state. But the fact that each state is sovereign makes it difficult to agree on the opinions of different political leaders regarding cooperation for development.[181] Thus, the advent of ECOWAS is seen as a sharing of sovereignty or even a reduction in the power of sub-Saharan states to discuss important issues within this regional integration to guarantee political stability and bring about sustainable economic development.

The regional integration of ECOWAS is considered in West Africa as a forum for political and economic renewal for the development of its member countries. So, this awareness through a self-criticism of nationalist politics and the acceptance of the sharing of their national sovereignty, added to the rejection of the international economic system by its injustice in the distribution of the terms of trade between rich and poor countries, the instability of political powers in each state and the ambition nurtured for real independence on the basis of economic solidarity were the political reasons that militated for multilateral cooperation within ECOWAS. The treaty provided that the Community would enter into force when seven member states had ratified it. By February 1976, thirteen member states

[181]Radelet, S. (1997). Regional integration and cooperation in Sub-Saharan Africa: Are formal trade agreements the right strategy? (No. 2272-2019-4056), 11-12.

had already ratified it. ECOWAS was thus created and gradually over the years its creative members broaden and deepen it according to circumstances and needs. It currently has fifteen members after leaving Mauritania in the 2000s. It has eight French-speaking states: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea Conakry, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo; five English-speaking countries: Gambia, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra-Leone and two Portuguese-speaking countries: Cape Verde after its independence in 1975 and Guinea-Bissau. Initially, with Mauritania, ECOWAS had sixteen member states. But for differences of opinion and interests within this Community, Mauritania left to form a bloc with the Arabic-speaking countries of North Africa. The objectives of ECOWAS will allow us better to understand the ambitions of this West African regional integration.

**The Objectives Of ECOWAS**

The most important integration that West Africa has built in its history until today since independence after many attempts at regional groupings remains the Economic Community of West African States. ECOWAS also remains the most ambitious community considering its targeted objectives and the number of member countries it comprises. So, in accordance with article 2 of its founding treaty, the main objectives of ECOWAS are to promote cooperation, integration and development in all areas of economic activity and primarily in the areas of industry, transport, telecommunications, energy, agriculture, natural resources, trade, monetary and financial issues in social and cultural affairs.[182] This cooperation aims to improve the living conditions of the populations of the member countries. Therefore, the main concern of this integration is to raise the standard of living of the peoples of the ECOWAS member states, maintain economic stability, strengthen relations between member countries, and contribute to the progress and development of the whole Africa in general and West Africa in particular.[183] The specific objectives are the missions that integration must

[182]Chapter II of Revised ECOWAS Treaty of June 11, 2006 in Abuja (Nigeria), article 2., accessed September, 19, 2020, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/5476/download

[183]Kufour, K. O. (1994). "Law, Power, Politics and Economics: Critical Issues Arising out of the New ECOWAS Treaty." Afr. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 6, 429.

strive to accomplish in order to achieve its main objective and its goal; these specific objectives are as follows:

- harmonization and coordination of national policies and promotion of programs, projects and activities, particularly agriculture, natural resources, industry, transport, communications, energy, trade, currency and finance, taxation, economic reforms, human resources, education, information, culture, science, technology, services, health, tourism and justice;

- promotion of the creation of joint production companies;

- the creation of a common market (free trade, the establishment of a common external tariff and the free movement of people and goods);

- the creation of an economic union;

- the promotion of large-scale joint ventures;

- adoption of measures to promote the integration of the private sector;

- the establishment of a favorable legal environment;

- harmonization of standards and measures;

- the promotion of a balanced development of the West African region;

- the promotion and strengthening of relations, the circulation of information, the adoption of a community policy on population which focuses on the need to establish a balance between demographic factors and development.[184]

By analyzing the objectives: main and specific of ECOWAS, we notice that a long and intelligent reflection has been made to manage this community very well. Likewise, no area of development is forgotten in this integration, for that one could think that West Africa had taken a good path of its real and sustainable development. ECOWAS, like all other regional

[184]Chapter II of Revised ECOWAS Treaty of June 11, 2006 in Abuja (Nigeria), article 2-5., accessed September, 19, 2020, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/5476/download

cooperation, has strengths and weaknesses within it, but it continues to accomplish its missions despite everything for the happiness of its member states. Development issues that fall within the line of international relations issues are not resolved one at a time, so it's a long, endless process that requires a lot of patience and tact. If this community still exists until today without disappearing like the other tendencies, it is because somewhere, it constitutes an appreciable model of regional integration in Africa. Considering its very ambitious objectives and the current standard of living of the populations of its member countries, it still has to make a lot of efforts to meet the expectations of its creators.[185] So, all is not beautiful, but all is not bad too. For this, some successes can be mentioned to its credit in the fields of agriculture, livestock, fishing, economy, and free movement of people and goods. Compared to other integrations from other continents, we can say that ECOWAS is an integration that is one of the youngest integration in the world so it needs time to readjust, correct its defects in order to effectively face the multiple and diverse problems of its space to achieve its goals. For the channeling of the efforts of ECOWAS, it has given itself inviolable principles for itself and for its member states.

For its effectiveness, the Economic Community of West African States has adopted the fundamental principles essential for its cooperation and its member countries. Some of these fundamental principles include:

- the equality and independence of its member states;

- solidarity and collective self-sufficiency;

- inter-state cooperation and harmonization of policies and integration of programs;

- non-aggression between member states;

- the maintenance of peace, security and regional solidarity by promoting and strengthening good neighborly relations;

- the peaceful settlement of disputes between member states;

[185]Hanink, D. M. and Owusu, H. J. (1998). "Has ECOWAS promoted trade among its members?." Journal of African Economies 7, no. 3, 363-383.

- respect, promotion and protection of human and peoples 'rights in accordance with the provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) of 1963 transformed into African Union (AU) on the model of the European Union (EU) in the 2000s;

- transparency, economic and social justice;

- the renaissance and respect of the legal rules and principles of the community;

- the promotion and consolidation of a democratic system of development in each member state in accordance with the: (Declaration of political principles in Abuja, Nigeria, July 6, 1991);

- the fair and equitable distribution of the costs and benefits of economic integration cooperation.[186]

The above principles serve as legal foundations for the community and indicate that the institutional structure of ECOWAS is largely flexible for its member countries. They also constitute a guide for the community and its members in order to carry out the objectives pursued by the organization. There emerges a conviction of global management of affairs through these basic principles that concern all integrated States. This integration is characterized by the liberalization of state affairs and the sharing of sovereignty with private companies included in the legal foundations accepted by all member countries. The cooperating countries understood that to succeed in this integration, it was necessary to share power with the private sector for better participation in the development of the West African sub-region. However, before the integration, the leaders of the member countries could not accept this sharing of power, which was for them, a weakening of their power. They relied more on their armies in their management because they had subscribed to the ideology of realism according to which it is the balance of power that allows development. In addition, for them, sovereignty was not something to be shared because it defines the essence and the

[186]Chapter II of Revised ECOWAS Treaty of June 11, 2006 in Abuja (Nigeria), article 2-5., accessed September, 19, 2020, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/5476/download

existence of a State, so it must be safeguarded at all costs. However, the wind of democracy which blew in the 1990s in Africa in general and especially in the West African part had given a strong signal to dictators to break with this bad regime to adopt the democratic regime.[187] So immediately, the mode and the system of governance changed because now there is a multiparty system, and citizens can opine on the management of the affairs of their countries. ECOWAS has its structure and its political foundations that should be explored.

## 3.2. STRUCTURE AND THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF ECOWAS

Like any well-structured organization, ECOWAS also has its institutional organs, which find their legitimacy in Article 2 of the founding treaty of this integration.[188] These bodies are made up of the following institutions: the Conference of Heads of State and Government, the Council of Ministers, the Executive Secretariat, Technical and Specialized Commissions and the Community Tribunal. There is also the Cooperation, Compensation and Development Fund created by article 50 of the treaty, which founds ECOWAS.[189] Table 6 summarizes the institutions and their occupants within this cooperation.

**Table 6**: **ECOWAS institutions, their occupants and their founding articles.**

| No | ECOWAS Institutions | Occupants | Founding Articles |
|---|---|---|---|
| 01 | Conference of Heads of State and Government | Heads of States (Presidents) | Article 2 |
| 02 | Council of Ministers | Ministers | Article 2 |

[187]Olson, M. (1993). "Dictatorship, democracy, and development." American political science review, 567-576.
[188]Chapter I of ECOWAS Treaty of May 28, 1975 in Lagos (Nigeria), Article 2., accessed September, 19, 2020, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/5476/download
[189]Chapter VIII of Revised ECOWAS Treaty of June 11, 2006 in Abuja (Nigeria), Article 50., accessed September, 19, 2020, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/5476/download

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 03 | Executive Secretariat[190] or ECOWAS Commission | Executive Secretary | Article 2 |
| 04 | Technical and Specialized Commissions | High-Level Technicians and Specialists | Article 2 |
| 05 | Community Tribunal | Judges and Lawyers | Article 2 |
| 06 | Cooperation, Compensation and Development Fund (Bank) | Bankers | Article 50 |

**Source:** Prepared by the author based on the ECOWAS Treaty of May 28, 1975, in Lagos (Nigeria) and Revised ECOWAS Treaty of June 11, 2006, in Abuja (Nigeria).

From Table 6, it appears that the governing bodies of this community are as follows:

- the Conference of Heads of State and Government and the Council of Ministers;

- the executive bodies are composed of the Executive Secretariat and the Technical and Specialized Commissions;

- the only judicial body which deals with questions of judgment remains the Tribunal of the Community;

- Finally, the cooperation also has a banking institution like ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development (EBID).

The governing bodies, including the Conference of Heads of State and Government and the Council of Ministers sit in the general direction of the Community and determine the orientations to follow for a good accomplishment of the missions of the organization. The Conference of Heads of State and Government is created by article 5 of the founding treaty and designates it as the main institution of the Community. Article 5, paragraph 2, states that the "Conference shall be responsible for ensuring the general direction and control of the executive functions of the community with a view to the progressive development of this

[190]The ECOWAS Executive Secretariat became the ECOWAS Commission at the ordinary summit of June 14, 2006 in Abuja, Nigeria, and headed by a President of the Commission since January 2007 for a non-renewable four-year term.

integration and the achievement of its objectives."[191] So, from this point of view, we realize that the Conference of Heads of State and Government is the most important institution of the Community which serves as a policeman for other institutions so that the cooperation agenda may be well conducted. Also, it ensures the control of the functioning of the other institutions of the Community and the achievement of the objectives.

In the more general context, the decisions and directives of the Conference of Heads of State and Government directly impact all other ECOWAS institutions. The Conference of Heads of State and Government establishes and adopts the internal rules mainly in the convening of its meetings and the conduct of debates. It appoints the Executive Secretary and, by the recommendation of the Council of Ministers, the Auditors as well. The Conference of Heads of State and Government has the right to seize, if necessary, the Court of Justice of the Community if it finds that a Member State has not respected one of its commitments. Also, if a Community institution intervenes beyond the boundary of its powers, a decision by the Conference will restore order. The Conference of Heads of State and Government can decide to set up a new commission at any time if necessary. This was the case at the Dakar Summit in Senegal in May 1979, where a Defense Commission comprising the Ministers of Defense, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the Ministers of Economic and Financial Affairs of the Member States was created.[192] This decision was taken to provide answers to defense questions within the Community.

In addition, the Conference also has the right to consult the Court to obtain its opinion on all judicial questions within its competence. The Conference can have an extraordinary session at the initiative of its President or the request of a Member State with the approval of this request by a simple majority of the members. The presidency is held in turn by the Heads of State and the Governments of the member countries. But the duration of the presidency is

[191]Chapter IX of Revised ECOWAS Treaty of June 11, 2006 in Abuja (Nigeria), Article 54-55., accessed September, 19, 2020, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/5476/download

[192]Meeting Of The Authority Of Ecowas Heads Of State And Government, Dakar 28 - 29 MAY, 1979, PP. 1-7., Accessed September 18, 2020, https://www.ecowas.int/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/2nd-ECOWAS-Summit-Dakar-28-29-May-1979.pdf

one year non-renewable, so that means that each member country only presides once and gives other members a chance to do their experiences at this high place of decision-making in this community. The Conference finally examines during the sessions the recommendations and reports that the Council of Ministers and the other executive bodies submit to him and takes the necessary decisions on these questions to settle the matters which it deems unsatisfactory.

The Council of Ministers originates from Article 6 of the founding treaty and has two ministers per member state.[193] The Council of Ministers oversees the proper functioning and development of the Community as indicated in the treaty establishing it. On the one hand, its other function is to make recommendations to the Conference of Heads of State and Governments on questions of general policy for the development and the advancement of the activities of the Community. On the other hand, it indicates the directives to all institutions placed under its commands, such as the Executive Secretariat and the Technical and Specialized Commissions. The Council of Ministers exercises its powers conferred to him, particularly regarding the adoption of regulations intended to ensure effective implementation of the provisions of the various protocols. It also has specific functions assigned to it, mainly concerning decisions on compensation to be granted to member states. Also, it constantly examines the disparity in the development levels of the member states and takes measures to establish an adequate balance. The decisions and directives of the Council of Ministers must be appreciated by the Conference of Heads of State and Government for an in-depth study to make modifications if necessary or to delete them if it considers that these decisions and directives are not convincing to replace them with more judicious ones. Under the Conference of Heads of State and Government, the Council of Ministers has the priority to establish its own rules of procedure concerning the convening of its meetings, the conduct of debates, and the execution of the work in its competencies. The Council of Ministers meets twice a year, and one of its sessions must be held just before the Conference of Heads of State and Government. However, it is also possible that the Council of Ministers

[193]Chapter III of ECOWAS Treaty of May 28, 1975 in Lagos (Nigeria), Article 6., accessed September, 19, 2020, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/5476/download

can have extraordinary sessions when an important and urgent problem needs immediate attention. The two governing bodies, by virtue of their missions which they lead jointly or separately, complement each other to give a coordinated and effective orientation to the work of the Community. The Conference of Heads of State and Government and the Council of Ministers are therefore complementary in their functions. Also, the place of a judicial body is no less important in ECOWAS.

**The ECOWAS Judicial Body**

The court of the Economic Community of West African States constitutes the judicial organ of this integration and is created by article 11 of the founding treaty of the Community.[194] Likewise, there is the protocol relating to the ECOWAS Court of Justice signed in 1991.[195] The two judicial bodies are the only ones empowered to judge disputes between the Member States of the Community. The tribunal is responsible for promoting human rights within the ECOWAS region. For the tribunal to effectively play its role in integration and promote human rights well, it must be able to render fair and non-contestable decisions without a party taken to give value to its creation. It is necessary to know the complaints within the court's jurisdiction, the categories of people who can legally apply to the court, and its enforcement mechanisms. The Community tribunal is competent to ensure respect for the law and the principles of equity in interpreting the clauses of the treaty and the settlement of disputes between its member countries. It also watches over the effective application of the treaty's content and settles questions of law that exist between member states and integration institutions. The Community Court is cautious about the Cooperation, Compensation and Development Fund to avoid abuses.

[194]Chapter III of Revised ECOWAS Treaty of June 11, 2006 in Lagos (Nigeria), Article 11., accessed September, 19, 2020, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/5476/download

[195]The Court of Justice of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 1991., Accessed September 20, 2020, https://www.acthprmonitor.org/the-court-of-justice-of-the-economic-community-of-west-african-states-ecowas/

In addition, it should be noted that the settlement of disputes amicably is more advisable and it is when this path fails, the protagonists turn to the court to decide. However, the jurisdiction of the Court, as described in Article 4 (g), concerning violations of the provisions of the treaty, extend to the provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR).[196] The Treaty of the Community took into account the provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights during its revision on June 11, 2006, in Abuja, Nigeria and the verdicts of the tribunal's jurisdiction must respect the clauses of the treaty.[197] With these efforts to reconcile and combine with ACHPR, the ECOWAS tribunal has more jurisdiction, normally if there is the will for fair and rapid justice. Also, this assiciation of the two jurisdictions offers the ECOWAS tribunal a great chance to deal with Human Rights issues in member countries in accordance with the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. But, the categories of people who can legally go to court remain an essential question. The ECOWAS Court of Justice is the victim of a restriction under the provisions of Article 9 of the Treaty.[198] According to this article, the only Member States or the Conference of Heads of State and Government can apply to the Court of Justice. However, cases of human rights violations frequently stem from the actions of States towards citizens or people. So, referral to the Court of Justice of the real victims who are the citizens remains impossible. Thus, this inability of citizens to seize the Court of Justice is a weakness for the guarantee of Human Rights. Therefore, any human rights enforcement mechanism that is not easily accessible to ordinary citizens would be the start of a failure to promote human rights. In addition to this inaccessibility situation, there is the absence of a commission that can serve as an intermediary for individuals and groups of individuals in the referral to the ECOWAS tribunal. The creation of intermediary commissions could support regional and sub-regional

[196]Chapter II of Revised ECOWAS Treaty of June 11, 2006 in Lagos (Nigeria), Article 4 (g)., accessed September, 19, 2020, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/5476/download

[197]Alter, K. J., Helfer, L. and McAllister, J. R. (2013). A new international human rights court for West Africa: The ECOWAS Community Court of Justice. American Journal of International Law, 107(4), 737-779.

[198]Chapter III of Revised ECOWAS Treaty of June 11, 2006 in Lagos (Nigeria), Article 9., accessed September, 19, 2020, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/5476/download

parliaments in the defense of Human Rights in Africa in general and in the West African region in particular.

The human rights regulatory mechanism is devoid of the obligatory nature allowing it to ensure respect for decisions taken by judicial powers which have no value for an individual victim, especially in the African context, where public opinion and indignation against human rights violations often do not significantly affect leaders who violate these rights through the abuse of state power.[199] This limitation is also observed at the highest level of the African Union with the statute of the African Charter of Human Rights, of which the Commission in charge of Human Rights depends on the Heads of State and Government. Although the revised ECOWAS treaty brought new and serious matters concerning the decisions that could be taken by the Conference of Heads of State and Government. The revised treaty authorizes sanctions that may particularly include the abolition of the rights and privileges of a member state and may be lifted by the Conference on the recommendation of the Council of Ministers. The adoption of sanctions within the scope of these treaties allows the leaders of ECOWAS to opt for positive measures aimed at better compliance with decisions.[200] It is undeniable that the rigor of the human rights mechanism would force African political leaders to respect fundamental human rights under diplomatic and economic sanctions or the abolition of their rights and privileges as a member of ECOWAS. Despite all these efforts to encourage the promotion of human rights, this question still remains a worrying problem in this community, especially in times of political conflict. The lack of respect for human rights often provokes these civil wars, so strong pressure must be put on political leaders to avoid unnecessary suffering for innocent populations. The decisions mentioned above will only make sense if the executive bodies of the Economic Community of West African States implement them for the happiness of all members.

[199]Ebobrah, S. T. (2010). "Critical issues in the human rights mandate of the ECOWAS court of justice." J. Afr. L. 54, 1.
[200]Cowell, F. (2011). "The impact of the ECOWAS Protocol on Good Governance and Democracy." African Journal of International and Comparative Law 19, no. 2, 331-342.

**The Ecowas Implementing Bodies**

The executive bodies of the Economic Community of West African States include the Technical and Specialized Commissions, the Executive Secretariat and the Cooperation, Compensation and Development Fund. These bodies are responsible for implementing the decisions taken by the governing bodies. The Technical and Specialized Commissions are created by Article 9 and are four in number, including:

- the trade, customs, immigration, monetary questions and payments commission;

- the committee on transport, telecommunications and energy;

- the committee on social and cultural affairs;

- the Committee on Industry, Agriculture and Natural Resources.[201]

It is important to know that paragraph 2 of article 9 of the founding treaty of this integration stipulates that the «Conference of Heads of State and Government may, if it deems it necessary, decide at any time on the creation of all other committees».[202] Therefore, this means that the Technical and Specialized commissions can be modified in their composition if necessary. So, it should be remembered that the composition of these committees does not have a standard form, and the reason for these changes is for the efficiency of the executive bodies in their various missions.

For a permanent supervision of these commissions in their missions, they are obliged to make reports and recommendations periodically to the Council of Ministers through the Executive Secretary. Then, they must also be available to accomplish other tasks in their competencies in accordance with the founding treaty of the Community. Regarding meetings, each committee is free to have as many meetings if it is important for an efficient accomplishment of its missions. But, the Conference of Heads of State and Government has unlimited rights

[201]Chapter III of Revised ECOWAS Treaty of June 11, 2006 in Lagos (Nigeria), Article 9., accessed September, 19, 2020, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/5476/download

[202]Chapter III of Revised ECOWAS Treaty of June 11, 2006 in Lagos (Nigeria), Article 6-24., accessed September, 19, 2020, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/5476/download

in meeting requests if there are urgent problems. This means that the committees can receive orders from the Conference; therefore, they have less force and are subject to it. We can then say that the implementation of decisions by the commissions also depends on the Conference of Heads of State and Government. From this perspective, it would be difficult for the commissions to easily apply decisions that sanction a Member State because the Head of this country will not accept it. These disputes are observed within the Community by the presidents of the member countries, making the functioning of the committees ineffective. Without exaggeration, the influence of the Heads of State and Government by their Conference on the committees can be compared to the right of veto held by the five Permanent States of the Security Council of the United Nations (UN).[203] Only here, the veto is not clearly and officially defined, but it is implied by the strength and the supremacy that the Conference has over all the activities of ECOWAS. Without a doubt, this power and supremacy of the Conference is one of the weaknesses of this Cooperation. To balance the forces in this Community, it must opt for the separation of powers so that each organ freely exercises its functions.

The post of the Executive Secretariat derives from Article 8 of the founding treaty of ECOWAS.[204] This body is headed by an Executive Secretary appointed by the Conference of Heads of State and Government for a period of four years, renewable only once. Article 8, paragraph 4 states that «the Executive Secretary is the principal executive officer of the community».[205] He can only be relieved of his functions by the Conference of Heads of State and Government which appointed him. He is assisted and supported in his functions by two deputy executive secretaries appointed by the Council of Ministers. The Executive Secretary is responsible for the administration of the day-to-day affairs of the Community and the execution of all decisions originating from the Conference of Heads of State and

[203]Okhovat, S. (2012). The United Nations Security Council: its veto power and its reform. Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, The University of Sydney, 11.
[204]Chapter III of Revised ECOWAS Treaty of June 11, 2006 in Lagos (Nigeria), Article 8., accessed September, 19, 2020, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/5476/download
[205]Chapter III of Revised ECOWAS Treaty of June 11, 2006 in Lagos (Nigeria), Article 8, Paragraph 4., accessed September, 19, 2020, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/5476/download

Government. In addition to the Executive Secretary and Deputy Executive Secretaries, the Executive Secretariat comprises a financial controller and other officials whose positions may be created by the Council of Ministers. The terms of employment of the Executive Secretary, his assistants and other officials of the Executive Secretariat are governed by regulations established by the Council of Ministers. The mission of the Executive Secretary is to place his services at the disposal of ECOWAS institutions and to help them in the exercise of their functions, to monitor the functioning of the Community regularly and to, report to the Council of Ministers, to submit a report of activities to all sessions of the Council of Ministers, and that of the Conference of Heads of State and Government, to undertake all work, all studies and to provide services relating to the objectives of the Community which may be be entrusted by the Council of Ministers and also to formulate on this subject all the relevant proposals which may contribute to the efficient and harmonious functioning and development of the Community in accordance with the provisions of Articles 2 and 8 relating to the composition of the executive body and creation of the Executive Secretariat.[206]

Within the Executive Secretary , the Cooperation, Compensation and Development Fund, whose headquarters are located in Lomé (Togo). They are directed by a Director General and controlled by a Board of Directors cooperating and working together. Both take care of the purely financial affairs of the Integration. The resources of the Cooperation, Compensation and Development Fund come from two main sources: first from the contribution of member states and second from loans, donations and other funding received in the form of bilateral or multilateral assistance agreements from foreign states and governments and international financial institutions. In accordance with Article 52 of the founding treaty of the Community, the Cooperation, Compensation and Development Fund exercises its functions in six different areas. He is responsible for:

- finance projects in member countries;

- compensate Member States which are victims of the establishment of joint ventures;

[206]Chapter III of Revised ECOWAS Treaty of June 11, 2006 in Lagos (Nigeria), Article 2-8., accessed September, 19, 2020, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/5476/download

- provide compensation and other assistance to Member States which have incurred losses due to the liberalization of trade within the Community;

- guarantee foreign investments made in member states;

- provide the appropriate means to facilitate the mobilization of internal and external resources for the Member States;

- help create projects for the development of the Member States of the Community.[207]

ECOWAS, like the other integrations, cooperations, and organizations of the world, functions because of several organs by which its decisions are implemented. These are the organs that help achieve its goals. It is undeniable that the leaders of this integration have plenty of ideas, but their implementation remains an essential question for the development of ECOWAS. There can be no strong institution without rigor in the actions carried out and respect for the clauses of the organization. In addition, the subordination between the organs must be reviewed to give each organ a fair amount of power to play its role fully. The Conference of Heads of State and Government has its eye on everything that happens in the Community since it is responsible for appointing the important leaders of the organization. This may hide the idea that it appoints only those leaders who obey their orders and desires for the protection of interests linked to a member country. These same realities weaken several regional, continental and international organizations worldwide. The largest organizations in the world are controlled by the most powerful states on our planet, thus creating a general economic injustice, especially in poor countries. This global economic inequality that divides the world into two groups of countries, countries of the North (rich) and Countries of the South (poor), results in a "new world order."[208] This injustice also directly impacts the social level, especially in relations between people and their leaders. Therefore, ECOWAS is only one example among many others that suffer from the weight of its leaders at the highest level. In the case of ECOWAS, Nigeria, because of its participation

[207]Chapter VIII of Revised ECOWAS Treaty of June 11, 2006 in Lagos (Nigeria), Article 52., accessed September, 19, 2020, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/5476/download

[208]Phillips, C. (2001). "A new world order.", 39-41.

in the functioning of integration, its economic and political strength and its large population, constitute the most influential member among the member countries of this Community.[209] This social marginalization leads to popular uprisings, which can lead to civil wars, as in the cases of the countries which are the subject of this study. In the objectives of ECOWAS, there are political and social integrations to understand better the political and social issues of this space .

During ECOWAS dispute resolution in any of its member states, there are three main organs (Conference of Heads of State and Government, ECOWAS commission and Community Tribunal) that play important roles. To begin a conflict resolution mission in a warring member, the Conference of Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS meets at the headquarters of the organization in Abuja, Nigeria to decide and define the strategies for the intervention of diplomats and of ECOMOG's military force. It is the most important decision-making body, but the President of the ECOWAS Commission also has the power to decide on the rapid intervention of ECOWAS in a country in conflict. Usually, the President of the ECOWAS Commission consults the Conference of Heads of State and Government before activating conflict resolution operations. The ECOWAS Community Tribunal generally deals with the judgment of disputes between member states, between individuals and states and in particular those presumed guilty of civil wars. ECOWAS organs such as the Council of Ministers, Technical and Specialized Commissions and Cooperation, Compensation and Development Fund (Bank) deal more with the economic development issues of the organization.

**The Political Foundations Of ECOWAS**

The West African Heads of State and Government, by signing the founding treaty of ECOWAS opted mainly for economic integration for the free movement of people and goods and the harmonization of economic policies to positively impact all economic, social,

[209]Ihonvbere, J. O. (1991). "Nigeria as Africa's great power: constraints and prospects for the 1990s." International Journal 46, no. 3, 510-535.

political sectors and cultural activities to ensure sustainable development. In this momentum, instead of dealing more with economic issues, the member countries of ECOWAS found themselves in conflicts to which this community must provide solutions. It should be noted that the democratization of the countries of the Economic Community of West African States did not bring peace in its first attempts. There were often unfortunate events in the aftermath of the presidential elections in several member countries that had embraced multiparty politics.[210] Thus, political crises have multiplied in the West African space because of electoral disputes, leading to armed and unarmed clashes, coups d'état and human rights violations. These reasons have forced ECOWAS to play the role of guardian of peace and security in its space. Integration made a commitment not to remain silent in the face of serious abuses that threaten the peace and tranquillity of the people of its member states. So ECOWAS deemed it appropriate to assume not only its primary responsibility but also to resolve political conflicts in its member countries.[211] This option brought a significant change in the new tasks of the organization. For this, ECOWAS has become the only West African integration capable of providing solutions to political conflicts as stipulated in its revised treaty, which has provided a framework for resolving political crises in its objectives and principles. It is no secret that a strong economy cannot exist without politics because they form an interdependent and complementary block.

In the revised ECOWAS treaty, the chapter thirteen stipulates that the peaceful settlement of disputes is an inspiration that comes from the sad situations of political, ethnic and religious crises that have lasted for several decades with painful consequences of deaths, displaced people, and refugees. Indeed, the West African sub-region has been shaken by violent crises which, since the democratic era, have caused loss of human life, the destruction of the property of some political leaders, and the suffering and desolation of innocent civilian populations. To end these political instabilities, which generate serious negative consequences, ECOWAS was committed to working for regional peace and security, which

[210]Hadenius, A. (1994). "From One-Party Rule to Multipartism in Africa." In African Development and Public Policy, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 231-255.
[211]Adeleke, A. (1995). "The politics and diplomacy of peacekeeping in West Africa: The Ecowas operation in Liberia." The Journal of Modern African Studies 33, no. 4, 569-593.

are necessary conditions for socio-economic development in its member countries. To guarantee peace already in 1978, the Conference of Heads of State and Government adopted a non-aggression protocol between member states, in 1981 a defense assistance protocol and a declaration of political principles in July 1991.[212]

The declaration focuses on the accession to state power through elections and not through coups d'etat to avoid the horrendous crimes that some army agents commit to take power. Thus, the Conference of Heads of State and Government created in 1990, the ceasefire group called the Economic Community of West African States Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG)[213] as required by the treaty relating to the peaceful settlements of disputes of chapter thirteen. Since its creation, ECOMOG has already intervened in several countries in conflicts within its member states such as the cases of Liberia and Sierra Leone and more recently in political crises in Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, Mali and Niger, among others. ECOMOG is an ECOWAS force that intervenes in conflicts jointly with UN forces because the support and logistical equipment are often insufficient for ECOMOG to act alone in countries in crisis. But legitimately, in the event of a threat to peace in a member country, this force has the right to intervene to separate the opposing camps[214] because any sustainable development process involves several factors, including political, economic and socio-cultural stability.

Political questions are very sensitive because they directly affect human existence through the respect or not of democratic values and Human Rights.[215] However, these values are promoted for a long time to avoid suffering to the people of the member countries of ECOWAS. But, until now, democratic systems are still weak in these integrated states. Most of the crises experienced by West African countries come from political abuses, namely: election rigging, election contestation, the modification of constitutions by certain presidents

[212]Abass, A. (2000). "The new collective security mechanism of ECOWAS: Innovations and problems." Journal of Conflict & Security Law 5, no. 2, 211-229.
[213]Inegbedion, E. J. (1994). "ECOMOG in comparative perspective." In The Political Economy of Foreign Policy in ECOWAS, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 218-244.
[214]Olonisakin, F. (1996). "UN co-operation with regional organizations in peacekeeping: The experience of ECOMOG and UNOMIL in Liberia." International Peacekeeping 3, no. 3, 33-51.
[215]Nwogu, N. (2007). "Regional integration as an instrument of human rights: reconceptualizing ECOWAS." Journal of Human Rights 6, no. 3, 345-360.

at the end of their legal terms to remain in power. Thus, we see the rejection of alternation in power, which leads to political crises in several ECOWAS countries. Likewise, there is oppression and discrimination or exclusion of leaders of opposition parties in the management of state power, and total control of all state institutions by the ruling party are all bad practices of power that trigger political conflicts. Sometimes ethnic and religious quarrels also take on a political color if the parties involved in both cases are political leaders. The civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone are typical examples that will enlighten our opinions. For several years in West Africa, for political reasons, ECOWAS has been facing a thorny issue of terrorism and armed rebellions.[216] This shows that the existence of this regional integration has its necessary, but the main thing is to be able to give satisfaction to its member countries in solving their problems. So, how to understand the functioning of ECOWAS through its bodies?

## 3.3. THE ECOWAS ROLE IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION

The ideal for a human community living in a given space is to live in harmony because social cohesion is an obligation for a useful human life. When everyone is free to go about their business to earn their daily bread, we can talk about development in this society. Often, in the face of certain social injustices, peace escapes certain communities, states or countries. We are talking about the breach of peace, which leads to political and social crises. Among these crises, we have civil wars that are nothing but armed clashes between groups of people or between the army of a country or state and its citizens. This unfortunate situation arises when there is a crisis of confidence or discrimination in state power management. So in West Africa, to minimize the risks of these civil wars, ECOWAS, which is at first glance an economic integration, was called upon to prevent, manage, and resolve these civil wars in its space. For this reason, it is important to understand the political deepening of ECOWAS.

[216]Maiangwa, B. (2013). "West Africa's terrorist challenge and the dynamics of regional response." Insight on Africa 5, no. 1, 1-18.

When ECOWAS was created in 1975, its main objective was to promote the process of economic integration between its member states as stipulated by neofunctionalism. Since the 1990s, several African countries, especially in West Africa, have been victims of long periods of war because of the democratic transition and especially the difficulties observed for the alternations in power of certain ECOWAS member states.[217] So, this regional integration's duty was to increase certain responsibilities to its competencies to face the problems of instability in its member countries. Thus, it also opted for political integration in these early days of democratic experiments from economic integration. The political agenda assigned to ECOWAS concerns the missions of prevention, management and resolution of political conflicts in its space. The Economic Community of West African States was created in 1975 with the main objective of economic development within its member countries. In the late 1980s, some ECOWAS member states such as Liberia in 1989[218] were already showing signs of a potential civil war. Moreover, Liberia was the first member country of this organization to know the civil war between 1989 and 1997 because of an armed rebellion. To prevent, manage and resolve these civil wars, which were already looming on the horizon, ECOWAS underwent a transformation and became a conflict resolution institution in 1990.[219] Therefore, the reason for adding the conflict resolution mission is to guarantee peace and security for its member states. Liberia was the first country to experience civil war in 1989, and ECOWAS had its first experience of conflict resolution missions there. Chapter IV of the 1999 ECOWAS Protocol on the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security established the system for observing peace and security in the space which is the ECOWAS Alert and Response Network (ECOWARN) housed in the Early Warning section of ECOWAS.[220] ECOWARN mainly deals with the prevention of wars whatever their origins (ethnic, religious, tribal, clan, regionalist and others) in the member states of ECOWAS.

[217]Joseph, R. (1997). "Democratization in Africa after 1989: Comparative and theoretical perspectives." Comparative politics, 363-382.
[218]Kieh Jr, G. K. (2004). Irregular warfare and Liberia's first civil war. Journal of international and Area Studies, 57-77.
[219]Francis, D. (2000). ECOMOG: a new security agenda in world politics. In Africa at the Millennium. Palgrave Macmillan, London, 177-202.
[220]ECOWARN, accessed may 17, 2022, https://ecowarn.org/

Indeed, if in the more general context of regional economic integrations according to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 2003 constitute a threat to the multilateral trading system such as the World Trade Organization (WTO).[221] This threat is explained by the fact that regional economic integrations allow States to sign regional cooperation agreements that are not often in line with WTO clauses. This signals that there is a kind of marginalization in the multilateral trading system. But the cooperating states do not see it this way because for the states that make regional cooperation, there are several advantages in this kind of cooperation. It allows the states to conclude regional agreements in several fields other than economics to accelerate development. We are nowadays in a globalized world in which economic and political exchanges seem to have no limits because of the evolution of information and communication technology. But above all, states need regional groupings for mutual exchanges of common sustainable development policies. Economic and politics are interwined so ECOWAS needed to do a political deepening to respond effectively to its member countries' economic, political, and social difficulties. Also, regional integration is closer to its creators to quickly intervene during times of need. In these regional operations, it is the intellectuals of the member countries who work there, so they can better understand each member country's challenges. This is why the political integration of ECOWAS makes sense because political stability is one of the pillars of a country's development. So, knowing the origins of ECOWAS is an asset.

## 3.4. THE ORIGINS AND TYPES OF CONFLICTS IN ECOWAS MEMBER STATES

There is always politics in regional integration, even if it is often not clearly defined. But in ECOWAS the member states have thought about the political and social questions in the founding treaty of their Community after several sad experiences of civil wars since the

[221]Gavin, B. (2007). "Reconciling Regionalism and Multilateralism: Towards Multilevel Trade Governance." In Multilateralism, Regionalism and Bilateralism in Trade and Investment, Springer, Dordrecht, 2007, 59-72.

1990s.[222] Thus, the conflicts facing the West African Space Community member countries emanate from several origins. For the most part, these conflicts are linked to questions of alternation in power in West Africa. Overall, these conflicts are typically social and arise from political, economic and social disparities. Civil wars often begin in this climate of political, economic and social discrimination of one ethnic group over others in a country. ECOWAS member states are also subject to border disputes that undermine Integration's diplomatic relations.

### 3.4.1. THE DIFFERENT KINDS OF CONFLICT IN THE ECOWAS AREA

The causes of the crises in West Africa are diverse and do not come only from within the continent but also from outside. So, these causes allow us to know the categories of wars with which West Africa is confronted. ECOWAS member countries are mainly confronted with three types of conflicts: civil wars, political uprisings, and border disputes. These crises multiplied in the 1990s in several ECOWAS member countries mainly because of poor governance and the flouting of democratic values and human rights. Civil wars have been very frequent in several countries for political purposes.

#### 3.4.1.1. CIVIL WARS

Since the 1990s, the African continent has become the scene of various conflicts. These conflicts are manifested by insurgencies, revolts, and tensions of all kinds that tend to go beyond the countries' limits. The case of West Africa has been more glaring in recent decades because this region has experienced more pangs of instability. The hotbeds of tension have multiplied in record time in the member countries of the Economic Community of West

[222]Taylor, I. and Wiliams, D. P. (2008). "Political culture, state elites and regional security in West Africa." Journal of Contemporary African Studies 26, no. 2, 137-149.

African States. The countries affected by the civil wars are Guinea Conakry, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Sierra Leone and most recently, Côte d'Ivoire and Mali.[223] Without forgetting the border conflicts between Benin and Niger, Nigeria and Cameroon, through the explicitly political tensions in certain countries such as Togo, Côte-d'Ivoire and Mali.[224] All these crises are a threat to the peace and stability of the member countries of the Community. So, before studying the cases of Liberia and Sierra Leone, let us evoke a few cases of civil wars in certain states of this integration.

The civil war in Guinea Conakry was sparked by the rise of rebel forces from various origins and scattered along Guinea Conakry's borders with Liberia and Sierra Leone. These rebels were mainly based in Liberia and Sierra Leone, supported by General Lansana Conte's regime opponents.[225] There was also the participation of mercenaries from countries like Burkina-Faso, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau and Senegal. The Liberian armed forces of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) present in Guinea intervened for political reasons. The first reason is the support given to the United Liberation Movement in Liberia (ULIMO-K), part of the Kranh rebels not rallied to power at the end of the war in 1997 and which was against the central Liberian power by the bias of Guinea; the second reason is linked to Guinea Conakry's action within ECOMOG in Liberia during the civil war and the third reason dates back to the early 1990s, when Lansana Conté sent Guinean soldiers to support the Sergeant Samuel Doe against the rebellion Liberia.[226] Guinean rebels' support for the new Liberian government was to remind its Guinean counterpart of its past political and military positions. So it was a settling of scores that the Liberian president wanted to render to his counterpart considered an enemy of the past.

In Guinea-Bissau, General Ansumane Mane led the rebellion from June 1998 when Joao Bernardo Vieira was democratically elected president. Particular attention has been paid to this government either by virtue of bilateral defense and security agreements or by the

[223]Obi, C. I. (2009). "Economic community of West African States on the ground: Comparing peacekeeping in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, and Côte d'Ivoire." African Security 2, no. 2-3, 119-135.
[224]De Calo, S. (1973). "The politics of military rule in Togo." Genève-Afrique/Geneva-Africa 12, no. 2, 62.
[225]Gberie, L. (2001). "Destabilizing Guinea." Partnership Africa Canada, October, 3.
[226]Ojo, E. O. and AGBUDE, A. G. (2012). "An Exploration of the Historical and the Political Backgrounds of Liberia." AFRREV IJAH: An International Journal of Arts and Humanities 1, no. 3, 187-200.

Conference of Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS. But unfortunately, the rebels have maintained tensions. Also to maintain peace, ECOWAS has established a ceasefire monitoring and control mechanism with the dispatch of ECOMOG military troops. The warring parties have agreed to sign the ceasefire agreements. Thus, between 1998 and 1999, the two parties signed several ceasefire agreements, but this did not prevent the rebels from continuing the fighting to seize power. Finally, on May 7, 1999, General Ansumane Mane, with the help of his troops, overthrows the regime of Joao Bernardo Vieira.[227]

The case of Nigeria is an internal problem because of "Boko Haram" Boko Haram, which means "Western education is a sin", is an Islamist and Jihadist group born in 2002 to ensure the sustainability of the works of the Prophet Muhammad.[228] This is a group that was created by an Islamist-jihadist named Mohamed Yusuf Marwa in 1980.[229] The group is based in northeast Nigeria in the town of Maiduguri in the Borno region. Boko Haram has become a great concern to Nigeria because of the suicide bombings daily. This group also kidnaps students and schoolchildren attending Western schools, and most of these learners are killed. Since the birth of Boko Haram, the Nigerian state has refused the involvement of any state or organization. So, these attacks are considered an internal problem specific to the country. Nigeria is working to limit the scale of the attacks caused by this group. Due to the principle of non-involvement in the internal affairs of states, the other ECOWAS member states have not reacted so far. Boko Haram has a religious stance that believes that the application of "Sharia" is the best way to guarantee a just society.[230]

For example, according to Sharia, for someone who steals for the first time, his right hand must be cut off and his left hand the second time. Nigeria is a secular country, as the democratic rules indicate; therefore, the Sharia law advocated by Boko Haram is an injustice to other religious congregations. However, the Nigerian state is still in control anyway, as

[227]Massey, S. (2004). "Multi-faceted mediation in the Guinea-Bissau civil war." Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies 32, no. 1, 76-95.
[228]Onyebuchi, E. E. and Chigozie, C. F. (2013). "Islamic fundamentalism and the problem of insecurity in Nigeria: The Boko Haram phenomenon." IOSR. Journal of Humanities and Social Science 15, no. 3, 46-48.
[229]Doukhan, D. (2012). "Who Are You, Boko Haram?." International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 4.
[230]Igboin, B. O. (2012). "Boko Haram sharia reasoning and democratic vision in pluralist Nigeria." International Studies. Interdisciplinary Political and Cultural Journal 14, no. 1, 75-93.

the Nigerian military often organizes heavy-handed attacks to eliminate this group. Much effort has been made in this momentum since this Islamist, and jihadist group has existed. But the total elimination of this group is not yet a reality. Perhaps soon, if this group's events overtake Nigeria, it will call on the ECOWAS armies and ECOMOG for support. Currently, the attacks of this group worry some countries bordering Nigeria, such as Niger, Benin and Cameroon. Nigeria must think of a lasting solution to protect the other countries from the Boko Haram group, which could soon have members in several countries.

Concerning Côte d'Ivoire, the war began on September 19, 2002 with a hostile rebellion by the government of Laurent Gbagbo.[231] The then President of Burkina-Faso, Blaise Compaore, was appointed as a mediator to reach agreement between the rebels and the government. Thus, on January 24, 2003, a first ceasefire agreement was signed in Linas Marcoussis.[232] As in the other cases, a few months later, the war resumed with a vengeance because the rebels would have formed on Burkina-Faso soil with significant resources to gradually come and attack from the north of the country by advancing towards the south. But their momentum was curbed when they wanted to take the city of Abidjan after taking two important ones: Bouaké and Korhogo. Côte d'Ivoire had been divided into two; the rebels occupied the north in the name of the New Forces, which later became the Armed Forces of the New Forces (FAFN). The Armed Forces of Côte d'Ivoire (FANCI) constitute the forces of Laurent Gbagbo's regime. The leader of the FAFN rebellion was Guillaume Soro, but a young commander called Issiaka Ouattara from the same family as President Alassane Ouattara, led the armed fighting on the ground. It should be noted that this crisis also has ethnic origins because, in Côte-d'Ivoire, the Dioula are considered to be immigrants from Burkina-Faso. However, it is the ethnic group of Alassane Ouattara, whose presidential candidacy is still contested by the party of President Laurent Gbagbo, which is from the Bété ethnic group. So the war had a double face; on the one hand, the rebels did not want Gbagbo, which was in charge of organizing democratic elections, and on the other hand, the Dioula

[231]Charbonneau, B. (2012). "War and Peace in Côte d'Ivoire: Violence, Agency, and the Local/International Line." International Peacekeeping 19, no. 4, 508-524.
[232]Yabi, G., and Goodwin, A. (2009). "From Linas-Marcoussis to the Ouagadougou Political Agreement." From Civil Strife to Peace Building, 17-32.

and Bété ethnic groups did not get along. But it was necessary to restore the authority of the Dioula ethnic group once again to legitimize Ouattara's candidacy. So to resolve the crisis, ECOWAS sent ECOMOG made up of nearly 1,500 soldiers, in January 2003.[233] As the material and logistical resources were lacking in ECOMOG, the UN provided support to this force which continued its mission under his mandate in 2004 in collaboration with the UN forces.[234] With several years of peacekeeping and several agreements signed, Laurent Gbagbo has agreed to appoint Guillaume SORO as his prime minister. This somewhat calmed the tensions perpetrated by the rebels, but Laurent Gbagbo's refusal to leave power in the 2011 elections further aggravated the situation. So the UN forces, including those of ECOMOG with the help of the French forces of the operation `` Licorne " led the Gbagbo regime to leave power on April 11, 2011 to the new president Alassane Ouattara after having made several victims, displaced families and exiles.[235]

The civil war in Mali has its origins in the poor distribution of the country's wealth because northern Mali, rich in mineral resources such as gold and uranium, have a hand in this crisis. In addition to the fall of General Gaddafi's regime in Libya in 2011, weapons were stolen by rebels from Libyan military camps. These rebels migrated to the Sahara where later, a group of Tuareg mercenaries who served the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya joined the rebels to form a rebellious coalition with powerful weapons. The full rebel coalition included: Tuareg rebels from MNLA (independence movement), ANSAR-Dine (Salafist), and jihadists from AQIM and MUJAO attacked Mali on January 17, 2012.[236] They captured Aguelhok, Ménaka and Tessalit. This capture of three important towns in Mali angered part of the national army, who felt that the central state was not giving the orders to attack as it should. This was how there was a divergence of opinions about the pace of the interventions. These defeats divide the Malian army into two parts, and a part of the army that saw the advances of the rebels as a great catastrophe made a coup d'état in March 2012, putting an end to the regime of the

[233]Bah, A. B. (2010). "Democracy and civil war: Citizenship and peacemaking in Côte d'Ivoire." African affairs 109, no. 437, 597-615.
[234]Holt, V. K. and Shanahan, K. M. (2005). African capacity-building for peace operations: UN collaboration with the African Union and ECOWAS. Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, 59.
[235]Bovcon, M. (2009). "France's Conflict Resolution Strategy in Côte d'Ivoire and its Ethical Implications." African Studies Quarterly 11, no. 1, 5.
[236]Solomon, H. (2013). "Mali: West Africa's Afghanistan." The RUSI Journal 158, no. 1, 12-19.

former president Amadou Toumanı TOURE, who went into exile in Senegal.[237] This coup was the source of an armed crusade between the “green berets” and “red berets” of the national armies. Under these circumstances, the rebels captured towns like Kidal, Timbuktu, and Gao. The rebel movement called the MNLA had ceased its offensives and declared Azawad's independence on April 6, 2012.[238] As everywhere else when war broke out, there were thousands of innocent deaths, displaced families and refugees in the neighboring countries. Moreover, there were differences of opinion between the rebels that signed the divorce between the MNLA group and the ANSAR-Dine group.[239] So in June 2012, the separatists were expelled from Gao by MUJAO and AQIM. In November 2012, the MNLA went to war against the jihadists MUJAO and AQIM, but failed by losing control of the town of Menaka and now occupying the town of Ansongo. Since the beginning of the Malian crisis all the negotiations carried out have been failures because the rebels were not prepared to make concessions in order to lay down their arms. So until the end of 2012, the Salafi jihadists had gained more strength from where in January 2013, they captured cities like Ségou, Mopti located in the south of Mali, after a muscular struggle.[240] At this pace, the whole country should be controlled by the jihadists, which is why foreign countries and peacekeeping organizations had reorganized to end the crisis by restoring the authority of the state. So the interventions concerned France with "Operation Servel," and the mission of the ECOWAS countries called MISMA. The UN forces relaid the ECOWAS MISMA under the name of MINUSMA. Later the Chadian armed forces specializing in combat in the desert and the training mission of the European Union joined the first two French missions and that of ECOWAS to liberate the country from the hands of the rebels towards the end of March 2013.[241] All the towns under the control of the rebels were taken over. The transitional

[237]Hagberg, S. and KÖRLING, G. (20012). "Socio-political turmoil in Mali: the public debate following the coup d'état on 22 March 2012." Africa Spectrum 47, no. 2-3, 111-125.
[238]Barducci, A. M. (2012). "The MLNA’s Fight for a Secular State of Azawad." Inquiry and Analysis Series. IDC Herzliya: International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 18.
[239]Solomon, H. (2015). "Ansar Dine in Mali: Between Tuareg Nationalism and Islamism." In Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Africa, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 67-84.
[240]Raineri, L. and Strazzari, F. (2015). "State, Secession, and Jihad: The Micropolitical Economy of Conflict in Northern Mali." African Security 8, no. 4, 249-271.
[241]Onuoha, F. C., and Thurston, A. (2013). "Franco-African military intervention in the Mali crisis and evolving security concerns." Al Jazeera Center for Studies, 2-5.

government was installed on June 18, 2013 which after two weeks of negotiations had signed a ceasefire agreement with the rebels.[242] Finally, on July 28, 2013, the presidential elections were organized democratically to bring President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita to power.[243] It is at this price that Mali has regained its calm since the new president took power. Unfortunately, since the accession to the supreme office of the new democratically elected president, the jihadist attacks have not stopped. They have even grown in the country, making the Malian people believe that their president is not up to his task. Also, a large part of the regular army of Mali does not agree with the president because he is not seriously concerned about the killings of the rebels which make many victims in the army. Thus, since his accession to state affairs, his management of state power has generated political tensions with popular uprisings. He could not bring peace and security and development issues also remained unsolved in the country. So, his failure to find solutions on the one hand to the rebels' questions , and on the other hand his mismanagement of state power led to the fall of his power in August 2020 by a military coup. Efforts are being made to put to the past the bad history of war lived by this member country of ECOWAS. If civil wars have raged in West Africa, purely political tensions are also a sword of Damocles that has hung over the heads of ECOWAS member countries since their adoption of democracy in the 1990s.[244]

### 3.4.1.2. THE POLITICAL UPRISINGS

The countries of West Africa have known not only civil wars. Along with the civil wars, there are the political uprisings and revolts that have surfaced. These uprisings are purely political in the cases of Côte-d'Ivoire and Togo and mainly revolts concerning the Casamance secessionist struggle in Senegal and those of the Tuaregs in Niger and Mali. From 1990 until

[242]Boutellis, A. (2015). "Can the UN stabilize Mali? Towards a UN stabilization doctrine?." Stability: International Journal of Security and Development 4, no. 1, accessed September 28, 2020, https://stabilityjournal.org/articles/10.5334/sta.fz/print/

[243]Bermeo, N. (2016). "On democratic backsliding." Journal of Democracy 27, no. 1, 5-19.

[244]The year 1990 marks the beginning of the democratization of the countries of West Africa with the adoption of new constitutions based on democratic rules.

1999, Côte d'Ivoire did not experience major political instability.[245] This country took advantage of its ten years of democratization to experience political stability with significant development of the country because of its cocoa production. However, one might wonder what happened to this country to make it plunge into political uprisings. The answer is that anti-immigration sentiment in this country has caused great ethnic disagreement based on "ivoirité"[246] and has played into political relations even at the highest level of the state. The 1999 coup d'état organized by General Robert Guei was the starting point for political uprisings in Côte-d'Ivoire because he should return power to civilians in accordance with democratic rules after a period of transition.[247] At the end of the transition period, the general resigned from the army to be a candidate, supposedly, it was the cocoa farmers who applied for his candidacy to restore peace and justice. This impulse to cling to power cost the life of Robert Guei at the end of 2001, and Laurent Gbagbo, a civilian had ensured the transition to bring the country to peace to organize free elections.[248] But Laurent Gbagbo, in his management of power understood that to gain popularity in the next elections he intended to participate as a candidate, he had to find a reason to eliminate the candidates who could prevent him from accessing the power. From there, he brought back the concept of "ivoirité" to say that those who are foreigners on Ivorian soil will see their candidatures rejected. The candidate targeted by this concept was Alassane Ouattara of the Dioula ethnic group, an ethnic group that can be found in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso. Thus, from 2002 until 2011, the concept put Côte-d'Ivoire under violent political uprisings because populations, especially Dioula ethnic groups and other sympathizers and relatives, did not understand how a citizen like Alassane is Ouattara could be excluded from the list of candidates while legally serving this country for a long time.[249] Through the mediation of France and ECOWAS

[245]Crook, R. C. (2001). "Cocoa booms, the legalisation of land relations and politics in Cote d'Ivoire and Ghana: Explaining Farmers' Responses." IDS Bulletin 32, no. 1, 35-45.
[246]Akındes, F. (2003). "Côte d'Ivoire: Socio-political Crises,'Ivoirité' and the Course of History." African Sociological Review/Revue Africaine de Sociologie 7, no. 2, 11-28.
[247]Daddieh, C. K. (2001). "Elections and ethnic violence in Côte d'Ivoire: The unfinished business of succession and democratic transition." African issues, 14-19.
[248]Toungara, J. M. (2001). "Francophone Africa in Flux: Ethnicity and political crisis in Côte d'Ivoire." Journal of Democracy 12, no. 3, 63-72.
[249]Cutolo, A. (2010). "Modernity, autochthony and the Ivorian nation: the end of a century in Côte d'Ivoire." Africa 80, no. 4, 527-552.

leaders, several agreements were signed to resolve the crisis. Concerning ECOWAS, an extraordinary Conference of Heads of State and Government met in Accra (Ghana) on September 29, 2002, where the leaders of the Community took measures to resolve the political uprisings in Côte-d'Ivoire.[250] Despite all these attempts to find solutions, the country had not found its letters of nobility. It was only in 2011, after the elections lost by Laurent Gbagbo, who refused to leave power, that several armed forces intervened to remove him, restoring Alassane Ouattara in his rights as president.[251]

In Togo, the dictatorial regime of General Etienne Eyadema Gnassingbe aroused the anger and uprisings of the population. With the wind of democracy which blew on the countries of West Africa, the Togolese people in this case, the opponents of the regime of Eyadema Gnassingbe could not accept that a single-family take the destiny of the country hostage without sharing. So, political life began to falter to the rhythm of uprisings by opposition leaders who demanded power-sharing by going to free elections. In addition, public opinion is shocked by the various abuses committed by the dictatorial regime of General Eyadema Gnassingbe and mainly by the way in which certain accused of being authors of hostile leaflets were tortured with electric chairs in September 1990.[252] These horrible sentences and executions prompted the population to wonder who would be next in the future, and if they do nothing, this regime risks exterminating all the opposition leaders in the country to stay in power. Despite all the means available to power, its authoritarian management and the very influence of the personality of President Eyadema Gnassingbe, the uprisings that Lomé, the capital of Togo, experienced on October 5, 1990, were the most violent that this country has ever had lived since its independence on April 27, 1960.[253] The power of Eyadema Gnassingbe continued to manage the country in this tyranny until his death on February 5, 2005, when his son illegally took power because he was the president of the Togolese

[250]Hara, F. and Yabi, G. (2013). "CôTe D'ivoire, 2002–2011." In Responding to Conflict in Africa, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 145-175.
[251]Zounmenou, D. D. and Lamin, A. R. (2011). "Côte d'Ivoire's post-electoral crisis: Ouattara rules but can he govern?" Journal of African Elections 10, no. 2, 6-21.
[252]Toulabor, C. M. (1994). "Political satire past and present in Togo." Critique of Anthropology 14, no. 1, 59-75.
[253]Morency-Laflamme, J. (2018). "A question of trust: military defection during regime crises in Benin and Togo." Democratization 25, no. 3, 464-480.

national assembly who should ensure the interim until the organization of the elections.[254] But this was not the case because the seizure of power by the son of the former Togolese president was backed by the Togolese army, which was largely from the same region of North Togo as the late president. A few months later, Faure Essozimna Gnassingbe the former president's son agreed to organize elections to democratically elect a president. On May 3, 2005, he became his own successor in power because he was elected by vote as the president.[255] Since his accession to power, his government has made efforts to integrate a dialogue with the opposition. At present, tensions seem to be calming down for the happiness of the Togolese population, which has lived in fear and torture for a long time.

The Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC) was the author of the revolts that took place in Senegal. This Movement has been claiming the independence of the southern province called Casamance since 1983 and whose historic leader is Father Augustin Diamacoune Senghor.[256] The power of President Abdou Diouf for twenty years tried to conduct negotiations with this rebel group without a lasting agreement. At the end of Abdou Diouf's power, President Abdoulaye Wade when came to power, ordered his national army since June 21, 2002 to lead a military offensive against the rebels.[257] The objective was to end the armed bands that sow terror, especially in the north of Casamance. Countries bordering Senegal such as Guinea-Bissau, Gambia with the Senegalese state have been involved in this fight to weaken the rebels so that they cannot repeat their attacks in the sub-region. After several years of combined efforts by these different countries to fight against the rebels' violence, the Casamance problem seems to calm down to the happiness of the populations of space formerly living in uprisings. We can rejoice that the province of Casamance has found some peace.

[254]Ebeku, K. S. A. (2005). The succession of Faure Gnassingbe to the Togolese presidency: an international law perspective. Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 15-21.
[255]Osei, A. (2018). "Like father, like son? Power and influence across two Gnassingbé presidencies in Togo." Democratization 25, no. 8, 1460-1480.
[256]Evans, M. (2013). "Historiographies, nationalisms and conflict in Casamance, Senegal." Contesting Historical Divides in Francophone Africa, 93.
[257]Englebert, P. (2005). "Compliance and defiance to national integration in Barotseland and Casamance." Africa Spectrum, 29-59.

For several years in West Africa, the Tuaregs have been considered the masters of the Western Sahara region by the Nigerien people and all the peoples of the countries bordering on Niger. Breeders of all kinds of animals resistant in the desert, the Tuaregs involuntarily dispersed on the African continent because of the repressions they suffered in some countries. In Mali, for example, the Modibo Keita regime has sent back a large number of them who have fled to Algeria and Libya in the hope of better living conditions.[258] Unfortunately, the Gadhafi regime had instrumentalised them by arming them for repressions on Niger and Mali in Libya.[259] In Algeria, in 1985, the economic crisis damaged the life of the Tuaregs, and two thousand were repatriated to Mali and Niger, where their life was already hell in the past and their return to the same territories should not be a paradise.[260] They were not greeted with good hospitality at all as they were subjected to police and military checks, provoking anger among this ethnic group. This marginalization of the Tuaregs led this section of the population to become brutal in their reaction. So from May 7 to 16, 1990, an armed commando invaded the Nigerien part of Tchin-Tabaraden and Tahoua, and the repression was very bloody even though the Nigerien government recognized fifty-four dead.[261] In Mali, violent clashes also took place on September 3 and 4, 1990, in Bourassa and left hundreds dead in both camps.[262] The consequence was that new clashes occurred both in Niger and Mali. These clashes were always to eliminate the Tuaregs for good from Malian and Nigerien territories. So, these bloody uprisings forced countries like Mali, Niger, Algeria and Libya to seek a solution to the Tuareg situation. The presidents of these aforementioned countries met in Djanet, a small Algerian town near Niger and Libya, on September 8 and 9, 1990, to discuss the Tuareg issue.[263] The various presidents present at the summit had reinforced their

[258]Pietrowski, M. and Angole, J. (1991). "Cessation of Touareg Repression: Respite or Resolution?" Africa Today, 41-47.
[259]ABDALLA, Muna A. "Understanding of the natural resource conflict dynamics: The case of Tuareg in North Africa and the Sahel." Institute for Security Studies Papers 2009, no. 194, 2009, P. 16.
[260]Krings, T. (1995). "Marginalisation and Revolt among the Tuareg in Mali and Niger." GeoJournal 36, no. 1, 57-63.
[261]Alzouma, G. (2009). "The state and the rebel: Online nationalisms in Niger." Journal of Contemporary African Studies 27, no. 4, 483-500.
[262]Keita, K. (1998). "Conflict and conflict resolution in the Sahel: The Tuareg insurgency in Mali." Small Wars & Insurgencies 9, no. 3, 102-128.
[263]Kohl, I. (2010). "Modern nomads, vagabonds, or cosmopolitans? Reflections on contemporary Tuareg society." Journal of anthropological research 66, no. 4, 449-462.

wishes on the issues of "free movement of people and goods between the countries bordering the Sahara" and endeavored to "define a strategy aimed at better development of border regions". After this 1990 summit, all the countries concerning the Tuareg problem made concessions to calm the tensions by integrating this ethnic group into the management of administrative affairs and giving them the chance to live comfortably with the other ethnic groups.[264] Political uprisings are not the only ills that Africa suffers from; there are also border disputes.

### 3.4.1.3. BORDER DISPUTES

The border disputes in West Africa have their origins since 1885 when the African continent was divided by European colonizers.[265] So, in the years 1895, France had created a colonial ministry whose mission was to organize all of its conquered and being conquered colonies in West Africa.[266] Already in 1904, France had nearly a dozen colonies in West Africa with a vast territory for its exploitation.[267] The French colonists were at the head of the management of these colonies for their own interests. France wanted its colonies to stand out from other colonies. So some territories have undergone modifications or even a change of status. Colonies have seen their status revised because of the changes made by the colonizing country. With this in mind, on March 1, 1919, a new colony, Upper Volta,[268] was formed.[269] Likewise, on December 4, 1920, the territory of the military in Niger entirely became territory

[264]Ronen, Y. (2013). "Libya, the Tuareg and Mali on the eve of the 'Arab Spring'and in its aftermath: an anatomy of changed relations." The Journal of North African Studies 18, no. 4, 544-559.
[265]Bulhan, H. A. (2015). "Stages of colonialism in Africa: From occupation of land to occupation of being.", 1-18, Accessed September 30, 2020 ,https://www.psycharchives.org/bitstream/20.500.12034/1358/1/jspp.v3i1.143.pdf
[266]SARVAN, Charles Ponnuthurai. "French colonialism in Africa: the early novels of Ferdinand Oyono." World Literature Today 59, no. 3, 1985, PP. 333-337.
[267]Njoh, A. J. (2004). "The experience and legacy of French colonial urban planning in sub-Saharan Africa." Planning Perspectives 19, no. 4, 435-454.
[268]Upper Volta is the name that the French colonizers had given to Burkina Faso during the colonial period. But the name of this country was changed in 1984 and became Burkina Faso with the accession to power of President Thomas SANKARA.
[269]Gervais, R. R. (1993). "Archival Documents on Upper Volta: Here, There, and Everywhere." History in Africa 20, 379-384.

of Niger and the colony of Haut-Senegal took the name of Sudan.[270] Subsequently, on January 1, 1921, the territory of Mauritania was transformed into a colony with its capital at Saint-Louis.[271] On December 13, 1921, the territory of Niger was also transformed into a colony, but its capital was transferred from Zinder to Niamey in 1926.[272] On November 27, 1924, in Senegal, all the important administrative services were transferred to Dakar, the capital of Senegal today.[273] All the different territorial modifications and border delimitations brought by the colonizers in the African continent, were the first origins of the border disputes throughout Africa in general and in West Africa in particular with the French maneuvers even after the independence of the colonies. Since the independence of West African countries, several territorial discussions have been observed between certain countries which share the same borders. At least a dozen border disputes have taken place after independence until today. Among these border disputes, we can cite those between Mali and Haute-Volta, Senegal and Mauritania, Senegal and Guinea-Bissau, Sudan and Niger, Sudan and Guinea-Conakry and Haute-Volta and finally that between Niger and Dahomey.

In the list of border disputes, the one that seems the most important to study in the first place is that between Mali and Haute-Volta (Burkina-Faso). It has been mainly torn apart among all the French colonies in its territorial structure. In addition, its creation in 1919 caused controversy leading to the cancellation of its existence because until 1932, for an economic problem, it was abolished to be distributed between Côte-d'Ivoire, Niger and French-Sudan (current Mali).[274] But, by the force of things, it had reappeared in 1947 because nothing should cause any problem if, during the disappearance of Upper Volta, the colonizers had not succeeded in joining a portion of the Agacher to French-Sudan.[275] Better, during the

[270]Harris, N. D. (1911). "French Colonial Expansion in West Africa, The Sudan, and the Sahara." Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 5, 353.
[271]Taine-Cheikh, C. (2008). "Mauritania.", 169-176.
[272]Djibo, A. K. (2019). "History of the urban planning of the city of Zinder in the Niger Republic." Routledge Handbook of Urban Planning in Africa, 30-43.
[273]Bigon, L. (2016). "Bubonic plague, colonial ideologies, and urban planning policies: Dakar, Lagos, and Kumasi." Planning Perspectives 31, no. 2, 205-226.
[274]Mcfarland, D. M. (1978). Historical Dictionary of Upper Volta (Haute Volta). Scarecrow Press, 1-2, Accessed October 2, 2020, https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/ff6a/fd814c1652fb3496212f9950dad68c25d755.pdf
[275]Naldi, G. J. (1986). "Case concerning the Frontier Dispute between Burkina Faso and Mali: Provisional Measures of Protection." International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 970-975.

reestablishment of this territory, France had restored it to its original limits, including the portion detached in 1935.[276] These various situations confirm the errors shown by the colonial powers in the division of Africa and the delimitation of colonial territories. But other cyclical factors made the conflict more inevitable because the two countries were predisposed to devote their respective territorial bases within the boundaries left by colonization for important economic reasons. Under these circumstances, each country wanted to recover or keep the old boundaries of its territory. People already knew that having a vast expanse of territory is a probable wealth. So, it was necessary at all costs to safeguard its territory intact for its wealth and to avoid having people isolated from their land of origin. In addition to the probable mineral and water resources, the point of interest of the two countries for the disputed region was the regional cooperation project known as Liptako-Gourma. From 1974, Burkina-Faso and Mali accused each other of border violence.[277] The Malian and Burkinabé armed forces have clashed in the Douentza region on Malian territory on several occasions. During this period, protests and clashes were so frequent that a solution had to be found to stop them as quickly as possible. In this context, the former president of Guinea-Conakry Ahmed Sékou Toure played the role of mediator by bringing the two countries to sign an agreement on July 11, 1975.[278] This agreement made it possible to end the armed confrontation that started in December 1974, if not for a time, because in 1985, a second border dispute broke out again between the two countries.[279] This time the armed clashes claimed more victims than the first. Still, in these conflicts, it is the territorial and economic reasons and purely political contingencies and the disagreements between the Burkinabé Thomas Sankara and the Malian Moussa Traore. Through their rulers at the time, countries like Libya and Nigeria played mediation, which led to the signing of a ceasefire agreement

[276]BASSOLET, François Djoby, and Tiémoko Marc GARANGO. "Upper Volta has a land area of 105,869 square miles, similar to." Contributions in Librarianship and Information Science 11, 1975, P. 273.
[277]NALDI, Gino J. "The case concerning the Frontier dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali): Uti possidetis in an African perspective." International & Comparative Law Quarterly 36, no. 4, 1987, PP. 893-903.
[278]Pflıeger, G., Gallatı, L., Rodrıguez, A., Wang, Y., Mın, K., and Sıngeorzan, A. (2016). "Mali and Burkina Faso: their bordering tensions.", 13.
[279]PONDI, J. E. (2000). "Compensating for Weak Symmetry in the Mali-Burkina Faso Conflict, 1985-1986." Power and Negotiation, 203-24.

on December 29, 1985.[280] Subsequently, the two countries resorted to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for a final settlement of their disputes. At the end of the process, the chamber set up to rule on this case delivered its verdict on December 22, 1986, including a new borderline between Burkina Faso and Mali.[281] The judgment was fair for the two countries in conflict because there were no more quarrels, and this is how the hatchet was buried to restore calm.

The border conflict between Mauritania and Senegal is said to be the result of an insignificant clash between the Peulh herders of Mauritania and the Sarakolé[282] peasants of Senegal in Diawara, a small village in Senegal bordering Mauritania. It is true that this small quarrel alone could not trigger such a serious crisis observed afterwards. However, this was the last straw that would have broken the camel's back as an accumulation of frustration and marginalization already weighed on the shoulders of black Africans in Mauritania. So from that point of view, a number of issues are at the root of this conflict. Among these problems, blacks' treatment in Mauritanian society played in the outbreak of clashes. For a long time, relations of mistrust and violence have characterized the cohabitation between “Whites” and “Blacks” Mauritanians.[283] According to history, blacks are considered the original inhabitants of Mauritania. But Mauritanian society is essentially dominated by the Moors.[284] In addition, there were rivalries between Mauritania and Senegal over the policy of developing the Senegal River, the stake of which would be above all economic: this development of the Senegal River had caused new misunderstandings.

On the one hand, residents on both sides of the river feared the arrival of large landowners or agro-industrial companies who could send them away. On the Mauritanian shore, this fear is doubled by another because the black residents were unhappy to be able to support the

[280]Johnson, S. (1986). "Burkina-Mali War: Is Nigeria Still a Regional Power." India Quarterly 42, no. 3, 294-308.
[281]Naldi, G. J. (1987). "The case concerning the Frontier dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali): Uti possidetis in an African perspective." International & Comparative Law Quarterly 36, no. 4, 893-903.
[282]The Sarakolé is a Senegalese ethnic group living in the north of Senegal and practicing mostly agriculture.
[283]Weinstein, W. (1966). "Mauritanian Rainbow." Africa Today 13, no. 6, 12-15.
[284]The Moors constitute the dominant ethnic group of Mauritania, they would come from the Turks according to the history but who arabized later. Since the independence of this country, the Moors have governed the country.

arrival of the white Moors. So there was great mistrust between the likely cohabiting Blacks and Moors, so it was also about racial issues and / or ethnic domination that blacks avoided. On the other hand, a dispute arose over the project to build a hydroelectric power station in Manantali. To do this, the Mauritanian president systematically refuted the terms of resolution 220 of the project, which provided a route on the left bank of the river that he considered more favorable to Senegal.[285] Finally, the Senegalese claims were on the borderline between the two countries. Thus, these demands for readjustment of the borders added to the rivalries about the development of the Senegal River and the difficult coexistence between the Moors and black Mauritanians led the two countries to the clashes of April 1989, which resulted in massacres and very considerable looting.[286] With several years of tensions ,and twists and turns concerning these border conflicts, undoubtedly one of the deadliest in West Africa, they ended thanks to the goodwill of the two countries aware of the sorrows that their populations were experiencing. They took the case to the International Court of Justice in 1995, which ruled on the question and definitively emptied it.[287]

Regarding the border conflict between Benin and Niger, the "Lété Island"[288] was the point of contention between the two countries, which had caused great tensions. Following the incidents of May-June 1960 on the island, the social and political crisis from December 1963 to February 1964 and the fall of Benin President Hubert Koutoukou Maga, the Nigerien government expelled the Beninese who inhabited the island.[289] Indeed, this island is considered by Benin as an area under its sovereignty, while Niger considers rather that it is under its national jurisdiction. The personal intervention of the Ivorian Head of State Houphouët Boigny following the tensions generated by this misunderstanding, an

[285]Vick, M. J. (2006). "The Senegal River Basin: A retrospective and prospective look at the legal regime." Natural Resources Journal, 211-243.
[286]Parker, R. (1991). "The Senegal-Mauritania conflict of 1989: a fragile equilibrium." The Journal of Modern African Studies 29, no. 1, 155-171.
[287]Wallensteen, P. and SOLLENBERG, M. (1997) "Armed conflicts, conflict termination and peace agreements, 1989-96." Journal of Peace Research 34, no. 3, 339-358.
[288]Lété Island is a territory located on the Niger River 40 km north-west of Gaya (Gaya is a town in Niger). This island has a length of 16 km and a width of about more than 4 km and its area is about 40 km ² which constitutes the important island on the border with the Republic of Dahomey, which has become the Republic of Benin.
[289]Patel, B. N. (2014). "Frontier Dispute (Benin/Niger)." In The World Court Reference Guide and Case-Law Digest, Brill Nijhoff, 457-469.

intervention which recommended that the populations continue to live together while waiting for the problem to be definitively resolved appears to be a situation that exacerbates the problem. Since there were clashes between the populations, which had prompted the interventions of the public security forces. The joint committee set up by the two countries to study and propose a final solution to the problems had failed. So the compromise signed between the two countries on June 15, 2001, in Cotonou (Benin) allowed them to submit their problem to the International Court of Justice, which definitively resolved this conflict in its judgment dated July 12, 2005.[290]

Two essential factors cause the border conflict between Senegal and Guinea-Bissau: the region's economic issues under discussion and a former Franco-Portuguese treaty of 1886.[291] In 1977 the discovery of oil added to the fishery wealth in the buffer region between the two countries pushed Senegal to claim the area.[292] Guinea-Bissau refused to accept an agreement reached without its knowledge by the former colonizing powers. There should have been a handful of armed clashes when the two countries reached an agreement in March 1985.[293] However, given the development of the situation, may 19 was marked by border attacks, and fortunately, however, these aggressions did not result in armed conflicts, since at the end of may 1990, appeasement and cooperation measures were taken by mutual agreement between Guinea-Bissau and Senegal.[294] This was how the spirits of war were put away. If we closely follow the resolutions of these border disputes, we note that ECOWAS has remained silent in settling these border conflicts. The agreements of the conflicting parties and the assistance of the International Court of Justice largely contributed to the resolution of these border disputes.

[290]Spadi, F. (2005). "The International Court of Justice Judgment in the Benin-Niger Border Dispute: The Interplay of Titles and Effectivites under the." LJIL 18, 777.
[291]Cabral, A. I. R. and Lagos Costa, F. (2017). "Land cover changes and landscape pattern dynamics in Senegal and Guinea Bissau borderland." Applied Geography 82, 115-128.
[292]Okafor-Yarwood, I. (2015). "The Guinea-Bissau–Senegal maritime boundary dispute." Marine Policy 61, 284-290.
[293]Aquarone, M. C. (1995). "The 1985 guinea/guinea-bissau maritime boundary case and its implications." Ocean Development & International Law 26, no. 4, 413-431.
[294]Beveridge, F. (1992). "Case concerning the Arbitral award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal): provisional measures, merits." The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 41, no. 4, 891-896.

This silence of ECOWAS can be explained by the fact that the countries in conflict are members of the Community, and the decisions can be biased by the commissions appointed for this purpose. Friendship relations between Heads of State and Government can also be a handicap for any resolutions that might be taken. In addition, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to send ECOMOG forces into armed clashes because these forces come from the same member countries in conflict. That is, a head of state cannot accept such a decision to send ECOMOG forces that will act against his power. All these reasons made ECOWAS passive in settling border disputes that had opposed several of its members. The various conflicts that have taken place in West Africa, be they civil wars, political conflicts caused by external gravity and sometimes bloody border disputes testify to the fragility of the West African region.[295] With the presence of these conflicts, ECOWAS could not just freeze on its economic objective or even the magnitude of these wars. It was, therefore, necessary to create a political body within the Community to resolve the problems to which its members are victims. This was how the political objectives took shape within this integration. Therefore, ECOWAS would then have to face the settlement of political and other conflicts in its member states. What can be the causes of political and social conflicts in the ECOWAS regional area?

### 3.4.2. THE CAUSES OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CONFLICTS IN THE ECOWAS AREA

Africa is an ancient continent that has known good and bad stories. Especially black Africa which has suffered for six centuries from the sad days of the black slave trade and the transatlantic trade and through the painful moments of colonization and imperialism. These dark moments for Africa have acted on the continent's political, economic, and social stability, especially with the division of the continent into small countries to the advantage

[295]Maconachie, R., Srinivasan, R., and Menzies, N. (2015). "Responding to the Challenge of Fragility and Security in West Africa.", 9.

of the colonizers.[296] It is true that all the responsibility cannot be attributed to the facts of the past alone. There is also the part of Africans themselves in the situation of political, economic and social instability that can be observed in this old continent, especially the responsibility of political leaders who have almost failed in the management of the political affairs of their respective countries. Thus, since the post-colonial period, African states have not been doing even better. After independence and especially in the march towards democratization, African countries in general and those of West Africa, in particular, have experienced periods of political crises.[297]These political conflicts have three main causes: the historical legacy of crises, the realities of the current powers in each country linked to the management of state affairs, and the external causes linked to the interference of certain rich countries in decision-making. First, what can be the causes of the legacy of the past of these political crises in West Africa?

### 3.4.2.1. THE HISTORICAL HERITAGE OF THE CRISES

For a long time, faced with the failures of civilians to govern their countries in Africa, the military reigned more with repetitive coups d'état until the march towards the democratic era in the 1990s.[298] The countries of sub-Saharan Africa have been in the same theater of instability in managing state power. Civilians have not been able to nobly accomplish this task of governance of their countries after the independence of 1960 throughout Africa.[299] So, the fall of military powers with the advent of democracy had given states' management back to civilians. Thus, the creation of ECOWAS was a channel for West African countries to harmonize their economic development for shared prosperity. But, the old demons will

[296]Collier, P. and Inkpen, R. (2001). "The Role of Mapping in the Colonisation of Africa: 1880-1914." The Mapping, 1-8.
[297]Brown, D. S. (2000). "Democracy, colonization, and human capital in sub-Saharan Africa." Studies in Comparative International Development 35, no. 1, 20.
[298]Mcgowan, P. J. (2003). "African military coups d'état, 1956–2001: frequency, trends and distribution." The Journal of Modern African Studies 41, no. 3, 339-370.
[299]Cooper, F. (2008). "Possibility and constraint: African independence in historical perspective." Journal of African History, 167-196.

resurface with frequently armed political and social tensions. These crises derive their reasons from the past of each member state and have various origins. Some countries are victims of the very deep historical process which dates back to pre-colonial and colonial times. Others come from the sudden change in cultural and religious habits imposed on African peoples for the adoption of so-called modern states in accordance with world standards. These contradictions between African cultures and modernism have created distances of opinions between peoples and their political leaders who want to give Africa a new way of life.[300]

In addition, there is a large gap in understanding of national and international political issues between the African peoples and their political leaders. Because the African countries lived in kingdoms with a great cultural mixing between the peoples. But this system was upset by colonization which divided certain ethnic groups who lived together.[301] It was a big shock in the cohesion of the current states in West Africa. There are also the manipulations of the leaders by interest groups, networks of influences and the regular interventions of the former colonial powers in the internal political questions of West African countries are also reasons which participate in the creation of bloodly conflicts and genocides. West African crises affect populations with a memory of the past that has nothing to do with the considerations of so-called sovereign states. The proof is that since the independence and even the democratization of African countries, crises still exist in several countries. The civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone are examples of this context. It is a question of going back further in history to understand certain realities of crises. For this reason, the question of the Mandingo peoples of the former Empire of Mali, dispersed on both sides, is currently a permanent source of conflict in the western part of the African continent. There have been impressions of the exclusion of certain peoples in this West African space, which has caused a breakdown in good neighborly relations in countries such as Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire. However, the Mandinka people existed in the past on Liberian territory and are no longer

[300]Bush, B. and Maltby, J. (2004). "Taxation in West Africa: Transforming the colonial subject into the "governable person"." Critical Perspectives on Accounting 15, no. 1, 5-34.
[301]Michalopoulos, S. and PAPAIONNOU, E. (2013). "Pre-colonial ethnic institutions and contemporary African development." Econometrica 81, no. 1, 113-152.

considered to be true Liberians. However, in history, these people were well structured in this country with chiefdoms. Also when we talk about the Malinka or the Mandingo,[302] we remember the power of the Mali Empire and the history of Soundiata Kéita and other emperors who made the reputation of West Africa in the background of the kingdom.

But the maintenance of this historical memory sometimes has drawbacks since certain peoples of West Africa retain a rather negative memory of the Malinka empires or kingdoms and quite precisely of the last before colonization: the warlike power of Samory Touré. Memories of the Samory Touré raids are still alive in northern Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire. Thus the stories told by parents to their sons about these raids fuel anger and lead to the settling of scores in times of crisis. The policies of these countries marked by sad memories of history, take advantage to gain popularity or to exclude certain political opponents. Since the twentieth century, the Liberian state has adopted a policy of exclusion towards the Mandingo by designating their status as people constituting a diaspora of traders because these people are often nomadic, and their main activity is commerce. This exclusion policy has led to the deterioration of good neighborly relations among the Liberian population and land ownership problems. The Mandingo no longer have access to land for their various activities or even for their housing. These many injustices towards the Mandingos in Liberia and to other peoples in West African countries are not likely to stabilize the region. It was precisely for this reason that during the Liberian civil war in 1990, there was fierce conflict between ethnic groups.[303] After this civil war the Mandingo lost the right to live in Liberia so currently in popular opinion the Mandingo no longer have any right to live in Liberia.[304] Such an attitude does not advocate for economic, political or social integration.

The case of Côte d'Ivoire remains almost the same with the Liberian question with the Mandingo. Here the relations between the Dioula traders and the supposedly indigenous

[302]The Malinka or Mandingo, constitute a people of West Africa that one finds particularly in Mali and Guinea and in a minority way in Senegal in the region near the Malian border, in Burkina Faso, in the north-west of the Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea-Bissau. The Malinka are found in small groups in northern Sierra Leone and Liberia.
[303]Ballah, H. and Abrokwaa, C. (2003). "Ethnicity, politics and social conflict: The quest for peace in Liberia." Penn State McNair Journal 10, 52-69.
[304]Goerg, O. (1997). "MANDINGO IN LIBERIA Religion, Commerce, and the Integration of the Mandingo in Liberia. By Augustine Konneh. Lanham, New York, London: University Press of America, 1996. Pp. xvii+ 167. $16.50 (ISBN 0-7618-0354-8)." The Journal of African History 38, no. 3, 497-534.

populations are frequently critical. Grudges within political classes and anti-immigrant sentiment shattered political relations at the highest level, with a division deeply rooted in society, eventually producing genuine ethnic hatred centered on "ivoirité."[305] These are all causes that sow discord between the societies which are called to live together. Regional integration in Africa presents particular features relating to this continent's socio-political and economic history: the colonial fact, the artificial nature of borders, and economic insufficiency.[306] All these conflicts are also based on multiculturalism because the fact remains that the various ethnic groups living together have problems of integration. Although cultural diversity is a strength, it can also be a source of social divorces between individuals from the same country.[307] So, failure to respect the culture of one's neighbor can lead to civil wars because it is an attack on democratic principles and even more so in violations of human rights. These are questions that African political leaders should address in order to prevent citizens from the moral and physical torture of which they are victims as soon as war breaks out. Unfortunately, it looks like these social divisions are taking advantage of these politicians to satisfy their selfish interests. Alongside the borrowings of the past of the crises in West Africa, there are recent reasons for the conflicts, which also plague the socio-political situation of the ECOWAS member countries.

### 3.4.2.2. RECENT REASONS FOR CRISES

The crises observed recently in the West African space are probably linked to the control concerns of modern states. Several armed or protest movements leaders aim to seize power in their respective countries. Contrary to democratic rules, which require the election of a

[305]Collett, M. (2006). "Ivoirian identity constructions: ethnicity and nationalism in the prelude to civil war." Nations and Nationalism 12, no. 4, 613-629.
[306]Agyemang, A. A. (1990). "Trade Liberalization Under the Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS): Some Preliminary Highlights of Legal and Economic Problems." J. World Trade 24, 57.
[307]Njoh, A. J. (2006). Tradition, culture and development in Africa: Historical lessons for modern development planning. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 31-47.

candidate by vote, the armed movements' leaders want to gain presidential office by force at all costs. This is the main motive for political struggles in West Africa. All crises indeed have their particular motives, but the most visible and sensitive side that political leaders use to destabilize their opponents is ethnicity. The ethnic issue has become the backbone that tears apart the social cohesion of sub-Saharan Africa. (Meredith, M., 2006), remarks that the rapid evolution of the phenomenon attests to the immense destabilizing potential of what unfortunately constitutes today, one of the key variables of African policy because it must be recognized that the rivalry between the ethnic groups has ended up entirely structuring collective mentalities and political issues in the region.[308] So ethnicity gained momentum, and the seizure of power is based on it. The ethnic difference has been constructed, maintained and used to promote and legitimize the acquisition of power.

In the past, people who lived in social harmony are now plagued by problems of ethnicity. The weight of ethnicity, which weakens several national units, quickly engendered open conflicts. This is the case observed in Liberia between the Mandingo and the so-called indigenous populations, Rwanda between Hutuand Tutsi,and in Côte d'Ivoire between the Dioulaand the so-called indigenous people, same in Somalia. So since independence, the African continent has found itself in the grip of ethnic, clan and religious conflicts. But in West Africa it is ethnic and religious conflicts that reign supreme; in this case, we have the examples of Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire for ethnic conflicts and Nigeria and Mali for religious ones.[309] From this remark, we can deduce that ethnicity or religion very often defines political behavior in West Africa. In addition, in this region, the ineffectiveness of state apparatuses constitutes an amplifying factor of conflicts, which suggests that cultural representation has taken precedence over state policy. The consequence of this situation is that the armed forces are no longer at the service of the nation but at the service of the quest for power. The army, which should ensure the security of states, has become like an enemy because it tends to refuse to remain under the authority of civilians elected by vote. So the army, imbued with

[308]Meredith, M. (2006). The State of Africa - A History of fifty Years of Independance, Ed. Free Press, London, 680.
[309]Ellis, S. (2006). The mask of anarchy updated edition: The destruction of Liberia and the religious dimension of an African civil war. NYU Press, 245-259.

these ethnic and religious considerations to carry out coups d'etat to seize power. One can quote the cases of putsch of the Ivory Coast in 2001 organized by the Commander Rober Gueyi and quite recently with the case of Mali in 2013. Apart from the army, the administrative problems maintain the conflicts in West Africa.

The fact that administrators of West African states have a different ethnic and religious coloring that makes a frank collaboration between these leaders difficult. This situation has repercussions on the populations through political discourse, which provokes hatred and resentment among citizens and the consequences that follow are conflicts. To all this must be added the poor distribution of the country's wealth in the sense that it is the supporters of the party in power who benefit from the advantages of power by leaving others behind. The State has therefore become an empty shell with selfish and personal interests. These are the reasons why West Africa has lived since independence in total political instability. The Economic Community of West African States aware of all these political problems created ECOMOG to respond somewhat to this growing phenomenon in the ECOWAS region.[310] Since independence, almost all African countries have not managed to get rid of their former colonizers completely. This impacts political life in Africa, precisely in that of the ECOWAS member countries, most of which are the French colonies and then English. These colonizers continue to control in an indirect way for their own interests their former colonies. Especially with the concept of globalization, it is no longer possible for a country to live in isolation, so this favors an opening to multiple injustices of which poor countries, in general, are victims and particularly those of West Africa that ECOWAS covers. So if the reasons for the aforementioned crises come from Africans themselves through ethnic, religious and clan considerations, other causes or reasons for conflicts in West Africa come from manipulation and external influence, mainly from ex- colonizing powers.

[310]Hutchful, E. (1999). "The ECOMOG experience with peacekeeping in West Africa." Whither peacekeeping in Africa, 61-85.

### 3.4.2.3. EXTERNAL CAUSES OF CRISES

It is no secret that the African continent is a great reservoir of natural resources necessary for the functioning of industries in developed countries. These natural riches are a big reason some rich countries have strong lobbies in some African countries. Without forgetting that the former colonizers refuse to cut off relations with their former colonies even several years after independence because they continue to exploit their natural resources.[311] So, several African countries' possession of these natural resources makes them targets of foreign powers investigating these resources for their industries. Moreover, colonial domination continues in another much disguised form in all the former colonies by promoting external involvement in the political affairs of these countries. In reality, African independence does not seem to be a reality because African countries do not have any weight in decision-making at the international level and in major international bodies. They are like spectators or followers of the orders of industrialized countries.[312] So, it's like making the decisions that impact everyone belongs to the richest in the world. Democracy at the international level is lacking because all countries do not have the same opportunity to speak. This acts on African countries that fail to defend their points of view on sensitive issues that engage the destiny of all states. This absence of international democracy has repercussions on the management of state affairs in African countries. Often African leaders have their hands and feet tied, which does not allow them to take certain decisions in the interests of their countries. But, a certain number of these leaders are involved in international corruption because they like the life of the rich countries more than conforming to the continent's economic realities. To achieve this standard of living for the rich, they choose to submit to the wishes of certain Heads of State and governments of rich countries and certain multinationals.[313] This

[311]Bannon, I., and Collier, P. (2003). Natural resources and violent conflict: Options and actions. The World Bank, 3-5.
[312]Amuwo, K. (2002). "Globalisation, NEPAD and the governance question in Africa." African Studies Quarterly 6, no. 3, 65-82.
[313]De Sardan, J. P. O. (1999). "A moral economy of corruption in Africa?." Journal of modern African studies, 25-52.

orientation of these leaders towards the rich countries makes the internal democratic values in African countries take a hit.

The democratic experience in Africa faces several hardships internally and externally because of the safeguarding of the interests of certain groups of people. In West Africa, especially in French-speaking countries, this fact is very visible because, during elections, some candidates often receive great support from outside to win elections.[314] From this perspective, the democratic rules are rigged for the benefit of the candidates who compose with these foreign powers. Disagreements between political leaders often stem from the bad practice of democracy. Thus, leaders who do not agree with the former colonizing countries do not have much chance to take state power even if the citizens of their countries love them. These practices provoke popular uprisings, which lead to political conflicts. According to (De Senarclens, P. 1998), in African states, Latin American states, and other developing countries, democracy has turned into a dictatorship.[315] However, dictatorship is never a guarantee of peace, so it is always a source of conflict. In a country where a part of the population is under the leaders' control, conflicts become unpredictable. In addition, ECOWAS countries, like all other African countries, do not benefit from the fallout of globalization. Because their economies are fragile to resist the unfair competition of international trade established by the World Trade Organization (WTO).[316] Globalization has created more poverty in African countries through social inequalities between rich and poor as the gap widens every day. However, great poverty is a bomb that compromises peace in poor countries. We must add to all these facts, mafia groups capable of financing rebellions in certain African countries when their partners are not in power to overthrow the governments in office.

The availability of natural resources in Africa makes it a continent of quarrels, on the one hand between the countries of the global north themselves and, on the other hand, between

[314]Odukoya, A. (2007). "Democracy, elections, election monitoring and peace-building in West Africa.", 148-160.
[315]De Senarclens, P. (1998). "Governance and the crisis in the international mechanisms of regulation." International Social Science Journal 50, no. 155, 91-104.
[316]Udmbana, N. J. (2004). "A Question of Justice: The WTO, Africa, and Countermeasures for Breaches of International Trade Obligations." J. Marshall L. Rev. 38, 1153.

the nationalist African peoples. To gain access to these raw materials, certain powers practice the policy of dividing political leaders. When war breaks out, they have a free hand to exploit the resources of these countries. In Niger, this is currently the case with the French company AREVA exploiting Nigerien uranium since 1961. A year after the independence of this country it is only 12% of the revenue that goes to Niger; the rest goes to the French company.[317] In Mali, the discovery of uranium in 2003 plunged the country into an armed attack between the rebels and the regime. Oil and diamonds are the points of contention between the political parties because a power supports each party's interests in Angolan territory. Likewise, several countries in tension in Africa find themselves in the same situation. We can cite countries like Liberia and Sierra Leone with transportable diamonds and timber, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, which has almost all the natural resources. So political conflicts in Africa also continue because of the war over natural resources coveted by industrialized countries. In these circumstances, the international arms sellers are the real initiators and profiteers of these repetitive wars in Africa.

There are military agreements that allow France to get involved in security issues in Africa. These agreements cover technical, logistical and defense assistance in the event of a threat to the peace. So France is taking the opportunity to get involved in the political affairs of African states. The history of the former French colonies in Africa gives France the right to military intervention. This was how it intervened in countries like Senegal in 1962, Gabon in 1964, and Central Africa from 1967 to 1970 and then in 1979, Togo in 1986 and most recently in Mali in 2013; the list goes on.[318] All these interventions show the French presence in the West African States. With the collaboration of corrupt and corruptible presidents, it is easy for other foreign powers to proceed in the same way as France to gain access to the exploitation of the natural resources of African countries.[319] All these actions combined form the weight coming from the outside. This external pressure weighs on the entire African continent in general and on the countries of West Africa in particular. For these reasons, wars

[317]Pederson, N. R. (2000). "The French desire for uranium and its effects on French foreign policy in Africa." ACDIS Occasional Paper, 19.
[318]Gregory, S. (2000). "The French military in Africa: Past and present." African Affairs 99, no. 396, 435-448.
[319]Ross, M. L. (2004). "How do natural resources influence civil war? Evidence from thirteen cases." International organization, 35-67.

reign permanently in several African countries with no real solutions to stop them. All the reasons mentioned above are sources of different conflicts in the ECOWAS region.

## 3.5. CONCLUSION

Economic Community of West African States, which is at first glance a purely economic integration, underwent a deepening to combine political missions in its space. One of the major causes was the advent of democracy in the 1990s in ECOWAS member countries. This wind of democracy which had blown in this part of Africa had brought political instabilities in more countries. Several civil wars have arisen in the bad practices of democratic rules. Because political actors to have power at all costs sometimes rely on the division of social cohesion in their speeches of electoral campaigns. The factors they play on to gain electorate are ethnic, religious, tribal and other sensibilities. So, ECOWAS took on the political mission to face the difficulties engendered by the application of democracy. It should be noted that ECOWAS is governed by six main organs. There is the Conference of Heads of State and Government, the Executive Secretariat, the Council of Ministers, the Specialized and Technical Commission, the Community Tribunal and the Cooperation, Compensation and Development Fund which is materialized by a bank. It is through these different bodies that ECOWAS play its dual role of economic and political integration. Its role that interests us here is that of its implications in the resolution of civil wars in its member countries. Mainly, the prevention, management and resolution missions of civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone. How on the diplomatic and military level (ECOMOG) the leaders of ECOWAS brought peace and security to these countries at war. To have an idea on this capital question, it is necessary to make connections with the theories of International Relations which make it possible to explain civil wars. The next chapter is (chapter 4.) which develops the role of ecowas in liberia and sierra leone civil wars.

## CHAPTER 4. THE ROLE OF ECOWAS IN THE LIBERIA AND SIERRA LEONE CIVIL WARS

Several African countries have been affected by civil wars a few years after their independence due to the mismanagement of state power.[320] These wars were accentuated in some countries in the experimentation of democracy in the early 1990s. One of the ECOWAS member countries that interest us in this case study on civil wars in this space of integration of West Africa is Liberia. At the end of the 1980s, Liberia experienced difficult times of civil wars until the eve of the 2000s.[321] ECOWAS got involved through its prevention, management, and conflict resolution missions in its member states to bring peace and security. For Liberia's political and economic stability, ECOWAS had played a great role in reconciling the opposing parties. In this study, the origin of these civil wars and the involvement of ECOWAS in accomplishing its peace and security missions deserve attention. So, how to describe this Liberian civil war which lasted almost ten years with many human victims and material damage?

Sierra Leone is a West African country member of ECOWAS, which has experienced the disasters of civil war and Liberia, which it neighbors. If the Liberian civil crisis had started in 1989 and ended in 1997, that of Sierra Leone had emerged in 1991[322] The Sierra Leonean civil war lasted longer than the Liberian one because, in the year 2002, this civil conflict had ended.[323] To restore peace and security, ECOWAS, in accordance with its peacekeeping agenda, had played its role between the warring parties for the return of peace. The main objective of ECOWAS is the collective sustainable development of its member states. However, to achieve this result, we need political and economic stability for all countries of

[320]GRASA, R. and Oscar MATEOS, O. (2010). "Conflict, Peace and Security in Africa: An Assessment and new questions after 50 years of African independence." International Catalan Institute for Peace, Working Paper, 8.
[321]Cook, N. (2003) "Liberia: 1989-1997 Civil War, Post-War Developments, and US Relations." Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 3.
[322]Ndumbe, J. A. (2001). "Diamonds, ethnicity, and power: The case of Sierra Leone." Mediterranean Quarterly 12, no. 4, 90-105.
[323]Kandeh, J. D. (2003). "Sierra Leone's post-conflict elections of 2002." The Journal of Modern African Studies 41, no. 2, 189-216.

integration. For this reason, ECOWAS always strives to invest in the missions of guaranteeing the peace and security of its space. So how can we understand the liberian civil war that lasted nine years (1989-1997) and all its different implications?

## 4.1. THE LIBERIA CIVIL WAR

Liberia is a country in sub-Saharan Africa which sank into civil war on the eve of 1990. This political crisis arose because of the discrepancies between Liberians descended from black American slaves and indigenous Liberians. It was about the sharing of state power that was concentrated in the hands of black American descendants who returned to Liberia.[324] They were more educated because they benefited from high-quality training in the United States of America before returning, but the natives did not have the same educational opportunities. Then, discrimination in the management of state affairs had set in; this had created disputes at domestic level.[325] Thus, the political instability in this country had started with sometimes successful and unsuccessful coup attempts. In the end, the whole country had fallen into a civil war with an internal community ethnic connotation.[326] That same year, ECOWAS underwent a deepening by combining economic and political functions. Considering the extent of civil wars in its space, this integration was obliged to add to its responsibilities the political mission to resolve the problems of political instabilities which were observed in its member states.[327] So, we can say that Liberia is one of the first member countries to have benefited from the first political missions of ECOWAS. The Community had adopted missions of prevention, management and resolution of crises within its member states. To learn more about the country of this research, it is important to visit its map above.

[324]Kieh, G. K.. (2012). "Neo-colonialism: American foreign policy and the first Liberian civil war." The Journal of Pan African Studies 5, no. 1, 164-184.
[325]Anonymous L2, based on survey by word questionnaire, July 19, 2021.
[326]Kieh Jr, G. K. (2009). "The roots of the second Liberian civil war." International Journal on World Peace, 2009, PP. 7-30.
[327]Yabi, G. O. (2010). "The role of ECOWAS in managing political crisis and conflict." FES Peace and Security Series, Abuja, 8.

**Map 4: Map of Liberia.**




**Source:** https://www.netmaps.uk/digital-maps/liberia-eps-map/

The map of Liberia above shows some important cities in this country which has suffered from civil war for years. What are the origins in an explicit way of this Liberian civil war and the actors involved?

### 4.1.1. THE ORIGINS AND ACTORS OF THE LIBERIAN CIVIL WAR

The Republic of Liberia, or simply Liberia, is located in sub-Saharan Africa, known under the name of West African countries. It is bounded to the east by Côte d'Ivoire, to the northwest by Sierra Leone, to the north by Guinea Conakry and south-southeast and to the west-southwest by the Atlantic Ocean. Liberia is the first country in Africa to gain international sovereignty in 1822.[328] It was an American colony that was the first independent country in West Africa and the whole African continent. Despite this break with its colonizers, this country has not succeeded in its internal governance for lasting stability of state power.[329] Development has not been an effective thing either because this state is

[328]Hargreaves, J. D. (1871). Liberia: the price of independence. Odù: Journal of Yoruba and Related Studies, 1971, no 6, 3-20.
[329]Anonymous L1, based on survey by word questionnaire, July 18, 2021.

currently found in the poorest countries in the world.[330] The worst thing is that this country was the object of civil wars for several years. These civil crises took shape in the marginalization of certain ethnic groups that were not associated with the governance of the country's affairs. This control of power by a clan or ethnic group is often the source of conflicts in several African countries, especially with political leaders' regionalist or exclusive speeches without other arguments to retain state power. This exclusion without reason of certain parts of the population leads to challenges to governance's legitimacy, which unfortunately ends in civil wars.

In Liberia, the war is rooted within its own state.[331] Monrovia is a colony created by slaves who came from America after gaining the freedom of their former masters. The country remained under the rule of the United States even after its independence. So this American influence caused a destabilization in the structure of the state, which put in conflict between the American-Liberians and the natives. Indigenous Liberians disagreed that only Liberian Americans rule the country for years without sharing. The American-Liberians have long ruled the country so they are the ones who run the affairs of the state.[332] This exclusion in the management of Liberian state affairs had engendered frustration among the natives of the country. Thus, in 1980, Sergeant Samuel Doe succeeded in a coup d'état by assassinating President William Tolbert and sixteen of his ministers and important figures in his government.[333] This is how he came to power with management in the mafia military regime full of corruption and brutality in which the people are forced into violence, terror, repression and revenge. This succession to power which the people greeted, had become a nightmare. Because Samuel Doe was worse than the old regime, he toppled. The experiences of the people who believed in the new dawn had been wrong. So the people's protests began by reducing the power of Doe. But despite this weakness of power, the president continued his terror to safeguard power. When Samuel Doe knew that his regime wanted to fall, he used

[330]Maynard, G. (1970). The economic irrelevance of monetary independence: The case of Liberia. The Journal of Development Studies, vol. 6, no 2, 111-132.
[331]Anonymous L 6, based on survey by word questionnaire, August 26, 2021.
[332]Anonymous L 3, based on survey by word questionnaire, July 24, 2021.
[333]Ojo, E. O. and Agbude, G. A. (2012). An Exploration of the Historical and the Political Backgrounds of Liberia. AFRREV IJAH: An International Journal of Arts and Humanities, vol. 1, no 3, 187-200.

ethnical and tribal factors to put certain ethnic groups in a conflict that opposed his management of power.

Sergeant Samuel Doe is from the ethnic group called Krahn.[334] In the bureaucracy and the country's army, he had privileged his own. So the country was under the control of the Krahns. There have been several coup attempts to put an end to this clan management without success. Faced with this resistance to the power of Doe, certain ethnic groups related to the Krahns came in reinforcement. So, the president held power surrounded by his Krahn tribe and allies. This autocracy of power management in which the opposition was suppressed, the situation that would be too much was the execution of General Thomas Quiwonkpa, leader of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), accused of a coup d'état in 1985.

Similarly, the Mano and Gio ethnic groups were also the targets of Sergeant Samuel Doe's soldiers. After the execution of Quiwonkpa, Charles McArthur Ghankay Taylor maternally Gio becomes the new leader of the NPFL. His troop was mainly composed of soldiers of the same ethnic group whose objectives were to systematically assassinate the Krahn and the Mandingo who are considered close to the Krahn . So for Charles McArthur Ghankay Taylor and his troop, it was necessary to eliminate all the ethnic groups who did not have the same parental ties as them and could be potential enemies to manage their power.[335] The consequence of this opposition was the outbreak of a generalized ethnic war between the Gio, Mano, Krahn and Mandingo ethnic groups.[336] This was the real origin of the civil war in Liberia. A civil conflict has plunged the Liberian people into sadness and loss of human lives and materials for almost ten years. Table 7 shows the list of the different ethnic groups in Liberia and their shares in the total population.

**Table 7: The different ethnic groups in Liberia .**

| No | Ethnic group | Percentage of total population(%) |
|---|---|---|

[334]Young, A. T. (2008). Costly Discrimination and Ethnic Conflict: The Case of the Liberian Civil Wars. Paper, University of Mississippi, 1-25.
[335]Waugh, C. M. (2011). Charles Taylor and Liberia: ambition and atrocity in Africa's lone star state. Zed Books Ltd., 25.
[336]Conteh-Morgan, E. and Kadivar, S. (1995). Ethnopolitical violence in the Liberian civil war. Journal of conflict studies, 1-14.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 01 | Kpelle | 20.3% |
| 02 | Bassa | 13.4% |
| 03 | Grebo | 10% |
| 04 | Gio | 08% |
| 05 | Mano | 07,9% |
| 06 | Kru | 06% |
| 07 | Lorma | 05,1% |
| 08 | Kissi | 04,8% |
| 09 | Gola | 04,4% |
| 10 | Krahn | 04% |
| 11 | Vai | 04% |
| 12 | Mandingo | 03,2% |
| 13 | Gbandi | 03% |
| 14 | Mende | 01,3% |
| 15 | Sapo | 01,3% |
| 16 | Other Liberian | 01,7% |
| 17 | Other African | 01,4% |
| 18 | Non-African | 01% |
| **Total** | | **100%** |

**Source:** 2008 Liberian General Population Census, accessed february 02, 2021, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/print_li.html

The different ethnic groups that were at the origin of the civil war in Liberia are Gio (08%), Mano (07.9%), Krahn (04%) and Mandingo (03.2%). We are talking about ethnic groups that can be qualified as minorities in this country. These ethnic groups put together do not reach half of the population. However, we know that the civil war ended more than 20 years ago. So in 1989, when this crisis started, these ethnic groups were still much less populated than

today.[337] In many countries in Africa, there is this difficult situation to explain why the minority ethnic groups often govern african states. The majority groups are often very poor, especially without university education to claim access to state power. Here we have the Kpelle (20.3%), Bassa (13.4%) and Grebo (10%), which constitute the majority of the population, but they were not directly involved in the civil war. In most African countries in civil war with ethnicity as their origin, the minority ethnic group that has power often has the support of outside powers as in the case of Rwanda in 1994 with the Hutus and Tutsi.[338] In what can be called the Rwandan genocide, France provided logistical and financial assistance to the Tutsi rebels against the Hutus.[339] So what can be the reasons for this Liberian civil war which originates from ethnicity?

### 4.1.2. THE REASONS FOR THE LIBERIAN CIVIL WAR

Understanding a civil war in a country involves several factors. The first factor is ethnic origin, which shows the starting point of the discord between the conflicting parties. In the case of the Liberian civil war, ethnicity is the source of the misfortune that this country has experienced for nearly a decade.[340] The following factors, which also need to be given great attention are the reasons that push people to civil wars in a state where living together and social cohesion should be a reality for social harmony. But often, for various reasons, it happens that social barriers are created between religious, ethnic and tribal groups. In West Africa and especially in the ECOWAS region, political leaders are the main actors who use religious, ethnic and tribal differences to find their place in politics. Liberia experienced the same situation because it aimed to safeguard state power for some and for others the

[337]Ellis, S. (1995). Liberia 1989-1994: A study of ethnic and spiritual violence. African Affairs, vol. 94, no 375, 165-197.
[338]Magnarella, P. (2002). Explaining Rwanda's 1994 genocide. Human Rights and Human Welfare, vol. 2, no 1, 2002, PP. 25-34.
[339]Wallis, A. (2014). Silent accomplice: the untold story of France's role in the Rwandan genocide. Bloomsbury Publishing, 2014, P. 122.
[340]Conteh-Morgan, E. and Kadivar, S. (1995). Ethnopolitical violence in the Liberian civil war. Journal of conflict studies, 1-14.

accession to state power by all means, which had led this country into civil war. So, the reasons for the Liberian civil war can be seen at three levels including the domination and discrimination of the natives by the American-Liberians in the management of state power, the rivalry between the highest ranking officers of the country's armed forces and finally ethnic differences used as political arguments:

After the independence of Liberia in 1822, the state power was concentrated in the hands of formerly enslaved Black people from America.[341] In Liberia, they are called the American-Liberians who benefited from the great university studies in the USA and had the former coloniser's support.[342] On the other hand, the majority of natives did not have this opportunity in terms of education and external support. So for at least a hundred years state power was controlled by these expatriates. This situation slowly created discontent among the natives because the country's wealth was not well redistributed. The governance of these American-Liberians only favored their clan to the detriment of others.[343] They held all the important economic sectors and the power of the country. Such a way of managing a country inevitably provokes uprisings and disputes to call the rulers to order. But in the Liberian case, these state managers did not want to listen to their citizens. Thus, the military entered the political game with the objective of freeing the people from these expatriate politicians guided by the former colonizer. The native Liberian people believed that a military coup could help them have a better life without knowing that the greatest frustration awaited them with the seizure of power by the military.

In 1980, Sergeant Samuel Doe snatched power by a coup d'état in great popular jubilation in the assassination of President William Tolbert.[344] The Liberian people saw a liberating messiah from the sufferings that they endured under the governance of the Americano-Liberians. But this joy was short-lived because of the rivalry between the highest-ranking

[341]Abasiattai, M. B. (1992). The search for independence: New world blacks in Sierra Leone and Liberia, 1787-1847. Journal of Black Studies, vol. 23, no 1, 107-116.
[342]Santana, G. (2012). A case of double conciousness americo-liberians and indigenous liberian relations 1840-1930, 13.
[343]Anonymous L 5, based on survey by word questionnaire, august 23, 2021.
[344]Ojo, E. O. and Agbude, A. G. (2012). "An Exploration of the Historical and the Political Backgrounds of Liberia." AFRREV IJAH: An International Journal of Arts and Humanities 1, no. 3, 187-200.

officers in the armed forces. The sergeant will make enemies in his own corporation because of the reasons of leadership in the governance of the country. Then, the national army was divided , and thus, began the adversity and the preparation of the coups d'etat against the power of Doe. It should be noted that under the governance of this military, ethnic issues were still hidden. The greatest concern was to reassure the people of a good break from the habits of the past regime. Unfortunately, the discordance between the armed men aggravated the precarious situation in the country. There have been several armed men who have fallen in this power struggle. But the reason that will most favor the march towards civil war in Liberia is the assassination in 1985 of General Thomas Quiwonkpa who was the leader of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) by the power of Doe.[345] This execution of the general made Charles McArthur Ghankay Taylor become the new leader of the NPFL the same year. Precisely in 1989 Taylor launched hostilities against the governance of Doe.[346] The resistance and the support of the soldiers who were close to the Krahn ethnic group pushed Charles Taylor to the extreme idea of exterminating them to have a free hand on power. It was with this in mind that ethnic manipulations began in the Liberian political sphere between Samuel Doe and Cherles Taylor.

In politics, to have supporters, some political leaders do not bet on their social projects but rather on their ethnic origins.[347] Especially in African countries where democracy is still young, the strength of ideas or arguments does not count too much in the political spectrum to gain the people's confidence. So the list goes on to name unfortunate events brought on by the religious, ethnic and tribal differences that politicians use to seize power. The civil war in Liberia in 1989 took on an ethnic color when political leaders began to exploit their ethnicities for support.[348] Four main ethnicities were key players in this ethnic crisis. The ethnic groups are Gio, Mano, Krahn and Mandingo. The point of contention for these ethnic groups is the control of state power. Sergeant Samuel Doe had the support of the Mandingo,

[345]Mcgowan, P. And Johnson, T. H (1986). Sixty coups in thirty years–further evidence regarding African military coups d'état. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 1986, vol. 24, no 3, 539-546.
[346]Ellis, S. (1995). Liberia 1989-1994: A study of ethnic and spiritual violence. African Affairs, vol. 94, no 375, 165-197.
[347]Anonymous L4, based on survey by word questionnaire, July 27, 2021.
[348]Ballah, H. and Abrokwaa, C. (2003). Ethnicity, politics and social conflict: The quest for peace in Liberia. Penn State McNair Journal, vol. 10, 52-69.

who were close to the Krahn ethnic group, which is his origin. Charles Taylor and his soldiers come from the Gio ethnic group allied to the Mano whose objective was to kill all the Krahns and Mandingos. This open adversity of Taylor to the power of Doe created a crisis of confidence between the four ethnic groups who became enemies of civil war. The reason for the formation of these two divergent camps is that alongside Taylor, it was necessary to eliminate the Krahn and Mandingo ethnic groups of Samuel Doe to take power. Although Doe's power was also not holy, he resisted to retain it. If we now understand the Liberian Civil War's reasons, what were its impacts?

### 4.1.3. THE IMPACTS OF THE LIBERIAN CIVIL WAR IN THE ECOWAS AREA

#### Socio-Economic Impacts In Liberia And In The Ecowas Area

Civil war does not happen without socio-economic impacts on the affected country and its neighborhood. To better understand the impacts of the civil crisis between 1989 and 1997 in Liberia, it will be interesting to look at the loss of human life. The Liberian civil conflict had resulted in the deaths of around 150,000 to 200,000 people[349] without forgetting the refugees and internally displaced persons. Refugees were estimated at more than 750,000 people in this context of the civil crisis.[350] For Anonymous L2, it is difficult to know the exact statistics of the number of dead, wounded, displaced and refugees in times of civil war because it is not possible to list everything.[351] Also, in times of war, it is no secret that human rights are not enforced. So moments of civil conflict also lead to looting other people's property, especially rapes of underage girls and adult women. However, human resources are the first asset in any country because it is human beings who create wealth. Often in civil wars, it is the able-bodied arms that lose their lives because, in most cases, it is the young people who

[349]Utas, M. (2005). West-African warscapes: Victimcy, girlfriending, soldiering: Tactic agency in a young woman's social navigation of the Liberian war zone. Anthropological Quarterly, 403-430.
[350]Innes, M. A. (2003). Scorched Ether: Radio Broadcasting in the Liberian Civil War. Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies, Concordia University, Montreal, vol. 14, 4.
[351]Anonymous L2, based on survey by word questionnaire, July 19, 2021.

go to the front lines for combat. Most of the time, regardless of the color of the war (ethnic, religious, tribal or otherwise), there are people who are forcibly recruited. These people often do not have the proper training to wage wars. They are hastily formed and sent to fight. The consequence is that the enemy camps kill them. As a violation of human rights, there are also child soldiers who are sometimes enlisted in these civil wars. The case of Liberia is no exception to this bad practice. In any case, a civil crisis never brings anything good except sadness to public opinion. What hurts the most are deaths for unbearable reasons that these wars cause in the country. When the Liberians started this ethnic conflict, they did not know that great suffering awaited them for almost a decade. Especially the worst face of civil war is the death of young people who are the future of a country.[352] We know when the war starts, but the end is difficult to predict. Table 8 shows the drop in the size of the Liberian population during the period of the country's civil war.

**Table 8: Trends in Liberian population growth**

| Years | Population | Five-year percentage change |
|---|---|---|
| **1955** | 1,011,363 | 1.69 % |
| **1960** | 1,118,657 | 2.04 % |
| **1965** | 1,245,102 | 2.16 % |
| **1970** | 1,400,730 | 2.38 % |
| **1975** | 1,600,452 | 2.70 % |
| **1980** | 1,853,001 | 2.97 % |
| **1985** | 2,145,754 | 2.98 % |
| **1990** | 2,075,912 | -0.66 % |
| **1995** | 2,044,661 | -0.30 % |
| **2000** | 2,848,456 | 6.86 % |
| **2005** | 3,218,116 | 2.47 % |
| **2010** | 3,891,356 | 3.87 % |
| **2015** | 4,472,230 | 2.82 % |

[352]Boyden, J. and De Berry, J. (2004). (ed.). Children and youth on the front line: Ethnography, armed conflict and displacement. Berghahn Books, 209.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **2020** | 5,057,681 | 2.44 % |

**Source:** Worldometer, accessed January 04, 2021 https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/liberia-population/

We can observe from Table 8 that the population's size has normally evolved positively between the years 1955 and 1980. Before the period of the civil war, there was an increase in population during these years. This means that the mortality was very low, so there were no negative impacts on the population growth. But from 1985 until 1995, the size of the population declined. This period coincided with the civil war which led to the decline in the population. The civil war raised the death rate in the country over the period 1985to 1995. Obviously, the population growth could not be normal. This large drop in the size of the population exposes the many human damages that this civil conflict has left behind in this country. These are the perverse consequences that the war has provoked. Nevertheless, the population growth has resumed normally since the year 200. Obviously, the year 2000 was another era in the life of Liberians because it was the post-war period in this country. We even note that the demography has become galloping to compensate for the human losses of the war. On the social level, the Liberian civil war left thousands of internally displaced people refugees and, unfortunately, dead. So, at the economic level, what adverse effects have been caused by this civil crisis?

A country cannot exist without its inhabitants because it is human beings who transform an environment to make it prosperous and viable. An economy has human life as its foundation because in a country it is the men and women who carry out income-generating activities to operate all economic sectors and even other areas that are not directly linked to the economy. There can be no sustainable economic development without a good policy of this vital sector for a nation.[353] In times of civil war, above all, control of the economic sector escapes the country's central power. So the economic performance receives a shock and loses its growth. When the free movement of people and goods becomes difficult or even impossible because of the barriers created by the war, economic activities slow down, because sometimes the

[353]Barbier, E. B. (1987). The concept of sustainable economic development. Environmental conservation, vol. 14, no 2, 101-110.

enemy camps in conflict divide the country into inaccessible and sometimes unlivable regions.[354] The bureaucracy also closes its doors when the crisis becomes very deep. In other words, the country's political leaders lose their legitimacy and can no longer collect taxes. Already that the economic activities lose their weight, the rulers fall into difficulties in the collection of fiscal receipts for the normal functioning of the country. So, the decline in economic performance accentuates the suffering of the people because it is money that makes it possible to meet basic daily needs. These needs are compulsory for human life, so a good economy is necessary even in times of war. In Liberia, it was four ethnic groups that started the civil war that plunged this country into suffering for almost ten years.[355] Since its independence, this country, like many others in Africa, has not been as economically developed. Liberia was on the list of poor countries when this civil crisis erupted. Its precarious economic situation had worsened during this dark period in its history. Economically, the world is divided into two blocks under the names of countries of the North (rich countries) and countries of the South (poor countries). In the 1990s, only South Africa was ranked among emerging countries.[356] Emerging countries are in the transition zone between poor countries and rich countries. Liberia was not among those countries making efforts to join the list of industrialized countries of the world. It was a poor country which accentuated its precarious situation with the onset of its civil war. Especially if, until now, this country is still struggling to get its head out of the water, it is because the after-effects of this crisis have harmed economic development. War inevitably destroys jobs in a country. For this reason, after a conflict, the victim country must sometimes start from scratch. The inhabitants' jobs and income-generating activities destroyed by the war must necessarily start over again. This reality negatively impacts the growth of a country. The ECOWAS countries are not rich, so if one of them has an economic problem, it affects the other members of the

[354]Francis, D. J. (2009). Peacekeeping in a bad neighbourhood: The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in peace and security in West Africa. African Journal on Conflict Resolution, vol. 9, no 3, 87-116.
[355]Forest, D. (2004). Causes et motivations de la guerre civile au Libéria (1989-1997). 2004. Thèse de doctorat. Université Laval, 6.
[356]Gottschalk, R. and Sodré, C. A. (2008). The liberalization of capital outflows in Brazil, India and South Africa since the early 1990s. In: Financial Liberalization and Economic Performance in Emerging Countries. Palgrave Macmillan, London, 95-120.

integration.[357] Even in times of peace many of these countries do not experience significant economic growth. So a civil crisis inevitably causes an economic pit. To better appreciate the depth of the economic crisis that Liberia experienced during its civil war, Table 9 shows the trends in Liberia's econonic growth over the period 1961-2020.

**Table 9: Annual Liberia's economic growth rate, 1961-2020.**

| Years | Annual economic growth rate | | Years | Annual economic growth rate |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **1961** | 2.435 % | | **1991** | -14.22% |
| **1962** | 1.345% | | **1992** | -35.1% |
| **1963** | 2.272% | | **1993** | -32.97% |
| **1964** | 5.158% | | **1994** | -21.78% |
| **1965** | 4.793% | | **1995** | -4.275% |
| **1966** | 7.703% | | **1996** | 12.2% |
| **1967** | 6.744% | | **1997** | 106.2% |
| **1968** | 4.767% | | **1998** | 29.72% |
| **1969** | 7.287% | | **1999** | 22.9% |
| **1970** | 6.668% | | **2000** | 25.7% |
| **1971** | 4.905% | | **2001** | 2.921% |
| **1972** | 4.135% | | **2002** | 3.759% |
| **1973** | -2.251% | | **2003** | -30.14% |
| **1974** | 4.752% | | **2004** | 2.617% |
| **1975** | -3.468% | | **2005** | 5.283% |
| **1976** | 5.307% | | **2006** | 8.041% |
| **1977** | 1.586% | | **2007** | 9.537% |
| **1978** | 4.82% | | **2008** | 7.146% |
| **1979** | 3.261% | | **2009** | 5.298% |
| **1980** | -4.097% | | **2010** | 6.104% |

[357]Nurudeen, A., Abd Karim, M. Z., & Aziz, M. I. (2015). Corruption, political instability and economic development in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS): is there a causal relationship?. Contemporary economics, 9(1), 45-60.

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **1981** | -2.138% | | **2011** | 8.198% |
| **1982** | -2.433% | | **2012** | 7.994% |
| **1983** | -1,898% | | **2013** | 8.704% |
| **1984** | -2.105% | | **2014** | 0.7% |
| **1985** | -0.845% | | **2015** | 0% |
| **1986** | -1.68% | | **2016** | -1.598% |
| **1987** | -0.999% | | **2017** | 2.47% |
| **1988** | -2.04% | | **2018** | 1.221% |
| **1989** | -26.67% | | **2019** | -2.499% |
| **1990** | -51.03% | | **2020** | -2.503% |

**Source:** Extracted from the IMF's April 2020 Database of Countries' Economic Growth.

Table 9 shows that the economic growth rate of Liberia has been very volatile over time. From 1961 until 1972, economic growth was positive compared to 1989-1997 period. The economic growth of Liberia was mostly negative between 1989 and 1995, coinciding with the civil war period. The largest negative growth rate was registered in 1990(-51.03%). The negative impact of the Liberian civil war on the economy is seen in the period between 1989 and 1995 when the economy showed a deep decline. It can be said that this civil conflict has severely affected the Liberian economy because in times of war individual and collective economic activities no longer operate normally. Often, there are closures of several shopping centers, small and medium-sized enterprises, and other commercial structures because the security and free movement of people and goods are no longer guaranteed. This difficult situation blocks all economic sectors and causes a decline in economic performance. In this period, the country's debt significantly increased because there was no longer the possibility for the State to collect internal tax revenues for the expenses of the sovereignty of the country. Finally, between 1996 and 2020, economic growth resumed with further ups and downs in growth rates. The highest growth was achieved in 1997, with economic growth of 106.2%, as the economy was catching up after the war. The worst economic performance was found in 2003 with a negative economic growth rate of -30.14%. Between 2019 and 2020, this rate remains negative( -2.5%). Like several other poor West African countries, Liberia is still an

economically ill country. Its annual economic growth rate is not gradual because it evolves in a checkered pattern with often negative economic growth rates. Especially the socio-economic impacts are observed more in the period of the civil war in this country, with high negative economic growth rates between 1989-1995. So what about the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita during the civil crisis in this country?

In a country, what allows the rulers to have the means to properly manage state affairs are the income-generating activities carried out by each citizen. In non-industrialized countries such as those in the ECOWAS region rely on taxation to have revenue for their government policies. However, in times of war, commercial activities often slow down or even stop because security is not guaranteed for everyone to go about their business. The free movement of people and goods is not possible in times of war, which negatively impacts the country's economic sectors. Without peace, traders have no regular consumers because offer and demand take a hit. So per capita incomes will also fall in the conflict country. In the case of Liberia, poverty increased during the period of its civil war as annual per capita incomes declined considerably. Table 10 shows the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita trends from 1990 to 2020.

**Table 10: Annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita in US dollars in Liberia from 1990 to 2020.**

| Years | Annual gross domestic product in US dollars per capita in Liberia | | Years | Annual gross domestic product in US dollars per capita in Liberia |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **1990** | 722 | | **2006** | 508 |
| **1991** | 630 | | **2007** | 535 |
| **1992** | 417 | | **2008** | 550 |
| **1993** | 283 | | **2009** | 556 |
| **1994** | 220 | | **2010** | 570 |
| **1995** | 205 | | **2011** | 597 |
| **1996** | 217 | | **2012** | 626 |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **1997** | 416 | | **2013** | 663 |
| **1998** | 499 | | **2014** | 650 |
| **1999** | 572 | | **2015** | 634 |
| **2000** | 681 | | **2016** | 608 |
| **2001** | 676 | | **2017** | 608 |
| **2002** | 685 | | **2018** | 600 |
| **2003** | 471 | | **2019** | 571 |
| **2004** | 474 | | **2020** | 554 |
| **2005** | 486 | | | |

**Source:** Extracted from the IMF's April 2020 Update Database on Liberia's Annual Per Capita Income from 1990 to 2020.

The civil crisis in Liberia began in 1989, but the year 1990 can be the starting point for the appreciation of the GDP for the simple reason that this year illustrates well the socio-economic impacts of the civil war that this country went through. So, in Table 10, which presents the trends in annual GDP per capita, we see that in the first two years following the war, the GDP per capita were 722 and 630 US dollars, respectively. The worst GDP per capita were recorded from 1992 until 1996, which were the cruel moments of the crisis. Over the period 1992-1996, The GDP per capita hovered around US$ 200. It was not until the end of the civil war in 1997 that the GDP per capita improved a little. So in 1997, the GDP per capita was 416 US dollars. But from 1998 until 2020, Liberia's annual GDP per capita fluctuated between 500 and 700 US dollars. In general, the Liberian civil war severely affected the country's economic performance and pushed many people into poverty.[358] Table 11 presents Liberia's Gross National Product (GNP) per capita from 1970 until 2018.

[358]Hegre, H., Østby, G. And Raleigh, C. (2009). Poverty and civil war events: A disaggregated study of Liberia. Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 53, no 4, 598-623.

**Table 11: Annual Gross National Product (GNP) per capita in US dollars in Liberia from 1970 to 2018.**

| Years | Annual gross national product in US dollars per capita in Liberia | | Years | Annual gross national product in US dollars per capita in Liberia |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **1970** | 253.6571 | | **1995** | 90.62906 |
| **1971** | 260.9833 | | **1996** | 101.4229 |
| **1972** | 276.8997 | | **1997** | 159.762 |
| **1973** | 284.8157 | | **1998** | 181.1296 |
| **1974** | 348.6448 | | **1999** | 172.7058 |
| **1975** | 398.4434 | | **2000** | 183.0243 |
| **1976** | 406.9612 | | **2001** | 151.0604 |
| **1977** | 452.671 | | **2002** | 158.54 |
| **1978** | 473.5601 | | **2003** | 108.7427 |
| **1979** | 518.9539 | | **2004** | 133.4129 |
| **1980** | 520.256 | | **2005** | 157.3696 |
| **1981** | 493.8987 | | **2006** | 183.294 |
| **1982** | 470.5671 | | **2007** | 216.9289 |
| **1983** | 467.9108 | | **2008** | 247.87 |
| **1984** | 434.7882 | | **2009** | 269.1485 |
| **1985** | 442.9025 | | **2010** | 285.9405 |
| **1986** | 404.8577 | | **2011** | 351.9034 |
| **1987** | 429.3637 | | **2012** | 355.9905 |
| **1988** | 466.112 | | **2013** | 385.1231 |
| **1989** | 490.686 | | **2014** | 393.0221 |
| **1990** | 254.549 | | **2015** | 422.9908 |
| **1991** | 234.4861 | | **2016** | 426.6377 |
| **1992** | 153.4955 | | **2017** | 414.1837 |
| **1993** | 111.5479 | | **2018** | 381.0368 |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **1994** | 91.48353 | |

**Source:** Extracted from the UNCTAD 2020 updated database

Careful observation of the data shows that from 1970 until 1980, the per GNP per capita grew steadily from 253.6571 US dollars in 1970 to 520.256 US dollars in 1980. We can say that in 10 years, Liberia doubled its Gross National Product. This means that its economy was in a dynamic of growth. But between 1981 and 1989, the Gross National Product per capita stagnated at around 400 US dollars. But during the Liberian civil war between 1990 and 1997, there was a considerable decrease in the Gross National Product per capita. In 1990, it was 254.549 US dollars, while it stood at 90.629 US dollars in 1995. This clearly shows that the Liberian civil war negatively impacted its economy. This country timidly resumed its economic growth from 1998 with small ups and downs. Between 1998 and 2018, the lowest annual gross national product income per capita was observed in 2003 with 108.742 US dollars. But, it was the year 2016 that recorded the highest annual gross national product per capita, which was 426.637 US dollars. The ECOWAS region was also negatively impacted by the war.

In sad moments of civil crises, the affected country or countries are difficult to access because often the borders are closed to secure internal and external populations.[359] Sometimes, if the war involves rebels, the country is cut into two or several inaccessible parts. These barriers undermine economic activities for national and international populations. The markets will no longer have visitors for trade. Therefore, internal and external businesses will unfortunately be blocked. This creates a situation of isolation of the country in civil conflict. Then, the whole region's economy receives adverse effects because of the breakdown of commercial transactions with the country at war. Especially since Liberia is a country with an opening on the Atlantic Ocean, its maritime transport is a strength for the other ECOWAS countries. In ECOWAS, Interland countries use the sea lanes of countries with maritime coasts to order their goods from other continents such as (Europe, America and Asia) which

[359]Martin, P., Mayer, T., and Thoenig, M. (2008). Civil wars and international trade. Journal of the European Economic Association, vol. 6, no 2-3, 541-550.

are the main places of imports for West African countries.[360] So, since sea routes are the most important routes for major imports and exports when a country is at war, the harmful consequences are immediate. This is why often, in times of war, there is famine because internal agricultural production is reduced, and imports become almost impossible. In these circumstances, the impacts of the civil war on the ECOWAS area are also presented.

**Political Impacts In Liberia And In The Ecowas Area**

In Liberia, the civil war has origins in the ethnicity and reasons for leadership problems between the leaders of the armed forces of the country for the sole purpose of governing the country. This adversity between the senior officers of the armed forces at the top of the government has led this country into civil conflicts because these leaders have preferred to base their governance policies or acquire state power on ethnic considerations. The main actors in this Liberian civil crisis are Sergeant Samuel Doe and Charles Taylor.[361] Their over-appetite for state power has plunged the country into great political turmoil. The country went through a civil crisis from 1989 until 1997 with many political impacts.[362] During the civil war in Liberia, four ethnic groups (Krahn, Mandingo, Mano and Gio) were directly involved. These groups had formed coalitions of two in each opposing camp. There were the Krahn and Mandingo ethnic groups in Samuel Doe's camp, and in Charles Taylor's camp, the Gio and Mano ethnic groups. This was the starting point for Liberia's political problems during its civil crisis. This meant that each group alliance had a policy and a vision for which it wanted to take power. Also, ideologically the country was much divided because of the various policies carried by each camp. Such a political division in public opinion discredits the central government. This generates the weakness of state power. The observation in Liberia with Sergeant Samuel Doe's governance was an example of the gradual erosion of

[360]Meagher, K. (2003). A back door to globalisation? Structural adjustment, globalisation & transborder trade in West Africa. Review of African Political Economy, vol. 30, no 95, 57-75.
[361]Hoffman, D. (2006). Despot deposed: Charles Taylor and the challenge of state reconstruction in Liberia. Legacies of Power: Leadership Change and Former Presidents in African Politics, 308-331.
[362]Harris, D. (1999). From'warlord'to'democratic'president: how Charles Taylor won the 1997 Liberian elections. Journal of Modern African Studies, 431-455.

his power. So the Liberian civil war made a power illegitimate and illegal because the citizens are no longer part of this governance. However, governance is normally done to serve the sovereign people in a democracy. So, these people no longer recognize themselves in the governance of their president as was the case in Liberia because of the civil war. The division of a country by ethnic sensitivities is the worst thing that can happen to a president during his term of governance. In this time of civil crisis, Liberian government policy was disorganized and disoriented by ethnic hatred. Power was no longer the concern of all citizens because some did not find themselves in this governance. The only political party that was against Samuel Doe's state management was Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL).[363] But the war was not between political parties but between certain ethnic groups (Krahn, Mandingo, Mano and Gio) in the country. The power of Samuel Doe had also completely excluded Afro-Liberians from the management of state affairs. However, these Afro-Liberians had control of the land and the country's wealth. Important sectors were in the hands of those americano-Liberians who ruled the country from 1847 until 1980.[364] Samuel Doe's ambitions before taking power were to fight corruption, poverty, the establishment of the rule of law and equality among Liberians because the Afro-Liberians considered themselves to be superior to the natives. But the governance of Doe had the lead in the wings because, on the arguments of having people of confidence, he had privileged his ethnic group in the governmental appointments and all the critical positions of the bureaucracy. The people had felt betrayed by the power of Doe because they had not kept their promise which was socio-political balance. He should strive for equal opportunities for all citizens of the country and for balancing economic and political disparities for all. But this betrayal of the trust of the people had been against him and his loss of power followed because he governed worse than the old regime. So he was at odds with his promises before he took state power. The fall of Samuel Doe's government was evident as his governance

[363]Reno, W. S. K. (1993). Foreign firms and the financing of Charles Taylor's NPFL. Liberian Studies Journal, vol. 28, no 2, 175-188.
[364]Dillon, E. C. (2008). The role of education in the rise and fall of Americo-Liberians in Liberia, West Africa (1980). 14.

marginalized several ethnic groups.[365] Without also counting on the assassinations of certain important adversaries in the ranks of the armed forces. Ethnic groups who saw their sons being killed by a president cannot support his governance. There were challenges to the state's authority in this period of the civil crisis because the rulers did not play their role as arbiter and father of the whole nation. Government policy should not have a choice of color or preference among citizens. State governance must be profitable for all citizens of the country. Thus, with the leadership of Charles Taylor, the country was divided in two making the governance of the country very difficult for Samuel Doe. In this period of the civil war the Taylor camp had succeeded in taking control of 90% of the territory except for the capital Monrovia.[366] So, politically Samuel Doe was isolated even within the country. So if at the national level the civil war has had a negative impact on Liberian political life, then what are the effects of this in the ECOWAS region?

For the anonymous L7 in an organization like ECOWAS if a member state is in civil war, the internal politics of other member states is necessarily affected because of the interdependence created by multilateral agreements between member states.[367] In each country, the national policy necessarily impacts the international one. So, if the national policy is in difficulty, the international one will also struggle to function well. A country's international policy being its international diplomacy works well in times of peace and security. But when peace and security are threatened in a country in civil war like Liberia was, some embassies and diplomatic representations close their doors and leave the country for their protections. Liberia being a member state of ECOWAS undermined its foreign diplomacy during its civil war between 1989 and 1997.[368] With globalization, no country lives in isolation or autarky because of the interconnectivity between the states of the world. The world has several levels of organizations that bring states together for certain common

[365]Innes, M., Carr, E. H., and Doe, S. K. (2002). Enemies of the Revolution: Radio, Propaganda and National Development in Samuel Doe's Liberia, 1980–1989'. Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies, Concordia University, Montreal, vol. 29, 1-2.
[366]Sesay, M. A. (1996). Civil war and collective intervention in Liberia. Review of African Political Economy, vol. 23, no 67, 35-52.
[367]Anonymous L7, based on survey by word questionnaire, August 28, 2021.
[368]Gershoni, Y. (1997). War without end and an end to a war: the prolonged wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone. African Studies Review, vol. 40, no 3, 55-76.

interests. Thus, there are regional organizations like ECOWAS, continental organizations like the African Union (AU) and global organizations like the UN and the WTO. Liberia is an adherent country to all of these different organizations at various levels. This membership in the various oraganizations can only be a sign of the vitality of Liberia's diplomacy if it takes advantage of it through win-win relationships. But the loss of the credibility of the Liberian state during its civil crisis had isolated this country politically, diplomatically and economically because the country did not offer pleasant living conditions when peace is threatened. The country could no longer get loans to support its policy of sustainable development. The country loses external support and aid because this support and aid will not go to the right destination without stability. Often the ruling side uses them to buy weapons against the opposing side. In the ECOWAS region, the Liberian civil war had created a division between the member countries of this integration. This disparity was around Nigeria's unilateral intervention by the ECOMOG armed force in Liberia to defend and protect Samuel Doe's ruling camp.[369] It should be noted that Nigeria is considered to be the most influential member country of the Community. The other ECOWAS member countries, especially those of French-speaking countries, did not agree to this rapid intervention by Nigeria without consulting the opinions of other members of the organization. However, on the other hand, the English-speaking countries had congratulated Nigeria's promptness with this intervention and had given it their support. This had caused a division of opinion regarding Nigeria's solitary intervention in this Liberian civil crisis because the French-speaking ECOWAS member countries saw support for a dictatorship.[370] Several francophone ECOWAS countries were against the power of Samuel Doe because his governance was ethnic and, above all, based on force. So for them, they could not support and defend a government that made its people suffer. But with the game of diplomacy, all the member countries of ECOWAS had found an agreement for an intervention to transition towards a democratic regime. This Liberian civil war had destabilized the entire West

[369]Adebajo, A. (2002). Liberia's civil war: Nigeria, ECOMOG, and regional security in West Africa. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1-19.
[370]Williams, G. I. H. (2002). Liberia: the heart of darkness: accounts of Liberia's civil war and its destabilizing effects in West Africa. Trafford Publishing, 2002, P. 123.

African part because political, economic and security stability was endangered.[371] In short, in a country's civil conflict, the doors of its foreign policy and its diplomacy are often partially or even completely closed. On the security level, what are the Liberian civil war's impacts on the country and the West African region?

**Security Impacts In Liberia And The Ecowas Area**

Generally, in a period of civil war in a country, the internal security aspect escapes the competence of the head of state in power. However, security is an important part of guaranteeing the free movement of people and goods in a country. But when a civil crisis breaks out in a country, there is a good chance that security is no longer a reality. In the case of Liberia during its civil conflict for reasons of ethnicity had divided the country in two. This means that two opposing camps each had a hand over part of the territory. So security automatically had a problem because movement within the country for certain ethnic groups was prohibited in the part of the country held by the enemy camp. Suddenly, with the development of this civil war which had become more serious over time, Liberian security was totally undermined. The free movement of people and goods was no longer possible. Considering that Charles Taylor's armed troops controlled 90% of the territory except the capital Monrovia, it was proof that Liberia was in security instability at this time of civil crisis.[372] Sergeant Samuel Doe controlled only 10% of Liberian territory, the capital Monrovia and surrounding areas.[373] Another facet of insecurity during a civil war is the arms race. Without weapons, there is no war, so the enemy camps in conflict use illegal channels to acquire them. Charles Taylor was accused of having signed secret agreements with commercial companies which operated on Liberian territory to have combat arms. It was for this reason that he had more logistical and financial means to wage this war.

[371]Ibid, P. 124
[372]Ambos, K. and Njikam, O. (2003). Charles Taylor's Criminal Responsibility. Journal of International Criminal Justice, vol. 11, no 4, 789-812.
[373]Outram, Q. (1997). 'It's terminal either way': an analysis of armed conflict in Liberia, 1989–1996. Review of African Political Economy, vol. 24, no 73, 355-371.

Faced with this rise in power of the Taylor camp against the camp of the ruling president Doe, Nigeria was obliged to intervene promptly to support the government in place.[374] But as the governance of President Doe was seen by the French-speaking ECOWAS member countries as a dictatorship, they were not happy with Nigeria's rapid intervention to support this dictatorship. Because, President Doe also used the country's logistical and financial resources to fight the Taylor camp, which companies and people in the shadows financed. This exaggerated acquisition of combat arms on both sides had a negative impact on the security of this country. Otherwise, people do not understand that an old independent country of more than 100 years than the other countries of its space is incapable of guaranteeing socio-economic, political and security stability.[375] Because, the number of years of management of this country by his own sons was an asset to have sufficient experiences for a harmonious social life. But this Liberian civil war has shown the opposite that any country can fall into conflict at any time if the leaders are not wise enough in their governance. This wisdom in governance must be based on the non-discrimination of any ethnic group, religion, tribe or clan. Without a social union in a country, social unrest can arise in unpredictable ways. Often the security of a step dependent on the speeches of political leaders. If these political speeches advocate peace and security, citizens will be tolerant among themselves despite their ethnic, religious, tribal and clan differences, even their difference in social rank. But when these political discourses are oriented towards social division by the differences that make up the social layers, living together will be jeopardized. In Liberia, the plan to eliminate certain ethnic groups (Krahn and Mandingo) by the political leaders of the ethnic groups (gio and the mano) was the starting point of mistrust between the different ethnic groups.[376] Because the killings of President Samuel Doe were also in the opposing ethnic groups.[377] He wanted to exterminate all the influential people of the gio and the mano. This plan had upset the political leaders of the target ethnic groups. So security depends on social

[374]Adebajo, A. (2002). Liberia's civil war: Nigeria, ECOMOG, and regional security in West Africa. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1-19

[375]Kieh, G. K. (2008) The first Liberian civil war: the crises of underdevelopment. Peter Lang, 65-143.

[376]Cooper, R. and Berdal, M. (1993). Outside intervention in ethnic conflicts. Survival, 1993, vol. 35, no 1, 118-142.

[377]Conteh-Morgan, E. and Kadivar, S. (1995). Ethnopolitical violence in the Liberian civil war. Journal of conflict studies, 1-14.

cohesion in a country. When the central state no longer fully plays its role of guarantor of security for its population, it is no longer possible to have the free movement of people and goods. The republican legal army no longer had the time to ensure the safety of people and property because it was occupied by war. Liberia is a visible example of the breakdown of the peace just because political leaders based their political arguments on ethnic hatred.

It should be noted that when a country is affected by a civil war, there is the proliferation of weapons because this country becomes a hub for illegal arms sellers. War increases gangsterism in the country that lives it. During the Liberian civil crisis, this country had become a landing site for drugs from Latin American countries.[378] The sellers of this prohibited product took advantage of security loopholes to do their business in all West African countries in particular and in all African countries in general. When insecurity takes hold in a country, it opens the door to all dangers. There was also the rise of armed robberies due to famine and the rapes of underage girls and all other women. When drugs and weapons circulate freely in a country, there is a high chance that crime will increase. We must also add to all these excesses the child soldiers' enlistment in the Liberian civil war.[379] Young people who should be in the classes at school are on the scene of fights. The insecurity was general; therefore, the civilians lived in fear and in pain because they were witnesses to the deaths of their parents and their neighbors who were in politics or not. People who were popular in parts of Liberia and who could be a potential maneuver for political issues for one of the warring camps were being killed. Liberia had become a ground for gratuitous assassinations to eliminate political adversaries. Being limited to the west-southwest by the Atlantic Ocean, the country was the object of frequent maritime piracy.[380] There were hijackings and attacks on ships by pirates. This insecurity was a harmful consequence of the civil war the country was going through. And this was not likely to guarantee the security of

[378]Williams, P. (1998) The nature of drug-trafficking networks. Current history, vol. 97, no 618, 154.
[379]Murphy, W. P. (2003). Military patrimonialism and child soldier clientalism in the Liberian and Sierra Leonean civil wars. African Studies Review, 61-87.
[380]Outram, Q. (1999). Liberia: roots and fruits of the emergency. Third World Quarterly, vol. 20, no 1, 163-173.

Liberia and all the other member countries of the integration of West Africa. So, at the regional level of ECOWAS what were the impacts of the Liberian civil war?

At the regional level of ECOWAS, it is clear that when one country is in difficulty in a union, the others are not spared. The anonymous L7 affirms that it is the sum of the national security of each member state of ECOWAS which guarantees the security stability of the West African region, but if the national security of a single member state is called into question, the internal and border security of all other member states will be negatively impacted.[381] It is comparable to the human body system where when one part of the body is not functioning well, all parts of the body receive the ill effects and start to function in slow motion. Integration is in the same direction because there is interdependence between the member states. A community that shares the same political and economic sorrows is necessarily affected when a member falls into a situation of violence and insecurity. The loss of the peace of one member country in one organization has negative impacts on all other members. So, inevitably the Liberian civil war had disturbed the sleep of the other member countries of ECOWAS. Of course, when a country's internal security is threatened, neighboring countries are often not immune. Just as peace is contagious in a region, so too is war with all its consequences. Because, in a space if all countries are at peace, there is a great chance that security will be the thing best shared. Unlike, in a part of a continent or of the world if a country is at war, without a doubt, insecurity will knock on the doors of all the other countries. In the case of Liberia during its civil war, the first point of contention which wanted to destroy ECOWAS was the solitary and prompt intervention of Nigeria alongside President Samuel Doe.[382] Integration wanted to disappear because French-speaking countries saw Samuel Doe as a dictator who must be removed from power. So the first impact of the Liberian civil war was the almost division of the members of ECOWAS.[383] But the diplomacy of the Community had very quickly played its role in reuniting all the members in order to find a

[381]Anonymous L7, based on survey by word questionnaire, August 28, 2021.
[382]Saliu, H. A. (2000). Nigeria and peace support operations: Trends and policy implications. International Peacekeeping, vol. 7, no 3, 105-119.
[383]Adeleke, A. (1995). The politics and diplomacy of peacekeeping in West Africa: The Ecowas operation in Liberia. The Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 33, no 4, 569-593.

suitable solution to this civil crisis. So the Liberian civil war had tested the union of ECOWAS.

It is also important to note that when the power of the state is failing, security is no longer controlled. Therefore, the government can no longer control the entry and exit of people and goods at its borders. This allows an explosion of illicit trade between this country at war and its neighbors. The most profitable activities that are surfacing are mainly the trafficking of weapons, drugs and sometimes human organs. Insecurity becomes worrying because weapons often fall into the hands of civilians who use them to sow panic among populations. These weapons are difficult to recover even after the war. As a result, these same weapons are often used to destabilize neighboring countries. On this subject, for example, when the power of Gaddafi fell, all the weapons which were with the civilians and the rebels were found in the countries like Niger and Mali, which are currently in total political instability.[384] Because the rebels have equipped themselves with the weapons used to fight the Gaddafi regime.

Consequently, the Liberian civil war had negatively impacted the peace of other ECOWAS member countries. So the security of the entire West African sub-region of ECOWAS was in difficulty. For this, what are the actions of prevention, management and resolution of the Liberian civil war by ECOWAS to limit its negative impacts in order to restore peace and security?

### 4.1.4. ACTIONS OF THE PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION OF THE LIBERIAN CIVIL WAR BY ECOWAS

In a country to guarantee peace and security, the rulers must be foresight. They must carry out actions that strengthen peace and security. Equitable governance without ethnic,

[384]Klute, G. (2013). Post-Gaddafi repercussions in northern Mali. Strategic Review for Southern Africa, vol. 35, no 2, 53.

religious, tribal, clan discrimination and all other social considerations and promoting non-violence are pledges that bring lasting peace and security to a state. These actions that go toward avoiding the breakdown of peace and security are actions of war prevention. However, it happens that despite all the measures taken to prevent civil crises, the prevention plan fails. Also, it is possible that consciously or unconsciously, some reckless political leaders provoke civil conflict by their speeches because of their political interests. So when prevention has not been useful and war breaks out, it must necessarily be managed to find a solution between the protagonists. This search for a solution calls for actions to resolve this crisis. These various crisis prevention, management and resolution actions are not only specific to a state but also to an integration which has an agenda for promoting peace and security. Because of non-interference in the internal affairs of a state, in the event of a breach of the peace, other states avoid intervening immediately. Because it is desirable that an internal solution be found. But when the warring state is struggling to stabilize itself to restore peace and security endangering citizens' lives, there must be an external intervention to resolve the crisis. This external involvement can be neighboring states or an organization competent in conflict prevention, management and resolution issues, as in the case of Liberia with the intervention of ECOWAS. The resolution of the Liberian civil war had gone beyond national competence, so it was important that a collective intervention of the member countries of ECOWAS was deployed to bring peace and security to the country.[385] Other ECOWAS member countries could not remain silent in the face of the atrocities of innocent Liberian citizens. In fact, in 1990, Liberia was the first country to host ECOWAS conflict prevention, management and resolution services.[386] So, what are the prevention, management and resolution mechanisms that ECOWAS used during the Liberian civil crisis to restore peace and security to put this country back on the rails of democracy in 1997?

[385]Sesay, M. A. (1996). Civil war and collective intervention in Liberia. Review of African Political Economy, vol. 23, no 67, 35-52.
[386]Aning, E. K. (1999). Eliciting compliance from Warlords: the ECOWAS experience in Liberia, 1990–1997. Review of African Political Economy, vol. 26, no 81, 335-348.

### 4.1.4.1. MECHANISMS OF THE PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION OF THE LIBERIAN CIVIL WAR BY ECOWAS

The resolution of a war, whether civil or not, is difficult to predict the end when it begins in a country. It is certain that the actors involved in the Liberian civil crisis did not know this conflict could last nearly 10 years.[387] This provides information on the danger that civil war represents for a country or a region. Normally everyone in their environment must work for peace in order to avoid war. Above all, the political leaders who govern states have the task of guaranteeing peace and security within the countries they are responsible for. But unfortunately, when war prevention fails, and a state falls into crisis, mechanisms are needed to manage and resolve it to restore peace and security.[388] At the start of the Liberian civil war, the swift intervention of Nigeria alone did not provide much in terms of a solution. Because Nigeria was aligned behind President Samuel Doe to fight the opposing camp of Charles Taylor.[389] This aid from an important ECOWAS member country was frowned upon because it lacked consultation with other members. Although Nigeria failed to support a dictatorship, other ECOWAS members had criticized this action. For this, the camp of Charles Taylor, seeing himself orphaned, had accelerated the armed attacks in several important cities of the country except Monrovia, which the government of Samuel Doe controlled.[390] So Nigeria's involvement alone in resolving this crisis was a failure. So the resolution of this Liberian civil conflict poorly started with Nigeria. The tension instead increased, especially in the camp of Charles Taylor, who saw unjust Nigeria's involvement. With the mechanism of collective actions for crisis management and resolution by ECOWAS through its military force ECOMOG and the support of other continental and global

[387]Cook, N. (2003). "Liberia: 1989-1997 Civil War, Post-War Developments, and US Relations." Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 3.
[388]Gershoni, Y. (1997). Military and Diplomatic Strategies of the Liberian Civil War. Liberian Studies Journal, vol. 22, no 2, 199-239.
[389]Adebajo, A. (2002). Liberia's civil war: Nigeria, ECOMOG, and regional security in West Africa. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 73.
[390]Outram, Q. (1997). 'It's terminal either way': an analysis of armed conflict in Liberia, 1989–1996. Review of African Political Economy, vol. 24, no 73, 355-371

organizations, ceasefire agreements were signed to gradually lead this country towards peace and security to organize democratic elections.[391]

To return the management of state power to a civilian, between 1990 and 1995, several ceasefire agreements were signed between the two opposing camps of the Liberian civil war.[392] These agreements did not lead to a happy ending. So, for five years, the efforts to resolve this civil crisis were doomed to failure. Thus, tensions rose more in the two warring camps because of the points of contention over the transition from power to civilian. The military power did not want to leave power so quickly to make way for democracy. Although on September 22, 1993, the United Nations Security Council established a United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNMIL).[393] This observer mission was made up of soldiers and civilians. In total, the mission's crew numbered 368 observers.[394] They went to support the ECOMOG military forces which had been there since 1990.

UNMIL diplomats shou enforce the Cotonou (Benin) peace agreement to lead to democratic elections in 1994.[395] Unfortunately, this country's agreement had failed and caused great panic because the conflict had become more intense and some UNMIL observers were kidnapped. These kidnapped UNMIL people were held hostage with ransoms. This situation had introduced another complication in managing and resolving the Liberian civil crisis. With the diplomacy of UNMIL and ECOWAS observers in September 1994, a second ceasefire agreement was signed in the town of Akosombo in Ghana.[396] This agreement also failed to bring peace and security to Liberia as the fighting had not stopped. So, in October 1994, ECOMOG did not have enough logistical and financial means to continue its mission.[397]

[391]Levitt, J. (1999). Pre-intervention trust-building, African states and enforcing the peace: the case of ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Liberian Studies Journal, vol. 24, no 1, 1-26.
[392]Adebajo, A. (2002). Liberia's civil war: Nigeria, ECOMOG, and regional security in West Africa. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 73-131,
[393]Aboagye, F. B. and BAH, A. M. S. (2004). Liberia at a Crossroads: A preliminary look at the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and the protection of civilians. Institute for Security Studies Papers, 2004, vol. 2004, no 95, 20.
[394] Ibid.
[395]Adebajo, A. (2002). Liberia's civil war: Nigeria, ECOMOG, and regional security in West Africa. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 119.
[396]Ibid, P. 131.
[397]Ofuatey-Kodjoe, W. (1994). Regional organizations and the resolution of internal conflict: The ECOWAS intervention in Liberia. International Peacekeeping, vol. 1, no 3, 261-302.

Likewise, the warring camps were not in the logic of agreeing on the end of the crisis. Thus, the Security Council of the United Nations had reduced to 90 members of its mission in the country.[398] This mission of small staff supported ECOMOG until 1997, when all missions ended.[399]

Under the ceasefire agreements, in December 1994, there was the Accra agreement in the Ghanaian capital.[400] Also, this had not led to the result of peace and security. In this order of thought, several cease-fire agreements were doomed to failure before 1994.[401] The first is that of Bamako (November 1990); the second is the Yamassoukro Accord (October 1991); the third refers to the Cotonou Agreement (July 1993).[402] But after the failed agreements between 1990 and 1994, ECOWAS member countries decided to try yet others in Nigeria. Thus, there were two agreements in Abuja, the capital of Nigeria, respectively, in August 1995 and 1996. These are the Abuja I (August 1995) and Abuja II (August 1996) agreements.[403] All these agreements aimed to promote the ceasefire with the ambition of a democratic transition of state power. The most important ceasefire agreement was observed in Nigeria with Abuja I in August 1995 because seven camp leaders in the civil conflict had accepted its signature.[404] It was the first time that there had been such a peace commitment. This result was obtained following negotiations by special ECOWAS diplomats. A transitional government was chosen despite some discrepancies between the conflicting rebel groups. The composition of this transitional government had raised a lot of hope to resolve this crisis. The covetousness of strategic ministerial positions between the rebel groups of Charles Taylor, George Boley and Alhadji Kromah had again engendered a rupture of peace

[398]Aboagye, F. B. and Bah, A. M. S. (2004). Liberia at a Crossroads: A preliminary look at the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and the protection of civilians. Institute for Security Studies Papers, 2004, vol., no 95, 20.
[399]Adibe, C. E. (1997). The Liberian conflict and the ECOWAS-UN partnership. Third World Quarterly, vol. 18, no 3, 471-488.
[400]Adebajo, A. (2002). Liberia's civil war: Nigeria, ECOMOG, and regional security in West Africa. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 155.
[401]Paes, W. C. (2005). The challenges of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration in Liberia. International Peacekeeping, vol. 12, no 2, 253-261.
[402]Adebajo, A. (2002). Liberia's civil war: Nigeria, ECOMOG, and regional security in West Africa. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 73-155.
[403]Ibid, P. 181.
[404]Ibid

and security. Liberia was still embroiled in severe civil tensions. There was no longer trust between the ethnic groups which were rebel groups in crisis. Despite all difficulties, ECOMOG and UNMIL had continued their operations to secure Monrovia and even took some towns around the capital from the rebels of Charles Taylor of NPFL and ULIMO-K of Alhadji Kromah.[405] To limit the damage caused by this Liberian civil war, in August 1995, an ECOWAS commission in charge of the crisis extended the 1995 Abuja agreement until June 15, 1997.[406] The committee also gave an ultimatum for the disarmament of the rebels until January 1997 so that the elections could be organized in May 1997.[407] Precautions were taken to avoid the rebels' supply of arms and bullets because the crisis could no longer continue without arms.

The determination of the missions involved in the resolution of this Liberian civil war had resulted in decisions being made to sanction the leaders of the ethnic groups if they did not submit to the return to peace clauses. Thus, the rebel leaders of the ethnic groups understood that they could not fight for long without the support they had and which supplied them with logistics and money. The diplomacy of these missions blocked all the external supports of the warring camps. This was how gradually disarmament had started. The prohibition of aid of all kinds to the various groups in the conflict had made it possible to initiate a drastic reduction in the circulation of weapons. It was the beginning of the solution that the mission had found for the return of peace and security in Liberia. In November 1996, the warring ethnic groups agreed to surrender their weapons to the UNMIL and ECOMOG missions.[408] There had been an encouragement to go towards total disarmament for the organization of democratic elections in 1997.[409] In this disarmament operation, over 9,500 weapons and 1.2

[405]Olonisakin, 'F. (1996). UN co-operation with regional organizations in peacekeeping: The experience of ECOMOG and UNOMIL in Liberia. International Peacekeeping, vol. 3, no 3, 33-51.
[406]Adebajo, A. (2002). Liberia's civil war: Nigeria, ECOMOG, and regional security in West Africa. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 181.
[407]Paes, W. C. (2005). The challenges of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration in Liberia. International Peacekeeping, vol. 12, no 2, 253-261.
[408]Nichols, R. (2005). Disarming Liberia: progress and pitfalls. Armed and Aimless: Armed Groups, Guns and Human Security in the ECOWAS Region, 109-43.
[409]Harris, D. (1999). From'warlord'to'democratic'president: how Charles Taylor won the 1997 Liberian elections. Journal of Modern African Studies, 431-455.

million units of bullets were transferred to the military forces of UNMIL and ECOMOG.[410] This drop-in tension allowed a move toward democratic elections. All social parties were involved in organizing credible elections accepted by all sides in civil conflict. People delegated by the various camps of rebel ethnic groups, civilians and people from religious congregations. In February 1997, the ECOWAS diplomats who were Foreign Ministers had a meeting with these different social parties designated to fix the date of the presidential elections for May 1997.[411] The ECOWAS ECOMOG received new soldiers from Benin, Burkina Faso, and Niger to organise peaceful elections without the risk of clashes. Refugees were invited to return to their countries to participate in the vote. The ECOWAS Mission took measures to promote the return of all the refugees who had expressed their desire. When this process of organizing the presidential elections was almost at an end, UN forces had left Liberia under UN instruction. It was ECOMOG and African Union (AU) that continued the mission until the elections. In late 1997, through the UN, the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in Liberia (UNIL) was established to strengthen peace, rebuild the country and create democratic structures.[412] Finally, under the leadership of ECOMOG, favorable conditions for the organization of free and democratic presidential and legislative elections were created, and the elections were held on July 19, 1997.[413] After these elections, Charles Taylor, who was the NPFL party's candidate, won the presidential elections, ending Liberia's civil war.[414] According to the anonymous L11, in 1990, even though ECOWAS lacked experience in conflict resolution, it was able to resolve this Liberian conflict with the help of observers and peacekeepers from the UN Security Council[415] . Table 12 lists the

[410]Paes, W. C. (2005). The challenges of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration in Liberia. International Peacekeeping, vol. 12, no 2, 253-261.
[411]Harris, D. (1999). From'warlord'to'democratic'president: how Charles Taylor won the 1997 Liberian elections. Journal of Modern African Studies, 431-455.
[412]Podder, S. (2013). Bridging the 'Conceptual–Contextual'Divide: Security Sector Reform in Liberia and UNMIL Transition. Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, vol. 7, no 3, 353-380.
[413]Aning, E. K. (1999). Eliciting compliance from Warlords: the ECOWAS experience in Liberia, 1990–1997. Review of African Political Economy, 1999, vol. 26, no 81, 335-348.
[414]Harris, D. (1999). From'warlord'to'democratic'president: how Charles Taylor won the 1997 Liberian elections. Journal of Modern African Studies, 431-455.
[415]Anonymous L11, based on survey by word questionnaire, September 14, 2021.

organizations and military forces of the missions that participated in the management and resolution of the Liberian civil crisis.

**Table 12: Organizations and military forces involved in restoring peace, security and resolving the Liberian civil war.**

| No | Organizations and Military Forces | Nature of Organizations and Military Forces |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | ECOMOG | ECOWAS military force for peacekeeping, security and disarmament for the resolution of the Liberian civil conflict |
| 2 | ECOWAS | West African Regional Integration |
| 3 | AU | African Continental Union |
| 4 | UN | Global Organization |
| 5 | UNIL | United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in Liberia |
| 6 | UNMIL | United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia for peacekeeping, security and disarmament for the resolution of the Liberian civil conflict |

**Source:** Self-prepared by the author.

In Table 12, there are three organizations, namely ECOWAS, a West African regional integration, the African Union (AU) as an African continental organization, and the UN, a global organisation that combined their efforts to settle Liberia's civil war. ECOWAS had sent its military forces called ECOMOG, for the UN, the UN forces UNMIL and the African Union had only played the diplomatic role for negotiations between the camps in conflict. After the civil crisis, through the organization of successful presidential and legislative elections, the UN left behind United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in Liberia to strengthen peace, the reconstruction of the country and the creation of good democratic foundations. What was the situation of humanitarian interventions during this civil crisis?

### 4.1.4.2. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE IN THE LIBERIAN CIVIL WAR

For anonymous L12, in times of civil war, a country needs not only external support for the management and resolution of this conflict, but also humanitarian aid to save human lives in distress.[416] Especially in an ethnic crisis that puts two or more opposing camps in contradiction, there are always innocent people who live martyrdom. These are people who are not often directly involved in the conflict but who suffer its negative consequences. The Liberian civil war pitted four ethnic groups against each other, yet the country has nearly twenty ethnic groups. The other ethnic groups in the country were forced to suffer the impacts of this civil conflict. In armed confrontation, there are always deaths, severe and non-serious injuries and, above all, famine because the war does not allow the practice of income-generating activities.[417] Also, agricultural production becomes weak or sometimes impossible. In this condition, other neighboring countries and humanitarian institutions often come to aid people in difficulty. Often during the war, despite the willingness of humanitarian institutions to help people in pain, insecurity does not allow it. During the Liberian civil war, this country was controlled by ethnic groups who sometimes did not allow humanist agents to enter their space.[418] Liberia was divided into two parts, most of which except the capital was under the domination of the troops of Charles Taylor.[419] The free movement of people and goods was compromised. There were great risks for the aid workers themselves. However, the Liberian civil war is one of the longest wars in terms of duration in West Africa. It is clear that the longer a crisis lasts, the more it claims many victims. So, in the middle of 1994, the people in need of humanitarian assistance were around 1.8 million Liberians.[420] These people mainly needed food and health care. In this year the conflict was very intense and general in the country. More seriously, the looting of homes, government agencies and

[416]Anonymous L12, based on survey by word questionnaire, September 18, 2021.
[417]Kieh, G. K. (2008). The first Liberian civil war: the crises of underdevelopment. Peter Lang, 143.
[418]Outram, Q. (1997). Cruel wars and safe havens: humanitarian aid in Liberia 1989–1996. Disasters, vol. 21, no 3, 189-205.
[419]Anonymous L9, based on survey by word questionnaire, September 2, 2021.
[420]Outram, Q. (1997). Cruel wars and safe havens: humanitarian aid in Liberia 1989–1996. Disasters, vol. 21, no 3, 189-205.

the sites of humanitarian institutions by conflict camps has been observed in the country. This made humanitarian assistance very difficult during a time of this civil crisis. In this circumstance, some citizens left their homes either to take refuge or find a hiding place to avoid war.

In addition, the US Embassy building accommodated more than 20,000 people who have abandoned their homes and areas of conflict.[421] UN forces also played an important role in transferring American foreigners and others in danger to the capital Freetown of Sierra Leone. A total of 2,400 Americans were sent to Freetown (Sierra Leone).[422] Some important personalities of the country had taken advantage of this humanitarian aid to transport the UN forces to meet in towns in Sierra Leone. But when the tensions of armed clashes began to drop, in August 1996, the residence of the US Embassy, which accommodated some Liberians emptied.[423] All returned to their places of origin because the country's reconstruction had timidly started. To accelerate the reconstruction and development of the country towards the end of the war, several international Bretton Woods institutions and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) have opted for their aid and subsidies. Especially, when the conflicting camps had accepted democratic elections, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Union (EU), the American Agency for International Development (USAID) and the International Red Cross provided the financial and materials aid to support the reconstruction of Liberia.[424] Knowing that at this time Liberia was among the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) when it came out of its crisis, its economic situation had become worse. But, this country had received financial assistance of more than 10 million dollars to give it a new economic breath.[425] Non-Governmental Organizations like the Red Cross have provided more aid in kind such as food, medicine to the population and equipment for certain hospitals without the minimum to treat simple illnesses. Despite all the efforts of

[421]Ross, JR, B. A. (2005). The US Joint Task Force Experience in Liberia. Military Review, vol. 85, no 3, 60.
[422]Cook, N. (2003). Liberia: 1989-1997 Civil War, Post-War Developments, and US Relations, 9-10
[423]ROSS JR, Blair A. The US Joint Task Force Experience in Liberia. Military Review, 2005, vol. 85, no 3, P. 60.
[424]Fearon, J. D., Humphreys, M. and Weinstein, J. M. (2009). Can development aid contribute to social cohesion after civil war? Evidence from a field experiment in post-conflict Liberia. American Economic Review, vol. 99, no 2, 287-91.
[425]Maresko, D. (2004). Development, relief aid, and creating peace: humanitarian aid in Liberia's war of the 1990s. The Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution, 2004, vol. 6, no 1,94-120.

humanitarian investments and the encouragement of refugees to return to their country, at least 244,000 Liberians refused to return to their country because of the trauma of the civil war.[426] Within the country itself, more than 75,000 people were still displaced because their homes were destroyed, and their neighborhoods no longer inspired them with confidence[427]. Table 13 shows the humanitarian organizations involved in resolving the civil war in Liberia.

**Table 13: The humanitarian organizations involved in resolving the civil war in Liberia.**

| No | Humanitarian and Financial Organizations | Actions |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | American Agency for International Development (USAID) | Financial aid to support the development of Liberia |
| 2 | European Union (EU) | Financial aid to support the development of Liberia |
| 3 | International Red Cross | Health aid to support survivors of the civil war in Liberia |
| 4 | International Monetary Fund (IMF) | Financial aid to support the development of Liberia |
| 5 | UN forces | Transfer of American foreigners and others in danger to the capital Freetown of Sierra Leone |
| 6 | US Embassy | The residence of the US Embassy had accommodated some Liberians in need |
| 7 | United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) | The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees provided assistance to refugees from Liberia's civil war. |

**Souce:** Self-prepared by the author.

[426]Tiepoh, M. G. N. (1992). The Liberian Civil War: The Future of Liberian Refugees. Refuge: Canada's Journal on Refugees, 14-17.
[427]Nilsson, D. (2003). Liberia: The Eye of the Storm: a Review of the Literature on Internally Displaced, Refugees and Returnees. Nordic Africa Institute, 12.

Table 12 summarizes the various humanitarian and financial organizations that intervened in the resolution of the civil crisis in Liberia. It is also mentioned the role played by each organization during this Liberian civil conflict. What inspires the Liberian constitution in the process of resolving its war?

### 4.1.4.3. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE LIBERIAN CONSTITUTION IN THE RESOLUTION OF ITS CIVIL WAR

For anonymous L10, generally, African constitutions, especially those of West Africa, are written in the image of those of the former countries which colonized them.[428] These constitutions often do not take into account the realities of African countries. Several African countries are still new students in democratic practice. This lack of great experience in democracy does not militate in favor of African politics. The school of democracy is still a great need for good governance in Africa. African political leaders who are in charge of state affairs still have the habits of kingdoms in which the power of kings ends after their death. So, once in-state power, African presidents forget the requirements of their countries' constitutions. That regularly provokes civil conflicts in several countries in Africa, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa[429] . According to anonymous L8, democracy in several African countries seems to have empty content.[430] It is a democracy that exists on paper because its practice seems impossible for some African countries, especially regarding respect for fundamental freedoms, Human Rights and the laws that countries give themselves. These difficulties linked to democratic practices frequently lead African countries to civil wars. The first is the lack of sharing of political power between different political parties, ethnic, religious, tribal and clan groups. These frustrations of certain parts

[428]Anonymous L10, based on survey by word questionnaire, September 11, 2021.
[429]Le Vine, V. T. (1997). The fall and rise of constitutionalism in West Africa. The Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 35, no 2, 181-206.
[430]Anonymous L8, based on survey by word questionnaire, August 30, 2021.

of the African peoples linked to the alternation of state power are the origins of several civil crises in Africa.

Liberia is no different from all African countries that have undergone colonization. Primarily, Liberia has had two constitutions: the first is from 1847 and the second from 1986.[431] These two constitutions have led the governance of this country from its independence to the present day. In the first constitution of 1847, in the preamble, it is written "we the people of the republic of Liberia were originally inhabitants of the United States of North America".[432] Already, this constitution has created a division because all Liberians are not from the United States of America. There were native people who were even the majority. The Americano-Liberians were in the minority in 1847 when this country gained independence, but they took state power with the support of the United States of America.[433] They ruled this country without alternating state power until 1986.[434] It was with popular uprisings and finally a coup that Sergeant Samuel DOE took power in 1980.[435] However, the first chapter of the Declaration of the Rights of the constitution of 1847, from the first article (1) to the twentieth (20), stipulates that all human beings are born equal. Therefore, they are equal before the laws freedom is for all.[436] They have the same rights and duties in the country because no one is superior to the other. Given this part of the constitution, Liberia should be a country of peace and security in which to live. But unfortunately, often African countries have very good texts without the practice of their content. This causes disputes between social strata. Especially the opposition parties all over Africa are suffering from deaf ears from the ruling parties. Chapters II and III deal respectively with legislative and presidential elections questions.[437] Article (2) of chapter II announces that the inhabitants of the counties must vote

[431]Liberia's Constitution of 1847 and 1986
[432]Liberia's Constitution of 1847, accessed, January, 22, 2021, http://crc.gov.lr/doc/CONSTITUTION%20OF%201847%20final.pdf
[433]Galy, M. (1998). Liberia, machine perverse: Anthropologie politique du conflit libérien (Liberia, Diabolical Machinery: The Political Anthropology of the Liberian Conflict). Cahiers d'études africaines, 533-553.
[434]Ibid.
[435]Kandeh, J. D. (2004). Liberia: "No Doe, No Liberia". In: Coups from Below. Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 97-118.
[436]Liberia's Constitution of 1847, Chapter I, Article (1-20).
[437]Liberia's Constitution of 1847, Chapter II and III

all the representatives; therefore, any citizen can be elected as deputy.[438] But in reality, it is often other things because it is necessary to have internal and external sponsors for all the elections in the countries of Black Africa. It is a vast network of corruption that gives the means to the candidates to have certain power facilities after the elections. The same is valid for the presidential elections which require more financial and material means for the electoral campaigns. The constitution of 1847 in its article (1) of chapter III says that the citizens can vote any person if that person is able to manage the state affairs.[439] But frankly, often good potential candidates are not allowed to apply. If from 1847 the American-Liberians ruled this country alone, it is because there were exclusive elections for a long time.[440] Chapter IV, which concerns justice, contains two articles that demand freedom of justice and fair judgment among citizens.[441] But, justice is often instrumentalized by the political force in power against the people. All these injustices are sources of civil wars in several countries.

The 1986 Liberian constitution replacing that of 1847, deleted the part of the preamble which considered all Liberians to be nationals of the United States of North America[442]. In the Liberian constitution of 1986, chapter I, which concerns the structure of the State, contains three articles that stipulate that the power belongs to the people( article 1) and that the constitution is supreme ( article 2).[443] Here, pride of place is given to the people and the constitution as the only forces upon which Liberian state power finds its legitimacy. Chapter III deals with questions of fundamental freedoms and Article (11, a.) refers to the right to life, liberty, security and prosperity.[444] It is a resumption of Human Rights in the civil and political rights category of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) of 1948.[445] There have been efforts to take into account the universal character of human rights. Chapters

[438]Liberia's Constitution of 1847, Chapter II, Article (2).
[439]Liberia's Constitution of 1847, Chapter III, Article (1).
[440]Liberia's Constitution of 1847, Preamble.
[441]Liberia's Constitution of 1847, Chapter IV.
[442]Liberia's Constitution of 1986., accessed January, 22, 2021, https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Liberia_1986.pdf?lang=en
[443]Liberia's Constitution of 1986, Chapter I, Articles (1 and 2).
[444] Liberia's Constitution of 1986, Chapter III, Article (11, a.).
[445]1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Paris (France).

V and VI deal respectively with matters of legislative and executive power.[446] Chapter V, Articles (30 and 31) provide information on the qualification requirements of members for legislative power.[447] There should be no discrimination or exclusion for candidates for parliamentary elections. Also, in chapter VI, articles (52 and 53) converge on the elections of the president and the vice-president and their respective prerogatives.[448] The election competition for the posts of the president and vice-president is open to all citizens who meet the conditions. So the chance is given to all the people who are able to get elected to submit their candidacies. This eliminates ethnic, religious, tribal and clan considerations. Chapter VII takes into account the judiciary which in its article (65) advocates the separation of powers between the executive, the legislative and the judiciary.[449] Especially justice for all is the wish of this part of this constitution. Chapter VIII is very important because it addresses the questions on the statutes of political parties and the conditions for the animation of political life in Liberia.[450] Article (77, a. and b.) describe the establishment of political parties, their conduct and the eligibility criteria.[451] It is important to underline that article (79, a.) authorizes the candidacies carried by the political parties and the independent candidatures of the people without political parties in the elections of the country.[452] In general, the constitution of 1986 removed the marginalizations that existed among the Liberian people, even Chapter VI on citizenship has become more flexible with this new constitution.[453] Section (27, a. and b.) puts all black Liberians on an equal footing regarding the enjoyment of citizenship.[454] However, in the old constitution of 1847, Americano-Liberians had more rights than black natives. So normally, ethnic, religious, tribal, and clan issues should not divide the children of this country. But since politics is often unpredictable, some political leaders lacking ideological inspiration play the cards of division to find their place. Otherwise, it is the same constitution of 1986 which serves as a fundamental support for the

[446]Liberia's Constitution of 1986, Chapter V and VI.
[447]Liberia's Constitution of 1986, Chapter V, Articles (30 and 31).
[448]Liberia's Constitution of 1986, Chapter VI, Articles (52 and 53).
[449]Liberia's Constitution of 1986, Chapter VII, Articles (65).
[450]Ibid, Chapter VIII.
[451]Ibid. Article (77, a. and b.)
[452]Ibid. Article (77, a.).
[453]Liberia's Constitution of 1986, Chapter VI.
[454]Ibid, Article (27, a. and b).

management of Liberia till this day. The United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in Liberia had invited the various warring camps to respect this 1986 constitution for the return to democracy.[455] This call for a return to constitutional values enabled the presidential elections in 1997, of which Charles Taylor was the winner.[456] The United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in Liberia was created to encourage political forces in this direction. Ultimately, this 1986 constitution remains an important instrument for Liberia's democracy. Because it is through it, the consensus for organizing legislative and presidential elections was found. After having learned about the Liberian civil war, how to understand that of Sierra Leone?

## 4.2. SIERRA LEONE CIVIL WAR

The civil war in Sierra Leone is a direct consequence of that in Liberia, its neighbor, with whom it shares a large border and especially ethnic convergences. These two countries also share linguistic interpenetrations between their populations. Their political, social and economic realities are almost identical. So, they are two countries with very close people in terms of identity. So the outbreak of the civil war in Liberia had also led Sierra Leone into an armed rebellion against the president of General Momoh who was in power.[457] Thus, in 1991 with the support of the rebels of the major political actor of Liberia Charles Taylor the leader of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), Sierra Leone fell into bloody attacks.[458] The aim of this fight was to eject General Momoh from power so that civilians could have a place in the politics of this country. For a long time, only the country's military forces were in power. Civilians complained that their governance was not based on

[455]Gray-Johnson, W. (2009). Assessing the United Nations approach to post-conflict peacebuilding in Africa: the mission in Liberia. Conflict trends, vol. no 3, 11-18.
[456]Harris, D. (1999). From'warlord'to'democratic'president: how Charles Taylor won the 1997 Liberian elections. Journal of Modern African Studies, 431-455.
[457]Zack-Williams, A. and RILEY, S. (1993). "Sierra Leone: the coup and its consequences." 91-98.
[458]Marchuk, I. (2009). "Confronting blood diamonds in Sierra Leone: the trial of Charles Taylor." Yale J. Int'l Aff. 4, 87.

democratic rules but dictatorship and autocracy. So, the alternation system in power had to be established by democratic means and not by coup d'état. But we must not forget that the problem of ethnicity has always existed in the country since its independence from Great Britain in 1961[459] . So in 1991, these ethnic quarrels, which were covered up and kept in secret, surfaced with the ethnic civil crisis observed in Liberia. The Sierra Leoneans had taken the example of the Liberian ethnic civil war to begin their struggle as well. So the Sierra Leonean civil conflict stemmed from the impacts of the Liberian ethnic civil crisis. The following map will give an idea of the geographical location of Sierra Leone, which is the second target country of this study.

**Map 5: Map of Sierra Leone.**




**Source:** https://www.netmaps.uk/Maps/africa/sierra-leone-maps/

This map above is that of Sierra Leone, showing the geographical location of important cities in this country which has been affected by a decade of civil war. More clearly, let's focus on the origins of the Sierra Leonean civil war and the main actors who made its history.

[459]Allen, C. (1968). "Sierra Leone politics since independence." African Affairs 67, no. 269, 305-329.

### 4.2.1. THE ORIGINS AND ACTORS OF CIVIL WAR IN SIERRA LEONE

Sierra Leone is one of the countries in sub-Saharan Africa and the Gulf of Guinea. The West African countries of the Gulf of Guinea all have an opening onto the Atlantic Ocean. Its capital is Freetown and is limited to the northwest and east-northeast by Guinea Conakry, to the southeast by Liberia and finally a wide Atlantic coast to the west-southwest. It is a country that has taken its independence from Great Britain since 1961.[460] Due to ethnic discrimination since the proclamation of its sovereignty, the country fell into civil war in 1991.[461] According to the anonymous S3 also, ethnicity is the basis of the civil war taking place in Sierra Leone because, since colonization, these ethnic considerations have always existed among the ethnic groups of this country.[462] For this, the Sierra Leonean civil war has as a backdrop the ethnic cleavages in the country since colonization. Nepotism and the corruption of political regimes, particularly those of Stevens Siaka (1971-1985) and General Joseph Saidu Momoh (1985-1992), are also other reasons for the collapse of the Sierra Leonean state, regional interference linked to the civil war situation in Liberia.[463] But above all, the economic struggle of these different ethnic groups for control of diamond mining and marketing are devastating factors that had precipitated the civil crisis in this country. Sierra Leone's abundant natural resources have made it an unstable country before and after its independence. The countries of West Africa adopted the democratic regime in the 1990s to regulate alternation in state power.[464] This democratization of the West African countries was a period of a new experience because the succession to power should be done through elections. However, Africans historically did not have powers based on alternation. It was a power for life because their successors took power after the death of kings. So the democratic regime was a new school that was not anchored in the culture of Africans. Inevitably,

[460]Ibid.
[461]Ndumbe, J. A. (2001). Diamonds, ethnicity, and power: The case of Sierra Leone. Mediterranean Quarterly, vol. 12, no 4, 90-105.
[462]Anonymous S3, based on survey by word questionnaire, July 17, 2021.
[463]Reynolds, A. (1999). Sierra Leone. D. Nohlen, M. Krennerich, B. Thibaut et al. Elections in Africa. A Data Handbook. New York: Oxford University Press. Go to original source, 789-802.
[464]Straus, S. and Taylor, C. (2009). Democratization and electoral violence in sub-saharan Africa, 1990-2007. In: APSA 2009 Toronto Meeting Paper, 4.

democracy would have to stir up internal quarrels that were still dormant. As soon as the competition for the choice of rulers must be through elections, each social component would like to be represented.

Unfortunately, ethnic, religious, tribal, and clan differences are often very visible in many West African countries. In this climate, the democratic experience becomes very difficult. This is why so far, some African countries are in political instability. The Sierra Leonean civil conflict had its origins in ethnicity, as in the case of Liberia, its immediate neighbor. The main actor who started the hostilities of this civil war in 1991 was the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) leader, Foday Sankoh.[465] He was very close to Charles Taylor, the leader of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), an ethnic rebel group that fought against the power of Samuel Doe in Liberia. So the Taylor rebels supported the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) to overthrow the power of General Joseph Saidu Momoh.[466] But Foday Sankoh's Revolutionary United Front (RUF) had failed in its fight to overthrow Momoh's power. To great surprise it was another unexpected force in the country that had succeeded in a coup by sweeping away General Joseph Momoh and his power gang. The National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) was a force grouping together ex-soldiers of the Sierra Leonean National Army led by Captain Valentine Strasser who had taken power in April 1992 by a coup d'état.[467] Even the change of rulers for the management of state affairs had not weakened the impulses of Foday Sankoh's group.

The attacks against Captain Valentine Strasser's new power continued. The main reason for the continuation of this fighting was ethnic. Because, just as in Liberia with the American-Liberians, the Krios of Sierra Leone are mixed race from the period of slavery. Since the independence of this country in 1961, the krios have enjoyed the favors of state power by making them economically prosperous than the natives of Sierra Leone.[468] All the important

[465]Abdullah, I. (1997). Bush path to destruction: the origin and character of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF/SL). Africa Development/Afrique and Développement, 1997, vol. 22, no 3/4, 45-76.
[466]Berman, E. G. (2001). Arming the Revolutionary United Front. African Security Studies, vol. 10, no 1, 5-14.
[467]Fyle, C. M. (1994). The Military and Civil Society in Sierra Leone: The 1992 Military Coup d'Etat. Africa Development/Afrique and Développement, 127-146.
[468]Spencer, S. (2017). Transcending traditional tropes: Autochthony as a discourse of conflict and integration in postwar Krio/Non-Krio relations in Sierra Leone. In: Politics and Policies in Upper Guinea Coast Societies. Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 205-222.

sectors as in the case of Liberia with the American-Liberians, in Sierra-Leone also the krios had the monopoly. This clan management of state power by favoring a clan or an ethnic group had always caused discontent among the natives. It must be said that Liberia and Sierra Leone have at least four ethnic groups in common. These are the Kissi, Mandingo, Mende and Vai, who live in both countries as ethnic groups with the same roots and characteristics that, unfortunately, colonization has divided.[469] But despite this separation, these ethnic groups have not definitively severed their family ties. This means that in several African countries the fate of one country is linked to other neighboring countries. If Charles Taylor had not hesitated to lend his support to Foday Sankoh's group, it is because they have somewhere the same ethnic origins.[470] According to them, they also suffered the same discrimination in their countries' governance of state affairs. So they had to fight to demand equal opportunities for all citizens of these countries. These struggles transformed into civil conflicts, causing severe and harmful consequences in these two countries. There were losses of human life and injuries, displaced persons, refugees, and significant material damage.

The RUF (Revolutionary United Front) of which Foday SANKOH is the leader is a rebel group close to Liberian President Charles TAYLOR.[471] So the civil war in Sierra Leone is like an extension of that in Liberia. The similarities between the civil wars of the two neighboring countries are numerous. These crises began with attempted coups d'état and coups d'état between armed groups and then took on an ethnic aspect for the purpose of acquiring political power. So in the case of the Sierra Leonean civil conflict Charles TAYLOR is indexed as the main initiator because he had the burning desire to control the diamond rich areas of Sierra Leone. For this objective, Charles TAYLOR supported militarily, economically and politically the RUF, a rebel military group of Foday SANKOH.[472] Regarding the ethnic groups in civil crisis in Liberia, it was the Gio and Mano

[469]Sengova, J. (2006). Aborigines and Returnees: In Search of Linguistic and Historical Meaning in Delineations of Sierra Leone's Ethnicity and Heritage'. New perspectives on the Sierra Leone Krio, 167-199.
[470]Batty, F. (2011). Do ethnic groups retain homogenous preferences in African politics? Evidence from Sierra Leone and Liberia. African studies review, 117-143.
[471]Ogunmola, D. (2009). Socio-Economic Injustice and Cronyism: Warlordism and Tayloryism in the Sierra Leone Civil War. Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences, 2009, no 3, 1-36.
[472]Marchuk, I. (2009). Confronting blood diamonds in Sierra Leone: the trial of Charles Taylor. Yale J. Int'l Aff., vol. 4, 87.

against the Krahn and the Mandingo. In civil conflicts in Africa, historical factors often have their roots. Thus, Sierra Leone has been the victim of this historical reality which is nothing other than the supremacy established between ethnic groups in this state. The Krios are the intellectuals and the best-off in the country because their status as descendants of slaves gives them several advantages more than the natives of Sierra Leone. As everywhere in the world, those who have the economic power, that political does not escape them also. So, the Krios had the control of all the country since the independence until the 1990s.[473] This situation had put them in the position enemies against all the native ethnic groups of the country and mainly the majority ethnic groups Mendes and Temmes who engaged in agricultural activities and hunting. The Krios are more in and around the capital Freetown. But the other ethnic groups for reasons of proximity to cultivable land and hunting settled further north of Sierra Leone. In the 1980s, the forests exploited by the native ethnic groups revealed a wealth of diamonds.[474] Thus, the exploitation of these diamond mines allowed the rapid development of this northern region. Also, foreigners were visiting this part of the country more for the diamond business. This massive migration to the North had displeased the leaders of the Krios, who wanted to wrest the exploitation of the diamond mines from the hands of the natives who had been there for a long time.[475] This was the main point of contention between the Krios and other Sierra Leonean ethnic groups. The persistence of the central power which the Krios ruled to exclude other indigenous ethnic groups from the exploitation of the diamond deposits prompted the Mendes and the Temmes, two majority ethnic groups, to oppose the decision.[476] This standoff between the Krios, on the one hand, and the Mendes and Temmes, on the other hand, gave the Sierra Leonean civil war an ethnic color. Otherwise, at first, it was a war of interest over the exploitation of the diamond mines. Table 14 shows the different ethnic groups and their shares (in percentage) in the total population.

[473]Oyètádé, B. A., & Luke, V. F. (2008). Sierra Leone: Krio and the quest for national integration. Language and national identity in Africa, 122-140.
[474]D'angelo, L. 2014). Who owns the diamonds? The occult eco-nomy of diamond mining in Sierra Leone. Africa, vol. 84, no 2, 269-293.
[475]Kabba, O. (2018). Sustaining Peace in Sierra Leone through Collaboration of the Dominant Ethnic Groups., 118.
[476]Ibid, P. 36.

**Table 14: The different ethnic groups of the Sierra Leonean population.**

| No | Ethnic group | Percentage (%) |
|---|---|---|
| **01** | Mende | 32.2 % |
| **02** | Temne | 31.8% |
| **03** | Limba | 8.3% |
| **04** | Kono | 4.4% |
| **05** | Kuranko | 4.1% |
| **06** | Sherbro | 2.3% |
| **07** | Fullah | 3.7% |
| **08** | Susu | 2.9% |
| **09** | Lokko | 2.6% |
| **10** | Kissi | 2.5% |
| **11** | Mandingo | 2.4% |
| **12** | Krio | 1.4% |
| **13** | Yalunka | 0.7% |
| **14** | Krim | 0.2% |
| **15** | Vai | 0.1% |
| **16** | Others | 0.6% |
| **Total** | | **100%** |

**Source:** 2004 Sierra Leone General Population Census, P. 33, accessed February 18, 2020**,** **https://projects.iq.harvard.edu/files/piep/files/glennerstermiguelrothenberg_dec2009.pdf**

As shown in Table 14, the Mendes and Temmes are the majority ethnic groups with respectively 32.2% and 31.8% of the country's total population. The role of these two ethnic groups in the Sierra Leonean civil crisis is decisive because they had taken the lead against the Krios. The leaders of the rebel groups who waged this war came from these two ethnic groups. However, in the case of Liberia, it was four ethnic minority groups. But, the common point in the two civil wars Liberian and Sierra Leonean was that indigenous ethnic groups demanded social justice in managing state affairs from the descendants of slaves (Americano-Liberian) and (Krios) having the monopoly of economic and political powers. So in Sierra

Leone, the other remaining ethnic groups are not as populated as the first two. So, Limbas are 8.3%, Konos 4.4%, Kuranko also 4.1% followed by Fullah who are 3.7%. The rest of the ethnic groups are not very numerous because their populations are between 2 and 0.1%. In the list of these ethnic groups, the Yalunka, Krims and Vais are the last with respectively 0.7%, 0.2% and 0.1%.

Through the reputational table of the ethnic groups that make up the Sierra Leonean population, there are fifteen recognized ethnic groups and the others Africans. The Mendes and Temmes are the majority ethnic groups with respectively 32.2% and 31.8% of the total population of the country. The role of these two ethnic groups in the Sierra Leonean civil crisis is decisive because they had taken the lead against the Krios. The leaders of the rebel groups who waged this war come from these two ethnic groups. However, in the case of Liberia it was four ethnic minority groups. But, the common point in the two civil wars Liberian and Sierra Leonean was that indigenous ethnic groups demanded social justice in the management of state affairs from the descendants of slaves (Americano-Liberian) and (Krios) having the monopoly of economic and political powers. So in Sierra Leone, the other remaining ethnic groups are not as populated as the first two. So, Limbas are 8.3%, Konos 4.4%, Kuranko also 4.1% followed by Fullah who are 3.7%. The rest of the ethnic groups are not very numerous because their populations are between 2 and 0.1%. In the list of these ethnic groups, the Yalunka, Krims and Vais are the last with respectively 0.7%, 0.2% and 0.1%. So, after having exibited the origins of the Sierra Leonean civil war, what can be the reasons which led this country in such atrocity?

### 4.2.2. THE REASONS FOR THE CIVIL WAR IN SIERRA LEONE

Generally, civil wars often surface in several countries in Africa in pre-election and post-election contests. So democratic excesses are sometimes a concern of conflicts in Africa. When the leaders in power do not want alternation in the management of state affairs, the opposition parties often call the people to uprisings against the government in office. This

atmosphere mainly leads to civil wars. In West Africa, the reasons for civil crises are a bit different. The discrimination of certain ethnic groups in state governance is important in the outbreak of conflicts.[477] For anonymous S5, there is also the monopolization of the country's wealth by a small ethnic group in the country because the country's wealth is often not well redistributed in society.[478] This creates social inequalities, which leads to frustration and civil wars. Several ECOWAS countries are well endowed with natural resources. When these resources benefit only a ruling minority, they can be a source of social-political instability. Natural resources are a blessing when a good leader is entrusted to their management. In a country that exploits these natural resources, its people must feel the shared prosperity in their lives.

Good management of these natural resources is not often the strong point of the leaders of African countries. Corruption and the self-fish settling generate discontent.[479] In the case of Sierra Leone, the reasons for the civil war can be seen from two angles. The country has been hostage-taking by the Krios since independence without sharing power with other ethnic groups considered unlettered farmers and hunters.[480] Yet ethnic quarrels were already present in the lives of these Sierra Leoneans. Unfortunately, the ruling leaders who have been the Krios for years had not sought adequate solutions to avoid an ethnic war later.

For anonymous S6, the biggest equation that the political leaders of Sub-Saharan Africa cannot resolve is respect of domocratic norms, especially alternation in power, respect for human rights, good governance, the fight against corruption and social inequalities and in general the guarantee of peace and security for the free movement of people and goods.[481] The first reason that provoked the Sierra Leonean civil war in 1991 was the breakdown of dialogue around the exploitation of diamond mines by the government of this country made

[477]Jackson, P. (2005). "Chiefs, money and politicians: rebuilding local government in post-war Sierra Leone." Public Administration and Development: The International Journal of Management Research and Practice 25, no. 1, 49-58.
[478]Anonymous S5, based on survey by word questionnaire, July 21, 2021.
[479]Smith, G. H. (1997). "The dichotomy of politics and corruption in a neopatrimonial State: evidence from Sierra Leone, 1968-1993." Issue: A Journal of Opinion 25, no. 1, 58-62.
[480]Fyle, C. M. (1994). "Official and unofficial attitudes and policy towards Krio as the main lingua franca in Sierra Leone." African languages, development and the state, 1994, PP. 44-54.
[481]Anonymous S6, based on survey by word questionnaire, July 22, 2021.

up of the Krio ethnic group.[482] However, these diamond deposits are found in the agricultural and hunting forests of the Mendes and Temmes ethnic groups who are nevertheless the majority in the country.[483] The central government had banned the illegal exploitation of these diamond mines. The ethnic groups concerned found this government decision unfair because before the discovery of these diamond deposits, they were left to fend for themselves. So, the artisanal exploitation of these diamond riches was a new income activity after farming and hunting. It was this showdown between the government and the ethnic groups considered to be farmers and hunters that had pushed Foday Sankoh's RUF to take up arms against the governors.[484]. What made things worse in this war, was the support of Charles Taylor, the leader of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) to expand its influence over the diamond territories of Sierra Leone.[485] The involvement of Charles Taylor's rebels had given another turn to the Sierra Leone civil crisis. The rise of the RUF in its attacks on the capital Freetown to seize power was accelerated with the help of the rebels of the NPFL of Liberia. The aim of the RUF / NPFL coalition was to seize power from the Krios in order to freely operate the diamond mines without problems. But, certain forces also had formed for the same purpose because each group wanted their share of the cake. In this list, there is the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) whose leader is Captain Valentine Strasser who had succeeded in wresting power from the hands of General Joseph Momoh in 1992.[486] Thus, Sierra Leone had three enemy groups that were competing for the control of power and the diamond mines.

The Sierra Leonean civil war took on an ethnic aspect with the confrontation of three groups, including the groups of General Joseph Momoh, the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) Captain Valentine Strasser and the alliance of the RUF and the NPFL of Foday

[482]Mitton, K. (2012). "Irrational actors and the process of brutalisation: Understanding atrocity in the Sierra Leonean conflict (1991–2002)." Civil Wars 14, no. 1, 104-122.
[483]Kandeh, J. D. (1992). "Politicization of ethnic identities in Sierra Leone." African Studies Review 35, no. 1, 81-99.
[484]Gberie, L. (2005). A dirty war in West Africa: The RUF and the destruction of Sierra Leone. Indiana University Press, 1-8.
[485]Johnston, P. (2008). "The geography of insurgent organization and its consequences for civil wars: evidence from Liberia and Sierra Leone." Security Studies 17, no. 1, 107-137.
[486]Fyle, C. M. (1994). "The Military and Civil Society in Sierra Leone: The 1992 Military Coup d'Etat." Africa Development/Afrique and Développement, 127-146.

Sankoh and Charles Taylor.[487] “The ethnicity that was like a dormant volcano had rekindled its flames to decimate the social bonds that were already vulnerable among Sierra Leoneans” said by anonymous S2.[488] The conquest of power to be able to control the diamond zones was the cause of the rise of ethnic rivalries. When the Krios, holders of economic and political power, saw that the Mendes and Temmes, formerly farmers and hunters, began by receiving foreigners to buy diamonds acquired by artisanal mining, the Krios wanted the exploitation to be formal.[489] But for years the government led by the Krios had exploited some diamond mines in the south without other ethnic groups seeing where the money was going. This had created mistrust between the Krios and other ethnic groups in the country. Because almost all the privileges of power were dedicated to the Krios. Therefore, the ban on artisanal diamond mining in northern Sierra Leone provoked anger among other ethnic groups who lived in this part of the country and felt abandoned by the government in terms of development. The artisanal diamond mining had opened up this area which was a rural part. Quickly, the diamond money was used for the construction of some luxurious buildings. The development of this part of the North started with some income-generating activities because the money from diamond sales was also invested in trade.[490] The North of Sierra Leone wanted to gain economic independence by exploiting diamond mines. It was a way out to compensate for the injustice of the Krios' governance since independence. This sudden change in the economic situation of the Mendes and Temmes made people jealous. Because only the Krios had a good economic situation in this country, and the other ethnic groups lived from agricultural activities and hunting. So it was the lust for diamond mining that awakened the old demons of ethnicity in Sierra Leone. It was for this reason that there had been a standoff between General Joseph Momoh, the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) of Captain Valentine Strasser and the alliance of the RUF and the NPFL of Foday Sankoh and Charles Taylor, who had plunged the country into civil war from 1991 until

[487]Zack-Williams, A. and Riley, S. (1993). "Sierra Leone: the coup and its consequences.", 91-98.
[488]Anonymous S2, based on survey by word questionnaire, July 15, 2021.
[489]Silberfein, M. (2004). "The geopolitics of conflict and diamonds in Sierra Leone." Geopolitics 9, no. 1, 213-241.
[490]Alao, A. (1999). "Diamonds are forever... but so also are controversies: Diamonds and the actors in Sierra Leone's civil war." Civil Wars 2, no. 3, 43-64.

2002.[491] After all, it must be remembered that this civil crisis was based on reasons of economic inequalities, clan governance of the country by the krios, rivalries for the seizure of power and the emergence of ethnicity due to discrimination in the management of state affairs, and especially the abandonment of regions of other ethnic groups in the development agenda of Krios governance. Such a civil conflict could not happen without impacts.

### 4.2.3. THE IMPACTS OF THE SIERRA LEONE CIVIL WAR IN THE ECOWAS AREA

#### Socio-Economic Impacts In Sierra-Leone And The Ecowas Area

The socio-economic impacts of the war in Sierra Leone are not negligible. The Sierra Leonean conflict which lasted for 11 years from 1991 until 2002[492] had not only shed human blood but also provoked displaced people and refugees in neighboring countries. As in all armed wars, the social impacts were considerable during this conflict. In 1998, 20% of women and childrenwere no longer able to exercise a profession because during the war, they were victims of the atrocities of armed rebels. They were raped, and often, some of their limbs were cut off by rebel warriors. The physical consequences of these atrocities are still visible on the victims of the Sierra Leonean population. Not to mention the rapes of underage girls and the forced enlistment of child soldiers in war. Worst of all, in January 1999, the RUF (Revolutionary United Front) rebels took the capital Freetown hostage, where they killed around 6,000 people.[493] The deaths of these 11 years of civil war in Sierra Leone are estimated between 100,000 and 200,000.[494] The observation is that this conflict has caused many deaths. This had considerably reduced the population of this country at war. The

[491]Maazouzi, K. (2017). "A Nation's Collapse: The Civil War Tactic and Impact Case Study: Sierra Leone (1991-2002)." PhD diss., Université d'Oran 2 Mohamed Ben Ahmed, 94.
[492]Maazouzi, K. (2017). "A Nation's Collapse: The Civil War Tactic and Impact Case Study: Sierra Leone (1991-2002)." PhD diss., Université d'Oran 2 Mohamed Ben Ahmed, 94.
[493]Williams, P. (2001). "Fighting for freetown: British military intervention in Sierra Leone." Contemporary Security Policy 22, no. 3, 140-168.
[494]Hoffman, D. (2004). "The civilian target in Sierra Leone and Liberia: Political power, military strategy, and humanitarian intervention." African Affairs 103, no. 411, 211-226.

internally displaced people surrounded more than 1 million[495] , and more than 800,000 people were urgently seeking housing for their protection from the war.[496] Other estimates have announced over 2 million people displaced during this Sierra Leonean civil war.[497] At the same time, refugees surrounded 820,000 people who had crossed Sierra Leone's borders to escape the conflict.[498] So, Guinea Conakry had hosted 200,000 refugees, Liberia had accommodated 120,000 refugees, and 500,000 refugees migrated to Ghana, Gambia and Ivory Coast.[499] Women were more likely to seek refuge with a percentage of 55% of the total number of refugees.[500] These social impacts show that the Sierra Leonean civil war was a disaster. Table 15 illustrates the demographic impacts of this conflict as the population decreased during this war due to deaths and refugees.

**Table 15: The impacts of Sierra Leonean civil war on its population.**

| Years | Population | Yearly percentage change |
|---|---|---|
| **1955** | 2,165,815 | 1.19 % |
| **1960** | 2,317,636 | 1.36 % |
| **1965** | 2,508,219 | 1.59 % |
| **1970** | 2,744,891 | 1.82 % |
| **1975** | 3,037,154 | 2.04 % |
| **1980** | 3,388,495 | 2.21 % |
| **1985** | 3,805,311 | 2.35 % |
| **1990** | 4,319,762 | 2.57 % |
| **1995** | 4,303,957 | -0.07 % |

[495]Amowitz, L. L., and al (2002). "Prevalence of war-related sexual violence and other human rights abuses among internally displaced persons in Sierra Leone." Jama 287.4, 2002, 513-521.
[496]Millar, G. (2011). "Local evaluations of justice through truth telling in Sierra Leone: Postwar needs and transitional justice." Human Rights Review 12, no. 4, 515-535.
[497]Hoffman, D. (2004). "The civilian target in Sierra Leone and Liberia: Political power, military strategy, and humanitarian intervention." African Affairs 103, no. 411, 211-226.
[498]Kaiser, T. (2004). "Participation or consultation? Reflections on a 'beneficiary based'evaluation of UNHCR's programme for Sierra Leonean and Liberian refugees in Guinea, June–July 2000." Journal of Refugee Studies 17, no. 2, 185-204.
[499]Ibid.
[500]Skran, C. (2020). "Refugee entrepreneurship and self-reliance: the UNHCR and sustainability in post-conflict Sierra Leone." Journal of Refugee Studies 33, no. 1, 268-298.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **2000** | 4,584,571 | 1.27 % |
| **2005** | 5,645,624 | 4.25 % |
| **2010** | 6,415,634 | 2.59 % |
| **2015** | 7,171,914 | 2.25 % |
| **2020** | 7,976,983 | 2.10 % |

**Source:** Worldometer, accessed March 18, 2021, https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/sierra-leone-population/

In Table 15, one can observe that from 1955 until 1990, the population grew steadily. In 1955, the population had a growth rate of 1.19%. This growth did not suffer a fall until 1990, when it showed an increase of 2.57%. So when this country was not in conflict, its population growth was normal. But, from 1991, which marked the beginning of the Sierra Leonean conflict, the country's population was reduced by deaths and refugees. Thus, in 1995, the population showed a decrease with a percentage of -0.07%. It was during the war period and no doubt the negative consequences that flowed from it. The impact of the Sierra Leonean conflict on its population or demography is defined by the loss of part of its citizens. Some were killed in armed clashes, and others have been forced to flee the country to avoid the atrocities of war.

However, when the conflict began to be resolved in the 2000s, the population started to grow again. It left -0.07 in 1995 to reach a growth of 1.27% in 2000. Likewise, this growth continued without problem, posting the highest percentage in 2005 with a rate of 4.25% between 2000 and 2020. It should be noted that this population growth has no longer suffered a negative decrease even if, from 2010 until 2020, it hovers around a little over 2%. Finally, Table 15 gives an overall idea of the negative impacts of the conflict in Sierra Leone on the growth of its population or demography. The population decline observed in 1995 was the result of the loss of life and refugees caused by this conflict which lasted from 1991 until 2002 in Sierra Leone. Economically, what are the consequences engendered by this conflict in Sierra Leone?

The Sierra Leonean civil war had not only generated negative social impacts. There were also economic impacts because the country was not stable to run its economic activities.[501] According to anonymous S15, it is when income-generating activities are possible that the country can fare better economically.[502] Also, the free movement of people and goods is possible when the country is in security and peace. If security and peace are threatened, human activities are no longer doing well. So in times of civil war, no commercial flourishing is possible. Before the outbreak of the civil war, the krios had a monopoly on the economy and state power.[503] But their decline took place when the conflict had started and even with the artisanal exploitation of diamond sites by the rebels, Sierra Leone's economy wanted to escape the krios. The poor populations of this country had found their small economic equilibrium in the artisanal exploitation of the diamond mines. During the civil war, this diamond exploitation did not stop by the rebels. They continued the exploitation because it was their main source of income which allowed them to feed themselves and acquire weapons for combat. They had enlisted, willingly or by force, women and children both in the fighting and exploitation of the diamond. For anonymous S12, it was impossible to legally conduct business activities in important cities like the capital Sierra Leone's Freetown.[504] The armed attacks affected more these big cities, which were the centers of the business. Especially in 1998, with the invasion of Freetown by the RUF to neutralize power, national and international companies closed their doors.[505] Even the movement of people was no longer possible because of the insecurity. Thus, the economic sector of this country was paralyzed during this civil war. Only informal economic activities were carried out with the blessing of the rebels.[506] These activities were mainly food and drugs which supplied the camps in conflict. Formal economic activities were impossible because the risks of bragging

[501]Zack-Williams, A. B. (1999). "Sierra Leone: the political economy of civil war, 1991-98." Third World Quarterly 20, no. 1, 143-162.
[502]Anonymous S15, based on survey by word questionnaire, September 9, 2021.
[503]Luke, D. F. and RILEY, P. S. (1989). "The politics of economic decline in Sierra Leone." The Journal of Modern African Studies 27, no. 1, 133-141.
[504]Anonymous S12, based on survey by word questionnaire, August 15, 2021.
[505]Maazouzi, K. (2017). "A Nation's Collapse: The Civil War Tactic and Impact Case Study: Sierra Leone (1991-2002)." PhD diss., Université d'Oran 2 Mohamed Ben Ahmed, 94.
[506]Le Billon, P. and Levin, E. (2009). "Building peace with conflict diamonds? Merging security and development in Sierra Leone." Development and Change 40, no. 4, 693-715.

rights and armed attacks were too high.[507] In the big cities shops and businesses have been held up several times. Faced with this insecure situation, economic operators have closed and fled these places of war deemed dangerous to human life. As the government could no longer protect citizens against this civil war, economic operators migrated to neighboring countries to save their lives.[508] The country had become poorer than in the past because per capita income was no longer significant. During the entire war period, the country did not experience economic growth.[509] Every year the growth rate fell because economic activities were practically declining. The government no longer had the possibility of making a budget for its governance.[510] Table 16 shows the negative impacts of the Sierra Leonean civil war on its economy through its annual economic growth rates.

**Table 16: Annual Sierra Leone's economic growth rate from 1961 to 2020.**

| Years | Annual economic growth rate in percentage (%) | | Years | Annual economic growth rate in percentage (%) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **1961** | 1.812% | | **1991** | 2.352% |
| **1962** | 4.533% | | **1992** | -19.01% |
| **1963** | 1.702% | | **1993** | 1.372% |
| **1964** | 6.685% | | **1994** | -1.946% |
| **1965** | 7.181% | | **1995** | -8.004% |
| **1966** | 1.699% | | **1996** | 1.754% |
| **1967** | 0.043% | | **1997** | -5.877% |
| **1968** | 2.012% | | **1998** | 1.788% |
| **1969** | 8.528% | | **1999** | -1.982% |
| **1970** | 8.624% | | **2000** | 6.653% |

[507]Collier, P. and Duponchel, M. (2013). "The economic legacy of civil war: firm-level evidence from Sierra Leone." Journal of Conflict Resolution 57, no. 1, 65-88.
[508]Chege, M. (2002). "Sierra Leone: The state that came back from the dead." Washington Quarterly 25, no. 3, 147-160.
[509]Davies, V. A. B. (2002). War, poverty and growth in Africa: lessons from Sierra Leone. Centre for the Study of African Economies, 3.
[510]Sesay, M. (1995). "State capacity and the politics of economic reform in Sierra Leone." Journal of Contemporary African Studies 13, no. 2, 1995, PP. 165-192.

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **1971** | 3.461% | | **2001** | -6.345% |
| **1972** | 0.902% | | **2002** | 26.46% |
| **1973** | 2.258% | | **2003** | 9.316% |
| **1974** | 3.502% | | **2004** | 6.596% |
| **1975** | 1.669% | | **2005** | 4.507% |
| **1976** | -0.45% | | **2006** | 4.224% |
| **1977** | 0.045% | | **2007** | 8.056% |
| **1978** | 2.406% | | **2008** | 5.398% |
| **1979** | 4.512% | | **2009** | 3.189% |
| **1980** | 4.847% | | **2010** | 5.348% |
| **1981** | 2.881% | | **2011** | 6.312% |
| **1982** | 4.78% | | **2012** | 15.18% |
| **1983** | -2.105% | | **2013** | 20.72% |
| **1984** | 4.095% | | **2014** | 4.556% |
| **1985** | -5.313% | | **2015** | -20.6% |
| **1986** | 1.238% | | **2016** | 6.056% |
| **1987** | 7.234% | | **2017** | 4.211% |
| **1988** | -7.082% | | **2018** | 3.729% |
| **1989** | 0.73% | | **2019** | 5.1% |
| **1990** | 3.349% | | **2020** | -2.302% |

**Source**: Extracted from the IMF's April 2020 Database of Countries' Economic Growth.

Sierra Leone is one of the poorest countries in Africa and the world. In Table 16, the annual economic growth rate is recorded by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) from 1961 until 2020. The annual economic growth rates shown in Table 16 confirm that even in a peace and security situation, this country was not economically prosperous. Logically, in a civil war situation between 1991 and 2002, where the practice of commercial activities was impossible, Sierra Leone recorded negative economic growth rates. This is due to the country's political, economic, and social instabilities. The civil war had blocked income-generating activities. From 1961 until 1990, the country experienced acceptable economic

growth rates. Because for 30 years, he made some efforts to achieve economic growth rates, the highest of which was observed in 1969 and 1970, respectively, with economic growth rates of 8.52% and 8.62%. So the most significant economic performance was achieved in 1970 with an economic growth rate of 8.624. But, there were some negative growth rates between 1961 and 1990. Sierra Leone experienced negative economic growth rates in 1976 (-0.45%), 1983 ( -2.1%), 1985( -5.31)%, and 1988( -7.08%) . Over the period 1961-1990, the worst economic performance was recorded in 1988.

This civil conflict affected the economic growth rates of Sierra Leone. Thus, in 11 years of civil war, the country recorded six different years of negative economic growth rates between 1991 and 2002. At the start of the civil war in 1991, the government had an economic growth rate of 2.35%. But with the scale of the war over time, economic growth rates fell and even were negative in some years. The two highest economic growth rates recorded in this period of the war were respectively in 2000, with an economic growth rate of 6.65% and in 2002, with an economic growth rate of 26.46%. The worst years in terms of economic growth are 1992 with an economic growth rate of -19.01%, 1994 with an economic growth rate of -1.94%, 1995 with an economic growth rate of -8%, 1997 with an economic growth rate of -5.87%, 1999 with an economic growth rate of -1.98% and finally 2001 with an economic growth rate of -6.34%. The worst economic performance was observed in 1992 with a growth rate of -19.01%. However, from 2002 which marked the end of the civil war, the rate of economic growth experienced a great boom. Because, in 2002, it was 26.46% qualified as a double-digit economic growth rate. This is the only rate of growth recorded since the end of the civil war until today. These annual economic growth rates for Sierra Leone remained acceptable from 2002 until 2020. Except that in 2015, this country experienced a net economic growth rate of -20.6%. And also in 2020 with a negative growth rate of -2.302%. Almost 20 years after the civil war, Sierra Leone is giving itself an economic boost for higher economic growth rates. Table 17 shows the trends in annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita US dollars. It helps to appreciate better the economic impacts of the Sierra Leonean civil war. These data are taken from the IMF.

**Table 17: Annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita in US dollars in Sierra Leone from 1990 to 2020.**

| Years | Annual gross domestic product in US dollars per capita in Sierra Leone | | Years | Annual gross domestic product in US dollars per capita in Sierra Leone |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **1990** | 446 | | **2006** | 384 |
| **1991** | 453 | | **2007** | 403 |
| **1992** | 367 | | **2008** | 415 |
| **1993** | 374 | | **2009** | 419 |
| **1994** | 368 | | **2010** | 431 |
| **1995** | 339 | | **2011** | 448 |
| **1996** | 344 | | **2012** | 505 |
| **1997** | 322 | | **2013** | 596 |
| **1998** | 325 | | **2014** | 610 |
| **1999** | 313 | | **2015** | 474 |
| **2000** | 324 | | **2016** | 492 |
| **2001** | 293 | | **2017** | 501 |
| **2002** | 355 | | **2018** | 509 |
| **2003** | 370 | | **2019** | 524 |
| **2004** | 378 | | **2020** | 501 |
| **2005** | 380 | | | |

**Source:** Extracted from the IMF database.

Careful observation of Sierra Leone's annual gross domestic product in US dollars per capita from 1990-to 2020 in Table 17 sheds light on the economic impacts of its civil war. In 1991, which marked the start of the civil conflict, the country's annual gross domestic product per capita was 453 US dollars. But during the entire period of the civil war from 1992 until 2002, the annual gross domestic product in US dollars per capita hovers around just over 300 US dollars. The lowest annual gross domestic product per capita was recorded in 2001 at 293 US dollars. After the civil war, the annual gross domestic product per capita has improved since

2007 to 403 US dollars. In 2012, it reached 505 US dollars, and in 2014 it climbed again to 610 US dollars. But this annual gross domestic product per capita fell in 2015 and 2016 with 474 and 492 US dollars, respectively. From 2017 until 2020, it remained around 500 US dollars. Table 18 shows the annual Gross National Product (GNP) in US dollars per capita in Sierra Leone. It shows the economic impacts of the civil war on the gross national income per capita in Sierra Leone.

**Table 18: Annual Gross National Product (GNP) per capita in US dollars in Sierra Leone from 1970 to 2018**

| Years | Annual gross national product in US dollars per capita in Sierra Leone | | Years | Annual gross national product in US dollars per capita in Sierra Leone |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **1970** | 157.8063 | | **1995** | 271.8543 |
| **1971** | 164.7284 | | **1996** | 301.3857 |
| **1972** | 178.7325 | | **1997** | 274.6625 |
| **1973** | 200.5186 | | **1998** | 207.9382 |
| **1974** | 226.2809 | | **1999** | 206.6239 |
| **1975** | 236.5731 | | **2000** | 192.1097 |
| **1976** | 214.9804 | | **2001** | 234.5336 |
| **1977** | 239.1754 | | **2002** | 259.3091 |
| **1978** | 298.0929 | | **2003** | 271.212 |
| **1979** | 332.8844 | | **2004** | 263.4559 |
| **1980** | 371.4414 | | **2005** | 294.3673 |
| **1981** | 391.4291 | | **2006** | 329.1332 |
| **1982** | 429.8266 | | **2007** | 355.752 |
| **1983** | 367.9372 | | **2008** | 412.6791 |
| **1984** | 441.0609 | | **2009** | 401.0637 |
| **1985** | 350.6891 | | **2010** | 411.1967 |
| **1986** | 256.3663 | | **2011** | 442.069 |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **1987** | 196.53 | | **2012** | 584.5786 |
| **1988** | 293.4714 | | **2013** | 712.916 |
| **1989** | 278.9468 | | **2014** | 697.7433 |
| **1990** | 191.8886 | | **2015** | 589.0293 |
| **1991** | 236.5584 | | **2016** | 522.8372 |
| **1992** | 199.0234 | | **2017** | 488.8057 |
| **1993** | 239.374 | | **2018** | 525.8725 |
| **1994** | 264.8354 | | | |

**Source:** Extracted from the UNCTAD database

As shown in Table 18, the annual gross national product per capita between 1970 and 2018 was volatile in Sierra Leone. The annual per capita incomes in this country show the characteristics of the world's poor countries. In 1970, the annual gross national product per capita was 157.80 US dollars. Thirty years later, in 1990, it was 191.88 US dollars. In this three-decade period, the lowest annual gross national product per capita was recorded in 1970. It stood at 157.80 US dollars. The highest annual gross national product per capita was recorded in 1984( 441.06 US dollars). The last 28 years from 1991 to 2018 are characterized by a period of civil war between 1991 and 2002. During these years of civil conflict, the annual gross national product per capita significantly declined. It hardly reaches 300 US dollars. It stagnated at around 200 US dollars. During this period of civil war, the lowest gross national product per capita was observed in the year 2000 at 192.11 US dollars. The highest one is recorded in the year 1996 at 301.38 US dollars. In all other years of the war, the annual gross national product per capita slightly exceeded just over 200 US dollars. This is proof that the civil conflict in Sierra Leone negatively impacted its economy. Since the end of Sierra Leone's civil war in 2002, the annual gross national product per capita has increased. In 2003, it was 271,212 US dollars and 525.87 US dollars in 2018. Between 2003 and 2018, the lowest gross national product was in 2004 at 263.45 US dollars, and the highest is achieved in 2013 at 712,91 US dollars. What were the socio-economic impacts of the Sierra Leonean civil war on the ECOWAS region?

In the ECOWAS zone, countries bordering and close to Sierra Leone, such as Liberia, Guinea Conakry, Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana, received refugees who fled the civil war.[511] So these neighboring countries received human pressure. For anonymous S4, in a situation of distress like that of the civil war in Sierra Leone, the immediate consequences are the tide of people who leave places of war for safe and peaceful areas.[512] So the other ECOWAS countries are forced to welcome these souls in distress. In the host countries of these war refugees, collaboration with indigenous populations is often not easy. The leaders of these countries must always play the role of arbiter to facilitate their settlements. They must also ensure that these refugees have the minimum food provisions to survive.[513] Even though other basic needs are not often available, at least they have to eat to stay alive. Thus, the host countries are making efforts to offer them this basic need which is to feed themselves. Also, among the efforts of the host countries of these refugees, there is care for those who are sick. All of these unforeseen charges have an impact on the economy of host countries.

During Sierra Leone's civil war, its economy was no longer functioning because peace and security were threatened. Small and big economic operators could no longer exercise their income-generating activities. The businesses were closed due to insecurity. However, if the internal economy does not work in a country mainly because there is war, its external trade also stops.[514] Sierra-Leone is a country open to the Atlantic Ocean which has a commercial transport port whose boats are useful for the economic exchanges of its neighbors.[515] During its civil war, its port and its airport no longer functioned.[516] The generalized insecurity in this country did not allow the flights of planes and the navigation of boats. Under these conditions, Sierra Leone involuntarily isolated itself from other ECOWAS countries despite

[511]Kaiser, T. (2004). "Participation or consultation? Reflections on a 'beneficiary based'evaluation of UNHCR's programme for Sierra Leonean and Liberian refugees in Guinea, June–July 2000." Journal of Refugee Studies 17, no. 2, 185-204.
[512]Anonymous S4, based on survey by word questionnaire, July 19, 2021.
[513]Berger, L. F. (2000). "State practice evidence of the humanitarian intervention doctrine: the ECOWAS intervention in Sierra Leone." Ind. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 11, 605-632.
[514]Collier, P. and Duponchel, M. (2013). "The economic legacy of civil war: firm-level evidence from Sierra Leone." Journal of Conflict Resolution 57, no. 1, 65-88.
[515]Gleave, M. B. (1997). "Port activities and the spatial structure of cities: the case of Freetown, Sierra Leone." Journal of Transport Geography 5, no. 4, 257-275.
[516]Ibid.

multilateral interventions to curb the crisis.[517] Trade with other countries was no longer possible in this war situation. Foreign investors, especially the Lebanese, who were more numerous, had left Sierra Leone during this period of war, and African economic operators who had also invested in this country had to abandon their economic activities to save their lives.[518] The land, air and sea borders were closed due to insecurity and above all, the armed rebels took control of almost the whole country[519] . No legal economic activity inside and outside Sierra Leone was possible. The free movement of people and goods was no longer possible within and outside the country. So the civil conflict in Sierra Leone is an economic shock for all of ECOWAS. Because the other member countries, through the deployments of the ECOWAS armed forces and the diplomats to resolve the conflict, were making additional budgets[520]. These are additional expenses for the national economy of other ECOWAS countries. But in the name of the solidarity of the integration of ECOWAS, the other members cannot be silent in the face of the human disasters that Sierra Leone was going through. All these collective peacekeeping and conflict resolution actions also accentuate the depth of poverty in the ECOWAS region.[521] So, after the socio-economic impacts of the Sierra Leonean civil war, what can be the political ones for this country and the ECOWAS region?

**Political Impacts In Sierra Leone And The Ecowas Area**

The political paralysis in Sierra Leone lasted between 1991 and 2002 because of its civil crisis.[522] According to anonymous S 13, during this civil conflict, this country has known at least six presidents either by coup or elections.[523] This abusive succession to power shows

[517]Davies, V. A. B. (2000). "Sierra Leone: ironic tragedy." Journal of African Economies 9, no. 3, 349-369.
[518]Zack-Williams, A. B. (1999). "Sierra Leone: the political economy of civil war, 1991-98." Third World Quarterly 20, no. 1, 143-162.
[519]Maclure, R. and Denov, M. (2006). "“I didn't want to die so I joined them”: Structuration and the process of becoming boy soldiers in Sierra Leone." Terrorism and Political Violence 18, no. 1, 119-135.
[520]Dumbuya, P. A. (2008). "ECOWAS Military Intervention in Sierra Leone: Anglophone-Francophone Bipolarity or Multipolarity?" Journal of Third World Studies 25, no. 2, 83-102.
[521]Badiane, O., ODJO, P. S. and WOUTERSE, F. (2018). "Macro-economic Models: Comparative Analysis of Strategies and Long Term Outlook for Growth and Poverty Reduction among ECOWAS Member Countries." Development Policies and Policy Processes in Africa, 21.
[522]Maazouzi, K. (2017). "A Nation’s Collapse: The Civil War Tactic and Impact Case Study: Sierra Leone (1991-2002)." PhD diss., Université d'Oran 2 Mohamed Ben Ahmed, 94.
[523]Anonymous S13, based on survey by word questionnaire, August 18, 2021.

the degree of the crisis that this country experienced. Under these conditions, politically and economically, the country is not profitable. Especially with the division of the country by the Sankoh rebels, who the majority ethnic groups supported, Sierra Leone could not have political stability.[524] Also, the bureaucracy could no longer function in several cities of the country. So the state lost its power during this period of civil war. Administrative services were no longer possible because insecurity was everywhere in the country. According to anonymous S9, in all small and large towns except in the capital Freetown, the state power was no longer represented.[525] The minimum services were done only in the capital, where the president and some government members were under high protection of the national legal forces and those of the ECOWAS and the UN.[526] Politics as management of the city no longer existed in this moment of threat to peace and security. Also, the force of the arguments to convince the people during the elections was replaced by the force of arms to terrorize the same people. The country's governance was no longer based on politics but on rebellion on the one hand and resistance on the other. In the two opposing camps, rebel and government, each camped on its position. Political negotiations were no longer possible, given the scale of the war. The government could no longer fully play its role of managing the city because the rebellion violated its sovereignty.[527] This loss of sovereignty was proof that no government policy could be implemented. The first objective of the government was the survival of the state. So it was necessary to fight the rebels at all costs to restore state authority by regaining control of the whole country. The civil war in Sierra Leone had generated several political impacts such as the non-existence of the animation of normal political life by the force of arguments, the loss of sovereignty and of the authority of the State, services administered by the state bureaucracy, violence between ethnic groups and political refugees. In short, the Sierra Leonean civil conflict brought instability and political violence that lasted

[524]Spencer, S. (2017). Transcending traditional tropes: Autochthony as a discourse of conflict and integration in postwar Krio/Non-Krio relations in Sierra Leone. In: Politics and Policies in Upper Guinea Coast Societies. Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 205-222.
[525]Anonymous S9, based on survey by word questionnaire, July 30, 2021.
[526]Nowrot, K. and Schebacker, W. E. "The Use of Force to Restore Democracy: International Legal Implications of the ECOWAS Intervention in Sierra Leone." Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 14, 321.
[527]Bellows, J. and Miguel, E. (2006). "War and institutions: New evidence from Sierra Leone." American Economic Review 96, no. 2, 394-399.

for 11 years.[528] Political parties no longer had secure spaces to animate conventional politics. Thus, the civil war had plunged the political parties into silence until the rebirth of democracy in 2002.[529] It was after the resolution of the civil conflict that the democratic elections took place on May 14, 2002, with the political parties such as: Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP), All People's Congress (APC), Peace and Liberation Party (PLP) and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF).[530] The results of these presidential and parliamentary elections gave the winner of the leader of the SLPP, Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, who became the democratically elected president after the crisis.[531] He also had a majority in parliament to implement his government policy. So, after these multiple internal political impacts described in Sierra Leone, what can be the political impacts of this civil war for the entire ECOWAS region?

"In the ECOWAS region, when a member country is in a political crisis, the other member countries are also affected because the political governance of all the other member states must take into account the measures to resolve this crisis", said by anonymous S7.[532] In the case of the civil crisis in Sierra Leone, the other member countries were weakened politically and economically by the civil war in Liberia, which lasted from 1989 to 1997.[533] Even the civil conflict of Liberia migrated to Sierra Leone because of the desire of President Charles Taylor, who wanted the Sierra Leonean diamond resources.[534] But in such a difficult and atrocious situation for the people of Sierra Leone, other members of ECOWAS cannot remain indifferent. So policies had to be put in place to protect all refugees first and secure the border countries of Sierra Leone to prevent the war from spreading to other countries. According to anonymous S7, especially since this civil war had ethnic seeds, it was necessary to take

[528]Peters, K. and Richards, P. (2011). "Rebellion and agrarian tensions in Sierra Leone." Journal of Agrarian Change 11, no. 3, 2011, PP. 377-395.
[529]Pham, J. P. (20005). "Democracy by Force-: Lessons from the Restoration of the State in Sierra Leone." Whitehead J. Dipl. & Int'l Rel. 6, 2005, P. 129.
[530]Jalloh, M. (2002). "Voting for peace and democracy in Sierra Leone Reflections on the May 2002 General Elections." Africa Insight 32, no. 4, 2002, PP. 59-63.
[531]Kandeh, J. D. (2003). "Sierra Leone's post-conflict elections of 2002." Journal of Modern African Studies, 189-216.
[532]Anonymous S7, based on survey by word questionnaire, July 25, 2021.
[533]Sylla, B. (2003). "The Effects of Internal Conflict and Civil War in West Africa: A Case Study of Liberia (1989-1997)." Master's thesis, International Islamic University Malaysia, 2003, P. 47.
[534]Marchuk, I. (2009). "Confronting blood diamonds in Sierra Leone: the trial of Charles Taylor." Yale J. Int'l Aff. 4, 87.

measures so that the same ethnic groups in neighboring countries did not provide their support.[535] This policy had limited the extent of the crisis to only two countries: Liberia and Sierra Leone.[536] In addition, in the bodies of ECOWAS and the African Union institutions, Sierra Leone no longer had representatives to defend its interests in the integration of ECOWAS and on the continental level of the African Union. For 11 years, this country remained ungovernable; it was impossible to appoint its representatives and diplomats in various branches within ECOWAS.[537] So Sierra Leone's diplomacy and foreign policy had lost their weight. The country was politically and diplomatically isolated. It was after the presidential and parliamentary elections of 2002 that Sierra Leone's foreign policy and diplomacy began to shine again.[538] So what are the security impacts of this civil war for Sierra Leone and ECOWAS?

**Security Impacts In Sierra Leone And The Ecowas Area**

Achieving sustainable development in all countries requires a guarantee of security because when security becomes a given in a country, there is peace. However, in times of civil war, it is difficult for a government to control security on its territory. The civil conflict in Sierra Leone has had negative consequences on the free movement of people and goods. When Foday Saybana Sankoh's rebels began their armed attacks in 1991, Sierra Leone was no longer a secure country.[539] Especially when the Sankoh rebellion gained strength with the help of President Charles Taylor of Liberia, it had almost taken every town and village in the country hostage except Freetown, the capital.[540] So, within Sierra Leone and at its borders, security had escaped the control of General Momoh's power. Also, when the rebel leader

[535]Anonymous S7, based on survey by word questionnaire, July 25, 2021.
[536]Gershoni, Y. (1997). "War without end and an end to a war: the prolonged wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone." African Studies Review 40, no. 3, 55-76.
[537]Bellows, J. and Miguel, E. (2006). "War and institutions: New evidence from Sierra Leone." American Economic Review 96, no. 2, 394-399.
[538]Wyrod, C. (2008). "Sierra Leone: A vote for better governance." Journal of Democracy 19, no. 1, 70-83.
[539]Maazouzi, K. (2017). "A Nation's Collapse: The Civil War Tactic and Impact Case Study: Sierra Leone (1991-2002)." PhD diss., Université d'Oran 2 Mohamed Ben Ahmed, 94.
[540]Sylla, B. (2003). "The Effects of Internal Conflict and Civil War in West Africa: A Case Study of Liberia (1989-1997)." Master's thesis, International Islamic University Malaysia, 47.

Sankoh of the indigenous Temme ethnic group convinced all the other ethnic groups that their poverty and ethnic marginalization problems came from the Krios, the country quickly became a ground of ethnic rivalry.[541] The Krios had become the enemies of all other ethnic groups in Sierra Leone. Sankoh had succeeded in this coup because the Krios alone had the economic, political and intellectual powers. Since independence, they succeeded one another in power with the advantages that this entailed. They were also the important economic operators of the country because of the favors of the power they held. On the educational level, the Krios had the economic power to ensure their children's education in the largest schools of the country and abroad.[542] These opportunities of the Krios were not acceptable to other indigenous ethnic groups. So, the rebel leader Sankoh had based himself on these social inequalities to strengthen his arguments.[543] Thus, the krios who were in the minority could not ensure their own security and that of the territory despite the means of power. In numbers, the krios were disadvantaged to face the other majority groups in the country.[544] In this situation of social tension, the rebels reigned supreme in the towns and villages of the country by giving up and flouting the authority and security of the State.

Even when ECOWAS with its multilateral forces stepped in to reinforce the government, only the capital Freetown could be secured after a long battle against the rebels.[545] Sierra Leone had become ungovernable because the force of power only stopped in the capital Freetown. The objective of the multinational forces of ECOWAS was to secure the members of the government and the capital where the most important infrastructures of the country are located.[546] This decision aimed to protect people and goods in the capital Freetown for a minimum of survival of the inhabitants of this city. It was also to ensure the security of state

[541]Sengova, J. (2006). Aborigines and Returnees: In Search of Linguistic and Historical Meaning in Delineations of Sierra Leone's Ethnicity and Heritage'. New perspectives on the Sierra Leone Krio, 167-199.
[542]Ibid.
[543]Abdullah, I. (1998). "Bush path to destruction: the origin and character of the Revolutionary United Front/Sierra Leone." The Journal of Modern African Studies 36, no. 2, 203-235.
[544]Sengova, J. (2006). Aborigines and Returnees: In Search of Linguistic and Historical Meaning in Delineations of Sierra Leone's Ethnicity and Heritage'. New perspectives on the Sierra Leone Krio, 167-199.
[545]Zack-Williams, T. (2012). When the state fails: studies on intervention in the Sierra Leone civil war. Pluto Press; Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 13.
[546]Berger, L. F. (2000). "State practice evidence of the humanitarian intervention doctrine: the ECOWAS intervention in Sierra Leone." Ind. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 11, 605-632.

infrastructures which are often destroyed by rebels during conflicts. If all state property is destroyed in a civil war, after the crisis the reconstruction of the country takes a long time. For this reason, the forces responsible for maintaining peace and security protect people and important State infrastructure. But in other towns and villages where the rebels were in control, their attacks targeted the properties of traders and people who did not want to support their fight.[547] Also, the decentralized state infrastructures in other small towns and villages are destroyed. The leading figure of the SANKOH rebellion succeeded in dividing the territory and the population of Sierra Leone in two.[548] On the territorial level, the rebels controlled the whole country except the capital Freetown. They had control over the diamond mines from which they drew their financial resources to stock up on arms and other vital needs. The illegal diamond trade had become the monopoly of the rebellion. It also controlled maritime borders and those with other neighboring countries such as Liberia and Guinea Conakry.[549] All of northern Sierra Leone was in the hands of the rebellion, which took advantage of natural diamond resources. The capital Freetown is in the south of the country and has an opening on the Atlantic Ocean. But the strength of the rebels did not allow sea and air navigation. Insecurity was everywhere in the country except the center of the capital Freetown guarded by multilateral forces of ECOWAS and the UN.[550] So, the rebel leader Sankoh remained very powerful throughout the period of this Sierra Leonean civil crisis from 1991 until 2002.[551] He was at the center of negotiations for the return of peace and security in Sierra Leone.

On the commercial level, Sierra Leone, which was already on the list of the world's heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC), had experienced deeper poverty.[552] Because without security no business activity is possible. If the rebels dominated all over the country during this war,

[547]Berman, E. G. (2001). Arming the Revolutionary United Front. African Security Studies, vol. 10, no 1, 5-14.
[548]Ibid.
[549]Arieff, A. (2009). "Still standing: neighbourhood wars and political stability in Guinea." The Journal of Modern African Studies, 331-348.
[550]Zack-Williams, T. (2012). When the state fails: studies on intervention in the Sierra Leone civil war. Pluto Press; Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 89.
[551]Maazouzi, K. (2017). "A Nation's Collapse: The Civil War Tactic and Impact Case Study: Sierra Leone (1991-2002)." PhD diss., Université d'Oran 2 Mohamed Ben Ahmed, 94.
[552]Davies, V. A. B. (2002). War, poverty and growth in Africa: lessons from Sierra Leone. Centre for the Study of African Economies, 3-4.

legal trade was impossible. Also, to have free and beneficial commercial activities, there must be a guarantee of the free movement of people and goods. However, in these moments of civil crisis, insecurity was everywhere. Human lives were in the throes of death because the attacks were unpredictable. So, it was impossible to conduct legitimate business activities in such an insecure environment. The law of supply and demand was broken by the absence of security. Goods and buyers were absent from trading because insecurity had blocked everything. Sierra Leone had become almost the private property of the Sankoh rebels. They quietly carried on their illicit businesses based on diamonds, drugs and weapons.[553] The government had lost control over trade as well. This notorious insecurity of Sierra Leone was described as a dead country.[554] Legitimate activities were almost rare throughout this period of civil war. Firearms and drugs circulated with impunity in rebel areas. So fear was all over the country because guns and drugs increase insecurity.[555] The tranquility of human life was threatened in the country. Especially with the sexual assaults of underage girls and of all ages of women[556] and the forced recruitment of child soldiers,[557] Sierra Leone had become a very dangerous and risky country.[558] The rebels dictated their laws until the end of this civil conflict. The worst part is that the leader of this rebellion is a man who had served in the formal army of Sierra Leone. So, it was easy for him to define strategies[559] for muscular attacks on areas that will quickly weaken the government forces and those multinationals of ECOWAS and the UN.[560] So, at the regional level of ECOWAS, what are the security impacts of the Sierra Leonean civil war?

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[553]Zack-Williams, A. B. (1999). "Sierra Leone: the political economy of civil war, 1991-98." Third World Quarterly 20, no. 1, 143-162.
[554]Maclure, R. and Denov, M. (2006). "“I didn't want to die so I joined them”: Structuration and the process of becoming boy soldiers in Sierra Leone." Terrorism and Political Violence 18, no. 1, 2006, PP. 119-135.
[555]Richards, P. (2009). "Dressed to kill: clothing as technology of the body in the civil war in Sierra Leone." Journal of Material Culture 14, no. 4, 495-512.
[556]Cohen, D. K. (2013). "Female combatants and the perpetration of violence: Wartime rape in the Sierra Leone civil war." World Pol. 65, 383.
[557]Zack-Williams, A. B. (2001). "Child soldiers in the civil war in Sierra Leone." Review of African Political Economy 28, no. 87, 73-82.
[558]Marks, Z. (2013). "Sexual violence inside rebellion: Policies and perspectives of the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone." Civil Wars 15, no. 3, 359-379.
[559]Marks, Z. (2019). "Rebel resource strategies in civil war: Revisiting diamonds in Sierra Leone." Political Geography 75, 102059.
[560]Zack-Williams, T. (2012). When the state fails: studies on intervention in the Sierra Leone civil war. Pluto Press; Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 117.

Bilaterally, the Sierra Leone civil war was the direct consequence of that in Liberia, especially with the support of Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) for the Sankoh rebels.[561] In Liberia's civil crisis Charles Taylor was also the rebel leader of the NPFL.[562] So, his rebel group put its war experiences to the service of the rebels group of Sankoh. This aid from Charles Taylor was based on the interests of the diamonds he wanted to control by these two groups of rebels. So the bilateral security of the two countries was threatened by the rebels that the two rebel leaders led. Southern Liberia had become an unstable part of the security plan because this area forms the north of Sierra Leone. The trafficking of arms, drugs and ammunition passed through this part of the two countries. The diamond trade was also carried out in this area under the control of the rebel duo. They illegally profited from the artisanal exploitation of diamond mines.[563] Guinea Conakry was also affected by insecurity because its border with Sierra Leone was not spared from the illegal business of the rebels.[564] Even if the government of Lansana CONTE, then president of Guinea Conakry, was not directly involved. Even so far, it is difficult for African leaders to effectively control their territories. Some areas of African countries are beyond the control of state authorities. These areas mainly concern the borders which do not have public infrastructure. It is a serious problem in Africa in general and in the ECOWAS region in particular. So the two neighboring countries of Sierra Leone were receiving threats from the insecurity that reigned in this country in the civil war as the masters were the rebels.

In interventions for maintaining peace and security by ECOMOG, a multilateral armed force of ECOWAS, opinions are often divergent between the French-speaking and English-speaking countries.[565] French-speaking countries do not like ECOMOG to intervene to support a dictatorship and authoritarian regime against the people who demand democracy. The English-speaking countries do not think in the same way because, for them, it is

[561]Marchuk, I. (2009). "Confronting blood diamonds in Sierra Leone: the trial of Charles Taylor." Yale J. Int'l Aff. 4, 87.
[562]Ibid.
[563]Alao, A. (1999). "Diamonds are forever... but so also are controversies: Diamonds and the actors in Sierra Leone's civil war." Civil Wars 2, no. 3, 43-64.
[564]Smillie, I., GBERIE, L. and Hazleton, R. (2000). The Heart of the Matter: Sierra Leone, Diamonds & Human Security: Complete Report. Diane Publishing, 23.
[565]Dumbuya, P. A. (2008). "ECOWAS Military Intervention in Sierra Leone: Anglophone-Francophone Bipolarity or Multipolarity?" Journal of Third World Studies 25, no. 2, 83-102.

necessary that ECOMOG intervenes to support any government against the rebels. So often, during ECOMOG interventions, these differences of opinion always come up. Despite everything, they manage to agree on multilateral interventions. These interventions aim to limit the spread of insecurity in ECOWAS member countries. The objective is to disarm the rebels and start negotiations for the return of peace and security.[566] Obviously, when an ECOWAS member country is in insecurity, the other members are directly and indirectly concerned. Because the security of the ECOWAS region requires collective action from all member countries.[567] If national and international air and sea traffic were not possible during the Sierra Leonean civil war, it was due to questions of insecurity. Therefore, an ECOWAS member cannot be involuntarily isolated. It needs other members' support to help them come out of their isolation. Often in the liberation interventions of the country in conflict, ECOMOG loses its soldiers due to insecurity.[568] So all ECOWAS member countries often pay with the life of their soldiers to bring peace and security to one of the member countries. Sierra Leone is also included in this list which had benefited from this armed support for its release from the attacks of the rebels of Sankoh. So a civil war always has negative internal and external security impacts.[569] For anonymous S8, the lack of security and peace causes threats to human lives, businesses, free movement, and public infrastructure loss.[570] These negative consequences that the civil war leads to without a country do not militate for the development of the human species on the domestic and international levels. Especially the immediate neighborhoods are never immune to security. So, after these several security impacts listed in this part, what are the actions of prevention, management and resolution of the Sierra Leonean conflict by ECOWAS?

[566]Nowrot, K. and Schebacker, W. E. (1998). "The use of force to restore democracy: International legal implications of the ECOWAS intervention in Sierra Leone." Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 14, 321.
[567]Dumbuya, P. A. (2008). "ECOWAS Military Intervention in Sierra Leone: Anglophone-Francophone Bipolarity or Multipolarity?" Journal of Third World Studies 25, no. 2, 83-102.
[568]Bøas, M. (2001). "Liberia and Sierra Leone—dead ringers? The logic of neopatrimonial rule." Third World Quarterly 22, no. 5, 697-723.
[569]Adebajo, A. (2002). Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 137.
[570]Anonymous S8, based on survey by word questionnaire, July 27, 2021.

### 4.2.4. ACTIONS OF THE PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION OF SIERRA LEONE CIVIL WAR BY ECOWAS

ECOWAS does not only focus on harmonizing the economic policies of its member countries for sustainable development. It is strongly involved in preventing, managing, and resolving conflicts within its member states[571] because economic development needs peace and security. Often despite the conflict prevention mechanisms by ECOWAS, some member countries like Sierra Leone are confronted by civil wars. As long as human nature remains very difficult to understand, crises will often remain unpredictable. Human posture and behavior change in the face of life situations. Therefore, despite the effectiveness of a conflict prevention mechanism, it is impossible to escape crises sometimes faced with certain realities of life such as pervasive social injustice, tribalism, poverty and discrimination between religions and ethnic groups.[572] When the conflict is already there in a country, it must be managed and resolved to spare the populations from its suffering. This is the mission that ECOWAS has given itself to end the tensions of war in its regional space. Sierra Leone experienced a civil war based on ethnicity because the preventive mechanism had failed by marginalizing the indigenous ethnic groups in favor of the krios who had all the powers of the country. So, how did ECOWAS manage and resolve the Sierra Leonean civil conflict?

#### 4.2.4.1. MECHANISMS OF THE PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION OF SIERRA LEONE CIVIL WAR BY ECOWAS

The one-party system imposed by former Sierra Leonean head of state Siaka Stevens in 1978 had reinforced social injustice because only the Krios clan emerged politically and

[571]Levitt, J. (2001). "Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution: Africa--Regional Strategies for the Prevention of Dislplacement and Protection of Displaced Persons: The Cases of the OAU, ECOWAS, SADC, and IGAD." Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. 11, 39.
[572]Lentz, C. (1995). "'Tribalism'and ethnicity in Africa." Cah. Sci. hum 31, no. 2, 303-328.

economically.[573] The other ethnic groups, however indigenous, in the country did not have significant positions of responsibility. This same scenario continued after the death in 1985 of the father of the single party Siaka Stevens.[574] His successor was General Joseph Saidu Momoh also from the krios. The management of power by the new president in 6 years had not been able to correct the errors of social injustice and ethnic marginalization of the former presidents. Thus, in March 1991, the native ethnic groups could no longer support this exclusive management of power.[575] In the past, the protests of these indigenous ethnic groups excluded from the management of state affairs were dispersed by the armed forces of various past heads of state. Therefore, their uprisings did not achieve their goals of establishing an inclusive management of state affairs. The armed forces have always succeeded in stifling the protests of these indigenous ethnic groups. These frustrations of the majority of Sierra Leonean ethnic groups set the stage for the rebellion. Thus, the corporal of the national legal army of Sierra Leone had left to create a rebellion in 1991.[576] It was this rebellion called the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) whose leader is Corporal Foday Sankoh. This rebel group had taken up arms to wrest power through a military coup. The rebellion fought for 11 years for alternation in power in Sierra Leone. This situation had plunged the country into a civil war from 1991 until 2002.[577] Despite the military coup in April 1992, which ended the power of President Joseph Saidu Momoh with the designation as president of the National Provisional Council of the Government of Captain Valentin Strasser of the Sierra Leonean National Army as President, the civil war had not ended.[578] So how was this war handled and resolved by the regional organization of ECOWAS?

[573]Riley, S. and Trevor W. PARFITT, W. T. (1987). "Party or masquerade? The all people's congress of Sierra Leone." Journal of Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 25, no. 2, 161-179.
[574]Luke, D. F. (1988). "Continuity in Sierra Leone: From Stevens to Momoh." Third World Quarterly 10, no. 1, 67-78.
[575]Kandek, J. D. (1992). "Politicization of ethnic identities in Sierra Leone." African Studies Review 35, no. 1, 81-99.
[576]Gberie, L. (2005). A dirty war in West Africa: The RUF and the destruction of Sierra Leone. Indiana University Press, 1-12.
[577]Zack-Williams, A. and Riley, S. (1993). "Sierra Leone: the coup and its consequences.", 91-98.
[578]Opala, J. A. (1994). "'Ecstatic Renovation!' : Street Art Celebrating Sierra Leone's 1992 Revolution." African Affairs 93, no. 371, 195-218.

When the civil war began between the national armed forces and the rebels in 1991, ECOWAS chose to secure the governments of President Joseph Saidu Momoh and Valentin Strasser[579] . formal armed forces were no match for the rebels who controlled almost all towns and villages except the capital Freetown. So the objective of ECOWAS was to prevent the rebels from taking Freetown. The rebels were so strong that negotiations were not on their agenda. Their goal was to take power to restore social justice and ban ethnic exclusion from the management of power to which they have been victims since the independence of Sierra Leone. So, the attempts of ECOWAS negotiations with the rebels for the ceasefire took a long time. The rebels reigned supreme throughout the country except the capital Freetown from 1991 until 1996.[580] It was after the military coup d'état of some national army officers, which had ejected the president of the National Provisional Council of Government Captain Valentin Strasser to bring to power President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah that negotiations with the rebels were initiated in 1996.[581] The military coup d'état of these national army officers took place in January 1996 and all the soldiers agreed to leave politics to civilians.[582] In February 1996, the presidential elections were held and leader of the People's Party of Sierra Leone (SLPP) Ahmad Tejan Kabbah emerged victorious.[583] It was the first democratic election organized by Sierra Leone since its independence. It was under the governance of Kabbah that the rebel leader Foday Saybana Sankoh agreed to go to the negotiating table. Meanwhile, the armed forces of ECOWAS known as ECOMOG were supporting the Sierra Leonean army for peacekeeping. In October 1997, to limit the circulation of illegal weapons, an embargo was imposed by the UN Security Council on petroleum products and weapons in Sierra Leone.[584] ECOMOG forces have been designated for compliance with this embargo across the country. This decision had allowed the restriction of the circulation of illegal

[579]Levitt, J. (1999). "Pre-intervention trust-building, African states and enforcing the peace: the case of ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone." Liberian Studies Journal 24, no. 1, 1-26.
[580]Gershoni, Y. (1997). "War without end and an end to a war: the prolonged wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone." African Studies Review 40, no. 3, 55-76.
[581]Riley, S. (1997). "Sierra Leone: the militariat strikes again.", 287-292.
[582]Ibid.
[583]Kandeh, J. D. (1998). "Transition without rupture: Sierra Leone's transfer election of 1996." African Studies Review, 91-111.
[584]Ochiai, T. (2019). "United Nations Sanctions against Sierra Leone and the Sandline Affair in the United Kingdom, 1997-98." Lagos Notes and Records 25, no. 1, 1-20.

weapons which are used by the rebels to fight. It was later, in June 1998, that the UN Security Council sent the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) to reinforce the armed forces of ECOMOG.[585] The union of these two forces on the battlefield had made it possible to accelerate the disarmament of the rebels and the negotiations. In December 1998, the armed forces of the two missions of ECOMOG and UNOMSIL considerably reduced rebel attacks and were able to secure the capital Freetown and its surroundings.[586] When the rebel leader Sankoh knew that his rebellion could not hold out for a long time, he accepted the ceasefire and disarmament. The head of mission of UNOMSIL Francis G. Okelo created the conditions through his diplomacy with ECOWAS officials to start negotiations.[587]

In 1998, when diplomacy for the negotiations was initiated, president Kabbah declared that his government agreed to cooperate with the missions of ECOWAS, AU, UN, ECOMOG and UNHCR for the return of peace in his country.[588] So the UN Security Council canceled the embargo on oil and arms. The Security Council had also increased its staff in the office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General by adding liaison officers and advisers on security matters. It was in the hope of quickly resolving this Sierra Leonean civil conflict which was already going on for too long. Eventually, the rebels agreed to negotiations with the Kabbah government in May 1999.[589] Thus, the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) became the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) in October 1999.[590] Its personal numbers were increased to 6000 military personnel including 260 observers.[591] MONUSIL's mission ended with this new change. With MONUSIL,

[585]Olonisakin, F. (2015). "United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL)." In The Oxford handbook of United Nations peacekeeping operations., Accessed May 4, 2021, https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199686049.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199686049-e-55

[586]Nuamah, K. And Zartman W. I. (2001). "Case Study: Intervention in Sierra Leone.", 1- 18.

[587]Olonisakin, F. (2015). "United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL)." In The Oxford handbook of United Nations peacekeeping operations., Accessed May 4, 2021, https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199686049.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199686049-e-55

[588]Nowrot, K. and Schebacker, W. E. (1998). "The use of force to restore democracy: International legal implications of the ECOWAS intervention in Sierra Leone." Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 14, 321.

[589]Richards, P. (2001). "War and peace in Sierra Leone." In The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 41-50.

[590]Mbugua, K., Pillay, V., and Kamidza, R. (2005). "UNAMSIL: UN Mission in Sierra Leone." Conflict Trends, no. 4, 40-41.

[591]Ibid.

negotiations already started in March 1996, Yamoussoukro (Ivory Coast) was chosen to conduct these negotiations and these negotiations culminated in the signing on November 1996 of a ceasefire agreement in Abidjan (Ivory Coast)[592] .Unfortunately a few months after this agreement, the guarantee of peace seemed difficult, if not impossible, because at the beginning of May 1997, there was a return of violence and a generalized resumption of fighting.The country's military junta had provided a strong hand to the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and, in May 1997, plunged the new democratically elected regime into a successful coup[593] .Therefore, the RUF took power with the help of the army, and this situation called on ECOWAS and the United Nations to think about finding a solution to resolve the conflict in Sierra Leone. According to anonymous 14, a three-phase approach had been adopted by ECOWAS, firstly the dialogue, secondly sanctions and finally the use of force to resolve the Sierra Leonean civil war.[594] In October 1997, ECOWAS called a negotiation with the rebels, certain national military representatives and the government for a peace plan in the capital of Guinea Conakry (Conakry), which failed because the various parties, especially the rebels and the national armies, did not respect this peace plan.[595] So the first two phases did not lead to a probable resolution of the conflict, so ECOWAS was forced to choose the path of force. ECOMOG then entered war with the military junta between February 7 and 10, 1998, and on February 12 a few days of the same year, Freetown was taken over by ECOMOG.[596] With the help of ECOWAS and the UN, new elections brought President Kabbah back on March 10, 1998.[597] However, some hotbeds of tension still existed in the territory. To eradicate these rebel tensions and restore peace and security, ECOWAS initiated talks with the RUF on April 18, 1998, in Lomé (Togo), resulting in a

[592]Abdul-Mumuni, A. (2005). "Conflict Resolution in West Africa: A Comparative Analysis of Sierra Leone and Liberia.", 19.
[593]Gberie, L. (1997). "The May 25 Coup d'Etat in Sierra Leone: A Militariat Revolt?." Africa Development/Afrique Et Développement 22, no. ¾, 149-170.
[594]Anonymous S14, based on survey by word questionnaire, August 24, 2021.
[595]PLAN, ELABORATION OF ECOWAS PEACE. "ECOWAS Six-Month Peace Plan for Sierra Leone 23 October 1997-22 April 1998." 1997, Accessed May 6, 2021, https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/afjincol9&div=64&id=&page=
[596]Aning, E. K. (2005). "The Challenge of Civil Wars to Multilateral Interventions–UN, ECOWAS, and complex political emergencies in West Africa: A critical analysis." African and Asian studies 4, no. 1-2, 1-20.
[597]Nowrot, K. and Schebacker, W. E. (1998). "The use of force to restore democracy: International legal implications of the ECOWAS intervention in Sierra Leone." Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 14, 321.

ceasefire agreement on May 18, 1999, and the signing of a country agreement on July 7, 1999.[598] The Sierra Leonean civil conflict was difficult to resolve because the rebels often changed their decisions after each negotiations when they returned to their base. To quickly resolve this crisis, after the transformation of UNOMSIL into UNAMSIL in 1999 by the UN Security Council, this new mission was reinforced by the resolution of 1289 up to 11,100 soldiers with 260 observers included in January 2000.[599] But, in the same year the RUF had not stopped its attacks which killed seven peacekeepers and they kidnapped 500.[600] Thus, in May 2000 by resolution 1299, the UN Security Council increased the number of troops to 13,000 soldiers with still 260 observers.[601] With the aim of strengthening the armed forces for the maintenance of peace and security, President Kabbah with the agreement of the UN had obtained the assistance of the forces of Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team (OLRT) of the United Kingdom (UK) led by Brigadier General David Richards[602] who had not only neutralized the rebels but also had freed hostages from the blue helmets. Finally, in March 2001 by resolution 1346, the Security Council further increased to 17,500 troops.[603] It was this last UN mission in collaboration with ECOMOG of ECOWAS and OLRT that ended this Sierra Leonean civil war in early 2002.[604] UNAMSIL continued to disarm the rebels and especially to regain control of areas rich in natural resources such as diamonds, oil, gold and bauxite. Thus, exactly in the month of January 2002, the civil conflict in Sierra Leone officially ended because UNAMSIL had succeeded in disarming and demobilizing more than 45,000 rebels.[605] The mission continued its work of maintaining peace and security

[598]Francis, D. J. (2000). "Torturous path to peace: The Lomé Accord and postwar peacebuilding in Sierra Leone." Security Dialogue 31, no. 3, 357-373.
[599]Bernath, C. and Nyce, S. (2004). "A peacekeeping success: Lessons learned from UNAMSIL." Journal of International Peacekeeping 8, no. 1, 119-142.
[600]Berman, E. G. (2000). Re-Armament in Sierra Leone: One Year after the Lomé Peace Agreement. Small Arms Survey, 19.
[601]Malan, M., Rakate, P. and Mcintyre, A. (2002). Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone: UNAMSIL hits the home straight. Vol. 68. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 12.
[602]Williams, P. (2001). "Fighting for freetown: British military intervention in Sierra Leone." Contemporary Security Policy 22, no. 3, 140-168.
[603]Malan, M., Rakate, P. and Mcintyre, A. (2002). Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone: UNAMSIL hits the home straight. Vol. 68. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 12.
[604]Mitton, K. (2012). "Irrational actors and the process of brutalisation: Understanding atrocity in the Sierra Leonean conflict (1991–2002)." Civil Wars 14, no. 1, 104-122.
[605]Solomon, C., and GINIFER, J. (2008). "Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration in Sierra Leone." Centre for International Cooperation and Security, 1-52.

until the eve of the democratic presidential elections. On May 14, 2002, the presidential elections took place, and President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, who had been in power since the conduct of negotiations for the return to peace and security was re-elected with 70% of the vote.[606] To try those who committed crimes against humanity and war crimes during this Sierra Leonean civil war, the UN Security Council created in 2002, a Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL).[607] It is a Court composed of eight international judges and is included in the Sierra Leonean judicial system. It is a hybrid jurisdiction which combined international law and Sierra Leonean national law. Its budget is 75 million dollars with an operating life normally of three years.[608] But with the length of the criminal proceedings, this court spent 300 million dollars before closing its doors in December 2013.[609] But it finally decided on September 26, 2013, to condemn the former president Charles Taylor, the main actor of the Liberian and Sierra Leonean civil wars, to a sentence of 50 years in prison.[610] Without dispute, the Court's Appeals Chamber had confirmed this conviction. The Tribunal retained against Charles Taylor in April 2012 five charges of crimes against humanity and also five charges of war crimes, followed by one count of certain serious violations of international humanitarian law committed by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) of Sierra Leone.[611] For lasting peace and security in Sierra Leone, despite the international community's presence, the United Kingdom continues to play an important political, military, and linguistic role. Since 2002, Sierra Leone has returned to peace, and this peace still reigns today[612] . Table 19 shows the different organizations that have worked for the return to peace and security in Sierra Leone.

[606]Harris, D. (2004). "Post-conflict elections or post-elections conflict: Sierra Leone 2002 and patterns of voting in Sub-Saharan Africa." Cadernos de Estudos Africanos 5/6, 39-49.
[607]Schocken, C. (2002). "The special court for Sierra Leone: overview and recommendations." Berkeley J. Int'l L. 20, 436.
[608]Jallo, C. C. (2010). "Special Court for Sierra Leone: Achieving Justice." Mich. J. Int'l L. 32, 395-440.
[609]Ibid.
[610]Owie, U. (2018). "The Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Question of Head of State Immunity in International Law: Revisiting the Decision in Prosecutor v Charles Ghankay Taylor." Nigerian Yearbook of International Law 2017. Springer, Cham, 239-265.
[611]Oosterveld, V. (2012). "Gender and the Charles Taylor case at the special court for Sierra Leone." Wm. & Mary J. Women & L. 19, 7.
[612]Neethling, T. (2007). "Pursuing sustainable peace through post-conflict peacebuilding: The case of Sierra Leone." African Security Studies 16, no. 3, 81-95.

**Table 19: Organizations and military forces involved in restoring peace, security and resolving the Sierra Leonean civil war.**

| No | Organizations and Military Forces | Nature of Organizations and Military Forces |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | AU | African Continental Union |
| 2 | ECOMOG | ECOWAS military force for peacekeeping, security and disarmament for the resolution of the Sierra Leonean civil conflict |
| 3 | ECOWAS | West African Regional Integration |
| 4 | UNOMSIL | United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone for peacekeeping and security |
| 5 | OLRT | The forces of Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team of the United Kingdom (UK) for the liberation of Freetown and the hostages of the peacekeepers |
| 6 | SCSL | Special Court for Sierra Leone for the judgment of civil war actors |
| 7 | UN | Global Organization |
| 8 | UNHCR | United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees for the assistance and protection of Sierra Leonean Civil War refugees |
| 9 | UNAMSIL | United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone for peacekeeping, security and disarmament for the resolution of the Sierra Leonean civil conflict |

**Souce:** Prepared by the author.

The African Union is a continental organization that initiated talks between the various warring camps in Sierra Leone through its diplomacy. ECOWAS is a West African organization that, in times of war in one of its member countries like the case of Sierra Leone, had for mission to restore peace and security. Like the African Union, it was also involved in the diplomacy of the talks between the protagonists. It also played the role of maintaining

peace, security and disarmament by its military forces ECOMOG for the resolution of the Sierra Leonean civil war. The United Nations Organization missions in Sierra Leone, such as the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, which later became the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, were responsible for peacekeeping, security, and disarmament to resolve the Sierra Leonean civil conflict. Also, the forces of the Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team of the United Kingdom (UK) had liberated the capital Freetown and the hostages of the peacekeepers from the hands of the rebels. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees had assisted and protected Sierra Leonean Civil War refugees. Finally, for the judgment of the criminals of this Sierra Leonean civil war, a Special Court for Sierra Leone was created in 2002 and operated until 2013. After this understanding of the roles played by African and global organizations for the resolution of the Sierra Leonean civil crisis, what was the intervention of the humanitarian organizations which were on the ground of war to assist the survivors?

#### 4.2.4.2. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE IN SIERRA LEONE CIVIL WAR

For anonymous S11, usually during a civil war like that of Sierra Leone, several humanitarian organizations intervene to save the country from suffering for the restoration of peace and security.[613] These organizations are often governmental (AU, ECOWAS, UN and others) and non-governmental (UNHCR, the International Red Cross, and others. The role of international governmental organizations is already explained above in the section, which shows the mechanism for the prevention, management and resolution of the Sierra Leonean civil war by ECOWAS and other continental and global organizations.[614] But here, it is a matter of focusing on Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and financial institutions of aid that intervened in the humanitarian sector, especially in the case of the civil war in Sierra

[613]Anonymous S11, based on survey by word questionnaire, August 8, 2021.
[614]Zack-Williams, T. (2012). "Multilateral Intervention in Sierra Leone's Civil War: Some Structural Explanations." When the State Fails: Studies on Intervention in the Sierra Leone Civil War, 13-30.

Leone.[615] Humanitarian NGOs play a very important role in a civil conflict because they bring different kinds of aid to the victims of the war. During a civil war, vital disturbances often set in because life no longer follows its normal course. There are problems such as famine, care for the sick and war survivors, protecting the homeless and taking care of refugees. Humanitarian NGOs often offer these vital needs in times of civil war. Humanitarian NGOs were also available during the civil war in Sierra Leone from 1991 until the end of this crisis in 2002 to help people at risk[616] . Sierra Leone has hosted several non-governmental humanitarian organizations during the resolution of its civil conflict for the return of peace and security. Among these humanitarian organizations is the International Red Cross, Human Rigths Watch, the UNHCR, financial institutions for development aid, and others.

When the Sierra Leonean civil war had become very severe and critical because it was causing many deaths, injuries and material damage, the first aid organizations that got involved in assisting the victims were the International Red Cross, UNHRC and Human Rigths Watch[617] , and so one. It is no secret that the Sierra Leonean conflict has brought suffering to the people of this country for years. The armed attacks of the rebel forces in several towns and the armed clashes between these rebels and the forces of ECOMOG and UNOMSIL or UNAMSIL[618] have had the sad consequences of loss of life, injuries, kidnappings, prisoners, looting, rape, displaced people, refugees and homeless people. Even the rebels destroyed some churches, mosques and markets that served as shelters for the displaced and homeless during the war. Those who were found were burned or killed with live ammunition, without forgetting the crises of famine, housing, and the development of diseases required humanitarian organisations' assistance. The International Red Cross, as usual in times of war, was a humanitarian organization that had given much assistance to the

[615]Enuka, C. (2012). "United Nations and ECOWAS Joint Intervention in Sierra-Leonean Conflict: An Analysis of the Problems of Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peace Enforcement." IUP Journal of International Relations 6, no. 3, 52-66.
[616]Bah, A. B. (2013). "The contours of new humanitarianism: War and peacebuilding in Sierra Leone." Africa Today 60, no. 1, 3-26.
[617]Akinrinade, B. (2001). "International Humanitarian Law and the Conflict in Sierra Leone." Notre Dame JL Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 15, 91.
[618]Chawla, S. (2000). «United Nations mission in Sierra Leone: A search for peace », Strategie Anlaysis, Vol. 24, No. 9, 1745-1755.

victims of the Sierra Leonean war who most needed its services.[619] The staff of the International Red Cross took all the risks to provide their support to the survivors in the war zones. Although insecurity reigned, the humanists of this organization had visited prisons to treat the wounded and sick. They took an active part in the peace process also to bring the warring camps back to a ceasefire for the return of peace and security in the country. According to the International Red Cross, over a million people needed help in this crisis, but it was impossible to satisfy everyone. The International Red Cross had no choice, so it was forced to select the most serious cases which urgently needed assistance to survive.

The Human Rights non-governmental organization, the Human Rigths Watch[620], had also played an important role in the struggle for the respect of Human Rights in times of war. Its objective was to protect human lives and initiate legal proceedings to bring justice to the victims of the Sierra Leonean civil war.[621] This humanitarian organization of Human Rights was involved in the negotiations for the return of peace and security, especially the respect of the Lomé (Togo) agreement in May 1999 on the disarmament, the release of prisoners and people kidnapped by the rebels.[622] Also, the rebels needed to guarantee free movement to humanitarian organizations to fully play their roles, bringing food and medicine to the war officers and the ECOMOG forces. Journalists should also be able to carry out their investigations without the risk of being killed or kidnapped while carrying out their work in war zones. The rebel leader Foday Sabana Sankoh had committed to respecting these clauses with his troops.[623] This emphasis on Human Rights in the Lomé negotiations by Human Rigths Watch triggered the real process of disarmament and peace because the threats to

[619]Sierra Leone: seven years after peace agreement, ICRC scales back activities, Accessed May 12, 2021, https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/news-release/2009-and-earlier/sierra-leone-news-151208.htm

[620]The Human Rights Watch in Sierra Leone, Accessed May 12, 2021, https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports98/sierra/old/Sier988-05.htm

[621]Amowitz, L. L., Reis, C., Lyons, K. H., Vann, B., Mansaray, B., Akinsulure-Smith, A. M., and Iacopino, V. (2002). Prevalence of war-related sexual violence and other human rights abuses among internally displaced persons in Sierra Leone. Jama, 287(4), 513-521.

[622]Alao, A. and ERO, C. (2001). "Cut short for taking short cuts: The Lomé peace agreement on Sierra Leone." Civil Wars 4, no. 3, 117-134.

[623]Macaluso, D. J. (2001). "Absolute and free pardon: The Effect of the amnesty provision in the Lome peace agreement on the jurisdiction of the special court for Sierra Leone." Brook. J. Int'l L. 27, 347.

judge those guilty of the war were conditioned by Sankoh's good faith. The rebels should benefit from judicial amnesty if they voluntarily accept the ceasefire's disarmament. They had agreed that Human Rigts Watch would investigate crimes against humanity and war crimes committed by individuals during this Sierra Leonean civil war. Reports by Human Rigths Watch with the collaboration of the UN Human Rights Committee led to the idea of the creation in 2002 of a Special Court for Sierra Leone to judge civil war criminals.[624]

The UNHRC is a humanitarian organization that took care of refugees who fled Sierra Leone, as they did everywhere during the war. Several of these refugees found themselves in neighboring countries, mainly in Guinea Conakry, where there were nearly 500,000 refugees from Sierra Leone and Liberia. The UNHCR had ensured their reception and provided them with the minimum necessary in their reception places[625]. It is an organization that has been criticized a lot for its actions but still continues to function. Refugees denounce mistreatment in housing camps. The Sierra Leonean civil war refugees are scattered between Liberia and Guinea Conakry. Some are housed with relatives or acquaintances they have in these countries, and others in refugee camps to benefit from the protection of the UNHCR. So, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) played an important role in the social reintegration of civil war victims, especially child soldiers and orphans. Thousands of child soldiers and orphans have benefited from UNICEF support for a new start in social life.[626] Some were referred to vocational training, and others who had lost their lower or upper limbs by mutilation underwent rehabilitation to exercise income-generating activities. UNICEF took on this post-civil war mission to revive the child victims of the Sierra Leonean civil war. After resolving the Sierra Leonean conflict in 2002, a United Nations Humanitarian Aid Coordination Unit (HACU) and the United Kingdom joined their financial forces to help

[624]Schocken, C. (2002). "The special court for Sierra Leone: overview and recommendations." Berkeley J. Int'l L. 20, 436.
[625]The UNHCR Representation in Sierra Leone, Accessed May 12, 202, https://www.unhcr.org/sierra-leone.html
[626]Zack-Williams, T. B. (2006). "Child Soldiers in Sierra Leone and the problems of demobilisation, rehabilitation and reintegration into Society: Some Lessons for Social Workers in war-torn societies." Social Work Education 25, no. 2, 119-128.

women and all other victims of the war for their social integration.[627] The aim was to give women and all victims a new hope of life. They benefited from a follow-up for their personal reconstruction in order to participate in the reconstruction of their country devastated by civil war for years. In this reintegration plan, there is also training, monitoring and financial support for the start of their activities. This humanitarian aid has positively contributed to the resolution of the Sierra Leonean crisis. It was a means of preventing the people from falling back into a new war because of poverty. In the field of education, the United Kingdom being the colonizing country of Sierra Leone, it provided financial, material and scholarship support also for the qualitative renewal of the Sierra Leonean administration.[628] Finally, there are Bretton Woods's institutions, such as the IMF, IBRD and the European Union which, have provided financial support for the rapid reconstruction of the country.[629] Since the end of the civil war in 2002, these institutions had united in injecting hundreds of millions of dollars to rebuild Sierra Leone.[630] All these humanitarian organizations have been very important in the Sierra Leonean conflict resolution process and after the resolution of this crisis. Some were more present at the time of the war for their assistance victims, and others had become more involved in the negotiations for the return of peace and security. Other humanitarian organizations have acted for the protection of human rights in times of war, and without forgetting those which have helped financially to restore confidence to the victims of war and for the reconstruction of Sierra Leone totally destroyed by 11 years of civil war.[631] Thanks to all these humanitarian organizations, Sierra Leone has gained new momentum for

[627]Kaldor, M. and Vincent, J. (2006). "Evaluation of UNDP assistance to conflict-affected countries: Case study Sierra Leone." Human Security. United Nations Development Programme Evaluation Office, New York, 16.
[628]Kargbo, M. (2006). British foreign policy and the conflict in Sierra Leone, 1991-2001. Peter Lang, 2006, 91.
[629]Conteh-Morgan, E. (2006). "Globalization, state failure, and collective violence: The case of Sierra Leone." International journal of peace studies, 87-104.
[630]Chege, M. (2002). "Sierra Leone: The state that came back from the dead." Washington Quarterly 25, no. 3, 147-160.
[631]Schabas, W. A. (2004). "A synergistic relationship: The Sierra Leone truth and reconciliation commission and the special court for Sierra Leone." In Criminal Law Forum, vol. 15, no. 1-2, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 3-54.

its development into a democratic peace and security regime since 2002[632] . Table 20 presents the humanitarian organizations that intervened in resolving the Sierra Leonean civil war.

**Table 20: The humanitarian organizations involved in resolving the civil war in Sierra Leone.**

| No | Humanitarian and Financial Organizations involved in the Sierra Leonean civil war | Nature of Humanitarian and Financial Organizations involved in the Sierra Leonean civil war and its Actions |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | European Union (EU) | Financial aid to support the development of Sierra Leone |
| 2 | Human Rigths Watch | Human Rights Watch for the implementation of human rights during the civil war in Sierra Leone. |
| 3 | International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) | Financial aid to support the development of Sierra Leone |
| 4 | International Red Cross | Health aid to support survivors of the civil war in Sierra Leone |
| 5 | International Monetary Fund (IMF) | Financial aid to support the development of Sierra Leone |
| 6 | United Nations Humanitarian Aid Coordination Unit (HACU) | United Nations Humanitarian Aid Coordination Unit (HACU) for a good management of aid for the reconstruction of Sierra Leone. |
| 7 | United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) | UNICEF a specialized agency of the United Nations for financing the education of child soldiers and orphans in Sierra Leone. |

[632]Maclure, R. and Myriam DENOV, M. (2009). "Reconstruction versus transformation: Post-war education and the struggle for gender equity in Sierra Leone." International Journal of Educational Development 29, no. 6, 612-620.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 8 | United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) | The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees provided assistance to refugees from Sierra Leone's civil war. |

**Souce:** Self-prepared by the author.

In table 20 above is a summary of the different humanitarian and financial organizations that intervened in the resolution of the civil crisis in Sierra Leone. It is also mentioned the role played by each organization during this Sierra Leonean civil conflict. How important is Sierra Leone's constitution in resolving its civil crisis?

### 4.2.4.3. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SIERRA LEONE CONSTITUTION IN THE RESOLUTION OF ITS CIVIL WAR

In several countries of Africa in general and in West Africa in particular, democratic constitutions were written in the 1990s.[633] Since the independence of African countries, the military has come to power with military coups. Constitutions written after African countries' independence in the 1960s have been rewritten to accommodate democratic rule.[634] Sierra Leone has had two constitutions in its governance. In 1961 when Sierra Leone gained its independence from Great Britain,[635] it functioned on the basis of an act of independence until 1978[636] before giving itself its first constitution. But the 1978 constitution[637] was changed to meet democratic standards in October 1991.[638] Considering that 1991 was the start of the Sierra Leonean civil war, democracy was reestablished in 2002 on the basis of the 1991 constitution.[639] According to anonymous S10, in all democratic countries, the constitution is

[633]Fombad, C. M. (2007). "A Preliminary assessment of the prospects for judicial independence in post-1990 African Constitutions." Public law 2, 233-257.
[634]Baker, B. (1998). "The class of 1990: how have the autocratic leaders of sub-Saharan Africa fared under democratisation?." Third World Quarterly 19, no. 1, 115-127.
[635]Esedebe, P. O. (1973). "The Independence Movement in Sierra Leone." Tarikh 4, no. 1, 15-27.
[636]Harris, D. J. (2014). Sierra Leone: A political history. Oxford University Press, USA, 47.
[637]Sierra Leone's Constitution of 1978, accessed May, 13, 2021, https://sierralii.org/sl/legislation/act/1978/12
[638]Sierra Leone's Constitution of 1991, accessed May, 13, 2021, https://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/ELECTRONIC/26723/90483/F311875481/SLE26723.pdf
[639]Ibid.

the fundamental law that guides state management[640] . The constitution safeguards democratic values because it fixes the modalities of governance. Therefore, in a country if the rulers respect the constitutional laws the country avoids risks of political crises. When rulers in a state violate the constitution, political violence occurs. States which are democratically stable have opted for strict respect for their constitutions. When governance guarantees equal opportunities for citizens, peaceful alternation of power and social cohesion in a country, there is no breach of peace and security. Civil wars often arise from the marginalization in the governance of certain social strata, ethnic and religious groups, and clans. Especially when an ethnic group lingers in power without alternation for years like the case of the krios in Sierra Leone, there are always disputes to claim equal opportunities.

"Since the independence of Sierra Leone, the krios have confiscated the political and economic advantages of power to the detriment of the indigenous ethnic groups" said by anonymous S14.[641] The economic precariousness of the majority ethnic groups, especially natives of Sierra Leone, wanted to change this clan governance of the krios. In the Sierra Leonean constitution of 1978, Chapter 1 proclaims the existence and recognition throughout the world of the Republic of Sierra Leone.[642] The second chapter affirms the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms for each individual. In particular, article 17 of this second chapter stipulates that the constitution protects each individual against all forms of discrimination.[643] Considering article 17, the krios violated for a long time the constitution which imposes the non social discrimination.[644] The indigenous ethnic groups did not enjoy the advantages of power like the krios who had the political and economic monopoly of Sierra Leone. Articles 22 and 23 of the third chapter define the criteria for being eligible for presidential elections and they do not discriminate against ethnicity in order to be a candidate.[645] It was just the will of the rulers of the krios that had pushed aside the other ethnic groups in order to dominate them. Let us not forget that the krios are mulattos

[640]Anonymous S10, based on survey by word questionnaire, August 3, 2021.
[641]Anonymous S14, based on survey by word questionnaire, August 24, 2021.
[642]Sierra Leone's Constitution of 1978, chapter I.
[643]Sierra Leone's Constitution of 1978, chapter II, article 17.
[644]Kandeh, J. D. (1992). "Politicization of ethnic identities in Sierra Leone." African Studies Review 35, no. 1, 81-99.
[645]Sierra Leone's Constitution of 1978, chapter III, article (22 and 23).

descendants of slaves returned from the United Kingdom who colonized Sierra Leone. So the krios had the support of the colonizing power with whom they have kinship and diplomatic relations. With the uprisings of the indigenous ethnic groups which demanded the sharing of power in the early 1990s, a new constitution was adopted in 1991[646] to better implement democratic values.

The Sierra Leonean constitution of 1978 composed of ten chapters with 178 articles[647] was changed by a new of fourteen chapters comprising 192 articles in 1991[648] to better take into account the rules of political plurarism in a democratic regime. So, the search for a return to peace and security during the civil war in Sierra Leone was based on the criteria of the new constitution of 1991.[649] In several African countries democracy is still young so its application is still difficult for some leaders. Sometimes constitutions do not have a problem, but it is the political leaders who refuse to conform to them in order to cling to power. The proof is that the democratic presidential elections which signaled the end of the Sierra Leonean civil conflict were organized on the basis of the constitution of 1991.[650] The constitution had no problem but it was the quality of the political leaders of this country because that the civil war started the same year. Normally, a good applicability of this new constitution could not lead to a civil crisis. So a constitution only makes sense if political leaders give it value. The proof is that when Sierra Leonean politicians decided to respect their constitution, the country regained peace and security with the organization of democratic presidential elections. It is the disrespect of the country's laws by political leaders that often causes civil wars in several African countries. The constitution contains fundamental laws which should guide the management of a state. But when this value slips away from political leaders, the country falls into total uncertainty and all troubles can be observed. Thus, to assert that the constitution of 1991, which served as a benchmark for the return to peace and security, played a significant role in the organization of credible

[646]Sierra Leone's Constitution of 1991.
[647]Sierra Leone's Constitution of 1978.
[648]Sierra Leone's Constitution of 1991.
[649]Ibid.
[650]Bundu, A. (2001). Democracy by force?: a study of international military intervention in the civil war in Sierra Leone from 1991-2000. Universal-Publishers, 278.

democratic elections accepted by all the candidates is not a utopia. Without this 1991 constitution already available, the Sierra Leonean civil war could have lasted longer.

The strength of the 1991 constitution is that it corrected the country's political, economic and social mistakes by putting all the Sierra Leonean people on an equal footing in several articles of this constitution. State power could no longer be a matter of the monopoly of a single ethnic group. All citizens wishing to participate in all elections could do so without any discrimination. For this, article 15 of chapter III of the 1991 constitution guarantees human rights and fundamental freedoms for each citizen.[651] Also, it is very clear in its article 27 of chapter III by stipulating that every Sierra Leonean citizen must be protected against discrimination in society.[652] This is a great step forward in enabling the people to live in harmony in order to participate freely in political and economic life. Chapter IV of this same constitution in its article 31 the right to vote is inalienable for valid citizens[653] .This article states that every Sierra Leonean has the right to vote and the right to be voted as a candidate. Article 35 of Chapter IV is based on the rights of political parties and the rules on which political parties must operate.[654] Here, the myth of monopartism disappears to make way for full multipartyism. Article 38 of Chapter IV defines the conditions for free and transparent elections.[655] In the Sierra Leonean presidential system, there is the post of president and vice-president so it is article 42 of chapter V which fixes the modalities of the elections of these two leaders of the country.[656] In this sense, no discrimination is observed to exclude candidates from certain ethnic, religious and tribal groups. Any citizen who has the requisite skills for all elections has the right to participate. These conditions are valid for the legislative elections of which the articles (73, 74 and 75) of chapter VI in its parit I make case by setting out the establishment, the members and the qualifications of the members of the Sierra Leonean parliament.[657] Chapter VII concerns the judicial field, which is part of a country's

[651]Sierra Leone's Constitution of 1991, chapter III, article 15.
[652]Sierra Leone's Constitution of 1991, chapter III, article 27.
[653]Sierra Leone's Constitution of 1991, chapter IV, article 31.
[654]Sierra Leone's Constitution of 1991, chapter IV, article 35.
[655]Sierra Leone's Constitution of 1991, chapter IV, article 38.
[656]Sierra Leone's Constitution of 1991, chapter V, article 42.
[657]Sierra Leone's Constitution of 1991, chapter VI, article (73, 74 and 75).

three or four powers (executive, legislative, judicial and the press)[658] .This Chapter VII advocates for fair justice based on laws and the constitution for all the people of Sierra Leone. All the laws of Sierra Leone are defined by chapter XII of this constitution of 1991 in its only article 170.[659] Thus, thanks to this new more explicit constitution, the opponents of the Sierra Leonean civil war through negotiations were able to go to the democratic vote.

Based on this constitution, the various missions involved in the resolution of the Sierra Leonean civil conflict were able to achieve peace and security through democratic elections. Without this constitution the elections would not take place so easily after the negotiations of the conflict resolution missions. So, it is undeniable that this constitution participated in the appeasement of Sierra Leone with the presidential elections of 2002.[660] These elections allowed the return to peace and security in Sierra Leone. So the constitution is an important tool for the life of a state. Without it, no democratic country can resist social violence because the laws harmonize life in society. Civil wars are rare when political leaders and their people obey constitutional laws. It is the failure to respect constitutional texts, especially those in power, which leads to social inequalities that create a civil crisis in a State.

## CONCLUSION

Liberia is a country in West Africa with the same characteristics as third world countries. Although this country was the oldest independent state under the domination of the United States of America in 1847, it could not take advantage of its freedom to implement real development.[661] A country that has been managed in the exclusion of certain social strata. Since its independence, state power has been concentrated in the hands of the Americano-

[658]Sierra Leone's Constitution of 1991, chapter VII.
[659]Sierra Leone's Constitution of 1991, chapter XII, article 170.
[660]Kandeh, J. D. (2003). "Sierra Leone's post-conflict elections of 2002." Journal of Modern African Studies, 189-216.
[661]Hargreaves, J. D. (1971). Liberia: the price of independence. Odù: Journal of Yoruba and Related Studies, no 6, PP. 3-20.

Liberians.[662] These ruled the country to their advantage to have control over all key sectors of the country. They were the richest in the country until 1980 because the economic sectors and the country's major economic operators were in their clan. The rest of the indigenous Liberian population lived in great poverty. With prostations and uprisings in the early 1980s, power ended up escaping the American-Liberians in favor of Sergeant Samuel Doe by a coup d'état in 1980 by the assassination of President William Tolbert.[663] For years, the part excluded from the management of state affairs had welcomed this coup as a messiah. The new president had promised fair treatment among the Liberian people without discrimination. He had also committed to fighting against corruption, which was a great evil in this country. Without also forgetting its promise to make the country economically prosperous. In general, disadvantaged Liberians believed that President Samuel Doe was the answer because he had made very good diagnoses of the country's needs. But their hopes for this military president collapsed very soon after three years of management of state power by Doe. His governance had reinforced all the evils he had promised to fight. Worse still, he added ethnic discrimination to the problems that existed. He failed in the fight against corruption and establishing fairness among Liberians because he ruled the country with people from his ethnic and close group (Krahn and Mandingo). The repetition of the serious mistakes of former President William Tolbert, the assassinations of certain senior military officers and the introduction of ethnic governance by President Samuel Doe, Charles Taylor had launched a fierce opposition to the power of Doe. These hostilities by Charles Taylor against the governance of Doe had led to ethnic quarrels between four ethnic groups (the Krahns, the Mandingos, the Manos and Gios).[664] The struggle for state power by these ethnic groups had plunged Liberia into a civil war in which ECOWAS and other continental and global organizations had played an important role in restoring peace and security by restoring democratic values.

[662]Akpan, M. B. (1973). Black imperialism: Americo-Liberian rule over the African peoples of Liberia, 1841–1964. Canadian Journal of African Studies/La Revue Canadienne Des Études Africaines, vol. 7, no 2, 217-236.
[663]Norman, M. (2014). The Quest to Reform the African State: The Case of William R. Tolbert Jr of Liberia, and Jerry Rawlings of Ghana. In: Leadership in Postcolonial Africa. Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 61-95.
[664]Conteh-Morgan, E. and Kadivar, S. (1995). Ethnopolitical violence in the Liberian civil war. Journal of conflict studies, 7.

The Liberian civil conflict started in 1989 between the camp of the ethnic group in power of Doe and that of Charles Taylor[665] . The first group wanted to keep state power and the second fought to overthrow it. In this climate of political tensions with ethnic colorings all of Liberia had fallen into war at the beginning of 1990[666] . The extent of this civil crisis had caused several losses of human life and enormous material damage. During the war, Charles Taylor's camp had taken over the power of Doe by controlling several cities except for the capital Monrovia. So, the Nigerian leaders of ECOWAS had gone solitary in support of the power of Doe. But this action had not received the approval of other members of ECOWAS, especially the French-speaking member countries who saw the power of Doe as a dictatorship that did not deserve help. Thus, Nigeria had to review the other members of ECOWAS for a collective intervention by ECOMOG. Other continental and global organizations such as the African Union (AU), and the United Nations (UN) have joined ECOMOG to manage and resolve this crisis.[667] Also, the interventions of Non Governmental Organizations such as the Red Cross and others contributed to the end of this Liberian civil war. Despite the difficulties and insecurities that reigned in this country, humanitarian organizations had not abandoned their missions. After several negotiations by the diplomats of this coalition of missions, between the opposing camps of Charles Taylor and Samuel Doe for the unsuccessful ceasefire between 1990 and 1996, the missionaries did not give up[668] . The protagonists did not find a consensus in several agreements such as those of Cotonou (Benin), Yamoussoukro, Akosombo and Accra (Ghana) in 1991 and 1996.[669] It was finally in Nigeria towards the end of 1996 and the beginning of 1997 that the country had been able to disarm itself for the organization of democratic elections under the control of observers from ECOMOG and

[665]Outram, Q. (1997). 'It's terminal either way': an analysis of armed conflict in Liberia, 1989–1996. Review of African Political Economy, vol. 24, no 73, 355-371.
[666]Ballah, H. and Abrokwaa, C. (2003). Ethnicity, politics and social conflict: The quest for peace in Liberia. Penn State McNair Journal, vol. 10, 52-69.
[667]Sesay, M. A. (1996). Civil war and collective intervention in Liberia. Review of African Political Economy, vol. 23, no 67, 35-52.
[668]Paes, W. C. (2005). The challenges of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration in Liberia. International Peacekeeping, vol. 12, no 2, 253-261.
[669]Adebajo, A. (2002). Liberia's civil war: Nigeria, ECOMOG, and regional security in West Africa. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 73-181.

UNMIL missions.[670] The presidential elections of 1997 were in favor of the candidate Charles Taylor who became the democratically elected president by the constitution of 1986[671] .Considering that the exclusive constitution of 1847 was changed by that of 1986 which is much more inclusive.[672] The return to democracy has enabled Liberia to benefit from assistance from the Bretton Woods institutions to begin its development. Even if so far this country is still on the list of the most indebted poor countries (HIPC) in the world, at least it has regained peace and security. Liberia has since timidly forced itself by gradually leaving behind the suffering of its civil war which had caused injuries, deaths, material losses, displaced persons and refugees. Currently, this is an old story in the life of Liberians even if the development of their country is slow in coming. So, in light of this information presented on the Liberian civil crisis from start to finish, what is the content of Sierra Leone's civil war?

The Sierra Leonean civil war was a direct consequence of that of its neighbor Liberia because of the covetousness of diamond wealth by former Liberian President Charles Taylor. Liberia having lived almost ten years of civil war because of the rebellion led by Charles Taylor[673] had fueled the Sierra Leonean civil war to get hold of the diamond mines between these two countries' borders. The facilitating factor for the involvement of the Liberian rebels in the civil crisis in Sierra Leone is that the two countries have certain ethnic groups in common. These are indigenous ethnic groups who, according to them, demanded social justice through the establishment of alternation in power.[674] In the case of Liberia the descendants of slaves returned from America recognized in the name of American-Liberians had a monopoly of political and economic power. The rebellion of Charles Taylor was created to break with the reign of the American-Liberians in power. This civil conflict began in 1989 and thanks to the involvement of regional, continental and global conflict resolution missions in 1997, it

[670]Olonisakin, 'F. (1996). UN co-operation with regional organizations in peacekeeping: The experience of ECOMOG and UNOMIL in Liberia. International Peacekeeping, vol. 3, no 3, 33-51.
[671]Harris, D. (1999). From'warlord'to'democratic'president: how Charles Taylor won the 1997 Liberian elections. Journal of Modern African Studies, 431-455.
[672]Liberia's Constitution of 1986.
[673]Gershonı, Y. (1997). "War without end and an end to a war: the prolonged wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone." African Studies Review 40, no. 3, 55-76.
[674]Ndumbe, J. A. (2001). "Diamonds, ethnicity, and power: The case of Sierra Leone." Mediterranean Quarterly 12, no. 4, 90-105.

ended.[675] With regard to Sierra Leone, the krios are mulatto descendants of slaves from the United Kingdom who had kept power since independence until 1992.[676] They also had a monopoly of political and economic power without sharing with the indigenous ethnic groups. This ethnic discrimination was the reason for the two civil wars in these border countries. In the case of Sierra Leone, there is also control of diamond mining resources in the north of the country. These Dimands attracted the Rebel group of Charles Taylor, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL)leader to help the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), which was also a rebellion led by Foday Saybana Sankoh[677] for the conquest of state power.

In reality, this civil conflict hid illegal exploitation and large-scale diamond trade by these two rebel groups. This was why the diamond from Sierra Leone in this civil war period was called blood diamonds. While the civil conflict left thousands dead, wounded, displaced and refugees, under the rebels' authority, the exploitation and sale of diamonds continued; the rebels developed this trade to have the means to buy arms, ammunition and food. There was also a great deal of material damage (destruction of infrastructure, trading companies and private homes) that the armed attacks had caused. Sometimes entire villages were burnt to force children and women to become rebellion soldiers. Underage girls and adult women were raped, and often there were mutilations of the upper and lower limbs of people who did not want to join the rebellion. Economically, the country already on the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) list had seen its economic situation worsen.[678] In a period of war, poor countries are plunged into an economic abyss. This accentuates the suffering of the people who are already suffering from the pangs of war. In the third world, poverty is often also a source of crisis because revolts follow when a large part of a country's population does not manage to meet its basic needs. So when economic stability is absent, there are always

[675]Harrıs, D. (1999). "From'warlord'to'democratic'president: how Charles Taylor won the 1997 Liberian elections." Journal of Modern African Studies, 431-455.
[676]Kandeh, J. D. (1992). "Politicization of ethnic identities in Sierra Leone." African Studies Review 35, no. 1, 81-99.
[677]Berman, E. G. (2001). "Arming the Revolutionary United Front." African Security Studies 10, no. 1, 2001, 5-14.
[678]Davıes, V. A. B. (2002). War, poverty and growth in Africa: lessons from Sierra Leone. Centre for the Study of African Economies, 2-22.

negative consequences on political and social life. Economic inequalities are more dangerous because they cause discontent, igniting uprisings that quickly lead to civil wars in poor countries. The worst is when a social group discriminates against others because it has state power. The frustration of other social groups often leads to civil crises. Sierra Leone was in the midst of this pattern of social inequity whose profiteers were the krios.

To resolve this Sierra Leonean civil conflict, the regional organization of ECOWAS through its military force ECOMOG intervened to maintain peace and security and began negotiations between the opposing camps for the return of peace and security. Alongside the ECOWAS forces, the forces of the United Kingdom, the UN peacekeepers, and the diplomats of the African Union conducted peacekeeping and security operations.[679] All these multilateral missionary forces and their respective diplomats were also involved in the negotiations for the return to peace and security. The power of the rebels over the national forces of Sierra Leone and that of ECOMOG did not facilitate negotiations. But with the support of the UN forces and those of the United Kingdom, the balance of power has changed in favor of peace missions. Thus, the long duration of the conflict made the missions difficult for mission forces and humanitarian organizations to resolve the conflict. But with the sanctions on the diamond trade and trafficking of all kinds, the rebels ended up being weakened. They accepted the negotiations of missionaries of peace and humanitarian organizations for the end of the crisis. The disarmament of the rebel forces was obtained in 2002[680] , and democratic presidential elections were held in the same year on the basis of the 1991 constitution.[681] This constitution was the foundation of the new democracy that Sierra Leone has started since the end of its civil war. So, there cannot be democracy in a country without a constitution which is the fundamental law advocating the rules of social life. Any country that respects its constitution and the laws it generates is protected against civil wars because failure to respect the laws creates social discrimination. Sierra Leone is yet another

[679]Hasan, M. M. (2015). The role of the ECOWAS, the United Nations and the United Kingdom in terminating Sierra Leone civil war. University of Massachusetts Boston, 43.
[680]Solomon, C. and Gınıfer, J. (2008). "Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration in Sierra Leone." Centre for International Cooperation and Security, 1-52.
[681]Kandeh, J. D. (2003). "Sierra Leone's post-conflict elections of 2002." The Journal of Modern African Studies 41, no. 2, 189-216.

example where the confiscation of state power by a clan in society has resulted in deadly fighting. The last chapter of this study (chapter 5) focuses on the comparative assessment of the achievements and failures of Ecowas in Liberia and sierra leone.

## CHAPTER 5: THE CAUSAL FACTORS AFFECTING THE ECOWAS CONFLICT RESOLUTION ROLE IN LIBERIA AND SIERRA LEONEAN WARS: A THREE-LAYERED LEVEL OF ANALYSES

ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) created in 1975[682] is the West African organization that resolves conflicts in its member states since the 1990s in the event of civil war. The Economic Community of West African States Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) is an ECOWAS military force created in 1990[683] to ensure peacekeeping missions and security in the event of war in one of its member countries . Liberia was the first country to experience the civil war between 1989 and 1997[684] in which ECOWAS made its first experiences of conflict resolution missions in 1990. Sierra Leone was the second country in the West African region to experience civil war in 1991, and hosted the ECOWAS conflict resolution mission from 1991 until 2002.[685] On the following African continental map, the space occupied by ECOWAS member countries is geographically delimited. The green color is used to show the ECOWAS member countries in the western part on the African map.

[682]ECOWAS, accessed October 25, 2021, https://www.ecowas.int/about-ecowas/basic-information
[683]Folder S-1834-0146-0005 - Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), accessed October 25, 2021, https://search.archives.un.org/economic-community-of-west-african-states-monitoring-group-ecomog-2
[684]Aning, E. K. (1999). Eliciting compliance from Warlords: the ECOWAS experience in Liberia, 1990–1997. Review of African Political Economy, 26(81), 335-348.
[685]Kabia, J. M. (2008). Greed or grievance? Diamonds, rent-seeking and the civil war in Sierra Leone (1991–2002). Extractive economies and conflicts in the global south, multi-regional perspectives on rentier politics, 93-106.

**Map 6: Map of ECOWAS members countries**




**Source:**https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Western-Africa-Economic-Community-of-Western-African-States-ECOWAS-Countries-Benin_fig1_264797873

On the African continental map in the western part, the green color represents the 15 member countries of ECOWAS. How to evaluate the achievements and failures of ECOWAS conflict resolution in Liberia between 1989 and 1997, and in Sierra Leone from 1991 to 2002 by taking into account the influence of international organizations in international level, the failures of ECOWAS leaders in regional level, and state weakness and role of individual leaders in a domestic level?

## 5.1. INTERNATIONAL LEVEL

When a civil crisis strikes no one can predict when it will end. A great uncertainty that sets in, and the organization that firstly is involved in the return of peace and security in West Africa is ECOWAS. It receives support from other organizations such as the United Nations Peacekeepers, non-governmental humanitarian organizations and diplomats from the African Union, European Union and the United Nations. In the resolution of the Liberian and Sierra Leonean conflicts, these various international organizations have been a great support to ECOWAS. Especially, the civil war actors also determine the difficulties of ECOWAS. ECOWAS is the regional integration of West Africa which has given itself the mission of resolving conflicts in its member countries despite its limited human, financial and material resources.[686] Through its mutilateral military forces (ECOMOG), it strengthens itself according to its capacity to ensure peacekeeping and security missions in its member countries in conflict.[687] It is the first to engage in conflict resolution in its region before receiving support from other partner military forces worldwide, and especially UN peacekeepers.[688] This financial, human and logistical support allows ECOWAS to accomplish its conflict resolution missions as best it can. How to explain the systemic change of the world after the end of the Cold War?

### 5.1.1. SYSTEMIC CHANGE: END OF THE COLD WAR

After the Second World War from 1939 to 1945,[689] the world became bipolar because of the currents of communist and capitalist thoughts of the two blocs, East and West. The Eastern

[686]ECOWAS, accessed October 25, 2021, https://www.ecowas.int/about-ecowas/basic-information
[687]Conteh-Morgan, E. (1998). "Conflict and Regional Peacekeeping: ECOMOG's Hegemonic Role in Liberia and Sierra Leone." Liberian Studies Journal 23, no. 2, 78-92.
[688]Ajayi, T. (2008). The UN, the AU and ECOWAS: A Triangle for Peace and Security in West Africa?. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Department for Development Policy, 1-9.
[689] McNeese, T. (2010). World War II, 1939-1945. Infobase Publishing, 7.

Bloc was made up of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) with Russia as the leading country, and the Western Bloc was made up of the countries allied in World War II with the United States of America (USA) as leader of this bloc. Also, the creation of the United Nations (UN) in 1945 had plunged the two blocs into a Cold War from 1945 until 1989 when the Wall fell in Berlin (Germany).[690] The Cold War was an ideological war between the communist bloc in the East and the capitalist bloc in the West. Then, the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989[691] marked the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the democratization of the world. One of the fundamental principles of democracy is that democratic countries do not go to war. Therefore, democracy is an instrument for guaranteeing peace and security through governance according to democratic standards. For the promotion of peace and security of global organizations such as the UN and regional organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty (NATO) in 1949, the European Union (EU) in 1951, the African Union (AU) in 1963, and ECOWAS in 1975 were created. The member states of these various organizations do not wage war on each other but join forces to fight undemocratic states that threaten peace and security. It is in this vein that these global and regional organizations often engage in conflict resolution missions in countries at war. The UN and NATO have distinguished themselves in this field with their interventions in warring states to restore peace and security. Then, the fall of the Berlin Wall announced the end of communism in favor of capitalism and the rooting of democracy in the world. Today the states of the world are either in the democratic regime or in the process of democratization for the promotion of peace and security in the world. So what is the role of international organizations and great power in the resolution of the Liberian and Sierra Leonean conflict?

[690]Young, J. W. (1994). Cold War Europe, 1945-1989: A Political History. The English Historical Review, 109(433), 1039-1040.
[691]Engel, J. A. (Ed.). (2009). The Fall of the Berlin Wall: The revolutionary legacy of 1989. Oxford University Press, 96.

## 5.1.2. ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND GREAT POWERS IN LIBERIAN AND SIERRA LEONEAN CONFLICT RESOLUTION

### . The Case of Liberia

In the resolution of the Liberian conflict between 1989 and 1997 international organizations such as the United Nations (UN) and the African Union (AU) played a role in supporting ECOWAS in its mission to resolve this conflict. The West African diplomatic system viewed as a sub-regional system is an integral part of the African regional system and global system.[692] The common point of the UN and the AU is the promotion of democracy in Africa and in the world, but the UN through its Security Council can constitute peacekeepers to send to a country at war as the case of Liberia in 1993[693] while the AU only plays the role of facilitator for the return to democracy and therefore to peace and security without military forces. With the aim of returning the management of state power to a civilian, between 1990 and 1995 several ceasefire agreements were signed between the two opposing camps of the Liberian civil war.[694] These agreements did not lead to a happy ending. So, for 5 years the efforts to resolve this civil crisis were doomed to failure. Thus, tensions rose more in the two warring camps because of the points of contention over the transition from power to a civilian. The military power did not want to leave power so quickly to make way for democracy. Although on September 22, 1993, the United Nations Security Council established a United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNMIL).[695] This observer mission was made up of soldiers and civilians. In total, the mission's crew numbered 368 observers.[696] They went to support the ECOMOG military forces which had been there since

[692]Van Nieuwkerk, A. (2001). "Regionalism into Globalism? War into Peace? SADC and ECOWAS compared." African Security Review 10, no. 2, 6-18.
[693]Aboagye, F. B. and BAH, A. M. S. (2004). Liberia at a Crossroads: A preliminary look at the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and the protection of civilians. Institute for Security Studies Papers, 2004, vol. 2004, no 95, 20.
[694]Adebajo, A. (2002). Liberia's civil war: Nigeria, ECOMOG, and regional security in West Africa. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 73-131,
[695]Aboagye, F. B. and BAH, A. M. S. (2004). Liberia at a Crossroads: A preliminary look at the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and the protection of civilians. Institute for Security Studies Papers, 2004, vol. 2004, no 95, 20.
[696] Ibid.

1990.[697] UNMIL diplomats should enforce the Cotonou (Benin) peace agreement to lead to democratic elections in 1994.[698] Unfortunately, this agreement of country had failed and this had caused great panic because the conflict had become more intense and some UNMIL observers were kidnapped. These kidnapped UNMIL people were held hostage with ransoms. This situation had introduced another complication in the management and resolution of the Liberian civil crisis. With the diplomacy of UNMIL and ECOWAS observers in September 1994 a second ceasefire agreement was signed in the town of Akosombo in Ghana.[699] This agreement also failed to bring peace and security to Liberia as the fighting had not stopped. So, in October 1994, ECOMOG did not have enough logistical and financial means to continue its mission.[700] Likewise, the warring camps were not in the logic of agreeing on the end of the crisis. Thus, the Security Council of the United Nations had reduced to 90 the members of its mission in this country.[701] It was this mission of small staff that had supported ECOMOG until 1997 when all missions ended.[702] Despite all difficulties, ECOMOG and UNMIL had continued its operations to secure Monrovia and even took some towns around the capital from the rebels of Charles Taylor of NPFL and ULIMO-K of Alhadji Kromah.[703] To limit the damage caused by this Liberian civil war, in August 1995, an ECOWAS commission in charge of the crisis extended the 1995 Abuja agreement until June 15, 1997.[704] The committee also gave an ultimatum for disarmament of the rebels until January 1997 so that the elections could be organized in May 1997.[705]

[697]Adibe, C. E. (1997). The Liberian conflict and the ECOWAS-UN partnership. Third World Quarterly, vol. 18, no 3, 471-488.
[698]Adebajo, A. (2002). Liberia's civil war: Nigeria, ECOMOG, and regional security in West Africa. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 119.
[699]Ibid, P. 131.
[700]Ofuatey-Kodjoe, W. (1994). Regional organizations and the resolution of internal conflict: The ECOWAS intervention in Liberia. International Peacekeeping, vol. 1, no 3, 261-302.
[701]Aboagye, F. B. and Bah, A. M. S. (2004). Liberia at a Crossroads: A preliminary look at the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and the protection of civilians. Institute for Security Studies Papers, 2004, vol., no 95, 20.
[702]Adibe, C. E. (1997). The Liberian conflict and the ECOWAS-UN partnership. Third World Quarterly, vol. 18, no 3, 471-488.
[703]Olonisakin, 'F. (1996). UN co-operation with regional organizations in peacekeeping: The experience of ECOMOG and UNOMIL in Liberia. International Peacekeeping, vol. 3, no 3, 33-51.
[704]Adebajo, A. (2002). Liberia's civil war: Nigeria, ECOMOG, and regional security in West Africa. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 181.
[705]Paes, W. C. (2005). The challenges of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration in Liberia. International Peacekeeping, vol. 12, no 2, 253-261.

Precautions were taken to avoid the supply of arms and bullets to the rebels because without arms the crisis could no longer continue. In November 1996, the warring ethnic groups agreed to surrender their weapons to the UNMIL and ECOMOG missions.[706] There had been encouragement to go very towards total disarmament for the organization of democratic elections in 1997 at the latest.[707] In this disarmament operation, over 9,500 weapons and 1.2 million units of bullets were transferred to the military forces of UNMIL and ECOMOG.[708] This drop in tension allowed a move towards democratic elections. To organize credible elections accepted by all sides in civil conflict, all social parties were involved. People delegated by the various camps of rebel ethnic groups, civilians and people from religious congregations. In February 1997 the ECOWAS diplomats who were Foreign Ministers had a meeting with these different social parties designated to fix the date of the presidential elections for May 1997.[709] To organize the peaceful elections without risk of clashes the team of the ECOWAS ECOMOG had received new soldiers from Benin, Burkina Faso and Niger. Refugees were invited to return to their countries to participate in the vote. The ECOWAS Mission had taken measures to promote the return of all the refugees who had expressed the desire. When this process of organizing the presidential elections was almost at an end, UN forces had left Liberia under UN instruction. It was ECOMOG and African Union (AU) that continued the mission until the elections. In late 1997, through the UN, the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in Liberia (UNIL) was established to strengthen peace, rebuild the country and create democratic structures.[710] Finally, it was under the leadership of ECOMOG that favorable conditions for the organization of free and democratic presidential and legislative elections were created and the elections were held on July 19, 1997.[711] After

[706]Nichols, R. (2005). Disarming Liberia: progress and pitfalls. Armed and Aimless: Armed Groups, Guns and Human Security in the ECOWAS Region, 109-43.
[707]Harris, D. (1999). From'warlord'to'democratic'president: how Charles Taylor won the 1997 Liberian elections. Journal of Modern African Studies, 431-455.
[708]Paes, W. C. (2005). The challenges of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration in Liberia. International Peacekeeping, vol. 12, no 2, 253-261.
[709]Harris, D. (1999). From'warlord'to'democratic'president: how Charles Taylor won the 1997 Liberian elections. Journal of Modern African Studies, 431-455.
[710]Podder, S. (2013). Bridging the 'Conceptual–Contextual'Divide: Security Sector Reform in Liberia and UNMIL Transition. Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, vol. 7, no 3, 353-380.
[711]Aning, E. K. (1999). Eliciting compliance from Warlords: the ECOWAS experience in Liberia, 1990–1997. Review of African Political Economy, 1999, vol. 26, no 81, 335-348.

these elections Charles Taylor who was the party's candidate NPFL had won the presidential elections so that was how this civil war between 1989 and 1997 ended.[712]

**. The Case of Sierra Leone**

The civil war began between the national armed forces and the rebels in Sierra Leone in 1991, ECOWAS had chosen to secure the governments of President Joseph Saidu Momoh and Valentin Strasser.[713] The formal armed forces were no match for the rebels who controlled almost all towns and villages except the capital Freetown. So the objective of ECOWAS was to prevent the rebels from taking Freetown. The rebels were so strong that negotiations were not on their agenda. Their goal was to take power to restore social justice and ban ethnic exclusion from the management of power to which they have been victims since the independence of Sierra Leone. So, the attempts of ECOWAS negotiations with the rebels for the ceasefire took a long time. The rebels reigned supreme throughout the country except the capital Freetown from 1991 until 1996.[714] It was after the military coup d'état of some officers of the national army, which had ejected the president of the National Provisional Council of Government Captain Valentin Strasser to bring to power President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah that negotiations with the rebels were initiated in 1996.[715] The military coup d'état of these officers of the national army took place in January 1996 and all the soldiers agreed to leave politics to civilians.[716] In February 1996, the presidential elections were held and leader of the People's Party of Sierra Leone (SLPP) Ahmad Tejan Kabbah emerged victorious.[717] It was the first democratic election organized by Sierra Leone since its independence. It was under the governance of Kabbah that the rebel leader Foday Saybana Sankoh agreed to go to

[712]Harris, D. (1999). From'warlord'to'democratic'president: how Charles Taylor won the 1997 Liberian elections. Journal of Modern African Studies, 431-455.
[713]Levitt, J. (1999). "Pre-intervention trust-building, African states and enforcing the peace: the case of ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone." Liberian Studies Journal 24, no. 1, 1-26.
[714]Gershoni, Y. (1997). "War without end and an end to a war: the prolonged wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone." African Studies Review 40, no. 3, 55-76.
[715]Riley, S. (1997). "Sierra Leone: the militariat strikes again.", 287-292.
[716]Ibid.
[717]Kandeh, J. D. (1998). "Transition without rupture: Sierra Leone's transfer election of 1996." African Studies Review, 91-111.

the negotiating table. Meanwhile, the armed forces of ECOWAS known as ECOMOG were supporting the Sierra Leonean army for peacekeeping. In October 1997, to limit the circulation of illegal weapons, an embargo was imposed by the UN Security Council on petroleum products and weapons in Sierra Leone.[718] ECOMOG forces have been designated for compliance with this embargo across the country. This decision had allowed the restriction of the circulation of illegal weapons which are used by the rebels to fight. It was later, in June 1998, that the UN Security Council sent the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) to reinforce the armed forces of ECOMOG.[719] The union of these two forces on the battlefield had made it possible to accelerate the disarmament of the rebels and the negotiations. In December 1998, the armed forces of the two missions of ECOMOG and UNOMSIL considerably reduced rebel attacks and were able to secure the capital Freetown and its surroundings.[720] When the rebel leader Sankoh knew that his rebellion could not hold out for a long time, he accepted the ceasefire and disarmament. It was the head of mission of UNOMSIL Francis G. Okelo who had created the conditions through his diplomacy with ECOWAS officials to start negotiations.[721]

In 1998, when diplomacy for the negotiations was initiated, President Kabbah declared that his government agreed to cooperate with the missions of ECOWAS, AU, UN, ECOMOG and UNHCR for the return of peace in his country.[722] So the UN Security Council canceled the embargo on oil and arms. The Security Council had also increased its staff in the office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General by adding liaison officers and advisers on security matters. It was in the hope of quickly resolving this Sierra Leonean civil conflict

[718]Ochiai, T. (2019). "United Nations Sanctions against Sierra Leone and the Sandline Affair in the United Kingdom, 1997-98." Lagos Notes and Records 25, no. 1, 1-20.
[719]Olonisakin, F. (2015). "United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL)." In The Oxford handbook of United Nations peacekeeping operations., Accessed May 4, 2021, https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199686049.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199686049-e-55
[720]Nuamah, K. And Zartman W. I. (2001). "Case Study: Intervention in Sierra Leone.", 1- 18.
[721]Olonisakin, F. (2015). "United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL)." In The Oxford handbook of United Nations peacekeeping operations., Accessed May 4, 2021, https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199686049.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199686049-e-55
[722]Nowrot, K. and Schebacker, W. E. (1998). "The use of force to restore democracy: International legal implications of the ECOWAS intervention in Sierra Leone." Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 14, 321.

which was already going on for too long. Eventually, the rebels agreed to negotiations with the Kabbah government in May 1999.[723] Thus, the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) became the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) in October 1999.[724] Its personal numbers were increased to 6000 military personnel including 260 observers.[725] MONUSIL's mission ended with this new change. With MONUSIL, negotiations have already started since March 1996, Yamoussoukro (Ivory Coast) was chosen to conduct these negotiations and these negotiations culminated in the signing on November 1996 of a ceasefire agreement in Abidjan (Ivory Coast).[726]

Unfortunately a few months after this agreement, the guarantee of peace seemed difficult if not impossible because at the beginning of May 1997, there was a return of violence and a generalized resumption of fighting because the country's military junta had provided a strong hand to the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and, in May 1997 plunged the new democratically elected regime into a successful coup.[727] The RUF had therefore taken power with the help of the army. This situation called on ECOWAS and the United Nations to think about finding a solution to resolve the conflict in Sierra Leone. A three-phase approach had been adopted by ECOWAS, firstly the dialogue, secondly sanctions and finally the use of force. In October 1997, ECOWAS called a negotiation with the rebels, certain representatives of the national military and the government for a peace plan in the capital of Guinea Conakry (Conakry) which failed because the various parties, especially the rebels and the national armies did not respect this peace plan.[728] So the first two phases did not lead to a probable resolution of the conflict, so ECOWAS was forced to choose the path of force. ECOMOG then entered war with the military junta between February 7 and 10, 1998, and on February

[723]Richards, P. (2001). "War and peace in Sierra Leone." In The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 41-50.
[724]Mbugua, K., Pillay, V., and Kamidza, R. (2005). "UNAMSIL: UN Mission in Sierra Leone." Conflict Trends, no. 4, 40-41.
[725]Ibid.
[726]Abdul-Mumuni, A. (2005). "Conflict Resolution in West Africa: A Comparative Analysis of Sierra Leone and Liberia.", 19.
[727]Gberie, L. (1997). "The May 25 Coup d'Etat in Sierra Leone: A Militariat Revolt?." Africa Development/Afrique Et Développement 22, no. ¾, 149-170.
[728]PLAN, ELABORATION OF ECOWAS PEACE. "ECOWAS Six-Month Peace Plan for Sierra Leone 23 October 1997-22 April 1998." 1997, Accessed May 6, 2021, https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/afjincol9&div=64&id=&page=

12 a few days of the same year, Freetown was taken over by ECOMOG.[729] With the help of ECOWAS and the UN, new elections brought President Kabbah back on March 10, 1998.[730] However, some hotbeds of tension still existed in the territory. To eradicate these rebel tensions and restore peace and security, ECOWAS initiated talks with the RUF on April 18, 1998 in Lomé (Togo) which resulted in a ceasefire agreement on May 18, 1999 and the signing of a country agreement on July 7, 1999.[731] The Sierra Leonean civil conflict was difficult to resolve because the rebels often changed their decisions after each negotiations when they returned to their base.

To quickly resolve this crisis, after the transformation of UNOMSIL into UNAMSIL in 1999 by the UN Security Council, this new mission was reinforced by the resolution of 1289 up to 11,100 soldiers with 260 observers included in January 2000.[732] In the same year the RUF had not stopped its attacks which killed seven peacekeepers and they kidnapped 500.[733] Thus, in May 2000 by resolution 1299, the UN Security Council increased the number of troops to 13,000 soldiers with still 260 observers.[734] With the aim of strengthening the armed forces for the maintenance of peace and security, President Kabbah with the agreement of the UN had obtained the assistance of the forces of Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team (OLRT) of the United Kingdom (UK) led by Brigadier General David Richards[735] who had not only neutralized the rebels but also had freed hostages from the blue helmets. Finally, in March 2001 by resolution 1346, the Security Council had further increased to 17,500 troops.[736] It was this last UN mission in collaboration with ECOMOG of ECOWAS and

[729]Aning, E. K. (2005). "The Challenge of Civil Wars to Multilateral Interventions–UN, ECOWAS, and complex political emergencies in West Africa: A critical analysis." African and Asian studies 4, no. 1-2, 1-20.
[730]Nowrot, K. and Schebacker, W. E. (1998). "The use of force to restore democracy: International legal implications of the ECOWAS intervention in Sierra Leone." Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 14, 321.
[731]Francis, D. J. (2000). "Torturous path to peace: The Lomé Accord and postwar peacebuilding in Sierra Leone." Security Dialogue 31, no. 3, 357-373.
[732]Bernath, C. and Nyce, S. (2004). "A peacekeeping success: Lessons learned from UNAMSIL." Journal of International Peacekeeping 8, no. 1, 119-142.
[733]Berman, E. G. (2000). Re-Armament in Sierra Leone: One Year after the Lomé Peace Agreement. Small Arms Survey, 19.
[734]Malan, M., Rakate, P. and Mcintyre, A. (2002). Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone: UNAMSIL hits the home straight. Vol. 68. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 12.
[735]Williams, P. (2001). "Fighting for freetown: British military intervention in Sierra Leone." Contemporary Security Policy 22, no. 3, 140-168.
[736]Malan, M., Rakate, P. and Mcintyre, A. (2002). Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone: UNAMSIL hits the home straight. Vol. 68. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 12.

OLRT that ended this Sierra Leonean civil war in early 2002.[737] UNAMSIL continued to disarm the rebels and especially to regain control of areas rich in natural resources such as diamonds, oil, gold and bauxite. Thus, exactly in the month of January 2002, the civil conflict in Sierra Leone officially ended because UNAMSIL had succeeded in disarming and demobilizing more than 45,000 rebels.[738] The mission continued its work of maintaining peace and security until the eve of the democratic presidential elections. It was on May 14, 2002 that the presidential elections took place and President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah who had been in power since the conduct of negotiations for the return to peace and security was re-elected with 70% of the vote.[739]

To try those who committed crimes against humanity and war crimes during this Sierra Leonean civil war, the UN Security Council created in 2002 a Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL).[740] It is a Court composed of eight international judges and is included in the Sierra Leonean judicial system. It is a hybrid jurisdiction which combined international law and Sierra Leonean national law. Its budget is 75 million dollars with an operating life normally of three years.[741] With the length of the criminal proceedings, this court spent 300 million dollars before closing its doors in December 2013.[742] It finally made the decision on September 26, 2013 to condemn the former president Charles Taylor who was the main actor of the Liberian and Sierra Leonean civil wars to a sentence of 50 years in prison.[743] Without dispute, the Court's Appeals Chamber had confirmed this conviction. The Tribunal had retained against Charles Taylor in April 2012, five counts of crimes against humanity and also five counts of war crimes followed by one count of certain serious violations of

[737]Mitton, K. (2012). "Irrational actors and the process of brutalisation: Understanding atrocity in the Sierra Leonean conflict (1991–2002)." Civil Wars 14, no. 1, 104-122.
[738]Solomon, C., and GINIFER, J. (2008). "Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration in Sierra Leone." Centre for International Cooperation and Security, 1-52.
[739]Harris, D. (2004). "Post-conflict elections or post-elections conflict: Sierra Leone 2002 and patterns of voting in Sub-Saharan Africa." Cadernos de Estudos Africanos 5/6, 39-49.
[740]Schocken, C. (2002). "The special court for Sierra Leone: overview and recommendations." Berkeley J. Int'l L. 20, 436.
[741]Jallo, C. C. (2010). "Special Court for Sierra Leone: Achieving Justice." Mich. J. Int'l L. 32, 395-440.
[742]Ibid.
[743]Owie, U. (2018). "The Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Question of Head of State Immunity in International Law: Revisiting the Decision in Prosecutor v Charles Ghankay Taylor." Nigerian Yearbook of International Law 2017. Springer, Cham, 239-265.

international humanitarian law committed by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) of Sierra Leone.[744] For lasting peace and security in Sierra Leone, despite the presence of the international community, the United Kingdom continues to play an important political, military and linguistic role. Since 2002, Sierra Leone has returned to peace and this peace still reigns until today.[745]

### 5.1.3. ROLE OF CONTINENTAL PLAYERS: AFRICAN UNION AND LIBYA

The founding treaty of ECOWAS signed on May 28, 1975 in Lagos (Nigeria), agrees on the idea of maintaining borders because the treaty does not say anything about the issue.[746] So successively all the integrations that have taken place in Africa have never really addressed the issue of borders. For a genuine African Union, African heads of state should think about bolishing colonial borders for a real mixing of the African people. This neglect is leaving the defects of African countries which often have border conflicts. So the borders inherited from colonization are often the source of wars between ECOWAS member countries. Another factor is that some populations have been placed other states where they are not from, which is a real headache that causes ethnic uprisings. In the resolution of the Liberian and Sierra Leonean conflicts the African Union as a continental organization had intervened. Its intervention was noted by his diplomats for the missions of good offices for the ceasefire. As the African Union does not have a military force like ECOMOG of ECOWAS, it intervenes in the resolution of conflicts in Africa as a conciliator of the warring camps. Above all, it was under his auspices that the protagonists of the Liberian and Sierra Leonean civil wars had agreed to go to the negotiating table. Therefore, the role of the AU was essentially diplomacy

[744]Oosterveld, V. (2012). "Gender and the Charles Taylor case at the special court for Sierra Leone." Wm. & Mary J. Women & L. 19, 7.
[745]Neethling, T. (2007). "Pursuing sustainable peace through post-conflict peacebuilding: The case of Sierra Leone." African Security Studies 16, no. 3, 81-95.
[746]ECOWAS Treaty of May 28, 1975 in Lagos (Nigeria)., accessed June, 12, 2021, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/5560/download

in accordance with its intervention agenda in the resolution of conflicts in Africa.[747] Also, for the respect of the principle of non-interference and the sovereignty of each member state, the African Union does not have the power to impose a decision. So its role is not that of giving lessons to member countries but that of initiating talks in times of conflict.

In a civil war when several internal and external actors are involved, the return to peace and security becomes challenging to achieve. If in this Sierra Leonean conflict, ECOWAS did not quickly obtained the results of its ceasefire negotiations, it was because of some hidden actors that were involved. The complication of the Sierra Leonean civil war was also due to the supply of arms, bullets and financial aid by Libya .[748] For instance, the Libya of Muammar Gaddafi was involved clandestinely in this war in Sierra Leone by supporting the rebels of Foday Sankoh. In the member countries of ECOWAS, the Libyan presence in the internal conflicts of each country that has been affected by the war has been often observed and criticized by other African countries.[749] Libyan Guide Muammar Gaddafi mainly granted financial aid and military training to rebels who requested it. In Sierra Leone, Sankoh had benefited from the same graces of Gaddafi to fight against the government of his country. The objective of this aid was to extend Libyan domination throughout Africa. Above all, Libyan Guide's idea to carry out his actions was the concretization of the United States of Africa.[750] He wanted to put in power political leaders who shared his vision. So he put the means to fight the African presidents who were supported by the Western countries. As the former Krios presidents were backed by the United Kingdom during their management of state affairs, Gadhafi had bet on the rebellion of Sankoh for the alternation. But often its aid to camps opposed to governments is seen as support for rebellions or terrorists. This is why Gadhafi was a controversial president in Africa in general and particularly in West African.

[747]Williams, P. D. (2011). The African Union's conflict management capabilities. New York: Council on Foreign Relations., 1-29.
[748]Zulu, L. C. and Wilson, S. A. (2009). Sociospatial geographies of civil war in Sierra Leone and the new global diamond order: is the Kimberley process the panacea?. Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, 27(6), 1107-1130.
[749]García, S. E., & Echeverría, M. P. D. (2018). Muammar Gaddafi's Legacy: A Domestic & Intellectual Approach. Journal of Pan African Studies, 11(3), 4-25.
[750]Ramutsindela, M. (2009). "Gaddafi, continentalism and sovereignty in Africa." South African Geographical Journal 91, no. 1, 1-3.

Ideologically, Gadhafi was not a follower of the liberal democracy that Western countries imposed on Africa. Instead, Gadhafi advocated popular democracy based on popular groups that gives authority to citizens in a country. This ideology of Gadhafi influenced the rebel Sankoh in its determination to fight for the alternation of power in Sierra Leone. Thus, after the resolution of the Sierra Leonean conflict, Gaddafi was accused in 2004 by the principal prosecutor of the special court for Sierra Leone of being responsible for the wars in the West African region composed of the member countries of ECOWAS.[751] However, no obligation had been made Muammar Gaddafi to answer for his acts before the International Criminal Court for his implication in the Sierra Leonean and Liberian civil conflicts. Therefore, the reproaches of Gaddafi remained only like warning without judicial judgments.

## 5.2. REGIONAL LEVEL

At the regional level, Within ECOWAS there is a lack of common interest, identity among member countries and Nigeria's hegemony which are factors that have negatively impacted ECOWAS conflict resolution missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone. ECOWAS member states do not agree on their common interests and identity because each protects its own interests and identity against those of all ECOWAS member countries. Also, to these two problems, there is the desire for domination of the other member countries of ECOWAS by Nigeria because it is the most influential member country of this organization.

### 5.2.1. REGIONAL HEGEMON-NIGERIA

The biggest challenge for ECOWAS during its intervention in Liberia was the divergence of opinions about the understanding of democracy and dictatorship on the management of

[751]« Libya blamed for W Africa wars » BEC News, 9 mars 2004, accessed July 28, 2021, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3544423.stm

power of President Samuel Doe.[752] When the civil war began, Nigeria went to support the power of Doe, which the French-speaking ECOWAS member countries called a dictatorship. Nigeria being the leading member country of ECOWAS, it intervened without the whole Community's opinion. This had created a division among the members of ECOWAS. For the French-speaking countries, the fact that since independence only the American-Liberians have succeeded each other in power in Liberia was not normal. They saw normal the war of the rebels who wanted justice for sharing power. But the English-speaking countries had an opposite vision. For the English speakers it was necessary to support the power of Samuel Doe which was threatened by the rebellion of Charles Taylor.[753] Regarding these differences of opinion within ECOWAS member countries, it can be seen on the concepts of democracy and dictatorship. The political leaders of the Froncophone countries believe that the greatest sign of respect for democratic standards is the alternation of state power. Therefore, the regular and transparent organization of the different elections to avoid that the same people do not manage the country all the time. There is also the limitation of presidential terms. All this helps to avoid discrimination in all its forms in the management of the affairs of a state. So, for the political leaders of French-speaking countries, when there is no alternation of state power, it is a dictatorship. However, for the political leaders of the English-speaking countries, if a member government is attacked by the rebels for example as in the case of Liberia, ECOWAS must support this government to fight against the rebels. The political leaders of the English-speaking countries opt for the protection of governments in civil war. But French-speaking political leaders do not share the same opinion. For them, a government that does not respect democratic standards does not deserve the support of ECOWAS. These were signs that his mission to resolve the Liberian conflict was not won in advance. Before ECOWAS sent its missions to Liberia, Nigeria was forced to follow integration orders by withdrawing from this war. After several discussions among ECOWAS member countries, diplomats and ECOMOG armed forces were deployed to the war field in Liberia. ECOMOG

[752]Sampson, I. T. (2011). "The responsibility to protect and ECOWAS mechanisms on peace and security: Assessing their convergence and divergence on intervention." Journal of Conflict and Security Law 16, no. 3, 507-540.
[753]Itano, N. (2003). "Liberating Liberia. Charles Taylor and the rebels who unseated him." Institute for Security Studies Papers 2003, no. 82, 12.

is a regional multilateral force whose soldiers come from ECOWAS member countries. It is not a permanent force but a force that is formed when there is a conflict resolution mission in a member country. It is also incompetence because the soldiers do not know each other and have never trained together for the efficiency of their missions.[754] This reason explains the difficulties of ECOWAS in accomplishing its conflict resolution missions. In Liberia's civil war, this was the very first ECOWAS mission. Its leaders were not yet experienced in this area of crisis resolution. Samuel Doe refused negotiations with the rebels in Liberia because he relied on his connections.[755] For him, as he had the support of the political leaders of the United States of America and those of Nigeria to fight the rebels by arms and not by negotiations. Nigeria is currently seen as the new policeman of Africa[756] because it is the greatest military power in West Africa above all, it is the leader of the military force of ECOMOG. Militarily, Nigeria is more equipped than all the other member countries of ECOWAS because since 1967, it has faced a civil war in Biafra[757] and currently it is suffering from the terrorist attacks of Boko Haram.[758] Nigeria repeated this same unilateral intervention in Sierra Leone's 1991 civil war to support president Joseph Saidu Momoh's power without consulting other ECOWAS members.[759] All these actions show the imposition of Nigeria and its hegemony within ECOWAS.

[754]Gershoni, Y. (1993). "From ECOWAS to ECOMOG: the Liberian crisis and the struggle for political hegemony in West Africa." Liberian Studies Journal 28, no. 1, 21-43.
[755]Swatuk, L. A. "The Mask of Anarchy: The Destruction of Liberia and the Religious Dimension of an African Civil War.", 445-447.
[756]Adebajo, A. (2000). Nigeria: Africa's new gendarme?. Security Dialogue, 31(2), 185-199.
[757]Levey, Z. (2014). Israel, Nigeria and the Biafra civil war, 1967–70. Journal of Genocide Research, 16(2-3), 263-280.
[758]Aghedo, I., & Osumah, O. (2012). The Boko Haram uprising: how should Nigeria respond?. Third world quarterly, 33(5), 853-869.
[759]Audu, B. N. (2017). The Nigeria led ECOMOG military intervention and interest in the Sierra Leone crisis: An overview. Social Sciences, 8(4), 1.

### 5.2.2. INTEREST OF MEMBER STATES

The ideal advocated by ECOWAS is to defend the common interests of its member states for collective development. The greatest dream and goal of ECOWAS is to bring economic development, political and social stability to its member states.[760] This objective has not yet been achieved because each member country has its own problems to solve and its objectives to achieve. Especially since the member states of ECOWAS do not have the same economic and political partners. These factors do not allow ECOWAS countries to have the same economic and political orientation for common interests. The member states of ECOWAS have not really bequeathed part of their sovereignty to the Organization to act in the common interest of its members. WAEMU (West African Economic and Monetary Union) is an institution that should help ECOWAS achieve a common currency for its member countries.[761] Since 2018, there has been a great debate within ECOWAS for the common currency "ECO"[762] and the common central bank called the BCEAO (Central Bank of West African States)[763] come into operation in 2020 but this objective has not been achieved due to the lack of convergence criteria that member states are fixed.[764] Discussions are continuing for the effectiveness of this common currency in 2027 according to ECOWAS leaders. Also, major road, rail and air networks should be created to interconnect all member countries in order to facilitate the movement of people and goods, especially as ECOWAS aims to be a free trade area between the citizens of member countries.[765] For example, the Benin-Niger and Burkina Faso-Côte d'Ivoire-Mali-Guinea Conakry railways have failed because the

[760]Yansane, A. Y. (1977). West African economic integration: Is ECOWAS the answer?. Africa Today, 24(3), 43-59.
[761]West African Economic and Monetary Union, accessed March 01, 2022, http://www.uemoa.int/en/about-uemoa
[762]The ECO is the name given to a project of common currency of the fifteen ECOWAS states.
[763]The Central Bank of West African States, accessed March 02, 2022, https://www.bceao.int/en/content/presentation-bceao
[764]Saka, J. O., Onafowokan, I. A., & Adebayo, A. A. (2015). Analysis of convergence criteria in a proposed monetary union: a study of the economic community of West African States. International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, 5(1), 230-239.
[765]Adepoju, A., Boulton, A., & Levin, M. (2010). Promoting integration through mobility: Free movement under ECOWAS. Refugee Survey Quarterly, 29(3), 120-144.

construction of these railways have remained projects since 1985 until this year 2022.[766] If the objectives announced above of ECOWAS were achieved, the common interest would be a reality for its member states. The main objective of ECOWAS, which is economic development within its member states, has struggled to be implemented until today because only Nigeria has made some economic progress.

### 5.2.3. REGIONAL ORGANIZATION AS AN INSTITUTIONAL SOURCE OF COMMON IDENTITY

The West African regional organization of ECOWAS is an institution that should succeed economically, politically and socially in general for the common development of its member states. ECOWAS is still far from this objective of achieving the common development of West Africa because the implementation of its policies is not the same in each member country. The reason for this difference is that ECOWAS member states do not perceive its decisions in the same way because of linguistic diversity. The official languages of ECOWAS are English, French and Portuguese,[767] so this does not facilitate understanding and leading discussions to reach agreement on common opinions. A language is a culture, a way of thinking and an identity therefore each member country of ECOWAS should bequeath part of its sovereignty to the Institution to achieve a common identity. It is often not easy for poor countries which lack everything and which need agreements outside Africa to obtain international loans, grants and aid from the Bretton Woods institutions and the support of certain private partners.[768] Above all, these differences in the languages spoken by the member countries of ECOWAS do not make it possible to achieve a common identity within the Institution. Although decades have passed since its inception since 1975, ECOWAS has

[766]Thomas, B. E. (1957). Railways and Ports in French West Africa. Economic Geography, 33(1), 1-15.
[767]Agbedor, P. (2009). The Language Factor in West Africa's Integration. Nation-States and the Challenges of Regional Integration in West Africa. The case of Ghana, 137.
[768]Shaw, T. M., & Okolo, J. E. (1994). African Political Economy and Foreign Policy in the 1990s: Towards a Revisionist Framework for ECOWAS States. In The Political Economy of Foreign Policy in ECOWAS. Palgrave Macmillan, London, 1-16.

yet to achieve a common identity for its member states. With the objective of achieving a common identity within ECOWAS, legally it is article 59 of the ECOWAS Treaty which stipulates this. Also, several protocols have been signed in the same direction as the protocol A/SP.1/5/79 was signed on May 25, 1979 in Dakar the capital of Senegal for the free movement of persons, the right of residence and establishment in each ECOWAS member country for any citizen of this West African organization. In the economic capital Cotonou of Benin on May 29, 1982, the protocol A/P/3/5/82 was signed on the citizenship code of ECOWAS. Later, on July 1, 1986 in Abuja, Nigeria, the Protocol A/SP.1/7/86 relating to the right of residence was signed by the member states of ECOWAS. On May 29, 1990 in Banjul in the capital of The Gambia, the protocol A/PS.2/5/90 relating to the right of establishment was again signed. In July 2014 during the 46th Conference of Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS in Accra, Ghana, article 2 of Protocol A/P1/5/79 on the free movement of persons was reinforced, which established in 2016 the law on the Biometric Identity Card for movement from one state to another without problem for a period of 15 years maximum. Normally, all ECOWAS member countries should have a common identity card and passport but until this year 2022 each member state issues its national identity card and passport for its population.[769] The movement of people and goods which should be the purpose of the common identity advocated by ECOWAS is not yet possible between member states. There are still difficulties for citizens of ECOWAS member countries to cross borders from one country to another.[770] Also, trade is still very embryonic because customs fees and taxes are not harmonized between member states for the fluidity of consumer markets.[771] Each ECOWAS member country applies its policy of customs fees and taxation of goods from other member countries. All these realities show the failure of ECOWAS to be an institution that provides a common source of identity for its member states.

[769]Adepoju, A. (2002). Fostering free movement of persons in West Africa: Achievements, constraints, and prospects for intraregional migration. International migration, 40(2), 3-28.
[770]Adeniran, A. I. (2014). Why a Borderless ECOWAS?. In Migration and Regional Integration in West Africa: A Borderless ECOWAS. Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 8-24.
[771]Simon, S. U., & Edebiri, S. I. (2015). TAX HARMONISATION OF INFORMAL TRADE TO FORMAL TRADE ACROSS-BOARDERS; A CASE STUDY OF ECOWAS. Knowledge Review Volume 33 No. 1, 1-10.

## 5.3. DOMESTIC LEVEL

At the domestic level, it is a matter of highlighting the role of individual leaders and the weaknesses of the Liberian and Sierra Leonean states during the resolution of their conflicts by ECOWAS. This part analyzes the role of influential local actors in the Liberian and Sierra Leonean civil wars and links the weaknesses of these two countries to the characteristics of Third World countries. How to evaluate the achievements and failures of ECOWAS conflict resolution in Liberia between 1989 and 1997, and in Sierra Leone from 1991 to 2002 by taking into account the role of individual leaders and Liberia and Sierra Leone states weaknesses' in a domestic level?

### 5.3.1 ROLE OF INDIVIDUAL LEADERS

The process of resolving the Liberian civil war has revealed that ECOWAS leaders still have to make many efforts to make their missions competitive. The leaders of this regional integration have incompetences that must be corrected for the organisation's effectiveness. If the conflict lasted for nearly ten years (1989-1997) before ending,[772] it is because the leaders of ECOWAS were not competent in their mission. Knowing that a civil war causes a great deal of material and human damage, it would be commendable to quickly resolve it to limit the suffering of the people. The observation of the management of the Liberian conflict by the leaders of ECOWAS shows that they are not often up to their missions. First to get involved in a war, the leaders of ECOWAS have a slow diplomacy which requires an understanding between them before going on in the member country at war. In the case of the Liberian conflict, ECOWAS leaders took a long time for negotiations between member

[772]Kieh Jr, G. K. (2004). Irregular warfare and Liberia's first civil war. Journal of international and Area Studies, 57-77.

countries while the war was causing enormous damage.[773] The ECOWAS intervention mechanism in crises in its area is not prompt. This administrative slowness of ECOWAS offers an opportunity to the warring camps to commit atrocities on the people. So often the political and economic instabilities that still reign in Africa in general and West Africa in particular, show that six decades after independence African leaders have failed in almost all areas. There are still several incompetences and disorganization that qualify the leaders of ECOWAS. Thus, an assessment of the political situation of the Liberian civil war would boil down to political crises around power for the most part. From independence until the outbreak of the civil crisis, the presidents of this country have not been able to build inclusive development.

The biggest challenge for ECOWAS during its intervention in Liberia was the divergence of opinions about the understanding of democracy and dictatorship on the management of power of President Samuel Doe.[774] When the civil war began, Nigeria went to support the power of DOE, which the French-speaking ECOWAS member countries called a dictatorship. Nigeria being the leading member country of ECOWAS, it intervened without the whole Community's opinion. This had created a division among the members of ECOWAS. For the French-speaking countries, the fact that since independence only the American-Liberians have succeeded each other in power in Liberia was not normal. They saw normal the war of the rebels who wanted justice for sharing power. But the English-speaking countries had an opposite vision. For the English speakers it was necessary to support the power of Samuel Doe which was threatened by the rebellion of Charles Taylor.[775] Regarding these differences of opinion within ECOWAS member countries, it can be seen on the concepts of democracy and dictatorship. The political leaders of the Froncophone countries believe that the greatest sign of respect for democratic standards is the alternation of state power. Therefore, the regular and transparent organization of the different elections

[773]Ibid.
[774]Sampson, I. T. (2011). "The responsibility to protect and ECOWAS mechanisms on peace and security: Assessing their convergence and divergence on intervention." Journal of Conflict and Security Law 16, no. 3, 507-540.
[775]Itano, N. (2003). "Liberating Liberia. Charles Taylor and the rebels who unseated him." Institute for Security Studies Papers 2003, no. 82, 12.

to avoid that the same people do not manage the country all the time. There is also the limitation of presidential terms. All this helps to avoid discrimination in all its forms in the management of the affairs of a state. So, for the political leaders of French-speaking countries, when there is no alternation of state power, it is a dictatorship. However, for the political leaders of the English-speaking countries, if a member government is attacked by the rebels for example as in the case of Liberia, ECOWAS must support this government to fight against the rebels. The political leaders of the English-speaking countries opt for the protection of governments in civil war. But French-speaking political leaders do not share the same opinion. For them, a government that does not respect democratic standards does not deserve the support of ECOWAS. These were signs that his mission to resolve the Liberian conflict was not won in advance. Before ECOWAS sent its missions to Liberia, Nigeria was forced to follow integration orders by withdrawing from this war. After several discussions among ECOWAS member countries, diplomats and ECOMOG armed forces were deployed to the war field in Liberia. ECOMOG is a regional multilateral force whose soldiers come from ECOWAS member countries. It is not a permanent force but a force that is formed when there is a conflict resolution mission in a member country. It is also incompetence because the soldiers do not know each other and have never trained together for the efficiency of their missions.[776] This reason explains the difficulties of ECOWAS in accomplishing its conflict resolution missions. In Liberia's civil war, this was the very first ECOWAS mission. Its leaders were not yet experienced in this area of crisis resolution. Samuel DOE refused negotiations with the rebels in Liberia because he relied on his connections.[777] For him, as he had the support of the political leaders of the United States of America and those of Nigeria to fight the rebels by arms and not by negotiations.

In the hierarchical composition of ECOWAS, the Heads of State are like the players and the referees at the same time. They are the references downstream and upstream of all integration decisions that they are able to influence in their interests. The Conference of Heads of State

[776]Gershoni, Y. (1993). "From ECOWAS to ECOMOG: the Liberian crisis and the struggle for political hegemony in West Africa." Liberian Studies Journal 28, no. 1, 21-43.
[777]Swatuk, L. A. "The Mask of Anarchy: The Destruction of Liberia and the Religious Dimension of an African Civil War.", 445-447.

is a body that gives them these attributes of veto holders over ECOWAS decisions.[778] If the Liberian civil crisis took a long time to settle, it is because decisions are often flouted for interests and friendship between leaders. The spirit of friendship takes precedence over that of the common good of ECOWAS integration. In addition, in the field of combat against the rebels in Liberia, faced with the insufficiency of the number of soldiers, the logistical and financial means, the leaders of ECOWAS turned to the UN.[779] In Liberia, where the American-Liberians were the sole beneficiaries of power from independence until 1992,[780] is just one example among many about democratic problem. For this reason, the military ruled several countries in West Africa after independence without power sharing as in the cas of Liberia. They assumed that civilians did not have a great deal of experience in running the affairs of their respective countries. They were outright flouted for the benefit of dictatorship in all its forms. As they were trained for weapons, these soldiers functioned only under dictatorship. All the leaders of ECOWAS member countries were in this perspective since democracy began on the eve of 1990 in the West African part.[781] It was this wind of democracy that had amplified the struggles for the alternation of power in Liberia.

In addition, the integration of ECOWAS in general also has its shortcomings related to incompetence in its management by its leaders since its creation in 1975 until today.[782] The leaders of ECOWAS have not bothered to plan the means to deal with the scourges facing their region because to govern is to foresee. Despite some efforts made through the interventions of ECOMOG as an intervention force in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Conakry and Bissau, and most recently in Ivory Coast and Mali, the incompetence of ECOWAS has been almost permanent in its actions.[783] It has practically failed in its peaceful management

[778]Chapter I of ECOWAS Treaty of May 28, 1975 in Lagos (Nigeria), Article 2., accessed June, 12, 2021, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/5560/download
[779]Adibe, C. E. (1997). "The Liberian conflict and the ECOWAS-UN partnership." Third World Quarterly 18, no. 3, 471-488.
[780]Buell, R. L. (1931). "The Liberian Paradox." The Virginia Quarterly Review 7, no. 2, 161-175.
[781]Chazan, N. (1992). "Africa's democratic challenge." World Policy Journal 9, no. 2, 279-307.
[782]Nurudeen, A., Abd Karim, M. Z., & Aziz, M. I. (2015). Corruption, political instability and economic development in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS): is there a causal relationship?. Contemporary economics, 9(1), 45-60.
[783]Adebajo, A. (2002). Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 43-111.

of the political crises of its member states. Nearly five decades of existence, ECOWAS has evolved amid administrative slowness, inability and disagreement among its member states. Most of the problems that ECOWAS encounters come from the leaders. Even if the Western powers are to be blamed, it is important that the leaders become good students in their organisation's management. If charity begins at home, then ECOWAS leaders must address internal threats in order to unite to deal well with external ones. The lack of cohesion on shared values is one of the weaknesses holding back the development of ECOWAS. Therefore, the major problems that hinder the community's proper functioning are to be found within it. Micro nationalism manifests itself in the selfishness of ECOWAS heads of state. Following the provisions of the founding treaty (article 2) of ECOWAS, the Conference of Heads of State is the supreme organ of integration.[784] Therefore, it should be understood that the proper functioning of the community largely depends on the main body that directs it. This means that all major decisions emanate from integration heads of state. But the latter have different opinions regarding the philosophies developed for the management of the Community. Because, the nature of the political regimes embodied by these West African heads of state also impacts the functioning of integration. All these evoked realities have led to unsatisfactory results for ECOWAS in its crisis management in its member countries. Like the case of Liberia which had recorded thousands of deaths, wounded, displaced persons, refugees and the destruction of community infrastructure in this country. The actions and the will of the heads of state of West Africa influence the functioning of ECOWAS. Table 21 shows the list of the ECOWAS's member states where it has intervened to resolve conflicts from 1990 to 2018.

**Table 21: ECOWAS member countries that hosted its conflict resolution missions from 1990 to 2018**

| No | Member countries benefiting from ECOWAS conflict resolution missions. | The Duration of ECOWAS missions. | Years of conflict resolution (years of return to peace and |
|---|---|---|---|

[784]Chapter I of ECOWAS Treaty of May 28, 1975 in Lagos (Nigeria), Article 2., accessed June, 12, 2021, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/5560/download

| | | | **security in each country.** |
|---|---|---|---|
| 01 | Liberia | 1989 - 1997 | 1998 |
| 02 | Sierra Leone | 1991 - 2002 | 2002 |
| 03 | Guinea Bissau | 1998 -1999 | 1999 |
| 04 | Guinea Conakry | 2000 - 2002 | 2003 |
| 05 | Ivory Coast | 2002 -2010 | 2011 |
| 06 | Mali | 2012 - 2013 | 2013 |
| 07 | Gambia | 2016 -2018 | 2018 |

**Source:** Author's elaboration based on various ECOWAS reports.

Table 21 above lists the seven West African countries that benefited from ECOWAS conflict resolution missions from 1990 until 2018. It also provides information on the duration of ECOWAS interventions and the dates of final resolution of conflicts in each member country.

Likewise, the influence of the actions and the will of heads of state and government is distinguished by the organizational structure of the ECOWAS treaty, which is composed as follows: the Conference of Heads of State, the Council of Ministers, the General Secretariat, and the Specialized Commissions. This structure shows the hierarchy of powers of the Community. It is a pyramidal structure whose most of the powers are in the hands of the Heads of State who are at the top of the integration management positions. So the Council of Ministers is totally dependent on the Conference of Heads of State and its decisions are always subject to the control of the Conference which can modify or cancel them as it wishes. The Executive Secretary, he is appointed by the Conference of Heads of State and this appointment is not without the influence of one or more of the Heads of State. Without exaggeration, the fate of ECOWAS lies in the hands of the Heads of State who compose it because all the power of this institution is concentrated at their level.[785] They have the power to make or break integration because all decisions are amended by them hence their 'right of veto' in ECOWAS. Certainly, seeking regional integration after Africa's dark periods of

[785]Cowell, F. (2011). "The impact of the ECOWAS Protocol on Good Governance and Democracy." African Journal of International and Comparative Law 19, no. 2, 331-342.

transatlantic trade, slavery and colonization was necessary.[786] These horrific times on the African continent left several wounds that once independent heads of state should strive to heal. But unfortunately, the idea of coming together in a Community has not abolished the mistrust, disparity, contradiction and egalitarianism between the leaders of ECOWAS. Each state wants to safeguard its sovereignty which makes integration difficult. In addition, within ECOWAS, Heads of State have great authority so if a Head of State finds that a decision goes against his interests, he uses his power to block the decision. So, to boycott a decision, some Heads of State refuse to give their annual deposit in order to wean the integration of the means for its operation.[787] However, without the funding, it will be difficult for the leaders of the Community to carry out their activities because despite the differences of opinion between the Anglophone and Francophone political leaders on the resolution of the Liberian conflict, they finally agreed on its resolution. All these problems hamper the organization towards the achievement of its goals. Thus, the political differences of the Heads of State of ECOWAS do not converge towards the achievement of the objectives sought by the Community. For their own interests, some Heads of State support rebellions by giving them many means to fight another Member State of the Community. Therefore, the desire for personal interests is not likely to strengthen the ties of ECOWAS member states. This is why integration still suffers from division and mistrust.

The first indicator which proves that the leaders of ECOWAS were lack of experience in their intervention of the civil war in Sierra Leone is the duration of 11 years before leading to the return to peace and security and especially to the establishment of democracy. Several ceasefire agreements failed because the opposing camps in civil war refused their applications. ECOWAS did not have a monitoring mechanism that forced the government and the rebels to respect these various agreements. This gave the opportunity, especially to the rebels to unfold their plans of attacks as they wanted without worrying about any sanction. At first, the ECOWAS resolution agenda was challenging to apply because, between its

[786]Fage, J. D. (1969). "Slavery and the slave trade in the context of West African history." Journal of African history, 393-404.
[787]Yansane, A. Y. (1977). "The economic community of West African States (ECOWAS)." The Review of Black Political Economy 7, no. 3, 215-237.

French-speaking and English-speaking member countries there was a difference of opinion on the nature of the civil war.[788] The French-speaking countries saw that the rebels were leading a just struggle to restore democracy by alternating power and respecting human rights. So, for them, the regime of the krios which was fought by the rebels was dictatorial.[789] But for English-speaking countries, the rebels were not right to fight their country's government with arms. This difference of opinion between the French-speaking countries and the English-speaking members of ECOWAS had weakened the actions of ECOWAS in the Sierra Leonean civil conflict.

ECOWAS leaders often find it difficult to agree on interventions when peace is threatened in one of the member countries. The hesitations of intervention are linked to the friendly between the heads of state of this regional space. During the Sierra Leonean crisis, the same situation occurred and led to a significant delay of intervention in the Sierra Leonean civil war at the regional and international level. In the 1990s, Kosovo was also going through a civil war, like some African countries.[790] So the United States, the United Nations and the African Union were opposed to military intervention to restore peace in countries in conflict. This hesitation of rapid intervention by soldiers from regional and international organizations resulted in the prolongation of several civil wars, including Sierra Leone. The UN encouraged regional organizations like NATO and ECOWAS to assume their responsibilities in their regions of competence. Thus, the Sierra Leonean civil conflict which began in 1991 had the time to cause a great deal of human and material damage.[791] Since the start of this crisis, it was on November 30, 1996 that the first ceasefire agreement was signed in Abidjan (Côte d'Ivoire).[792] Unfortunately, this agreement signed between the Kabbah government and

[788]Dumbuya, P. A. (2008). "ECOWAS Military Intervention in Sierra Leone: Anglophone-Francophone Bipolarity or Multipolarity?." Journal of Third World Studies 25, no. 2, 83-102.
[789]Asangna, C. (2017). An examination of the Sierra Leone war. African Journal of Political Science and International Relations, 11(5), 103-111.
[790]Lichnofsky, C. (2013). "Ashkali and Egyptians in Kosovo: New ethnic identifications as a result of exclusion during nationalist violence from 1990 till 2010." Romani Studies 23, no. 1, 29-61.
[791]Kabia, J. M. (2008). "Greed or Grievance? Diamonds, Rent-Seeking and the Civil War in Sierra Leone (1991-2002)." Extractive economies and conflicts in the global south, multi-regional perspectives on rentier politics, 93-106.
[792]Bartholomew, E. E. (2007). "Constructing Durable Peace: Lessons from Sierra Leone." Cal. W. Int'l LJ 38, 129.

Sankoh's RUF did not come to a favorable end. So, the ECOWAS intervention really started after more than four years of fighting between state forces and rebels. After the failure of the Abidjan Agreement, on October 23, 1997, another agreement was signed between the AFRC / RUF armed forces and representatives of ECOWAS signed in Guinea Conakry.[793] This second agreement did not lead to the resolution of the crisis because the RUF rebellion did not respect the disarmament clause since a coup d'état took place in the same year after this 1997 Conakry agreement.[794] Nigeria was accused of being very present unilaterally in this Sierra Leonean civil crisis by other members of ECOWAS including Senegal and Ghana. ECOWAS diplomacy did not include some solitary actions by Nigeria alongside the Kabbah government. Mistrust had grown between leaders of ECOWAS member countries regarding this crisis in Sierra Leone. Faced with the occupation of the capital Freetown of Sierra Leone in 1998 by the rebels of Sankoh,[795] the Head of State Kabbah himself in March 1999 launched a diplomatic offensive by visiting certain important member countries of ECOWAS such as the Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria and Togo, to discuss the situation in this country to find possible solutions. Thus, on May 18, 1999, the Sierra Leonean government was able to sign a ceasefire agreement with the RUF in Lomé (Togo).[796] This agreement effectively took effect on May 24, 1999. In this perspective, negotiations between the Sierra Leonean government and the RUF began on May 25, 1999 in Lomé.[797] The debates were led by an arbitration committee headed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Togo under the presence of ECOWAS, the African Union (AU) and the Special Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations.

For the success of the Lomé agreement, the President of ECOWAS who was the Togolese Head of State decided to strengthen the forces of ECOWAS and wished for joint actions to limit the solitary interventions of certain member states because, Nigeria was not the only

[793]Ibid, P. 131.
[794]Gberıe, L. (1997). "The May 25 Coup d'Etat in Sierra Leone: A Militariat Revolt?" Africa Development/Afrique Et Développement 22, no. ¾, 149-170.
[795]Williams, P. (2001). "Fighting for freetown: British military intervention in Sierra Leone." Contemporary Security Policy 22, no. 3, 140-168.
[796]Omotola, J. S. (2007). "The Sierra Leone Lomé Peace Accord." conflict trends 2007, no. 3, 38-43.
[797]Bright, D. (2000). "Implementing the Lomé peace agreement." Accord: An International Review of Peace Initiatives 9, 36-41.

country that was close to the government of Kabbah. The rebels also had the support of some countries like Charles Taylor's Liberia and Blaise Compaoré's Burkina Faso because in April 1999, the commander of ECOMOG forces, Felix Mujakperuo publicly declared that the presidents of Liberia and Burkina Faso supplied arms to the RUF using aircraft and crews registered in Ukraine.[798] It was necessary to put an end to these various supports on both sides for a successful outcome of the crisis. The leaders of ECOWAS were not able to control the networks that provided arms to the rebels. They did not have sufficient and adequate means for this mission. The leadership of the President of ECOWAS Eyadema Gnassingbé was strongly supported by member countries whose forces were serving in ECOMOG (Nigeria, Guinea, Ghana and Mali), some foreign countries and international organizations.[799] Also, diplomacy alone could not activate the important negotiations between the camps in civil conflict in Sierra Leone. The rulers of the United Kingdom and the USA were represented in Sierra Leone conflict resolution by the Special Envoy of the President of the United States for the Promotion of Democracy in Africa, Reverend Jesse Jackson) and the Special Representative of the Secretary General of United Nations for Sierra Leone, Francis G. Okelo.[800] Therefore, the leaders of ECOWAS do not yet have sufficient skills to resolve on their own the various problems of this regional integration of West Africa. Also, the differences of opinion on the concept of democracy between the French-speaking and English-speaking countries means that the Conference of Heads of State composed of the presidents of all the member countries of ECOWAS is slow in taking decisions on certain questions of conflict resolution in a member country at war as was the case in Liberia and Sierra Leone. They referred very much to the decisions of the UN Security Council before acting in the event of a threat to peace or the resolution of a conflict. The proof when the civil war situation worsened in Sierra Leone, it was in New York in the United States that a meeting was held inNovember 1997 between the Security Council and representatives of ECOWAS to define the next steps to be taken to avoid further failure to apply agreements

[798]Simonsz, D. (2007). "In search of international tort law: civil liability of arms manufacturers for indirect sales to embargoed conflict zones." PhD diss., University of Pretoria, 17.
[799]The Lomé peace negotiations, accessed August 8, 2021, https://www.c-r.org/accord/sierra-leone/lom%C3%A9-peace-negotiations
[800]Hasan, M. M. (2015). The role of the ECOWAS, the United Nations and the United Kingdom in terminating Sierra Leone civil war. University of Massachusetts Boston, 35-56.

such as those in the first two.[801] This meeting in New York greatly contributed to the Sierra Leonean civil conflict outcome. The resolution of the Liberian conflict was also a similar situation because on September 22, 1993, the United Nations Security Council established a United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNMIL).[802] This observer mission was made up of soldiers and civilians. In total, the mission's crew numbered 368 observers.[803] They went to support the ECOMOG military forces which had been there since 1990.[804]

The fact that at the beginning of the civil war, Nigeria was an open ally of the power of Kabbah in Sierra Leone, the tensions between the member countries of ECOWAS had weakened the operations of ECOMOG which was directed entirely by the Nigerian government. These leadership quarrels between member countries did not militate for the rapid resolution of the civil conflict in Sierra Leone. To bring President Kabbah back to power, Nigeria had the sole decision to send troops to Sierra Leone to resolve the conflict and the restore democracy and human rights. According to (Pham, 2006), "Nigerian-led ECOMOG forces secured the roads and main towns and did not attempt to pursue the RUF rebels into the forest, which created a military standoff."[805] This was how this first ECOMOG intervention failed. In this almost chaotic situation, the leadership rivalries between Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana and Nigeria were amplified by negative criticism from Nigeria for its solitary intervention in the crisis in Sierra Leone.[806] For Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana, the option of resolving the conflict through diplomatic channels was the best at the expense of the military intervention that Nigeria was supporting.[807] From his military operations through ECOMOG, Nigeria realized that it had to take the path of negotiation with the RUF rebels. The Nigeria-

[801]Statement by the President of the Security Council on the situation in Sierra Leone, accessed August 10, 2021, https://reliefweb.int/report/sierra-leone/statement-president-security-council-situation-sierra-leone-1
[802]Aboagye, F. B. and Bah, A. M. (2004). Liberia at a Crossroads: A preliminary look at the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and the protection of civilians. Institute for Security Studies Papers, 2004(95), 20.
[803] Ibid.
[804]Adibe, C. E. (1997). The Liberian conflict and the ECOWAS-UN partnership. Third World Quarterly, vol. 18, no 3, 471-488.
[805]Pham, J. P. (2006). Child Soldiers, Adult Interests: The Global Dimensions of the Sierra Leone an Tragedy, New York: Nova Science Publishers, 132.
[806]Dumbuya, P. A. (2008). "ECOWAS Military Intervention in Sierra Leone: Anglophone-Francophone Bipolarity or Multipolarity?." Journal of Third World Studies 25, no. 2, 83-102.
[807]Osakwe, C. C. and Audu, B. N. (2017). "The Nigeria led ECOMOG military intervention and interest in the Sierra Leone crisis: An overview." Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences 8, no. 4 S1, 107.

led ECOMOG was unable to disarm the RUF rebellion. After this theater of leadership rivalry between member countries the path of diplomacy has been chosen by all the leaders of ECOWAS and international organizations for the resolution of the Liberian conflict. In fact, the incompetence of ECOWAS leaders in resolving the Sierra Leonean civil conflict stemmed from a disagreement between the presidents of member states. It was a question of political and strategic reasons mainly the positioning of Nigeria to have the place of the regional power, of the economic reasons for the exploitation and the commercialization of diamonds coming from the country at war, of the social reasons linked to the friendships between certain chiefs of West African states and the links of some of them with the actors of the Sierra Leonean civil war.

Finally, the leaders of ECOWAS agreed to act together in the Sierra Leonean conflict for the rapid return to peace and security. They used both diplomacy to negotiate and ECOMOG forces to disarm the rebels.[808] They were able to silence all their disagreements to engage diplomatically and militarily to stop the suffering of the Sierra Leonean people during this civil crisis. After all diplomatic and military efforts, the two fighting parties agreed to return to peace and security through democratic means and President Kabbah announced the end of the Sierra Leonean civil war in 2002.[809] Despite the end of the Sierra Leonean civil war, there are many criticisms related to the way the negotiations were conducted by the leaders of ECOWAS. According to (Hirsch, 200l), the Lomé Agreement was more controversial because it ignored the responsibility of the RUF before the penal code of Sierra Leone.[810] However, the RUF was the main actor in the rebellion, which massacred Sierra Leonean civilians throughout this period of conflict. But a peace agreement signed between the opposing camps involved in this civil crisis amnestied him for his crimes, and offered him several ministerial portfolios of great political influence in the country. The weakness of this Lomé Accord was unacceptable because it justified that an armed rebellion can gain power

[808]BERMAN, E. G. (2000). Re-Armament in Sierra Leone: One Year after the Lomé Peace Agreement. Small Arms Survey, 11- 29.
[809]Kandeh, J. D. (2003). "Sierra Leone's post-conflict elections of 2002." Journal of Modern African Studies, 189-216.
[810]Hirsch, J. L. (2001). Sierra Leone: Diamonds and the Struggle for Democracy, Boul der: Lynne Rienner, 15-16.

through terrorism according to (Lizza, 2000).[811] However, the lack of capacity and financial resources to operate national and regional institutions independently in several African states very often force them to resort to external aid in many vital sectors.

### 5.3.2 STATE WEAKNESSES'

#### . The Case of Liberia

In any country, government policy impacts all other areas of decision-making. A good policy in the governance of a country boosts all other sectors of activity. So government policy determines directions and results in other areas of the country. Seen in this light, politics can be seen as the driving force behind other sectors of the country. Even in economics, there are no good results without good policy from the central government of the country. Politics are everywhere for decision-making for good management of state affairs.[812] However, in times of civil war sometimes the central government no longer has the full power to apply its policy because of the country's instability. It is undeniable that if central politics go wrong the whole country becomes sick. This is why it is important in a democratic regime to choose good rulers for the country. Normally, during presidential election campaigns, citizens with the right to vote should choose their president on the basis of a social project.[813] Therefore, the choice of a president should not be based on ethnic, religious, clan, tribal and other considerations, but the choice must be made on the candidate who has a better project for society. The social project of each candidate for the presidential elections determines the country's future policy. It is for this reason that it is important that the citizens choose their president on the best offer of social project. But if the president is elected on ethnic, religious, clan, tribal and other considerations, it is an open door to evils such as bad governance, corruption, nepotism, favoritism and especially the exclusion of certain social layers of the

[811]Lizza, R. (2000). « Where Angels Fear to Tread », The New Republic, 22-27.
[812]Pettigrew, A. M. (2014). The politics of organizational decision-making. Routledge, 16-30.
[813] Dolan, K. (2014). Gender stereotypes, candidate evaluations, and voting for women candidates: what really matters? Political Research Quarterly, vol. 67, no 1, 96-107.

enjoyment of their rights.[814] The marginalization of part of the people in a country creates social rifts which in turn cause frustration. It is from these discontents that the uprisings begin to culminate in civil wars in several countries. In 1955 the population of Liberia was 1,011,363. At the start of its civil war in 1990, Liberia's population was 2,075,912. It had doubled in the 35 years interval. In the middle of the war in 1995, it was 2,044,661 inhabitants. Three years after the civil war in 2000, it had remained almost stagnant around 2,848,456 inhabitants. In 2015 it had doubled to 4,472,230 inhabitants and in 2020 it was 5,057,681 inhabitants. It can be seen that after the 1997 civil war, Liberian demography began to increase exponentially. During the civil war between 1989 and 1997 the population decreased. So, the Liberian civil war had negative impacts on its population growth due to dead, displaced and refugees. In total, there were approximately 150,000 to 200,000 dead people and 750,000 refugees during this Liberian civil war. So, we can deduce that Liberia has lost almost a million of its population including refugees who were hosted in neighboring countries such as Côte d'Ivoire, Sierra Leone and Guinea Conakry. Figure 1 shows the list of the different ethnic groups in Liberia and their shares as percentage of total population.

**Figure 1: The different ethnic groups of the Liberian population.**




**Source:** 2008 Liberian General Population Census, accessed february 02, 2021, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/print_li.html

[814]Caleb, A. and Danjuma, I. A. (2018). Identity conflicts as challenge to political stability in West Africa. African Journal of Political Science and International Relations, vol. 12, no 4, 42-53.

The different ethnic groups that were at the origin of the civil war in Liberia are Gio (08%), Mano (07.9%), Krahn (04%) and Mandingo (03.2%). We are talking about ethnic groups that can be qualified as minorities in this country. These ethnic groups put together do not reach half of the population. However, we know that the civil war ended more than 20 years ago. So in 1989 when this crisis started these ethnic groups were still much less populous than today.[815] In many countries in Africa there is this difficult situation to explain which is that very often it is minority ethnic groups that govern our states. The majority groups are often very poor and especially without university education to claim to have access to state power. Here we have the Kpelle (20.3%), Bassa (13.4%) and Grebo (10%) which constitute the majority of the population but they were not directly involved in the civil war. Figure 2 shows the drop in the size of the Liberian population during the period of the country's civil war.

**Figure 2: Trends in Liberian population.**




**Source:** Worldometer, accessed January 04, 2021 https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/liberia-population/

[815]Ellis, S. (1995). Liberia 1989-1994: A study of ethnic and spiritual violence. African Affairs, vol. 94, no 375, 165-197.

We can observe from Figure 2 that the population's size has normally evolved positively between the years 1955 and 1980. Before the period of the civil war there was an increase in population during these years. This means that the mortality was very low so there were no negative impacts on the population growth. But from 1985 until 1995, the size of the population declined. This period coincided with the civil war twhich led to the decline in the population. The civil war raised the death rate in the country over the period 1985-1995. Obviously, the population growth could not be normal. This large drop in the size of the population exposes the many human damages that this civil conflict has left behind in this country. These are the perverse consequences that the war has provoked. Nevertheless, the population growth has resumed normally since the year 200. Obviously, the year 2000 was another era in the life of Liberians because it was the post-war period in this country. We even note that the demography has become galloping to compensate for the human losses of the war. On the social level, the Liberian civil war left thousands of internally displaced people refugees and unfortunately, deaths.

Economically, the negative impacts of the Liberian civil war are also visible. The annual economic growth rate from 1961 to 2020 shows that between 1961 and 1988 the annual economic growth rates were positive with an average of around 2%. Between 1989 and 1995, which is the period of the war, economic growth rates were negative with an average of approximately -30%. But between 1996 and 2000, Liberia had recorded very high positive annual economic growth rates of around 40%. In 1997, it recorded the highest annual economic growth rate of around 106.2%. Annual economic growth rates have remained acceptable from 2001 until 2020 at around 3% on average. Its Gross Domestic Product per Capita per year averaged around US$200 between 1989 and 1997. From 2000 until 2020, its Gross Domestic Product per Capita per year averaged around US$500. Regarding its Gross National Product per Capita per year from 1970 until 1990 was on average around 400 US dollars. Between 1991 and 1997 Liberia had recorded a Gross National Product per Capita per year on average around 100 US dollars and finally between 1998 and 2018 a Gross National Product per Capita per year on average around 200 US dollars. Note that Liberia recorded its lowest annual economic growth rate, gross domestic product and gross national

product per capita per year during its civil war period between 1989 and 1997. The annual economic growth rate and domestic product and national gross saw improvement after the end of its civil war. Figure 3 shows the trends in Liberia's econonic growth over the period 1961-2020.

**Figure 3: Annual Liberia's economic growth rate, 1961-2020.**




**Source:** Extracted from the IMF's April 2020 Database of Countries' Economic Growth.

Figure 3 shows that the economic growth rate of Liberia has been very volitile over time. There have been a lot of variations because the growth rate increases in some years, also decreases in certain years and there are also some negative annual economic growth rates. Thus, from 1961 until 1972, economic growth was positive in evolution compared to the period 1989-1997. This means that there have been years of strong economic growth and those of weak economic growth. In the interval between these years, 1962 saw weak economic growth with a rate of 1.345% and 1966 was the year with the greatest growth with 7.703%. But between the years 1973 and 1995 the Liberian economic growth is in most of the negative years. The greatest growth recorded in this interval of time only the years 1974, 1976, 1977, 1978 and 1979 recorded positive growths of which the greatest economic growth was found in 1976. The economic growth of this country fell completely during the period of the civil war between 1989 and 1995. Then, in this moment, the greatest decrease is registered in 1990 the year following the beginning of the civil crisis with an economic growth rate of -51.03%. The best economic performance was achieved in 1995 with an economic growth rate of -4.275% because it was the beginning of the resolution of the war. The negative impacts of the Liberian civil war on the economy of this country are clearly seen in the years 1989 and 1995 when the economy showed a deep decline. It can be said that this civil conflict has severely affected the Liberian economy because in times of war

individual and collective economic activities no longer operate normally. Often, there are closures of several shopping centers, small and medium-sized enterprises and all other commercial structures because the security and the free movement of people and goods are no longer guaranteed. This difficult situation blocks all economic sectors and causes a decline in economic performance. It is in these periods that the country's debt signficantly increased because there was no longer the possibility for the State to collect internal tax revenues for the expenses of the sovereignty of the country. Finally, between 1996 and 2020 economic growth resumed with further ups and downs in growth rates. The greatest growth was achieved in 1997 with an economic growth of 106.2%. This growth can be explained by the fact of the aid which the foreign countries brought to this country in difficulty to facilitate the transition towards peace. The worst economic performance was found in 2003 with a negative economic growth rate of -30.14%. Between 2019 and 2020, this rate remains negative with a growth rate of -2.5%. Like several other poor West African countries, Liberia is still an economically ill country. Its annual economic growth rate is not gradual because it evolves in a checkered pattern with often negative economic growth rates. Especially the socio-economic impacts are observed more in the period of the civil war of this country with deeply negative economic growth rates in 1989 and 1995. So what about the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita during the civil crisis in this country?

In a country, what allows the rulers to have the means to properly manage state affairs are the income-generating activities carried out by each citizen. In non-industrialized countries such as those in the ECOWAS region rely on taxation to have revenue for their government policies. However, in times of war, commercial activities often slow down or even stop because security is not guaranteed for everyone to go about their business. The free movement of people and goods is not possible in times of war, which has negative impacts on the country's economic sectors. Without peace there are no regular customers for traders because offer and demand take a hit. So per capita incomes will also fall in the conflict country. The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in US dollars per year and per capita will fall too. In the case of Liberia, poverty increased during the period of its civil war as annual per

capita incomes declined considerably. Figure 4 shows the trends in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita from 1990-2020.

**Figure 4: Annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita in US dollars in Liberia from 1990 to 2020.**




**Source:** The IMF; World economic outlook database.

The civil crisis in Liberia began in 1989, but the year 1990 can be the starting point for the appreciation of the GDP for the simple reason that this year illustrates well the socio-economic impacts of the civil war that this country went through. So, in Figure 4 which presents the GDP of each year per capita, we see that the first two years following the start of the war, the GDPs are estimated respectively at 722 and 630 US dollars per capita of the Liberian population. The worst GDPs are recorded from 1992 until 1996 which are the cruel moments of this crisis. These GDPs hover around a little over US $ 200 per year per capita. It was not until the end of the civil war in 1997 that the slope was raised a little. So in 1997 the GDP per capita was 416 US dollars. But since 1998 until this year 2020, the GDP per year and per capita fluctuates between 500 and nearly 700 US dollars. This means that there is a little stability in terms of per capita income each year after the period of civil war. Proof that this crisis had negative impacts on the socio-economic life of Liberians because during the civil war the economic situation was bad. In general, the Liberian civil war severly affected the economic performance of the country and put many people into poverty and or

misery.[816] To better assess the economic realities in the following table, we will show the internal wealth of Liberia by its Gross National Product (GNP) since 1970 until 2018.

**Figure 5: Annual Gross National Product (GNP) per capita in US dollars in Liberia from 1970 to 2018.**




**Source:** Extracted from the UNCTAD 2020 updated database on the annual Gross National Product (GNP) of Liberia.

Careful observation of data from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) on the Gross National Product (GNP) in annual US dollars per capita of Liberia from 1970 to 2018 shows that from 1970 until 1980 the per capita incomes have grown slightly each year for 10 years. From 253.6571 US dollars per capita in 1970, this country recorded 520.256 US dollars per capita in 1980. We can say that in 10 years Liberia has doubled its Gross National Product. This means that its economy was in a dynamic of growth. But between 1981 and 1989 the Gross National Product per capita or GDP per capita of the country stagnated around 400 US dollars. So, we notice a small drop in annual income per capita linked to a drop in the Gross National Product. Worse still, during the period of the Liberian civil war between 1990 and 1997, there is a huge decrease in the Gross National Product with the highest annual income of 254.549 US dollars per capita in 1990 and the lowest annual income is 90.62906 US dollar per capita in 1995. This clearly shows that the Liberian civil war had negative impacts on its national economy which can be seen through the annual Gross National Product per capita. This country timidly resumed its economic growth from 1998 with small ups and downs. Between 1998 and 2018, the lowest annual

[816]Hegre, H., Østby, G. And Raleigh, C. (2009). Poverty and civil war events: A disaggregated study of Liberia. Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 53, no 4, 598-623.

gross national product income was observed in 2003 with 108.7427 US dollars per capita. But, it was the year 2016 that recorded the highest annual gross national product income which was 426.6377 US dollars per capita. Considering all these economic hardships at the national level of Liberia during its civil war, so for the ECOWAS region the negative impacts of this low economy will be visible too.

**. The Case of Sierra Leone**

Before the Sierra Leonean civil war, this country suffered from bad governance because between 1968 until the 1990s political and economic power was concentrated in the hands of the Krio ethnic group.[817] Most of the country's population lived in difficult economic conditions. This social inequality had resulted in popular revolts for the change of governance in favor of all the people of Sierra Leone. The objective of the popular protests was the alternation of power to end the reign of the krios. Faced with the resistance and refusal of President Joseph Saidu Momoh, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebellion of which Foday Saybana Sankoh is the leader had emerged in order to overthrow the power in place.[818] Political instability in Sierra Leone began in this condition. Especially when Corporal Foday Saybana Sankoh took the lead in the rebellion, several young soldiers and civilians from ethnic groups long marginalized by the powers of the Krios had joined him. Thus, the RUF rebels became more numerous and more influential in the struggle for power. The rebel leader Sankoh, who was a soldier, knew well the weak points of Momoh's power and the military strategies that had to be put in place to destabilize it. Also, with the help of the rebels of President Charles Taylor of Liberia, Corporal Sankoh's rebellion had grown in strength against the power of Momoh.[819] Central power had become almost non-existent because it could no longer control all of Sierra Leone's territory. When the Sankoh rebels took all the major towns and even almost the capital Freetown in early 1998 with several deaths, the

[817]Sengova, J. (2006). Aborigines and Returnees: In Search of Linguistic and Historical Meaning in Delineations of Sierra Leone's Ethnicity and Heritage'. New perspectives on the Sierra Leone Krio, 167-199.
[818]Gberie, L. (2005). A dirty war in West Africa: The RUF and the destruction of Sierra Leone. Indiana University Press, 1-8.
[819]Berman, E. G. (2001). Arming the Revolutionary United Front. African Security Studies, vol. 10, no 1, 5-14.

government fell under pressure from the rebels.[820] But very quickly, the ECOWAS ECOMOG armed forces intervened to restore power. However, the civil war continued between rebels and successive powers until 2002 despite the presence of the ECOWAS armed forces. Demographically in 1955 the population of Sierra Leone was approximately over 2 million. In 1955 and 1990, the number of inhabitants had doubled to approximately just over 4 million. During the period of the war between 1991 and 2000, the population of Sierra Leone was always around more than 4 million inhabitants. But in 2005, the demography increased around 6 million inhabitants. Also, between 2005 and 2020 the number of inhabitants has almost doubled by about 8 million inhabitants. It is noted that in times of peace and security the population of Sierra Leone increases exponentially. But when there is civil war, there are negative consequences for the population because the war causes deaths, refugees and displaced persons. The negative impacts observed on the Sierra Leonean population can be interpreted in this sense. The Figure 6 shows the different ethnic groups and their proportions in terms of popularity in percentage and finally a comment will follow to identify the ethnic groups which were at the origin of the civil war in this country.

**Figure 6: The different ethnic groups of the Sierra Leonean population.**




**Source:** 2004 Sierra Leone General Population Census, P. 33, accessed fabruary 18, 2020**,** **https://projects.iq.harvard.edu/files/piep/files/glennerstermiguelrothenberg_dec2009.pdf**

[820]Williams, P. (2001). "Fighting for freetown: British military intervention in Sierra Leone." Contemporary Security Policy 22, no. 3, 140-168.

As shown in Figure 6, the Mendes and Temmes are the majority ethnic groups with respectively 32.2% and 31.8% of the country's total population. The role of these two ethnic groups in the Sierra Leonean civil crisis is decisive because they had taken the lead against the Krios. The leaders of the rebel groups who waged this war come from these two ethnic groups. However, in the case of Liberia it was four ethnic minority groups. But, the common point in the two civil wars Liberian and Sierra Leonean was that indigenous ethnic groups demanded social justice in the management of state affairs from the descendants of slaves (Americano-Liberian) and (Krios) having the monopoly of economic and political powers. So in Sierra Leone, the other remaining ethnic groups are not as populated as the first two. So, Limbas are 08.3%, Konos 04.4%, Kuranko also 04.1% followed by Fullah who are 03.7%. The rest of the ethnic groups are not very numerous because their populations are between 2 and 00.1%. In the list of these ethnic groups, the Yalunka, Krims and Vais are the last with respectively 00.7%, 00.2% and 00.1%. Figure 7 illustrates the demographic impacts of this conflict as the population decreased during this war due to deaths and refugees.

**Figure 7: The impacts of Sierra Leonean civil war on its population.**




**Source: Worldometer, accessed March 18, 2021**, https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/sierra-leone-population/

In this Figure 7 which shows the evolution of the population of Sierra-Leone from 1955 to 2020, the observation is that from 1955 until 1990, the population grew steadily. In 1955, the population had a growth of 1.19%. This growth did not suffer a fall until 1990 when it showed a growth of 2.57%. So when this country was not in conflict, its population growth was normal. But from 1991, which marked the beginning of the Sierra Leonean conflict, the population of this country was reduced by deaths and refugees. Thus, in 1995, the population showed a decrease with a percentage of -0.07%. It was during the war period and no doubt the negative consequences that flowed from it. The impact of the Sierra Leonean conflict on its population or demography is defined by the loss of part of its citizens. Some are killed in armed clashes and others have been forced to flee the country to avoid the atrocities of war. However, when the conflict began to be resolved in the 2000s, the population started to grow again. It left -0.07 in 1995 to reach a growth of 1.27% in 2000. Likewise, this growth continued without problem, posting the highest percentage in 2005 with a rate of 4.25% between 2000 and 2020. It should be noted that this population growth has no longer suffered a negative decrease even if from 2010 until 2020, it hovers around a little over 2%. Finally, this Figure 2 gives an overall idea of the negative impacts of the conflict in Sierra Leone on the growth of its population or demography. The population decline observed in 1995 was the result of the loss of life and refugees caused by this conflict which lasted from 1991 until 2002 in Sierra Leone.

Economically, the Sierra Leonean war had negative impacts as well. The annual economic growth rates from 1961 until 1990 remained more or less positive with an average of around 2.5%. Between 1991 and 2001, economic growth rates were negative with an average of about -2%. Regarding the gross national product per capita per year for Sierra Leone, the data available is from 1990 to 2020. So, the gross national product between 1990 and 2002 which marks the beginning and the end of the Sierra Leonean civil war, the Gross domestic per capita per year averages around US$300. Between 2003 and 2020 the gross domestic product per capita per year is on average about 450 US dollars. The gross national product per capita per year between 1970 and 1990 averaged around US$250. In the Sierra Leonean civil war period of 1991 and 2002, the gross national product per capita per year averaged

around US$200. Finally after the civil war from 2003 to 2018, the gross national product per capita per year is on average 400 US dollars. These results show that during the civil war period between 1991 and 2002, the annual economic growth rates, the domestic and gross national products per capita and per year fell. Then, the Sierra Leonean civil war of 1991 and 2002 negative impacted its demography and its economy. The Figure 8 shows the negative impacts of the Sierra Leonean civil war on the economy of this country through its annual economic growth rates according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

**Figure 8: Annual Sierra Leone's economic growth rate from 1961 to 2020.**




**Source**: Extracted from the IMF's April 2020 Database of Countries' Economic Growth.

Sierra Leone is one of the poorest countries in Africa and the world. In Figure 8, the annual economic growth rate is recorded by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) from 1961 until 2020. The annual economic growth rates displayed by this table confirm that even in a situation of peace and security, this country was not economically prosperous. Logically, in a situation of civil war between 1991 and 2002 where the practice of commercial activities was impossible, Sierra Leone had fallen into a negative economic decline. This is due to the political, economic and social instabilities that reigned in this country because the civil war had blocked income-generating activities. Thus, through this table, from 1961 until 1990, the country experienced acceptable economic growth rates. Because for 30 years, he made some

efforts to achieve economic growth rates, the highest of which were observed in 1969 and 1970 respectively with economic growth rates of 8.528% and 8.624%. So the greatest economic performance was achieved in 1970 with an economic growth rate of 8.624. But, there are some negative growth rates in the same interval of years 1961 and 1990. These rates of economic decrease are respectively in the years 1976 with economic growth rate of -0.45%, 1983 with a rate of economic growth of -2.105%, 1985 with an economic growth rate of -5.313% and in 1988 with the lowest and above all negative economic growth rate of -7.082%. The year 1988 was the worst year in terms of economic growth rate between 1961 and 1990. Because, the country achieved an economic rate of decline of -7.082%.

For the other 30 years from 1991 to 2020, the remark is that in this interval, the civil war had intervened at the beginning of the year 1991 until 2002. This civil conflict affected the economic growth rates of the Sierra Leone. Thus, in 11 years of civil war, this country recorded 6 different years of negative economic growth rates between 1991 and 2002. At the start of the civil war in 1991, the country had an economic growth rate of 2.352%. But with the scale of the war over time, economic growth rates have fallen and even been negative in some years. The two highest economic growth rates recorded in this period of the war are respectively in 2000 with an economic growth rate of 6.653% and in 2002 with an economic growth rate of 26.46%. The worst years of economic growth rate are: 1992 with an economic growth rate of -19.01%, 1994 with an economic growth rate of -1.946%, 1995 with an economic growth rate of -8.004%, 1997 with an economic growth rate of -5.877%, 1999 with an economic growth rate of -1.982% and finally 2001 with an economic growth rate of -6.345%. The lowest economic growth rate was observed in 1992 with a negative growth rate of -19.01%. However, from 2002 which marked the end of the civil war, the rate of economic growth experienced a great boom. Because, in 2002, it was 26.46% qualified as a double-digit economic growth rate. This is the only rate of growth recorded since the end of the civil war until today. These annual economic growth rates for Sierra Leone remained acceptable from 2002 until 2020. Except that in 2015, this country experienced a net economic growth rate of -20.6%. And also in 2020 with a negative growth rate of -2.302%. Almost 20 years after the civil war, Sierra Leone is giving itself an economic boost for higher economic

growth rates. Figure 9 shows the trends in annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita US dollars. It helps to better appreciate the economic impacts of the Sierra Leonean civil war. These data are taken from the IMF's 1990-2020 database for Sierra Leone.

**Figure 9: Annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita in US dollars in Sierra Leone from 1990 to 2020.**




**Source:** Extracted from the IMF's April 2020 Update Database on Sierra Leone's Annual Per Capita Income from 1990 to 2020.

Careful observation of Sierra Leone's annual gross domestic product in US dollars per capita from 1990-2020 in Figure 9 also sheds light on the economic impacts of its civil war. In the year 1991 that marked the start of the civil conflict, the annual gross domestic product in US dollars per capita in Sierra Leone was 453 US dollars. During the entire period of the civil war from 1992 until 2002, the annual gross domestic product in US dollars per capita hovers around just over 300 US dollars. The lowest annual gross domestic product in US dollars per capita was recorded in 2001 at 293 US dollars. After the civil war, the annual gross domestic product in US dollars per capita has improved since 2007 to 403 US dollars. In 2012, it reached 505 US dollars and in 2014 it climbed again to 610 US dollars. This annual gross domestic product in US dollars per capita fell in 2015 and 2016 with amounts of 474 and 492 US dollars respectively. From 2017 until 2020, it remained around 500 US dollars. The

Figure 10 below shows the annual Gross National Product (GNP) in US dollars per capita in Sierra Leone. This Figure 10 will also show the economic impacts of the civil war on the national income of each inhabitant in Sierra Leone.

**Figure 10: Annual Gross National Product (GNP) per capita in US dollars in Sierra Leone from 1970 to 2018.**




**Source:** Extracted from the UNCTAD 2020 updated database on the annual Gross National Product (GNP) of Sierra Leone.

In Figure 10, the annual gross national product per capita in US dollars between 1970 and 2018 has seen ups and downs in Sierra Leone. The annual per capita incomes in this country show the characteristics of the world's poor countries. Third World countries are those whose people live on less than US $ 1 a day. Therefore, the first part of the analysis of these data in the table will concern the first 30 years (1970-1990). In 1970, the annual gross national product per capita in US dollars was 157.8063 US dollars. 30 years later in 1990, it was 191.8886 US dollars. In this three-decade period, the lowest annual gross national product per capita in US dollars was recorded in 1970 with an income of 157.8063 US dollars per capita and the highest annual gross national product per capita in US dollars was realized in 1984 with an income of 441.0609 US dollars per capita. The last 28 years from 1991 to 2018 are characterized by a period of civil war between 1991 and 2002. During these years of civil

conflict, the annual gross national product per capita in US dollars has declined. It hardly reaches 300 US dollars per year for each inhabitant. Rather, it has stagnated around 200 US dollars per year for each inhabitant. In this period of civil war, the lowest gross national product observed is in the year 2000 with an annual income of 192.1097 US dollars per capita. The highest one is recorded in the year 1996 with an annual income of 301.3857 US dollars per capita. In all other years of the war, the annual gross national product per capita slightly exceeded just over 200 US dollars and this is proof that the civil conflict in Sierra Leone has negatively impacted its economy. Since the end of Sierra Leone's civil war in 2002, the annual gross national product per capita in US dollars has started to increase. In 2003 it was 271,212 US dollars per capita and in 2018 it increased to 525.8725 US dollars per capita. Between 2003 and 2018, the lowest gross national product is in the year 2004 with an annual income per capita of 263.4559 US dollars and the highest is achieved in the year 2013 with an annual income per capita of 712,916 US dollars. The following table shows the level of analysis according to the causal factors and the theories corresponding to each level of analysis.

**Table 22: Level of analysis according to the causal factors and the theories corresponding to each level of analysis.**

| **Level of Analysis** | | **Causal Factors** | **Theories of Each Level of Analysis** |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Countries** | **International Organisations** | - Systemic change : end of Cold War | => Structural Neo-realism |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Liberia And Sierra Leone** | **And Former Colonizers** | - Role of great world powers<br>* UN<br>* US<br>* UK<br>* EU<br>* Israel<br>* Lebanon<br>- Role of continenatal actors<br>* UA<br>* Nigeria<br>* Libya | => Classical realism<br><br><br><br><br><br><br><br>=> Classical realism |
| | **Regional Actors** | - ECOWAS members states common interests<br>- ECOWAS as an institutional source of common identity<br>- Regional hegemon<br>* Nigeria | => Lberalism<br><br>=> Constructivism<br><br>=> Classical Realism |
| | **Domestic Actors** | - State weakness<br>- Role of individual leaders | => Third World theory |

**Source**: Autor's elaboration based on the frawork of Helene Gandios (2009)[821]

## 5.4. FINDINGS AND ASSESSMENT

Most of the west African states have almost the same characteristics politically, economically and socially. They are experiencing the same political, economic and social problems

[821]Gandois, H. (2009). The emergence of regional security organisations. A comparative study on ECOWAS and SADC. [PhD thesis]. Oxford University, UK, 94.

because they are not yet independent in these areas. They depend on external aid in times of peace and war to solve their vital problems. So the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone do not differ when we study their origins and causes. They took place in the moment of the alternation of state power in the two countries. These are civil conflicts that stem from ethnic discrimination in the two states. In both cases of crises, the minority ethnic groups had all the advantages of power by excluding the majority ethnic groups from the management of state affairs.[822] The causes of these two civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone lay in the exclusion and discrimination of the broad social strata which are the majority ethnic groups from the enjoyment of their country's wealth. The Krio and American-Liberian ethnic groups are in the minority respectively in Sierra Leone and Liberia but governed these countries without alternation until the day after the 1990s.[823] This confiscation of powers by the minority ethnic groups triggered rebellions in these two countries. These rebels denounced the autocracy and the dictatorship of the powers of minority ethnic groups. Faced with the refusal to negotiate democratic alternation with these minorities in each country, the rebels took up arms to quickly make themselves heard. In Sierra Leone the majority ethnic groups participated more in the civil war on the side of the rebels to take power because the recruitment and enlistment of combatants was by force in all the towns and villages taken by the rebels of Foday Sankoh . While in Liberia, the rebels waged war without recruiting and conscripting combatants by force. That is why there is participation of the ethnic majority in the civil war in Sierra Leone and not in Liberia.

As in both cases civil crises are similar with similar origins and causes, it would be important to show the responsibilities of the different actors who have been involved in the resolution of these conflicts. The main actor is the regional organization of ECOWAS whose mission is to provide economic, political and social solutions in its area for sustainable development.[824] However, to achieve its objective, there must be peace and security for the free movement of people and goods. Therefore, it necessarily has the responsibility of

[822]Batty, F. (2011). "Do ethnic groups retain homogenous preferences in African politics? Evidence from Sierra Leone and Liberia." African studies review, 117-143.
[823]Ibid.
[824]Bach, D. C. (1983). "The politics of West African economic co-operation: CEAO and ECOWAS." The Journal of Modern African Studies 21, no. 4, 605-623.

preventing, managing and resolving conflicts in the event of a breach of peace. It is helped in its multiple tasks by certain rich countries which are the former colonizers of African countries and international governmental and non-governmental organizations. So, all these actors are accountable for the successes and failures of ECOWAS in its missions. Responsibilities are located at three levels in the case of the Liberian and Sierra Leonean civil wars. It is about the achievements and failures of ECOWAS conflict resolution in Liberia between 1989 and 1997, and in Sierra Leone from 1991 to 2002 by taking into account the influence of international organizations in international level, the failures of ECOWAS leaders in regional level, and state weakness and role of individual leaders in a domestic level.

In the resolution of the Liberian and Sierra Leonean civil wars, there were the influences of external forces which were also involved since the origin of these wars. The main actor is the regional organization of ECOWAS whose mission is to provide economic, political and social solutions in its area for sustainable development.[825] However, to achieve its objective, there must be peace and security for the free movement of people and goods. Therefore, it necessarily has the responsibility of preventing, managing and resolving conflicts in the event of a breach of peace. It is helped in its multiple tasks by certain rich countries which are the former colonizers of African countries and international governmental and non-governmental organizations. So, all these actors are accountable for the successes and failures of ECOWAS in its missions. Responsibilities are located at three levels in Liberia and Sierra Leone conflicts resolution. It is about the involvement of external forces (international organisations, great world powers like US and UK that are former colonizers of Liberia and Sierra Leone) in international level, the faillures of the leaders of ECOWAS in regional level, and state weakness and role of individual leaders in a domestic level. The successes or failures of ECOWAS are not only linked to international organizations.

There is also the lack of experience in conflict resolution of the leaders of ECOWAS. This West African regional organization did not have too many experiences in conflict prevention,

[825]Bach, D. C. (1983). "The politics of West African economic co-operation: CEAO and ECOWAS." The Journal of Modern African Studies 21, no. 4, 605-623.

management and resolution because ECOWAS assigned this mission in 1990 in the face of recurring political crises in its area.[826] Also, the Liberian and Sierra Leonean civil wars are the first experiences of ECOWAS in the field of conflict resolution. So, it was obvious that the leaders of ECOWAS are not up to their missions given the lack of experience and financial and material means to fully play this role. Recourse to foreign aid was essential and still is essential to ECOWAS when carrying out its missions in its member countries that need it. The military power did not want to leave power so quickly to make way for democracy. Although on September 1993, the United Nations Security Council established a United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNMIL).[827] This observer mission was made up of soldiers and civilians. In total, the mission's crew numbered 368 observers.[828] They went to support the ECOMOG military forces which had been there since 1990.[829] UNMIL diplomats should enforce the Cotonou (Benin) peace agreement to lead to democratic elections in 1994.[830]

In Sierra Leone after the transformation of UNOMSIL into UNAMSIL in 1999 by the UN Security Council, this new mission was reinforced by the resolution of 1289 up to 11,100 soldiers with 260 observers included in January 2000.[831] In the same year the RUF had not stopped its attacks which killed seven peacekeepers and they kidnapped 500.[832] Thus, in May 2000 by resolution 1299, the UN Security Council increased the number of troops to 13,000 soldiers with still 260 observers.[833] With the aim of strengthening the armed forces for the maintenance of peace and security, President Kabbah with the agreement of the UN had

[826]Da Costa, P. (1991). "A new role for ECOWAS." Africa Report 36, no. 5, 37.
[827]Aboagye, F. B. and BAH, A. M. S. (2004). Liberia at a Crossroads: A preliminary look at the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and the protection of civilians. Institute for Security Studies Papers, 2004, vol. 2004, no 95, 20.
[828] Ibid.
[829]Adibe, C. E. (1997). The Liberian conflict and the ECOWAS-UN partnership. Third World Quarterly, vol. 18, no 3, 471-488.
[830]Adebajo, A. (2002). Liberia's civil war: Nigeria, ECOMOG, and regional security in West Africa. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 119.
[831]Bernath, C. and Nyce, S. (2004). "A peacekeeping success: Lessons learned from UNAMSIL." Journal of International Peacekeeping 8, no. 1, 119-142.
[832]Berman, E. G. (2000). Re-Armament in Sierra Leone: One Year after the Lomé Peace Agreement. Small Arms Survey, 19.
[833]Malan, M., Rakate, P. and Mcintyre, A. (2002). Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone: UNAMSIL hits the home straight. Vol. 68. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 12.

obtained the assistance of the forces of Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team (OLRT) of the United Kingdom (UK) led by Brigadier General David Richards[834] who had not only neutralized the rebels but also had freed hostages from the blue helmets. Finally, in March 2001 by resolution 1346, the Security Council had further increased to 17,500 troops.[835] On the continental level, there is the participation of the African Union and on the world level the UN and all other competent organizations to help resolve the crises in the West African region. The African Union has assisted ECOWAS by playing the role of facilitator in the resolution of the Liberian conflict.[836] The role of the AU in conflict resolution in Africa is to uphold democratic standards for the organization of elections. Therefore, the contribution of the AU in the resolution of the Liberian conflict was to lead the political class towards democratic elections in 1997.[837] It is an institution which opts for democracy for the return to peace and security.

The successes or failures of ECOWAS are not only linked to external forces. There is also the faillures of ECOWAS' leaders. This West African regional organization did not have too many experiences in conflict prevention, management and resolution because ECOWAS assigned this mission in 1990 in the face of recurring political crises in its area.[838] Also, the Liberian and Sierra Leonean civil wars are the first experiences of ECOWAS in the field of conflict resolution. So, it was obvious that the leaders of ECOWAS are not up to their missions given the lack of experience and financial and material means to fully play this role. Recourse to foreign aid was essential and still is essential to ECOWAS when carrying out its missions in its member countries that need it. On the continental level, there is the participation of the African Union and on the world level the UN and all other competent organizations to help resolve the conflicts in the West African region.

[834]Williams, P. (2001). "Fighting for freetown: British military intervention in Sierra Leone." Contemporary Security Policy 22, no. 3, 140-168.
[835]Malan, M., Rakate, P. and Mcintyre, A. (2002). Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone: UNAMSIL hits the home straight. Vol. 68. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 12.
[836]Oguonu, C. N., & Ezeibe, C. C. (2014). African union and conflict resolution in Africa. Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, 5(27 P1), 325.
[837]Harris, D. (1999). From 'warlord'to 'democratic'president: how Charles Taylor won the 1997 Liberian elections. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 37(3), 431-455.
[838]Da Costa, P. (1991). "A new role for ECOWAS." Africa Report 36, no. 5, 37.

Finally, the management and resolution of the Liberian and Sierra Leonean conflicts were experiences that enabled ECOWAS leaders to know the scope of the new missions assigned to this regional organization in 1990.[839] Despite its achievements and setbacks, ECOWAS remains the West African organization that responds promptly to the problems of its member countries even if it is assisted in its missions by several other actors for lack of financial and material resources. It is still an organization that depends on the former colonizers and several international actors for aid for its functioning. For ECOWAS to be up to its missions and have a place within the bodies of major decisions, its leaders must review its mode of financing and operation. It cannot have international influence if it continues to receive instructions and help from the efforts of citizens of other countries and continents. It either commit to providing efforts to have in large part the means for its missions. Even if no country and organization is completely independent, foreign influences and interference in internal decisions are no longer important when a country or an organization has the means for its policy. For ECOWAS to become essential for its space, it must carry out structural reforms by reducing the excessive presence of heads of state at all decision-making levels. The strength of the presidents of the member countries weighs too heavily on the functioning of integration. Each member country must regularly honor its annual bonds to provide ECOWAS with the financial means for its operation. If it had its own means, the Liberian and Sierra Leonean civil wars could have found a solution quickly without leading to long durations that caused atrocities to these peoples. Therefore, the means are essential for the efficiency and success of ECOWAS missions.

[839]Da Costa, P. (1991). "A new role for ECOWAS." Africa Report 36, no. 5, 37.

## GENERAL CONCLUSION

### 1. PROBLEM AND OBJECTIVE

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) emerged from the genius of West African countries on May 28, 1975 in Lagos, Nigeria with 16 member states at the start but in 2000s Mauritania let the Organization. Its main task is to bring economic well-being to the region by providing a free trade area with free movement of people and goods. However in the 1990s, with the advent of democratic rule in African countries, another mission was assigned to ECOWAS. The prevention, management and resolution of civil wars in its member countries was the second mission of ECOWAS when the young democratic countries of West Africa began experiencing political instability. Since the 1990s, it has intervened in several member countries to bring peace and security. Countries like Liberia and Sierra Leone were the first on the list experience conflict resolution missions. Liberia and Sierra Leone were the first countries which experienced the civil wars in the West African part because of social concerns linked to economic and political problems. These two neighboring countries share a long border whose peoples have some languagues in common. They have some similar ethnic groups (Kissi, Mandingo, Mende and Vai) in the two countries who lived together. It is the unequal distribution of wealth and the maintenance of a large part of the population in poverty for years in a country which generates uprisings which lead to civil wars. Especially, when minority or majority ethnic groups are deprived of the benefits and power management in a country, it can fall down in civil war. It is for this reason that it is important to better understand the causal factors affecting the accomplishments and failures of EOCWAS in conflict resolution missions.

Civil wars are often painful periods in the life of a country. Because they cause deaths, displaced persons, refugees, famine and severe poverty among the people. They also handicap the development of the countries which are affected. In the case of Liberia, the civil war began in 1989 and that of Sierra Leone in 1991 because there are many causal factors

including international, regional and domestic level ones. In these two civil wars, ECOWAS with the help of the AU and the United Nations had played a decisive role in bringing peace and security. The Liberian civil war that began in 1989 ended in 1997 and that of Sierra Leone lasted from 1991 until 2002. In this research we will focus on the ECOWAS conflict resolution missions through a comparative study of the Liberia and Sierra Leone civil wars. This study aims to bring out the differences and similarities that exist in the two cases. How to evaluate the achievements and failures of ECOWAS conflict resolution in Liberia between 1989 and 1997, and in Sierra Leone from 1991 to 2002 by taking into account the influence of international organizations in international level, the failures of ECOWAS leaders in regional level, and state weakness and role of individual leaders in a domestic level?

The global objective was the analysis of the causal factors including international, regional, and domestic level ones.

Specifically, our objectives were as follows:

- understanding of the origins of civil wars that come from ethnicity in West Africa countries like Liberia and Sierra Leone;

- proving that there are similarities in the appreciation of the Liberian and Sierra Leonean civil wars;

- investigating domestic, regional, and international levels causal factors that affect ECOWAS conflict resolution role towards Liberia and Sierra Leone.

It is important to note that on the continental level in Africa the African Union (AU) is recognized as the largest organization whose mission is to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts. The AU is often supported by the United Nations (UN) in its missions. Given its heaviness in these missions characterized almost by failure, regional organizations were born for more efficiency in the missions of prevention, management, and resolution of civil wars. In the four regions of Africa (East, West, North and South), there are regional integrations. However, the parties most affected by civil wars often use these regional organizations to play the role incumbent on the African Union. East Africa uses IGAD: Intergovernmental Authority for Development and West Africa involves ECOWAS for conflict prevention,

management and resolution missions like in the case of the Somali civil war in 1991. Likewise, Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) has played an important role in resolving the crisis in Sudan since the 2000s. These two integrations play capital roles each on its field of action in this sense. Therefore, there are several studies on the issues of prevention, management, and resolution of civil wars in West and East Africa by ECOWAS and IGAD which are two important regional integrations in Africa in general. Previous research did not address the aspects of comparative study of the origins of civil wars between two or more countries. It is for this reason that our research is oriented on a comparative study of the origins of civil wars and the missions of prevention, management, and resolution of conflicts by ECOWAS which is a West African integration since 1990. In this study we want to highlight the similarities and differences in the origins of civil wars that may exist between countries like Liberia and Sierra Leone. Thus, we can better understand the missions of prevention, management, and resolution of conflicts by ECOWAS in these two border countries.

## 2. HYPOTHESES

To conduct this research, three main hypotheses were used:

**-The first hypothesis proposed that "**societal insecurity dilemma" between different ethnic groups led to civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone. In fact, the realist concept of "emerging anarchy"[840] and "insecurity dilemma"[841] and "societal security dilemma"[842] are found to be persuasive in explaining the emerging "offensive" ethnic rivalries in civil wars and also national security calculations of ECOWAS member state authorities which had been incompatible with the demands of ethnic forces in Liberia and Sieerea Loeıne civil wars.

[840] Posen, B. R., (1993). 'The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict'. Survival 35, no. 1, 27–47.
[841] Job, B., (1992). 'The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States'. In The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States, 11–35. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
[842] Roe, P., (2004). Ethnic Violence and the Societal Security Dilemma. London ; New York: Routledge, 57.

This hypothesis is verified in the two cases of civil wars in the countries targeted in this study, which are Liberia and Sierra Leone. In both cases, the civil conflicts started with bad governance by the monopoly of power of minority ethnic groups with all the economic and political advantages. In Liberia, it is the American-Liberians who constitute a small ethnic group returning from the United States of America who monopolized the state power without sharing with the other indigenous ethnic groups. Their governance is supported by American political leaders who also derive benefits through bilateral agreements from the exploitation of Liberian natural resources. The confiscation of political and economic power from the American-Liberians has engendered frustration among other majority ethnic groups. It was the origin of the civil war in this country. In the case of Sierra Leone, the Krio who are mixed race descendants of the inhabitants of their former colonizer which is the United Kingdom had applied the same policy to the indigenous ethnic groups with the blessing also of the political leaders of the former colonizer. This political, economic, and ethnic discrimination had plunged Sierra Leone into civil war. So, the two countries targeted in this research have the same origins of civil wars.

**-The second hypothesis** proposes that the involvement of regional and international organizations like the UN and AU positively affected ECOWAS conflict resolution missions in civil wars. This hypothesis is verified because in the resolution of the Liberian conflict between 1989 and 1997, and that of Sierra Leone from 1991 to 2002 international organizations such as the United Nations (UN) and the African Union (AU) played a role in supporting ECOWAS in its mission to resolve this conflict. The common point of the UN and the AU is the promotion of democracy in Africa and in the world, but the UN through its Security Council can constitute peacekeepers to send to a country at war as the cases of Liberia and Sierra Leone civil wars. Although on September 22, 1993, the United Nations Security Council established a United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). This observer mission was made up of soldiers and civilians. In total, the mission's crew numbered 368 observers. In June 1998, UN Security Council sent the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) to reinforce the armed forces of ECOMOG. The United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) became the United Nations Mission in Sierra

Leone (UNAMSIL) in October 1999. Its personal numbers were increased to 6000 military personnel including 260 observers.

**-The third hypothesis** was the involvement of continental actors such as Libya has negatively affected the ECOWAS conflict resolution role. This hypothesis is also verified because Libya of Muammar Gaddafi was involved clandestinely in this war in Sierra Leone by supporting the rebels of Foday Sankoh. In the member countries of ECOWAS, the Libyan presence in the internal conflicts of each country that has been affected by the war has been often observed and criticized by other African countries. Libyan Guide Muammar Gaddafi mainly granted financial aid and military training to rebels who requested it. In Sierra Leone, Sankoh had benefited from the same graces of Gaddafi to fight against the government of his country. The objective of this aid was to extend Libyan domination throughout Africa. Above all, Libyan Guide's idea to carry out his actions was the concretization of the United States of Africa.

**- The fourth hypothesis** is that at regional level, the existence of a regional hegemon, Nigeria, negatively affected the ECOWAS conflict resolution role in civil wars. This last hypothesis is verified too because Nigeria is currently seen as the new policeman of Africa because it is the greatest military power in West Africa above all, it is the leader of the military force of ECOMOG.[843] Militarily, Nigeria is more equipped than all the other member countries of ECOWAS because since 1967, it has faced a civil war in Biafra and currently it is suffering from the terrorist attacks of Boko Haram. Nigeria unilateral intervened in Liberia and Sierra Leone civil wars to support presidents in power without consulting other ECOWAS members. All these actions show the imposition of Nigeria and its hegemony within ECOWAS.

**- The fifth hypotheses proposed that at regional level the lack of common identity among ECOWAS members negatively affected ECOWAS conflict resolution missions in these two civil wars.** Social construction explanations are also persuasive in terms of explaining the casual factors such as lack of common normative identity in ECOWAS as

[843]Economic Community of West African States Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) is a military force created by ECOWAS in 1991 and became a standby force in 1999.

compared to other regional organizations that affected in conflict resolution roles in civil wars. Some social constructivist scholars also argue that "elites" play a significant role in constructing hostile identities between ethnic groups.[844] Social constructivist literature also focuses on conflict "agents" or conflict "enterpreneurs". These actors are generally elites-political, military, religious, local etc. [845]. In case of Sierra Leonean and Liberian civil wars, we found many examples of elits as conflict "agents" in ECOWAS member states that play significant role in support different rebel gorups and construct hostile identities between different groups. Lack of a "common identiy" has been an important factor that facilitated this process during these two civil wars.

-The sixth hyphotesis proposed that **at domestic level, individual preferences of the state leaders and state weaknesses negatively effected ECOWAS conflict resolution role in these civil wars.** The biggest challenge for ECOWAS during its conflict resolution missiona in Liberia was the divergence of opinions about the understanding of democracy and dictatorship. ECOWAS leaders often find it difficult to agree on interventions when peace is threatened in one of the member countries. The hesitations of intervention are linked to the friendly between the heads of state of this regional space. During the Sierra Leonean crisis, the same situation occurred and led to a significant delay of intervention in the Sierra Leonean civil war at the regional and international level. State weaknesses that is discussed in detailed in Chapter 4 and Cahpter 5 also negatively affected the success of ECOWAS conflit resolution missions in these two civil wars.

[844] Richard J., (2009). "Constructivism and Conflict-Resolution" (içinde) Jacop Bercovitch et. al. *The Sage Handbook of Conflict Resolution,* Sage, London, 172-191.
[845] Richard J., (2009). "Constructivism and Conflict-Resolution" (içinde) Jacop Bercovitch et. al. *The Sage Handbook of Conflict Resolution,* Sage, London, 180.

## 3. DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS AND THEORITICAL IMPLICATIONS

Throughout this research, it was a question of showing through a comparative study the role of ECOWAS in conflict resolution in the cases of the Liberian and Sierra Leonean civil wars:

First, this study is based on understanding the origins of civil wars in the two target countries. It emerged that in both countries' ethnicity was the origin of civil wars. In the case of Liberia, the American-Liberians had the country held hostage by solitary management. They all had the different political and economic advantages of the country. They were supported in their governance policies by the political leaders of the USA. However, the majority indigenous ethnic groups were left behind. This ethnic majority, made up of several ethnic groups, was frustrated by this deprivation of the country's political and economic advantages. It was the origin of the Liberian civil war which had started with an armed rebellion led by certain political and military leaders of the majority ethnic groups. In the Liberian civil war, Charles Taylor was the leading figure in the rebellion that demanded the sharing of power in the country. Concerning Sierra Leone, the ethnic group of the minority krios also reigned without sharing state power with the other majority ethnic groups. This ethnic discrimination in the management of Sierra Leonean state affairs had prompted Foday Sankoh to lead a rebellion to demand equal political and economic opportunities in the country. So, in the two target countries, ethnic discrimination in governance was at the root of civil wars. Ethnicity can divide a country to the point of plunging it into civil crises. In running a country if all ethnic groups do not have equal opportunities, in the medium and long term, there can be serious negative social consequences. It is for this reason that it is very important to pay attention to national unity in state management. All ethnic sensitivities must be represented in decision-making bodies for social balance. This prevents the country from falling into political instabilities which have negative socio-economic impacts. Here, the starting hypothesis was to demonstrate that the Liberian and Sierra Leonean civil wars stemmed from ethnic discrimination. The results of this research on this question confirm this hypothesis.

Secondly, it was a question of showing the role of ECOWAS in the resolution of the Liberian and Sierra Leonean conflicts. In both cases of target countries, the ECOWAS conflict resolution mechanisms diplomacy and the deployment of the ECOMOG army. Diplomacy to initiate ceasefire negotiations between the protagonists and the armed forces of ECOMOG to ensure the mission of maintaining peace and security. This hypothesis is also confirmed because despite the difficulties of ECOWAS in its conflict resolution missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone with the help of other continental, global and humanitarian organizations, it ended up bringing peace and security in both countries. In the resolution of the two civil conflicts, ECOWAS had benefited from the significant support and accompaniment of organizations such as the African Union, the UN, the Bretton Woods institutions, and certain humanitarian organizations cited in the development of chapter 4. The aid from all these organizations enabled ECOWAS to achieve its objectives. So, by its personal strength, it could not quickly lead to the return of peace and security in these two countries in civil war. ECOWAS lacks logistics, financial means and even experience for the rapid accomplishment of its missions. It is for this reason that in her conflict resolution missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone, she was assisted by various organizations and foreign armed forces. As this regional integration is made up of third world countries, it cannot assume alone the burdens of its conflict resolution missions in its member countries. ECOWAS, despite its difficulties and even its shortcomings, it remains a first resort community organization which settles conflicts and economic problems in its regional area. It is ECOWAS which is first involved in the resolution of various political, economic, and social problems in its member countries before receiving foreign aid.

Finally, the study of comparative assessment of the achievements and failures of ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone resulted in the involvement of external forces, the failures of ECOWAS leaders and the presence of neocolonialism in the two countries. As they are two poor neighboring countries, their symptoms were almost the same. There are similarities in assessing the Liberian and Sierra Leonean conflict resolution missions by ECOWAS. Among the handicaps played against the resolution of these conflicts by ECOWAS, there are external forces. In the cases of the two countries in this study, diamonds were the natural resource that

allowed external forces to interfere in both civil wars. Illegal diamond mining enabled the rebels to have the means for war. Natural resources, which are normally a blessing for the countries that possess them, can also be a source of crisis because they attract foreigners. The illegal exploitation and sale of diamonds had aggravated the situation of instability and insecurity in the two neighboring countries in civil wars. These interventions of external forces are motivated by hidden interests.

It should also be noted that the diplomats and soldiers of the ECOMOG armed force did not have much experience in conflict resolution. Especially since the Liberian and Sierra Leonean civil wars were the first conflict resolution missions for ECOWAS. Therefore, its leaders and ECOMOG were incompetent to manage and effectively and quickly resolve these civil wars to restore peace and security which are the foundations of economic development. The shortcomings in terms of experience in the field of conflict resolution meant that the two cases of conflicts lasted a long time before finding solutions. Also, the colonized countries of Africa all present almost the same characteristics of foreign domination especially by their former colonizers. During the Liberian and Sierra Leonean civil wars the presence of their former rulers was visible alongside the minority ethnic groups who held state power. This neocolonial weight had acted negatively on the two countries during their civil wars. Without forgetting also that the same former rulers defined and implemented from afar the management policies of these countries. It is imperialism which is nothing other than the political and economic controls of several ECOWAS member countries such as Liberia and Sierra Leone. Therefore, the true independence of certain African countries remains a question.

In this research, **several theories were used in an eclectic manner to explain the role of ECOWAS in conflict resolution as well as the casual factors that effects ECOWAS^s conflict resolution role specifically in Liberian and Sierra Leone civil wars.**

It is about neofunctionalism to explain the phenomenon of regional economic integration of ECOWAS and multilateralism to explain the composition of the armed forces of ECOMOG which come from ECOWAS member countries. First, neofunctionalism is a theory that explains the process of economic integration. In the theoretical framework, to explain the

process of economic integration neo-functionalism serves as the basic theory.[846] In other words, neofunctionalism serves as a framework for understanding economic integration processes in a region. Neofunctionalism also provides persuasive arguments for explaining the evolution of ECOWAS from an economic integration to adopting conflict resolution roles. However, the process of regional economic integration in West Africa has been tied to peace and security since there is a strong correlation between economic development and political stability. So, neofunctionalism explains the process of economic and political integration of ECOWAS because it is the political leaders of this West African Community who define the guidelines for development in all vital areas. Regarding the conflict resolution missions of ECOWAS in its geographical space, multilateralism makes it possible to constitute the teams of diplomats and the armed forces of ECOMOG. In times of war in an ECOWAS member country, its leaders meet to decide on the composition of the staff who will carry out the conflict resolution mission. The mission which is made up of diplomats and soldiers from member countries. It is in this context that multilateralism is manifested within ECOWAS for the joint efforts for conflict resolution. So the conflict resolution missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone are part of the regional integration process.

However, regional multilateralism of West Africa could better be understood by analyzing the casual factors that affect the ECOWAS conflict resolution role at international, regional and domestic level. Realism, Liberalism, Social Constructivism and Third World Approach provides persuasive explanations for the causal factors that affect the successes and failures of ECOWAS conflict resolution role in Liberia and Sierra Leone civil wars at international, regional and domestic level.

With regards to specifically civil wars and conflict resolution, Social Constructivist focus on the beliefs, attitutes and perceptions of parties in a conflict. In other words, they focus on the role of "identities" in conflicts. Some social constructivist scholars also argue that "elites" play a significant role in constructing hostile identities between ethnic groups.[847] Social

[846]Gehring, T. (1996). "Integrating integration theory: Neo-functionalism and international regimes." Global Society: Journal of Interdisciplinary International Relations 10, no. 3, 236.
[847] Richard J., (2009). "Constructivism and Conflict-Resolution" (içinde) Jacop Bercovitch et. al. *The Sage Handbook of Conflict Resolution,* Sage, London, 172-191.

constructivist literature also focuses on conflict "agents" or conflict "enterpreneurs". These actors are generally elites- political, military, religious, local etc. [848] This in fact is crucial for understanding the domestic level casual factors and specifically the perception and identity of ECOWAS leaders in civil wars, in our case the Liberia and Sierra Loenea civil wars. Social construction explanations are also persuasive in terms of explaining the casual factors such as lack of common normative identity in ECOWAS as compared to other regional organizations that affected in conflict resolution roles in civil wars.

Realist literature in civil wars also provide crucial conceptualizations and explanations. For instance, Posen (1993) argues that the collapse of imperial regimes in many parts of the world can be viewd as "emerging anarchy" in which regardless of internal characteristics of states, as sovereigns disseppear, a host of less cohesive ethnic, religious and and cultural groups emerge as being more "offensive". [849] Kaufman also contends that if anarchy reaches to a point in which the government can not control its territory efffectively enoughto protect its to protect people while the ethnic-based organizations can, then the ethnic based organizations/ groups can create a security dilemma. [850] Furthermore, Brial conceptualizes the casual factors of civil wars as "insecurity dilemma" as compared to "security dilemma" in which "national security, defined as regime security by state authorities, becomes pitted against the incompatible demands of ethnic, social, and religious forces." [851] Brian, for instance, specifically adresses the problems and prospects for security in the Third World in the 1990s. [852] Similarly, Roe intoduces the concept of "societel security dilemma" that captures best the certain casual dynamics between different ethnic groups that lead to civil wars. [853]These concept of "emerging anarchy" and "insecurity dilemma" and "societal

[848] Richard J., (2009). "Constructivism and Conflict-Resolution" (içinde) Jacop Bercovitch et. al. *The Sage Handbook of Conflict Resolution,* Sage, London, 180.
[849] Posen, B. R., (1993). 'The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict'. Survival 35, no. 1, 27–47.
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[851]Job, B. (Ed.). (1992). 'The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States'. In The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States, 11–35. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
[852]Ibid.
[853]Roe, P. (2004). Ethnic Violence and the Societal Security Dilemma. London ; New York: Routledge, p: 57.

security dilemma" are crucial in explaining the emerging "offensive" ethnic rivalries and national security calculations of ECOWAS member state authorities which had been incompatible with the demands of ethnic forces in Liberia and Sieerea Loeıne civil wars (See Chapters 4 and 5).

## 4. LIMITATIONS OF ECOWAS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In the 1990s, the conflicts that took place in its member countries led ECOWAS to opt for political integration. This option of building political integration aims to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts in its member countries. The economy is linked to politics because it is politicians who create the favorable conditions to facilitate trade. Since the advent of the globalization of the world economy, non-state actors have grown in power because state borders and sovereignty are no longer a one-state issue. The flow of people, goods and capital require a good human rights framework, which is the responsibility of politicians. After sixty years of independence, politics still remains a point of contention in Africa. Despite the wind of democracy that blew through West African countries in the 1990s, human rights are hardly protected by African leaders who embody the politics of the respective countries.

However, if human rights are violated, it is difficult to establish the equality and legality which are the source of social stability. We cannot understand that all African states want to develop, but oddly enough, they are not making substantial efforts to achieve it. In addition, it is no longer possible for a country to achieve development by opting to lead a self-sufficient life. However, West African political integration suffers from ideological cohesion because each state tends to withdraw more and more into itself. This creates mistrust among member states and reduces ECOWAS integration relations to words or writings on paper with no follow-up and no enforcement. For the envisaged integrations, we chose to create economic cooperation organizations responsible for promoting African unity to better respond to the problems of the continent. But it was made case that the sovereignty of each member state

will be preserved so it followed that the impulses of these organizations always confronted the so-called sovereignty of the States, which hide behind it to violate their peoples.

To achieve integration, it is preferable to start with economic integration as in the case of ECOWAS. Economic integration in socialist countries is not as successful as in liberal economy countries. If the European Union is considered a successful model of economic integration, it is because at the start the Member States agreed to begin by economic integration through the very specific sectors which are coal and steel in the framework of the creation in 1951 of the European Coal and Steel Community. During the creation of ECOWAS, States also targeted specific and precise sectors of economic integration, but the real problem lies in their unwillingness to assert the clauses of integration through a national policy. Sovereignty is dearer to African leaders, which is why ECOWAS is struggling to achieve its goals. The Heads of State and Government, who should for the achievement of the objectives that the Community has set for itself, are more concerned with national interests than those of integration. It is indisputable that true economic integration rests on political and economic will. This means that successful economic integration must necessarily go through good political integration. Political integration does not mean the loss of sovereignty for the benefit of any one State but rather in the hands of a supranational authority controlled by all the States, unfortunately the Heads of State and Government who sit at the highest level. ECOWAS level did not favor the installation of such a system. This makes it difficult to make decisions and apply them.

In the same vein, some West African states are literally firmly attached to their sovereignty, they have abandoned it altogether in the sense that they are controlled by international institutions. And also, they are subject to the desires of the rich countries on the economic, financial, diplomatic, political, military, even cultural levels because with globalization the poor countries are spectators. Globalization has contributed to the attribution of subject country status to poor countries and the status of actor countries to rich countries. Poor countries do not have the weight against rich countries so they are only subject to the decisions of the rich countries. African states are not yet able to dispose of themselves as long as they are under the domination of rich countries. Of course, dignified integration

requires member states to hand over part of their sovereignty to the supranational authority leading the integration. Economic integration always goes hand in hand with political integration because it is policies that provide the means and implement the decisions emanating from integration. In an integration there are several dimensions: economic, monetary and financial, political and social, cultural and moral so the absence of one of the dimensions probably creates an imbalance. Within the framework of ECOWAS, this coordination between economy and politics is lacking. It is for this reason that ECOWAS is still dragging its feet which distract it from its objectives. So, economic integration is impossible without the prior will for political integration. This means that any integration can only prosper with the political commitment of its creators.

The political differences of African Heads of State do not allow for the good political coordination necessary for economic integration. In addition, within the integration of ECOWAS, we notice that each state has its economic policy other than that desired by the integration. This weakens the Community's efforts to achieve the objectives pursued by the member countries. While the diplomacy of the economy undoubtedly involves political diplomacy, it is important that African leaders think about coordinating their efforts in the same direction for the common interest on which the existence of ECOWAS is based. Politics has a prominent place in international relations so it is seen as the driving force behind any union. If it is well practiced among states that aspire to integrate, there is a strong chance that such integration will be successful and beneficial for the integrated countries. Otherwise, it would be a fiasco to want any kind of integration without taking into consideration henceforth the quality of the political relations which bind the States. The poverty of almost all the member countries of ECOWAS has caused political differences which daily reduce the credibility of the Community vis-à-vis the citizens of the member countries. Moreover, ECOWAS seems to have no weight at the international level. So, the founding countries of ECOWAS must consider a number of more ambitious plans to correct the current shortcomings of this integration so that it may flourish.

If ECOWAS wants truly achieve its objectives, especially in political matters, its leaders must respect the decisions of the institution by effectively implementing them. It must

strengthen and support democracy in its member states, strengthen measures to combat the various kinds of trafficking in drugs, small arms and children to reduce cross-border crime. The lack of will in the application of the protocols, the ineffectiveness of the structures responsible for coordinating the activities of the Community, the political instability and the economic crises which impoverish the citizens are urgent problems that ECOWAS must solve for a sustainable development of its member states. Considering that ethnicity is increasingly becoming a source of division and contradiction, then the laws of member countries must now provide equal opportunities in all areas to citizens. If there is a guarantee of equal opportunities in the management of state affairs, citizens live in harmony and without tensions. It is discrimination of all kinds that generates wars in a community. It is necessary that political leaders put people at the center of their governance because the human resource remains the main actor in development. Each citizen is useful in the process of economic and political development of his country. Inclusive governance remains very effective for the development of each country. Therefore, to avoid civil crises, ECOWAS member countries must avoid the exclusion of a socio-cultural party in their management of state affairs. Above all, a social group must not give itself a monopoly on the management of power by excluding others. To realize the dreams of economic and political integration of ECOWAS, great efforts must be made in this direction for sustainable development in a climate of peace and security for the region of West Africa and the whole African continent. Each member country of ECOWAS must promote the recommendations of the Mediation and Security Council created in 2000 for the promotion and guarantee of peace and security in West Africa for the achievement of the objectives of sustainable economic development, political and social stability.

## 5. CONTRIBUTIONS, SUGGESTIONS AND LIMITATIONS OF RESEARCH

### . Contributions

After this research, which concerns the role of ECOWAS in the resolution of conflicts in West Africa, specifically the cases of Liberia and Sierra Leone, has enabled us to understand that the Liberian and Sierra Leonean civil wars have their origins in the ethnicity and there are causal factors that affect ECOWAS conflict resolution missions at the international, regional and domestic levels. At the international level, the UN Security Council supported ECOWAS through observers and peacekeepers in the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia and Sierra Leone. There is also the assistance of the African Union for the return to democracy through the negotiations of its diplomats between the protagonists in the civil war in the two targeted countries. On the continental front, the Libya of former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi was aiding rebels in the two civil wars as ECOWAS fought for a ceasefire. At the regional level, we have seen the failures of ECOWAS leaders because of their lack of experience in the field of conflict resolution. It should be remembered that the approach of ECOWAS for an agenda of conflict resolution missions was done in 1990. It was a year after ECOWAS began its missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone. It also emerges that Nigeria's hegemony does not allow ECOWAS to fully play its role in conflict resolution. At the domestic level, the poverty of both countries, the discrimination of certain ethnic groups has created political instability which has led to civil wars in the two targeted countries.

So, for ECOWAS to be more effective in its role of conflict resolution in its member countries, it must make structural and administrative reforms:

Structurally, ECOWAS must review the role of the Conference of Heads of State, which is a super powerful body that decides everything and even gives the right of veto over each decision to the presidents of each member country. This body makes the ECOWAS conflict resolution mechanism very slow and cumbersome because of the bonds of friendship between the presidents who support each other against the will of their peoples in the ECOWAS region. The President of the Commission should be the most important personality

in the structure of ECOWAS like the Secretary General of the UN. ECOWAS must have a military force and well-trained diplomats for rapid and effective interventions during its conflict resolution missions. ECOWAS member countries should create common military and diplomacy schools dedicated to conflict resolution issues. Finally, ECOWAS must create an awareness body against social discrimination of all kinds in its member countries for political, economic and social balances to avoid rebellions.

Administratively, ECOWAS must apply sanctions against member countries that do not respect the charter of the organization such as Nigeria which has made solitary interventions without consulting other members in Liberia and Sierra Leone. ECOWAS must compel all member countries to implement the norms and values that it has given itself freely. It must also think about the recruitment of qualified human resources for a dynamic and competent administration. The Mediation and Security Council created in 2000 must be promoted in each member country. Finally, ECOWAS member countries must have the means for their conflict resolution missions to avoid interference from international organizations and the great powers.

**. Suggestions for Future Research**

This research is a comparative study of the role of ECOWAS in two of its member countries which have been affected by civil wars. The main objective was to highlight the causal factors that affect the role of ECOWAS in its conflict resolution missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone at the international, regional and domestic levels. So, this thesis is limited only to a comparison of the causal factors that affect the role of ECOWAS in its conflict resolution missions between two countries in its region. As this research is only a comparison between two countries, it will be useful to make a comparative regional studies for future research. The results of this research can be tested on other regional organizations around the world that have a conflict resolution mission agenda to see if there are causal factors that affect their conflict resolution interventions at the international, regional and domestic levels. This study can be applicable to other African regional organizations such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), East African Community (EAC), Southern African Development Community (SADC) and Economic Community of Central African States

(ECCAS) because an analysis of the causal factors that affect their roles in conflict resolution missions in their region is possible on the international, regional and domestic levels.

**. Limitations of Research**

This research was carried out during the difficult period of the Corona virus (COVID-19) pandemic from 2020 to 2022. Above all, the collection of empirical data was carried out by word questionnaires by email addresses addressed to the ambassadors of the target countries (Liberia and Sierra Leone) and ECOWAS diplomats. So, there were no face-to-face interviews except Zoom videoconferences, phone calls and questions to resource persons by WhatsApp. We were expecting at least fifty respondents for the two words questionnaires, but in the end, it was about twenty targeted people who responded. the sample would have been more representative if there were more respondents. The field of conflict resolution by ECOWAS does not yet have a sufficiently extensive bibliography. Also, the ECOWAS archives are not yet numerous enough to help the researcher. So, like any human work, this research does not claim to be perfect but it is just a scientific curiosity to provoke other future research on conflict resolution by ECOWAS.

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• **Annexes**

**Annex1: Interview questionnaire for ECOWAS diplomats and Liberian Ambassadors.**

1- Do you have any memories about the civil war in Liberia?

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2- If yes, in what year did it start and in what year did it end?

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……

3- According to your information, how did this civil war start? What kinds of actors were involved?

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……..

4- Why this civil war happened in Liberia? Can you explain some of the reasons for this war?

……
……

5- What are the first cities affected by this civil war?

……
……

6- Do you think this civil war has economic, political reasons, religious, ethnic, clan reasons or other reasons?

……
……

7- If you know other reasons than those mentioned above, please explain to us in a few lines.

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…….

8- Were there any deaths in this civil war? If so, approximately how many?

……

……

9- Were there any wounded in this civil war? If so, approximately how many?

……

……

10- Were there displaced people inside the country because of this war? If so, approximately how many? And what towns or places had they gone to hide?

……..

…….

11- Were there refugees because of this war? If so, approximately how many? And to which countries had they taken refuge?

……..

…….

12- Were there any underage girls or elderly women raped? Do you have any idea how many underage girls and elderly women raped? Are they violated by opposing warring camps or by ECOWAS and UN mission forces?

……

……

13- Were there any child soldiers enrolled in this Liberian civil war? If so, approximately how many child soldiers participated in this civil war?

……

……

14- How was this Liberian civil war resolved? It was the Liberians who had reconciled among themselves? Or was there the involvement of an organization for the resolution of this civil conflict?

……
……

15- Liberia being a member of ECOWAS, what role did ECOWAS play in this civil war?

……
……

16- Were the ECOWAS military armies called ECOMOG sent to restore peace and security?

……
……

17- If so, was ECOMOG sent on time or late during this civil war?

……
……

18- In its peace and security maintenance missions, has ECOMOG received other support? If yes, which ones?

……
……

19- The UN forces were alongside those of ECOMOG? If so, what do you think of this collaboration between the UN forces and those of ECOMOG?

……
……

20- Could ECOMOG alone ensure peace and security maintenance missions? If so, how and why? And if not, why?

……
……

21- What do you think ECOMOG lacks to effectively carry out peace and security missions alone in times of war in its member countries?

……
……

22- Does ECOMOG lack financial or logistical means for the efficient accomplishment of its missions?

……
……

23- What were the missions of the diplomats of ECOWAS and the African Union with the opposing camps at war?

……
……

24- Which humanitarian organizations intervened in this war to help populations in difficulty? Can you name some of these humanitarian organizations?

……
……

25- What kinds of aid did these humanitarian organizations provide to the population?

……
……

26- By what process were peace and security finally found in Liberia?

……
……

27- In your opinion, the ECOWAS conflict resolution mission in Liberia was beneficial or not?

……
……

28- Considering the role of ECOWAS in conflict resolution in Liberia, is it useful for its member countries?

……
……

29- In general, what does ECOWAS lack so that it can be more effete in its missions according to you?

……
……

30- In your opinion, were the member countries of ECOWAS right to deepen it politically? If yes, why?

……
……

31- Do you think that ECOWAS is economically well integrated? If yes, why? And if not, why?

……
……

32- For the economic and political integration of ECOWAS to be strengthened, what must member countries do?

……
……

33- Finally, according to you, what will be the future of ECOWAS in the short term and in the long term?

Please, due to the Coronavirus pandemic or COVID-19, this written interview is optional and respects the anonymity of participants and respondents including the non-disclosure of their email addresses and identity. You can send this questionnaire to other ECOWAS diplomats and Liberian Ambassadors you know. They can respond with this email address: issakaawali@yahoo.fr

Receive my sincere thanks for your participation and responses and may God protect us all from this COVID-19 pandemic.

**Annex2: Interview questionnaire for ECOWAS diplomats and Sierra Leone Ambassadors.**

1- Do you have any memories of the civil war in Sierra Leone?

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2- If yes, in what year did it start and in what year did it end?

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3- According to your information, how did this civil war start? What kinds of actors were involved?

……
……

4- Why did this civil war happen in Sierra Leone? Can you explain some of the reasons for this war?

……
……

5- What are the first cities affected by this civil war?

……
……

6- Do you think this civil war has economic or political, religious, ethnic, clan reasons or other reasons?

……
……

7- If you know other reasons than those mentioned above, please explain to us in a few lines.

……

……

8- Were there any deaths in this civil war? If so, approximately how many?

……

……

9- Were there any wounded in this civil war? If so, approximately how many?

……

……

10- Were there displaced people inside the country because of this war? If so, approximately how many? And what towns or places had they gone to hide?

……

……

11- Were there refugees because of this war? If so, approximately how many? And to which countries had they taken refuge?

……

……

12- Were there any underage girls or elderly women raped? Do you have any idea how many underage girls and elderly women raped? Are they violated by opposing warring camps or by ECOWAS and UN mission forces?

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……

13- Were there any child soldiers enrolled in this Sierra Leonean civil war? If so, approximately how many child soldiers participated in this civil war?

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14- How was this civil war in Sierra Leone resolved? It was the Sierra Leoneans who had reconciled among themselves? Or was there the involvement of an organization for the resolution of this civil conflict?

……

……

15- Sierra Leone being a member of ECOWAS, what role did ECOWAS play in this civil war?

……

……

16- Were the ECOWAS military armies called ECOMOG sent to restore peace and security?

……

……

17- If so, was ECOMOG sent on time or late during this civil war?

……

……

18- In its peace and security maintenance missions, has ECOMOG received other support? If yes, which ones?

……

……

19- The UN forces were alongside those of ECOMOG? If so, what do you think of this collaboration between the UN forces and those of ECOMOG?

……

……

20- Could ECOMOG alone ensure peace and security maintenance missions? If so, how and why? And if not, why?

……
……

21- What do you think ECOMOG lacks to effectively carry out peace and security missions alone in times of war in its member countries?

……
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22- Does ECOMOG lack financial or logistical means for the efficient accomplishment of its missions?

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……

23- What were the missions of the diplomats of ECOWAS and the African Union with the opposing camps at war?

……
……

24- Which humanitarian organizations intervened in this war to help populations in difficulty? Can you name some of these humanitarian organizations?

……
……

25- What kinds of aid did these humanitarian organizations provide to the population?

……
……

26- By what process were peace and security finally found in Liberia?

……

……

27- In your opinion, the ECOWAS conflict resolution mission in Sierra Leone was beneficial or not?

……

……

28- Considering the role of ECOWAS in conflict resolution in Sierra Leone, is it useful for its member countries?

……

……

29- In general, what does ECOWAS lack for it to be more effete in its missions according to you?

……

……

30- In your opinion, were the member countries of ECOWAS right to deepen it politically? If yes, why?

……

……

31- Do you think that ECOWAS is economically well integrated? If yes, why? And if not, why?

……

……

32- For the economic and political integration of ECOWAS to be strengthened, what must the member countries do?

……

……

33- Finally, in your opinion what will be the future of ECOWAS in the short term and in the long term?

……

……

Please, due to the Coronavirus pandemic or COVID-19, this written interview is optional and respects the anonymity of participants and respondents including the non-disclosure of their email addresses and identity. You can send this questionnaire to other ECOWAS diplomats and Sierra Leone Ambassadors that you know. They can respond with this email address: issakaawali@yahoo.fr

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