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instituut voor
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Contact
Phone: +31 (0) 30 820 05 40
Fax: +31 (0) 30 820 05 41
E-mail: info@turksestudies.org
Website: www.turksestudies.org

Postal address
Institute for Turkish Studies
Laan van Chartroise 174
3552 EZ Utrecht
The Netherlands

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c/o International Review of Turkish Studies
Laan van Chartroise 174
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Telephone number:	+31 (0) 30 820 05 40
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Editorial Foreword

Armand Sag[1]

New issue

The fourth issue of the International Review of Turkish Studies is now lying in front of you. After the first three issues the publication of this fourth issue was becoming increasingly more difficult. Not because there were less submitted articles but, just the opposite, young academics from whole over the world saw the potential and started to submit their papers.

The mass share of these articles both enlightened and brought a great enthusiasm to our team of editors. Our fairly new academic journal seems to be accepted by most international and national scholars that deal with Turkish Studies.

All of this have made our journal a big gain for the academic world that deals with the aspect of Turkish Studies.

Content IRTS 1.4

The 'International Review of Turkish Studies' (IRTS), volume 1, issue 4 has yet another unique collection of national and international scholars with a different approach to their topics. Along with these difference there is also a wide circle of experienced scholars and young upcoming Ph.D.-candidates who together form a perfect balans.

For one, our first article of Maxime Gauin is titled 'The Convergent Analysis of Russian, British, French and American Officials about the Armenian Volunteers (1914-1922)'. Gauin, who is a Ph.D.-candidateat the Department of History of the Middle East Technical University, is quickly followed by the second article.

This second article is titled 'Republican origins of Kemalism: The early phase of its evolution' and submitted to us by Vahram Ter-Matevosyan; a Senior Research Fellow at the Department of Turkish Studies of the National Academy of Sciences in Armenia. This splendid article depicts the early phase of the Republican evolution from a different point of view since Ter-Matevosyan also used non-Western sources like Russian materials.

1 Drs. Armand Sag is editor-in-chief of International Review of Turkish Studies and also works as a senior researcher at Institute for Turkish Studies, where he is chairman of the board.

These two articles are followed by 'Conversion, Collaboration and Confrontation. Islam in the Register of the Patriarchate of Constantinople (14th Century)' of Mag. Dr. Johannes Preiser-Kapeller, who is affiliated with the Institute for Byzantine Studies of the Austrian Academy of Sciences. His article emphasizes that the Register of the Patriarchate of Constantinople contains more than 800 documents of the period 1315-1402 and therefore is one of the most important sources for anyone who wishes to research the Muslim expansion into Byzantine territory. These documents illustrate several cases of actual encounters between Byzantine Christianity and Islam in the 14th century. A detailed paper indeed.

Preiser-Kapeller is followed by Dr. Ayşegün Soysal Akyos (Boğaziçi University, also known as Bosporus University) with her paper 'The "Barker" of the Unionists: The Forgotten Early Life and Works of Aka Gündüz'. Her article sheds an additional light to the literary output of Aka Gündüz produced primarily during this period of major political tension and transition in the late Ottoman history.

And last but certainly not least, we have Dr. Şeyda Barlas Bozkuş of Marmara University in Istanbul, Turkey with her paper 'Turkey in Global Art Scene: Dual Narratives In Politics of International Exhibitions After 1980s'. Her article aims to analyze Turkish visual culture after the 1980s through international exhibitions.

The editorial board

Having said all this; one must not neglect to mention that for the first time the Editorial Board has been unchanged since the last issue which shows that both the Institute for Turkish as well as the International Review of Turkish Studies are well on their way to being a firm established institution. Seeing that this issue is the last journal of the year 2011, I would like to take this opportunity to wish everybody (both our readers as well as our Editorial Staff) a terrific 2012.

Winter 2011 (December 20th, 2011)

The Convergent Analysis of Russian, British, French, and American Officials Regarding the Armenian Volunteers (1914-1922)

Maxime Gauin[1]

Abstract: The Armenian nationalist parties, after decades of revolutionary action against the Ottoman Empire, supplied in 1914 and during the following years dozens of thousands of volunteers for the Russian and the French armies. The Russian and French officers in addition to the American observers and the British, who cooperated with Armenians in the Caucasus in 1918, initially praised the military value of the Armenian volunteers, but sooner or later, deplored their attacks against Muslims and their lack of loyalty. This article illustrates the convergence of the reports, across the nationalities of the officers, the geography (northeastern Anatolia, Cilicia, the Caucasus), and the time periods (World War I, Russian civil war and Turkish War of Independence).

Keywords: Armenian Revolutionary Federation-Dashnak, Armenian volunteers, Armenian Republic, Caucasus, Cilicia, Ethnic cleansing, Hunchak Party, Boghos Nubar, Ramkavar, Turkish War of Independence, World War I.

> *"I must not dissimulate from you that this troop no longer inspires confidence in me."*
>
> Report of Captain Josse, commanding the 7th Company of the Armenian Legion, April 20, 1920.[2]

The Ottoman archives are definitely the most important sources for Ottoman history, including the Armenian issue[3], the war crimes perpetrated by the Armenian volunteers, and their other misdeeds. However, the foreign archives provide supplementary and useful evidence, since the authors of these documents worked for countries which were enemies of the Ottoman Empire (UK, France, Russia), or at least allied with its enemies (U.S.). These Russian

1. Maxime Gauin is a Ph.D.-candidate at the Department of History of the Middle East Technical University in Ankara, Turkey.

2 Service historique de la défense nationale (SHDN), 4 H 42, dossier 6.

3 Yücel Güçlü, "Will Untapped Ottoman Archives Reshape the Genocide Debate? Turkey, Present and Past," The Middle East Quarterly, XVI-2, Spring 2009, pp. 35-42, http://www.meforum.org/2114/ottoman-archives-reshape-armenian-debate; Jeremy Salt, "The Narrative Gap in Ottoman Armenian History," Middle Eastern Studies, XXXIX-1, January 2003, pp. 19-36, http://www.tallarmeniantale.com/salt-narrative-gap.htm.

and Western documents are also crucial for understanding the relations between the Armenian organizations and the Great Powers.

The purpose of this article is not to pursue any concurrence of victims; not to pretend that a people globally suffered more than another; and even less to assert, as few Turks said in a moment of exasperation due to the Armenian terrorism of the 1970s and 1980s, that "the real genocide was inflicted upon the Turks." The Turkish historiography pointed out correctly that the CUP government reacted strongly to the criminal actions against Armenian deportees. Several Muslims—probably more than twenty—were sentenced to death and hanged in 1915.[4]In only the spring of 1916, 1,673 Muslims were tried by a martial court, including 67 who were sentenced to death and hanged, 524 sentenced to jail, 68 to forced labor, exile, or a fine.[5] Such a fact is incontrovertibly a decisive argument against the "Armenian genocide" allegation—and even the pro-Armenian historian Hilmar Kaiser acknowledged his incapacity to respond to this fact.[6] It is an equally credible argument that a substantial number of the Muslims believed—wrongly—that anything was permitted during the Armenian relocation. Talat Pasha himself correctly summarized the situation, defending the displacement itself and denying the charge of criminal designs by his government, but acknowledging that "I still to the present day feel great pain and distress that I was unable to prevent the atrocities that were carried out against people who were outside the area of revolt and had absolutely nothing to do with it."[7]

On the other hand, the massacres of Armenians were never denied by the Turkish historiography (the emphasis which is placed on the massacres is another question), but the massacres of Turks, other Muslims, and Jews by the Armenian volunteers remain crudely denied, minimized, or even excused by

4 Guenter Lewy, The Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey, (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2005), p. 111; Stanford J. Shaw, From Empire to Republic. The Turkish War of National Liberation, (Ankara: TTK, 2000), tome I, pp. 57-58.

5 Yusuf Halaçoğlu, The Story of 1915. What Happened to the Ottoman Armenians?, (Ankara: TTK, 2008), pp. 82-87. See also Yusuf Halaçoğlu, Facts on the Relocation of Armenians, 1914-1918, (Ankara: TTK, 2002), pp. 83-86; Hikmet Özdemir and Yusuf Sarınay, Turkish-Armenian Conflict Documents, (Ankara: TTK/TBMM, 2007), pp. 281, 261, 285, 294, 299, 317, 347, 349 and passim.

6 The Armenian Weekly, March 8, 2008. For other arguments refuting the "genocide" allegation, see especially, in addition to Yusuf Halaçoğlu, Feridun Ata, İşgal İstanbul'unda Tehcir Yargılamaları, Ankara: TTK, 2005; Kemal Çiçek, "Relocation of the Ottoman Armenians in 1915: A Reassessment," Review of Armenian Studies, n° 22, 2010, pp. 115-133; Edward J. Erickson "Armenian Massacres: New Records Undercut Old Blame," The Middle East Quarterly, XIII-3, Summer 2006, pp. 67-75, http://www.meforum.org/991/armenian-massacres-new-records-undercut-old-blame; Guenter Lewy, The Armenian Massacres..., pp. 44-89 and 122-257.

7 Stanford J. Shaw, From Empire..., tome I, pp. 61-62.

the majority of the authors supporting the "genocide" charge.[8] This synthesis, based on published sources and non-published French archives, is a reply to such an unscholarly denial and an invitation to further research.

Background (1862-1915)

The Armenian revolutionary movement (1862-1913)

In the second half of the 19th century, groups (1860s), secret societies (1870s), and eventually political parties (Armenakan in 1885, Hunchak in 1887, Armenian Revolutionary Federation in 1890) were formed among the Armenians. Gradually, the control was taken by Russian Armenians, but the main field of operation was the Ottoman Empire. Despite variations, Russia played an increasingly important role in the development, not to say the manipulation, of the Armenian revolutionary movement; the Tsarist governments followed the traditional policy of attempting to obtain access to the high seas and the not less traditional use of religious minorities, already proven to be efficient against Poland in the 18th century. A substantial portion of the Protestant missionaries played also an important role in the rise of bitter religious division and even more in the demonization of the Turk in the West.

The majority of the revolutionary nationalists, especially the Hunchak and the ARF-Dashnak, used extreme violence against both the Muslims and Armenians hostile to the revolutionary activities. These revolutionaries collected considerable arsenals of guns and bombs to carry out their goals. Showing absolute contempt for the lives of many Armenian civilians, both ARF and Hunchaks practiced insurrections and terrorist acts, where several thousands of Muslims were killed, provoking deliberately bloody reprisals (especially in eastern Anatolia during the years 1894-1896), and sometimes failing to provoke such counter-massacres (especially in Van, 1897). An intense propaganda campaign deliberately exaggerated the misdeeds of Turks and

8 For an excellent scholar analysis of a non-scholar attempt to discredit a Western source on the crimes of Armenian volunteers, see Heath Lowry, "Richard G. Hovannisian on Lieutenant Robert Steed Dunn. A Review Note," The Journal of Ottoman Studies, V, 1985. See also Serdar Palabıyık, "A Literature Between Scientificity and Subjectivity: A Comparative Analysis of the Books Written on the Armenian Issue," Review of Armenian Studies, n° 11-12, 2007, http://www.eraren.org/index.php?Lisan=en&Page=DergiIcerik&IcerikNo=476; and Robert F. Zeidner, The Tricolor over the Taurus, (Ankara: TTK, 2005), pp. 44-45. The German sociologist of Armeno-Kurdish heritage Taner Akçam called even "a legend" the massacres of Muslims by the Armenian volunteers of Russian army, during a debate on PBS, in April 2006. Other cases are discussed below.

Kurds.[9]

The ARF continued to practice uprisings, terrorism, and revolutionary activities until the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, and never hesitated to kill the Armenians who were reluctant to provide it money.[10] Considering that the Ottoman Empire was close to collapse in 1912-1913, because of Libya and the first Balkan War[11], the ARF broke its alliance with the CUP and turned back to Russia. With the assassination in December 1912 of Bedros Kapamacıyan, a wealthy merchant elected mayor of Van in 1909 with the support of the CUP, the ARF finished its decades-long work of exterminating loyal Armenian

9 See, for instance: Türkkaya Ataöv, "Procurement of Arms for Armenian Terrorists: Realities Based on Ottoman Documents," Paul B. Henze, "The Roots of Armenian Violence," and Heath Lowry, "Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Armenian Terrorism: 'Threads of Continuity'," in International Terrorism and the Drug Connection, (Ankara: Ankara University Press), 1984, pp. 71-83 and 169-202; R. des Coursons, La Rébellion arménienne, son origine, son but, Paris, Librairie du Service central de presse, 1895, http://louisville.edu/a-s/history/turks/la_rebellion_armenienne.pdf; Hratch Dasnabedian, The History of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, 1890-1924, (Milan: Oemme 1989°, pp. 21-28, 47-48 and 59-62; Ali İhsan Gençer, "Armenian Revolutionaries Regulations of 'The County Revolutionary Organization'," in A. Çay (ed.), The Eastern Question. Imperialism and the Armenian Community, Ankara, 1987, pp. 39-66; Kâmuran Gürün, The Armenian File. The Myth of Innocence Exposed, (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları), 2007 (1st edition, Nicosia, 1985), pp. 151-
205; H. M. Knadjian, The Eternal Struggle, (Fresno: Republican Printing House, ca 1918, reprint 2010), pp. 13-30; William L. Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism. 1890-1902, (New York, Alfred A. Knopf), 1960, pp. 150-160, 204-210 and 349-350; Guenter Lewy, The Armenian Massacres..., pp. 11-29; Pierre Loti, Les Alliés qu'il nous faudrait, (Paris: Calmann-Lévy), 1919, pp. 48-51 and 119-121; Louise Nalbandian, The Armenian Revolutionary Movement, (Berkeley-Los Angeles-London: University of California Press), 1963, pp. 97-101, 109-112, 119-128, 168 and 173-178;Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermeni İsyanları, Ankara, 2008, tome I and II;İnayetullah Cemal Özkaya, Le Peuple arménien et les tentatives de réduire le peuple turc en servitude, (İstanbul:Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi),1971, pp. 69-175 and 199-219; Kapriel Serope Papazian, Patriotism Perverted, (Boston: Baikar Press), 1934, pp. 13-21, 24, 38 and 57-73;Jeremy Salt, Imperialism, Evangelism and the Ottoman Armenians. 1878-1896, (London-Portland: Frank Cass), 1993, pp. 9-39, 55-80, 92-119, 123-135 et 143-157; Mark Sykes, The Last Caliph's Labt Heritage, London, 1915, pp. 409 and 418; Felix Valyi, Spiritual and Political Revolutions in Islam, (London: Kegan Paul), 1925, pp. 29-33 and 139-236, http://ia600308.us.archive.org/30/items/spiritualandpoli029564mbp/spiritualandpoli029564mbp.pdf

10 Hratch Dasnabedian, The History..., pp. 63-77; Guenter Lewy, The Armenian Massacres..., pp. 30-32; Kapriel Serope Papazian, Patriotism..., pp. 68-69.

11 On the military aspects of the Balkan wars, see Edward J. Erickson, Defeat in Detail. The Ottoman Army in the Balkans, 1912-1913, Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2003. On the other aspects, see Pierre Loti, Turquie agonisante, Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1913, http://www.archive.org/download/turquieagonisant00lotiuoft/turquieagonisant00lotiuoft.pdf ; and Justin McCarthy, Death and Exile. The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims, 1821-1922, Princeton: Darwin Press, 1995, pp. 135-177.

elites in eastern Anatolia.[12] Even if it was weakened after 1896 by a split, the Hunchak continued its activities, assassinating several Armenians[13], organizing an uprising in Adana in 1909[14] and a plot to murder Talat Pasha, Minister of Internal Affairs, in 1913-1914.[15] The Armenian American scholar Ronald Grigor Suny observes correctly that "Armenian nationalists refused to concentrate on fighting the Russian autocracy and directed their activities against the Ottoman Empire."[16]

Actually, many years before the outbreak of WWI, the Armenian revolutionaries decided their strategy of treachery and betrayal against the Ottoman Empire. Article 6 of the program adopted by the Hunchak Party in its origin (around 1887) and still in force in 1914, said: "The time for the general revolution will be when a foreign power attacks Turkey externally. The party shall revolt internally."[17]A letter of the common secretariat of the London and Marseille committees to the Armenian archbishop of Adana, on August 9, 1892, explained in advance the strategy of the revolutionaries: to use "hypocrisy," and when the right time would come, to destroy the telegraph lines, to "kill the high civil servants," to "spoil the Public Treasury," and to take the weapons of military depots.[18]It is surely not a coincidence that the main Armenian rebellion of WWI occurred in Van, a city where the Armenian standard of living clearly

12 Hasan Oktay, "On the Assassination of Van Mayor Kapamacıyan by the Tashnak Committee," Review of Armenian Studies, I-1, 2002, pp. 79-89, http://www.eraren.org/index.php?Lisan=en&Page=Dergilcerik&IcerikNo=94

13 "Claim Trust of Murder," The Lake County Time (Chicago), July 24, 1907 ; "Assassin is Put to Death — Armenian Revolutionist Dies for the Murder of Countryman," The Fort Wayne Sentinel, December 6, 1909.

14 Kâmuran Gürün, The Armenian..., pp. 207-211 ; Yücel Güçlü, Armenians and the Allies in Cilicia. 1914-1923, Salt Lake City, University of Utah Press, 2010, pp. 39-49 ; Osmanlı Belgelerinde 1909 Adana Olayları, Ankara, 2010, two volumes; Salâhi R. Sonyel, "The Turco-Armenian 'Adana Incidents' in the Light of Secret British Documents (July, 1908 — December 1909)," Belleten, LI, December 1987, pp. 1291-1338, http://www.ttk.org.tr/templates/resimler/File/fulltext/Belleten_Makale/bel201-1291_1338.pdf

15 Turkish General Staff, Armenian Activities in the Archive Documents, (Ankara: ATASE), tome III, 2006, http://www.tsk.tr/eng/ermeni_sorunu_salonu/arsiv_belgeleriyle_ermeni_faaliyetleri/pdf/Arsiv_Belgeleriyle_Ermeni_Faaliyetleri_Cilt_3.pdf

16 Ronald Grigor Suny, Armenia in the Twentieth Century, (Chico [California]: Scholars Press), 1983, p. 11.

17 Sarkis Atamian, The Armenian Community, (New York: Philosophical Library), 1955, p. 96; Louise Nalbandian, The Armenian Revolutionary..., p. 111.

18 Yusuf Sarınay (ed.), Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermeni-Fransız İlişileri, Ankara, 2002, tome I, 1879-1918, pp. 19-22 (Turkish version) and 294-299 (French version), http://www.devletarsivleri.gov.tr/Forms/belge/993/8.PDFhttp://www.devletarsivleri.gov.tr/Forms/resim/993/8.PDF

improved during the end of 1890s and the 1900s.[19]

Insurrections and recruitment of volunteers (1914-1918)

Initially, the CUP asked the Armenian parties to simply remain loyal to the Ottoman Empire, butnoticing as early as summer 1914 that the ARF and other Armenian organizations were recruiting volunteers for the Russian army, they proposed the following deal: a massive involvement of both Ottoman and Russian Armenians against Russia in exchange for an autonomous Armenia comprising of territory from the two empires. The ARF refused and continued its activities against the Ottoman Empire for Russia.[20] When the CUP government asked the ARF to remain neutral, "the desired response was not given," according to Captain Leghazarof, officer of the Armenian general staff during WWI.[21] Hovannes Katchaznouni, ARF leader and Prime Minister of Armenia from 1918 to 1919, indicates (my emphasis):

"In the Fall of 1914 Armenian volunteer bands organized themselves and fought against the Turks because they could not refrain themselves from organizing and refrain themselves from fighting. This was in an inevitable result of a psychology on which the Armenian people had nourished itself during an entire generation: that mentality should have found its expression, and did so.

If the formation of bands was wrong, the root of that error must be sought much further and more deeply. At the present time it is important to register only the evidence that we did participate in that volunteer movement to the largest extent and we did that contrary to the decision and the will of the General Meeting of the Party.

The Winter of 1914 and the Spring of 1915 were the periods of greatest enthusiasm and hope for all the Armenians in the Caucasus, including, of course, the Dashnagtzoutiun. We had no doubt that the war would end with the complete victory of the Allies; Turkey would be defeated and dismembered, and its Armenian population would at last be liberated."[22]

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19 Justin McCarthy and alii, The Armenian Rebellion at Van, (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press), 2006.

20 Morgan Philips Price, War and Revolution in Asiatic Russia, (London: George Allen & Unwin), 1918, p. 245, http://www.archive.org/download/cu31924027963762/cu31924027963762.pdf ; Stanford J. Shaw, The Ottoman Empire in World War I, Ankara: TTK, tome I, 2006, pp. 93-100. See also Documents on Ottoman Armenians, (Ankara: Prime ministry Directorate of Press and Information), tome II, 1985, pp. 2-15.

21 Rôle des Arméniens du Caucase pendant la guerre 1914-1918, SHDN, 16 N 3187, classeur 36.

22 Hovannes Katchaznouni, The Armenian Revolutionary Federation Has Nothing to Do Anymore, New York, Armenian Information Service, 1955.

In the Sivas province alone, 15,000 Armenians joined the Russian army, and 15,000 others formed gangs who attacked the Ottoman military forces.[23] G. Pasdermadjian, a former Dashnak deputy of Erzurum in the Ottoman Parliament (1908-1912), went to Russia as early as Summer 1914 to organize the recruitment of both Ottoman and Russian Armenians as volunteers in the Russian army. In addition to the 150,000 regular soldiers, Pasdermadjian's committee provided more than 50,000 men to the Tsar's army.[24] According to Pasdermadjian, apparently less than 20,000 of these men were Russian subjects.[25] Since the Armenian volunteers of France, the UK, and the U.S. fought mostly in Western armies, and since the Armenian communities of Bulgaria and Romania were too small to provide big groups of volunteers, these figures mean that around 30,000 Ottoman Armenians—possibly more[26]—betrayed their country by fighting for Russia.

The question to answer is if there was a completely coordinated insurrection or a series of rebellions organized by groups which shared common objectives, but were not necessarily in permanent contact is still a matter for debate. The basic fact of the well-planned rebellions and the great danger which they represented, however, cannot be seriously challenged.[27]

The Hunchak Party had broken its ties with the CUP in 1909 and chosen, since the very beginning, the side of Russia. The Hunchakists organized rebellions in Zeytun in August 1914 then in the beginning of 1915, provoking the first localized displacement of Armenians.[28] The representatives of the insurgents estimated that, in February 1915, around 15,000 Armenians were fighting the

23 Documents..., tome II, p. 80.

24 Avetis Aharonian and Boghos Nubar, The Armenian Question Before the Paris Peace Conference, 1919, p. 6, http://www.archive.org/download/armenianquestion00pari/armenianquestion00pari.pdf

25 G. Pasdermadjian, Why Armenia Should Be Free, (Boston: Hairenik), 1918, p. 19. Pasdermadjian is not absolutely clear, speaking of volunteers from "Caucasus", but if there is an error in the interpretation of this figure, it is an overestimation of Russian Armenians' number and so an underestimation of Ottoman Armenians' number.

26 Yusuf Halaçoğlu, Facts..., p. 105 gives the figure of 50,000, relying on Ottoman documents.

27 Armenian Activities..., tome I and III, passim; Edward J. Erickson, "Armenians and Ottoman Military Policy," War in History, XV-2, April 2008, pp. 141-167, http://www.tc-america.org/media/Ericson_militarypolicy1915.pdf Justin McCarthy, "The Armenian Uprising and the Ottomans," Review of Armenian Studies, II-7/8, 2005, http://www.eraren.org/index.php?Lisan=en&Page=DergiIcerik&IcerikNo=134; Osmanlı Belgelerinde..., tome IV, pp. 85-234; Esat Uras, The Armenians in History and the Armenian Question, Ankara: Documentary Publications, 1988, pp. 855-885, http://louisville.edu/a-s/history/turks/the_armenians_in_history.pdf

28 Armenian Activities..., tome I, pp. 73-74 and 181; Azmi Süslü, Armenians and the 1915 Event of Displacement, Ankara, 1994, p. 68; Gwynne Dyer, "Correspondence," Middle Eastern Studies, IX-3, October 1973, p. 383; Yusuf Halaçoğlu, Facts..., pp. 47-48 and 58-60.

Turks in and around Zeytun.[29] The agitation increased in the country around Van during the winter of 1914-1915, and whole Turkish villages were annihilated. A unified front of the Armenian committees, led by the ARF, launched the major revolt in Van city in April 1915 (carefully premeditated), and it was the main reason of the displacement of Armenians from whole provinces (but with exceptions). Thousands of Muslim civilians were indiscriminately butchered by the insurgents, the women were raped,the buildings were pillaged then destroyed; and the response of many Ottoman fighters, especially the Kurdish irregulars, was not fundamentally different.[30]

Other insurrectional movements happened in the city of Sassoun, in the Bitlis, Erzurum, Trabzon, Sivas, Ankara, Adana, and Bursa provinces.[31] As early as November 1914, the Armenian committees prepared intensively, both in Anatolia and in the Diaspora, for a landing of the Entente's forces in Cilicia, and the ARF leader Mikael Varandian repeated the proposition in the name of "20,000" Diaspora Armenians in March 1915, but eventually in vain, and the actual result was the constitution of the Légion d'orientfor the French army in 1916.[32]In a note from July 24, 1915, Boghos Nubar's committee claimed that "in Turkey, only the Armenian populations of Armenia [eastern Anatolia] and Cilicia have very marked insurrectional tendencies against the Turkish regime," giving as evidence that there were "25,000 insurgents" in Cilicia and "15,000" in "neighboring provinces."[33]As late as October 1915, in the city of Urfa, which was exempted until then of forced displacement, the Armenian nationalists attacked the Ottoman army in a true—and bloody—

29 Arthur Beylerian, Les Arméniens, les grandes puissances et l'Empire ottoman dans les archives françaises (1914-1918), Paris : université de Paris-I, 1983, p. 7.

30 Armenian Activities..., tome I, pp. 32-33, 65-70, 75-76, 89-95, 109-121, 124-125, 128-129 and passim;Yusuf Halaçoğlu, Facts..., pp. 52-57; Justin McCarthy and alii, The Armenian Rebellion..., pp. 176-257 and 277-281; Azmi Süslü, Armenians..., pp.71-75.

31 For instance: Armenian Activities..., tome I, passim ; Aspirations et agissements révolutionnaires des comités arméniens, avant et après la proclamation de la Constitution ottomane, Istanbul, 1917, pp. 168-185; Kâmuran Gürün, The Armenian..., pp. 248-251 and 255-257; Yusuf Halaçoğlu, Facts..., p. 48-52 and 57; Azmi Süslü, Armenians..., pp. 68-70 and 75-87; Aram Turabian, Les Volontaires..., p. 41.

32 SHDN, 4 H 42, dossier 1 ; Arthur Beylerian, Les Arméniens..., pp. 12-14 and passim ; Edward J. Erickson, "Captain Larkin and the Turks: The Strategic Impact of the Operations of HMS Doris in Early 1915," Middle Eastern Studies, XLVI-1, January 2010,pp. 151-162, http://www.tc-america.org/media/Ericson_LarkinandtheTurks.pdf ; Yücel Güçlü, Armenians and the Allies..., pp. 51-101 and 201-205; Guenter Lewy, The Armenian Massacres..., pp. 103-109; Stanford J. Shaw, The Ottoman..., tome II, 2008, pp. 875-881; Salâhi R. Sonyel, "Armenian Deportations: a Reappraisal in the Light of New Documents," Belleten, January 1972, pp. 56-57.

33 Commission des archives diplomatiques, Documents diplomatiques français : 1915, tome III, Brussels : Peter Lang, 2004, p. 98 ; Vatche Gazarian, Boghos Nubar's Papers and the Armenian Question, 1915-1918. Documents, Waltham : Mayreni, 1996, p. 203.

battle.[34] So happened what the German Generals Felix Guse and F. Bronsart von Schellendorff and the Germany Vice-Consul Kuckoff described asa large and generalized conspiracy to organize insurrections.[35]

To say that the Armenian nationalists fired systematically "the first shot"—including against the loyal Armenians, like Bedros Kapamaciyan—is not to diminish the crimes perpetrated by some Muslims against Armenian civilians, and more generally the sufferings of the Armenian population, but simply to notice the historical truth.[36] Similarly, to say that the insurrections of Zeytun,Van,and Urfa created a context for local civil war does not mean that the whole Turko-Armenian tragedy can be explained as a simple "civil war"—despite the questionable generalizations of some authors.[37]

The fact remains, however, that the first goal of the Armenian volunteers was to wipe out the Muslim population of eastern Anatolia. The American missionary G. C. Raynolds, despite an obvious pro-Armenian view, wrote in a report that in Van "the Armenians seem perfectly debauched," and that, among the reasons for their crimes, there is "the thought to make this a purely Armenian province."[38] The goal of an "integral Armenia, from the Black Sea to Mediterranean Sea" was completely against all the demographic realities, and as a result, was called the "dream" of "Armenian megalomaniacs" by the pro-Armenian Colonel Chardigny, member of the French military mission in Caucasus.[39] Nevertheless, the Armenian representatives in Paris claimed in 1919 a mandate to "integral Armenia" by a major power, which was supposed to clean the whole Muslim population.[40]

It is not much of a surprise that before and after 1919, Armenian volunteers practiced ethnic cleansing. It is even less a surprise since those who asked

34 Documents..., tome II, p. 105 and tome III, pp. 109-110; Guenter Lewy, The Armenian Massacres..., pp. 198-202.

35 Felix Guse, „Der Armenieraustrand und seine Folgen", Wissen und Wehr, n° 6, 1925, pp. 609-621; Cem Özgönül, Der Mythos Eines Völkermordes, (Köln: Önel Verlag), 2005, p. 122; F. Bronsart von Schellendorff, „Ein Zeugnis für Talaat Pascha," Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, July 24, 1921.

36 Justin McCarthy, "The First Shot,"Review of Armenian Studies, n° 1, 2002, pp. 28-51, http://www.eraren.org/index.php?Lisan=en&Page=DergiIcerik&IcerikNo=91

37 For an example of such a generalization by a good scholar, see Justin McCarthy, Muslims and Minorities. The Population of Ottoman Anatolia and the End of Empire, New York-London, New York University Press, 1983, pp. 118-122. Mr. McCarthy refined his analysis since the 1980's.

38 Justin McCarthy et alii, The Armenian Rebellion..., pp. 252-253.

39 La question arménienne, 30 octobre 1919, SHDN, 16 N 3187, classeur 39.

40 Avetis Aharonian and Boghos Nubar, The Armenian Question Before the Paris Peace Conference, 1919, pp. 2 and 7-13 (more especially p. 12), http://www.archive.org/download/armenianquestion00pari/armenianquestion00pari.pdf

young Armenians to fight the Turks—then the Azeris—developed an extremely virulent racism. Since the origin the of the Armenian revolutionary movement, "in stark contrast to the lingering pro-Russian feelings among the Armenians, the attitude toward the Turks was one of bitter hatred if not racial contempt. [...] Whereas Russians were seen as Europeans, the Turks were regarded by many Armenians as an Asiatic people, an inferior and uncultured people."[41]
In its issue of August 19, 1914, Haiastan, the official newspaper of the ARF in Bulgaria, said: "The Armenian nation has always bravely resisted this race which was led by nothing but betrayal and crime. The world must be rid of this evil, and for the tranquility of it, the Turkish nation must be suppressed."
Not so different was the appeal of Aram Turabian for recruitment in French and Russian armies, also in August 1914. Turabian described the Turks as an inferior and criminal race, who will be expelled from both Anatolia and Bosphorus by the Tsar's army.[42] The racist speeches continued during the entire war and after. A publication of the Armenian Bureau in London asserted in 1918 (my emphasis):

> *"Actual Turkish nationality there is none nowadays; that isto say, any territory of appreciable size in Europe or Asia whichis peopled homogeneously by the Mongolian tribesonce known as 'Turks,' and distinguished from other Mongolians by theTurkish speech. [...]But the original Turks had brought with them the Turkish spirit, the spirit which had prompted the Hun and the Avar, the Tatar, and the original Bulgar [Bulgarian], the Petcheneg, the Seljuk, and the Othmani [sic: Ottoman] to ravage and destroy for the mere lust of destruction and of stupid conquest.*
>
> *All these Turkish-Tatar tribes have deserved a prominent place on the black list of human history."*[43]

Mikael Varandian, the ARF's main ideologist from the 1900s to his death in 1934, developed a similar racist theory, expressed without any ambiguity. According to Varandian, the Turks are just "primitive and nomadic tribes," "like a huge parasite," "unable to produce, assimilate and rule, strong only in the art to consume, enslave and destroy," "recusant any culture," who "destroyed" or at least "paralyzed" the Greek, Armenian, and Slavic cultures.[44]

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41 Ronald Grigor Suny, Armenia..., ibid.

42 Aspirations..., pp. 102 and 155.

43 The "Clean-Fighting Turk". Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, (London: Spottiswoode, Ballantyne & C°/ Armenian Bureau Publications), 1918, p. 3.

44 Mikael Varandian, L'Arménie et la question arménienne, (Laval: G. Kavanagh & Cie), 1917, pp. 23-30. See also Avetoon Pesak Hacobian, Armenia and the War, (New York: George Doran C°), 1918, pp. 37-39, 44-47 and 56-61, http://www.archive.org/download/armeniawar00haco/armeniawar00haco.pdf

The Armenian volunteers were necessarily inclined to assault and assassinate Turkish civilians, whatever their actual acts might be, since they were hearing again and again that the Turks are not really humans, but something like half-animals ("huge parasite"), only able to fight and to commit crimes.

Russian invasion of northeastern Anatolia (1914-1916)

Russian views

The effectiveness of the Armenian volunteers for the Russian army in the beginning of the war is undisputed. Several Russian generals testified that they provided very valuable services, and the Tsar himself expressed his satisfaction, during a visit to the Armenian Cathedral of Tbilisi (Tiflis).[45]
However, as early as December 1914, some Russian officers complained to their superiors about the war crimes perpetrated by the Armenian volunteers, who quickly preferred to butcher Muslim civilians instead of continuing the fight against the Ottoman army. These complaints increased during the year 1915, and provoked a debate between the Russian officers. The opponents to the Armenian units argued that the massacres of Muslims by Armenians had bad military consequences; the supporters of these units answered that one could find a way to curb the "excesses." Interestingly, several of the officers advocating the suppression of the volunteers units feared that the Armenian volunteers could fight Russia after the end of the war. Eventually, the units were suppressed in December 1915; some of their members were eliminated, others integrated to the regular army.[46]

The most detailed account by a Russian official about the crimes of the Armenian volunteers during the Russian invasion is likely the 65-page report of Brigadier General Leonid Bolhovitinov, dated December 11, 1915. Bolhovitinov indicated that "Armenian voluntary units had started violent slaughters against the Muslim people with racist motives" (my emphasis) and that such violence had deep roots: since the end of the 19th century, the Armenian revolutionary committees assassinated both moderate Armenians and Muslim civilians. Bolhovitinov warned against the exaggerations of

45 Herbert Adams Gibbons, Armenia in the World War, (New York: American Committee Opposed to the Lausanne Treaty), 1926, pp. 9-10, http://armenians-1915.blogspot.com/2011/03/3232-armenia-in-world-war-by-herbert.html ; Avetoon Pesak Hacobian, Armenia..., pp. 86-88; Gabriel Korganoff (Gorganian), La Participation des Arméniens à la guerre mondiale sur le front du Caucase (1914-1918), (Paris: Massis), p. 28.

46 Michael A. Reynolds, Shattering Empires. The Clash and Collapse of the Ottoman Empires, 1908-1918, (New York-Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 2011, pp. 156-158; Azmi Süslü, (ed.), Russian View on the Atrocities Inflicted by the Armenians Against the Turks, (Ankara: Köksav), 1991, pp. 31-33. See also Mehmet Perinçek (ed.), Rus Devlet Arşivlerinden. 100 Belgede Ermeni Meselesi, (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap), 2007, pp. 68-103.

Armenian propaganda:

> *"We shall not believe in the death tolls that the Armenians give. The number of missing people has been exaggerated in the memos distributed by the Dashnak party and there is no doubt that they are politically-motivated. Those Armenian gangs, who triggered the slaughters, are the ones who should be blamed for those missing."*

The Russian general was also afraid that the Dashnak would eventually use their weapons against his country, after they had betrayed the Ottoman Empire.[47]

Bolhovitinov experienced again the war crimes of Armenian volunteers even after the disbanding of the units. He reproduced in a telegram from March 17, 1916, the explanations of the Russian commander in Bitlis, an occupied Ottoman town:

> *"The infantry unit had taken some twenty Muslim homeless orphans into the house and fed them. The group went out on reconnaissance but when they came back in the evening, they found all the children butchered into pieces. When our soldiers were out, there were only Armenians at home. As a result of the investigation I have ordered, it is definite that these murders have been realized by the Armenians. Unfortunately, the culprits could not be found. The Armenian volunteers have caused such a large complication, that it was not possible to resolve the matter."*[48]

Some ARF leaders, chiefly G. Pasdermadjian (1873-1923) and Hratch Dasnabedian (1928-2001), attributed the dissolution of volunteer units to a Russian design of "Armenia without Armenians," the policy of Lobanov-Rostovsky in the 1890s.[49] At first, Pasdermadjian was not a neutral witness but an actor, writing in 1918, and attempting to diminish the importance of the alliance between the Armenian committees and the Tsarist regime, less than popular among the U.S. public opinion. Even in forgetting the fact that Hratch Dasnabedian was an ARF leader and wrote in an explicitly defensive perspective, the fact remains that he relies only on self-justification from Dashnak sources.

Anyway, there are two problems with the assertions of these Dashnak leaders. At first, the complaints against the Armenian units and even the disbanding of

47 Mehmet Perinçek (ed.), Ermeni Raporu, (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap), 2009. For a previous, shorter, account by Bolhovitinov, see Azmi Süslü, (ed.), Russian View..., p. 33.

48 http://armenians-1915.blogspot.com/2009/04/2803-antranik-armenians-massacring.html

49 Hratch Dasnabedian,The History..., p. 119; G. Pasdermadjian,Why Armenia..., p. 29.

them happened before the capture of Erzurum. Second, if Lobanov-Rostovsky likely had the designs which Pasdermadjian and Dasnabedian attribute to him, Michael A. Reynolds gives a rather different context of the formulation "Armenia without Armenians" in 1915:

> *"One tsarist official, Prince Vasilii Gadzhemukov, bluntly laid out the case the case against the Armenians in a report to Yudenich. [...] With their indiscriminate slaughter of Muslims at Van, he explained, 'the Armenians themselves' had given the 'signal of the barbaric destruction of the Armenian nation in Turkey'. And although that destruction left 'the positive result that Turkey has left us Armenia without Armenians', the legacy of Van had stiffened Muslim resistance to Russian arms 'for fear of falling into Armenian hands'."*[50]

It would be difficult to call this Prince "pro-Turkish," not only because he was an official of the most constant enemy of the Turks, but also because he accepts the exaggerated allegation of "the barbaric destruction of the Armenian nation in Turkey." Pasdermadjian himself corroborates in part the Gadzhemukov's conclusions, in saying that if the Armenians "had bought their fate in 1914 to the German cause," "first of all, these frightful Armenian massacres would have not taken place."[51] In his memoirs, Pasdermadjian adds that he came to Russia to organize the recruitment of volunteers despite the warnings of some of his proper Dashnak comrades, who said that this decision "could have negative effects for the Armenians of Turkey."[52] Aram Turabian was even more explicit. He claimed that he and his associates "knew perfectly" the bloody consequences of the revolutionary activities against the Ottoman Empire. Turabian advocated shamelessly for the "necessity" to "sacrifice a part of the current [Armenian] generation."[53]

The truth is that Russia wanted to settle Cossacks, even more than Armenians, and exterminated several Muslim communities of the Caucasus during WWI[54], pursuing its policy of rushing to the open seas, which attained

50 Michael A. Reynolds, Shattering Empires..., pp. 157-158.

51 Garegin Pasdermadjian, Why Armenia..., p. 43.

52 Garegin Pasdermadjian, Bank Ottoman: Memoirs of Armen Garo, (Detroit: Armen Topouzian), 1990, p. 19.See also Firuz Kazemzadeh, The Struggle for Transcaucasia, (New York: Philosophical Library), 1951, p. 26; and Kapriel Serope Papazian, Patriotism..., pp. 38-39 (Papazian is wrong on the intention of the CUP, which he had no way to know; but right on the factual finding of ARF's actions and their consequences).

53 Aram Turabian, Les Volontaires..., pp. 41-42.

54 Georges Mamoulia, Les Combats indépendantistes caucasiens entre URSS et puissances occidentales : le cas de la Géorgie, (Paris: L'Harmattan), 2009, p. 14.

its climax in 1914-1917[55]—additional proof, if needed, that the humanitarian concerns had very little to do with Russian policy. However, these deedsare not an argument corroborating the ARF'ssimplistic allegation of Russian betrayal. The Russians, practicing ethnic cleansing against the Muslims since the 18th[th] century, knew perfectly how long and difficult such an operation would be; in conquering vast lands at a time when the Caucasus still had an important Muslim population, they understood that an unconditional support to Armenian nationalism would provoke a strong reaction among the Muslims of both Anatolia and the Caucasus, which could jeopardize all the conquests gained—with difficulties—since the 19[th]century. The issue is much more complex than the single—and incontrovertible—cynicism of Russian policy. Anyway, if Russia used Armenian nationalism as a tool, this tool accepted its statute. The ARF had broken its ties with the Tsarist regime in 1907 and returned to its close alliance in 1912-1913. In fact, Pasdermadjian's and Dasnabedian's views typify a Dashnak shortcoming well analyzed by Hovannes Katchaznouni (emphasis of the English translator):

> *"We had created a dense atmosphere of illusion in our minds. [...]*
>
> *We overestimated the ability of the Armenian people, its political and military power, andoverestimated the extent and importance of the services our people rendered to the Russians. And by overestimating our very modest worth and merit we were naturally exaggerating our hopes andexpectations. [...]*
>
> *To complain bitterly about our bad luck and to seek internal causes to our misfortune — that is one of the main aspects of our national psychology from which, of course, the Dashnagtzoutiun is not free.*
>
> *One might think we found a spiritual consolation in the conviction that the Russians behavedvillainously towards us (later it would be the turn of the French, the Americans, the British, the Georgians,Bolsheviks — the whole world — to be so blamed). One might think that, because we were so naïve and solacking in foresight, we placed ourselves in such a position and considered it a great virtue to let anyonewho so desired to betray us, massacre us and let others massacre us."*[56]

Another important fact is that the leaders of the Armenian volunteers units obtained, as early as 1916, the transformation of these units in Armenian regiments, which remained on the Caucasian front.[57]

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55 Max Hoschiller, L'Europe devant Constantinople, 1916, pp. 84-93.

56 Hovannes Katchaznouni, The Armenian Revolutionary Federation...

57 Anahide Ter Minassian, 1918-1920, la République d'Arménie, Bruxelles : Complexe, 2006, p. 27.

Other views

Anyway, the Russian officers had no reason to exaggerate the war crimes of the Armenian volunteers in their internal reports, and the grievances of these officers are largely corroborated by other sources. Haig Shiroyan, an Ottoman Armenian of Bitlis who immigrated to the U.S. after WWI, and can hardly be considered an advocate of the Turks, explained in his memoirs: "The Russian victorious armies, reinforced by Armenian volunteers, had slaughtered every Turk they could find, destroyed every house they penetrated."[58]Despite a pronounced pro-Armenian and anti-Turkish bias, the missionary Grace Knapp explained that after the capture of Bitlis by the Russian army (1916), "the Moslems who did not succeed in escaping were put to death," especially by "a band of Armenian volunteers, part of the advance guard of the Russian army."[59] This finding corroborates the report of General Bolhovitinov about massacres of Turks in Bitlis, in the beginning of 1916.

Mary Caroline Holmes, a missionary in Urfa who was described by the strongly Turkophobe U.S. Consul George Horton as "a heroic American lady,"[60] noticed in a private letter from 1919:

> *"It is essential to remember that for 24 years the grievances of the Armenians have been systematically advertised in England and America. [...] On the other hand, how little is known of [...] the massacres by Armenians during the retreat into Armenia before the Russian advance through the Caucasus."*[61]

Despite being openly pro-Armenian, U.S. Major General James G. Harbord noticed in his report of investigations in eastern Anatolia:

> *"In the territory untouched by war from which Armenians were deported the ruined villages are undoubtedly due to Turkish deviltry, but where Armenians advanced and retired with the Russians their retaliatory cruelties unquestionably rivaled the Turks in their inhumanity."*[62]

58 Haig Shiroyan, Smiling Through the Tears, New York, 1956, p. 186.

59 Grace Knapp, The Tragedy of Bitlis, (New York-Chicago-London-Edinburg: Flemming H. Revell C°), 1919, p. 146.

60 George Horton, The Blight of Asia, (Indianapolis: Bobbs Merill C°), 1926, chapter XXVI, http://www.aina.org/books/tboa/tboa.pdf

61 Salâhi R. Sonyel, "How Armenian Propaganda Nurtured a Gullible Christian World in Connection with the Deportation and 'Massacres'," Belleten, January 1977, p. 175.

62 James G. Harbord, Conditions in the Near East. Report of the American Military Mission to Armenia, (Washington: Government Printing Office), 1920, p. 9.

Morgan Philips Price, the war correspondent for the Manchester Guardianin the Caucasus and a future member of British Parliament, was among the Armenian volunteers in November 1916. Price's testimony confirms that the dissolution of the Armenian volunteers unit did not stop the arrogance or even the crimes of these men. They considered themselves as the main actors of Russian military victory, had "very ambitious political pretentions," and considered the Russians as "intruders." The Armenian volunteers also considered that they were allowed to exterminate all the Muslims they could, combatants and non-combatants, and acknowledged shamelessly their crimes in front of Philips Price, when he saw some corpses of butchered Kurds and asked who killed them.[63]

Similarly, in a report of 1919, Major Edward W. C. Noel, a political officer of the British Army sent by London to excite Kurds against the Kemalists, described the crimes of Armenians and Nestorians, committed several months after the suppression of volunteers units (my emphasis):

> *"As a result of three months touring the area occupied and devastated by the Russian army and Christian army of revenge, during the spring and summer of 1916, I have no hesitation in saying that the Turks would be able to make out as good a case against their enemies as that presented against the Turks in Col. Agha Petro's letter. According to the almost universal testimony of the local inhabitants and eye-witnesses, the Russian acting on the instigation and advise of the Nestorians and Armenians who accompanied them, the leading of whom seems to have been Agha Petro himself, murdered and butchered indiscriminately any Moslem member of the civil population who fell into their hands. A typical example that might be quoted is the extermination of the town of Rowanduz and the wholesale massacre of its inhabitants.*
> *While Col. Petros is able to quote isolated examples of Turkish atrocities, a traveler through the Rowanduz and Neri districts would find widespread and wholesale evidence of outrages committed by Christians on Moslems. Anything more thorough and complete would be difficult to imagine. I might also mention that according to the testimony of the Kurdish population, Col. Agha Petros proved the Russians' evil genius and was to a great extent directly responsible for the excesses*

63 Morgan Philips Price, War..., pp. 139-141.

committed by Russian troops."[64]

In his position, Major Noel cannot be called a "pro-Turkish" author. His investigation happened only three years after the events, i.e. when the memories were still fresh and the traces of the war crimes—especially the destruction of buildings—were still well present. Sir Arnold Talbot Wilson, lieutenant-colonel of the British army during WWI, called Noel a man of "rare courage, indomitable will and local experience" and corroborated largely his account. Lieutenant-colonel Wilson wrote:

> *"In the winter of 1915/16, the Russians had penetrated as far as Rowanduz, taking whatever they could and burning what was left. The orchards were destroyed by taking the trees for firewood, or by cutting the irrigation channels. Males able to bear arms were killed or driven away, and women, children, old men and dogs alone were left, to starve amidst the smoking ruins of their homes. The dogs survived longest. When the Russians were in the ascendant, it was the Muslim villages that suffered, for they had often shown active sympathy with their co-religionist; when the Turks gained ground it was on the Armenian villages, that, for the same reason, they wreaked their vengeance, assisted by such Kurds as survived."*[65]

Wilson added that "the conduct of our Russian allies was worse by far than of the Turks."[66] However, he was, even less than Noel, a "Turkophile."[67]

Captain C. L. Wooley, a British officer who travelled in eastern Anatolia and northern Iraq after the Moudros armistice, also collected testimonies of Kurds about large-scale massacres perpetrated in the Bitlis and Van regions.[68] Donald Bloxham is one of the very few authors who support the "Armenian genocide" charge and nevertheless acknowledge a part of the war crimes perpetrated during the Russian invasion: "During the Russian advance into eastern Anatolia at the beginning of 1916, vengeful Armenian

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64 Stanford J. Shaw, From Empire...,tome II, p. 922.

65 Arnold Talbot Wilson,Loyalties : Mesopotamia. A personal and Historical Record, volume II, 1917-1920, (Oxford-London: Oxford University Press), 1930, pp. 31-32.

66 Arnold Talbot Wilson, Loyalties : Mesopotamia. A personal and Historical Record, volume I, 1914-1917, (Oxford-London: Oxford University Press), 1930, p. 266.

67 See especially Arnold Talbot Wilson, Loyalties..., II, p. 38.

68 Jeremy Salt, The Unmaking of the Middle East, (Berkeley-Los Angeles-London: University of California Press), 2008, p. 67.

forces [...] murdered many Muslims, as testified to in the British sources."[69] But he attributes inaccurately these massacres to "vengeance." Vengeance was possibly among the reasons, but the racist statements made before the forced displacement and their quick result (massacres as early as 1914) show sufficiently that "vengeance" is far from being the single cause.

Not surprisingly, a considerable body of Ottoman documents, especially the reports of an investigative commission which worked in the Van province between the two Russian occupation periods, corroborates most of the allegations on the 1914-1916 massacres and provides many details, including the names of many victims.[70] To dismiss these documents only because they are Ottoman is a polemical, not scholarly, response. These reports were not designated—initially—for publication and propaganda, but to inform the Ottoman government.

Several of these various sources indicate that the Armenian volunteers committed numerous war crimes since the beginning of the war, on every possible occasion. The extent of these crimes depended largely on the power of the Russian officers involved in them, and also on their attitude, which shows a large gradient, from active cooperation to strong opposition. The collapse of Russia at the end of 1917 gave the remaining Armenian volunteers the ideal occasion to achieve their goal with very limited Russian resistance this time.

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69 Donald Bloxham, The Great Game of Genocide, Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 100.

70 Armenian Activities..., tome II, pp. 3-4, 11-12; Aspirations..., pp. 375-416; Documents..., tome III, pp. 117-121; Documents sur les atrocités arméno-russes, (Istanbul : Société anonyme de papeterie et d'imprimerie), 1917, http://louisville.edu/a-s/history/turks/documents_sur_les_atrocites_armeno-russes.pdf ; English translation: Erdal İlter, Armenian and Russian Oppressions (1914-1916), (Ankara : Köksav), 1999; Yusuf Sarınay (ed.), Erminiler Tarafından Yapılan Katliam Belgeleri/Documents on Massacre perpetrated by Armenians, tome I, 1914-1919, Ankara, 2001, pp. 1-189; Kara Schemsi, Turcs et Arméniens devant l'histoire, Genève : Imprimerie nationale, 1919, pp. 35-75, http://louisville.edu/a-s/history/turks/turcs_et_armeniens.pdf See also Stéphane Yérasimos, « Caucase : la grande mêlée (1914-1921) », Hérodote, n° 54-55, 1989, pp. 155-159.

Russian retreat (1917-1918)

Russian sources

The first massacres of this new phase were recorded in Russian archives as early as the first half of 1917[71], but it was during the retreat following the Bolshevik revolution that the Armenian volunteers were the most free to do what they wanted above all.

The main Russian source about the war crimes perpetrated during this period is the lieutenant-colonel Twerdokhleboff, author of the War Journal of the Second Russian Fortress Artillery Regiment (original document seized by the Ottoman army); then of personal notes on the Erzurum atrocities, taken from this diary, and written on his own initiative: the Ottoman archives indicate that it was Twerdokhleboff who proposed writing a memo on the crimes of the Armenian volunteers.[72]These texts were translated into French and into English as early as 1919;[73] they were partially or entirely republished in various works. The facsimile of the manuscript in Russian was published in 1987, 1991, and 2007.[74]

Twerdokhleboff's testimony largely deserves its place among the sources on the war crimes of Armenian volunteers, because of his detailed and scrupulous presentation of the events. Twerdokhleboff described what he saw, and when he used other testimonies, he gave the names of the individuals—mostly other Russian officers or Armenians proud to have butchered Turks. As an officer of an army who fought the Turks since 1914, and on several occasions before, he had no reason to have any pro-Turkish bias.

> *"I heard all the details of the massacres directly from myCommander-in-Chief Odichelitzé in person.*
>
> *The event happened as follows. The massacres were organized by adoctor and a contractor. In other words it was not conducted by oneof the gang members. I cannot write the names of those twoArmenians*

71 Michael A. Reynolds, Shattering Empires..., p. 194.

72 Enver Konukçu, "Massacres of the Turks and Mass Graves," in Türkkaya Ataöv (ed.), The Armenians in the Late Ottoman Period, (Ankara: TTK/TBMM), 2001, p. 148.

73 Notes d'un officier supérieur russe sur les atrocités d'Erzéroum, İstanbul, 1919 ; Notes of Superior Russian Officer on the Atrocities at Erzeroum, İstanbul, 1919.

74 Azmi Süslü (ed.), Russian View..., pp. 107-152 (first edition in Turkish, Ruslara Göre Ermenilerin Türkler Yaptıkları Mezalim, (Ankara: Ankara üniversitesi basımev), 1987, pp. 103-150); Gördüklerim Yaşadıklarım/I Witnessed and Lived Through/Ce que j'ai vu et vécu moi-même, (Ankara: ATASE), 2007,pp. 129-188, http://www.tsk.tr/eng/ermeni_sorunu_salonu/arsiv_belgeleriyle_ermeni_faaliyetleri/pdf/yarbay_tverdohlebov.pdf

as I do not remember their last names. More than 800 unarmed innocent Turks were massacred. Only an Armenian was killed while the massacred were trying to defend themselves. Theyslaughtered the people as if they were sheep. They had the peoplewhom they sentenced to death dig large ditches. They took thepeople to edges of those ditches in groups and after havingbutchered them like beasts they dumped them into those ditches.One of the Armenians was counting the corpses thrown into ditchesand upon his saying, "Is there only 80 people? It can take 10 more!Slaughter another 10!" disdainfully ten more people were slaughtered,thrown into the ditch and the corpses were covered with earth."[75]

But this account, if certainly the most detailed, is not the single from the Russian side. The Ottoman army seized the report of Captain Ivan Gokilevich Plat to Twerdokhleboff.[76] Captain Casimir submitted a memo to the Ottoman officers, which largely confirms the charges made by Twerdokhleboff and Gokilevich, especially about the massacre of Erzincan: Casimir, like Twerdokhleboff, gives the figure of at least 800 Turks killed in this town.[77] Tatiana Karameli, a student of medicine at Moscow University serving as a nurse in the Russian Red Cross during World War I, wrote in her diary what she saw about the massacres of Turkish civilians by Antranik's men in Bayburt and İspir, especially the slaughter of 150 children. The document was seized by the Ottoman army and eventually published.[78]

Western sources

In the beginning of 1919, the British government asked to the Direction of Military Intelligence (DMI) to check the Turkish allegations of massacres perpetrated by Armenians in 1918. The response was: "That atrocities were committed by Armenians on their retreat before the Turks is very probably true."[79]

Captain Emory H. Niles and Arthur E. Sutherland, investigators sent to eastern Anatolia by the U.S. military mission, corroborate the Russian findings about Erzurum and Erzincan massacres:

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75 I Witnessed and Lived Through..., p. 51.

76 Türkkaya Ataöv, The Reports (1918) of Russian Officers on Atrocities by Armenians, (Ankara: Tinaz Matbaası), 1985.

77 Documents relatifs aux atrocités commises par les Arméniens contre la population musulmane, Istanbul : Société anonyme de papeterie et d'imprimerie, 1919, p. 28 ;Documents..., tome III, pp. 145 and 161-162.

78 Ermeniler..., tome I, pp. 363-373.

79 Salâhi R. Sonyel, "Armenian Deportations...", p. 66.

> *"During their occupation, the Russians made many improvements in the way of communications, building roads and railroads. On the Russian retirement, however, the Armenians destroyed many of the Russian improvements and most of the Musulman villages, they massacred the Musulman inhabitants and retired leaving the country in a complete state of desolation."*[80]

In the unpublished version of his report, Major General James G. Harbord mentions the atrocities of Erzurum and Erzincan.[81]

The Niles-Sutherland report also indicates that the war crimes of 1917-1918 were not limited to the Erzrurum vilayet; the Armenian volunteers attempted to finish the annihilation work started in 1914-1916, and they fulfilled largely their goals, especially the destruction of the remaining Muslim buildings (my emphasis):

> *"The second region, from Bitlis through Van to Bayazid may be described as the basin of the Lake Van. [...] In this entire region we were informed that the damage and the destruction had been done by the Armenians who, after the Russians retired, remained in occupation of the country, and who, when the Turkish army advanced, destroyed everything belonging to the Musulmans. Moreover, the Armenians are accused of having committed murder, rape, arson and horrible atrocities of every description upon the Musulman population. At first we were most incredulous of these stories, but finally came to believe them, since the testimony was absolutely unanimous and was corroborated by material evidence. For instance, the only quarters left at all intact in the cities of Bitlis and Van are the Armenian quarters, as was evidenced by the churches and inscriptions on the houses, while the Musulman quarters were completely destroyed. Villages said to have been Armenian were still standing, whereas Musulman villages were completely destroyed. [...] We believe that it is incontestable that the Armenians were guilty of crimes of the same nature against the Turks as those of which the Turks are guilty against the Armenians. [...]*
>
> *The most salient fact impressed on us at every point from Bitlis to Trebizond was that in the region which we traversed the Armenians committed upon the Turks all the crimes and outrages which were committed in other regions by Turks upon Armenians. At first we were most incredulous of the stories told us, but the unanimity of the testimony of all the witnesses, the apparent eagerness with which they told of*

80 Justin McCarthy, "The Report of Niles and Sutherland," XI. Türk Tarih Kongresi, Ankara: TTK, 1994, tome V, p. 1842. See also p. 1830.

81 Salâhi R. Sonyel, "Armenian Deportations...", p. 68.

> *wrongs done them, their evident hatred of Armenians, and strongest of all, the material evidence on the ground itself convinced us of the general truth of the facts, first,that Armenians massacred Musulmans with many refinement of cruelty, and second that Armenians are responsible for most of the destruction done to towns and villages."*[82]

Niles and Sutherland were not "pro-Turkish" and even less "anti-Armenian." They accepted all the allegations of war crimes which were said to be perpetrated by Turks against Armenians, without checking anything; they accepted the allegations of war crimes perpetrated by Armenians against Turks only after a careful investigation. Haig Shiroyan, already mentioned, confirming that "the once beautiful Bitlis city, under the retreating feet of defeated soldiers and incoming conquering armies, was left in fire and ruins."[83]

Other Western witnesses saw the results of the war crimes perpetrated during the Russian retreat. Pierre Loti wrote in 1919:

> *"It is regrettable for them [the Armenians], like for the Greeks, that the war allowed too many European observers to penetrate within their country and to see them at work. One knows now that if they were butchered, they failed never to be butchers. Many official reports demonstrate that. I sent recently to L'Illustration [French weekly] photographs of mass graves of Turks prepared by their Christian hands and where there were, among the victims, mostly women and children, because these most recent killings happened in villages whose men were left to war."*[84]

The Ottoman archives give many details about the cruelties of the Armenian volunteers, providing, like for the crimes perpetrated in 1914-1916, many names of victims and perpetrators, dates, and precise locations of slaughters.[85] Using such documents and, when it was possible, the testimonies of old witnesses, Turkish archeologists discovered, since 1986, several mass graves of Turks slaughtered in 1918.[86]

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82 Justin McCarthy, "The Report...," pp. 1828-1829 and 1850.

83 Haig Shiroyan, Smiling..., ibid.

84 Pierre Loti, Les Alliés..., p. 57. See also Justin McCarthy, Death..., pp. 230 and 242, n. 107, referring to the investigations of the Austrian journalist Stefan Steiner.

85 Documents, tome II, pp. 119-154 and tome III, pp. 135-171.

86 Şenol Kantarcı, "The Lost Lives in the Outskirts of Ararat: The Victims of Iğdır Plain," IV-4, 2003; Enver Konukçu, "Massacres of the Turks...",pp. 143-154.

Interpreting the massacres

In his work of "propaganda" (according to his proper words)[87], Aram Andonian mixes crude denial of the evidence of massacres perpetrated in 1917-1918 and justification of these crimes. Vahakn D. Dadrian also tries to excuse and minimize these massacres.[88]

The French Armenian historian Anahide Ter-Minassian carefully avoids calling the acts of the Armenian volunteers in Erzincan "massacres". She is much more accurate in saying that in Erzurum and its vicinity, the Armenian irregulars "killed, without distinction of sex or age, the Muslims who fallen under their hand, pillaged and burned the villages." But she calls "very punctual" these "events" and asserts that they were "used later by the Turkish historians to deny the genocide of 1915 and to put the responsibility of the massacres on the Armenians."[89] As we saw, these "events" were all but "very punctual," and they were preceded by rebellions, volunteer recruitment, and numerous war crimes perpetrated in 1914-1916. Pasdermadjian and even more so Turabian explicitly claimed their responsibility in the fate of the Ottoman Armenians. Dr. Ter-Minassian, like most of the supporters of the "Armenian genocide" allegation, amalgamates the challenge of the "genocide" label and the "denial" of any massacre. Yves Ternon is much more explicit about Erzincan and even calls these acts "unspeakable" and "inexcusable," but he misrepresents the use, by the Ottoman-Turkish side, of the findings about the massacres against Muslim civilians in 1917-1918.[90]

On an incomparable higher level of scholarship, Dr. Reynolds' comment on the scale of the atrocities seems excessively optimistic: "Although the available evidence does suggest serial massacres, the small Armenian forces were incapable of carrying out a program of annihilation."[91] The Niles-Sutherland report, as well as the Turkish-Ottoman sources, indicates the Armenian units completely ravaged the regions where they retreated, and that the single reason why a part of the Muslim population survived and remained is that the Ottoman army arrived in time. The goal of the Armenian units in 1917-1918 was perfectly clear: to leave nothing and nobody behind them. They did all what they could to fulfill this objective.

87 Ara Krikorian (éd.), Justicier du génocide arménien : le procès de Tehlirian, Paris : Diasporas, 1981, p. 232.

88 Vahakn N. Dadrian, The History of the Armenian Genocide, (Providence: Berghahn Books), 2003, pp. 425-426.

89 Anahide Ter-Minassian, 1918-1920..., pp. 60-62.

90 Yves Ternon,The Armenian Cause, (Delmar : Caravan Books), 1985, pp. 123-124 ;Les Arméniens, histoire d'un génocide, (Paris : Le Seuil), 1996, p. 341.

91 Michael A. Reynolds, Shattering Empires..., p. 198.

Armenian-Azeri Conflict (1918-1920)

The volunteers of the Russian army constituted the army of the Armenian Republic, created in 1918, after the Russian revolutions. The British army, allied with Armenia, arrived in the Caucasus in summer 1918 and reinforced its presence during autumn. As early as the end of 1918, the British Command in the Caucasus had a low opinion of the Armenian units, mostly because of their ethnic cleansing campaigns against the Muslim population.[92]Not unlike in the Ottoman Empire, the extreme violence of Armenian nationalists against Turkic civilians of the Caucasus becomes more understandable in knowing that the lives of the Armenians opposed to the Dashnaks were considered by them later as having no value. In 1918, the ARF assassinated Hampartzoum Arakelian in his bed, a 70-years old journalist from Tbilisi, because of his numerous articles criticizing the Dashnaks.Even Kartchikian (Garjigian), a member of the Dashnak-dominated government of Erevan, was also murdered, for reasons which remain unclear, but may be due to internal dissensions within the ARF.[93]

In 1919, George Kidston, of the British Foreign Office, observed:

> *"I fear that there is not the slightest doubt that the Armenian is at least as good a hand at massacring as his Moslem neighbour, and the Dashnak gang, who are at present in control at Erivan, inspires no confidence."*[94]

Similarly, Louis Nettement, the French Consul in Tiflis (Tbilisi), who made a journey to Armenia in autumn 1920, was very sensitive to the sufferings of the Armenian populations, but did not have a much better image of the Dashnak government. He called Dro "a former terrorist," who "owes its position to a political crime perpetrated against the Russian governor of Baku."The Consul added that the wife of Ohandjanian "perpetrated a terrorist attack in Constantinople some years ago."[95]

The hatred against the Turkics was also deeply ingrained, as testifies Ohannus Appressian, a former officer of the Armenian army: "As a boy, I was taught that the Tatars were always at fault" and "our people had been taught from earliest childhood to fear the Turks. For too many years Armenian mothers had lulled

92 Michael A. Reynolds, Shattering Empires..., p. 229; Stanford J. Shaw, From Empire..., tome II, pp. 923-946.

93 Serge Afanasyan, L'Arménie, l'Azerbaïdjan et la Géorgie, de l'indépendance à l'instauration du pouvoir soviétique. 1917-1923, (Paris : L'Harmattan, 1981), p. 74 ; Kapriel Serope Papazian, Patriotism..., pp. 69-70.

94 Salâhi R. Sonyel, "How Armenian Propaganda...," p. 174.

95 L'Arménie. Notes de voyage, 6 octobre 1920, archives du ministère des Affaires étrangères (AMAE), microfilm, P 16674.

their children to sleep with songs whose theme was Turkish fierceness and savagery."[96]Leslie Urquhart, agent of the British Military Intelligence Service, concluded that more than 8,000 "Tatars" (Azeris) were killed in Baku and 18,000 others (unarmed) "ruthlessly murdered" in the Elisabetopol district, in 1918.[97] Ohannus Appressian provides a similar figure: 25,000 in total.[98] The French specialist of Azerbaijan Antoine Constant estimates the casualties to have been 9,000 in Baku alone (including Iranians) and calls this tragedy "a pogrom animated by racial hatred."[99]

This policy was generalized. Indeed, Admiral Mark L. Bristol, American High Commissioner in Istanbul, reported on January 2, 1920:

> *"The Armenian government, with its regular forces, attempted to clear the Tatars away from a railroad for twenty-seven miles and this has caused Tatar refugees to the extent of many thousands. This is similar to the Greek operations in the Vilayet of Aydin."*[100]

Bristol received so many reports that, as late as August 14, 1922, after the collapse of the Dashnak-dominated Republic, he wrote his diary:

> *"I know of my own officers who served with General Dro that defenseless villages were bombarded and then occupied, and any inhabitants that had not run away were brutally killed, the village pillaged, and all the livestock confiscated, and then the village burned. This was carried out as a regular systematic rid of the Moslems."*[101]

One of the intelligence agents mentioned by Bristol was Lieutenant Robert Dunn, who maintains his findings in his memoirs.[102]

The British received also many accounts of the same facts. As a result, Lord Curzon sent a letter of protest to Avetis Aharonian on March 13, 1920, warning that such crimes were "alienating public opinion in Europe."[103] Similarily, Richard Osborne wrote to a British representative on April 7, 1920:

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96 Leonard Ramsden Hartill, Men Are Like That, (London-Indianapolis: John Lane/The Bobbs-Merrill C°), 1928, pp. 21 and 128.

97 Salâhi R. Sonyel, "Armenian Deportations...", art. cit., p. 66.

98 Leonard Ramsden Hartill, Men..., p. 206.

99 Antoine Constant, L'Azerbaïdjan, Paris : Karthala, 2002, p. 250. See also Michael Reynolds, Shattering Empires..., p. 200.

100 Justin McCarthy, Death..., p. 217.

101 Justin McCarthy, Death..., p. 215.

102 Robert Dunn, World Alive. A Personal Story, New York: Crown Publishers, 1956.

103 Stanford J. Shaw, From Empire..., tome II, p. 928.

> *"I would instruct Mr. Wardrop to say that a more suitable subject for discussion between himself and M. Evangulov would appear to be the apparent decision of the Armenian authorities to exterminate the Mussulman population of the Erivan Republic."*[104]

Sir Eyre Crowe, deputy Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, wrote the next day:

> *"No doubt the Armenians are themselves largely to blame for the Turkish crusade against them. […] I should have thought that the only answer we need give to M. Evangulov is to […] communicate to him a copy of the Mussulman petition of complaint (Wardrop dispatch n° 89, E 2732) and point out how much the difficulties of the Allies in helping the Armenians are aggravated by the Armenian persecution against the Moslems."*[105]

On July 20, 1920, the French Commissioner in Caucasus, M. de Martel, relying on "witnesses who came back recently from Armenia," wrote to the Quai d'Orsay that the Armenian troops expelled "more than 40,000 Muslims," who were "always quiet and peaceful," since they were "too close to the [Armenian] capital city to have designs of independence." About 4,000 were killed "without exemption for women and children, who were drowned in the Arax river by the Armenian soldiers." Martel finished with this interesting remark: "It seemed to me not unneeded to report these details, which show that it is not always 'the same who were massacred.'"[106] On August 3, Martel reported "a serious military effort which does not exclude some massacres" by the Armenian army to "expel the Muslim agglomerations."[107] Similarly, the correspondent of the French daily Le Temps in Batumi reported in July 1920 that the Dashnak Party was carrying out a policy of "mass persecution," by "massacres and violence," which killed several "dozens of thousands" and provoked the afflux of many refugees.[108]

The Socialist-Revolutionary Party of Armenia denounced—in vain—the physical elimination of the Azeris ("Tatars") to the President of the Parliament:

> *"a series of Tatar villages […] have been cleared of the Tatar population and have been exposed to robbery and massacre. That the local police*

104 Justin McCarthy, Death…, p. 248, n. 171; Salâhi R. Sonyel, "Armenian Deportations…", art. cit., p. 64.

105 Ibid.

106 AMAE, P 16674.

107 Ibid.

108 Pierre Loti, La Mort de notre chère France en Orient, (Paris : Calmann-Lévy, 1920), p. 288, http://www.archive.org/download/lamortdenotrech00loti/lamortdenotrech00loti.pdf

> *not only did not prevent but even took part in these robberies and massacres, that these events left a very bad impression on the local population which is disgusted with these robberies and disorders and who wish to live in peace with their neighbors and request that the guilty be accordingly judged and punished as they are to this day left unpunished."*[109]

Anahide Ter Minassian, daughter-in-law of Rouben Ter Minassian (1881-1951), Minister of Interior, explains that this member of the Armenian government himself called his program "a ferocious plan" of ethnic cleansing against the Turkics—but asserts wrongly that the government was not aware of this plan.[110] Ohannus Apressian confirms:

> *"Our troops surrounded village after village. Little resistance was offered. Our artillery knocked the huts into heaps of stones and dust, and when the villages became untenable, and the inhabitants fled from them into the fields, bullets and bayonets completed the work. Some of the Tatars escaped, of course. They found refuge in the mountains, or succeeded in crossing the border into Turkey. The rest were killed. And so it is that the whole length of the border-land of Russian Armenia from Nakhitchevan to Akhalkalaki, from the hot plains of Ararat to the cold mountain plateaus of the north, is dotted with the mute mournful ruins of Tatar villages."*[111]

French occupation of Cilicia (1918-1922)

France attempted to dominate Cilicia for economic motivations (especially cotton) after the Moudros Armistice (1918). But for various reasons, including the disastrous behavior of the Armenian Legion, which constituted most of the French troops in Cilicia, the peace treaty was signed with the Kemalists (1921) and the French army retired from November 1921 to January 1922.[112]

In a letter to Admiral Bristol, Calep Gates, former president of Euphrates College in Harput (1894-1902) and actual president of Robert College in İstanbul, explained that the Armenian volunteers from America said to their French officer: "You don't need to train us. Only give us an opportunity to fight the Turks."[113] Such an aggressive mentality remained after the end of the armistice and was largely responsible for the crimes of the Armenian

109 Justin McCarthy, Death..., p. 216.

110 Anahide Ter Minassian, op. cit., p. 216.

111 Leonard Ramsden Hartill, Men..., p. 202.

112 Yücel Güçlü, Armenians and the Allies..., pp. 102-156; Stanford J. Shaw, "The Armenian Legion and its Destruction of the Armenian Community in Cilicia," in Türkkaya Ataöv, The Armenians..., pp. 155-206; Robert F. Zeidner, The Tricolor...

113 Yücel Güçlü, Armenians and the Allies..., pp. 111-112.

volunteers and their local Armenian supporters against Turkish and Muslim civilians.

One more time, the argument of "revenge" is weak. As Guenter Lewy indicates rightfully, "in the absence of a large Kurdish population, no massacre took place in Cilicia, and a substantial part of the Armenian exiles sent to southern Syria and Palestine survived." A part of Adana's Armenians escaped the forced displacement, as well as most the Armenians of Maraș. Another 6,000 of the Armenians of Urfa were allowed to come back as early as 1917.[114] Even Arnold Toynbee conceded, in the Blue Book, that "the respectable Moslem townspeople seldom desired the extermination of their Armenianneighbours, sometimes openly deplored it, and in several instances even set themselves to hinder it from taking effect. We have evidence of this from various places," especially in Cilicia[115]. In 1922,Toynbee came forward, concluding that "During the deportation of the Armenians in 1915, the Turkish civilpopulation displayed more human feeling in Cilicia (as far as the evidencegoes) than in any other province."[116] About the land conflicts between the mühacir (Muslim refugees) and the Armenians returning to Cilicia, the French Armenian historian Dzovinar Kévonian points out correctly that "the disputes [we]re incessant and the problems sometimes insoluble, because the resettled mühadjir had themselves lost everything."[117]

Despite the crude denials of the Armenian delegation in Paris, some Armenian legionnaires were very proud of their war crimes. Interviewed in the 1950's, Movsès Balabanian (born in 1891) said:

> *"In Dyortyol[Dörtyol], an Armenian soldier had crossed the Gharakilissa River; the Turks had beaten him. The Armenians then burned the Turkish village. Not a chicken was left alive between Dyortyoland Alexandrette [İskenderun].*
> *There was a doctor from Kessab, who was a prisoner of the Turks, for he had been serving in the Turkish army. They were helping us. For instance, there was a Turkish cannon on top of the Catholic Monastery in Haifa. It was turned towards the Turkish side and bombarded and killed the Turks. It turned out that the soldier there had been an Armenian boy and, in order to help us, he had turned the cannon towards the Turks*

114 Guenter Lewy, The Armenian Massacres..., pp. 186-187, 202-203, 218-220 and 252.

115 The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, (London-New York-Toronto: Hodder & Stoughton), 1916, p. 652.

116 Arnold J. Toynbee, The Western Question in Greece and Turkey, (London-Bombay-Sidney: Constable & C°), 1922, p. 312, n. 1, http://www.archive.org/download/cu31924027921778/cu31924027921778.pdf

117 Dzovinar Kévonian, Réfugiés et diplomatie humanitaire. Les acteurs européens et la scène proche-orientale pendant l'entre-deux-guerres, Paris : Publications de la Sorbonne,2004, p. 51.

and killed many of them. Had they allowed us, we, the Armenians could have come to Armenia then. We would have liberated all our lands. They set us free on 28th of April, 1919. They brought us to Mersin. On the way, in the train, when we saw Turks, we fired on them. There was a Chakalian. He said: 'Boys, it's shameful; it's a pity, why do you blame those poor Turkish peasants and kill them? When we go, after us they'll kill the Armenians who live here...'"[118]

As early as February 1919, the French High Command dissolved the 4th Armenian battalion because of the clashes between dozens of Armenians and North African soldiers of the French army. About fifty Armenians were sent to martial-courts, 400 to a disciplinary battalion in Egypt, and the 400 remaining, who were "non-suspect," were dispatched to other units.[119] The British General Allenby, who praised the Armenian volunteers during WWI a lot [120], vetoed any new recruitment of Armenians for the military as a result of this affair.[121]

Despite these crimes, Boghos Nubar complained about the treatment of the Armenian volunteers in a letter to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs.[122] General Jules Hamelin, chief of the French armies in the Near East in 1918-1919, replied that the allegations were baseless. Hamelin added that he sent the Légion d'Orient from Syria to Cilicia because the Armenian "exactions against the Muslim population" at the end of 1918 prevented him from maintaining this military unit in Syria, and that the attacks by Armenians continued "every day" in Cilicia ("robberies, hold-ups, pillages, murders"), forcing the French officers to punish the perpetrators. In March, Hamelin went further, warning that France was not, and would never be, awarded by any gratitude from the Armenians.[123]In a letter to Georges Clemenceau, on June 27, 1919, Hamelin reiterated his previous criticism against the Armenian committees, and said that if they had utility during the war, they were now only a source of trouble, especially the Union nationale arménienne (affiliated with the Ramkavar Party) and its "excitations to indiscipline, and against France." General

118 http://ermeni.hayem.org/turkce/vkayutyun.php?tp=ea&lng=eng&nmb=157

119 Télégramme chiffré du général Hamelin au ministère de la Guerre, 6 mars 1919, AMAE, P 1426 ; Robert F. Zeidner, The Tricolor..., pp. 78-83.

120 Gareguin Pasdermadjian, Armenia: A Leading Factor in the Winning of War, New York, 1919, p. 22, http://www.archive.org/download/armenialeadingfa00garo/armenialeadingfa00garo.pdf

121 Lettre du président du Conseil au ministre des Affaires étrangères, 5 avril 1919, AMAE, P 1426.

122 Lettre de Boghos Nubar au ministre, 13 janvier, ibid.

123 Télégrammes du général Hamelin, 2, 25, 26 février, 4, 5 mars 1919 ; lettre du général Hamelin au ministre de la Guerre, 15 février 1919 ; lettre du président du Conseil au ministre des Affaires étrangères, 25 février 1919 ; télégramme de Georges Picot, 19 février 1919, télégrammes de l'amiral Cassard au ministère de la Marine, 13 février, 1er mars 1919, ibid.

Hamelin supported his findings by an account of the sentences pronounced in spring 1919 by the French military justice for rebellion, including two death sentences.[124]

Captain Roger de Gontaut-Biron, a staff officer of the High Commissioner François Georges-Picot in the Near East, corroborated fully the Hamelin's account. He mentioned the negative and disturbing influence of the Union nationale arménienne on the Armenian legionnaires which led them to commit numerous crimes against the Muslim civilians and acts of rebellion against their French officers. Gontaut-Biron complained of its "obvious bad faith" and the "hugely exaggerated" grievances against the French army.[125] Captain Josse, quoted in the beginning of this article, explained in April 1920 to his superior that the Armenians of his unit completely ignored gratitude, lacked of courage, and that all his efforts to acquire their confidence were in vain.[126] This opinion was common: the same month, General Dufieux wrote a short report explaining that "the officers of the Armenian Legion have no more authority on their troop, and have lost any confidence in it." Dufieux added that "this Armenian troop has now only one strong feeling: the hatred of the Muslim."[127]

The official French military history blames both the Union nationale arménienne and the Ramkavar ("Comité d'Égypte") for a defamatory campaign against France, begun due to the punishments given by the French military judiciary to Armenian soldiers who perpetrated crimes against Turkish civilians.[128] Even Aram Turabian, in charge of the recruitment of Armenian volunteers for the French Foreign Legion, criticized strongly the lack of loyalty and sincerity of Boghos Nubar vis-à-vis France, from another perspective: the double negotiations and double speech about a Western mandate in Cilicia, with both France and U.S., at the same time, a strategy which had no result but only discredited the Armenian parties in Paris.[129]

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124 Hamelin au ministre de la Guerre, 27 juin 1919, AMAE, P 16672. See also copie de télégramme, colonel commandant troupes françaises Cilicie à Général commandant T.F.L. à Beyrouth, 29 mai 1919, SHDN, 4 H 42, dossier 6.

125 Roger de Gontaut-Biron, Comment la France s'est installée en Syrie (1918-1919), Paris : Plon, 1922, pp. 54-55, http://www.archive.org/download/commentlafrances00gontuoft/commentlafrances00gontuoft.pdf

126 See n. 1.

127 Avis du général Dufieux n° 3382/1, 27 avril 1920, SHDN, 4 H 42, dossier 6.

128 Les Armées françaises au Levant, Vincennes : Service historique de l'armée de terre, tome I, 1979, p. 123, quoted and translated in Stanford J. Shaw, From Empire to Republic, op. cit., tome II, pp. 878-879.

129 Aram Turabian, L'Éternelle victime de la diplomatie européenne : l'Arménie, Marseille : Imprimerie nouvelle, 1928, pp. 66-72.

As early as March 1919, the French military censorship intercepted a letter from the Ramkavar Committee of Cairo to an Armenian legionnaire of Cilicia, "preaching rebellion."[130] Numerous other letters, containing strident, not to say insulting, anti-French propaganda, were seized during the following months; and the French military command was informed that Armenian newspapers in the U.S. published inflammatory articles claiming a U.S. and/or British mandate in Cilicia, to remove the French troops. General Hamelin also explained that Boghos Nubar forwarded the unsubstantiated complaints of the Armenian legionnaires interned in Egypt for indiscipline.[131] In addition, General Antranik, in coordination with Moushegh, produced "anti-French propaganda" in 1920, and was prevented by the French authorities from making a journey to Cilicia.[132] Other propagandists diffused false allegations all the way to the city of Jeddah[133] (currently in Saudi Arabia).

Mary Caroline Holmes, an American missionary previously quoted, corroborates fully the French allegations of ingratitude and disloyalty:

> *"To the visitor the Armenian has shown himself no better than a professional beggar. To get him to do a hand's turn to help himself is an exception, and gratitude does not seem to be part of his code. Indeed, the examples of ingratitude, of dishonesty, of intrigue against the very individuals who are helping him are only too numerous."*[134]

A very important printed source is the diary of Paul Bernard, written in 1920 and published in 1929, when the passions were appeased. Bernard was not pro-Turkish or pro-Armenian but a classical French imperialist. He hoped that Cilicia remained under French domination, but for him such domination could make sense only if the country was developed with equity and impartiality. That is why Bernard praised Brémond for his economic policy but criticized him for his strong pro-Armenian bias. Bernard was the direct witnesses of assaults, assassinations, and pillage perpetrated by Armenians against Turks and Arabs in Adana (June-July 1920), "a shame for our flag" and very likely the result of the activities carried out by the Armenian nationalist

130 Copie d'un télégramme reçu par le ministre de la Marine, 10 mars 1919, AMAE, P 1426.

131 Rapport du général Hamelin au président du Conseil, 10 septembre 1919, AMAE, P 1667317785 ; Année 1919 — Dossier relatif à l'influence des comités arméniens [et] aux réclamations et mauvais esprit des légionnaires, SHDN, 4 H 42, dossier 6.

132 Télégramme du général Gouraud au ministère des Affaires étrangères, 23 octobre 1920 ; télégramme du consul Laporte au ministère, 3 novembre 1920 ; télégramme de Robert de Caix au ministère, 13 décembre 1920 ; télégramme de Gaillard au ministère, 14 décembre 1920, AMAE, P 16674.

133 Lettre du consul général de France à Djeddah au ministre des Affaires étrangères, 23 septembre 1920, ibid. See also Robert F. Zeidner, The Tricolor..., pp. 246-247 and 253.

134 Quoted in Salâhi R. Sonyel, "How Armenian Propaganda...," ibid.

parties. Paul Bernard also received information about the slaughter of all the inhabitants of a Turkish village, "butchered with an odious refinement of cruelty." Bernard adds that several Armenians and at least one Assyrian were sentenced to death and hanged by the French military justice.[135] On April 23, 1920, the archbishop of Adana Moushegh, a pre-1914 agitator[136] who was closely in touch with the Armenian legionnaires in 1919, was also sentenced. He received in absentia ten years of forced labor and twenty years of exile for conspiracy, "preparation of crimes against the public peace," storing of weapons, and fabrication of bombs.[137]

These facts are especially illuminating, since they demonstrate a certain change in the attitude of Colonel Brémond. Strongly pro-Armenian (Stanford J. Shaw allows even for the possibility that he was of Armenian heritage[138]) Brémond commuted, to 15, 10, and 5 years of forced labor, the death sentences pronounced by a French martial-court (for the murder of Turks) against three criminal Armenians in 1919.Such a parole was illegal, since Cilicia remained a Turkish land.[139] In 1920, there was no indication that Brémond paroled any convict.Finally, Brémond was recalled by the French government—because of his pro-Armenian bias—and in January 1921, "a sensible amelioration in the relations of the French authorities with the local Turkish population and authorities" was noticed, and attributed to the "policy of rapprochement, moderation" vis-à-vis the Turks since 1920, including the prevention of "pillage and oppression" by Armenians.[140]

Similarly, in a note of November 25, 1920, to the British authorities, General Gouraud, justified as following the refusal to give again weapons to Armenians in Cilicia:

> *"Previously arms had been indeed distributed to the Armenians, either to defend their villages or so that they could form auxiliary units*

135 Paul Bernard, Six mois en Cilicie, (Aix-en-Provence : Éditions du Feu), 1929, pp. 23, 32, 45-47, 49, 59-60, 63-65, 82 and 85. See also Robert F. Zeidner, The Tricolor..., p. 250.

136 Christopher Walker, Armenia. The Survival of a Nation, (London-New York: Routledge), 1990, p. 187.

137 Général Gouraud au président du Conseil, 21 juillet 1920, AMAE, P 16674. See also télégramme du consul Laporte au ministère, 3 novembre 1920, ibid.

138 Stanford J. Shaw, From Empire..., tome II,p. 866.

139 Yusuf Sarınay (ed.), Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermeni-Fransı İlişkileri, tome II, 1918-1919, Ankara, 2002, pp. 413-415.

140 Télégramme de Robert de Caix au ministère, 6 janvier 1921 ; réponse de Georges Leygues à Robert de Caix, 12 janvier ; Note sur les affaires syriennes pendant le ministère de M. Leygues, 20 janvier 1921, AMAE, P 17785. See also télégramme de Georges Leygues au haut-commissaire français à Constantinople, 23 octobre 1920, AMAE, 16674 ; and Robert F. Zeidner, The Tricolor..., p. 255.

attached to the French columns operating in Cilicia. In each instance, the Armenians have taken advantage of this retreat to treat the Turks exactly as the Armenians claim they have themselves been treated, looting and burning villages and massacring unarmed Muslims."[141]

The Armenian Legion itself was disbanded during the year 1920. Indeed, most of its members provoked numerous troubles, the number of desertions increased and as a result, several French officers, including Captain Josse, General Dufieux, and General Gouraud asked for the dissolution of the Legion.[142] More generally, it is remarkable that both Pierre Loti, the most active friend of Turks from 1912 to 1922, and the strongly Turkophobe, pro-Armenian, and pro-Greek Michel de Paillarès agree on one basic finding: the overwhelming majority of the French soldiers in İstanbul had a good opinion of the Turks, but a very bad opinion of the Armenians and Greeks, especially those who were involved in nationalist activities—Loti relying mostly on letters sent to him, Paillarès on interviews.[143]

But Boghos Nubar continued his bitter and unsubstantiated criticism against Paris, for instance in alleging that France promised Cilicia as the land for an "autonomous Armenia," an assertion which was completely false.[144] Worse for the Armenia population, Boghos Nubar's party, the other Armenian committees, and the Armenian Church attempted to prevent the inevitable departure of the French troops, and the coexistence between Turks and Armenians, in diffusing extremely intense propaganda, portraying falsely the Kemalists as butchers of Armenians. The main result was an unnecessary exile of Cilician Armenians to Syria and Lebanon. The joint efforts of the

141 Justin McCarthy, Death and Exile..., p. 207.

142 Année 1920 — Dossier relatif à divers incidents qui ont lieu à la Légion arménienne ; le général Gouraud à M. le général commandant la 156e division d'infanterie, 25 février 1920 ; le chef de bataillon Beaujard commandant la Légion arménienne, à M. le général commandant la 1re brigade du Levant, 17 avril 1920, Avis du général Dufieux n° 3382/1, 27 avril 1920 ; télégramme n° 1871/3 du commandant Bezert au général commandant en chef des Armées françaises au Levant, 1er octobre 1920, SHDN, 4 H 42, dossier 6 (this file contains many other documents supporting the same views) ; Lettre du ministre de la Guerre au ministre des Affaires étrangères, 20 mai 1920 ; réponse du ministre des Affaires étrangères, 18 juin ; ministre de la Guerre au ministre des Affaires étrangères, 12 juillet, AMAE, P 1426. See also Édouard Brémond, La Cilicie en 1919-1920, Paris : Imprimerie nationale, 1921, p. 66.

143 Pierre Loti, Les Alliés..., pp. 103-126; Michel de Paillarès, Le Kémalisme devant les Alliés, (İstanbul-Paris : Éditions du Bosphore, 1922), pp. 72-79 and 82-86. Paillarès' anti-Turkish racism is especially clear p. 318.

144 Lettres de M. de Selves, président de la commission des Affaires étrangères du Sénat, au président du Conseil, 28 décembre 1920 et 13 février 1921, AMAE, P 16670 ; Réponse à des questions posées par la commission des Affaires extérieures du Sénat, 29 novembre 1921, AMAE, 16676. See also Yücel Güçlü, Armenians and the Allies..., pp. 130-131.

Kemalists and the French authorities were vain.[145]

While referring to published French sources and archives, Richard G. Hovannisian, in his multi-volume History of the Armenian Republic fails to mention any of the numerous accounts of French officers about the crimes of Armenian legionnaires. Vahé Tachjian is more objective, but not completely accurate and balanced.[146]

Conclusion

These numerous reports converge on the same conclusions. On a military level, the Armenian volunteers were efficient fighters in the beginning, but as soon as they had the opportunity, they turned to brutal butchers. Politically, they initially appeared as loyal soldiers, then betrayed, or threatened to betray, the interest of the power which armed them. More generally, a strong intellectual dishonesty and deep ingratitude were essentially deplored.
The large-scale of war crimes against the Muslim population corroborates the finding of Justin McCarthy:

> *"To mention the sufferings of one group and avoid those of another gives a false picture of what was a human, not simply an ethnic, disaster."*[147]

And the proudly proclaimed goal to annihilate Turkey validates the judgment of Bernard Lewis:

> *"For the Turks, the Armenian movement was the deadliest of all threats [...] The Armenians, stretching across Turkey Turkey-in-Asia from the Caucasian frontier to the Mediterranean coast, lay in the very heart of the Turkish homeland—and to renounce these lands would have meant not the truncation, but the dissolution of the Turkish state."*[148]

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145 Télégramme du général Gouraud au ministère des Affaires étrangères, 24 octobre 1921 ; télégramme du ministère au Haut-Commissaire à Beyrouth, 3 novembre ; télégrammes du général Pellé au ministère, 5, 15 et 23 novembre 1921 ; lettre du ministère à Franklin-Bouillon, 12 novembre 1921, AMAE, P 17785 ; Commandement supérieur, Levant — Journal des marches et des opérations, 1921, pp. 456-469, SHDN, 4H 47, dossier 1 ; Bulletin périodique n° 39, 5 décembre 1921-5 janvier 1922, SHDN, 4 H 49, dossier 1 ; Bulletin de renseignements n° 279, 17-21 novembre 1921, 4 H 61, dossier 3 ; Yücel Güçlü, Armenians and the Allies..., pp. 140-156 and 210-216.

146 Vahé Tachjian, La France en Cilicie et en Haute-Mésopotamie. Aux confins de la Turquie, de la Syrie et l'Irak (1919-1933), (Paris : Karthala, 2004).

147 Justin McCarthy, Muslims and Minorities..., p. 137.

148 Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey. Third edition, New York-Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 356.

The same remarks would be true in the case of Azerbaijan. But beyond the case of the Turkics, the Armenian volunteers' misdeeds were a catastrophe for the Armenian civilians themselves, both in Anatolia and the Caucasus.
On the other hand, if these general observations are backed sufficiently by sources to be certitudes, the scholarly knowledge of these tragedies must still be considerably improved. The French archives especially remain insufficiently explored, and many points are still to be studied, especially the social origins of the Armenian volunteers, the encouragement or, on the contrary, the resistance of Armenian civilians to these crimes, and the precise policy of the Great Powers vis-à-vis these slaughters. The issue of the Armenian volunteers for the Greek army should also be studied. It is known that twelve were sentenced, together with Greeks, by the Greek military courts in 1919 due to the pressure of the Entente, and that in 1920, several hundreds of other Armenian volunteers were fired by the Greek General Paraskevopoulos because of their aggressive attitude vis-à-vis the Turks in western Anatolia; ten were said to have been sentenced to death and executed by the Greek military justice.[149]

It is a fact that major powers used Armenian nationalism for their own purposes. But whatever these intrigues could be, the Armenian committees, especially the ARF, should not be regarded as only tools, but also as autonomous organizations. The final failure of Armenian nationalism in 1923 should not be regarded as only the abandonment, and even less as a "betrayal" by great powers, but also—much more so—as the bankruptcy of the political strategy followed by the Armenian committees, and especially, their inordinate arrogance. They believed themselves sufficiently strong enough to blackmail Saint Petersburg, London, Paris, or Washington. They used two main arguments: the valuable services provided to the armies, and the call to "human values." Both were denied permanently by the behavior of the volunteer units which they created.

The legacy of the volunteers units is considerable. Dro, one of the most active butchers of Turks in eastern Anatolia and the Caucasus, became the main leader of the ARF in 1923 and led the 812th Armenian battalion of the Wehrmacht (20,000 men).[150] S. Tehlirian was one of the volunteers for Russian army and assassinated Talat Pasha in 1921.[151] Gourgen Yanikian, who relaunched Armenian terrorism on January 27, 1973, by murdering

149 Arnold J. Toynbee, The Western Question..., p. 401; S.R. Marine, Affaires arméniennes, 15 novembre 1920, AMAE, 16674.

150 Christopher Walker, Armenia...,p. 357.

151 Ertruks Türker, "Assassination of Talat Pasha and Harootiun Mugerditchian," Review of Armenian Studies, III-1, 2003, http://armenians-1915.blogspot.com/2006/06/766-assassination-of-talat-pasha-and.html

the Turkish general consul in California and his deputy, was also a former volunteer for the Russian army. Yanikian believed: "I will set the example." He was indeed "the spiritual leader" of the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), and more generally, a catalyst for the new wave of Armenian terrorism.[152]

152 Michael Bobelian, Children of Armenia, (New York: Simon & Schuster), 2009, pp. 141-163; Michael M. Gunter, Armenian History and the Question of Genocide, (New York-London: Palgrave MacMillan), 2011, pp. 59 and 65; Bilâl Şimşir, Şehit Diplomatlarimiz (1973-1994), (Ankara-İstanbul: Bilgi Yayınevi), 2000, tome I, pp. 80-117.

Republican origins of Kemalism: The early phase of its evolution Framing the periodization of Kemalism

Vahram Ter-Matevosyan[1]

Abstract: The article deals with the ideological construction of the founding years of Republic of Turkey with a particular attention to the Soviet historiography on the Kemalist movement. Observation of the Soviet historiography reveals some important aspects of the Soviet treatment of political and social transformations that took place in Turkey in the 1920-30s. Soviet diplomats, ideologues and intellectuals dealing with Turkey at the time treated the deeds of Mustafa Kemal with visible admiration and were among the first to identify and emphasize the inherent ideological components existent in his massive undertakings. However, the Soviet treatment of the Turkish transformation has remained largely unattended in the literature of Kemalism which led observers to underestimate some key aspects pertaining the initial years of the Republic. The article brings up some important observations made by the SU observers and parallels them with Turkish academic discussions on the inception of Kemalism and its ideological layers. The article also gives a survey of significant ideological trends of the early 1930s which led to what Soner Cagaptay has coined "High Kemalism". Contextualization of different layers of Turkish ideological transformation will help us to better understand the reasons of why Soviets were interested in seeing the Turkish transformation as an ideological revolution even earlier than Turks did in the late 1920s and early 1930s.

Keywords: Kemalism, Turkey, Soviet Union, Ideology, Evolution, Kemalist principles

Introduction: Kemalism, the governing philosophy of the Republican Turkey named after the founding father of Turkey Mustafa Kemal (1881-1938), remains a concept with widely debated definitions and contents. During the eight decades of its existence, the key philosophical arguments of Kemalism have constantly been reproduced through education and the public space. Those trends eventually led Kemalism willingly or not to dominate the social sub-conception of Turkish society thereby Kemalism was transformed into a cultural phenomenon. Irrespective of its questioning characteristics, it succeeded to shape the mentality and value system of four generations of Turks. It was never abandoned as a shelter of statehood, patrimony and protection. Now, we think it is worth revisiting the origins of the state ideology, to raise a few questions of its origins and shed light on few issues

1 Vahram Ter-Matevosyan, Ph.D. is a Senior Research Fellow at the Department of Turkish Studies of the National Academy of Sciences in Yerevan, Armenia.

that remained uncovered until today.

Some widely-known observers date the actual history of Kemalism back to the 18th century; mainstream observers are more moderate and go back to the 19th century and more particularly to the events of "Tanzimat" reformations (1839), while some authors are doing their best to find the roots of Kemalism in the constitutional undertakings of the 1870s[2]. Kemal Atatürk himself claimed the year of 1919 as a departure point for the nationalist Kemalist movement, while others are more explicit on the date - 19 May, 1919, when Kemal landed in Samsun: meanwhile, some observers (Suna Kili, Niyazi Berkes, Mahmut Goloğlu among them) are clear on the date of Kemalism – October 23, 1923, a date which symbolized the distinct break with the past and thus marked the birth of an entirely new Turkish nation-state. Simultaneously, there are opinions proclaiming that the actual birth date of Kemalism is 1931, when it was incorporated into the official ideology of the RPP; or the year 1937 when it gained an official status and was included in the constitution of the state. Others are more candid and have metaphoric interpretation of it by claiming that Kemalism was born with the Republic and thereafter it was born and reborn with every single day of the Turkish state. In other words there is no consensus on the actual date of Kemalism, which simply means that this ambiguity allows for different styles of legitimacy pursued by various actors.

Along with these various approaches over the date of its inception, the term Kemalism itself lacked a clear definition and continues to do so.

At the outset of the War of Independence under the stewardship of Kemal different expressions emerged like "the Kemalists", "the Kemalist movement", "the Kemalist revolution", "the Kemalist Turkey" etc., which were in general empiric generalizations. Later, in the second half of the 1920s, when it became apparent that the "the Kemalist revolution" was not constrained only with the struggle for Independence, but also incorporated the internal affairs of the State, a new term "Kemalism" emerged, but that one also was primarily used as a synonym for describing the Kemalist revolution, certainly with bigger emphasis on its socio-economic concepts.

It is tremendously interesting that western and Turkish observers did not take into close consideration the Soviet attitude and studies concerning the origins of Kemalist ideology. This aspect is very interesting, which meanwhile requires us to treat the Soviet approach with utmost care, though. Soviet observers, journalists and scholars in the 1920s consistently reported to the Moscow administration about the development of the internal affairs in Turkey. Back in 1926 Konstantin Youst reported from Turkey about the revolutionary deeds of Mustafa Kemal, describing the overall atmosphere in the country, the attitude of people towards their leader. He gave the mythical image of Kemal, which according to him, was dominant by that time among the Turks. The personality

of Kemal was equated with Christ, Mohammed, Buddha, Confucius as well as with Washington, Lincoln, Luther, Peter the First and Lenin.[3] Here Youst used the term Kemalism to refer the counter-revolutionary zeal of Kemalist elite's drive against the Pan-Turkic circles within the country.[3]

Thus, in his usage the frames and margins of the term remained imprecise and he most probably used that term to refer to the general spirit of togetherness prevalent among the Kemalists. Back in 1927, Irandoust (V. P. Osetrov) wrote his famous article "The essence of Kemalism" in the Communist party's official press.[4] He describes Kemalism as an "authentic mass revolution", which was a specific type of Eastern revolution which followed the Western pathway. At the same time, he distinguished two characteristics of Kemalism which had made it a unique case; mainly its revolutionary and counter-revolutionary dimensions.[6] Irandoust also envisioned the fate of Kemalism in the following way: "the future of Kemalism depends on its anti-imperialistic character, otherwise the possible compromise with imperialism would mean the crisis of Kemalism and its program".[6] A year later, in 1928, the same author published another book to decode the main developments of Turkey,[8] where he used plainer terminology to describe the agencies of the newly-founded state. He used the terms "Kemalist Turkey", "Kemalist movement", by pinpointing the revolution that had been carried out from 1918 to 1920 by "Kemalists", a rank-and-file of the ideological revolution.[9] He also presented the dominant fashion among the Turkish observers to ascribe theoretical aspects to Kemalism.

Another, interesting component that Irandoust presented was the prevailing trend among the Soviet Communist revolutionaries to transform and project the Kemalist brand of revolution in China, by identifying the existing socio-political similarities in both countries. He went on to mention that rather interesting case is counter posed by another trend in the international mass media, particularly in the Japanese media, which repeatedly applied the term "Kemalism" to generalize counter-revolutionary movements of the Chinese generals (Chiang Kai-shek and Phin Yui-sen), who, by acting under the guise of anti-imperialism, virtually serve the needs of the Chinese bourgeoisie[10].

It is noteworthy, that in 1927 B. Ferdi described the CHP as the party of the Kemalist cause, which brought the national bourgeoisie to the power at the expense of forced measures directed against possible opposition forces[11]. Another Soviet observer of Turkey Kross wrote that by the end of the third decade within the Kemalist revolutionary circles a few factions emerged, which caused certain deviations from the general politics of the mid-1920s[12]: the right wing (or pro-Western section) of Kemalism, which demanded more resolute involvement of the West in state-building of Turkey, but the financial crisis of 1929 had a negative impact on them; the Left demanded an expanded state role in the economy and the daily life of the country; the Pan-Turkist circles

also were activated by initiating efforts to make Kemalism an official ideology and a scientific doctrine, establishing the Museum of Kemalist Revolution and the Institute of Turkism etc.; the Orthodox section required to rely upon the peasants and the Anatolian petty-bourgeoisie, as trustable resources for promoting the policy of nationalism, republicanism and laicism.[13] Ferdi also contended that after five years of independence the factions a1ppeared within the ranks of the CHP as well, which was manifested in the increasing dissatisfaction of the masses, and a result more people were leaving the party than joining it.[14] In 1927, Kitaigorodskiy coined Turkey "the kingdom of Kemalism",[15] where the Kemalist ideologues were doing their utmost to defend the rights of the new bourgeoisie. In the spirit of the Communist party, he urged "the red diplomacy" of the Soviet Union to acknowledge the true face of Turkey for taking appropriate measures for insuring Turkey's loyalty towards the SU.[16]

It is generally agreed that for the first time, the word "Kemalism" began to be used in certain intellectual circles either in 1929 or in 1930. It is taken for granted that the year 1931 is the very year when six principles were made public. In reality, a few observers only refer to the fact that four out of these six concepts first appeared in October 1927 as part of "The president Gazi Mustafa Kemal His Excellency's Declaration of the General Principles agreed to in harmony at the Republican People's Party {3rd} congress"[17]. In this document, the Party declares itself to be "Republicanist, laic, populist and nationalist" (Cümhurietçi, lâyik, halkçi ve milliyetçidir).[18] To put it more accurately, October 1927 is the date when Mustafa Kemal put his insights and ideological visions for the future of Turkey under the umbrella of Kemalism. His famous speech, which lasted six days, served as a turning point for the ideological basis of the country. Again, as noted above, M. Kemal was feeling secure enough in 1927 not to push ahead these four ideas with the presumed intensity as he was feeling no threat whatsoever from any part of the socio-political reality and from the closely supervised society.

In any account, in the Turkish context the term Kemalism, with its ideological connotation and interpretation, might have been first used in 1929 and became widespread in the country. According to some observers Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu was the first person who, in his column in the national daily "Milliyet", used that term. Others mention the language expert Ahmet Cevat as an initiator of that term in the "Muhit" journal[19] or the name of the long time justice minister of M. Kemal, Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, as another instigator of the term Kemalism[19]. The last two options are less realistic, since they date back at best to the beginning of the 1930s, which was too late for Kemalism to be coined. Some observers claim that shortly after the Menemen incident an intellectual figure wrote an article stating that the party should accept Kemalism as its principal ideology as with fascism in Italy and communism in Russia.[21] In 1930, Josef Washington Hall argues that it was westerners

and interviewers of Kemal who "branded the movement "Kemalist", as if he were some rebel upstart. He [Kemal] resented the term as he did not intend to establish "Kemalism" but a new Turkey, nor did he wish to incite the resentment of the Nationalists".[22]

The reason for this endeavour to distinguish the date is that in 1922 a French author Michel Paillarès published a book named "*Le Kemalisme: Devant Les Alliès*"[23], but it was the history of the rise of Mustafa Kemal and a detailed history of the Independence war. Some observers are referring to this monograph and its title which helped Kemal's allies in choosing the name for the RPP's ideology. Although we found no reference in the literature of the time, it is difficult to exclude a possible connection or association between them. Thus, we can assume that although the term Kemalism gained a widely-accepted currency in Turkey in 1929 at the latest, in the international milieu Kemalism had been in use for a long time for describing the ideological construction policy of the Turkish elite.

Narrowing the definitional framework

If we try to define Kemalism it will be as follows - Kemalism is the name given to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's and his Republican People's Party's (henceforth - RPP) political thought and practices and the persistently official and semi-official, hegemonic ideology of the Turkish Republic. Among the implicit and explicit goals of the ideological inception were apparent intentions of providing a clear, vivid, patriotism-infused guidelines of future goals of the Revolution, around which the population, the relatively untouched peasantry might be rallied. In other words, after a decade long purification of the official discourse, by the beginning of the 1930s, the time was ripe to popularise the basic assets of the Kemalist undertakings. The close disciples of Mustafa Kemal were certain that distinct bureaucratic elite is formed which would be capable to teaching the society the basic tenets of the new nation building project.

Prior to further elaboration of popularization policy of Kemalism the whole period of forming the ideological currents and the intra-elite struggle of the end of 1920s and the beginning years of the 1930s should be critically evaluated. The international ideological currents also played not a secondary role in making Kemalism an ideological current capable of performing a certain mission. Among other factors the world economic crisis (or Depression) of 1929 and the Free Republican Party (Serbest Cumhuriyet Firkası - FRP), experiment in 1930 were pivotal in making Kemalism to come into final existence. "The Great Crash" pushed the government to undertake counter-measures to cope with it, which was interpreted as a fatal outcome of free enterprise – a brainchild of Western capitalism. The governing elite had the Soviet Union's case in mind, which escaped the crisis due to its state control mechanism and that case inspired them to incorporate key aspects of that model into

certain areas of the Turkish economy. In 1930, the government became more outspoken about its intention to play a greater role in the economy.

The Turkish and Western scholars observing the Turkish revolution agree that the foundation and further evolution of Kemalism was a single-layered process and both Atatürk and his close allies had a clear vision of the role that Kemalism was going to play. In reality, a close scrutiny of the history of the 1930s reveals that even in the beginning there was no clear idea of "what type of Kemalism" they had in mind. A gradual succession of Kemal Atatürk from daily politics and the strife of the elite to fill the gap brought different currents of Kemalism into the surface. Hamit Bozarslan distinguished three characteristic phases of development of Kemalism from its earlier period onto the end of the 1930s. The first period, according to him, was the War of Independence (1919-1922) itself, the second one, going from 1922 to the end of 1930, was that of a "Janus-like" Kemalism, since it was at the same time nationalist and the bearer of a project of "Western civilization", the third period, 1930-1938, witnessed an openly and self-consciously anti-liberal and anti-democratic regime.[23]

Ertan Aydin distinguishes three versions of Kemalism presented by a) conservative modernists as well as b) "Ülkü" and c) "Kadro" journals, which left a considerable impact on the evolution of the Kemalist discourse.[25] Though the Kadro movement and the journal were considered as the sole source where the whole ideology of Kemalism 'was baked', the role of the "Ülku" journal or the Ülku version of Kemalism was downplayed. The "Kadro" journal was being viewed with suspicion both by the RPP's elite and eventually by Atatürk. The General Secretary of the RPP led the campaign against "Kadro" journal arguing against the claims of its leader Ali Karaosmanoğlu (who claimed that "Kadro" means an ideological cadre of the party, "a vanguard cadre"). R. Peker made clear to A. Karaosmanoğlu - that duty belonged to them. "Kadro" became associated with the Communist propaganda and eventually became less productive in terms of articulating ideological principles. Instead, R. Peker was adamant in founding the RPP's own journal, named "Ülku", which was to shape the ideology of the Kemalist regime. In February 1933, the journal "Ülku" came to life.[26] The zenith of the journal's preaching activity was February 1933 until August 1936, since during this period "Ülku elite" was dominant in making the key ideological contents of the journal. Later, R. Peker's role decreased, he retired from his position and the journal's importance in disseminating revolution's ideology became secondary.

In the mid-1930s and in later decades the theoretical and empirical interpretation of Kemalism was trusted mainly to Recep Peker[27], Şeref Aykut[28], Naşit Kızılay[29], Şevket Sureya Aydemir[30] and a few others. In 1937, another proponent of the Kemalist ideology Tekin Alp published a book "Le Kemalisme". He discussed the concept of a nation as well as principles of unity

of language, culture and idea by considering them as necessary prerequisites for construction of new rational nationhood. He based himself on Ziya Gőkalp's distinction between culture (hars) and civilization (medeniyet).[31] He was born in Serez in 1883 as an Ottoman Jew and named as Moiz Kohen. Later in his life, he made friends among the circles of the CUP (Committee of Union and Progress) including Ziya Gőkalp. This relationship influenced all his life. Publication of "Le Kemalisme" should be considered as a reflection of his identity. That book was an important one from a few perspectives. Firstly, it has a conjectural value; secondly, it reflects the atmosphere of its era; and finally, it quotes the discussions about Kemalism. Besides, the arguments Tekin Alp put forward about nationalism, liberalism and secularism made it possible for us comment on the Kemalist ideology of the time. It is noteworthy, that he was not dealing with some vague prescriptions for political, economic and social development, but with a network of doctrinal options which had already been the subject of numerous official and semi-official exegeses.[32] To him, Kemalism was no longer an uncertain term merely describing the revolutionary reality of the time, but an ideology which was in charge of the fate of Turkish nation and state. It designates the path that the Turkish nation-state needed to follow to achieve her goal.[33] He went on to state that Kemalism was empowered by dynamics and vitality and there was no venue for dream and abstraction in Kemalism.[34]

One of the main outstanding ideologues of Turkish transformation and in shaping the core Kemalist principles was Ziya Gőkalp (1875-1924). He, along with his eminent companions like Mehmet Emin, Halide Edip (Adıvar), Mehmed Fuad (Koprulu), Ahmet Hikmet and Űsüf Akcura, initiated a large campaign in the 1910s to disseminate their visions of the Ottoman future based on nationalist ideologies and Islamic culture. Although their main vision was to establish Pan-Turkism and Pan-Turanism (the idea of uniting all Turkish peoples in the State of Turan) they envisioned chauvinistic and aggressive policy in attaining their goals. In the later years, some of their perspectives were incorporated both in the policy of the Young Turks and the Kemalist reformation. On the surface, Pan-Turanism and Pan-Islamism were rejected by Kemalists, who considered these ideas as lost causes and which were not in line with the then contemporary conditions of the world. Kemalists were deliberately trying to alienate themselves from those circles as unsuitable and as likely to bring discredit to them. Gőkalp, by being deeply influenced by the French sociologist Durkheim, was the first of his ilk to initiate a concerted systemizing of European elements with Ottoman Muslim civilization. He was particularly inspired by Durkheim's ideas on the supremacy of society over the individual, with the sole difference that Gőkalp emphasized the "nation" rather than "society".[35]

Abdullah Cevdet was also a distinguished figure in the late Ottoman and

early republican period whose influence on Atatürk has been downplayed. In fact, F. Creel claims that significant elements of the Kemalist ideology have clear roots in the writings of A. Cevdet, and some outstanding features of the Kemalist ideology are historically inexplicable without reference to his ideas. Creel thereby questions the dominating theory of primacy of Gőkalpism (his term) on Kemalism.[36] From September 1904 until November 1932 Cevdet published the journal "*Ictihad*", first in Geneva, later in Cairo and then in Istanbul. In this journal he articulated a set of modernization and ideological visions, which later on were found, in one shape or another, in the deeds of M. Kemal. Creel asserts that way back in 1891 Cevdet first claimed the importance of abandoning Arabic script and Arab methaphysics, by stressing the need of having a Turkish language based on Latin script. He was concerned with the right type of educational systems, with the further existence of religious orders (whom Cevdet named "a bunch of blockheads"), with the right formula of economic restructuring.[37]

The epoch of "High Kemalism"

By the mid-1930s, the principles of Kemalism which were described as techniques of finding out the truth, began to be loaded with substantive meanings. The major reforms had been completed but the objectives of "rapid economic development" and "reaching the highest level of contemporary civilization" had not been successfully accomplished. The military victory was too far in the past to reproduce the kind of legitimacy which was urgently needed by the government, for the people had not been mobilized into political administration. Movements of opposition—both legal and illegal—had been suppressed. In short, the government was now alone in its path, devoid of popular support.[38] Moreover, the rise in 1930 of the FRP which was an example of official-legal opposition, and the Menemen Incident, which was part of the illegal line of opposition, made the ruling party become even more isolated. The Turkish bureaucracy bore an outstanding role in making Kemalism a capable ideological current by transforming the Kemalist deeds, thoughts and ideas into a political manifesto and taking upon themselves the responsibility for carrying it out.

A close scrutiny of the Kemalist reforms suggests that at the very outset they encountered fierce opposition from various parts of the political and social spectrum and that style of statecraft has been deeply incorporated in the system of state building of Turkey. To put it simply, the whole discourse and the essence of the struggle was the official and oppositional interpretation of the Kemalist version of the Turkish transformation. Yet it is rather unproblematic to stretch the official interpretation of it, whereas the opposition's claims that the Kemalist version of modernization and transformation should cease to exist by paving ground for alternative ideas and projects are gaining more legitimacy.

An important question, which comes to one's mind is, why Atatürk did not

develop an explicit ideology to defend and secure his achievement prior to 1931? Weiker takes a shortcut explaining two principle reasons: a) M. Kemal was a man of action concerned about the ends rather than means, b) in the 1920s the themes westernization and modernization were sufficient boosters for evoking emotional commitment.[39] Cagaptay argues that in the 1920s Turkey was busy trying to recover from the extensive warfare of the previous decade, when country had suffered tremendous demographic and material devastation, and Atatürk was more busy on establishing a secular Turkey, re-structuring political and physical shape of the country.[40] On the other hand, between 1920 and 1923, the fear that Anatolia would be split on primordial-group lines ran as a strong undercurrent among the architects of Kemalism trying to establish their own centre, and it remained as a fundamental – although often latent – issue of the Kemalist policy to the end of one party in 1950.[41]As we are aware, the second part of the 1920s marked the period of unprecedented cultural and social modernization reforms in Turkey. These measures were accompanied with injection of the idea that the new elite was the sole and the safest resort of the nation. With a certain degree of safety we can claim that during the 1920s the only idea that was capable of keeping the Turks together was a chauvinistic and a hazardous version of nationalism inherited from the later period of the Ottoman time and the Young Turks. In other words, Mustafa Kemal's victorious beginning and his subsequent measures were sufficient methodological and strategic tools for keeping the society cool and away from doubtful ideas.

Though a close inspection of his actions and speeches after the 1924 alternative party adventure and the brutal suppression of the 1925 Kurdish rebellion reveal that he was striving to initiate an ideological campaign for granting more credits to his measures, but all in all, he was feeling powerful enough to continue without a properly elaborated ideological background. One may argue that modernization, laicism and westernization as kernels of early version construction for Kemalism were formidable tools for national consolidation, but in the late 1920s Mustafa Kemal realized that these three components were not satisfactory and productive to consolidate the society for keeping it together and united. It needs to be added, that a certain degree of dissatisfaction was also present in Kemal's approaches, in judgments concerning the society's appreciation towards the all the reforms that he had done. To him, the society's feedback was not sufficient, and obviously he was expecting more in response to his decade-long sacrifices. To put it shortly, by the end of 1920s M. Kemal and the RPP elite realized that the Kemalist regime and their cherished revolution were highly unpopular across Turkey, which subsequently forced the responsible elite to take countermeasures to make the revolution more efficient. M. Kemal was adamant that his deeds during the War of Independence were sufficient reasons to be treated with due sensibility and the nation would follow his any word without questioning their feasibility. These features enhanced the importance of creating an

"autonomous" and "self-sufficient" ideological framework.

Although the 1930s marked the development and active propagation of Kemalism's ideological principles, the ideological quasi-discourses starting from the Tanzimat period (from 1839) had certain impacts on the shape of Kemalism. The subsequent waves of ideological currents like Pan-Turanism, Pan-Islamism, Pan-Ottomanism constituted a fertile ground for development and further empowerment of the Kemalist discourse. It is appropriate to cite Weiker who persistently argues that the seeds of the revolution were set in Atatürk's mind during the WWI, when he was analyzing the causes of the decline of Ottoman Empire and prospects of Turkey's future.[42]

The popular support for the short-lived Free Party and the Menemen incident, is believed, had significant impact on M. Kemal in a sense that they heightened his increasing concerns about popular unrest and disobedience. He decided to act on this by consolidating the RPP's hold on power after returning from his three-month tour of Turkey in 1930. "He arrived at the conclusion that this feeling arose from the fact that the people in general were insufficiently instructed respecting the principles of the RPP which alone guarded the revolutionary fervour, which alone could elevate the masses, and of which he himself was the head and from which the government was formed".[43]

Kemal decided to initiate the restructuring of the government and putting particular accent on more radical wing of the RPP. On March 3, 1931, he sent a letter to the RPP asking for new elections. On March 10, 1931, Recep Peker, was appointed as the RPP's new Secretary General. On April 24th, the parliamentary elections were held, on May 4th the forth term of the Parliament held its inaugural meeting, on May 5th, İnöunü's sixth government was formed. Kemalism became known as such at the RPP Congress, which was held in Ankara, between 9th and 16th of May, 1931. The Congress revised founding principles and in addition to the three vaguely defined principles of Republicanism (Cumhuriyetçilik), Nationalism (Milliyeçilik), Populism (Halkçilik) adopted in 1927, three new principles were added - Etatism (Devletçilik) Revolutionism/Transformationism (Inkilapçi/devrimçilik) and Laicism (Lâikik). The definitions of the first three doctrines were expanded with meticulously nuanced and heavy loaded ideological components. In a speech on 24 September 1931, Atatürk reiterated the six principles and backed the idea of building the future of the Republic based on them.

In the 1930s, Recep Peker, along with other three key Kemalist ideologues, Yusuf Hikmet Bayur (1881-1980), Yusuf Kemal Tengirşenk (1873-1976) and Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, delivered speeches on a number of important topics at the Istanbul University. In their presentations, Bayur focused on Kemalism and foreign policy, Tengirşenk spoke on Kemalist economy, and Bozkurt presented a comparative analysis of the Kemalist and other revolutions and wrote in the

newspaper to articulate on Kemalism.[44] On 16 October, Recep Peker voiced the RPP's commitment to the basic principles at a conference, which he gave to university students in Istanbul, where he elaborated on a number of key issues concerning non-Muslims, ethno-religious shape of the nation, non-Turkish Muslims' position vis-à-vis the nation.[45] The 1931 decision of the RPP brought a new ideological imprint which leaned the system on authoritarian measures in contrast to the relatively free atmosphere of the 1920s. The RPP increasingly became the centre of power in the country as its organizations expanded in number and the drive to enlist more young people under its banner and to indoctrinate them with the new ideology was intensified. Thus, under Kemal's stewardship "a new era" was underway, which was coined "Kemalism par excellence".[46] The period of High Kemalism would last until Atatürk's death in 1938.

On October 28-30, 1933, as a part of active propaganda campaign launched by the RPP the Tenth Anniversary of the Republic was celebrated. Webster elaborates on this event by illustrating the mass-media coverage. The significant part of that event became the Anniversary brochure published by the General Executive Committee, bearing the single title "10". It contained 208 pages with a meticulous account of the attainments and deeds of the Kemalist regime commencing from the birth of the Republic reaching to the immediate events prior to the celebration. It also included extracts from the Atatürk's 6 day speech as well as the RPP's program principles. Webster thinks that the content of the brochure was calculated to inspire increasing faith and loyalty in all who read it.[47] The RPP adopted a flag of Alti Ok (six arrows) on a red background. The "arrows" have metaphorical interpretations suggesting the image of a projectile – Turkey - being shot through space and time, travelling swiftly and directly on a clear path, or on six clear paths, determined and launched by its grand marksman, Mustafa Kemal.

In 1934, Mustafa Kemal assumed the name Atatürk – Father of the Turks – bestowed on him by the National Assembly. Thus, his full name became, literally translated, "the Chosen, the Perfect, the Father of the Turks". On 9 February, 1935, the parliamentary elections were held, on March 1, İnöunü established his seventh government and its program was approved after six days. Between 9th and 16th of May, 1935, the Forth congress of the RPP was held (which was the last one personally attended by Atatürk). During the congress key principles became plainer, which stated that "the main ideas that constitute the foundation of the program of the RPP" and a crucial distinction was added: it named the ideas as the "principles" of "Kemalism". "The main lines of our intentions, not only for a few years, but for the future as well, are here put together in a compact form. All of these principles, which are the fundamentals of the Party, constitute Kemalism".[48] During the congress the Secretary-General Recep Peker, announced that "fundamental principles of the party will become the principles of the new Turkish state after the

new party programme has been ratified".[49] After the Congress Peker indeed emerged as a 'radical', his version of Kemalism has since been invoked by 'radical' Kemalists, civilian and military, as representing the 'true' Kemalist tradition. He also emerged as the "party ideologue" claiming to have the full approval of Atatürk.[50] He also eulogized the head of the state and proposed to strengthen further the authority of the party.

The six principles were placed in the Constitution on February 5, 1937, by the law number 3115. Thus Article 2 of the constitution was amended to read: "The Turkish state is Republican, Nationalist, Populist, Etatist, Laic and Revolutionary. Its official language is Turkish and its Capital is the city of Ankara".[51] The constitution did not either define or clarify the meaning of these terms. It is widely claimed that the implantation of Kemalism was attained in three stages: from 1931 to 1937 it was a program of the single party, in 1937 the six arrows were inserted into the Turkish constitution and Kemalism became officially the national ideology as well. Later on, in the 1943 program the doctrine was spelled in its current form ("Kemalism") and the arrow-born trajectory image of a "path" was added, a concept that permeates Kemalist discourse: "All these principles that are the foundations of the Party are the path of "Kemalism".[52] Gasanova claims that the ideological system of Turkey consisted not of those "six principles", but also "four basics" – 1) motherland, 2) nation, 3) republic, 4) civil law.[53]

By 1937 and 1938 when Kemal Atatürk was not actively involved in daily politics due to health deterioration problems, a total control over the socio-political and ideological realms of the Turkish nation was maintained. Although from 1925 till 1938 some 17 different rebellions were suppressed in various parts of the country a general stability in the country was a predominant trend. By that time the strong bureaucracy, empowered with a detailed knowledge of Atatürk's thoughts and Kemalist interpretation of worldly affairs, acquired a strong confidence and legitimacy to defend the deeds and all the achievements of the Kemalist revolution. There was no opposition in the country which was due to (and accompanied with) an unparallel personal charisma and authoritative power of Kemal Atatürk and the system that came into existence thanks to him.

The personal charisma of Atatürk was the only obstacle for the bureaucratic intelligentsia to further promotion of state structuring a transient state desired by Atatürk. With the death of Atatürk no obstacles remained and as Lewis argues "... authoritarian and paternalistic mode of government degenerated into something nearer to dictatorship as the word in commonly understood".[54] Alkan has concluded that in the later period of Atatürk the elite's outlook changes, and in conjunction with the emphasis placed on the principles of the revolution, liberal tendencies tended to disappear'.[55]

Conclusion

Thus, we can canclude that from the commencement of Kemalism until the death of Atatürk, the debate revolving around the key principles of Kemalism had undergone continuous evolution. In the early years of the 1920s the parameters of the ideological construct of the newly founded state still remained imprecise. Later on, in the late 1920s and by the beginning of the 1930s, the M. Kemal himself and his close associates acknowledged that the spirit of the revolutionary zeal eroded and new incentives were needed to mobilize the society around the common goals. In the 1930s, a new era emerged in Turkey – the epoch of the "High Kemalism". In that phase Kemalism was loaded with heavy ideological principles which became unceasingly dominant in the later decades. Meanwhile, by the mid-1930s it became clear that besides the narrow elite-approved version of Kemalism there were various versions of Kemalisms (movements like "Kadro", "Ulku", republican-conservatism), each developed on rather conflicting terms and principles as partial ideological representations of an all-encompassing process of Turkish transition to modernity. Even nowadays, interpretation of Kemalism by hard-core Kemalists hinges on the perception of the 1930s with its complicated contentions and perilous repercussions. It is therefore, the complex and systematic study of Kemalism's evolution is a significant necessity for fathoming the true essence of the Kemalist discourse in Turkey.

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Conversion, Collaboration and Confrontation: Islam in the Register of the Patriarchate of Constantinople (14th Century)[1]

Johannes Preiser Kapeller[2]

Abstract: The Register of the Patriarchate of Constantinople, which contains more than 800 documents of the period 1315-1402, is one of the most important sources for the (church) history of this time of renewed Muslim expansion at Byzantium's cost. First, this paper analyses how Islam is being described in these documents in regard to the terminology and the framework of traditional Byzantine polemics; besides more general terms such as "barbarians", "infidels" or "enemies", also more specific appellations with regard to religion ("Ismaelitai", "Musulmanoi") or ethnicity ("Persians", "Turks") are used in the Register. Second, the reaction of the Byzantine laymen but also of the lower and high clerics to the Islamic expansion as documented in the Register of the Patriarchate is surveyed: a main concern of the Patriarchate was the conversion of Christians living in areas under Muslim rule to Islam, a phenomenon which can be observed in several documents. In contrast, we find very few examples of Muslims converting to (Orthodox) Christianity during this period. In partibus infidelium, the Byzantine church had to come to arrangements with the new potentates in order to receive permission to minister its flock; but the Patriarchate attempted to define limits for the collaboration between its hierarchs and Muslim rulers, which were, however, sometimes violated by bishops "on-site". Some hierarchs were even prepared to acknowledge Muslim potentates as their legitimate secular overlords similar to the Byzantine emperor, forestalling the later agreement between the Orthodox Church and the Ottoman Sultan after the fall of Constantinople in 1453. Thus, the documents from the Register of the Patriarchate illustrate several cases of actual encounter between Byzantine Christianity and Islam in the 14th century besides the famous Byzantine works of anti-Islamic polemic (by John VI Kantakuzenos or Manuel II Palaiologos) of this period.

Keywords: Byzantium, Medieval Islam, Orthodox Christianity, Christianity and Islam, Medieval Turkish History, Late Byzantine History

Introduction: "Behold, I send you forth as sheep in the midst of wolves"

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2 Mag. Dr. Johannes Preiser-Kapeller is a researcher at the Institute for Byzantine Studies of the Austrian Academy of Sciences in Vienna, Austria.

(«ἰδοὺ ἐγὼ ἀποστέλλω ὑμᾶς ὡς πρόβατα ἐν μέσῳ λύκων»); this passage from the gospel of Matthew (10, 16) can be found in several documents from the Register of the Patriarchate of Constantinople for recently ordained metropolitans who were about to travel to their church in partibus infidelium (PRK II, doc. nr. 115, lns. 6-7 [Nov. 1338/June 1339], nr. 117, lns. 6-7 [Nov. 1338/June 1339], nr. 118, lns. 6-7 [Nov. 1338/June 1339]; Darrouzès, Reg. nr. 2185, 2184). The Register of the Patriarchate of Constantinople is one of the most important sources on the ecclesiastical, political, economic and social history of Late Byzantium. In two manuscripts now in the Austrian National Library (Vind. hist. graec. 47 and 48) are preserved more than 800 documents from the Patriarchate and the Synod of Constantinople for the period from 1315 to 1402 (Darrouzès, 1971). Miklosich and Müller compiled a first edition of these texts in the 1860s; but this edition is incomplete and of course outdated now (Miklosich, Müller, 1860 and 1862). Since 1981, a new edition is in progress in Vienna for the Corpus Fontium Historiae Byzantinae (PRK I-V). During the period covered by the documents in the two codices of Register, more and more territories of the Byzantine Empire and the Orthodox Church were occupied by Muslim powers, at first in Western Asia Minor, since the middle of the 14th century also in Europe.

This was of course not an entirely new experience for the Patriarchate of Constantinople: since the start of the expansion of Islam in the 7th century areas which fell under its jurisdiction had been lost; but the heaviest blow had been the invasion of the Byzantine heartland of Asia Minor by Turkish tribal groups after the battle of Mantzikert in 1071. While the areas in Western Anatolia were later recovered, high-ranking ancient metropolitan sees such as Caesarea in Cappadocia remained under Muslim rule in the 12th century; thus the Byzantine Church had to develop several measures to organize the administration of bishoprics in these area, such as the temporary combination of bishoprics under one metropolitan or the relocation of a bishop from a ruined city to another one which was still able to provide sufficient revenue. But of course the service in these regions could be at least unpleasant and sometimes even dangerous, as the word from the Gospel we have quoted illustrates (Vryonis, 1971; Preiser-Kapeller, 2008, LIII–LVI, and the lemmata on the various bishoprics).

The Patriarchate had to tolerate the presence of the "wolves" even in Constantinople, since Emperor Michael VIII Palaiologos (after the reconquest of the city from the Latins in 1261) had made an agreement with the Mamluks of Egypt which allowed for the re-construction of a mosque, especially for the spiritual needs of Muslim traders, in Constantinople (there, a first prayer room for Muslims had already been established in the 8th century) (Todt, 1991, 248; Reinert, 1998; Anderson, 2009). 40 years later Patriarch Athanasios I. in the early 1300s complained about this mosque and the prayer call of the muezzin and accused the Muslims that they would not even allow the sound

of a simantron (a wooden gong) in their own sphere of control – but to no avail (Talbot, 1975, 84, lns. 19-28 [letter nr. 41]; Congordeau, 1991, 410; Todt, 1991, 248-249; Reinert, 1998, 144); Byzantium's rulers had since centuries time and again successfully established a modus vivendi with powerful Muslim neighbour states, and Late Byzantium was even less in a position to violate existing treaties (Mansouri, 1992; Korobeinikov, 2004, 53-74; Todt, 2008).

For the church, the perilousness of the Muslims was evident; illustrative in this respect is the terminology used for the metaphorical "wolves" in the documents from the Register of the Patriarchate. A term utilised very often for the Muslims is ethne (the plural of ethnos), the equivalent to the Latin gentes as denomination for pagan people (cf. PRK I, doc. nr. 6 [July/ Sept. 1315], ln. 35: ἐπεὶ γὰρ οὗτοι μέσον ἐθνῶν, ὡς εἴρηται, εὑρίσκονται καὶ χρῄζουσιν; nr. 49 [July 1317], lns. 3-4: ὑπὸ γὰρ τῆς τῶν ἐθνῶν καταδρομῆς). Common is also the identification of Muslims as barbaroi ("barbarians") or as echthroi ("enemies"). Also in contemporary Byzantine historiographical works such as those of Gregoras and of Kantakuzenos, the term "barbaros" is used to identify Muslims or Turks in most cases, as Gill Page (2008, 172-176) has observed (cf. PRK I, nr. 61 [November 1318-February 1319], lns. 17-19: τὴν γὰρ ἁγιωτάτην μητρόπολιν Σμύρνης ὑπὸ τῶν βαρβάρων ὁποῖα δὴ τὰ τοῦ χρόνου κατεχομένην καὶ κυκλουμένην; nr. 96 [January 1327], lns. 19-20: διὰ πλῆθος ἁμαρτιῶν σύγχυσιν καὶ ἀνωμαλίαν ἑκ τῆς τῶν ἀθέων ἐχθρῶν ἐπιθέσεως; PRK II, nr. 126 [May 1340], ln. 7: ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν καὶ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων τῶν ἐν τοῖς βαρβάροις Χριστιανῶν, ln. 15: οἱ ἐχθροί; PRK III, nr. 189 [February 1354], lns. 3-4: τῆς τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἐπιθέσεως παραχωρήσει Θεοῦ διὰ πλῆθος ἁμαρτιῶν). These nouns are often combined with adjectives such as asebes ("godless") or allophylos ("from an alien race"), which themselves are also used alone in their nominalized form as appellation for Muslims (PRK II, doc. nr. 115 [November 1338-June 1339], ln. 3: ὑπὸ ἔθνος ἀσεβὲς; PRK IV, nr. 364 [1370]: μεταξὺ τῶν ἀσεβῶν τε καὶ ἀλλοφύλων οἰκεῖν).

These terms are not applied exclusively to Muslims, but also to people such as the (at this time still pagan) Lithuanians (Miklosich, Müller, 1860, 523-524 [Nr. 268] = PRK IV, nr. 347 [June 1370]; Preiser-Kapeller, forthcoming). And in a letter from Patriarch Philotheos Kokkinos and the Synod for Metropolitan Dionysios of Keltzene, a bishopric in Eastern Anatolia at the border to Armenia, from the year 1364, for instance, Dionysios is commiserated that he has to live ἐν μέσῳ ἐθνῶν ἄλλων τὲ καὶ τῶν θεοστυγῶν Ἀρμενίων, "in the middle of alien heathen people and the God-accursed Armenians" (Miklosich, Müller, 1860, 454 [nr. 197, without text]; PRK IV, nr. 276 [edition of the text]). In this case, the existence of heterodox Christian communities is more or less parallelized with the presence of Muslim groups.

More specific terms for Muslims found in the documents from the Register are traditional Byzantine designations such as Ismaelitai or Musulmanoi

(cf. Meyendorff, 1982; Hoyland, 1997, esp. 523-544; Heilo, 2010; LBG 4, 716, and 5, 1049); the Islamic faith (called musulmanismos in PRK III, nr. 215, ln. 153, a term not attested otherwise, cf. LBG 5, 1049) is mentioned as he ton Musulmanon kakia ("the wickedness of the Muslims") or as he asebeia ton Musulmanon ("the ungodliness of the Muslims") (PRK II, nr.116 [November 1338-June 1339], ln. 17: ἡ τῶν Ἰσμαηλιτῶν ἐπίθεσις, ln. 27: τῆς τῶν Μουσουλμάνων κακίας; PRK III, nr. 215 [July 1356]: καὶ συνθέμενος τῇ τούτων ἀσεβείᾳ μουσουλμανίσας; Miklosich, Müller, 1860, 550-551 [nr. 293] = PRK IV, nr. 374 [1374]: ὁ ἀπὸ τῶν Μουσουλμάνων ποτὲ Ἀντώνιος; Miklosich, Müller, 1862, 155 [nr. 425, 1391]: ἀναθεματίζω τὴν ἀσέβειαν τῶν Μουσουλμάνων).

Common are also ethnonyms; the Turkish domination of an area in Asia Minor is called he persike tyrannis ("the Persian Tyranny") – "Persians" being of course a traditional denotation for enemies from the East since antiquity (PRK I, nr. 7 [July-Sept. 1315], ln. 15: ἐκ τῆς κατεχούσης τούτους περσικῆς τυραννίδος; Moravcsik, 1958, 252-254). On the other hand, a document from the Register also calls the Muslims of the Golden Horde in Russia "Persians", which obviously could be used as a general name for Muslims (PRK III, nr. 215 [July 1356], ln. 115: προσχωρήσας τοῖς Πέρσαις; Moravcsik, 1958, 254; cf. also the term „Achaimenides" for „Muslims" in the work of John Kantakuzenos, see Trapp, 1966, 44*). A definite identification of an ethnic group is provided by the appellation οἱ Τοῦρκοι – the Turks – for the various Turkish groups in Asia Minor such as the Ottomans, the Aydın or the Teke; "hoi Tourkoi" in the documents of the Register are always these tribes and states, whereas in earlier Byzantine sources the term was used also for other groups such as the Hungarians (Miklosich, Müller, 1860, 592-593 [nr. 329] = PRK IV, nr. 417 [1372]: οἱ Τοῦρκοι; vf. also Miklosich, Müller, 1862, 86-87 [nr. 379, September 1384] = PRK V, nr. 489; Miklosich, Müller, 1862, 129-131 [nr. 405, February 1389] = PRK V, nr. 526; Moravcsik, 1958, 320-327; Brand, 1989). In the Register Islam is also sometimes mentioned as he asebeia ton Turkon, as "the ungodliness of the Turks" (Miklosich, Müller, 1862, 155 [nr. 425, 1391]: είς τοὺς Τούρκους καὶ ἐσεβόμην τὴν ἀσέβειαν αὐτῶν).

While the documents from the Register clarify that the "Turkish" danger is not only based on their military power but also on their alien faith, these administrative charters do not give room for more sophisticated polemics against Islam as can be found for instance in the contemporary works of the emperors John VI Kantakuzenos (who had anyway wedded his daughter to the Ottoman ruler Orhan) or Manuel II Palaiologos, who became generally noted due to the citation of his opus by Pope Benedict XVI in 2006 (cf. Trapp, 1966, esp. 44*-88*; Vryonis, 1981; Meyendorff, 1982; Sahas, 1983). More prominent in our source is the concrete menace for the souls of the Christians (ψυχικὸν κίνδυνον) who have to live under Muslim rule and next to Muslim neighbours (PRK I, nr. 7 [July-Sept. 1315], ln. 5; Todt, 1991, 606); this threat becomes even more acute if the Muslim overlord does not allow for the presence of an

Orthodox bishop and the flock remains without shepherd (Preiser-Kapeller, 2008, LIII-LVI; Rohe, 2009, 153-158). The worst fear of Patriarch and Synod was of course the conversion of their spiritual children "to the ungodliness of the Muslims" (cf. esp. Vryonis, 1971, 351-402, also on the role of Sufi-orders in the conversion of Christians to Islam; on this aspect see also several chapters in: Balivet, 1999; cf. also Ducellier 1983, 114-116).

Very significant in this respect – as already Speros Vryonis had pointed out – is a letter from Patriarch John XIV Kalekas to the clergy and laymen of the city of Nicaea in Northwestern Asia Minor, written in 1338/1339, mere seven years after the capture of the city by the Ottomans (PRK II, nr. 116, lns. 17-30; Vryonis, 1971, 341-343; Todt, 1991, 614-616). The Patriarch wrote:
Now the attack of the Ismaelites has overwhelmed us, with the permission of God because of the quantity of (our) sins [this is the most common explanation for the success of Muslims to be found in Byzantine sources since the 7th century (Hoyland, 1997, 524-526; Vryonis, 1971, 418-419)]. They have captured many of us, (they have) enslaved and displaced them with violence, so that they (= the captured Christians) – alas! – select their wickedness and ungodliness. (... But) Those who choose the true faith in God and desist from the wickedness of the Muslims, in which they have fallen, (the church) will again attribute to the flock of Christians, heal and maintain them; they will not find an obstacle to the salvation of their souls because of their, as I said, earlier error.

A few years after the Ottoman occupation of Nicaea, the Patriarch was concerned about the number of conversions to Islam to such an extent that he was prepared to promise more or less exemption from punishment for those who were disposed to return to Christendom, although the canon law of course prescribed heavy penalisation for apostasy (cf. Mitsiou, Preiser-Kapeller, 2010). But the Patriarchate was also well aware that Islamic law imposed capital punishment on apostates (Rohe, 2009, 134-135), and thus John Kalekas made even more concessions:
But all those, who from fear of punishment want to live for themselves and in secret, where they internalize and realize Christianity, will equally find (the) healing inasmuch as the make every effort to keep the commandments of God. (PRK II, nr. 116, lns. 34-38; cf. also Balivet, 1999, 231-254)

This patriarchal statement equals an invitation to Crypto-Christianity and illustrates the flexibility – or "oikonomia" to use a term from our sources (Hunger, 1981, 45) – of the Byzantine church hierarchy in their attempts to maintain Christian life in the regions lost to the Turks.

But conversions to Islam had become a phenomenon common in the mixed communities of Asia Minor (since the 12th century) and elsewhere; we encounter it in several texts from the Register. A very unpleasant case in this

respect was the conversion of an orthodox Christian mentioned in a document from the year 1356: this man had come into a lawsuit with several priests in the city of Tanaïs at the river Don, which was under the sovereignty of the Muslim Khan of the Golden Horde. In order to avoid an unfavourable decision and the re-payment of a certain amount of money and to improve his position, he "went to the Persians" and "became a Muslim" (the verb used in the Greek text is "musulmanizo", PRK III, nr. 215, ln. 117-118; cf. also LBG 5, 1049). The peculiarity in this case was the fact that this man was the brother of the neighbouring orthodox Metropolitan of Alania in the northwestern Caucasus (PRK III, nr. 215, lns. 113-126; Kresten, 2002, 26-27).

Obscure remain the causes for the conversion of another Rhomaios to Islam, Nikolaos Bulgaris; we possess the document with which Bulgaris declared his return to Christianity before Patriarch Antonios IV and the Synod in July 1391:
I, Nikolaos Bulgaris, declare and promise by my present letter in front of our most holy Lord, the ecumenical Patriarch, and the divine and holy Synod, that I will keep myself from now on in the Orthodox faith of the Christians, and that I reject and condemn the wickedness of the Muslims and all their rites, I assure that I also will bring here my children so that they live in Christianity. And everything I have done from resentment, with involvement of the evil demon, and (that) I went to the Turks and (that) I admired their wickedness, I now reject with God's grace and I promise to observe the Orthodox faith of the Christians. (Miklosich, Müller, 1862, 155 [nr. 425]; Darrouzès, Reg. Nr 2891. The Greek text also in: Mitsiou, Preiser-Kapeller, 2010, 271-272).

As already noted, the motive for Bulgaris' emmigration to Turkish territory and conversion is presented in a very vague way. The "resentment" may have been caused by a conflict with the secular or ecclesiastical authorities in Constantinople (Ducellier 1983, 114-116; Mitsiou, Preiser-Kapeller, 2010, 261-262). Illustrative in this respect is a statement made by a priest of the imperial clergy, Konstantinos Kabasilas, and recorded in the Register of the Patriarchate; after he had been sentenced to deposition by the Synod because of several offences, Kabasilas made a threat that he would defect "to the Franks or to the Turks" if the Synod's verdict was not reversed – at this time obviously a plausible option for someone who encountered difficulties in Byzantium (Miklosich, Müller, 1862, 55 [nr. 361/2, September 1383] = PRK V, nr. 465; on Kabasilas cf. Kraus, 2004, 248-263 and Kraus, 2007, 308-311). We may assume a similar motive for Bulgaris' actions. Such a concealment of very unpleasant facts is a phenomenon to be observed in the documents of the Register very often (Hunger, 1997, 11-43). But certainly, this return of a lost sheep to the Christian flock was a cause for delight in the Patriarchate.

Even more pleasant would have been of course the conversion of a born Muslim to Christianity. In the year 1180, on the initiative of Emperor Manuel

I Komnenos, the Byzantine church had even modified the official formula for such conversions in order to make it easier acceptable for Muslims (Montet, 1906 [on the older formula]; Darrouzès, 1972; Sahas, 1991; Angold, 1995, 111-113; Hanson, 1996). The most prominent converts from Islam to the church of Constantinople in the Late Byzantine Period were the Seljuk Sultan Izzeddin Keykavus II of Ikonion (PLP nr. 328) and his family, who took refuge in Constantinople after a defeat against the Mongols in 1261; they received baptism from the hands of metropolitan Makarios of Antocheia (in Pisidia, PLP nr. 16271; Laurent, Reg. nr. 1367; it may have been relevant that the mother of the Sultan was a Christian, cf. Cahen, 2001, 124, 175, 186-187 [on the first flight of Izzeddin Keykavus II to Nikaia] and 190-191 [on the second flight]; Melville, 2009, 59, 63, 68; Yaşar Ocak, 2009, 405). Also John VI Kantakuzenos refers in his polemical work against Islam to a noble and rich Turk, who converted to Christianity and even became a monk under the name Meletios (PLP nr. 17738; Todt, 1991, 196 and 235-245). In the Register of the Patriarchate we encounter only one born Muslim who became Christian; but this man had been baptised a "Latin" (or: "Roman Catholic") Christian and had received the name Antonios before he confessed his adherence to the dogmas of the church of Constantinople in February 1374 (Todt, 1991, 243; Mitsiou, Preiser-Kapeller, 2010, 255). At the end of the document, Antonios declared:
καὶ οἰκειοχείρως αὐτὴν ὑπογράφω τῇ γλώττῃ καὶ τοῖς γράμμασιν, οἷς ἐπίσταμαι.
("... and by my own hand I sign this (confession) in the language and with the letters which I understand") (Miklosich, Müller, 1860, 550-551 [nr. 293] = PRK IV, nr. 374; Mitsiou, Preiser-Kapeller, 2010, 255).

Actually we possess Antonios' autograph signature in Arabic letters in the first codex of the Register (Vind. hist. graec. 47, fol. 284v; a picture in Mitsiou, Preiser-Kapeller, 2010, 280, fig. 5). Beneath his signature the scribe from the patriarchal chancellery wrote:
Ταῦτα λέγουσι τῇ τῶν Ἑλλήνων γλώττῃ· ὁ ἀπὸ τῶν Μουσουλμάνων ποτὲ Ἀντώνιος.
("This means in Greek language: the former (convert) from the Muslims, Antonios") ((Miklosich, Müller, 1860, 550-551 [nr. 293] = PRK IV, nr. 374; Mitsiou, Preiser-Kapeller, 2010, 255)

The Muslim origin of Antonios was emphasized, although he had taken a detour to the Roman church previous to his conversion to the church of Constantinople. But the number of these spiritual victories was small in comparison to the losses of bishoprics to the expanding Turkish and especially Ottoman power.

As mentioned above, the toleration of the presence of a bishop or metropolitan by the Muslim overlords appeared to be a guarantee for the maintenance of Christian life. Such toleration necessitated some form of compromise

between the new secular power and the authorities of the church, sometimes the bishop on site, sometimes the Patriarchate itself. As we have seen in the case of the (former) Christians of Nicaea for instance, the Patriarch and the Synod were prepared to accept certain measurements which were not tolerable under normal circumstances in order to delay "the decline of the church", as Speros Vryonis has called it (Vryonis, 1971, 288-350). But they intervened as soon as they learned about forms of compromise, cooperation or even collaboration between their clergy and Muslim authorities which seemed improper, dangerous or actually criminal.

Orthodox canon law (nr. 30 of the so-called Canons of the Apostles; Joannou, 1962, 21, lns. 14-20) forbade a clergyman to appeal to a secular potentate to change the ecclesiastical order for one's own benefit – to take possession of a bishopric for instance. Such a perpetration was especially condemnable if the secular power involved was not even Christian (Milaš, 1905, 490-492; Potz, Synek, 2007, 361). Nevertheless, several cases in this respect became object of synodal jurisprudence.

The already mentioned Metropolitan Symeon of Alania, whose brother converted to Islam, himself resorted to the court of Khan of the Golden Horde Ğambek I in 1350 in order to receive a privilege (in the Greek text called dialeichion/διαλείχιον, from: jarlïγ) which granted him episcopal rights on the city of Tanaïs – contrary to an earlier decision of the Synod in Constantinople. Eventually, Symeon was removed from office, but later again rehabilitated (PRK III, nr. 215, lns. 27–33; Hinterberger, 1999, 177-180; Kresten, 2002, 23; Preiser-Kapeller, 2011, in print).

In a similar manner, the Metropolitan of Germanikupolis, a bishopric of the Patriarchate of Antiocheia in Cilicia, won the favour of the local Emir, presumably 'Alā'addīn Beğ of Karāmān (τῇ ἐξουσίᾳ τοῦ εὑρισκομένου ἐκεῖ ἀμηρᾶ), to accroach the jurisdiction over two neighbouring metropolises of the Patriarchate of Constantinople, Attaleia and Sylaion; Patriarch Philotheos Kokkinos protested against this in a letter to his counterpart in Antiocheia in January 1376 (PRK III, nr. 255, lns. 27-33; Darrouzès, Reg. nr. 2668; Sümer, 1978, 643-650, esp. 647-648; Hild, Hellenkemper, 1990, 258; Kresten, 2000, 55-64, see also 61, fn. 199 on the identification of this Emir; Preiser-Kapeller, 2008, 343-346; Todt, 2008; cf. also Leiser, 2002, 442-443).

The recently ordained Metropolitan Antonios of Perge and Attaleia (on the Southern Coast of Asia Minor) in 1386 had to learn, that the neighbouring Metropolitan Matthaios of Myra had occupied jurisdictional rights on several localities, which had been overseen by the metropolitans of Perge in former times; Matthaios of Myra had done this with the consent of the local Muslim potentate (τῇ τοῦ ἄρχοντος ἐκεῖ ἐνδόσει καὶ κρίσει), the Emir of Teke. Patriarch Neilos Kerameus instructed the Metropolitan of Myra to release the disputed

parishes and warned both Metropolitans not to involve the Emir in their conflict again, "since this is unworthy for our rank and for the dignity of a bishop", as we read in the document (Miklosich, Müller, 1862, 94–95 [nr. 389] = PRK V, nr. 501; Vryonis, 1971, 329-330; Flemming, 1964, 68-69 u. 84-89; Neumann, 1997, 529; Leiser, 2002, 442-443; Preiser-Kapeller, 2008, 343-346). "Unworthy for the dignity of a bishop" Patriarch and Synod also considered the actions of a metropolitan in Asia Minor in the year 1343: Matthaios of Ephesos, whose letters provide a very vivid picture of the life of a Byzantine bishop under Turkish rule (Vryonis, 1971, 343-348; Todt, 1991, 610-613; Preiser-Kapeller, 2008, LV and 110), was in conflict with the metropolitan of Pyrgion, who had been a bishop of Matthaios' metropolis, but successfully had achieved the promotion of his church to metropolis in the Synod. Both churches were located in the sphere of control of the powerful Emir Umur I of Aydın, who was an ally of Emperor Andronikos III as well as John VI Kantakuzenos; therefore Matthaios wrote a letter to Umur in order to persuade the Emir to expel his opponent from Pyrgion. Unfortunately for Matthaios, this letter came into the hands of the Synod, which was especially consternated about the way Matthaios had addressed the Muslim potentate, because the metropolitan of Ephesos had called Umur "his beloved son and himself the father" of the Emir; furthermore, he referred to the clergy in Pyrgion "as the priests" of the Emir (... καὶ καλὸν υἱόν αὐτοῦ τοῦτον ἔλεγε καὶ ἑαυτὸν αὐτοῦ πατέρα, παπάδες τὲ αὐτοῦ τοὺς τοῦ Πυργίου πρεσβυτέρους).

The Synod declared: „This he should not have done. For it befits high dignitaries of the Church to observe (the appropriate form of address) for such persons and not to use the same titles similarly for believers and for heathens and infidels. By all means, there must be a differentiation in the form of address as well as in everything else." (PRK II, Nr. 144, 322, 46-53 [April 1343]; Darrouzès, Reg. nr. 2243; Vryonis, 1971, 332; Kresten, 2003, 35-36). The use of metaphors which indicated spiritual kinship was common in the ecclesiastical correspondence of Late Byzantium, but limited to addressees of orthodox belief; if even catholic rulers were excluded from the circle of spiritual children of the Byzantine Church, the consternation of the Synod about Matthaios' letter becomes comprehensible (Preiser-Kapeller, 2012, forthcoming). As the Synod knew, it was necessary to make compromises with the new Muslim overlords in many bishoprics of the Patriarchate, but for the leadership of the Byzantine Church it was evident that their clergy should follow the rules of differentiation between "believers and infidel" in order to make clear the existence of a dividing line which should not be crossed.

But this and similar cases the Patriarch and the Synod had to deal with seemed less serious than incidences when Byzantine clergymen not only took advantage of Muslim power, but ruthlessly exposed their flock to the metaphorical wolves.

In April 1372, the Synod had to call the case of a priestmonk (hieromonachos) from Pharos, a locality on the European shore of the Bosporus (Külzer, 2008, 585), to the north of Constantinople. When a group of Christian fugitives, who had escaped from Ottoman captivity, took refuge there in the church of Hagios Georgios, the priestmonk together with the inhabitants of Pharos not only violated church asylum and expelled the fugitives from the church, but handed them over to the Turks, who killed several of the fugitives. Obviously, the people of Pharos feared the retaliation of the Ottomans, who at this time already could enter the hinterland of Constantinople more or less at will. Nevertheless, the Synod assigned the penance for homicide to the laymen of Pharos; the priestmonk was deposed and lost his priesthood (Miklosich, Müller, 1860, 592–593 [nr. 329]; Darrouzès, Reg. nr. 2647).

Even more concussive for the Synod was the case of one of their colleagues, Metropolitan Dorotheos of Peritheorion. Peritheorion, a city in the province of Rhodope (Thrace; cf. Soustal, 1991, 394-395; Preiser-Kapeller, 2008, 348-349), had been conquered by the Ottomans around the year 1373. Metropolitan Dorotheos had escaped to Constantinople, where he had lived for several years until he came into conflict with the Emperor and the Patriarch. Therefore, he defected to the Ottomans and made an agreement with them: for the permission to return to Peritheorion and to officiate there, Dorotheos, among other conditions, obligated himself to hand over any fugitive Christians, who would take refuge in the churches of his metropolis, to the Turks. And he met the obligations of this treaty on several occasions, as was recorded in the relevant case record in the Register of the Patriarchate in 1381. Patriarch Neilos Kerameus and the Synod of course condemned and deposed Dorotheos in absentia. But the document transmits to us a very remarkable statement of Dorotheos, which he presumably had made previous to his flight from Constantinople to the Ottomans: ... φανερῶς γὰρ ἔλεγεν ἐκεῖνος ἐνώπιον πάντων τοὺς Τούρκους ἔχειν καὶ βασιλεῖς καὶ πατριάρχας καὶ προστάτας ἰδίους, (...) ("For he said openly in public, that the Turks have their own emperors and patriarchs and headmen"). Dorotheos ignored the necessary "differentiation (between Christians and Muslims) in the form of address as well as in everything else", which Matthaios of Ephesos had neglected, in a much more dramatic way; this parallelisation of Byzantine and Ottoman authorities must have rung warning bells in the secular as well as ecclesiatical establishment of Constantinople, as becomes evident from the document in the Register of the Patriarchate (Miklosich, Müller 1862, 37-39 [nr. 353]; Darrouzès, Reg. nr. 2728; Preiser-Kapeller, 2008, 348-349).

But a historian may say that Dorotheos in this respect was only ahead of his times; about 70 years later, the Patriarch of Constantinople himself had to acknowledge the Ottoman Sultan as new secular overlord, an overlord whom various contemporary Greek sources already denominated as "basileus", which had been the traditional title of the Byzantine emperor (Cf. Reinsch,

2009, 15-30). The differentiation between Christian and Muslim potentates was not feasible any more.

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The "Barker" of the Unionists: The Forgotten Early Life and Works of Aka Gündüz

Ayşegün Soysal Akyos[1]

Abstract: A summary or abstract outlining the aims and subject matter: Aka Gündüz (1885-1958) is a pseudonym of Enis Avni who was a well-known journalist, novelist, short story and play writer as well as a member of parliament in the Republican Turkey. He spent his early life as an ardent follower of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). He participated, big or small, in almost all the events prepared by the CUP to direct and control the public opinion. At the beginning of the World War I, he was eliminated by the party and exiled to Anatolia where he lived as an undercover activist like other "self-sacrificing volunteers" sharing the same expulsion by the CUP. With the end of the war, he had become a fierce opponent of the CUP and committed himself fully to the national struggle movement in Anatolia. Unfortunately and paradoxically enough, this caused him to share the same fate of the Unionists who were banished to Malta after the occupation of Istanbul by the Allied forces . Later, he was to become a firm adherent of the new regime.

In order to evaluate his place in the early stages of the nationalist discourse, this article studies the literary output of Aka Gündüz produced primarily during this period of major political tension and transition in the late Ottoman history. Archival material is presented in the research and which will shed a light on the internal conflicts of the CUP.

This article aims to reveal the turning points in the career of a Unionist and his transformation, first to an opponent of the CUP and lastly to an accepted and respected, thus a conventional Turkish patriot. Probably his early expulsion from the CUP spared him from the accusation of being a Unionist and he got a chance to get a position in the republic. In order to evaluate his part in the gloomy years of the demising Ottoman Empire his works needs to be studied.

Keywords: Turkey, Ottoman history, history of Turkish literature

Introduction

Aka Gündüz (1885-1958) is one of the forgotten men in Turkey. He spent his early life as an ardent follower of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) and an agitator. Later, he was to become a firm adherent of the new regime. In order to reveal the transition from Ottomanism to Turkism and his place in

1 Ayşegün Soysal Akyos, Ph.D. is a instructor at the Ataturk Institute for Modern Turkish History of the Boğaziçi University in Istanbul, Turkey.

the early stages of the nationalist discourse, this article studies the literary output of Aka Gündüz produced primarily during this period of major political tension and transition in the late Ottoman history as he participated, big or small, in almost all the events prepared by the CUP to direct and control the public opinion.

Aka Gündüz was a journalist, novelist, short story and play writer as well as a member of parliament in the Republican Turkey. Though Aka Gündüz was a prolific writer before and after the proclamation of the Republic he is best known in Turkey for his popular works written during the Republican era. In order to evaluate his place within the early stages of the nationalist discourse, this paper studies the literary output of Aka Gündüz produced between 1908-1914 a period of major political tension and transition in late Ottoman history. Archival material is presented in the research which will shed new light on the internal conflicts of the CUP.

The object of this paper is to give the life of Aka Gündüz a context. Aka Gündüz spent his early life as a member of the CUP. At the beginning of the World War I, he was eliminated by the party and exiled to Anatolia where he lived as an undercover activist like other "self-sacrificing volunteers" expelled by the CUP. With the end of the war, he had become a fierce opponent of the CUP and committed himself fully to the national struggle movement in Anatolia. Unfortunately and paradoxically enough, this caused him to share the same fate of the Unionists who were banished to Malta after the occupation of Istanbul by the Allied forces.

In Turkey there is still a lack of biographies of Republican elites. Aka Gündüz is certainly one of those on which detective work is needed to reconstruct his life. Yusuf Ziya Ortaç underlined the fact in 1966 and pointed out that unlike Mehmet Emin Yurdakul, Ömer Seyfettin, Ali Canip Yöntem and Ziya Gökalp, the champions of national literature, Aka Gündüz is forgotten. Although he served the same cause with his poems, short stories, novels and theatre plays and although he was very popular then[1], nowadays his works are subject to academic interest but are not widely read or known. What were the reasons for this descent into oblivion? One reason is political especially for his achievements before the Republican period which I will come to in a little while. The clues for other reasons can be found in a review of his book Türkün Kitabı (Book of the Turk) written by one of his colleagues, Ali Canib. He related that Aka Gündüz was known as the "Baudelaire of the East" due to his mostly "morbid" and stressful lines. Ali Canib also mentions his articles in two Salonika newspapers, Kadın and Zaman. His articles in Kadın were signed as Seniha Hikmet and received as the writings of a young woman without any suspicion. This period was then followed by a silence which he rendered as a waiting period for the appearance of a new current. Aka Gündüz became a revolutionary just like Namık Kemal and added that he was

never a storyteller, but rather a mentor for the people. Ali Canip anticipated the demise of Gündüz's literary reputation due to a basic ignorance of the formalities inherent in the discipline for which the latter cared little. Writing was for the people, for excitement, irrespective of the consequences on the medium as 'art'. Ali Canip saw this not only as a deficiency for the sake of art but a danger if it continued.[2]

His Life

Aka Gündüz was one of the children of borderland, born somewhere between Alasonya and Katarina in Manastir probably in 1884/1885 to a father who was an army major from Rize and a mother from Circassia. His original name was Hüseyin Avni. In his writings he used the pen-name Enis Avni which he later changed to Aka Gündüz. He was named Hüseyin Avni after Hüseyin Avni Pasha (1820-1876) with the hope that he would become a prominent soldier. Hüseyin Avni Pasha was known for his role in the dethronement of Abdulaziz and his saying "my hatred is my religion". As Aka Gündüz was enrolled into the military school this sentiment was often heard and his name was accordingly changed to Enis Avni. He recorded that he held a grudge for those who could not even stand his name's similarity to this pasha.[3]

His mother, an educated woman who knew French, Italian and Greek and taught them to her son, died early. Enis Avni took his first education in Seres and Salonika then later at the military school in Salonika. When his father went to the Ottoman-Greek War of 1896-1897 he was sent to Istanbul. Though his step mother did not want to send him he ran away to Istanbul and found his uncle who worked for Abdulhamid II who then enrolled him at Galatasaray School which was established to educate students of different religious and ethnic groups in a modern way and teach them French. After Enis Avni entered Galatasaray he changed his mind and decided to be a soldier like his namesake. He left Galatasaray after a short stay and enrolled at a military school in Istanbul – at which he met Omer Seyfeddin and went with him to Edirne. Soon it became clear that they had had parallel life courses with each other i.e. their fathers were soldiers, their mothers were educated, and they both had military training. They were both ardent Turkish nationalists, and yet as is so often the case, it was the one who died early who is best known in Turkey, while the other one who survived is virtually forgotten.

From Edirne he came back to Istanbul but could not finish his military career due to an illness and/or disobedience in 1903 when he was a second grade the War College.[4] His first poem was published in his Istanbul years in 1901.[5] Aka Gündüz relates that he then began working as a professional journalist for the newspaper Malumat at about the time when he wrote a poem about the eruption of volcano in Martinique Island in may 1902.[6]

When his military career ended he went back to Salonika and worked in the customs office for a while. One basic source records that he then went to Paris for two years but this may not be true. Either that of he went to Paris twice as there are archival references to his being in the French capital in 1911.[7]

His Career as a Unionist

It is certain though that Enis Avni was in Salonika after 1905 and wrote for Çocuk Bağçesi[8] - the voice of the Salonika dissidents before the establishment of the Ottoman Freedom Society.[9] Enis Avni seems to have joined these dissidents, though Çocuk Bağçesi was closed after a dispute between Omer Naci and Riza Tevfik at the end of 1905. When Ömer Naci and Husrev Sami left Salonika for Paris, Enis Avni and Nesimi Sarım were subsequently arrested due to the fact that they had seen them off.[10] When he released from jail, he was ordered to reside in Salonika with Nesimi Sarım, but after a month incarcerated again.[11] In any case, I think we can say that he was close to Omer Naci and maybe even speculate that he was on the Committee of Fatherland and Freedom (Vatan ve Hürriyet Cemiyeti).

'In 1907 in conjunction with the merger of two committees, the Ottoman Freedom Society and the Committee of Progress and Union, new activist regulations were prepared by the CPU. The committee also adopted an Ottomanist vision encouraging union among the various Ottoman elements. Probably after the merger Enis Avni's initiation to the committee took place along with Ali Şefik, Sapancalı Hakkı and Nesimi Sarım.[12] It was also decided to create of branches of "self-sacrificing volunteers" (fedai).[13] According to Mustafa Ragıp Enis Avni was in the Salonika branch of fedai with Hilmi, Yakup Cemil, Hüsnü, Abdülkadir, Bahri, Fazlı, Mehmed, Hamdi and Mustafa Necip.[14] He also relates that they were all eager to assassinate the garrison commander of Salonika, Lieutenant Colonel Nazim who had been sending spy reports to Istanbul about the committee Mustafa Necip was eventually chosen by drawing lots.[15]

The first play of Enis Avni was Aşk ve İstibdad (Love and Despotism) which staged the assassination of Nazim Bey and had Enis Avni playing the main character, Ali. Despite the fact that it was a literary drama, the play nevertheless gives quite detailed information about the activities and secret mode of operation of the internal functioning of the committee. This play was published in Kadın under his editorship but remained unfinished.[16]

Yet it is during the Second Constitutional period that Enis Avni seems to come to the fore in literature and the press. He became the editor of Kadın published in Salonika between the dates September 1908 - May 1909[17] and wrote for journals like Bağçe and published a newspaper, Hak (Right) again in Salonika, in November 1909. Enis Avni volunteered for the Action Army (Hareket Ordusu) which was send to quell the mutiny of 13 April 1909 (31 March incident) in Istanbul and he wrote his feelings in Kadın[18]. Interestingly enough the journal

stopped publishing shortly after this event, and the series of Enis Avni's articles remained unfinished. This incident was a religious uprising against the Young Turk government, known because of the Julian calendar as the "31st March Incident". The mutiny resulted from the discontent of ordinary soldiers and medrese students over their conditions. This army mutiny in Istanbul exposed the weakness of the CUP and at the same time gave it a new opportunity and the sultan was deposed, who favored a return to absolutism. His newspaper Hak was also closed after only two issues. The reason for this may be his appointment to Adana as a scribe to the town council, where Cemal Bey (later Pasha) had become the governor[19] after the Armenian incidents. During his 13 month stay in Adana, Enis Avni also worked for the local Adana newspaper. His appointment could not have been a mere coincidence considering the shift of Unionist cadres to this city including acquaintances such as Cemal Pasha, and Yakup Cemil, for instance. I must admit that we don't know yet fully how these cadres were used or intended to be used by the party.

Ahmet Emin Yalman remarks that after the proclamation of the constitution, and especially after the 31 March incident a general aim emerged to increase relations with the outside world and send students to foreign countries for education. This desire for contact with the outside world was so firm that a law was issued by the government which enabled travelling without passport for over a year.[20] The CUP was also active in this issue going so far as to create a council for the students abroad. Ali Canip, the secretary of this council, wrote that CUP was not only interested in sending students abroad but also in the anticipated communication with the student associations to understand their needs and to keep them informed about the "sound thoughts" (efkâr-ı salime) in the Ottoman empire.[21] Yusuf Kemal (Tengirşenk), a deputy of the Ottoman Assembly who was sent to investigate the Armenian incidents in Adana was appointed inspector of students in Europe after he prepared his report. Enis Avni must have known him from Adana. May be it is not a simple coincidence and may be Enis Avni was not sent only for education alone, but to control, and perhaps initiate "nationalist" organization of the Ottoman students in Europe. After all, didn't his time in Europe as a student ended without an outcome? Hans-Lukas Kieser asserts that after 1911 an ethnic nationalist movement developed among the Turkish students in Europe simultaneously with the Ottoman Empire and this was supported by the CUP. We learn from his book that Yusuf Kemal attended the first congress of the organization of these students which assembled near Lausanne at the end of 1911.[22]

Ministry of Education decided to send Enis Avni to Paris at the end of 1910.[23] At the end of January 1911 he went to Paris on a 300 frank salary and the Ottoman Consulate in Paris was asked to help him get accepted and enrolled at the Law School. The supervisor of the Ottoman students in Paris was also informed of his coming.[24] In his biography it is noted that he also entered

Saint Germain en Laye though returned to Istanbul after two and a half years without finishing any of the schools.[25] I could not find any information about his fine arts education and so, it seems, he did not stay in Paris that long either.

Despite this fact he seems to have resumed his journalistic activities at home. It was said that he published Hak Yolu with Mehmet Ubeydullah Efendi,[26] a journal which produced six issues between 16 February and 23 March 1911. This seems inconsistent however as during this time he must have been in Paris. Likewise, in none of those issues did I see his name even if Enis Avni himself counts it among the journals he worked for.[27] He was also editor in chief of the newspaper Cihad (Holy War) which began published on 23 July 1911 with the approval of the government in which Talat Bey was the minister of the interior. It only lasted for five issues probably due to the unstable political climate. In this newspaper he answers the letters of Prince Sebahattin addressed to CUP, but in praising Enver Pasha in these writings Enis Avni was widely misunderstood. Warned by friends, and even receiving death threats from a stranger, he sent a letter to Enver Bey and tried to assure him of his good intentions. But to no avail, the newspaper was closed. He later paid a visit to Talat Bey who appeased Enis Avni saying that Enver Bey was convinced that there had been a misunderstanding.[28] It is interesting that Enis Avni could see the minister of internal affairs personally but could only reach a lieutenant colonel via letter.

As we can see the year of 1911 was complicated for Enis Avni just as it was for the CUP and the Ottoman state. One cannot find a more instructive sample of turmoil as Falih Rıfkı Atay puts it.[29] In September events accelerated further when the congress of the CUP convened in Salonika secretly and the Italian-Turkish War began. 1911 congress was the last secret congress of the CUP. The committee was facing a major internal crisis and the congress became the scene of a struggle between factions.

According to Tahsin Alangu Aka Gündüz was playing an active role in the re-organization of the CUP in Salonika. He was writing in journals, participating in meetings and organizing demonstrations.[30] It is probable that after this Cihad incident Avni went to Salonika, and began to use Aka Gündüz as a penname in Genç Kalemler expecting to be taken more seriously. His first writing signed under this nom de plume was entitled "Kayıkçı" (Boatman) and was presented as a "national short story with new language".[31] "New Language" was the name of the new understanding propagated by the journal Genç Kalemler starting with the second volume. This movement strived for the purification of language, and its close affiliation with nationalism was advocated. A language that was easily understood by the common people was necessary and this idea and the journal itself were supported by the CUP. His second short story in the same magazine was "Grandmother and Son" (Nine ve Oğul) and its

author, Aka Gündüz, was presented as a "young Caucasian writer". Here the publication of his first book Türk Kalbi (Turkish Heart) was also announced.[32] Thus, not only had Enis Avni changed his name, but he had created a new identity for himself as a Caucasian, emergent from his own remote roots. It is symbolic that Enis Avni renounced his birthplace just before it was lost in the same year.

Enis Avni, now as Aka Gündüz and as an important writer of the national literature went once more to Istanbul and started writing for the newspaper Tercüman-ı Hakikat.[33] He also published Türk Kalbi there. The book was comprised mostly of short stories some of which were published in Tercüman-ı Hakikat and related to the Tripolitanian War, and others which were dedicated to the criticism of the Hamidian regime, and in praise of "freedom".[34] He later wrote that as Tercüman-ı Hakikat was a flatterer, on the one hand they fomented the politics on the other hand they had a good time.[35] He also gives information about the elections of 1912. Before and after the March 31 incident the land was covered with a political flood. The party was determined to make a powerful purge and also published a new election program which he found too general.[36] Then he relates how he wrote a program for an employee in the newspaper and how he became a deputy and forgot the man who made him win.[37]

Though Aka Gündüz was remembered principally as a tout, protected by the CUP because of his role in the public demonstrations organized before the Balkan Wars,[38] in time he also became known as a preacher. When he joined a nationalist delegation to Izmir which included other Turkish Heart (Türk Ocağı) members like Ahmed Ağaoğlu, Hamdullah Suphi, Köprülüzade Fuad, Ali Canip and Kâzım Nami, he was warmly welcomed by the people. The group consisted of nationalist figures who gave conferences in Izmir. This trip was described in the journal Türk Yurdu (Turkish Homeland) as 'the first time in this Turkish country that a Turkish mission was invited on behalf of Turkishness (Türklük)'.[39] During this visit we learn that in a place after the conferences Aka Gündüz was asked by a group of women to give a speech although he was not included into the program.[40] We feel that even if he was not seen to be of the same rank as the others, he was perhaps the most esteemed by the people.

In 1912 he began writing for Tanin and from this came his second book Türkün Kitabı (The Book of the Turk) which was comprised mostly of his articles from this newspaper. Throughout 1912 Aka Gündüz propagated war in his articles in Tanin and was also active in public demonstrations organized by the CUP. The Great Cabinet was in power at this time and when it declared that it would carry out the reforms specified in the Treaty of Berlin. CUP criticized this as an act of submissiveness. On October 7, 1912, one day before Montenegro declared war on the Ottoman Empire; there were widespread demonstrations

in Istanbul to protest the government's policies. Şerif Çavuşoğlu decided to use the student movement, a claim later verified by Ahmet Bedevi Kuran[41] and sent Aka Gündüz.[42] Accordingly, the students came to the Sublime Porte to confront the prime minister, and were led by Aka Gündüz, agitating and encouraging them to shout "we want war" and "we won't give Rumelia".[43] According to some testimonies he even spoke to the Prime Minister Gazi Ahmet Muhtar Pasha before being arrested. In his testimony he rejected the claims that he was leading the demonstrators,[44] but nevertheless was put into jail with other Unionists.[45] In his memoirs he stated that he surrendered according to the orders of the party.[46] He was accused of having organized the demonstration outside the Sublime Porte on the day before the Montenegrin declaration of war with the object of overthrowing the Government. He was condemned to seven years' detention.[47] But he was released after a short while.

When the Ottoman Empire entered World War I, a fatwa was read at the mosque of Mehmed the Conqueror on 14 November 1914, declaring of Holy War. Public demonstrations under the banner of "National Manifest" were organized by the Committee of Union and Progress, the Association of National Defense, the Association of Muslim Merchants and the Naval Association. Some observers held Germany responsible for staging this show.[48] Jihad was thought as a powerful weapon against the colonial powers. An informal office under the roof of the Foreign Office was established to coordinate propaganda efforts and operations in relation to the Islamic world. Orientalist Martin Hartmann was affiliated with this office and he gave an important place to Aka Gündüz in his book about the Turkish literature. He was the last and longest entry.[49] On November 1914, on the same day with the proclamation of jihad, the Russian Monument at Ayastefanos was destroyed,[50] something Aka Gündüz had called for three days earlier in an article in Karagöz.[51]

The crowds had also surged to the German and Austrian embassies after the ceremony at the Fatih mosque, but this swell of emotion passed off without incident. Later in the evening some people also ransacked the Tokatliyan Hotel as it owned by a Russian citizen. Though some newspapers suggested that this event was incited by the belligerent states,[52] the Tokatliyan event was otherwise widely condemned. The next day an explanation was announced by the organizers.[53] According to the Navy Organization though the police were effectively powerless to curtail the activities of the enthusiastic and passionate masses, mercifully few unlawful incidents like the barbarian assault to the German embassy in Petersburg were recorded. Perhaps, some conjectured, this alone exemplified the different national characters of Russians and Ottomans.[54] Despite this tolerant attitude of the Navy Organization the government was perturbed and exiled Aka Gündüz to Konya.

US ambassador Morgenthau explains these events through a wider understanding of the German policy of agitating for the "Holy War".[55] But what the connection of Aka Gündüz with the Germans was remains a question to be answered. Perhaps pragmatism is the answer, insofar as the government was anxious to keep the demonstrations under control and Aka Gündüz was a notoriously undisciplined, unreliable and dangerous character, it was safer to keep him in exile, far from the capital, Istanbul.

But he was by no means docile and continued to create problems for the government even from his remote locale. In a cipher telegraph from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the governor of Konya it emerged that Enis Avni had been insulting government officials in his letters to his family, all of which now had been confiscated.[56] Another document stressed that he should not be allowed to go anywhere from now on without the expressed permission of the ministry.[57] He was sent to Bozkır in Konya[58]. Gündüz himself recalled how he had kicked up a row and had to be moved to another "resort".[59] He also recalled how he had duplicated the agencies telegraphs and distributed them to the villages, but how, due to a "stupid" district governor, this was banned too. He conceded that "maybe I would write noxious propaganda against our almighty government and great constitution",[60] or soldiers' letters and petitions, but these were banned as well[61] and he was, in time, sent to Konya martial court.[62] Permission to send Aka Gündüz to Gemlik was given in august 1915[63] and he went in January of the following year[64]. It is an interesting, and unresolved, afterthought that after his departure the Ministry asked the governor of Konya if Enis Avni was the writer who was also known as Aka Gündüz[65] and the answer was positive and stated that consent for his departure was taken from the ministry.[66] Is this a sign of regret? Might be.

We know from archival documents that he wasn't the only person exiled to remote places.[67] Might we therefore surmise that the deportation of Aka Gündüz also had a meaning from the perspective of the internal dynamics of the party? Though released twice by court martial, and in the absence of a trial, he was nevertheless arrested and exiled.[68]

Most of his writings bear characters from the real life and autobiographic features. In one of his short stories the name of the hero of "the story of someone who was killed as a favor" is Enis, his name. In this story Aka Gündüz tells us that he knew Enis for thirty years and that he was a volunteer of virtue.[69] He related that there were party quarrels and a war problem at then. A few men were sacrificed to check the crisis. The allied powers tried to benefit this opportunity, Enis was charged secretly and he was exiled under a series of false accusations.[70]

According to Hartmann, Aka Gündüz was exiled because of his play Muhterem Katil (Honorable Murderer), in which an Ottoman activist Yakup goes to

Caucasia to organize the Turks against Russia. For Hartmann the idea seems plausible that this character was based on Yakup Cemil, the fedai who shot the war minister in January 1913.[71] At the beginning of the World War I he was sent to Eastern Anatolia and there he worked in the organization of Armenian forced emigration. Because of his unruly character, fierce practices and the defeats he was responsible for, however, he was sent back to Istanbul. After the Çanakkale victory, and aware that the British Empire was inclined to sign an advantageous peace treaty Yakup Cemil having first tried to persuade the Unionist government for a peace later launched a coup to overthrow the government. But he was arrested and sentenced to death – an order which was executed on September 11, 1916.[72] Before his arrest Yakup Cemil had gone to Bursa where he had met Aka Gündüz and Hüsrev Sami. Hüsrev Sami was another old friend of Aka Gündüz from Salonika and after he resigned his office as an inspector became an opponent of the CUP.

Aka Gündüz, who was working in a hotel in Bursa run by Satvet Lütfi, the secretary of Prince Sebahattin who had been exiled to Bursa after the murder of Mahmut Şevket Paşa,[73] warned Satvet Lütfü of the temper of Yakup Cemil.[74] He must have been gone to Bursa from Gemlik and he wrote that he was brought to Istanbul after the Yakup Cemil incident, jailed and released, then exiled once more.[75] He wrote about this incident after the war and blamed the Unionists. According to Aka Gündüz the responsibility of the pro-war party was less than the responsibility of those who rejected the peace. Actually he wanted to undermine his role in propagating the war or wanted to forget it.[76] Aka Gündüz himself wrote a petition in 1919 complaining that he had been exiled to Anatolia in November 1914 without any legal verdict. As he was not released until November 1918 he demanded his essential expenditures be compensated.[77] In his Hayatdan hikâyeler (Stories from Life) published in 1928 he recounts that he was exiled for "four years, two months and 12 days during the war". In this time, he mused retrospectively, and in this place, his education was completed. Anatolia had been a university for life[78] in which this man of Rumelia got to know Anatolia and in so doing added vivid, realistic tones and humor to his future literary accomplishments.

In 1918 the Ministry of Internal Affairs ordered the governor of Bursa to take the photographs of Enis Avni and other political exiles in Bilecik and to send them to the ministry.[79] Interestingly, in the same year Talat Paşa, now the prime minister sent Aka Gündüz 40 liras.[80] Why? Mithat Şükrü Bleda has suggested that Talat Bey often borrowed money from his friends and so one day, when he took money from Aka Gündüz, he swore that he would repay the debt tenfold when he became prime minister.[81] According to Ali Canib Aka Gündüz reminded Talat Bey his promise by a telegraph when he became prime minister in February, 1917. Ali Canib wrote that Talat Bey actually send him 50 liras.[82]

After the armistice of Mudros he wrote for Alemdar a series of articles accusing the Unionists in a vitriolic manner. "Talat crushed with pen, Enver cut with sword, Cemal hang with rope but in order to devastate a nation, to ruin a state these were not enough: a brain was necessary for a crushing pen, a wrist was necessary for a cutting sword and a force was necessary for a hanging rope. This would not happen with ignorance, stupidity and arrogance; these were made possible by three men: Ziya Gökalp, Kara Kemal and Dr. Nazım."[83]

After that he wrote for Celal Nuri's İleri and then he published Alay with Ercüment Ekrem (Talu) between January-March 1920. This journal lasted 12 issues in which Aka Gündüz used both of his names. Because of his enthusiastic support of the Nationalists in Anatolia, he was arrested again in April 1920 by the British and deported to Malta to join the Unionists. After the exile was fulfilled he went to Ankara and supported the National Struggle movement and published Anadolu'da Peyam-ı Sabah mocking Ali Kemal's Peyam-ı Sabah at the end of 1921. His activism continued in March 1922 when the students of the Istanbul University Faculty of Literature wanted some professors to resign and so made a boycott. Aka Gündüz supported this boycott with his articles[84] even if Ali Kemal dismissed his activism and these of others as unworthy scrabble and mere "cabbage leaves".[85] In 1923 Aka Gündüz became the leader of the government supported General Union of the Workers and he also headed the Labor Group in İzmir Economy Congress in 1923. Now he was now in the service of the new regime albeit fulfilling his interest in the disadvantaged sections of the community. Next Aka Gündüz was charged to follow the negotiations of the Population Exchange Committee and to represent the Anadolu Agency in Greece[86]. In 1924 he was assigned to investigate the files in the State Archives but it seems that he did not show up.[87] He also continued to write in newspapers like Hakimiyet-i Milliye, Cumhuriyet and Yeni Gün and in journals such as Politika and Hayat. He continued his journalistic and literary activities right up until his death in 1958. As a firm adherent of the Republican regime he also became actively embroiled in debates and criticized the dissidents to the regime. He was a deputy in the National Assembly for ten years from 1933 until 1943.

His Works

Aka Gündüz pointed out in one of his articles that after the proclamation of the constitution a "Jean Jacques Rousseau democracy emerged". Some of the ministers were undoubtedly from among the common people and they presented their presence among, and talking with "the people" as an indicator of democracy's triumph. But Gündüz was sorry to be an instrument to this foolery then. He learnt that this fake democracy created a fake or Levantine bourgeoisie and then a fake aristocracy. Talat Bey, who was a real common fellow, once said that he felt himself a bourgeois without wealth and he attributed this change to Byzantium.[88]

Abidin Nesimi associates Enis Avni with Omer Seyfettin and Ali Canib as Ottoman Turkish socialists and affiliated to Salonika Socialist Workers' Federation.[89] I could not fully verify this information and feel that it is rather too much to designate him socialist. I think however that Enis Avni's concern for the people is clear, not least through his characters in his works that are usually from the oppressed, lower segments of society. He was an anti-elitist and populist because he believed in the people's inherent goodness and wisdom. In poverty, he believed, resided truth and honesty, noticeably absent in other classes.[90]

Enis Avni in an article about the Committee of Progress and Union divided Ottoman history into four distinct periods: the first was from the beginning until the reign of Suleiman the Lawgiver; the second phase lasted until Abdulhamid II's reign; except the short life of Mithat Paşa the third period was a period of oppression and the last period began with the declaration of the Constitution. Enis Avni underlined the fact that the people had had to take their freedom and Constitution by force. It had not been granted and the CUP was itself the people, all the Ottomans, without discrimination of race and/or religion.[91]

Aka Gündüz was more productive after 1911 until his exile in 1915. Almost all of his writings were parallel to the policies of Unionists, some of them seems like guided by the party. For example, the CUP wanted, as an emergent priority, to develop a strong Ottoman naval force. The poor condition of the fleet had been highlighted during the Ottoman Naval Parade of 1910, after which the Ottoman Navy Foundation had been established in order to purchase new ships through public donations. By 1914 an important sum had been subscribed, especially by the people of Istanbul and coastal areas according to a report in The Times. The same issue reported that Aka Gündüz wanted 300.000 lira from Gazi Muhtar Pasha, prime minister in 1912,[92] implying strongly that he was once again on the frontline. Indeed, he wrote a brochure addressing Gazi Ahmet Muhtar Pasha in January 1914 (though it was not published until 1916), suggesting that his donations were insufficient[93] and urging him to donate more. A second brochure was addressed to Said Pasha, the head of the Chamber of the Notables, also encouraging him to give more money in the same manner. Gündüz did not hesitate to point out the fact that poor people had given much more to the Navy than those two, leading to serious questions arising concerning their relationship with this land. How long, he asked, would we feed you in vain?[94] This assault on the privileged is an unchanging theme in Aka Gündüz's writings since the proclamation of the Second Constitution in 1908.

When he was in exile he managed to publish a historical novel, Katırcıoğlu Avcı Sultan Mehmed Devrinde[95] but it was written in January 1914. It might be another publication targeting Mahmut Muhtar Pasha because his family name

was Katırcıoğlu. It started with the title tales of history and relates the tyranny of Katırcıoğlu who lived in sixteenth century.

Probably for his provocative writings, Aka Gündüz was held responsible by the police for the publications targeting the Greeks. After the war, i.e. after his exile, Aka Gündüz blamed Dr. Nazım for his accusation indirectly. He also blames Dr. Nazım for stirring up the youth to precipitate the economic boycott of Greeks. He mentions that a youngster objected on the grounds that the Greeks are "our citizens" too, but guided and lead public opinion with pamphlets, booklets and journals nevertheless.[96]

Türk Kalbi and Türkün Kitabı published respectively in 1911 and 1912 shows his transition from Ottomanism to Turkism. Türk Kalbi[97] is not one-sided and emotional like Türkün Kitabı, yet is remarkable in its depiction of the characters which belong to different layers of society. We don't see any non-Muslim characters after his book "Turkish Heart" published in 1911 where the non-Muslims were portrayed as positive figures in accordance with the understanding of brotherhood and Ottoman citizenship supported by the CUP. However he dedicated his play Muhterem Katil to its performers, the "national artists" Ms. Kınar and Nureddin, Safvet, Dülgeryan.[98]

Moreover, Aka Gündüz wrote a monolog particularly for Kınar Hanım which was published in Donanma (Navy) in which he stated that the play could not be performed without her permission.[99] I think we can say that his understanding of nationalism though fierce was not as exclusive as Omer Seyfeddin. For Aka Gündüz "the other" was Europe, not the non-Muslims in the Ottoman Empire at least explicitly he didn't mention this. His brutal wording reflects the trauma of losing his birthplace and his hatred for Europe and Russia. This was extremely evident in the address to Rauf[100] who was the captain of the cruiser Hamidiye and became famous during the First Balkan War: he asked Rauf to target and blast Salonika, first the grave of his mother then Aya Sophia.[101]

He was one of the "most famous Turkists" who wrote about the "The Turkish and Pan-Turkish Ideal"[102] of Mois Kohen. Though he admired the work he also wrote that he couldn't hide his disappointment: "I wish this book has been written by a Turk but to expect this from the authors who didn't want to utter their heart's voices even in the midst of war is just as ridiculous and vain as to believe in the victory of Russia ("Moskof")". What pleased him most was the fact that it was written by a beloved and capable Jewish citizen who gave a lesson to the mute Turkish writers.[103]

"Stay Turk and love those who are not"

The book is named after the first short story which is 'Türk Kalbi'. The main figure of the story was a youngster who came from the Turkish land on the

other side of the Lake Baykal. The author calls him a "karındaş" (uterine) not the most widely used form "kardeş" (brother). He became a Turkish officer from Oghuz descent but died at war. His grandmother wants her grandsons be martyrs too. The last sentence of the story is "stay Turk and love those who are not" making the diversity of the characters meaningful.

In almost every short story of Aka Gündüz we see a praise of war and death for the motherland. Türk Kalbi is not exception to this. In the story "News" there was a feast because war was declared against Italy[104] and elsewhere Aka Gündüz uses mottos like "you have to die in order to live" often.[105] Hartmann pointed to the death scenes and cemeteries in Türkün Kitabı (The Book of the Turk) and denoted it as a condemned mode of the modern Turkish literature.

He also questioned from where this unhealthy manner came for he did not know any similar literary mode in the old Ottoman literature.[106] He also points out to the prayer-like calls of Aka Gündüz in front of the catafalques of the old Ottoman rulers such as Murad and Mehmed the Conqueror. What was the aim of this pious fraud asked Hartmann?[107] But if there is one oft-quoted work, revengeful and devastating rather than religious in motifs, it is the piece for Mehmed, which was first published in Tanin and included in Türkün Kitabı[108], quoted repeatedly in different books, attracts attention with its.[109] Again Hartmann strongly suggests that Türkün Kitabı was thought of as a reader for the schools because of the inflammatory style of Aka Gündüz which was so capable of capturing and enrapturing simple temperaments. It seems cancelled but the assignment to prepare a reader explains the choice of pieces, including often repeated prayers, which show little diversity.[110]

In Türk Kalbi, and specifically in the short stories related to Tripolitania, there are positive Arab characters. In one piece 'Yumurcak' (Brat), one of the main figures is Armenian and again is positively portrayed. He is an old man with two sons, but one of them has been handed down a life sentence for being an Armenian revolutionary, while the other one was a student of Medicine school but who had been killed under the Hamidian regime. The hero of the story, 'brat' was an orphan in the neighborhood watched by the old man and his ethnic belonging is not clear. The brat stole something from the old man; the old man noticed the police but "brat" ended up with being a pasha.[111]

Another interesting story is "Atnaş'ın Üç Günü" (Three Days of Atnas) which happens "when freedom comes out" at the beginning of the Second Constitutional Period. The piece dealt with the question "what is the homeland?" Atnas, a Greek, calls the people in Greece as his co-religionists but the people in the Ottoman Empire his brothers. He wants to kill the teacher who depicts the state as Turk as opposed to Ottoman. It is also interesting to note that a greeting expression in Greek is denoted as "Ottoman". Atnas became a soldier and died in a battle and his last letter was brought to his

village by the Ottoman soldiers who knew Greek quite well. Atnas calls to Apollon emotionally saying "you won't be able to burn us down as long as there are Ottoman youngsters who die for his homeland like me".[112]

An interesting story is 'Veliahd' (Heir apparent) depicting the heir apparent who visited the battle field in a war against Russia. In this imaginary war Batumi was taken from the Russians who captured it in 1878. The striking think is that the writer made an Armenian and a Greek officer to take Batumi. A Jewish character is not lacking, an officer who catch the Russian pilots up in the air. Ottoman army was portrayed as very powerful and following the latest technical improvements and even making innovations. The officers were inventing simple but useful devices.[113]

In the monolog "The Father of the Bastards" we see familiar topics used repeatedly by Aka Gündüz: a grandfather who left one of his feet in Kars, a husband who died at war. In this Rumelian piece the grandfather insists that the wedding be realized before his son goes to the battlefield to ensure an heir. In time the same village was attacked and the wife raped by men who spoke Slavic. The husband did not come to save her however because "motherland comes first". Instead she became an immigrant and gave birth to a child whose father, according to the author, was "Europe". Though she wanted to kill the baby she couldn't because a Turkish woman couldn't kill an innocent. When the baby died of natural causes however, the women would place the bastard's corpse on the dead body of Europe.[114]

Most of Aka Gündüz's articles in the journal Karagöz before his exile are provocative essays praising war and bloodshed.[115] British Empire and Russia were the targets of his hatred; he grudged even sole English alive and he could not tolerate the breathing of a Russian.[116] He praised Hindenburg by comparing him with Enver Pasha.[117]

Jäschke claims that the idea of saving the brethren abroad was forgotten after the discussion emerging with the article of Yusuf Akçura in 1904. This secret desire only occasionally occurred and he gives the staging of Aka Gündüz's play Muhterem Katil in 1914 as an example.[118]

The journal Donanma announces in October 1914 the staying of a play by Aka Gündüz titled Yarım Türkler (Semi-Turks), which was published later in 1919. Muhterem Katil was published in the capital in 1914 and was performed in Istanbul by the theatre group of the Ottoman Navy Foundation more than twenty times as well as in Izmir[119]. It was introduced as a "national and revolutionary" work. Aka Gündüz himself admits that it was an ornament to excite national feelings not a perfect example of theatre art. He wrote this piece before the declaration of war against Russia but he says that it was not a prophecy but his wish. The main deficiency of the work according to him was the fact that

he could not tear Russia as much as he desired.[120] The theme revolves around the idea of saving the brethren living outside the territories and boundaries of the Ottoman Empire, and thus to incite the Turkish nationalist feelings against Russia. Pan-Turkish sentiments are abundantly present in the work. The main idea of the plot is in almost full accordance with the actions and publications of the author at the time.

After the war when he began to write in newspapers again his main theme was criticizing the Unionists. Because of the courts-martial held in Istanbul in 1919-20 he wrote that the CUP was responsible of all charges and the Armenian forced-deportation was planned by some Unionist leaders like Bahaeddin Shakir. He added that even if they did not do anything wrong they should have taken the blame in order to save the nation.[121] But he did not use the word "Armenian" even once when he was writing on this topic. He blames the Unionists generally for their abuses, oppressive policies against the people as a whole; he did not distinguish non-Muslims.

Conclusion

I tried to reveal the turning points in the career of a Unionist and his transformation, first to an opponent of the CUP and lastly to an accepted and respected, thus a conventional Turkish patriot. Probably his early expulsion from the CUP spared him from the accusation of being a Unionist and he got a chance to get a position in the republic. Aside his articles his literary works shed light on the transformation of Turkey.

Aka Gündüz's unsophisticated novels and short stories were immensely popular in the 20s and early 30s. These works treated sentimental and tragic themes among ordinary people with a certain element of realism. In his famous novel Dikmen Yıldızı Aka Gündüz says that may be the future generations would find his metaphors, comparisons, paragrams and style strange, bizarre or even ridiculous but he was excited by the future generations. His characters in the novel were the parents of the coming generations, they are your past Aka Gündüz adds and asks them not to know his past.[122] And that was what happened.

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19 BOA İ..DH.. 1477 / 1327/N-23, 17 N 1327 [02.10.1909]. He was appointed first as the deputy governor (BOA İ..DH.. 1476 / 1327/B-40, 15 B 1327 [02.08.1909]) He worked there until he was appointed to Baghdad in June 1911. (BOA İ..DH.. 1487 / 1329/C-18, 16 C 1329 [14.06.1911])

20 A. E. Yalman, Yakın Tarihte Gördüklerim ve Geçirdiklerim, vol. 1 (1888-1918) (İstanbul, 1970), p. 104.

21 A. C. Yöntem, 'Devirlerden Hatıralar', Yakın Tarihimiz, vol. 1, no. 1, March 1, 1962, p. 4.

22 H.-L. Kieser, Türklüğe İhtida 1870-1939 İsviçre'sinde Yeni Türkiye'nin Öncüleri (İstanbul: İletişim, 2008), pp. 109-110.

23 BOA MF.MKT 1163 / 79, 4 Za 1328 [7 November 1910]

24 BOA MF.MKT 1165 / 39, 8 M 1329 [10 January 1911]

25 F. Çoker, Türk Parlamento Tarihi. TBMM – IV. Dönem 1931-1935. IV. Dönem Milletvekillerinin Özgeçmişleri. Vol. II (Ankara: TBMM Vakfı, 1966), p. 35.

26 Mehmet Ubeydullah Hatipoğlu (1858-1937), he was a Unionist deputy, writer, traveler and also a religious figure. Ö. H. Özalp, Ulemadan Bir Jöntürk: Mehmed Ubeydullah Efendi (İstanbul: Dergâh Yayınları, 2005).

27 Sadrettin, Sevdiklerimiz, p. 46.

28 Aka Gündüz, 'Gazetecinin tek korkusu Suitefehhüm. Suitefehhümle pişen yoğurtlu kebabın hikâyesi', Yedigün, 25 Nisan 1939, no. 320, p. 11.

29 F. R. Atay, Batış Yılları (İstanbul: Dünya Yayınları:7, 1963), p. 43.

30 T. Alangu, Ömer Seyfeddin / Ülkücü Bir Yazarın Romanı (İstanbul: May yayınları, 1968), p. 179.

31 Genç Kalemler, vol. 2 no. 12, p. 203.

32 Aka Gündüz, 'Nine ve Oğul: Türk Kalbi'nden', III/4 (16), 16 February 1327 [29 February 1912].
33 Some of his articles in this newspaper: 'Üç Sahne', 3 September 1911; 'Zengin bir gece', 11 September 1911; 'İftirak', 5 September 1911; 'Akif Bey', 6 September 1911 in M. And, Meşrutiyet Döneminde Türk Tiyatrosu (1908-1923) (Ankara, 1971), p. 307.

34 Türk Kalbi (Matbaa-i Hukukiye, 1327): 1. Türk Kalbi (pp. 3-12); 2. Ultimatom – 8 eylül 1327 [21 Eylül 1911] (pp. 13-17); 3. Haber.. (pp. 18-23); 4. Trablusgarb (pp. 24-28); 5. Bombardıman (pp. 29-39); 6. Cennet Kapısı (pp. 40-46), p. 4); 7. Şukka-i Senâveri (p. 47-57); 8. İki bayram (pp. 58-63); 9. Kayıkçı (pp. 64-77); 10. Ukkaş bin Mansur (pp. 78-86); 11. Ali Fizani (pp. 87-94); 12. Burak Reis (pp. 95-107); 13. Veliahd (pp. 108-131); 14. Atnaş'ın üç günü (pp. 132-155); 15. Yumurcak (pp. 156-166); 16. Mahkemede (pp. 167-177); 17. En büyük cinayet (pp. 178-).

35 Aka Gündüz, 'Hafız Efendinin mebusluk hikâyesi', Hayattan Hikâyeler (Istanbul: İkdam, 1928), p. 90.

36 "Bir program ki efradını da cami ağyarını da" in ibid. p. 97.

37 ibid, pp. 89-105.

38 İ. Hakkı Sunata, İstibdattan Meşrutiyete Çocukluktan Gençliğe (İstanbul: İş Bankası, 2006), p. 353 and Mevlanzâde Rıfat, Türkiye İnkılabının İçyüzü (İstanbul: Pınar Yayınları, 2000), p. 51.

39 K. N., 'İzmir Seyahati', Türk Yurdu, vol. IV, no. 45 (25 July 1329/7 August 1913), p. 388.

40 Kâzım Nâmi, 'İzmir Seyahati – 3', Türk Yurdu, vol. III, no. 54, p. 109.

41 Oktay, "Aka Gündüz'ün Hayatı, Sanatı ve Eserleri", p. 40 quoting A. B. Kuran , Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda İnkılâp Hareketleri ve Millî Mücadele (İstanbul: Çeltüt Matbaası, 1959), pp. 569-570.

42 'Benim Gördüğüm Bab-ı Âli Baskını', Yakın Tarihimiz, vol. I, no. 7, April 12, 1962, pp. 193-194.

43 Rıfat, Türkiye İnkılabının İçyüzü, p. 51.

44 Y. Aktar, İkinci Meşrutiyet Dönemi Ögrenci Olayları (1908-1918) (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1990), pp. 88-96. The testimony of Aka Gündüz is included.

45 'Ah!...', Türkün Kitabı, p. 229.

46 Oktay, "Aka Gündüz'ün Hayatı, Sanatı ve Eserleri", p. 40 quoting Aka Gündüz, 'Rahmetli Velid Ebuzziya', Gece Postası, 22. 01. 1947.

47 'Arrest of Committee Leaders', The Times, 18 November, 1912.

48 G. Hagen, 'German Heralds of Holy War: orientalists and Applied Oriental Studies', Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, 24.2 (2004), p. 146.

49 M. Hartmann, Dichter der neuen Orient (Berlin 1919), pp.

50 D. K. Mutlu, 'The Russian Monument at Ayastefanos (San Stefano): Between Defeat and Revenge, Remembering and Forgetting', Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 43, no. 1, January 2007, pp. 75-86.

51 T. Heinzelmann, Die Balkankrise in der osmanischen Karikatur: die Satirezeitschriften Karagöz, Kalem und Cem 1908-1914 (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1999), pp. 65-66. Max Rudolf Kaufmann gives the translation of this article in his book Pera und Stambul (Weimar 1915), pp. 220-223.

52 'En son haberler. Dün akşamki hadise', İkdam, no. 6371, 26 Zihicce 1332, 15 Teşrinisani 1914 and 'Dünki vakıa', Tanin, no. 2119, 26 Zilhicce 1332, 2 Teşrinisani 1330, 15 Teşrinisani 1914, p. 6.

53 'Tokatlıyan hadisesi hakkında', İkdam, no. 6372 26 Zilhicce 1332, 3 Teşrinisani 1330, 16 Teşrinisani 1914.

54 'Tezahürat-ı milliye', Donanma, vol. 5, no. 20, 16 Teşrinisani 1914 [November 16, 1914], p. 310.

55 Büyükelçi Morgenthau'nun Öyküsü (trans. by Atilla Tuygan) (Istanbul: Belge, 2005), pp. 134-135. Liman van Sanders relates the events as organized public reaction, according to him in these national demonstrations crowds organized by the police walked around the streets and after the visit of the allied embassies such attacks occurred. He also points out that such demonstrations were noticed in Germany. Liman von Sanders, Türkiye'de Beş Sene (İstanbul, Yeditepe, 2007), p. 57.

56 BOA DH.ŞFR 49 / 74, 3 Ra 1333 [19 January 1915].

57 BOA DH.ŞFR 48 / 296, 19 Ş 1333 [2 July 1915].

58 DH.ŞFR 458/78, 7 Ks 1330 [20 January 1915].

59 Gündüz, Hayattan Hikâyeler, p. 5.

60 İbid. p. 4.

61 DH.ŞFR 498/71, 9 Ts 1331 [22 November 1915]

62 Aka Gündüz, 'Affedersiniz Efendiler, Bir Şey Söyleyecegim', Alemdar, 5 February 1335 /1919, No:53-1363, p.1

63 DH.ŞFR 508/27, 24 Ks 1331 [6 February 1916]

64 DH.ŞFR 507/75, 18 Ks 1331 [31 January 1916]

65 BOA DH.ŞFR 60 / 220, 28 Ra 1334 [3 February 1916].

66 DH.ŞFR 508/27, 24 Ks 1331 [6 February 1916]

67 For example a certain Gipsy Ibrahim was deported to Adana after the Minister of the Navy, Cemal wrote to Minister of the Interior Affairs Talat informing him that he was attacking Talat and Enver and claiming that the party was divided into two. BOA DH.ŞFR 492 / 105, 26 Ey 1331 [9 Oktober 1915].

68 Aka Gündüz, 'Affedersiniz Efendiler, Bir Şey Söyleyecegim', Alemdar, 5 February 1335 /1919, No:53-1363, p.1 in A. Ersaydı, "Alemdar Gazetesi'ne Göre Mütareke Dönemi Başlarında İttihatçılar ve İttihatçılık" (MA Thesis, Gazi, 2007).

69 Gündüz, Hayattan Hikâyeler, p. 51.

70 İbid., p. 71.

71 Hartmann, Dichter der neuen Orient, p. 112.

72 M. Ragıp, İttihat ve Terakki Tarihinde Esrar Perdesi. Yakup Cemil Niçin ve Nasıl Öldürüldü? (İstanbul: Örgün, 2004), 2nd ed.

73 S. N. Tansu, İttihâd ve Terakki İçinde Dönenler (İstanbul, Yeni Zamanlar, 2003), p. 506.

74 Ragıp, İttihat ve Terakki Tarihinde Esrar Perdesi, p. 741.

75 A. Gündüz, "Affedersiniz Efendiler, Bir Şey Söyleyecegim", Alemdar, 5 February 1335 /1919, No:53-1363, p. 1

76 Aka Gündüz, "Affedersiniz Beyler, Bir Şey Rica Edecegim", Alemdar, 12 March, 1335 /1919, No: 81-1391, p.1

77 BOA DH.EUM.MH 190 / 129, 15 Ş 1337 [15 May 1919].

78 Gündüz, Hayattan Hikâyeler, p. 3.

79 BOA DH.ŞFR 83 / 63, 25 Ra 1336 [9 Jabuary 1918].

80 BOA DH.ŞFR 89 / 5, 22 N 1336 [1 July 1918] ve DH.KMS 44-2 / 54, 22 N 1336.

81 M. Ş. Bleda, İmparatorluğun Çöküşü (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1979), p. 86.

82 A. C. Yöntem, 'Benim Bildiğim Talât Paşa', Yakın Tarihimiz, vol. 1, no. 6, April 5, 1962, p. 162.

83 The title of the series was 'unholy tripod': "Mel'ûn Sehpâ İttihad ve Terakkinin ervâh-ı selâse-i habîsesi", Alemdar, 13 February 1335/1919, no. 1365, p. 1; 14 February 1335/1919, no. 1366, p. 1; 15 February 1335/1919, no. 57/1367, p. 1; 17 February 1335/1919, no. 59/1369, p. 2; 18 February 1335/1919, no. 60/1370, p. 1; 19 February 1335/1919, no. 61/1371, p. 1; 20 February 1335/1919, no. 62/1372, p. 1.

84 K. İ. Gürkan, Darülfünun Grevi (Harman Yay., 1971).

85 Peyam-ı Sabah, no. 1207, 13April, 1922.

86 BOA HR.İM 41 / 71, 18.10.1923.
87 BOA HR.İM 240 / 124, 26.5.1924.

88 Aka Gündüz, 'Geçmiş zaman olur ki, hayali iki para bile etmez: Eski Devirlere Bir Bakış', Modern Türkiye Mecmuası, no. 22, Temmuz 1938, p. 23.

89 A. Nesimi, Türkiye Komünist Partisi'nde Anılar ve Değerlendirmeler 1909-1949 (İstanbul: Nöbetçi Yayınevi, 2009), p. 29.

90 Enis Avni, 'Aşk ve İstibdad' (piyes), Kadın, no 16, 26 Kanunusani 1324, p.16.

91 "Osmanlılar ve Terakki ve İttihad Cemiyeti", Bağçe, p. 12.

92 'The Ottoman Navy', The Times, issue 40424, 19 Jan, 1914, p. 7.

93 A. Gündüz, Gazi Muhtar Paşa Hazretlerine açık mektub. Zenginler Cedveli: 1 (Istanbul, 1332), 14 p.

94 A. Gündüz, Ebu Hatırat Said Paşa Hazretlerine açık mektub. Zenginler Cedveli: 2. (Istanbul, 1332), 13 p.

95 A. Gündüz, Katırcıoğlu. Avcı Sultan Mehmet Devrinde 1508-1509 (İstanbul: Cem'i Kütüphanesi, Sada-yı Millet mat., 1332/1916), 58+2 pp.

96 A. Gündüz, 'Mel'ûn Sehpa. İttihad ve Terakkinin ervah-ı selase-i habisesi-5', Alemdar, 16 February 1335 /1919, No:61-1371, p.1

97 See Footnote 34.

98 A. Gündüz, Muhterem Katil (Istanbul, 1330/1914).

99 Aka Gündüz, "Piçlerin babası" [the father of the bastards], Donanma, no. 12/60, 8 Eylül 1330 (21 Eylül 1914), p. 183.

100 Hüseyin Rauf Orbay (27 July 1881–16 July 1964). He signed Armistice of Mudros as the Minister of Navy. He later joined the Turkish War of Independence. He became the first Prime Minister of the new Republic of Turkey on 11 August 1922. In 1924 he was one of the founders of the Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkasi (Progressive Republican Party), in opposition to Atatürk's Republican People's Party. When this party was closed in 1925, he went to exile in Europe for 10 years. After the death of Atatürk, he was cleared of all accusations and became a member of the Turkish parliament. During World War II he was the Turkish ambassador in London.

101 'Rauf'a', Türkün Kitabı (Dersaadet: Selanik matbaası, 1329), pp. 163-168.

102 English translation in 1917; in Turkish as Türkler Bu Muharebede Ne Kazanabilirler? Published in 1914.

103 M. Kohen, Türkler bu muharebede ne kazanabilirler? (İstanbul: "Türk Yurdu" kitabhanesi, 1330), p. 50.

104 'Ultimatom – 8 September 1327 [21 September 1911]", Türk Kalbi, pp. 13-17.

105 "Haber.." Türk Kalbi, pp. 18-23.

106 Hartmann, Dichter der neuen Orient, s. 115.

107 Ibid. P. 116.

108 Türkün Kitabı: 1. Barut kokusu (17 Eylül 1327) 2. Üçüncü yüzbaşı (20 Ağustos 1328) 3. Sulh mürekkebi (29 Ağustos 1328) 4. Silah başında (11 Ağustos 1328) 5. Bingazide Enver Beye (valdesi lisanından) (29 Eylül 1328) 6. Ramazan Hoca (23 Eylül 1328, Tanin) 7. Ana mektubu (13 Ağustos 1328) 8. Kırmızı cevap (25 Ağustos 1328) 9. Rüzgârın sırrı (18 Ağustos 1328) 10. İki tarih (8 Eylül 1328) 11. Acu Mehmed (22 Eylül 1328, Tanin) 12. Vatandaş (20 Eylül 1328) 13. "Fatih"e – türbesinde (21 Eylül 1328, Tanin) 14. İlk top – patlarken (29 Eylül 1328, Tanin) 15. "Arab"a (3 Teşrinievvel 1328) 16. Meşhed-i hüdavendigâr (24 Teşrinievvel 1328) 17. Mihrab önünde – Süleymaniyede (30 Eylül 1328) 18. Bozgun (18 Kanunusani 1328) 19. Mahkeme-i kübra (25 Kanunusani 1328) 20. Piç (1 Şubat 1328) 21. Girid'deki bayrağım (2 Şubat 1328) 22. İsyan (26 Şubat 1328) 23. Rauf'a (1 Mart 1329) 24. Sulhun ağzı (6 Mart 1329) 25. Hakikatin hikâyesi 26. Gitmeyiniz! Gitmeyiniz! (25 Kanunusani 1328) 27. Orduya açık mektub (27 Kanunusani 1328) 28. Nerelerdesiniz? Niçün susuyorsunuz – şairlere ve ediblere (31 Kanunusani 1328) 29. Galata (3 Şubat 1328) 30. Büyük padişahıma ariza (5 Şubat 1328) 31. Bir damla zehir daha.. (9 Şubat 1328) 32. Paşa kadını 33. Ah!... – mahbesde.

109 A. Gündüz, 'Fatih"e – türbesinde', Tanin, no. 1460, 12 şevval 1330, 21 Eylül 1328, 4 Teşrinievvel 1912, p. 3.

110 Hartmann, p. 116.

111 'Yumurcak', Türk Kalbi, pp. 156-166.

112 'Atnaş'ın üç günü', Türk Kalbi, pp. 132-155.

113 'Veliahd', Türk Kalbi, pp. 108-131.

114 A. Gündüz, "Piçlerin babası", pp. 183-186.

115 A. Gündüz, 'Hayyalel felâh!!', Karagöz, no. 686; A. Gündüz, 'Hakikatin Sesi..', Karagöz, no. 688.

116 A. Gündüz, 'İngiliz Hançeri??', Karagöz, no. 693.

117 A. Gündüz, 'Hindenburg Paşa', Karagöz, no. 694, 19 Teşrinisani 1330 [2.12.1914].

118 G. Jäschke, "Der Turanismus der Jungtürken. Zur Osmanischen Aussenpolitik im Weltkriege", Die Welt des Islams, Band 23, 1941, p. 7.

119 Ö. F. Huyugüzel, İzmir Fikir ve Sanat Adamları (1850-1950), p. 91.

120 A. Gündüz, Muhterem Katil, p.

121 A. Gündüz, 'Balçık, Ağızda – Güneş, Havada', Alemdar, 2 April, 1335 /1919, No: 102-1412, p.1

122 E. Köroğlu, "Ulusal Tarih Tasarımı ve Popüler Edebiyat: Aka Gündüz Örneği," Journal of Turkish Studies=Türklük Bilgisi Araştırmaları 31/II, Şinasi Tekin Armağanı II 2007, p. 341.

Turkey in Global Art Scene: Dual Narratives in Politics of International Exhibitions After 1980s[1]

Şeyda Barlas Bozkuş[2]

Abstract: This paper aims to analyze Turkish visual culture after the 1980s through international exhibitions. Heritage and contemporary art exhibitions reflect the cosmopolitan vision of modern Turkey in global art scene. Today, these exhibitions convey ideas, ideologies and cultural vision of the state transform representational identity of the country. This study is a review of my Ph.D thesis which was written in Bogazici University Ataturk Institute for Modern Turkish history ask crucial questions on Turkish cultural policy in terms of international exhibition and formation of post-modern visual culture.

Keywords: International Exhibitions, Turkish Cultural Policy, Globalization, Visual Culture

The post 1980's period witnessed a significant cultural transformation in Turkey. This cultural transformation changed the way art was perceived by the intellectuals, the state, the media and the public at large. The change in perception of art can best be reflected in the museums and the practice of art exhibition. This review paper focuses on my Ph.D thesis which has already completed at Boğaziçi University, Ataturk Institute for Modern Turkish History.

Today, art and heritage exhibitions are understood not only as abstract events, but for their cultural context and also for transformation of new ideas. Especially, international exhibitions reflect selected ideological visions and histories renegotiating cultural borders. The thesis is an attempt to sheds light into Turkey's history of cultural heritage and its art displayed in international exhibitions.

Literature on broad art history and literature on cultural studies exist for analyzing the art and cultural heritage exhibitions of the post 1980's

1 Unpublished Ph.D.Thesis, Boğaziçi University, Ataturk Institute for Modern Turkish History, 2011. http://www.ata.boun.edu.tr/dissertations.htm

2 Şeyda Barlas Bozkuş is a Faculty member at the Faculty of Communication of the Marmara University in İstanbul, Turkey

period from various perspectives.[3] However, little has been done to analyze how international exhibitions reflected changing attitudes in representation of art and cultural heritage in Turkey. This study mainly focuses on how the transformation in the era post 1980s was related to not only to the modern governmental cultural policies but also to the effects of globalization on the Turkish society. The overall result of this change created a new public sphere for Turkey's society which representation of its identity in new ways. In the post-1980's, as a result changes in exhibition strategies, mainly two different kinds of exhibition: structural emerged in international arena.

However, little has been done on how international exhibitions reflect the changing attitudes in the representation of art and heritage of Turkey. This study mainly argues that the transformation in the cultural policies in the post-1980s period has been related not only to the modern governmental practices but also to the effect of globalization on Turkish society. The overall result of this change is to create a new public sphere of society and to represent Turkey's identity in new ways. In the post-1980s, as an outcome of change in exhibition strategies, two different kinds of models emerged in Turkey, namely-heritage and contemporary/modern art exhibitions in the international arena.

The dissertation aims to illuminate the ideological and political background of international heritage and contemporary art exhibitions after the 1980s underlining two different narratives. The present study has identified two broad exhibition narratives which represent different characteristics of history, identity, and cultural politics in Turkey and elaborates this discursive duality. It is argued that both heritage and contemporary art exhibitions of post-1980s carry symbols and discourses which focus on Turkish history and an aspiration for a global identity. These dual identity discourses correspond to tendencies in organizing international exhibitions. Heritage exhibitions generally realized by the state funds are directly related with the great importance given to Turkish

3 The following studies can be given as example: Tony Benett. The Birth of the Museum: History, Theory, Politics. London and New York: Routledge, 1995; Emma Barker (ed). Contemporary Cultures of Display. Italy: Open University Press, 1999; Carol. Civilizing Rituals: Inside Public Art Museums. London and New York: Routledge, 1995. Greenberg, Reesa; Bruce W. Ferguson and Sandy Naire (eds), Thinking About Exhibitions. London, New York: Routledge, 1996; Peter H. Hoffenberg, An Empire on Display: English, Indian, and Australian Exhibitions from the Crystal Palace to the Great War. Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of Califarnia Press, 2001; Sharon Mcdonald, The Politics of Display: Museums, Science, Culture. London and New York: Routledge, 1998; Timothy Mitchell, "Orientalism and the Exhibitionary Order," in The Art of Art History: A Critical Anthology, (ed.) Donald Preziosi Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1998; Daniel J. Sherman and Irit Rogoff (eds). Museum Culture: Histories, Discourses and Spectacles. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000.

culture and history in the world civilizations. Contemporary art exhibitions, on the other hand, generally reflect the modern face of the country funded by private entrepreneurs or Turkey´s big bourgeoisie. Due to the sensitive political symbols they carry, Turkish state has, until now, kept at a distance to art works that were exhibited in international contemporary art exhibitions. For this reason, the state concentrated on organizing contemporary art exhibitions that were seen as unpolitical. It is observed in this study that both the state and the private business created the duality in the narrative structure and themes of the exhibitions in the last thirty years by controlling how the image of the country is presented and determining what is accepted as a heritage to be preserved.

In this study, the transformation of the basic notions of modernity in the exhibition space is basically discussed in terms of Turkey´s changing cultural policy and art historiography, through new representation strategies in the body of the international exhibitions. Shifts from a linear narration to the multicultural representations, from state museums to private museums, and from national image to more cosmopolitan one revealed the transformation in Turkey´s international exhibition strategies in the era of globalization.

Post 1980 era is commonly described as a "global period". The term refers to the changing characteristics of politics, economy, in the social and cultural system of the world. Different entities, such as nation-states, multi-national corporations and international organizations, approach the global arena with different resources (like economic and cultural) and seek to set different agendas of their own. In the 2000s, we witnessed the resistance of the "nation state" and the "national cultural traditions" to the negative impacts of globalization. Tourism and museums preserve the memories of an earlier era of national cultures and international exhibitions became showcases for representing national identities.[4]

Especially during this period, with the development of global economic and political institutions, construction of a global culture became necessary. However, it is difficult to construct a genuine global identity and hence a global culture, due to its lack of a homogenous collective identity. In a globalizing world, nations still cultivate their distinctive characteristics by rediscovering their pasts, history, and aesthetic values, seeking to improve their different status and to enlarge their cultural resources, as a stepping stone to be an effective player in the globalization game.[5] In this sense, international cultural heritage exhibitions and art biennials illustrate the

4 Anthony David Smith, "Towards a Global Culture?", in Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalizations and Modernity, (ed.) Mike Feather Stone (London: Sage Publication, 1995), p.176.

5 Ibid., p.188.

values of both cosmopolitanism and of national identity. These exhibitions serve as intermediary mediums through which both global aesthetics and national identities presevere.

Stuart Hall argues that that cultural identities are "far from being eternally fixed in some essentialized past, they are subject to the continual play of history, culture, and power".[6] Globalization in this sense has triggered local cultures within particular social, cultural, and historical context. It actually thrives on this particular tension between local identity and global culture. Thus the opposing themes such as the global versus the local, the international versus the national, and the universal versus the particular are widely promoted.[7] My argument in this dissertation is that studying Turkey's international cultural heritage and art exhibitions will show us transformations in the representation the strategies from a local identity perspective into a partly global one as well as the fact that these exhibitions are constructed on this paradoxical tension between the local and the global approaches.

This work is an attempt to analyze the internationally showcased cultural heritage and modern art exhibitions in the age of globalization. I argued that both international cultural heritage exhibitions and modern art exhibitions carry new political, social, and cultural implications and are closely related with the representation of the Turkish identity and its art history. This work mainly focuses on three major dimensions:

a) changing representation strategies in art and heritage exhibitions as an outcome of globalization,
b) a shift from classical version of Turkish art historiography to a global vision of art as a dialogue of cultures,
c) transformation in cultural policies from a state-centered approach to private sector orientations.

It should be noted that for this topic has not been largely studied and elaborated previously in Turkey. The theoretical framework of this thesis tackles the following issues: the global politics of museums, development of exhibition strategies, cultural heritage management and cultural policies, as well as globalization and privatization of culture.

History of exhibition practices and politics of the museums have been rarely studied in Turkey. There is only a limited number of works which can

6 Stuart Hall, Cultural Identity and Cinematic Representation, Framework, n. 36(1989),p.47, pp.46-49.

7 Roland Robertson, "Glocalization:Time-Space and Homogeneity-Heterrogenity",in Global Modernities, (eds.) Mike Featherstone, Scott Lash and Roland Robertson (London: Sage Publishing,1995), p.33,pp.25-44.

be referenced on the subject in the development of art exhibitions, museums, and festivals which provide detailed information and theoretical discussions.[8]

The main reason for this vacuum is that the history of contemporary exhibition practices is quite new for Turkey. Other thesis written at the fine arts faculties rely mostly on the survey of modern and contemporary art exhibitions based on newspaper articles and periodical researches, without offering any critical or theoretical discussion of the exhibitions. The primary sources of this study are exhibition catalogues, press conference documents, and media analyses. Additionally, online sources of Turkish and foreign press news and art critiques are an indispensable resources of my research.

In the field of cultural studies, visual culture as a sub-discipline in Turkey is an area needing research. The present thesis can be considered as a bridge between cultural studies and Turkish art history. The study tries to fill a gap in the field of museum studies and visual culture in the context of cultural and art history of Turkey. For an analysis of the development of exhibition presentation techniques in Turkey during the post 1980 years, the study analyzes the far and wide travelling heritage exhibitions organized by the Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which travelled widely around the world. The international modern art exhibitions in which Turkey participates in, for instance Venice Biennial the nationally displayed group exhibitions organized by the official funds or private cultural foundations have also been examined. However, individual gallery exhibitions are not included in this work since 1980's, due to lack of primary sources.

From 1980's onwards, national self-promotion of Turkish identity will be evaluated in both contemporary art and traditional art exhibitions observed

8 The following studies can be given an example: Wendy M.K. Shaw, Osmanlı Müzeciliği: Müzeler, Arkeoloji ve Tarihin Görselleşmesi. Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004; Mehmet Üstünipek, Tanzimattan Cumhuriyete Çağdaş Türk Sanatında Sergileri 1850-1950. Istanbul: Artes Yayıncılık, 2007;Sibel Yardımcı, Kentsel Değişim ve Festivalizm: Küreselleşen İstanbul'da Bienal. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2006; Deniz Göktürk, Levent Soysal, İpek Türeli, Orientalizing Istanbul: Cultural Capital of Europe, Routledge: London and New York, 2010; Ayla Ödekan, Cumhuriyetin Renkleri, Biçimleri. Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı, 1999; Filiz Yenişehirlioğlu, The Republican Ethic and the Family Album: Collecting and Art Historical Research in Turkey,1923-1950 ; Filiz Yenişehirlioğlu, Discovering Islamic Art: Collections and Collector,182-193. London: I.B. Taurus, 2000; Filiz Yenişehirlioğlu "Tarih,Tarihsellik,Tarihselcilik ve Kültürel Tüketim," in Bilanço: 1923-1998, , Istanbul :Türkiye Toplumsal ve Ekonomik Tarih Vakfı veTUBA Yayınları, 1998; Filiz Yenişehirliğlu, "Decontextualising and Recontextualising Ottoman Cultural Heritage in Post-Ottoman Nation States ", in Heritage, Multi-Culturalism and Tourism, vol.I,119-142. Istanbul: Bogaziçi University Press, 1999.

in large scale. It should be noticed that interpreting the nationally framed exhibitions with a historical perspective, not only as a reflection of social memory but also from other perspectives , provides us an array of new meanings in order to decipher the diplomacy of international exhibitions, ways of cultural exchange and post-modernist discourse in contemporary art scene.

The title of this dissertation reflects the dual nature of the ways in which Turkish identity is presented through art in the post 1980›s. Mainly two different kinds of narrative structure are seen in Turkey's representation in the international art scene. First is the cultural heritage exhibitions mainly concerned with the presentation of identities, histories and stories. Cultural heritage exhibitions are often perceived and analyzed in terms of their value as commodity and the identification of local/national history for the 'tourist gaze'. Cultural heritage exhibitions organized in Turkey are basically on archeology, history and ethnography. These organizations have been mainly organized by the political support of the Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism and the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, due to lack of sufficient financial support of the state institutions, private sector and foreign states which hosted the exhibitions also provide funds for realization of these cultural events. By the end of the 1990›s, the private sector in Turkey has also initiated cultural heritage exhibitions at international scale to widen the borders of advertising and promoting their images.

A second type of cultural narrative structure analyzed in this study is related to international contemporary art exhibitions that Turkish artists participated in after the 1980›s. Although the state institutions rarely supported contemporary art in and outside Turkey, Turkish private sector interests are concentrated very much in this field from the start with an aim to promote the modern face of the country. Contemporary art works at international exhibitions mostly include political messages that can visualize problems in socio-cultural identity.

This study is an attempt of rethinking Turkey's the international exhibition policies in the post 1980›s, through examining heritage and contemporary art events. In order to understand the complex mechanisms of representation at international exhibitions during this period, history of museums and exhibitions in Turkey needs to be understood. Writing the history of modern exhibitions, which were directly affected by neoliberal transformation of the post 1980›s, in fact, is an attempt for rethinking Turkey's globalization from a new perspective. The question of this study is: How Turkey's image and its national identity are transformed at the international exhibitions in the present global world?

Tony Benett states that the focus on relations between museums, fairs and exhibitions is meant to serve as a 'device' for understanding the broader political and cultural context in history.[9] Due to that, post modern exhibitions mostly highlight conveying ideas, forms, and aesthetic values of the people, national identities and symbols through different societies.

From Foucald's perspective, the issue of representation constructs for the visitor a way of seeing in which power and knowledge are realized and embodied in a particular place. As Foucault argued, power and knowledge are thoroughly mutually intertwined; power is involved in the construction of truths, and knowledge has implications for power. This power is also engaged in displaying strategies. Institutionally embedded values of government are also target forms of thought and conduct for extended populations, which is implemented through the social body forms, techniques, and regimes of culture. The production, distribution and consumption of knowledge are always political in this sense. The knowledge involved in exhibition-making process is a form of what Foucault calls "governmentality" explained as the 'instrument of government instead of being laws, now come to be a range of multiform tactics.[10] The functions of the museum and the exhibition are understood as some part of these tactics. Hence, Foucault categorizes the museum and exhibitions as a disciplinary tool for the modern society, using such channels as time-space, destination and narration.

The development of governmental culture in the Foucauldian sense, lays not only in political statement, but also in minor details such as in architecture of buildings, symbols, order of the materials. Exhibition spaces are particular forms of representation related with the distribution of power, actual audience and content of the exhibition.[11] According to Bennett, the exhibitionary complex provides a context for the permanent display of power - knowledge. Display of power or the so called "rhetoric of power" is defined as an ability to organize and co-ordinate an order of things to produce place for the people in relation to that order.[12] The space of representation can be summarized as "showing" and "telling" things, constituting a new arrangement of scientific disciplines: history, art, archeology, geology and anthropology. The historical exhibits are a result of the combination of these disciplines and various ideological practices which reproduced versions of the past. The rest of this chapter will focus on how exhibitionary forms and techniques enable a certain kind of reading of international exhibitions. This chapter will also illuminate the 19th and 20th century history of world art exhibitions. Using a comparative perspective, a

9 Tony Bennett, The Birth of the Museum, p.6.

10 Bennett, p.38.

11 Ibid. p.40.

12 Bennett, p.67.

history of the birth of the cultural heritage exhibitions, biennials, blockbuster exhibitions will be discussed to shed light on the development of exhibition practices in the world.

The transformation of Turkish museums and emergence of cultural centers after the post 1980's is also investigated. Chapter three will shed light into the privatization of the art sphere by the bourgeoisie and the changing social/ cultural role of exhibitions, educating the public through the ideology of the dominant class. This way, modern art and culture exhibitions held at museums, galleries, and culture centers are claimed to be civilized agencies of the country but they are actually instrumentalized by corporations, and the elites of the city and state authorities. At this point, the analysis of Bourdieu about the forms of capital is indicating how the bourgeoisie strengthened its power in the cultural sphere after 1980's needs to be stressed. Bourdieu claims that "economic capital serves as a basis of other types of capital. The economic capital is the core of the cultural capital which is a form of knowledge, an internalized code or a cognitive acquisition which equips the social agent with empathy towards appreciation for or competence in deciphering cultural relations and cultural artifacts."[13] Di Maggio influenced from Bourdieu's theory of cultural capital, argues that the newly emerging class produced a model of "the cultural manager capitalist" who use the resources of their corporations to raise their prestige in the society.[14]

In other words, they involve their corporation in the cultural world in order to strengthen their positions in social life. By this way, art under the hegemony of the commercial sponsors functions through power and status relations. The costs of blockbuster exhibitions are so high that museums, especially in Britain and USA, have become increasingly reliant on commercial sponsorship. Therefore, this study will analyze international art and culture exhibitions in Turkey as part of formation of a bourgeois public sphere in the last twenty five years. The corporations and social elites support particular types of art events through their institutions, and legitimize and reproduce the dominant taste through addressing the public. As a result, bourgeois public sphere dominates the art taste and determines the ways in which exhibitions represent Turkey's cultures in a global world.

In this connection, the function and position of the private museums in international exhibitions will be also elaborated. My second task in the third chapter is to evaluate the ways in which the bourgeoisie dominates

13 Pierre Bourdie, The Field of Cultural Production: Essay on Art and Literature (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993), p.7.

14 Chin-ta Wu, Kültür Endüstrisi ve Kültür Yönetimi (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2007), p.26-28.

the public art and raise the question if there is a division between the state and the private art spheres. If a division really exists, I will try to find how the patronage relations of the arts can change according to the types of exhibitions-contemporary art, history or ethnography.

The rise of cultural heritage exhibitions and the transformations in Turkish art history literature is discussed, since this study observes that there is a growing tendency to display Anatolian, Turkish and Ottoman history at blockbuster exhibitions in the post 1980's, held both in Turkey and overseas.

It can be argued that state centered cultural heritage exhibitions exemplified the development of a new governmental relation to culture in the works of high culture. Sharon Mc Donald emphasizes that political nature and consequences of representation of art and culture are productive arenas in which to investigate questions of cultural production and knowledge.[15] In global world, the grounds of the growth of the importance of culture are embedded in the socio-cultural practices of neo-liberalism and intensified globalization.

The 1980›s mark a turning point in the world in this sense. Culture was discovered as a platform by which people could be involved as an alternative to political engagement. This dissertation focuses on this period and asks how dual narratives were formed and under which circumstances the transformation of the image of Turkish culture is perceived in the post 1980›s. The main problematic issue in this study is how to reveal the ways in which dual narratives play an important role in international cultural heritage and contemporary art exhibitions. While one narrative emphasizes national/ ancient heritage, the other dwells on global culture and intercultural dialogue.

Chapter four is focus on the collections showcased in international cultural heritage exhibitions. These range from archeological-pre-historical objects, to Islamic collections, to Turco-Ottoman collections, and to Anatolian ethnographical objects. Starting from the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923 until the mid 1990›s, the state had almost complete hegemony over the museum and exhibition practices, since history and culture were seen as areas that determined Turkey's image abroad. Indeed, the power of the state in the construction of nation's past and the project of modernity which are embodied at exhibitions and national heritage sites go hand in hand with the dominant historical discourses and ideological and social affiliations. Redefining or reproducing the past, cultural heritage exhibitions are 'memory

15 Sharon Mcdonald, The Politics of Display: Museums, Science, Culture (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), p.3.

sites' of the nation, and assume a great role in art historiography.

In the early republican era, the Turkish history thesis and the 'break discourse' in Turkish historiography had a great impact on the ideological framework of the exhibitions, so the primary concern of this chapter is to analyze the transformation in the strategies of cultural heritage exhibitions. Chapter four is intended as a discussion of art history literature; it also gives critical information about the transformation of the national identity and the tension between Orientalism and self-orientalism. Basic questions will be asked: what are the strategies of cultural heritage exhibitions? Is there a shift in art historiography through analyzing the cultural heritage exhibitions? How did the private sector organize and support for the cultural heritage exhibitions after the 1990's? What are the expectations of foreign audiences from the Turkish exhibitions? Is there an outside pressure to show orientalist attitudes as the image of Ottoman history exhibitions? Why did Turkish curators partly prefer self -orientalization? Under the light of these questions, this chapter will display exhibition strategies and institutionally embedded relations of the state and private sector at the international cultural heritage exhibitions.

The second type of the international exhibition that the dissertation is concerned with are biennials and art festivals: neo-liberal policies and a booming art market in the 1980s which meant that the international exhibition system became increasingly interested in contemporary art and commercial values of art objects. Several of the large international biennials such as Sao-Paulo, Sidney, Kwangju, Cairo and the oldest ones Venice and Documenta Kassel have considerable impact on the art market and artists' reputation. Biennials are not only involving artists in a competition, but also introducing visible parameters for cultural change. For many years, the Venice Biennial and Documenta have drawn a fixed and selective map of the art world, with national pavilions in which each country exhibits its own artist and promotes its contemporary art in a global scene. However, in 1990›s, international exhibitions came to function to demonstrate the boundaries between the global and the local cultures. The influential role played by curators who select themes and artists for international exhibitions, has highlighted the issue of representation of nations upholding national, sub-cultural, international, gender-race specific, regional identities.

"Putting Istanbul on the map of the art world" became one of the aims of local administrations, private sector foundations and the Turkish governments after the 1980›s. Considering the new meanings and images of Istanbul among the world cities, it has been discussed how the city's culture integrated in the global system through art. Sociologist Sibel Yardımcı argues that Istanbul Biennial is a chance to create a brilliant city image and the city of Istanbul acts itself as a commodity in international market economy.

[16]Considered as one of the most prestigious biennials alongside Venice, Sao Paulo and Sydney, the International Istanbul Biennial was hoped to become a landmark for global art scene and to compete with them. The curators (mostly foreigners) and directors of the biennials, who are selected by the IKSV committee, have generally developed conceptual frameworks reflecting urban problems, globalization, and multiculturalism and….so on. The themes of the Istanbul Biennial reproduce and recode the dilemma of Turkey's identity between the East and the West. How Istanbul has historically been recreated through orientalism and multiculturalism in the discourse of the Biennial is be questioned. The way in which foreign curators engaged in post modern strategies in ideological framework of International Istanbul Biennial will also be analyzed.

In addition to the Istanbul Biennial, "Istanbul 2010: Cultural Capital of Europe" project was realized as a result of long lasting efforts of Turkish volunteer committees to introduce cultural heritage as well as the modern face of the city. The reason behind this project is that the city of Istanbul was aspired to be categorized in the group of Europe's global cities as Berlin, London, Paris and hoped this title would impact the city's international image, particularly in tourism. The strategy, was planned with the aim to attract first-class wealthy tourists to the city. Within this framework, Chapter 5 is present Istanbul Biennial and Istanbul 2010: Cultural Capital of Europe events as outcomes of changing vision of Turkish cultural policy. The question 'which apparatus was used to promote the cultural image of the city in visual arts?' is asked. In fact, Istanbul 2010: Cultural Capital of Europe was primarily concerned with use of culture for urban marketing and tourist promotion. Its program contained panel discussions, conferences, workshops organized with the scope of discovering the beauty of the city, and developing cultural tourism. Establishing new museums or renovating museums in this context should be seen as attempts to develop the infrastructure of cultural heritage and museums rather than radical changes attitudes vis-a-vis art and culture.

Chapter six is tackle with Turkish artists' participation in contemporary art exhibitions, which is one of the most used channels for interaction with European art. Due to the scope of this dissertation, only international group organizations organized by museums, cultural foundations and the Turkish Ministry of Culture, and the participation of Turkey in the International Venice Biennial were studied. The cultural strategies observed in group exhibitions helped me to analyze the changes in representations of cultural identity. The following set of questions are asked: What sorts of objects and art works

16 Sibel Yardımcı, Küreselleşen İstanbul'da Bienal: Kentsel Değişim ve Festivalizm, (İstanbul:İletişim Yayınları, 2005), p.70,71.

are represented at international exhibitions? For whose gaze were these constructed images presented? Through whose eye have they been filtered before being exhibited? How have the artists from Turkey been presented and evaluated abroad? Why did the curator use certain representational forms and strategies and how did the representational strategies transform at the international exhibitions compared to the 1980's? The selection of group contemporary art exhibitions in terms of its displaying strategies make it possible to realize the inner organic relations between global and local as well as changing themes and concepts in Turkish contemporary art.

In the last chapter, multi-component political agendas in internationally framed exhibitions as a form of cultural diplomacy are studied. This is almost a kind of propagandist deployment of art exhibition. By controlling how the image of the country is viewed or by determining what is preserved, cultural representations are used to produce national icons constructed by specific political eras. Whose version of the national culture is being exhibited? What is not shown and why? As Wallis argues - in order to use cultural artifacts for public relation purposes, it is necessary to select and juxtapose artworks in such a way that they should focus and enhance the national image for foreign consumption. In other words it has designed to "sell" the nations image in the Western World.[17] These are self promoting exhibitions displaying an exotic world, carrying a form of propaganda that serves as a bridge between the third world nations and the first world audiences. Especially, after the 1980's, the blockbuster exhibitions have become a significant phenomenon due to their influence. The exhibition serves to educate and entertain the public while bringing prestige and profit to the host institution. With the rise of neo-liberal tendencies, the corporations led by families became especially more involved in the arts and culture through their cultural institutions and sponsorship.

For the sponsors who promote the name of their businesses as a product to be 'sold', exhibitions offer valuable marketing opportunities. The main concern is publicity rather than direct artistic issues and such companies are primarily interested in sponsoring a potential blockbuster to raise their symbolic existence in the cultural field. However, such exhibitions tend to display a very narrow range of objects and themes, usually chosen by the sponsors. The business sponsors' demands may take precedence over the host institution's own goals. This kind of commercial sponsorship can restrict museums to stage only the most popular kinds of exhibitions. The popularity

17 Brian Wallis, "Selling Nations: International Exhibitions and Cultural Diplomacy", in Museum Culture: Histories, Discourses, Spectacles, Daniel Sherman and Irit Rogoff (ed.), (Minneapolis:University of Minnesota Press, 2000), p.269.

might become a form of censorship for other groups of art works today.[18] In line with this perspective, I briefly mention the relationship between art and economy analyzing commercial sponsorship in the line promotion of Biennials and blockbuster exhibitions in the case of Turkish.

In post 1980's, the structural transformation in museums and exhibitions around the world, directly affected the representation of identity in Turkish cultural policy. This transformation had a mutual characteristic in itself. When the political, social, and cultural spheres transformed contemporary art and cultural heritage exhibitions, the image of Turkish culture and art were also affected by this change. In order to comprehend the main characteristics of the duality in narrative structure of international exhibitions, the interaction between the globalization and representation of national culture is analyzed in relation to the international exhibitions of the period.

Museum and exhibitions provides settings for works of culture and they also function as a social program aimed at reshaping general forms of social behavior. The displaying of cultural forms and practices within exhibitions utilize objects for the culture. Discussing representation of culture in the last decades, means focusing on museums, fairs, and exhibitions gave us the notion of visual history.

For the analysis of the international art and cultural heritage exhibitions in the post 1980's, I scrutinize the international exhibitions organized and supported by the Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, European and American cultural institutions, national cultural foundations and and private museums in Turkey. These exhibitions which were organized outside Turkey made it possible to analyze the cultural identity of the country in the global art scene. For this reason, I specified my research mainly to two areas: international Turkish cultural heritage and contemporary art exhibitions abroad.

I would like to note that for this kind of analysis on Turkey, it is difficult to find sufficient theoretical or empirical work. Not in the least, because this is a sensitive issue for those involved or because some curators are not willing to share their data or their documents. For example, I wanted to access to the archives of the director of Sakıp Sabancı Museum, Dr. Nazan Ölçer; the coordinator of the visual arts department of İstanbul 2010: European Capital of Culture Project, Beral Madra; and art historian Prof. Nurhan Atasoy and wished conduct interviews with them, but none of them accepted. Başak Şenova and Genco Gülan gave international exhibition catalogues

18 Emma Barker, p.131-132.

and documents on contemporary Turkish arts. For this reason, I was unable to support my arguments with interviews. Especially as primary sources, I used the interviews of the curators and artists which were published in newspapers, art magazines and journals. My research should be deepened and developed by heritage and contemporary arts catalogues due to the scope of the dissertation. Mrs.Nilüfer Ertan, the head of Foreign Relations and Cultural Activities department helped me to reach a limited number of specific information and dates about international cultural heritage exhibitions.

However, I could not access to the archives of the General Directorate of Museums and Cultural Heritage; whose library includes a number of exhibition catalogues which give limited details of international exhibitions. In addition to this interview, I met Nazan Çimilli and Ömür Tufan the ceramic section of Topkapı Palace. In the 1990's, every year Turkey has sent two or three exhibitions abroad. However starting from 2000, the number of exhibitions raised eight or nine creating certain risks factors for the historical objects. For example, Quran pages can be harmed due to changes in humidity level that lead to the destruction of old papers. Up until now, Turkey has organized nearly hundred exhibitions outside Turkey that were sent to thirty different countries. Turkey sent art and historical exhibitions mostly to Germany, Japan, USA, Spain, Italy, Malaysia, Holland and France.[19]

Most of the exhibitions catalogs are not available at the library and archive of The Directorate of Cultural Heritage and Museum. During my research, some of them could be found in Istanbul Archeology Museum, Topkapı Palace Museum and Turkish-Islamic Art Museum libraries.

The contemporary exhibition catalogues and newspaper archives which were the primary source of the thesis gathered from art historian/editor Zeynep Rona, contemporary art curator and contemporary artists Genco Gülan's private archives, Istanbul Bilgi University Santral Istanbul Contemporary Archive (which is closed now), Bilkent University of Art Archive (can access only to the documents from 1987 to 2005), Garanti Gallery Platform Library and archive (for periodicals only). These private and institutional archives provided me to find first hand sources that were the framework of this dissertation. My secondary sources depended on Western literature in cultural and museum studies since not even one book about modern exhibition theory exists.

19 Canada, Austria, Romania,Hungary, Greece, Israil, Macedonia, Turkmenistan, South Korea, Singapour, Portugal, Qatar, Belgium, Slovenia are other countires to host Turkish art and history exhibitions. Interview notes with Mrs Nilüfer Ertan on April 2, 2009 in Ankara.

As a result, in this study, the transformation of the basic notions of post-modernity in the exhibition space is basically discussed in terms of 1) cultural policy, 2) Turkish art historiography, 3) changing representation strategies in the body of the international exhibitions. The dual narratives were articulated in three different transformations namely: cultural policy, Turkish art history writing, and representation of national identity. Under the effect of globalization, the theme and structure of the Turkish international exhibitions shifted from national to international.

This study aims to show the transformation in the presentation of the cultural identity of Turkey, reconstructed in accordance with the tension between the global and local cultural concerns. The role and status of Turkey within the EU membership process also should be viewed in terms of this overall process. Turkey's new visual representations in international exhibitions are related to the new social, economic, and political formations in which the country finds itself. Being contemporary (i.e, European) and being culturally different (Turkish, Muslim) still seem to be the guiding principles of cultural representation in Turkey.

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