İslâm Araştırmaları Dergisi, Sayı 7, 2002, 97-118

Turks in Germany: Between Inclusion and Exclusion

Talip Küçükcan*

Turks in Germany: Between Inclusion and Exclusion

Labour migration from Turkey to Europe starting in the 1960s, that occurred for predominantly economic reasons, has resulted in the emergence of large Turkish communities across Western Europe. An overwhelming majority of Turkish immigrant workers settled in the countries of destination. Germany has absorbed the largest volume of Turkish workers in Europe, due to its expanding economy that needed a larger workforce. This article examines the position of Turks in Germany and critically evaluates the dominant discourses on the problem of immigration as well as policies adopted towards foreigners in Germany.

'man hat Arbeitscrafte gerufen und es kommen Menschen'
(We called for manpower, but people came instead)

Max Frisch -Swiss play writer-

This article sets out to demonstrate that Turkish workers in Germany are no longer transitory *gastarbeiter* (guestworker) people, but are rather de facto settlers in Germany, despite the dominant official political discourse which constantly reiterates that Germany is not a country of immigration. The parameters of this political discourse are based on an ethnocentric interpretation of citizenship and nationhood in Germany, which emphasises '*volknation*', a cultural nation, and leads to the political exclusion of ethnic minorities. The official construction of immigrants as 'cultural others' and the growing racism and xenophobia in various

* Doç. Dr. Talip Küçükcan, TDV İslâm Araştırmaları Merkezi (İSAM).

© İSAM, İstanbul 2002

sections of society are important obstacles to establishing social harmony. More importantly, depriving the de facto settled immigrant communities from citizenship and political participation contradicts the ideals of a pluralistic democratic socio-political system.

As Habermas[1] rightly observes 'today we live in pluralistic societies that are moving further and further away from a model of a nation-state based on a culturally homogenous population. The diversity of cultural forms of life, ethnic groups, religions and worldviews is constantly growing'. It is important to recognise this reality and to draw new policies that avoid the social, cultural and political exclusion of ethnic minorities. This will not only help ease the social transformation in a globalising world, but will also reduce the tension between different ethnic groups by allowing them to become full and equal members of a political community.

Turkish Immigrants in Germany: From *Gastarbeiter* to Immigrant-Ethnic Community

Germany hosts a larger absolute number of immigrants than any other country in Western Europe today. According to SOPEMI reports, there were more than 5.2 million foreigners living in Germany in 1990, rising to 6.8 million in 1993. By the end of 1997, the Federal Interior Ministry announced that 7.37 million foreigners were living in Germany. This constitutes 9 per cent of the total population. The largest group of foreigners is the Turks, with 2.11 million people.[2]

The number of Turks living in Germany reached 1,856,000 in 1992.[3] Although it has been repeatedly stated by the German authorities during the early phases of immigration and in their aftermath that *'Deutschland ist kein Einwanderungsland'* (Germany is not a country of immigration),[4] by the beginning of the 1980s it had become obvious that the guestworker population was not decreasing as had been hoped by the policy makers. When the guestworker period was meant to have ended

1 Jürgen Habermas, "The European Nation State: On the Past and Future of Citizenship", *Public Culture*, vol. 10, no. 2, 1998, p. 409.

2 *European Forum for Migration Studies Report*, no. 14, Bamberg, 1998, p.14

3 Faruk Şen,"1961 bis 1993: Eine kurze Geschichte der Turken in Deutschland", in *Deutsche Turken; Das Ende der Geduld*, C. Leggewie and Z. Şenocak (ed.), Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1993, p. 17.

4 Roger Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and in Germany*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992, p. 174.

in 1973, with the cessation of labour recruitment (*Anwerbestop*) due to the economic crisis, foreign workers who were not willing to live separated from their families were left with two possibilities. Bade[5] explains these possibilities as; either returning to their home countries without having a chance to come back to Germany later or bringing family members from their home country to Germany. When faced with these two options many of the workers opted for unification with their families not in the home country, but in the country of destination. When many of the foreign workers preferred the second choice, the paradoxical situation of today developed; the guestworker population lives in Germany as a true immigration minority without a true immigration perspective, as Germany still denies being a country of immigration.

In defiance of the official statement that Germany is not a country of *Einwanderungsland*, the propensity to stay in Germany signalled the guestworkers' intention that they were not in Germany to work for a couple years in order to save and then return to their country of origin as had been planned, but were rather there permanently or 'for good', as coined by Castles and his colleagues.[6] Nevertheless despite ongoing discussions of potential reforms, foreigners still have a provisional status in Germany. Terms such as *Gastarbeiter* (guestworker), *ausländische Arbeitnehmer* (foreign employees) or Ausländer (foreigners) all denote the alien character of the migrants. As Mandel[7] notes:

> 'the very term by which these people are commonly referred, "Gastarbeiter", guest workers, underlines the ambiguity of their status. The wide currency of the term strengthens the linguistic leverage exercised against foreigners, for the term itself carries with it specific connotations. For example, guests by definition are temporary, and are expected to return home. Guests are bound to obey the rules and regulations of the hosts. Whatever the intentions, guests rarely feel "at home" in foreign environs. The second half of the compound word "-arbeiter," worker, refers to the economic value of the migrant determined solely in relation to his or her labour- "Arbeistcraft," manpower, as Max Frisch has said.'

Although they are still referred to as guest workers, many of the foreigners do not intend to return to their home country.

---

5 K. J. Bade, "Immigration and Integration in Germany since 1945", *European Review*, vol. 1, no. 1, 1993, p. 75-79.

6 S. Castles, H. Booth, and T. Wallace, *Here For Good, Western Europe's New Ethnic Minorities*, London: Pluto Press, 1984, p. 75.

7 R. Mandel, "Turkish Headscarves and the 'Foreigner Problem': Constructing Difference Through Emblems of Identity", *New German Critique*, 1990, no. 46, p. 28.

A survey result in 1980 found out that more than 40 per cent of the Turks living in Germany wanted to settle down in this country. According to a later study carried out by the Centre for Turkish Studies in Germany, 39.4 per cent of the respondents said that they did not intend to return to Turkey and 21 per cent expressed that they had no intention of going back in less than ten years. These data suggest that at least 60 per cent of those interviewed expressed a clear intention to stay in Germany, either permanently or for a long period of time.[8] In 1992, the number of those who wanted to stay permanently increased to 83 per cent and only 17 per cent of those interviewed expressed their intention to return to Turkey. The establishment of Turkish-owned businesses is yet another indication of permanent settlement. Currently there are more than 40,000 small, medium or large-scale Turkish workplaces, generating jobs for more than 120,000 employees[9].

Permanency and New Directions

The propensity to stay in Germany and its indications added a new dimension to migration studies and forced the policy makers to shift their attention from the predominantly economic concerns and effects of migrant workers both in Germany and in Turkey, to matters of a social and political nature which were not directly related to pragmatic ends. In the early period of post-war labour migration, the analysis of labour migration focused on the relationship between migration and development. The effects of labour migration, such as a favourable impact on wages, profits, investment, growth and price stability in the country of immigration, and its effect on reducing unemployment, the contribution towards the balance of payments through remittances and foreign exchange, the acquisition of technical skills and Western attitudes while abroad were among the issues dealt with by planners, researches and politicians.

Since labour migration was seen as a temporary phenomenon, as reflected by the term 'gastarbeiter', social and cultural issues were not taken to be important matters in formulating migratory policies concerning the foreign workers from Turkey during the early immigration period. When the process of transformation from being a gastarbeiter group to

8 Faruk Şen "Turks in Federal Republic of Germany; Achievements-Problems-Expectations", *Turkish Review Quarterly Digest*, vol. 13, no. 17, 1989, p. 41.

9 Şen, 1993, op.cit., p. 25.

an immigrant-ethnic Turkish community signalled itself in Germany, especially after the introduction of a ban on further immigration in 1973 and a sudden increase in the Turkish population through family union and the high birth rate, the focus of migration studies and policies was changed so as to give more space to and emphasis on social and cultural issues. The process of structural transformation brought several other issues to the fore with regard to the foreign population, arising from their continuing presence in Germany. The emergence of a permanent Turkish-ethnic community (along with other minority nationals) shifted the main focus of the problems from immigration and settlement to cultural differences and conflicts between immigrants and the host society. The new focus generated interest among both academic circles and policy makers on a governmental level; the problem of integration and social harmony between culturally different societies in a nation-state had become an undeniable issue. The Turkish Muslim identity in the early to mid-seventies was construed by the host society as 'traditional', which connotes a conflict with modern German values, thus making it difficult to integrate. At this stage, neither academics nor politicians discussed the issues of accommodating a 'difference' in a civil and democratic society. Turks were constantly described as 'Muslims' and 'traditional' by the media and a fixed identity was imposed upon them, one which clearly indicated their differences from the Germans. Thus, they were pushed to the periphery and to social marginality.

The terminology used to denote workers has undergone a certain degree of modification since the beginning of the organised labour migration. The traditional word for working immigrants was *Fremdarbeiter* (foreign/alien workers), which was replaced by the term *Gastarbeiter* (guestworkers) in 1960. Meanwhile the official term remained as *ausländishe Arbeitnehmer* (foreign employees). In the late 1980s, the terminology became more simplified. Currently the term *Ausländer* (foreigner) is used by nearly everybody. As Thränhardt[10] argues, these terms and the concomitant labelling evoke a connotation which explicitly indicates the 'otherness' of immigrants who were supposed to be temporary residents. The unification of the two Germanys, The Federal Republic of Germany and The German Democratic Republic, raised further cultural

10 D. Thränhardt, "Germany: an undeclared immigration country", *New Community*, vol. 21, no. 1, 1995, p. 19-20.

issues as to the identity, nationhood, Germanness and citizenship of these people. The unification had boundary raising and ethnic marking effects. In Faist's words 'German unification spurred the discourse of cultural difference. Among other things, it raised the issue of collective identity as national identity. In the aftermath of German unification, the rhetoric of national and ethnic identity, 'we' versus 'them', has resurfaced'.[11]

The Fall of Civility and the Rise of Racist Violence

With the unification of the two Germanys, a new phase started in the *gastarbeiter* phenomenon with renewed significance. Since the demolition of the Berlin Wall in 1989 thousands of people from the East entered into the West. This flood into the West German labour market posed a threat to the already fragile position of the Turks and other non-German migrants in Germany. The process of unification also had a weakening effect on the position of foreigners and heightened their feelings of insecurity.[12] As Bade points out, after unification in 1990, there was an increase in aggressive xenophobia and violence against immigrant communities. First in the Eastern and than in the Western parts of the Germany, attacks on foreigners became very overt and foreigners were hunted down in the streets with racist slogans, such as 'foreigners out' and 'Germany for Germans'.[13] Skrypietz notes, for example, that 49 people lost their lives in racist attacks between 21 October 1990 and 25 May 1993. During the initial tide of violent attacks primarily asylum seekers were victimised.[14] It is noted that 2,600 violent criminal offences in 1992 alone were reported as being racially motivated.[15]

Since 1992 such attacks have increasingly been aimed at Turks, the largest group of foreigners living in Germany. Turks became the primary targets for racist attacks as 'the skinhead 'culture' praises the ruthless

11 Thomas Faist, "How to Define a Foreigner? The Symbolic of Migration in German Partisan Discourse", *West European Review*, vol. 17, no. 2, 1994, p. 62.

12 A. Ashkenasi, "The Turkish Minority in Germany and West Berlin", *Immigrants and Minorities*, vol. 9, no. 3, 1990, p. 314.

13 Klaus J. Bade, "Immigration and Social Peace in United Germany", *Daedalus*, Winter Issue, 1994, p. 85.

14 I. Skrypietz, "Militant Right-Wing Extremism in Germany", *German Politics*, vol. 3, no. 1, p. 133.

15 S. Baringhorst, "Symbolic Highlights or Political Enlightenment? Strategies for Fighting Racism in Germany" in *Racism, Ethnicity and Politics in Contemporary Europe*, Alec G. Hargreaves and Jeremy Leaman (eds.), Aldershot: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 1995, p. 225.

mercenary who polices the streets to make them *'turkenfrei'* (free of Turkish people) as the true German hero'.[16] The extent of this racism, which developed a *turkenfrei* Germany discourse, evidently confirms Wallersetin's observations on the nature of racism and xenophobia in the capitalist world economy. Wallerstein[17] argues that racism is not simply a matter of having an attitude of dislike for other groups on the basis of physical or cultural criteria. Racism is more than that, and it seems that the modern world is reproducing its old practice of ejecting the 'barbarians' from the physical centre of society. The old practice was aimed at cleaning society of the 'others' and purifying the environment. Death is the extreme version of ejection, which was revived in Germany as evidenced by the following events. On 21st November 1992, in Mölln, a house where a Turkish family had resided since 1976, was set on fire by extremist gangs. Bahide Arslan (aged 51), Yeliz Arslan (aged 10) and Ayşe Yılmaz (aged 14) lost their lives in the incident.[18] Bade[19] succinctly observes that attacks on foreigners in Germany 'is more than simple hostility toward foreigners and outsiders. It is xenophobic violence originating from a lack of perspective, lack of orientation, and social fear, as well as frustration and aggression.' Of different explanatory models, one of the most important explanations for the causes of 'hostility toward foreigners', 'xenophobia', 'right wing extremism' or 'youth violence' is tied to the continued disorientation of the population about social problems that relate to immigration and integration, as Germany denies emphatically that it has become a country of immigration in a social or cultural sense.

Rise of incivility and aggression continued, and at the end of May 1993 another Turkish family fell victim to a racist arson attack in Sollingen. The reaction of the Turkish community to this violent attack that claimed the lives of five Turkish people was spontaneous. The Turkish community, angered by frequent aggression aimed at its members, filled the streets of Sollingen and demanded protection for themselves and the punishment of the aggressors. The Turkish community was also

16 Skrypietz, op.cit., p. 139.

17 I. Wallerstein, "The Ideological Tensions of Capitalism: Universalism versus Racism and Sexism" in *Race Class and Nation*, Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein , London: Verso, 1991, p. 32-33.

18 *Der Spiegel*, 49/1992, p. 15.

19 Bade, op.cit., 1994, p. 86-87.

supported by some Germans during the marches in condemnation of the tragedy. In many parts of Germany, liberal, secular and religiously oriented Turkish organisations were united and also took action to protest the violence. No matter how tragic the aggression and attack on Turkish Community members in Germany was, this resulted in the arousal of collective behaviour that represented the Turkish Muslim minority in Germany. Diversities and varieties of political and religious orientation were overwhelmed by the common concern and future of the Turkish Community in Germany. Communal reaction that was motivated by a collective consciousness, one can argue, strengthened the ethnic bond among community members. The question of why primarily Turks were chosen as targets was once again raised. Such attacks, in the face of ineffective political actions, played a unifying role among Turkish population in Germany, as evidenced by the co-operation shown between ethnic Turkish and Islamic organisations with regard to the political and legal rights of Turks living in Germany. Although now fewer than in 1992, racist attacks have continued. In 1993, for example, 2,232 and in 1994, 1,489 racist attacks were reported in Germany. However, violent rightwing attacks increased by 25 percent in 1997. Official reports stated that some 11,700 rightwing criminal attacks were reported in 1997, an increase from 8,700 a year earlier.[20] The estimated number of members of militant and extremist organisations to 45,300 in 1996.[21] Regional election results in Saxony-Anhalt in April 1997 also caused considerable concern among foreigners in Germany. The extreme right-wing German People's Party (DVU) took 13 per cent of the vote in this regional election. For the first time since German re-unification, a racist party which openly campaigns against foreigners was elected to regional parliament on 26th April 1997. The DVU's election posters had clear right wing and racist messages such as 'Germany for Germans' and 'Criminal Foreigners Out'.[22]

Failure of the Political Elite

The German Government took two important, yet contradictory, policy decisions that affected non-Germans after the unification of the two Germanys. The first decision was taken on 31 October 1990 by the Constitutional Court, granting foreigners the right to vote and to be elected to

20 *Financial Times*, 8 May 1998.
21 *Migration und Integration in Zahlen*, 1997, pp. 167-170.
22 *The Independent*, 27 April 1998.

local parliaments as representatives. The second policy decision, the new Foreigners Law, which facilitates deportation, has been in force since 1 January 1991 . The second policy decision suggests the emergence of a trend on the part of the post-unification German government toward more exclusionary policies regarding the political status of foreigners and immigrant communities in Germany.

Some politicians were engaged in marking Turks as 'others' and drawing cultural boundaries in an increasingly heterogeneous German society. 'Since Turks are different from Germans in culture and mentality, and want to stay different, it is only natural that they seek the proximity of their fellows in Germany. That means Turkish quarters, also known as ghettos, are developing in our cities. This can only be prevented by force, not by social security benefits or persuasion...We have no reason to let critics at home and abroad accuse us of racism, when we insist that the German Federal Republic must not become a country of immigration. Anyone who disregards this natural and justified feeling of our fellow citizens is preparing the way for the extreme right...The question of reasonable and humane rotation must be reconsidered.' These remarks were made in 1982 by the leader of a CDU/CSU parliamentary group.[23] The difference between German and Muslim identity was further emphasised by the CDU chairman in the 1983 Annual Conference. He demanded that Germany should protect its cultural identity against Islamic culture. These statements undoubtedly agree on one thing; that there are two competing identities, as implied by the party officials, that are irreconcilable. The Turkish ethnic identity, marked by Islamic values and its social manifestations in public places, seems to disturb these politicians. The strong emphasis on the irreconcilable nature (including the religion and culture) of Germany versus the Turkish-Islamic identity is seen as one of the most important obstacles to integration into the host society. The cultural and religious identity of the Turkish community is also seen as a possible barrier to changing the citizenship law. Rabinbach[24] draws attention to the widely held essentialist and culturalist perception that unlike other 'European' minorities, 'Turks intransigently resist cultural integration, and as Muslims are the most foreign of the foreigners.'

23 Castles, op.cit, p. 208.

24 A. Rabbinbach, "Fire and Blood in Germany", *Dissent*, Fall, 1993, p. 417.

In relation to integration, segregation in housing has had a further hindering effect on the establishment of social contacts between Turks and Germans. It is well documented that foreign workers and their families in Germany are disadvantaged in housing. In the 1950s and 1960s guestworkers were accommodated in camps previously inhabited by exiles and refugees. Even today, foreign workers and their families live in those run-down and cheap apartments that were once called 'refugee flats'.[25] During fieldwork research carried out in Berlin, I have personally observed the concentration of Turkish migrants in places such as Kreuzburg and Wedding, where the existence of Turkish residents was very apparent through the shops that sold ethnic food, restaurants that had Turkish names and that served a variety of Turkish dishes, and more importantly, through the appearance of the people, in terms of clothing and their overt behaviour. In such an environment one can satisfy many of one's needs without having to come into contact with Germans. In the Turkish quarter of Berlin, I did not, for example, need to speak any German. Shop owners overwhelmingly were of Turkish origin and I found out that it was not very difficult for a Turk to survive and lead a daily life without knowing much German. A highly Turkish populated quarter of Berlin, Kreuzburg, as Mandel[26] points out, has the nickname 'Little Istanbul', reflecting the origins of its inhabitants and its ethnic features, marked by a Turkish life style, shops, cafes and mosques. In addition, the underground line passing through this district is known as 'The Orient Express', reinforcing the image of 'Little Istanbul'. A common joke that Berlin is another province of Turkey also lends support to the argument that the Turkish community has been excluded, by provision of bad housing in an ethnically marked quarter of a metropolis. The failure of politicians to address these issues has been mostly ignored and instead, cultural differences are blamed for the lack of social interaction between Turks and Germans. Holzner[27], for example, adopts an approach that concedes that the Turks are the most alien group in Germany, with their fixed sociocultural characteristics. These fixed characteristics, he argues, are rooted in ethnic and racial

25 Bade, op.cit., 1993, p. 77.
26 Mandel, op.cit., 1990, p. 27.
27 L. Holnzer, "West Germany' in *International Handbook on Race and Race Relations*, J. A. Singler (ed.), Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1987, p. 429.

background, such as external appearance, the religious beliefs of the migrants and in the linguistic differences between Germans and Turks. All these features resist integration into German society. One should note here, that the culturalist discourse focuses on how different the 'others' are, rather than opening new avenues of discussions and policy making, such as attempting to accommodate the cultural difference, recognizing multiculturalism in a pluralistic society and including others in the political community. Moving beyond the ethnocentric and cultural construction of others will shed more light on the inequality, exclusion and marginalisation that Turkish residents in Germany are subjected to. Looking at the position of Turkish youth, most of whom were born in Germany, and the Turkish-Muslim women, will show that the culturalist and essentialist perception of immigrants overshadows the real issues that affect both Turks and Germans.

Turkish Youth: Education, Identity and Underclass

The number of young Turks in European countries is steadily increasing. They are receiving their education in countries where most of them were born and eventually they look for employment in the same country. The position of the young generation of Turks is evidently creating problems in access to equal education, training and employment with the native young population. The gravity of the problem becomes even more alarming when the settlement intentions of the young generation are taken into account. Germany has the largest population of younger generation Turks, between the ages of 15-20, numbering more than 670,000. The estimated number of young Turks in Europe, on the other hand, is about 800,000.

Table 1: Young Turks in Selected European Countries (000)

Germany	Netherlands	Belgium	France	Sweden	Switzerland
15-18: 122.1	15-19: 20.7	10-19: 21.5	12-16: 21.3	15-19: 2.4	16-18: 4.0
18-21: 142.1	20-24: 28.7	20-29: 18.1	17-21: 9.1	20-24: 3.8	19-21: 4.5
21-25: 187.3	–	–	–	–	–
25-30: 220.4	–	–	–	–	–

Source: Annual Report 1996, collected from the national statistical sources.

Faist[28] argues, with regard to vocational education and job training for school leavers, that there has been a persistent inequality between Turkish and German youth. In access to training slots, discrimination against Turkish school leavers is not direct; rather, as Faist points out, it works through informal and institutional processes of access to training and jobs. According to CEDEFOP,[29] Turkish youth, similar to immigrant youth in other European countries, experience high rates of exclusion. During the 1970s and throughout the 1980s, Turkish youth has experienced higher rates of unemployment as compared to the majority youths.

A survey in 1985 found that Turkish children are the least successful students, having difficulties with the school curriculum and with the German language. According to the findings, the percentage of children for whom the German school curriculum was 'too difficult' was highest among Turkish children. One third of Turkish children are said to have 'poor or very poor' knowledge of the German language, more than half of them are said to have a 'poor or very poor' command of spoken German. It is also reported that 62.9 per cent of Turkish children involved in the survey had a 'poor' command of written German and half of them had a 'poor or very poor' level of school achievement.[30] They are also not socially integrated in the class. One-third of Turkish children are teased by their classmates. Successful education is important for social mobility and employment opportunities. Some Turkish parents, frustrated by the German education system which persistently fails their off spring, have started to send their children to Turkey to be educated.[31]

Compared to two-thirds of all German youths, more than 90 percent of Turkish young people did not go on to university or post-secondary technical colleges directly after completion of secondary school. According to BMWB,[32] the enrolment of German youth in job training was two times higher than that of Turks.

---

28 Thomas Faist, "From School to Work: Public Policy and Underclass Formation among Young Turks in Germany during the 1980s", *International Migration Review*, vol. 27, no. 102, 1993, p. 307.

29 European Centre for the development of Vocational Training, 1986.

30 M. K. Malhotra, "The educational problems of foreign children of different nationalities in West Germany", *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 8, no. 2, 1985, p. 292.

31 A. S. Çağlar, "German Turks in Berlin: Social Exclusion and Strategies for Social Mobility", *New Community*, vol. 21, no. 3, p. 317.

32 Berufbildungsbericht, 1991, pp. 103-112.

Table 2: Percentage of immigrant youth in apprenticeships, 1980-90, (15-18 year-olds)

	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990
Turks	22.4	21.6	23.1	25.2	29.1	30.9	35.5
Yugoslavs	32.7	33.5	32.2	29.7	33.5	32.6	40.0
Italians	25.2	28.0	30.1	33.5	36.6	38.3	42.8
Greeks	17.9	19.8	22.1	22.4	24.2	23.9	27.2
Spaniards	33.3	38.1	43.2	42.6	45.3	45.2	49.0
Portuguese	26.3	29.2	33.7	37.7	42.5	43.3	43.8
Immigrant total	24.1	24.1	25.4	26.9	30.8	32.4	35.5
Total: Germans & Immigrants	59.0	62.9	66.5	69.3	72.6	75.0	79.4

Source: BMBW, Berufsbildungsbericht 1993, p. 72.

While only one-third of all immigrants aged 15 to 20 were enrolled in apprenticeship training, two-thirds of German youth had access to job training. The unemployment rate among Turkish youth was nearly twice as high compared to that of German youth, or even when compared to other immigrant groups in Germany. Young Turkish men and women display much higher rates of unemployment and lower rates of enrolment in apprenticeship schemes (on job training) and vocational education (in part-time vocational schools), the key mechanism of access to skilled jobs.[33] Almost no Turkish youth has entered training in the advanced sector, such as banks, insurance, public administration, etc. Rather they predominantly moved into training in industry, commerce and trade sectors.[34]

Herbert[35] points out that since 1974 on, the main guideline of the German government towards foreigners has been "yes" to absorption, "no" to immigration. Accordingly, this policy has created an intolerable situation for second generation foreigners in the Federal Republic. Foreign children were thought to have been integrated into the German school system, on the one hand, and were expected to loosen their contact with the culture of their parents' country, while on the other hand, the door to return was to be kept open . The catastrophic outcome of this policy was

33 Thomas Faist, *Social Citizenship for Whom? Young Turks in Germany and Mexican Americans in the United States*, Aldershot: Avebury, 1995, p. 11.

34 Faist, op.cit., 1993, p. 314.

35 U. Herbert, *A History of Foreign Labour in Germany, 1880-1980* (trans. William Templer), Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1990, pp. 242-243.

the creation of bilingual illiterates, fluent in neither German nor in the language of their parents. The group most affected among young foreigners is Turks who come to Germany after completing five years of primary schooling in Turkey. They face an array of difficulties in Germany. They must for example 'endure the stress of the culture shock associated with relocation to the West at the difficult age of puberty, having not learned any trade, and generally not being able to speak a word of German. They were socialised within the cultural framework of their native country and thus beset by correspondingly great problems in adapting to their new environment and learning to cope with its demands.' Two different and usually opposing forces are at work during the process of socialisation of the young generation. Values involved in this process show important inconsistencies between the values of traditional society in the migrant home and the values of dominant Western society in the school of the host country.[36]

Gendering Cultural difference: Marginalizing Turkish-Muslim Women

According to SOPEMI reports the number of Turkish women in Germany was around 791,000 in 1991 out of a total Turkish population of 1.9. Statistisches Bundesamt reports that the number of Turkish women reached 915,432 in 2000. Turkish women, as their male counterparts, are less represented than German women in training for clerical and administrative occupations; these fields demand good communication and language skills. As discussed by Faist,[37] the job/employment constraints that Turkish women face are not so much products of 'tradition'. Academic credentials of young Turkish women in general are higher than those among young Turkish man. Rather, public policy, over the years has not addressed the specific cumulative disadvantages that young Turkish women face in obtaining some form of job training. Faist goes on to point out that some of the young Turkish women interviewed in the Duisburg area refrained from looking for training places, since they feared that they might receive negative responses from employers, particularly because of their Muslim background.

36 Nermin Abadan Unat, "Turkish Migration to Europe and the Middle East: Its Impact on Social Structure and Social Legislation" in *Social Legislation in the Contemporary Middle East*, Laurance O. Michalak and Jeswald W. Selacuse (eds.), Institute of International Studies, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987, p. 197.

37 Faist, op. cit., 1993, p. 325.

The headscarf of Turkish women in Germany has become a marker of identity. It has become, over the years, one of the objects which Germans associate with Turkishness. As Mandel[38] contends, 'the headscarf worn by many Turkish women and girls became the displaced locus of debates on the socio-economic reality of contemporary Germany and acquired a complex plethora of meaning over and above that of marking cultural or religious identity.' It is reported by several observers that a number of Turkish women who arrived in Germany with Western clothes shifted to typical Turkish dress after a couple of years as an expression of their identity and belongingness to the Turkish community.

It has been argued that the attitudes of many Germans towards Muslim-Turkish women are very negative and hostile. Ahmed[39] observes that many Germans show negative reactions when they see Turkish women and girls wearing the Islamic headscarf. In some cases this reaction has gone further, such as exerting formal or informal power to stop Turkish women and girls from wearing scarves. In some public schools, for example, teachers have banned the wearing of scarves in the classroom. The cultural bond of early immigrant Turkish women with their Islamic background remained intact with few exceptions. But over the years 'the situation of the Muslim women of the second and third generation in Germany is to a high degree characterised by stark conflicts between their parents traditional value system and the young girls, who have grown up in a German environment with totally different norms of orientation'.[40]

Islamic Organisations and Turkish-Muslim Identity

The number of Muslims in Germany has steadily increased. Statistics give different numbers in relation to Muslims living in Germany. In 1979 there were 1.7 million Muslims, 1,268,300 of which were of Turkish origin. The total number of Muslims at that time accounted for 30 percent of foreign residents.[41] The migration flow continued during the following decades, and the number of Muslims rose to 1.9 million in the

38 Mandel, op.cit., 1990, p. 29.

39 M. D. Ahmed, "Muslim Women in an Alien Society: A Case of Germany", *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, vol. 13, no. 1, 1992, p.76; Mandel, op. cit., 1990, s. 37-38.

40 Ahmed, Ibid, p. 72-74.

41 B. Etienne, "Islamic Associations and Europe", *Contemporary European Affairs*, vol. 2, no. 4, 1989, p. 31.

mid-1990s. Today there are more than 2.1 million Turkish Muslims in Germany. If we add Muslims refugees from Bosnia, Kosovo and other smaller Muslim communities to this figure, the number of Muslims in Germany reaches almost 2.5 million.

Many of the Turkish migrants in Germany come from originally rural regions in Turkey. For these people, Islam has remained one of the important aspects of daily life and formed part of the collective memory in their new urban environments, such as Berlin, Cologne and Munich. The migrant worker, as pointed out by Abadan-Unat,[42] hangs on to his/her traditional culture and identity, often as a defence against the rejection of the dominant culture. Original national cultural identity is carried with him/her to the new environment. Bozarslan argues that in order to prevent the effects of modern lifestyle on Turkish migrants, they...

> 'turned back to their traditional values based on religious identity, as a means of ensuring the cohesion of the community and the family and as the best antidote to the destructive effects of German urban life. From the beginning, therefore, the conditions in which immigration took place helped to establish the central place of Islam in the daily life of immigrants, both as faith and as an expression of identity. To speak of the "discovery" or "rediscovery" of Islam by Turkish immigrants in the 1980s is therefore to misunderstand the reality of the situation before 1980.'[43]

Islam renders the Turkish minority extremely visible. In the case of migrants from EU (formerly EC) countries in Germany, such as Italian, Greek and Spanish communities, religion does not create such cultural divisions as is the case with Turkish-Muslims. As a result of increasing institutionalisation, Muslims have at their disposal more than 900 places of worship and their numbers seem to increase every year.[44] As Soysal[45] notes, there is a high level of organisational activity among Turkish migrants in Germany. Existing Turkish associations in Germany do not have a centralised character and they are fragmented, some of them being very politicised. The fragmentation of associations is also true for religious organisations, which try to disseminate and promote Islamic

42 Abadan-Unat, op.cit., p. 199.

43 Hamit Bozarslan, "Islam and the Turkish Community in West Germany: Religion, Identity and Politics", *Contemporary European Affairs*, vol. 2, no. 4, 1989, p. 114-115.

44 A. Hartley, "Europe's Muslims", *The National Interest*, vol. 22, Winter Issue, 1990/1991, p. 60.

45 Yasemin Soysal, "Workers in Europe: Interactions with the Host Society" in *Turkey and the West*, M. Heper et al. (eds.) London: I. B. Tauris, 1993, p. 232.

values among the Turkish community. There are several effective religious organisations in Germany, representing different tendencies regarding Islamic ideology and methods of addressing the Turkish population. The issues they address include not only purely religious ones, but also other matters, ranging from discrimination, racism, and the education of the young generation to the political rights of the migrant community. Among these organisations that serve the Turkish clientele in Germany is *Islamiches Kulturzentrum* (Islamic Cultural Centre-*İslam Kültür Merkezi*) based in Cologne, which had 210 local centres throughout Germany in 1982. Known as *Süleymanılık* this organisation promotes the views of Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan (1888-1958). The European Associations of National Vision (*Avrupa Milli Görüş Teşkilatları*) with its headquarters in Cologne is another influencial organization. The National Vision tries to achieve a representative role not only for Turks living in Europe but also for the Muslims of other national origins.

Since the 1970s, The Directorate of Religious Affairs of Turkey (*Türkiye Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı*) has developed an interest in serving the Muslim-Turkish Community outside Turkey. In 1971, the *Diyanet*, for the first time, sent imams to different Western European countries during Ramadan (the month of fasting) and during religious festivals for preaching Islam. At the beginning, these appointments were usually for one or two months. Temporary appointments of imams were replaced by more organised and longer term appointments. For the organisation of mosques and the appointments of imams, the *Diyanet* opened a special section in Ankara. This was followed by the opening of a large Central Office in Cologne on 13 May, 1985. Among the responsibilities of this office are the appointment and overseeing of imams and the co-ordination of all religious activities. It is argued that this was a move made by a secular state to intervene in religious affairs in order to exert some control over religious organisations and to cripple the influence of competing ideologies seen as radical threat to the Turkish community in the German diaspora. According to this view, the Ankara government pursued a policy to regain control and the legitimacy, as well as to counter different messages to which the Turkish immigrants have been receptive.[46] Abdullah's views of The Turkish Islamic Union of *Diyanet* also support these notions. He claims that the *Diyanet* is trying to facilitate the social integration of Turks and to offer the youth a concept of Islam that is consistent with

46 Bozarslan, op. cit., p. 118.

contemporary life. In relation to other organisations, the *Diyanet* is making efforts to prevent Turkish Muslims from becoming dependent on institutions and organisations that are of an overtly hostile attitude towards 'Western' society.[47]

In Western Europe, the *Diyanet* controls more than one thousand mosques. According to the 1991 Activity Report of the *Diyanet*[48], 604 mosques were under the *Diyanet's* control in Germany. The *Diyanet* paid the salaries of 418 imams, while 186 imams were appointed by the *Diyanet*, but paid by local organisations. According to the same report, *Diyanet* employs 838 personnel outside Turkey, mainly located in Western Europe. Apart from permanent appointments, the *Diyanet* still sends temporary imams and preachers at certain periods in the year. Activity Reports state that temporary appointments of religious personnel totalled 426 in 1991. According to a recent press release by the *Diyanet*, 357 religious personnel (imams and preachers) were sent to 21 different countries. Germany received the highest number of short-term appointed imams and preachers for the month of Ramadan. 158 of the personnel performed their temporary duties in Germany, while there were 32 in Holland, 29 in France, 29 in the Russian Federation, 12 in Switzerland, 12 in Kirghizistan, 11 in Austria, 10 in Denmark, 10 in Kazakhistan, 10 in Albania, 8 in Azerbaijan, 7 in Tajikistan, 7 in Bulgaria, 5 in Northern Cyprus, 4 in Macedonia, 4 in Belgium, 2 in Romania, 2 in Kosova, 2 in Western Thrace, 1 in Sweden, 1 in Canada and 1 in Poland. These appointees undertook the duties of preaching Islam, leading prayers and organising meetings to promote the values of Islam during the month of Ramadan. In addition, Turkish Muslims also try to organise Islamic education for their children, as they do not believe that the German educational system addresses their needs nor that it accommodates an Islamic education. This view is warranted by the fact that there is a lack interest on the part of German educational authorities and policy makers to revise the curriculum to include the teaching of Islam in public schools.

What is clear so far is that the dominant political discourse in Germany articulates cultural differences between Turks and Germans as belonging to distinct *'volksnation'* and puts the blame on Turks for resisting integration. Paradoxically, on the other hand, Turks and other immigrants are asked

47 Abdullah, op. cit., p. 441.

48 *Yurt Dışı Din Hizmetleri Raporu*, Türkiye Diyanet İsleri Başkanlığı, 1991, Ankara.

to participate in the social and cultural life of German society without devising legal and political structures of recognition, accommodation and inclusion. This brings us to the issue of citizenship, which regulates the relation between state and its subjects and determines the legal status of a citizen with his/her rights, duties and responsibilities.

Conclusions: A Test for Germany, Citizenship, Politics of Blood Principle: *Jus Sanguinis vs. Jus Soli*

In his oft-quoted essay, Marshall[49] developed three basic rights of citizenship. These are the civil, political and social elements or parts of citizenship. According to Marshall, the civil element consists of the rights for individual freedom, such as liberty of the person, freedom of expression, religion, thought, the right to own private property and equality before the law. The political element of citizenship is the right to have a say in the exercise of political power, the right to elect and stand for an election for the participation in the political system whose main institutions are the parliament and local government councils. In Marshall's thought, the social element of citizenship is composed of the rights to have access to social security and economic welfare offered by the state. Policies with regard to access to citizenship show varying characteristics between countries. Ethnic or ethno-cultural diversity within a defined boundary of a state has increased as a result of large-scale immigration after World War II.[50] This has generated serious problems in the granting of citizenship and fundamental rights, especially in Germany, where citizenship is based on ethnic descent. German citizenship laws exclude Turks from becoming a member of the political community which would allow them to participate in civic, as well as political life in Germany.

As a consequence of an 'ethnocultural understanding of nation-state membership',[51] German citizenship has always been exclusionary, since it is based on blood principle, *jus sanguinis*. Three principles underlie the German citizenship law. The first is the attribution of citizenship at birth which is based on descent (*jus sanguinis*). Second principle is naturalization, which is regarded as exceptional and is only granted when

49 T. H. Marshall and T. Bottomore, T., *Citizenship and Social Class*, London: Pluto Press, 1992, p. 8.

50 T. Hammar, *Democracy and the Nation State*, Aldershot: Avebury, 1990, p. 71; Ibid, p. 69.

51 Brubaker, Ibid, p. 51.

the applicant is thoroughly integrated in German society, and then only when his or her naturalization is in the public interest. The third feature of German citizenship is that the unity of Germany is a basic premise of the citizenship policy of Germany. Therefore, Germany insists on the continued validity of the 1913 citizenship law.[52] Although 9 per cent of the German population now consists of foreign residents, most of them of Turkish descent, these people cannot become German citizens by naturalization unless they fulfil strict requirements.[53] As naturalization has traditionally been treated as the exception, foreign residents are required to meet several standards in order for their applications for citizenship to be considered. Before application, foreign residents are expected to have unrestricted legal capacity, unblemished character, residence in their own dwelling and to have been proven capable of supporting themselves and their dependants. In 1982 a public effort was made to encourage Turkish migrants living in Berlin to apply for citizenship. It was thought that about thirty thousand were eligible to apply, but only fifty applied.[54] Although, by the mid 1990s, more than half of the foreigners had lived more than ten years in Germany, the naturalization rates remained low; naturalization requires the giving up one's former citizenship. As a result of this requirement, only about 140,000 foreigners became naturalized between the years of 1977-1986.[55] These findings support Hammar's view[56] that the requirements for naturalization in Germany are strict and that they also presuppose 'a profound transformation of the applicant, that his ties to the old country are broken and that he intends to stay the rest of his life in (Germany),' Furthermore, it has been reported that Germany will not sign the European Council convention on facilitating the naturalization of foreigners and the provision of dual citizenship.[57]

52 K. Hailbronner, "Citizenship and Nationhood in Germany" in *Immigration and the Politics of Citizenship in Europe and North America*, William Rogers Brubaker (ed.), New York: University Press of America, 1989, p. 67.

53 M. Almond, "Europe's Immigration Crises", *The National Interest*, Vol: 29, Fall, 1992, p. 60.

54 D. Klusmeyer, "Aliens, Immigrants, and Citizens: The Politics of Inclusion in the Federal Republic of Germany", *Daedalus*, vol. 122, no. 3, Summer, 1993, p. 89.

55 J. Halfmann, "Two Discourse of Citizenship in Germany: The Difference Between Public Debate and Administrative Practice", *Citizenship Studies*, vol. 1, no. 3, 1997, p. 316.

56 Hammar, op. cit., p. 85, 89.

57 *EFMS Migration Report*, no. 4:, 1998, p.14.

Table 3: Naturalisation of Turkish Nationals in selected European countries

	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
Netherlands	820	3,280	1,950	6,110	11,520	18,000
Germany	1,225	1,697	2,016	3,502	7,344	10,760*
Sweden	1,173	832	832	1,358	1,569	4,201
France	690	921	914	1,124	1,296	1,515
Denmark	437	195	107	376	502	560
Norway	281	280	304	474	238	393
Belgium	117	157	217	199	437	272
Total	4,740	7,362	6,350	13,243	22,906	35,701

Source: Adopted from SOPEMI 1995.

**1993 Annual Report, Turkish Ministry of Employment and Social Security.*

According to a survey conducted in 1989, 49 percent of the Turkish minority expressed an interest in taking out German citizenship, but they had been dissuaded by the rules governing naturalization. [58] Cultural and political orientation plays an important role in the willingness to apply for naturalization.[59] Turks are the most hesitant group among those who are entitled to apply for discretionary citizenship, in comparison to Yugoslavs and Greeks. Whereas, in 1985, one out of every 200 Yugoslav immigrants were granted citizenship and one out of every 500 Greek, only one out of every 600 Turk was naturalised.[60] A survey in 1995 found that 60% of the young Turks expressed an interest in becoming German citizens if Germany would not ask them to renounce

58 Klusmeyer, op. cit., p. 90.

59 Fluctuations in the naturalization rates can be attributed to the nature of developments in citizenship and related issues, for a short discussion see Rainer Bauböck and Dilek Cinar, "Briefing Paper: Naturalization Politics in Western Europe", *West European Politics*, vol. 17, no. 2, 1994, pp. 192-196; In Germany, for example, more lenient requirements were introduced by the Alien Act (Auslandergestz) of 1990 for long-time resident non-Germans. Another reason in the increasing rate of naturalization is persistent encouragement of Turkish officials in Europe to apply for citizenship. Turkish embassy officials frequently ask Turkish immigrants to apply for the citizenship of their country of residence in public meetings. Immigrant organisations side with the official rhetoric. In a public address in Essen the then Turkish Consular, Mr. Erol Etçioğlu urged Turks to apply for German citizenship. He said that 'Turkish nationals are settling here and they should establish respectability in German society. Turks should take up German citizenship as soon as possible. This is important for the rights of political participation. Once this right is achieved political parties in Germany will change their approach to Turks. In order to encourage Turks to obtain foreign citizenship the Turkish government has made some amendments to the related laws to ensure that a change in citizenship will not affect the property rights of Turks.' (*Türkiye Gazetesi*, 3 February 1995).

60 Hailbronner, op. cit., p. 76.

their Turkish citizenship.[61] Rist[62] suggested as early as 1979 that 'the future for the immigrant is set. They will stay, but they will stay on or near the bottom for at least the next generation.' It seems that even after nearly two decades the immigrants are not still accepted into the social and political structures in Germany. This is true at least for the Turks, as they are not able to participate fully in civic life due to restrictions stemming from not holding German citizenship, because its underlying character is still ethnocultural. As long as the perception of German citizenship remains to preserve its project of 'the community of descent' and it does not open up to overcome cultural boundaries, immigrant ethnic minorities in Germany are bound to stay on the periphery of the political community.

Özet

Avrupa ülkelerine yönelik Türk işçi göçü 1960'lı yıllarda başlamış ve takip eden yıllarda Avrupa'nın bir çok ülkesinde sayıları bugün 3,5 milyona ulaşan geniş bir Türk nüfusu oluşmuştur. Almanya en çok göçmen nüfusuna sahip olan Avrupa ülkelerinden biri olarak 2 milyonu aşkın bir Türk topluluğuna ev sahipliği yapmaktadır. Politikacıların ilk dönem beklentilerinin tersine Türklerin büyük bir çoğunluğu Türkiye'ye dönmek yerine Almanya'ya yerleşme ve bu ülkenin vatandaşlığına geçmeyi tercih etmiştir. Bu makale Türkler ve diğer göçmenlerle ilgili Almanya'daki resmi söylemi ele almakta ve Türklerin karşılaştığı temel sosyal sorunları kimlik ve kültür araştırmaları açısından incelemektedir.

61 V. Götz, "Multiculturalism and Constitutional Values in Germany" in *Multiculturalism and Rights in Multicultural Europe and America*, Michael Dunne and Tiziano Bonazzi (eds.), Keele: Keele University Press, 1995, p. 120.

62 R. C. Rist, "Migration and Marginality: Guestworkers in Germany and France", *Daedalus*, no. 108, 1979, p. 106.