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CIVIL
TURKISH AND GEORGIAN TRENDS, 1980-2010

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Abstract

This preliminary comparison between Turkish and Georgian state-civil society relations reveals that, although the events and themes adopted by civil society organizations have diverged in both countries, the strategies these NGOs have used are similar. The effects of influencing (foreign) policy have been more successful in Turkey than in Georgia. In Georgia the effects of NGO work had more effect in ensuing fair elections and freedom of speech. In Turkey, NGOs had a head-start (no Soviet rule to deal with) and the size, economy and demography of the country permit NGOs to be much less dependent financially on foreign donors or the state. However, in the past decade more and more individuals who do speak out have been jailed. This article shows that the understanding of modernization as individuals becoming decreasingly constrained by state structures needs revision.

Introduction

Ideas about civil society and the state have come a long way since Adam Ferguson's publication of *An Essay on the History of Civil Society*. Historical overviews from cultural, philosophical or societal development perspectives reveal roughly the same pattern evolving from the Enlightenment to German Idealism, the emerging bourgeoisie and variations of Marxism.[1] This line of analysis has resulted in the same conclusion as far as Western Europe is concerned: the separation of civil society and the state (Bideleux 1998, p. 17; Szucs 1988, p. 300; Daniel 2006, p. 189). But this is not the last word. Separation can be achieved in different ways, with different nuances, and the level of analysis is important in defining it. Pertinently, the state-civil society relationship need not be the same in the EU as it is in its neighbouring countries of Eurasia. A closer look at the development of the state-civil society in two of these countries, Turkey and Georgia, is the binding theme of this article.

Historically, civil society (societas civilis) refers to social groups who managed to emancipate themselves from absolutist monarchies, taking their example from merchants and guildsmen and this process encouraged the growth of autonomous

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institutions (Bideleux inextricably bound up with urbanization and the growth of commerce (Keane 1988; Bernard 1993) and, at a later stage, with modernization, but not necessarily with democratization. This raises the question of whether this pattern has coincided with societal development in Eurasia?[2]

Turkey and Georgia make an interesting case because, apart from being neighbours, they share the label Eurasian and have some common history. During the Middle Ages, the Bagrationi Queen Tamar's realm stretched into now north-eastern Turkey up to the cities of Trabzon and Erzurum, an area referred to as Tao-Klarjeti. Pockets of Laz speaking people (a language related to Georgian) along the Black Sea coast and several churches in that region, testify this influence. Later the Ottomans conquered what is now called the sovereign republic of Georgia.

Remainders of Turkish influence can be traced in the Georgian language and in the forms of political organization. As Suny (1988, p. 18) explains: 'In the East, family relations remained the basic generative principle of political life'. In the 20th century, Georgia was separated from the free West by being incorporated into the Soviet Union, whereas Turkey entered Western structures such as NATO in 1952. During the past decade Turkey has invested large sums of money in Georgia. In many ways, they are involved in the broader geo-politics of the region associated with Caspian oil and gas (BTC line to Ceyhan in Turkey), the conflicts around Nagorno Karabakh, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, ethnic minorities, and both border Armenia. Significantly, Georgia is predominantly a Christian Orthodox country whereas Turkey is a predominantly Muslim country.

The question is why do we take the past thirty years as a frame of reference? In the sphere of globalization, which has intensified after both the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the growth of information technology including the Internet, the development of civil society has been strongly encouraged in both Georgia and Turkey. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are representatives of civil society. A comparison of NGO activity is thus an interesting point of departure in trying to understand the potential differences in state-civil society relations in the way themes are addressed and strategies of influence used. How have Turkish and Georgian NGOs responded to certain stimuli from the outside and which patterns can be discerned in their attempts to influence governmental policy? In the case of Turkey, the end of the military dictatorship in 1983 can serve as a starting point of NGO build up. In the case of Georgia, this point came ten years later when, after two (civil) wars in late 1993 and early 1994, Georgia began opening up to the rest of the world under the leadership of President Shevardnadze. Embassies were opened, international organizations such as the World Bank and the UN welcomed and a myriad of NGOs were established. But, as we shall see in the section on history, the development of civil society in Georgia (then the SSR of Georgia), actually began under perestroika and glasnost (c. 1985) shortly after the demise of the Turkish military dictatorship in 1983. Of course, in any comparison we should not lose sight of the fact that Georgia is a small country (4.5 million people) which had to begin rebuilding its economy almost from scratch after independence in 1991 with help from International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the European

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Bank, whereas Turkey independent but also one of the G-20 and seventeenth on the world GDP list.

Premises

The prime exercise of this article is to give an insight into the historical development of civil society in both Turkish and Georgian society. Hence, it discusses the most recent themes of the past three decades to which major non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have so far adhered. The starting premise is that the civil society and state-civil society relations have been responses to their respective histories.

The second premise is related to the transformation of society from a traditional form of organization into a more modern structure. At a certain point, both countries were modernized. Modernization involves "a changing relationship between social structures and social agents. When modernization reaches a certain level, agents tend to become more individualized, that is, decreasingly constrained by structures" (Beck 1992, p.2; Taylor 1994, p. 16). In Georgia, paradoxically, it was the Soviet occupation after 1921 which forced the industrialization of the country, although this was never completely rounded off. Importantly, modernization does not imply democratization or a civil society. Both Georgia and Turkey were modernized but for seventy years Menshevik Georgia had to comply with the Bolshevik Soviet system. Although Turkey had been modernized, it had been governed by recurrent periods of military rule and at this juncture in history both countries are in the process of striving to meet the requirements of EU human rights and other standards.

The third and last premise is that the transformation of society involves state-people relations and although the two societies have modernized, the state-people relationship will probably have followed different courses, and hence might have been modernized in different ways. The question is how? We explore these relationships in the Georgian and Turkish fields of action.

Method

In both cases, historical overviews, newspaper clippings and open interviews with NGO leaders were used as sources. However, the research on NGO activities in Turkey and Georgia was done independently. Thus the data sets vary a bit. The present situation does not allow for more than a general comparison to be made of similarities and differences regarding time line and NGO influence on policy in both countries. We therefore consider this to be an essential initial explorative step to be followed by more and systematic research based on similar questions.

Theory: State-Civil Society Relations in East and West

As all societal phenomena, civil society is conceptualized in different ways and from divergent perspectives: structural, as something in between, and from an actor perspective. From a structural perspective, civil society is an aggregate

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of non-governmental groups, the will of citizens in an organized, private and non-profit distributing way, independent of government, even though in the West, governments can help finance NGOs in their own country. A certain degree of self-government and voluntarism are considered important (Salamon and Anheier 1997: 33-34). For the past twenty to thirty years one dominant understanding of civil society – boosted by the Polish example of Solidarity – has been one which sees NGOs as free associations mediating between the individual and the state, although some use the term intermediary organizations involved in the development of activities (Caroll 1992; Fischer 1997). The first is a verb, the second a noun, but they both refer to the 'betweenness'. A more actor-oriented definition is: 'self-governing, private, not-for profit organizations that are geared to improving the quality of life for disadvantaged people' (Vakil 1997, p. 2060). Trade unions, interest groups, chambers of commerce, professional associations, ethnic associations, religious organizations, student groups, cultural organizations, sports clubs and informal community groups, and in some views political parties, can be considered to constitute civil society (Carothers, 1999-2000; Hulme and Edwards 1997; Kaldor 2003; Lewis 2003; Salamon and Anheier 1992). In some cases, although this is highly debatable, even the mafia and militia groups (Carothers 1999-2000, p. 20) are included in civil society as they stand between the state and business. This can be the case in both weak states (where the state has little control and hence the mafia has 'free reign'[3]), but paradoxically it also occurs in strongly regulated, absurdly bureaucratic states, in which the incredibly complicated formal procedures prove impossible to follow and hence encourage people to seek an alternative *modus vivendi* in order to survive.[4]

Since civil society is understood either as a space between the family and the State (Hegel 1821) or as a third sector alongside the State (primary sector) and industry (secondary sector), theoretical discussion about civil society revolves around such questions as: Is civil society part of the state, co-existent with the state or separate from and independent of the state? Two schools of thought can be distinguished in this context: the L and M streams (Taylor 1990). The L-stream is based on the ideas of John Locke who envisioned civil society as a pre-political moral community which delegates limited power to a minimal state. According to the L-view, the power of state authority needs to be confined to guarantee such basic human rights as the preservation of human life, liberty and property. The M-stream, based on Montesquieu's reasoning, takes a strong state as its point of departure. Therefore, corps intermediaires are needed to mediate between an individual and a strong state, acting as a check against the despotism of centralized power.

Of course, from a Marxist perspective there is no such thing as a 'neutral' state. The state, the superstructure and capitalism represent the interests of the bourgeoisie against the interests of the proletariat and civil society. In his view, civil society formed part of the base, alongside the proletariat and the bourgeoisie as part of the superstructure. As is well known, Karl Marx based some of his ideas on Hegel's dialectics. Heralding modern understanding of a liberal, market-oriented society, it was Georg Hegel who more or less synthesized the L- and M-streams. Hegel perceived the role of the state to be neutral, perhaps even positive, in opposition to

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Marx who perceived th
he departed from Marx' work, instead of placing civil society in the proletarian socio-economic base, another later thinker, Antonio Gramsci located civil society in the political superstructure. Civil society was important as it was the source of the cultural and political ideas required for the hegemony of capitalism to survive. However, since ideas and perceptions and theories could be changed, as far as Gramsci was concerned, civil society was not part of the problem but instead offered an opportunity to change ideas and solve problems.

Civil society in the West is assumed to mediate between the individual and the state in an ongoing secularization and individualization (Beck 1992, Taylor 1991). In more recent times, civil society has been supposed to counteract the effects of far-reaching individualism in the West (Taylor 1990, 1991). It is a different picture in the Russian Federation and Eurasia, where NGOs are considered to be 'in opposition' to the state or ruler (Szucs 1988, p. 308; Bideleux 1998, p. 18). Taking the state as a point of departure, civil society is sometimes conceptualized as part of the state, operating in tandem with the state (Daniel 2006). Another feature, 'absolutism', was also experienced differently in East and West. In the West it was a compensation for the disappearance of serfdom, in the East it was a device for the consolidation of serfdom (Bideleux 1998, p. 24): 'In the West society was subordinated to the state but was able to preserve certain autonomies and later to reassert itself. In the East, society was nationalized. While the western response prepared the way for capitalism, the eastern variant consolidated feudalism in a new and stronger form' (Szucs 1988, pp. 311-312, 318). Pertinently, the pattern of response was not uniform. Obviously whether a state is strong or weak or sovereign in secure surroundings or easily shaken by powerful neighbours will elicit different results.

So far, we have set out various conceptualizations of the relationship between state and civil society: state and civil society are co-existent; the state, industry and civil society are separate sectors (primary, secondary and tertiary sectors); the state and civil society are divided into a super- and sub-structure a base, whereby in one case civil society is considered part of the base and in another civil society is viewed as part of a political superstructure, and we have civil society as mediating between the individual and the state. Mediation in Western writing implicitly assumes NGOs and other intermediate organizations exert some kind of control over the state and this is considered a positive mechanism of collective empowerment. In the Eurasia and the Middle East, this intermediary position can easily be conceived as the complete opposite: namely, as a mechanism for the state to exert social control (Wiktorowicz 2000) over its people. The state can capture associational activities into its system of control by carefully observing and monitoring NGO leaders and channeling their NGO activities in the direction of state interests. Consequently, a comparison of state-civil society relations in literature already reveals the divergence in assumption: namely, that of taking the sovereign individual as a point of departure versus the primacy of the state.

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Table 1: Theoretical tr

West	Eurasia/East
Primacy of the individual	Primacy of the State
Basic premise: trust	Basic premise: distrust
Mediation = control on the state evaluated as a positive thing	Mediation = evaluated as in opposition to the state, negative
Collective empowerment	Social control by the state
Civil society is separate from the state; between family and state or as a third sector alongside first and second sector	State and civil society co-existing, in close association with the state
Absolutism: compensation for abolition of serfdom	Absolutism: consolidation of serfdom
Society managed to retain some autonomy	Society was nationalized
Abolition of serfdom and regaining of autonomy prepared way for capitalism	Abolition of serfdom led to nationalization of society, consolidated feudalism
Protestantism (more autonomy)	
Roman Catholicism (more state influence)	Christian Orthodoxy and Islam more interwoven w/ state
Civil society supposed to counteract effects of far- reaching individualism	Collectivist strong family orientation makes civil society almost redundant

A Brief History of Civil Society in Georgia[5]

In between 1801-1828, first Eastern and then Western Georgia were brought under Russian Romanov Czarist rule and remained so until the Russian Revolution of 1917. Under absolute rule by the monarchs and the continuation of serfdom until 1864, the little civil society there was seen as part of the state, not as independent of the state (Daniel 2006, p. 189). Exceptions to the rule are found in Catherine the Great's Nakaz (Instruction) to her Legislative Commission in 1766, in which she discusses the importance of the rule of law and in which she instituted corporate rights for the nobles and civil rights for the free population (Daniel 2006, p. 189; Madariaga 1990, pp. 203-206, 211, 215-218).

In the second half of the nineteenth century, Georgia was not left untouched by the rise of capitalism, the subsequent redefinition of social relations or burgeoning nationalism. Undeniably, during this period important events relevant to civil society occurred. One was the abolition of serfdom, the liberation of peasants under the jurisdiction of the Viceroy of the Caucasus, in 1864. Although the fact that the prime motive was to help the nobility deprived of their serfs, and hence income, by means of special loans and boarding schools for their children, the Georgian prince Ilia Chavchavadze and his close friends and colleagues did become a motor

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for a national awakenir
which Chavchavadze established, published and wrote in spent time explaining such modern concepts as 'governance' and 'management' to his people (iveria 1877 March 4th edition).

Another signpost on the road to civil society was the emergence of a movement of 'angry young men', known in retrospect in Georgian history as 'The Men of the Sixties', or the tergdaleulebi. This expression literally means 'Those Who Have Drunk of (that is: crossed) the Waters of the River Terek (tergi in Georgian)'. Their most outstanding representatives were Ilia Chavchavadze (1837-1907), Akaki Tsereteli (1840-1915) and Iakob Gogebashvili (1840-1912). All three of them fought against serfdom and child labour, for the revival and growth of authentic Georgian culture and for attaining the goal of having all education in the national language. Another public speaker, a contemporary of theirs, Niko Nikoladze (1843-1928) was one of the thirty Georgian students attending university in St Petersburg in the early 1860s. He followed a different path. Nikoladze was arrested and expelled for participating in political actions antagonistic to the Russian authorities in September-October 1861. Consequently, he moved on and continued his studies in Western Europe. However, some of his closest associates who remained in Russia formed a group, founded by Giorgi Tsereteli and Petr Umikashvili, which called itself 'New Youth' (akhali akhalgazrdoba). They set up a newspaper called droeba (The Times). Because they were more radical than the tergdaleulni from whom they had emerged, they were called the meore dasi (the Second Group) as opposed to the First Group (pirveli dasi), composed of Chavchavadze and his associates. With hindsight, the first group was more conservative, defending Georgian customs and traditions, whereas Nikoladze specifically sought models on which to organize society, varying from state-regulated capitalism to various forms of 'association' and 'collectivism'. [6]

At the beginning of the twentieth century the number of similar societies and associations increased. By 1915 more than thirty Georgian cultural and educational societies had been formed, including The Society of History and Georgian Ethnography, The Georgian Charity Organization, The Georgian Society for Fine Literature (sinatle = light), The Georgian Philharmonic Society, The Society for Organizing Universities for the people and The Society for the Education of Women (ganatleba = education/enlightenment). Their ranks were swelled by consumer groups and co-operative banks. By 1916 these amounted to 333 groups with about 120,000 members (Reisner 1998).

Another significant nineteenth-century public institution was the amkaris, corporate unions, resembling guilds. These amkaris united bakers, tanners, jewellers and other such professions and their purpose was dual: first and foremost to regulate production and protect their interests, but they were also concerned with addressing public needs. The word amkari refers to both the union and the organizational structure. Besides amkaris, there were private entrepreneurs who became philanthropists such as David Sarajishvili (1848- 1911). When the Bolshevik re-occupied Georgia in 1921, many of these pre-revolutionary civil society initiatives were stifled.

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The Second Half of Public Organizations

In the former Soviet Republic of Georgia, after 1985, the gradual ebbing of the control by the Communist Party (CP) was speeded up by the growth of civic and political groups.[7] Such NGOs as the Chavchavadze and Rustaveli Societies emerged. Unofficial political groups were also established. The majority of members of these groups and societies was formed by the Tbilisi intelligentsia.

Referring to NGOs under perestroika, it is necessary to distinguish between such public organizations as unions, which existed under control of the Communist Party (CP), and newly emerging platforms struggling against or independent of CP control. Among the few NGOs which had already been in existence for a long time under CP control were the Architects' Union and the Writers' Union. The groups and platforms which emerged under perestroika were organized either around Human Rights (Helsinki, political prisoners) or environmental issues (Trans-Caucasus Railway, projected dams). Gradually these forces united around the goal of gaining independence. Nevertheless, the majority of the groups striving for independence still tended to be ethnic-based. One such pro-independence groups was the Ilia Chavchavadze Society, founded at the end of the 1980s, which set up a newspaper, iveria, in 1989. Another was the Shota Rustaveli Society though initially started by the Communist Party, under leadership of Akaki Bakhradze managed to step out of the sphere of CP control.

Although the words society and public organization[8] highlighted the non-governmental in the context of Soviet hegemony, their basic goal was political and most have remained political organizations.[9] Right at the outset, when these societies were just beginning to get off the ground some people tried unsuccessfully to link various organizations and small groups of people.[10] One overriding reason they failed was that such groups were anxious not to be labelled *dissidents*; they simply wanted to be able to work on such 'Green projects' as boycotting the Trans-Caucasus Railway, giving yet another example of how the relationship between state and individual is perceived in different ways.

The Green Movement in Georgia played an important role in mobilizing intellectuals during the last two years of perestroika. It achieved this response by its strong advocacy of Georgian independence, a campaign which stimulated the setting up of various environmental and social NGOs. It topped this success by becoming part of the reform movement in Parliament after independence. The 'Green' programme is not only concerned with environmental issues and against nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, but is also engaged in social problems. The Green movement along with members of the Rustaveli Society and the Caucasian Club acted against projects such as the Trans-Caucasus Railway and the Khudoni Hydro-electric Dam with success. The protest about the Trans-Caucasus Railway was based on judicial-ecological arguments (the rails were to cross a water catchment area), economic (not cost-effective) and the fact that the railway would be built through the culturally rich valleys of Georgia and Ingushetia. The upheaval against the Khudoni Hydro-electric Dam was backed by such politicians such as Zurab

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Zhvania, and thousand the 'ecocide'[11] of Georgia. The Khudoni Campaign continued during the summer and autumn of 1989, reaching such extremes as a protest hunger strike by some of the Svaneti population. The Council of Ministers called a halt to the construction in July and in February 1990 passed the Bill for the Cancellation of the Khudoni Hydro-electric Power Station.[12]

Platforms in 1989 and the Independence of Georgia under President Gamsakhurdia

The questioning of authorities, organization projects, conferences and 'fighting' for other issues continued unabated. Hence around 1989 there were three major platforms:

- the Ilia Chavchavadze Society which co-operated with the Helsinki Round Table
- the NDP of Gia Chanturia and Irina Sarishvili, his wife;
- the Rustaveli Society and the PopularFront (Akaki Bakhradze). [13]

With the Baltic States taking measures to claim their independence, a referendum on independence was also held in Georgia. Over 95 per cent of the people voted in favour of independence from the Soviet Union. The next step was to organize free elections. In a nutshell, Gamsakhurdia's Round Table Coalition received enough votes to enter Parliament (the CP won only 29 per cent). The Round Table Bloc Free Georgia stood for free elections, a free market economy, freedom of religion and freedom of speech, and for replacing Russian with Georgian.[14] Zviad Gamsakhurdia was elected president but his term of office was short.

Rebuilding Georgia under President Shevardnazde 1992-1999 and 1999-2003

Initially, the SSR Georgia was composed of ASSR Abkhazia and the Autonomous Oblasts of South Ossetia and Adjara. After the independence of Georgia from the Soviet Union, the first two were eager to gain their independence from Georgia. To cut a long story short, after about six months in power President Gamsakhurdia was ousted by the militia and (civil) war broke out. It was in this chaos that Shevardnadze, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, was asked to return to Georgia where he had been First Secretary of the CP when it was still the SSR Georgia. It was only after he managed to restore order with help of the Russian Federation by outsmarting the militia, that the building of the Newly Independent State could begin. In the first phase, humanitarian aid had come rushing in from the Red Cross (ICRC) as well as from the UN, both eager to assist with border control, and from the UNHCR for the IDPs, the 150,000 or more internally displaced Georgians, especially those who had fled from Abkhazia. Besides these, not much later Caritas Internationalis, the International Rescue Committee (IRC)

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and the International UNICEF had either representatives or offices or both working in Georgia.

Along with the Soros Open Society Georgia Foundation, ISAR (now called Horizonti) was one of the first foundations to set to work in Tbilisi after independence. As early as February 1994 it was supporting a large number of environmental and social NGO projects (about twenty in the initial years, up to forty at the end of 1997) by giving small grants (USD 1000 - 3000), just enough to allow an NGO leader to survive for six to twelve months. By issuing grants, spreading information on both grants and NGO activities (*NGO Sector News*) and organizing trainings, ISAR succeeded in attracting young NGO leaders and staff members eager to learn how to acquire more grants, speak 'third sector language' and wanting to be instructed in projects and running an organization. Gradually the selection of amounts was diversified by the addition of medium-sized grants. By 1996, ISAR was referring to strengthening an NGO sector and of working closely with an NGO 'community'.[15] In an effort to combine initiatives and bundle forces, a new Regional Environmental Center (REC) was established in Georgia in 1997 funded with EU money. In the following year the CENN was established by another group of NGOs

ISFE (International Society for Fair Elections) was founded with the help of the National Democratic Institute (NDI) five weeks before the parliamentary and presidential elections of November 1995. ISFE trained more than 1,300 monitors deployed in polling stations throughout Georgia. These kinds of monitoring activities, including learning to conduct exit polls, were repeated and improved before the elections of both 1999 and 2003. In 2003, exit poll information showed that the election results had been tampered with. The venting of this fact on independent Radio/TV station Rustavi 2 actually contributed to the success of the Rose Revolution.

Another important step in 1996 was the establishment of the Liberty Institute which is closely associated with the temporary closing down of the Radio/TV station Rustavi 2 which first went on air in June 1994 in Rustavi broadcasting the programme Courier. By spring 1996, the organization had built up enough strength to move to the capital Tbilisi but was closed down illegally shortly afterwards. This closure meant that the people at Rustavi 2 were unemployed and these journalists and programme managers were forced to look for other work. Two of them teamed up to launch the NGO 'Liberty Institute', which has since become quite famous, in August 1996. The idea was to have a platform from which to campaign for and advocate civil liberties, in pride of place freedom of speech.

Other donor organizations came to Georgia, USAID, the Eurasia Foundation, IREX, and many other smaller (embassy) programmes gave support to civil society activities. A Young Economists Association was established, as its primary task was the training of journalists and gathering of economic information, it tended to be less overtly present in public debates. Many more NGOs were established legal (Georgian Young Lawyers Association), Human Rights (Article 42, FPPHR, HCAGC, UNA Georgia), Conflict Resolution (ICCN, DASI, Caucasus Links),

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Civic Education and R
GFSIS, IPS, CSI) etc. Most of the NGOs mentioned here still exist actively.

In the next seven years until the Rose Revolution in 2003, the Liberty Institute was extremely active defending freedom of speech on every possible occasion, seizing every opportunity to appear on TV. After 1999 it also began to champion freedom of belief, defending the rights of (foreign) sects and condemning the intimidation of Jehova's Witnesses and criticizing the traditional Georgian lifestyle. After 2000 there was a clear upsurge in the activities of DASI, in which it was joined by the youth kmara (Enough) movement in efforts to undermine the legitimacy of the Shevardnadze regime, a campaign it kept up until the Rose Revolution in November 2003.

Strengthening and Continuing the Modernization of the State under President Saakashvili, 2004-2013

After the revolution, the new president Saakashvili and his government managed to set Georgia on the path towards being a stronger state which functioned more effectively. With many prominent NGO leaders invited into the government, Parliament and elsewhere, and in a situation in which donor organizations would only give money if NGOs would co-operate with the government (instead of 'oppose' or 'control') after the Rose Revolution, the NGO scene was transformed from a lively field of action into a more specialized and instrumentalized one. The priority on state building in the context of neo-liberal policy encouraged direct contacts between government and foreign donor organizations, thereby 'cutting out' some NGOs as intermediary organizations. Basically until the war in 2008 there were three groups of NGOs: those co-operating with opposition parties hoping to share in some of the foreign funding. There was a liberal elite (neutral on the outside but supported by the United National Movement) and the watchdogs (independent but hardly noticed by society). Unfortunately Saakashvili's success and his desire to join NATO also stepped up mutual tension with the Russian Federation, culminating in the August 2008 war which deprived Georgia of territory and cost human lives on both sides. Although various groups in society did not agree with the way government was conducting its foreign policy towards Russia and the then break-away regions Abkhazia and South Ossetia, opposition nor NGOs were successful at influencing this policy. The war generated a new stream of humanitarian and financial aid to help restore the war damage and build houses for the IDPs. With new donor money flowing in, new NGOs were established especially evolving around research and gathering statistics for policy making (CIESR, IDFI). After a few years of anonymous philanthropy, billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili announced his candidacy on behalf of the Georgian Dream in October 2011. A few strong independent NGOs, including Transparency International, the Georgian Young Lawyers' Association and the Fair Elections Society, very actively focused on the fairness of the upcoming elections in October 2012, elections which Saakashvili's National Movement lost to the Georgian Dream.

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A Brief History o

There has been an ongoing debate about the weakness of civil society and its causes in Turkey. For some, the blame can be laid on the authoritarian nature of the Ottoman Empire, which never allowed space for civil society or for participatory organizations (the forerunners of NGOs). It has frequently been argued that as the state exercised arbitrary power and authority over the non-governmental bodies and, as there were no stable legal guarantees for their survival, these bodies had neither a real possibility to develop nor the chance to survive even if they did manage to get off the ground. Şerif Mardin is a proponent of this argument. Even though he does refer to some institutions such as town and guild associations, which do show some of the characteristics of civil society, Mardin claims that as a part of society which could operate independently of central government and based on property rights', "civil society" (in a Hegelian sense) did not exist in the Ottoman Empire (Mardin, 1969, p. 264). Haim Gerber rejects this argument and claims that the Ottoman legal system was not arbitrary and that substantial traces of civil society were to be found in the fabric of the Ottoman state and society during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and they continued to exert considerable influence in the nineteenth and twentieth century (Gerber, 2000, p. 133). Ömer Çaha and Lütfullah Kahraman see the community system (millet), pious foundations (waqf), guild associations (lonca), religious scholars (ulema) and notables (ayan) as elements of civil society present under the Ottoman Empire.

It would be no exaggeration to say that the nineteenth century was a period of great reform and transformation in the Ottoman Empire. Commencing with the reforms of Selim III and Mahmud II, these continued with the instigation of the Tanzimat (literally Re-organization) and the Islahat (Improvement) Edict and reached their apex with the declaration of a constitutional monarchy. These reforms began by transforming the Ottoman army, followed by an overhaul of the civil bureaucracy, the Ottoman millet system and finally society as a whole. This reform was an attempt of modernization in the form of Westernization. These attempts to create a centralized, bureaucratic, rational modern state narrowed the space which the traditional units of civil society had been using in the past. Şerif Mardin argues that the purpose of these reforms was to create the foundation of a (new and modern) civil society which was expected to generate economic growth. In fact these reforms were Dead Sea fruit as, in the final analysis, those who reaped the most benefit were those involved in foreign trade, specifically the Levantines (Mardin 2004, p. 210), and they failed to make the contributions expected of them.

Particularly the period following the declaration of the Second Constitution (1908) was marked by the establishment of many associations, which subsequently participated in public life. Women's and youth organizations, associations formed by various professions and associations based on politics and economy-related fields are some examples which spring to mind. During this period, associations whose orientations were either religious or ethnic separatist also appeared.[17] The *Donanma Cemiyeti* (founded on 19 July 1909) is a good example of one of the brand new institutions of the new, modern civil society in the form of an association. This association resembled the German *Floottenverein* or the British Navy League and

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its goal was the to und
to bolster its fighting power at a time in which the portents of an imminent Great War could no longer be overlooked. Although initially it was a voluntary initiative, the Cemiyet enjoyed the strong backing of the state in its attempts to improve its organization and smarten up its activities. Later, it acquired a semi-official status (Gök, 2008, p. 78-79).

Nevertheless, although the modernization process and constitutionalism undoubtedly did offer a much more formal rule of law, in practice they did not provide an autonomous space for civil society and during this period the traditional institutions of civil society experienced difficulties. In the process of the foundation of the Republic, the state authorities tended to view the institutions of traditional civil society (waqfs, madrasas, dervish convents) as potential sources of resistance to the rapid reforms required to speed the modernization process. Instead of providing traditional civil society with a free space in which to manoeuvre, the state did promote the establishment of some NGOs in apparently modern forms because the authorities thought that such organizations were needed if they were to be able to stand on an equal legitimate footing with the Western European states. They allowed the activities of these NGOs as long as they generated the support needed by state but these 'modern' NGOs could never have survived by themselves. Two examples are the League of Nations Association established in Istanbul on the instructions issued by the Ankara government to the Istanbul government (officially established in 27 April 1922) (Sürmeli 2000, p. 184) and the Tayyare Cemiyeti, effectively established to mobilize the resources of the nation to purchase aircraft and place them under the command of the Turkish Military Force by 16 February 1925.

The 1961 Constitution did provide a wider arena for freedom of association. It can be claimed that, in its modern organizational forms, Turkish civil society only really began to flourish after its inception. The 1960s was the decade in which the number of modern associations throve. Student associations, influenced by the 1968 global youth movements, were very active and displayed a highly anti-American profile and they even tried to put pressure on Turkish politics, including foreign policy. Certainly throwing US Marines into the sea off the coast of the Dolmabahçe Palace, setting the US ambassador's car on fire and kidnapping and freeing four American airmen were all attempts to influence the general direction of Turkish foreign policy. The 1971 military intervention limited the space allocated to civil society, as the government perceived increasing NGO activity as some sort of threat to the continuity of the state.

The 1970s are understudied years, but certain facts about them are unequivocal. Numerous associations and trade unions were founded and, in these years NGOs (legal or illegal) did try to influence Turkish politics by making no secret of their reactions to government decisions and actions. They also did their utmost to exert an influence on the economy and social life. Widespread student protests against the US and Turkey's membership of NATO by left-wing groups and the highly sceptical attitude of right-wing political groups towards Russia and in-country leftists must be counted among open, direct attempts to influence Turkish foreign

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policy at that time. N(pressures to affect of the way associations functioned in Turkey. [18]

The 1980 coup was a great blow to the civil society. All associations and trade unions (with a few exceptions) were shut down and political parties were banned. Some of those associations whose activities were considered harmless were later permitted to reopen. Political parties were disbanded by 16.10.1981 (Milliyet, 17.10.1981). The active, indeed even the passive, members of many associations were detained and many of them tortured. The new constitutional system based on the 1982 Constitution failed to provide any opposition or autonomous civil society organization with room to manoeuvre. Normalization in this area took many years to achieve.

Moving on to the last three decades, it can be said that the 1980s were dominated by business organizations, the 1990s were driven by ethnic organizations and hometown associations, and in the first decade of the twenty-first century, NGO dynamism was principally driven by philanthropic associations and faith-based solidarity communities. The rest of this article will be devoted to an analysis of the civil society and NGO themes on the basis of events which privileged certain themes above others.

Three Patterns in Turkey: Economy-driven, Ethnic and Philanthropic NGOs

Principally as the result of the reform of the Turkish economy initiated by the IMF-led economy restructuring plan, the 1980s were characterized by the increased activity of business organizations. Under the regime of this plan, the Turkish economy was transformed from an import- substitution type to an export-led one. This radical change naturally increased the interest of the Turkish business community in the outside world. Previously it had mainly been left to TUSİAD (founded 1971) to represent the business community, but in the late 1980s and early 1990s, new business associations were established. One of these, founded in 1990, is MUSİAD, ideologically conservative and whose members are known for their religiosity. TUSKON is a recent example of this same thematic thread. It is a new confederation of small- and medium-size (SME) associations of businesspersons, established in 2005.[19] One of the influences exerted on society had been the awakening of an interest in foreign countries effectuated by TV broadcasts. *32.Gün* presented by Mehmet Ali Birand and travel programmes like *"7'den 77'ye"* presented by Barış Manço pioneered such broadcasts.[20]

The increasing interest taken by the business community in foreign economic policy, investments in such neighbouring countries as Georgia and Iraq, the integration of Turkey into the EU, free trade agreements which the EU has signed with other countries and the difficulties faced by businesspeople prior to and during their travels abroad are all reasons which lurk in the background of this growing interest. The Chamber of Commerce and Businessmen's Associations in Diyarbakır, Urfa, Mardin and Gaziantep have been actively involved in Turkish foreign policy towards Iraq in general, Northern Iraq in particular. The Edirne businessmen's associations have been busy developing trans-border trade and

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trans-border cultural cc
Business Council has played a very active role in developing relations between Armenia and Turkey and campaigning for the lifting of the Turkish embargo on this country. The Turkish Union of Chambers of Commerce and Stock Exchanges (TOBB) has become active in the Palestine-Israel conflict and participated in the Erez Free Economic Area Project, whose purpose is to establish a free economic area in the borderland between Israel and the Gaza Strip. TOBB and DEİK, in conjunction with the Secretary of the Department of the Foreign Trade have, organized the Turkey-Africa Business Forum, which runs parallel to the Foreign Ministry-organized Turkey-Africa Summit. All these examples demonstrate the heightened activity of business associations in the Turkish foreign policy process. Kemal Kirişçi explains this by citing the evolution of Turkey into a trading state (Kirişçi, 2009: 46-47, 50).

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War led to the end of grand ideology-oriented politics. This change of tack provided free space for ethnic groups and ethno- nationalism, to which events in Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia bear witness. Nor have these events passed Turkey by. There has been a rise in the number of associations based on the ethnic identity of their members. International and domestic developments have definitely affected this process. Ethnic autochthon Kurds, Diaspora Circassian, Georgian and Chechen groups as well as different migrant groups have organized according to their country of emigration, and the activities of their associations have stepped up enormously in this new period. On account of the nature of problems the countries in which they have had an interest or the problems that these groups faced themselves, they have also developed a stance on and interest in Turkish foreign policy.

The Kurdish problem and those political groups which define themselves by propagating the Kurdish question can be said to have been very influential on the course of Turkish foreign policy since the early 1980s, but these groups have never exerted any political influence on successive Turkish governments. After the 1980 coup, many of the politically active Kurds emigrated to European countries including Germany, Sweden, France and the Netherlands. In a strategy known as the boomerang effect, the aim for which they have striven is to influence Turkish politics by affecting the politics of the country in which they reside. The widespread, systematic human rights violations of the early 1980s provided these Kurdish NGOs with some strong political arguments by which to sway the foreign policy of their host countries towards Turkey. These are grounds for claiming that the best way to characterize the 1990s is to refer to the rise of ethnic politics in the field of foreign policy. The NGOs which have had an effect on Turkish foreign policy are not limited to the those of the Kurds; oppression in Bulgaria activated Balkan Associations, the Yugoslavia crises activated Rumeli associations,[21] the rapprochement between Turkey and Greece in 1999-2000 activated the 1923 Lausanne Convention exchange migrants in Turkey and they have subsequently contributed to political moderation and closer ties with Greece. Caucasian diasporas in Turkey have also tried to sway Turkish foreign policy towards the Caucasus, reaching two peaks: during the war between Chechens and the Russian army and during that between the Georgians and Abkhazians.[22]

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The 2000s have witnes
foreign policy. The Izmit earthquake on 17 August 1999 can be pinpointed as an important turning-point for increasing NGO activity in the arena of humanitarian aid. During the earthquake, the disorganized response of the state paved the way for citizen initiatives to take the leading role and, after the crisis, some of those initiatives which had built up their capacity were not disbanded but continued to operate.

Mehmet Özkan and Birol Akgün argue that the interest of the philanthropic associations in Africa began in 1996 with the Foundation for Human Rights and Freedom and Humanitarian Relief (IHH). This association was followed by others (Özkan and Akgün, 2010: 539). After the earthquake in Bam, Iran (2003), the tsunami in Indonesia (2004), the earthquake (2005) and flood disaster (2010) in Pakistan and the earthquake in Japan (2011), these NGOs were quick to give help in these countries in which they provided humanitarian assistance. These operations created extra room to manoeuvre and offered a lever by which to influence the makers of Turkish foreign policy.

The most important fruit of the activities of Turkish NGOs in Africa for Turkish foreign policy has been the support of the African countries for the nomination of Turkey for permanent membership on the UN Security Council. In fact, Turkey has now received the backing of most of the African countries and hence, with the support of 151 countries out of 192 members of the General Assembly of the UN, it has been able to become a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council.

Some philanthropic NGOs, including IHH, have an interest in Palestine and carry out aid operations in the occupied Palestinian territories. IHH has participated in an international campaign whose purpose was to deliver direct humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip, which is subject to a heavy Israeli embargo. The ship which was owned by IHH was attacked by the Israeli military in international waters and nine IHH volunteers were killed. The ship was subsequently temporarily confiscated by the Israeli authorities. This attack damaged Turkish-Israeli relations which had been tense since the Israeli attack on Lebanon in 2006. Despite the preferences of the Turkish foreign ministry for a moderate approach, the IHH activism deepened the crisis and, perhaps accidentally, this group had a very big impact on the Turkish foreign policy towards Israel.[23]

It should also be noted here that this periodization does not mean that the business community has remained inactive during the 1990s and 2000s, or that ethnic NGOs have not been influential in this time frame. It simply shows us that there has been a new entry in the field and that the visibility of these NGOs was raised during the stated periods. In conclusion, it was the increasing activity of the business community and the development of a civic space independent of the state for either financial or human resources which triggered the process of NGO involvement. It seems on the cards that, as long as there is a free space for civic actors, NGO involvement in politics in general and foreign policy in particular will increase.

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Analysis

One of our premises assumes that state-civil society relations have been shaped historically. Although our historical overviews do show similarities, seventy years of Soviet rule hard on the heels of the Czarist regime, created a difference in Georgia and caused a temporal delay compared to the situation in Turkey. Under the Russian Empire, which included present-day Georgia, civil society was seen as part of the monarchy, developing apace with this institution, hence it was not considered separate from or independent of the state. The same argument is applied to the Ottoman Empire. Ottoman civil society was complementary to the state in providing health care, education, food and shelter to those in need and could only operate with the approval of the central state authorities. It had no autonomy in its relationship with the state. Nevertheless, both cases are nuanced: Catherine the Great did establish the rule of law for the nobility and her free subjects. Exactly the same argument, that rule of law under the Sultanate was not completely arbitrary, is used to claim that civil society did exist under the Ottoman Empire. The difference in opinion lies in the definition of civil society as the rule of law instead of as an autonomously thriving part of society.

It seems that the two countries diverge most in the exposition of the second premise, the transformation from a traditional to a modern society. The period between 1864 and WWI engendered big changes in both, the exception being that in Georgia the cultural modernization led to a national awakening of resistance to the Russian Empire. The sort of society which emerged from the feudal society had a dual organization, with the prince on one side and the serfs on the other. Civil society in Georgia was linked to redefining relations between the aristocracy and the peasants but pertinently, it was also bound up with the promotion of Georgian language and culture in a context in which Russian oppression still prevailed. Therefore, the analytical level chosen is important: Chavchavadze and the associations and newspapers he established to educate the people and keep them informed about their standing in the Russian Empire are crucial in this context. If the local context alone is taken into account, the dualism between the aristocracy and the people tends to predominate with the associations still very close to Chavchavadze and the tergdaleuli.

Ensuing changes culminated in the Bolshevik Revolution (1917) as a result of which Georgia, as did Armenia and Azerbaijan, managed to remain separate (1918-1921) until the South Caucasus was also incorporated into the Soviet Union. Since communism makes civil society redundant because the state takes care of everything, for seventy years both the church and civil society suffered, with the exception of sporadic resorts to dissident type of action. Only in the last years of perestroika were a few associations established and, although these did have a political agenda, they were obviously in competition with the Communist Party. In other words, a section of the political elite was beginning to claim a space of its own, separate from the all encompassing communist regime.

Following the Great War, in Turkey there was a period of ambiguity for civil society during an understudied era in which the state subsidized some NGOs to help support

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the army and the navy.
strongly encouraged by US politicians, began about Europe inviting Turkey to join the EU, a beginning was made in embedding Turkey in Western structures. Hence, an overview of Turkish NGO activities shows Turkey had a head start.
This leads to the third premise, namely: that state-civil relations were shaped differently. For the time being, reviewing NGO activity, it does appear that Turkish NGOs have been active and effective in influencing the Turkish political agenda, by supporting protest actions, by mobilizing the policy of other countries to their own ends (boomerang effect), by informing the people through the media (press conferences, TV and the like), monitoring elections and keeping an eye on promises made, as well as by implementing international law. As the restructuring of events in and affecting Turkey shows, a nascent pattern is emerging, with a trend of moving away from an economic theme in the direction of ethnic themes and lately philanthropic themes. This categorization does not necessarily mean that the economy-driven NGOs of the 1980s and identity-driven NGOs of the 1990s have ceased to exist. Instead it implies that the actors have developed an interest in influencing Turkish policy on new themes in different epochs. In the language of Gramsci, the NGO leaders have tried, and indeed managed to influence the political superstructure. Following the dialectical movement of Hegel to a certain degree, it could be said that, after the human rights violations of the 1980s came a reaction, this time from ethnic interest groups defending their rights against the state and government, protecting minorities from the state.

In Georgia, after the implementation of a democratization programme, the pattern appears to have been more donor-driven: in the post-Soviet era, foreign donors began to support environmental activity tutoring NGO leaders in 'civil society speak', and how to practise the civil society strategies of exerting influence by monitoring, organizing press conferences, publishing societal analyses and such. Paradoxically, the establishment of so many NGOs competing on environmental issues, and the Green Movement leader entering politics, actually destroyed their movement. Nevertheless, what it does reveal is that the boundaries between civil society activity and politics are blurred and subject to opportunism. Political parties draw on NGO support and NGO leaders can use their NGO as a spring board into politics. Environmentalism was eventually followed by themes which concentrated on Fair Elections and later on Human Rights. After 2000, the persistent activity of a few NGOs, the kmara Movement in conjunction with the media and the independent TV station Rustavi 2 energized a sufficient number of people to generate a revolution in November 2003. President Shevardnadze was ousted and President Saakashvili emerged as the winner in the elections which followed. The authoritarian state had elicited a reaction from the people. Foreign donors now required NGOs to co-operate with the government, since that government was assumed to be democratic and pro-Western. In spite of various groups of people although wanting to join NATO, disagreeing with the government's policy towards the Russian Federation and the way negotiations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia were being conducted, NGOs were not able to significantly influence policy in these matters. In the last decade, the tendency has been for a few strong NGOs to dominate the field. They have achieved results especially by ensuring free and fair elections.

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A big difference betwe
and the intensification of globalization did usher in an overnight change in the laws and habits of the people in Georgia. It took nearly seven years after independence for the Communist propiska Law (Georgian chatsera) to be rescinded. State consciousness was more deeply engrained in people's minds and distrust towards anything 'non-governmental' lingered on well into the late 1990s. Indeed, distrust of anything 'governmental' lingered on until the revolution in 2003. Only after 2000, with the first stirrings towards the Rose Revolution, did expectations change on a more massive scale, temporarily at least.

Neither country has escaped the influence of globalization but the economic growth in Turkey has encouraged the expansion of a middle class bourgeoisie much more quickly than in Georgia where the growth of a middle class began to take root mainly after 2003 and even today still remains fragile. It certainly must be admitted that in Georgia only a small elite has profited enormously and poverty remained and still remains persistent, whereas a middle class is prospering in Turkey. In contrast to Turkey, Georgia is still fairly dependent on foreign investment and aid and it does not have a financially independent civil society sector.

Conclusion

We began this article with the hypothesis that a separation between civil society and the state is a basic tenet in the West. On the basis of a preliminary comparison between Georgia and Turkey, we have drawn the conclusion that, although the events and themes adopted by NGOs have diverged in both countries, the strategies these groups have used in both Turkey and Georgia are similar. One exception to the rule is the boomerang strategy of persuading foreign powers to influence the local government, a strategy resorted to by Turkish minorities and human rights activists abroad. The effect of influencing (foreign) policy has been more successful in Turkey than in Georgia where NGOs have monitored but have been unable to influence the policy vis à vis Abkhazia, South Ossetia and the Russian Federation. In Georgia the effects of NGO work had more effect in ensuing fair elections and freedom of speech. Free media, human rights and research (statistics) for policy making are topics which have received continuous attention.

Two major lines have emerged in the Georgian case. First and foremost there was a primacy of the monarchy and later of the state (autocratic CP, government and business converging at the top). Although civil society activity was highly stimulated after independence in 1991, these initiatives depend on foreign donor-money. With the exception of a few pro-governmental NGOs which receive funding from the government, the room given to NGOs to operate autonomously is narrow. Nevertheless, Georgian society, as represented by tens of thousands of people, refused to accept the closing down of Radio/TV station Rustavi 2 and rejected the thwarted election results of November 2003. By their action, they were setting a norm for freedom of speech and elections in the future.

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In Turkey, NGOs had country permits NGOs to be much less dependent financially on foreign donors or the state and they do manage to exert influence on Turkish (foreign) policy. However, in the past decade more and more individuals who do speak out have been jailed and any sort of massive protest has failed to eventuate. The Turkish case allows us to conclude that NGOs in Turkey enjoy more diversity. Those close to the centre of the state try to work in harmony with the state. They also try to benefit from the resources which are to be transferred by the governments. Those in opposition are always in trouble with the state and their domestic breathing space is very narrow. This encourages them to engage in international coalitions and they use the boomerang effect to edge the state in the direction of policy change. Those which are neither pro- government nor pro-opposition have forced to rely heavily their own resources and they do their utmost to try to avoid being politicized.

Finally, the state-civil society relations have been shaped differently in the Eurasian context both between each other and also compared to the Western Europe. From our preliminary explorative comparison we conclude that the understanding of modernization as individuals becoming decreasingly constrained by state structures needs revision in the more collectivistic post-Soviet, post-military and relatively more religious spheres of Georgia and Turkey. A frame composed of dimensions for comparing influence on various spheres of policy would be needed for fine tuning.

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1. This line of analysis is an example of what Beck would call a theory of "utopic evolutionism" or "simple modernization", "whether its motor be communicative rationality, the development of the means of production, or structural differentiation and functional integration" (Beck 1992:2).

2. Categorizations of Georgia vary from Eastern European to Eurasian or the Black Sea region.

3. At some point, Nodia also humorously refers to the Georgian mekhedrioni (militia, horsemen, knights) in the early days of Georgian independence as part of civil society.

4. The thieves in law in the former Soviet Union might serve as an example of an informal, alternative system of justice, circumventing the formal judges who were seen as corrupt and incompetent.

5. A part of the section on civil society in Georgia is developed from Companjen's PhD (2004) Between Transition and Modernity VU University Amsterdam, and also from follow-up research on Civil Society and the Rose Revolution (2008), and on Globalization and NGO's in Georgia (2011).

6. Suny (1988:131).

7. Sedaitis (1991:168): since 1985, the number and size of unofficial political groups in the former Soviet republics has expanded at a dizzying rate.

8. Soviet law did not allow for more subtle differences between public organizations. For many years newspapers, political parties and NGOs were registered on the same list at the Ministry of Justice. Some changes were made under the Public Law on Associations passed on July 14, 1994. The passing of the Law on Enterprise in 1995 separated newspapers, political organizations and NGOs from each other. It was only under the Civil Code (inception November 27, 1997) that NGOs were more clearly defined as we know them today: non-political, non- (purely) commercial organizations with some degree of voluntarism.

9. In 1998, the Ilia Chavchavadze Society participated in the local elections in the bloc 'Georgia – Merab Kostava Society'. In the parliamentary elections of 1999, it participated in a bloc with the 'Popular Front of Georgia' under the chairmanship of Nodar Natadze. Robert Petriashvili was one of the co-founders of this party with many others including Davit Berdzenishvili and the philosopher Merab Mamardashvili (Political Parties Directory 1999:24-25).

10. Interview with Zaliko Kikodze November 1997.

11. In Georgian and Russian 'ecological' is equivalent to 'environmental'.

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12. Interestingly the l
Indian company wanting to build the dam. The project is still controversial because the project documents do not show the economic benefit that Georgia will get from it, whereas at minimum 260 Svanetian families will need to be displaced with their villages and churches disappearing under water. Moreover the people concerned are poorly informed. Where is the civil society protest this time round? The Georgian Times April 22, 2013, p.8.

13. In 1999, the Ilia Chavchavadze Society still existed as a political party, then co-operating with the Popular Front of Georgia. The Rustaveli Society, though formally still extant, was not mentioned as a political party.

14. Although the Soviets did not manage to ban the Georgian language from the Constitution, in practice schoolbooks and formal documents were still written in Russian.

15. This is an interesting word because there is no equivalent in the Georgian language for community, let alone the very specific North American connotation attributed to this concept.

16. Some of the ideas discussed here in the Turkey-part of this article have been developed from an earlier article, Doğan, E. (2013) 'Changing Motivations of NGOs in Turkish Foreign Policy Making Processes: Economy, Identity and Philanthropy', in: International Review of Turkish Studies, Spring 2013, Volume: 3, Issue: 1, p. 56-81.

17. Ömer Çaha and Lütfullah Karaman state that constitutionalism in the Ottoman Empire was intended to serve the development of civil society. Every constitutional regulation/adjustment limited the authority of the state with regard to the civil society. However, the authors claim that this did not produce the expected outcome, and a new statist bureaucratic administrative elite restructured the authority of the state over the civil society (Çaha and Kahraman, 2006: 72).

18. Directly after the warning of the army on 12 March, 1971, Dev-Genç (Revolutionary Youth), Doğu Devrim Kültür Ocakları (East Revolution Culture Centers), Ülkü Ocakları , TÖS (Turkish Teachers' Union), İşsizlikle Mücadele Derneği (Fight Against Unemployment Association) were closed down by First Army Martial Law Command (Milliyet 29.04.1971); six associations were closed down in Adana (Milliyet 04.05.1976); three associations were closed down in Tekirdağ (Milliyet 03.10.1976); four associations, namely Sosyalist Gençlik Birliği (Socialist Youth Union), Ülkü Ocakları, Nallıhan At Yetiştiricileri (Nallıhan Horse Breeders), Tüm Sağlık Personeli Derneği (The Association of All health Care Employees) were closed down in Ankara (Milliyet 25.06.1977); the Governorship of Ankara closed the head offices of the Pol-Der (Police Association - an association of leftist police officers) and those of the Pol-Bir (Police Union - an association of nationalist police officers) (Milliyet 06.07.1978).

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19. Ahmet Kuru clain describes this movement as the most influential Islamic movement inspired by Fethullah Gülen (Kuru, 2008: 529).

20. 32.Gün has been broadcast since 1985, 7'den 77'ye commenced in 1988 and ended in December 1998. Another programme which has been broadcast on a conservative channel, Samanyolu TV, also affiliated with the Gulen Movement, Ayna, has been broadcast since 1995. There are various other travel programmes on Turkish TV channels.

21. These associations were very active during the dissolution of Yugoslavia and tried to influence Turkish foreign policy by staging demonstrations and mounting campaigns. To name but a few examples, 24 Yugoslavia Migrant Associations, which defined what they had experienced in Yugoslavia as a massacre, organized a demonstration and laid a demonstrative mourning wreath at the Yugoslavian Embassy in May 1992 (Milliyet, 24.05.1992); the Yugoslavian Migrants Solidarity Association visited Foreign Minister Hikmet Çetin and informed him of their cause. After seeing him, this group visited the UN Turkey Representation and handed in a petition which stipulated exactly what had been experienced in Bosnia-Herzegovina in February 1994 (Milliyet, 12.02.1994); the Bosnia Solidarity Association staged a demonstration in the Edirne border region in July 1995 (Milliyet, 24.07.1995).

22. The Circassian Diaspora in Turkey is composed of two main groups: Northern Caucasians (Abkhaz, Ossetians, Chechens) and Southern Caucasians (Georgians, Lazes, Megrells). Formerly these groups had acted in concertr against the Soviet Union and then against Russia. However, after the Russia-Chechen and Abkhaz-Georgian conflicts, their unity collpased. The Northern Caucasian Diaspora has organized itself under the Caucasia Association (KAF-DER), Caucasia Abkhazia Solidarity Committee (KADK) and Friends of Caucasia Initiatives. The Caucasian Associations Federation is the umbrella association of KAF-DER and KADK.

23. Mr.İsmail Haniye, Prime Minister of the Palestinian Authority in Gaza, visited Turkey, during which he called on ship the MV Mavi Marmara with IHH officials., In his speech in front of the ship, Haniye stated that, thanks to the Mavi Marmara martyrs, the embargo had been lifted and they had won victory against the Israeli siege. Because of the Mavi Marmara martyrs the historic mission and the role Turkey played for Palestinian cause has been understood once again (Hurriyet, 03.01.2012). Just on its own, this speech shows the impact of IHH on international politics.