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THE BELATED CONSUMMATION OF THE OTTOMAN–SAFAVID PEACE OF ZUHAB, 1639–1643*

SELİM GÜNGÖRÜRLER**

Ottoman–Safavid dealings after the 1639 truce at Zuhab (a.k.a. *Kasr-ı Şirin*) are assumed to have been mostly eventless. Our received knowledge holds that once the on-and-off warfare of almost one and a half centuries (1501–1638) ended with the Ottomans' taking back Baghdad (1638), neither side was willing to tangle again with one another until the overthrow of the Safavid kingdom in Iran (1722), and that they both were content with upholding the peace, which rested only upon a truce, and abiding by a roughly drawn border.

Sources that shed light on these eighty-four years of neighbourliness, however, tell otherwise. From 1639 to 1722, the Ottoman Empire and Safavid Iran dealt with each other often and in a lively diplomacy between monarchs, prime ministers, field-marshals, and governors-general. By means of dozens of missions headed by ambassadors, envoys, heralds, and emissaries, these dignitaries sent hundreds of letters to one another, bargained, struck deals, stood up to each other, and brought on crises. Outside of a few formal occasions, this diplomacy was not ceremonial or congratulatory, but rather substantial. At the same time, both states strived again and again to gain the upper hand along the border by harbouring defectors, stirring up insubordination, making shows of strength with full-fledged armies, quelling uprisings, backing up vassals, widening direct rule, disputing the demarcation, and calling for compensation against breaches.[1]

Here I delve into the first four years after the signing of the protocol at Zuhab. I first set down the peace principles on border demarcation, hierarchy, and balance of power. We thereby see how both sides prioritized fulfilling the military withdrawal with the least entanglement, and for this sake made a bare border protocol into a treaty with almost no alteration throughout its ratification, promulgation, and consummation. The winners and the losers alike wanted to end the war. But whereas

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* Quotations from original sources are transcribed in line with modern Turkish spelling rather than a letter-by-letter conversion from the Arabic script to the Latin.

** This study was conducted in part with financial support from the Austrian Research Fund (FWF), project 32696, of which the author is the principal investigator.

1 See my 'Fundamentals of Ottoman–Safavid Peacetime Relations, 1639–1722', *Turkish Historical Review* 9 (2018) 151–197; and *Diplomacy and Political Relations between the Ottoman Empire and Safavid Iran, 1639–1722*. PhD diss., Georgetown University, 2016.

the Ottomans preferred the peace and showed their readiness for it, the Safavids needed the peace and made concessions for its sake, such as (re)acknowledging Ottoman primacy.

I then handle the unforeseen halt, so-to-say the interregnum, that happened amid the last step of the treaty's consummation when the swap of prisoners of war had already begun and the last ratification had already been sent out, but before it could be handed over. Owing mostly to this, the formal state of war dragged on for a few more years after the fighting on the front had stopped. The Ottomans went on to stand watch above all at the fortress of Baghdad, after forthwith building it up, with troops so strong as a mid-sized army. Top dignitaries likewise kept their wartime titles of command. Besides the two envoys, commissioners, the ratificatory pledge-deed, the peace-letter, and a few other diplomatic letters exchanged after the signing of the protocol, it took the sides two further ambassadors and two more envoys as well as at least twelve further diplomatic letters, a few espionage undertakings, backstage deals, and political executions of high-ranking personages to work out the consummation of the peace, which had meanwhile become even more entangled with the outbreak of a demarcation strife and a border breach. Through these shuttling diplomats and writs, the Ottomans also underscored their primacy in courtly yet straight threats to a Safavid Iran that was glad to hear of Murad IV's sudden death. As the confident grand vizier Kemankeş Kara Mustafa Pasha reassured his restless new lord, İbrahim, the Ottoman Empire also set out to implement policies to cleanse middle Iraq of the traces of Safavid occupation, stamping it anew with marks of Ottoman sway.

1. Underlying Documents and Principles

The peace of Zuhab, unlike the name *treaty* with which it came to be known, was at the outset a border protocol (*sınır-nâme*) that later became ratified by a Safavid pledge-deed (*ahd-nâme*[2]), and an Ottoman peace-letter (*sulh-nâme*) in answer thereto. On 17 May, Ottoman commander-in-chief,[3] grand vizier, and plenipoten-

2 Unlike what is taken for granted, Shah Safi's ratificatory document was formally not a letter but a pledge-deed. The formulas uttered by the shah "We command a pledge that (*ahd fermûdîm ki*)" and "We made a pledge that (*ahd kerdîm ki*)" leave no room for doubt as to the genre. Likewise, Murad IV speaks of Safi's "pledge-deed (*ahidnâme*)" and calls the end deal a "treaty," or, word-for-word, a "mutual-pledge" (*muâhede*)," in his peace-letter of answer. See footnote 14 for the references to both documents.

3 *Serdâr-ı ekrem*, a campaigning grand vizier in wartime whom the monarch extraordinarily made the unconditional commander of all Ottoman armies and navies. If so, the grand vizier, who was now also *commander-in-chief*, then acted not only in his regular capacity as the absolute deputy of the monarch, but also beyond it, as if he himself were the monarch. To mark the commander-in-chief's temporarily unlimited and non-accountable monarchal powers, the exclusive regalia that distinguished this office from regular grand vizierate included an aigrette (of the type symbolizing sovereign rulership), which the padishah set with his own hands on the *commander-in-chief*'s head. Likewise, the Illustrious Standard [of

tiary[4] Kemankeş Kara Mustafa Pasha underwrote the protocol with the Safavid plenipotentiary,[5] Saru Xan[6] Tâleş. The pictured *treaty*, namely a "mutual-pledge" (*muâhede*) as both the signatory states and later historians called it,[7] was indeed the

Prophet Muhammed] was assigned from the imperial court to the company of the commander-in-chief for the span of the campaign. See [*Şâir*] *Abrurrahman Abdi Paşa Kanunnâmesi*. Ed. by H. Ahmet Arslantürk. İstanbul, 2012, 24; İ. Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devletinin Merkez ve Bahriye Teşkilatı*. Ankara, 1998, 158–163; Abdülkadir Özcan, 'Serdâr', *TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi.* Vol. 36. Ankara, 2009, 551–552 for further implications of the Ottoman commandership-in-chief. I therefore disagree with Savory's translation of the Safavid *sipehsâlâr* as commander-in-chief [see Roger M. Savory, 'The Office of *Sipahsâlâr* (Commander-in-Chief) in the Safavid State', in ed. Bert G. Fragner – Christa Fragner – Gherardo Gnoli – Roxane Haag-Higuchi – Mauro Maggi – Paola Orsatti (eds.), *Proceedings of the Second European Conference of Iranian Studies held in Bamberg, 30th September to 4th October 1991*. Roma, 1995, 597–615]. The Safavid *sipehsâlâr* was the top commander of the kingdom's military, but unlike a commander-in-chief / *serdâr-ı ekrem*, he still marshalled under the command of a superior, first of all the shah, and on some occasions the chief vizier as well. Therefore, his office corresponded much more to that of a field marshal / Ottoman *serdâr* or *sipehsâlâr*. See Savory's article also for other historians translating the Safavid *sipehsâlâr* as *commander-general* / *Feldmarschall*, which I find more accurate. The *commander-in-chief*, namely the Ottoman *serdâr-ı ekrem*, who temporarily held unrestricted sway over the Empire in its whole, in a way that covered not only the military but also any other thinkable exercise of sovereignty, did not have a matching post in Safavid Iran. Hence, another Ottoman rendering of *serdâr-ı ekrem* was not *sipehsâlâr* but *sipehsâlâr-ı a'zam*, as can be seen in NMH.d. 6, ent. 221.

4 The Ottoman terminology for *plenipotentiary* (*murahhas*) and *plenipotentiary powers* (*ruhsat-ı kâmile*), which would soon become fixed, were not used in this instance. Instead, the grand vizier's regular capacity as the padishah's "absolute deputy (*vekîl-i mutlak*)" was highlighted. Next to this "general deputation (*vekâlet-i âmme*)," the extraordinary statement that for these talks Kemankeş Mustafa Pasha also held "absolute regency (*niyâbet-i mutlaka*)" and "particular regency (*niyâbet-i hâssa*)" of the padishah especially underscored his case-specific plenipotentiary powers. See footnote 14 for the reference to the letter he sent from Zuhab to Shah Safi.

5 Unlike the earlier Safavid diplomat at Zuhab, Saru Xan Tâleş was further marked as "credible deputy (*vekîl-i mu'temed*)" with reference to his plenipotentiary powers. See footnote 14 for the reference to the letter that Kemankeş Mustafa Pasha sent from Zuhab to Shah Safi.

6 So as to differentiate between the Safavids' debased employment of this title from its original, sovereign meaning, I transcribe Safavid uses as *xan*, whereas I spell the historical or contemporary references to sovereign rulership with the more customary *khan*.

7 The Ottoman Empire and the Qajar shahdom of Iran agreed, in the Erzurum congresses two centuries later, to ground their upcoming treaty (of Erzurum) on the "treaty" of Zuhab. Both sides produced copies of the letters of ratification given by Murad IV, Kemankeş Kara Mustafa Pasha, and Shah Safi. The Ottoman and the Qajar commissions thought that these letters rested upon an original treaty underwritten by both sides at the same time, unaware that it was the very exchange of these letters that had brought out a "treaty" out of a border protocol. Thus, they deemed the treaty papers signed and exchanged by the two sides lost. They even made up separate stories on why and how their respective original copies might have gotten lost. See Sabri Ateş, 'Treaty of Zohab, 1639: Foundational Myth or Foundational Document?', *Iranian Studies* 52:3–4 (2019) 411–420.

war-ending capacity of this border protocol, which came into force with the shah's pledge followed by the padishah's promulgation. The clauses did not change throughout the ratification steps, seemingly because both parties were willing to re-establish peace with the least possible entanglement and lag. Therefore, after the Ottomans had taken back Baghdad and wiped out the Safavids' battle-hardened troops, the negotiators focused on demarcating the border, leaving out all other matters that could likely come up in a full-fledged treaty.

The sides mainly followed the maxim of *uti possidetis*, with small modifications in behalf of the Ottomans, who had the upper hand. Iran thus yielded the fortress city of Baghdad and the land around it in Mesopotamia. The border that ran upwards from the Persian Gulf through Iraq, Kurdistan, Azerbaijan, and the Caucasus was drawn by the protocol as follows:[8]

The Ottoman side of the southern border, mostly overlapping [Arabian] Iraq, was made up of the tributary principality of Basra (the House of Efrâsiyaboğlu), and the provinces of Baghdad (whose borders were demarcated with posts set up after the finalization of the peace)[9] and Şehrizor,[10] along with their counties (*sancak*) and appendages. At the Safavid side of the border were the vassal principality of Huveyze (the House of Musha'sha'), the province of Kirmanşah, and the vassal principality of Erdelân/Kurdistan. Northwards, the Ottomans kept the provinces of Van[11] and Erzurum, which overlooked the Safavid provinces of Azerbaijan (Tabriz) and Karabağ. In the Caucasus, the province of Kars[12] and fiefdom of Çıldır (the

8 *Muahedat Mecmuası* 2. Ankara, 2008, 308–312; Özer Küpeli, *Osmanlı–Safevi Münasebetleri (1612–1639)*. İstanbul, 2014, 276.

9 Cessan, Badrah, Mendelcin, and the plains next to them stayed on the Ottoman side. The border ran from Derne and Derteng, and split up at the border-post (*sermîl*/*mil başı*), leaving Derne and Derteng to the Empire. The Iranian holdings began from the mountain to the left of the border-post and included Dergezîn, Hemedân, Bâğ-ı Cinân, Mihribân (Merîvân), and Sin, while the land and villages to the east of the mountain by the border-post were left to the Ottomans. In this region, the Ziyaeddin and Haruni arms of the Câf tribe stayed under Ottoman lordship, while the Bire and Zerdüvi branches stayed under Safavid sway. The Iranian stronghold of Zencîr on the aforesaid mountain was to be torn down. *Ibid*.; Evliyâ Çelebi b. Derviş Mehemmed Zıllî, *Evliyâ Çelebi Seyahatnamesi*, Vol. 4. İstanbul, 2011, 229–249. "Derteng Boğazı: …Acem şâhıyla bu Derteng Boğazı'nda hudud kesilip hâlen bu boğaz ağzında bir amûd-ı müntehâya hududnâme yazılmış ve celî hatt ile sikkeyi mermerde kazılmış bir mîl-i mermerdir. Andan içeri cânib-i kıbleye Âl-i Osman'ın Bağdad hudûdudur, ol amûddan taşra taraf-ı şarka Acem şâhı hudûdudur." *Ibid*., 249. The translated use of *sermîl* /*mil başı* and Evliya Çelebi's description of the erected post by the Dertend pass onto which the border-protocol's text was engraved hint that what is meant by *sermîl* is indeed a border-post, which then seems to have become the name of that spot too.

10 The stronghold of Zalim and part of the mountain behind it overseeing the stronghold stayed under Ottoman sway. The stronghold of Oraman with the villages tied thereto stayed in Iran. Along the border, the Ottomans kept Çağangediği, Kızılca, and their attached lands. Iran kept Merîvân (Mihribân) and its surroundings.

11 The strongholds of Kotur and Mekü were to be torn down.

12 The stronghold of Mağazberd was to be torn down.

House of Atabeğli) stayed in Ottoman hands across the Safavid province of Çukursa'd (Erivan). The northernmost frontier at Georgia was split between the Ottoman-tributary lands of Mingrelia (the House of Dadiani), Guria (the House of Gurieli), Imereti (the House of Bagrationi) and the Safavid-vassal lands of Kartli (the Bagrationis) and Kakheti (the Bagrationis).[13]

That Murad IV's deputies could, thanks of having won the war and taken the onslaught into Iran, dictate the conditions of the protocol, left its mark on Shah Safi's pledge-deed.[14] The Safavid shahdom thus hailed the Ottoman padishah as supreme monarch, a matter which the Sublime Porte was keen on in its dealings with other states. The titles chosen for the padishah by the Iranians show that the shah could not uphold his wish to become the padishah's match; he rather acknowledged himself as a king ranking below the emperor of the House of Osman. Titles from Murad IV's *inscriptio* in the shah's pledge-deed drafted by the Safavid chancery, such as "king-of-kings (*şehinşah*)," "supreme-monarch (*sultan-ı azam*)," and "God's shadow (*zıllullah*)," lay bare that the shah had acknowledged the padishah as the highest-ranking ruler in interstate hierarchy.[15] Maybe again as a token thereof that the Ottomans' will had more weight in shaping the peace of Zuhab, the Safavids had to word their pledge-deed without saying that they *gave* or *granted* it. These words were almost standard in Ottoman pledge-deeds.

The style and text of the padishah's peace-letter[16] sent in answer further uphold the inferences made from the shah's pledge. First of all, the ratification steps were not reciprocal; the two rulers did not swap their ratifications of the border protocol.

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13 Sadık Müfit Bilge, *Osmanlı Çağı'nda Kafkasya 1454–1829*. İstanbul, 2015, 127, 139–143, 492, 506.

14 Drawn up between 18 and 21 May 1639. The talks were concluded on May 17 and the Safavid embassy headed by Saru Xan Tâleş bearing the ratifications had reached the grand vizier's encampment on May 22. Mehemmedkulu [Beyg-promoted-to-]Sültan Çağatay, the Safavid envoy bearing Shah Safi's ratification and pledge-deed to Murad IV, reached Constantinople in the month of Rebîülahir. Mustafa Naîmâ Efendi, *Târih-i Na'îmâ*. Ed. by Mehmet İpşirli. Ankara, 2007, 926–928; Abdülkâdir Efendi, *Topçular Katibi Abdülkâdir (Kadrî) Efendi Târihi* 2. Ed. by Ziya Yılmazer. Ankara, 2003, 1126. For Kemankeş Mustafa Pasha's letter to Shah Safi letting know of the settlement reached at Zuhab, see İskender Beyg Türkmân Münşî, *Zeyl-i Târîh-i Âlem-ârâ-yı Abbâsî* [quoting from Muhammed Yusuf Vâlih Kazvînî-Isfahânî's *Huld-i Berîn*]. Ed. by Ahmed Süheylî Hânsârî. Tahrân, hs.1317, 223–227; Muhammed Masum bin Hâcegi Isfahânî, *Hülâsatü's-Siyer*. Ed. by Îrec Afşar. Tahran, hs.1358, 271–275; Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi [BOA], *İbnülemin – Hâriciye*, 18. For Shah Safi's ratificatory pledge-deed, which was addressed to Murad IV but at the outset sent to Kemankeş Mustafa Pasha, see İskender Türkmân, *Zeyl-i Âlem-ârâ* [quoting from Muhammed Yusuf Vâlih Kazvînî-Isfahânî's *Huld-i Berîn*], 220–223; Isfahânî, *Hülâsatü's-Siyer*, 268–271; *İbnülemin – Hâriciye*, 407.

15 Feridun Bey, *Münşeatü's-Selâtîn*. Vol. 1. [İstanbul], h.1275, 299–301 [entry: "İran Şâhı Şah Safi tarafından hudud ve sugûra dâir takdim olunmuş olan nâmenin sûretidir]."

16 Sent with envoy Hamzapaşazâde Mehmed Agha, a court affiliate (*müteferrika*) who went along with Mehemmedkulu Çağatay on his way back to Iran after handing over the shah's pledge-deed.

Murad IV sent out his peace-letter only after Safi's pledge-deed reached Constantinople and the imperial court looked into it, as another mark of Ottoman primacy. So as to put a bold face on, Safi wrote that he himself had spearheaded the reconciliation after Murad IV had made known his willingness for it. However, Murad IV uttered his consent to the peace with words that openly show how the Ottomans' overcoming on the battlefield shaped the clauses. Murad the shah-of-shahs said that he ratified the protocol because the shah had asked for peace, made a pledge, sent the deed with his stamp pressed under the text, and "beseeched [Murad's] august approval.[17]"

The negotiations, breadth, and content of the peace of Zuhab were built upon a pragmatism that both sides upheld after sixty years on-and-off and fruitless fighting. One can see this pragmatism in the drafting of a peace agreement with the content of a border protocol.[18] On the other hand, this should not overshadow the fact that the Safavids acknowledged that they were overwhelmed. In the same year as losing Kandahar to Mughal India,[19] they could not afford to fight against the Ottomans, whose armies had already thrust into Iran. Iran's ultimate defeat, with its choice army wiped out and middle Mesopotamia taken back by the Ottomans, had confirmed for the Safavids their time-tested acknowledgement of that the House of Osman had the upper hand. The reestablishment of peace would make Iran politically steadier while making its financial and military burden lighter, as the Ottomans no longer meant a threat. For the Shahdom, this deal was more welcome than any other scenario.[20]

Though the Ottoman Empire felt satisfied with its winnings, it too was war-weary. This notwithstanding, Iran still had to buy the peace. The ratifications did not only raise the border protocol into a peace contract but also laid the groundwork of later relations, which would stay steadfast for the next eighty-four years, up until the downfall of the Safavid kingdom. For the Safavids, lasting peace could be secured only by acknowledging Ottoman primacy. This would ever shape Iranian decision makers' mindset. The Ottomans on the other hand could enforce impositions, or at least they trumped the Safavids' sanction power. Everything that came about

17 "makbûl-i hümâyunumuz olmasını istid'â…"

18 Ernest Tucker, 'From Rhetoric of War to Realities of Peace: The Evolution of Ottoman–Iranian Diplomacy through the Safavid Era', in *Iran and the World in the Safavid Age*. Willem Floor – Edmund Herzig (eds.). London–New York, 2012, 86.

19 Hans Robert Roemer, 'The Safavid Period', in Peter Jackson – Laurence Lockhart (eds.), *The Cambridge History of Iran* 6. Cambridge, 1986, 283; Andrew J. Newman, *Safavid Iran: Rebirth of a Persian Empire*. London–New York, 2006, 73–74. Chief vizier Sarı Taki was to blame for the loss as he had taken a hard line with the governor of Kandahar, who then went over, together with his province, to Mughal lordship.

20 Rudi Matthee, *Persia in Crisis: Safavid Decline and the Fall of Isfahan*. London–New York, 2012, 118–119; Matthee, 'Safavi Iran and the "Turkish Question" or How to Avoid a War on Multiple Fronts', *Iranian Studies* 52:3–4 (2019) 514–515.

between the Empire and Iran throughout this eighty-four-year peacetime should be read against this background.

2. The Cleansing of Safavid Traces in Iraq

Military withdrawal had to wait for the monarchies to ratify the protocol. Before anything else, as soon as taking Baghdad, Murad IV ordered the war-torn bulwarks to be built up as he commanded his troops to march onwards into Iran. On 28 December 1638 (two days after the victory), he installed Küçük Hasan Agha, then commander of the Janissary Corps, as the provisional pasha of Baghdad.[21] Janissary chief-of-staff (*kul kethüdâsı*, the third-ranking general of the Corps) [Arnavut] Bektaş Agha was to man the fortress at the head of 8,000 Janissaries as a wartime measure.[22] Murad IV soon set out for Constantinople, leaving his grand vizier Kemankeş Mustafa both as commander-in-chief of the war and as negotiator-plenipotentiary for the upcoming peace talks.[23]

Building up the fortress of Baghdad was the Empire's foremost business of the day, notwithstanding whether there would be peace or war. Drawing on the Imperial Army's manpower and the know-how of its technical staff, the undertaking began.[24]

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21 At the same time, Tezkireci Mûsâ Efendi was installed as judge of Baghdad and Zeylenabidin Efendi as *mufti*. Karaçelebizâde Abdülaziz, *Ravzatü'l-Ebrâr,* published in İbrâhim Özgül, *Ravzatü'l-Ebrâr [Kara Çelebi-Zade Abdülaziz Efendi'nin Ravzaü'l-Ebrâr Adlı Eseri (1299–1648) Tahlil ve Metin]*. PhD diss., Erzurum Atatürk University, 2010, 337; Naîmâ, *Târih*, 970, 999; Evliyâ Çelebi, *Seyahatnâme,* 263.

22 Hacı Halife Mustafa Kâtib Çelebi, *Fezleke*, published in Zeynep Aycibin *Kâtib Çelebi. Fezleke. Tahlil ve Metin. I–II–III.* PhD diss., Mimar Sinan University of Fine Arts, 2007, 897; Naîmâ*, Târih*, 894. In early March 1640, about a month after Murad IV's death and İbrâhim's enthronement, a large treasury was sent to Baghdad to pay for the accession bonus of the Sublime Court troops serving there. Topçular Kâtibi Abdülkadir names only Baghdad within the framework of the accession bonus sent out: Kadrî Efendi, *Târih*, II, 1137. But all Sublime Court soldiers serving in all provinces would get this payment. So, this highlight hints at the extraordinarily high number of janissaries standing watch at Baghdad as a wartime measure.

23 Naîmâ*, Târih*, 896–898. Before setting out, Murad IV accepted Efrâsiyaboğlu Ali's presents, which betokened that Basra yielded to the House of Osman. Murad reconfirmed Ali as the tributary lord of the Basra-centered principality of Efrâsiyaboğlu. The same deal took place with the lords of el-Hasa (Şefî Xan of Benî Hâlid), Oman (Şefî Xan), and the Islands of Hâridât (Şemseddin Emîr). The Bedouin chieftains and Kurdish *bey*s too, whose lands now laid within Ottoman borders, themselves came to the Imperial Marquee with presents. In return for military service to the state by reporting for duty with their troops under the banners of the governor-general of Baghdad whenever called up, they received imperial reconfirmation of their chieftainships and fiefdoms. As a symbolic sign of yielding to Ottoman lordship, aside from presents, the aforesaid prince(ling)s also sent the keys of their main strongholds. The prince of Basra, for example, sent the keys of Qurna. See Evliyâ Çelebi, *Seyahatnâme,* 261–262.

24 Murad IV allotted the restoration of each section of the fortress to one of the pashas and companies of various Court Corps along with the provincial troopers there. Each group thus

Kemankeş Mustafa himself oversaw the fulfilment before starting the onward march into Iran so as to dictate the conditions of peace. Abundant supplies, ammunition, and money were also stocked[25] for times of need. The fortifications thus came to an even better condition than before 1638. On 23 March 1639, the day of the grand vizier's setting off with the Imperial Army towards Iran, 12,000 new men were enlisted for the Baghdad Local Corps, besides the 8,000-strong Janissary force headed by chief-of-staff Bektaş Agha and the 1,000-strong Court Cavalry[26] contingent marked out to stand watch at this borderland stronghold.[27]

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shaped was helped by the campaigning architects, engineers, builders, and carpenters. Kadrî Efendi*, Târih,* II, 1104; Evliyâ Çelebi, *Seyahatnâme*, 260.

25 The *defterdar* himself, the new commander of the Jannisaries, the battalions of the Court Cavalry Corps, munitioners, gunners, artillery carters, the deputy of the treasury chancellor (*rûznâmçe efendisi*), secretaries of the financial department and the Imperial Registry, remaining Janissaries, the pashas of Rumelia, Anatolia, Karaman, Rum (Sivas), Aleppo, Syria, Tripoli, Dulkadir (Maraş), and Mosul, the provincial troopers there as a whole, etc. all participated in this mobilization to build up the fortifications of Baghdad, which had seen Ottoman sieges while being held by the Safavids. Vast numbers of pack animals that the Imperial Army had brought were also put to use. Kadrî Efendi*, Târih,* II, 1109.

26 This Court Cavalry contingent was left at Baghdad: Karaçelebizâde, *Ravzatü'l-Ebrâr*, 338; Kâtib Çelebi, *Fezleke* , 901; Kadrî Efendi*, Târih,* II, 1112. Because the Local Corps were being enlisted permanently and all of those hired were freshly coming into the governorate's service, a condensed register showing the breakdown of the corps- and intra-corps divisions was sent to Constantinople: *İbnülemin – Askeriye*, 267. See also BOA, *Bâb-ı Âsafî Defterhâne-i Âmire Defterleri* Vol. 93 for the register of the survey of the houses, shops, inns, gardens, and orchards in the city of Baghdad, done in March 1639.

27 In about ten years after the war ended, Baghdad would stand as a large fortress-city where Ottoman military power and political presence concentrated at the southern flank of the Iranian border. The walls, towers, and bastions were repaired, upgraded, and outfitted with strong, up-to-date guns. The upkeep of the moat was taken care of as if an onslaught could come from Iran anytime. For the defenders, the moat was to make up a favorable ground to withstand, so as to forestall the shah's army from beleaguering the city in full. A sizable garrison always stood watch on the bulwarks. Even trade caravans had to log themselves in and give up their weapons as they stepped in through the city gates. Baghdad's great breadth, organization, manning, and outfit compensated the drawbacks that could stem from its lying on lowland and the shallowness of the moat that girded it. Those walls that overlooked the land were better fortified, manned, and outfitted than those overlooking the Tigris. Jürgen Andersen – Volquard Iversen, *Orientalische Reise-Beschreibungen*. Schleswig, 1669, 166–167; Jean-Baptiste Tavernier, *Tavernier Seyahatnâmesi*. Trans. by Teoman Tunçdoğan. İstanbul, 2010, 236. Aside from the non-garrison military within the walls (such as the pasha's household troops), the garrison was made up of rotating Court Janissaries, artillerymen, and the Local Corps. Above all, the White Gate (east) and the Dark Gate (west), the keep, the Persian Bulwark (south), and the Imam-ı Azam Gate along with Küçükhasanpaşa Bastion, Melekpaşa Bastion, Mûsâpaşa Bastion, Hasanpaşa Tower, the Flat Tower, and Zülfikar Bastion were fitted out with guns more than enough to ward off a beleaguering Iranian army as standalone units even if almost no back-up was to come from the rest of the fortress. The great garrison sternly abided by the night watch, while officers patrolled in disguise for unannounced inspections. The Court Corps watched over the keep, where the treasury, stocks, and ammunition were kept, even more strictly. Evliyâ Çelebi,

The work on the bulwarks was completed on 18 February 1639. As a keepsake of his overcoming Iran, Murad IV had poems dating and celebrating his conquest of Baghdad engraved on the arches above the fortress gates and newly made buildings. Again to betoken the reinstated Ottoman sway, a full-fledged military-band (*mehterhâne*) was set up at Baghdad, which was said to be the best of its kind in all Ottoman frontier provinces (including the famous one at Cairo), playing twice daily.[28] Celebrations for enthronements, births of imperial princes, and victories at faraway frontiers would be held in Baghdad with well-wrought festivities.[29] The care taken in Baghdad went beyond the practice of stamping provincial centres with marks of Ottoman lordship. Such occasions embodied the imperial policy of showing off might from this prestigious metropolis to neighbouring Iran.

On 5 May 1639, the commander-in-chief shifted Küçük Hasan Pasha to the governorate of Van and installed in his stead Bıyıklı Derviş Mehmed Pasha to Baghdad. Right after signing the Border Protocol at Zuhab on 17 May 1639, Kemankeş Mustafa Pasha called off the Imperial Army's march into Iran, and started the withdrawal. Back at Constantinople, in the second event of the week-long processions held in mid-June to mark the imperial court's triumphal comeback from the Iranian war, the captured Safavid dignitaries (most notably Kumuşlu Mîr-Fettah, his son,[30] Halef Xan, Aliyâr Xan) and one hundred other Kızılbaş military prisoners were paraded while they were made to play their trumpets and kettledrums through the public, which had thronged the way in ranks to behold the conqueror monarch. Murad IV's decrees consenting to the agreed-upon clauses of the protocol and the confirmation of the appointments to Baghdad, which also bestowed vizierate upon Derviş Mehmed, were sent out from Constantinople in July and reached the grand vizier's headquarters in Diyarbekir on the 24th. Kemankeş Mustafa thereupon let go of some of his forces in mid-July[31] and set out for the capital. Each appointment from then on to the governorship of Baghdad would come along with the bestowal

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Seyahatnâme, 263–267. After the garrison was more than filled with Court and Local troops, Kurdish tribal militias were entrusted with the safety of sections of the countryside. Kâtib Çelebi, *Fezleke*, 900; Kadrî Efendi*, Târih,* II, 1127.

28 The poems dating and commemorating the conquest were engraved on white marble in pure gold with *celî* writing, so that they could be read even from afar. Evliyâ Çelebi, *Seyahatnâme,* 260, 263. The kettle-drum played by the Baghdad Military Band was so great that the player needed to climb a few stairs to set himself up. The fame of this kettle-drum had spread to other lands in the Ottoman Empire and Iran. *Ibid*., 266.

29 See Nazmi-zâde [Hüseyin] Murtezâ [Efendi], *Gülşen-i Hulefâ: Bağdat Târihi 762–1717*. Ed. by Mehmet Karataş. Ankara, 2014, 235, 239, 241–242, 270, 273, 291, 295 for the celebrations and ceremonies held in Baghdad for the enthronements of İbrâhim (1640), Mehmed IV (1648), the births of imperial princes Mehmed (IV) (1642), Ahmed (III) (1673), and the conquests of Chania (1645), Rethymo (1646), Várad (1660), Újvár (1663), Candia (1669), and Kamianets-Podilskyi (1672).

30 See below for more details on these two men.

31 Kâtib Çelebi, *Fezleke*, 907–910; Kadrî Efendi*, Târih,* II, 1122–1123; Küpeli, *Osmanlı–Safevi Münâsebetleri*, 277–278; Naîmâ*, Târih*, 929, 936.

of vizierial rank if the appointed governor[32] was not already a vizier.[33] Thus, this top *deputy of the Monarchy* at Baghdad overlooking Iran would always be a governor-general.[34]

The grounds for swapping Küçük Hasan with Bıyıklı Derviş Mehmed were seemingly military and disciplinary. The goal was to clinch the hold on the retaken province and undo the Safavid influence. The grand vizier, with an eye to the discipline and authority he wanted in the wake of the reconquest, deemed Küçük Hasan's ways of governing too easy-going to wipe the legacy of the fifteen years of Safavid occupation. Also, with an eye to the commandership of the Baghdad garrison that numbered more than 20,000 as a wartime measure – almost as great as a mid-sized field army of a kingdom, Derviş Mehmed fit in with the "subduing administrator[35]" role that Kemankeş Mustafa had in mind[36] for the leadership at the Iranian borderlands. Even after the ratifications were sent out, these extraordinary measures were not called off right away. Until the end of April 1640, almost a year after the border protocol, Bektaş Agha and the extraordinary Court Corps companies left with him kept on standing watch against Iran. And furthermore, Constantinople would not lessen their strength at least throughout the next eleven years.[37]

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32 Ottoman terminology: *beylerbeyi* / *mir-i miran* / *emirü'l-ümera* / *vali*; Safavid terminology: *hâkim*.

33 A governor with vizierial rank, namely a three-*tuğ* pasha, had far more authority and sanction power than a governor without vizierial grade, namely a two-*tuğ* pasha. This appointment was made above all for borderlands of strategic weight in foreign dealings, such as Budapest (later Belgrade), Egypt, and Baghdad. In urgent developments between states, three-*tuğ* pashas, unlike their two-*tuğ* colleagues, could themselves take the lead and act forthwith until directives came from the Sublime Porte. With the authority drawn from the Imperial Council connection of vizierate, a three-*tuğ* pasha could hold the "padishah's council" and deal out justice, even when he only passed by or was otherwise present in any province governed by a two-*tuğ* pasha. Until called-off in 1642 by grand vizier Kemankeş Mustafa, vizier-governors could even draw the padishah's monogram, thus issuing their own orders as the padishah's decrees. See Uzunçarşılı, *Merkez ve Bahriye Teşkilatı*, 206–207; Halil İnalcık, 'Vezir', *TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi*. Vol. 43. Ankara, 2013, 90–92; M. Uğur Derman, 'Tuğra', *TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi*. Vol. 41. Ankara, 2012, 336–339.

34 Ottoman terminology: *vali/beylerbeyi – vezir*; Safavid terminology: *beylerbeyi*.

35 "hâkim-i kahhâr".

36 At his four-month tenure, Küçük Hasan had made a name for himself as a righteous administrator by holding court to deal out justice. What was awaited of Bıyıklı Derviş Mehmed, on the other hand, was to not be so forbearing as his forerunner, and to keep the province's Kurdish and Arab tribes under discipline. Nazmizâde, *Gülşen-i Hulefâ*, 232–234.

37 Kadrî Efendi, *Târih,* II, 1140, 1160, 1162, 1173. At the commandership of Court Janissaries at Baghdad, Bektaş Agha had likewise extraordinarily high-ranking immediate successors, such as *zağarcıbaşı* ("head-houndkeeper," fourth-ranking general of the Corps) Hamza Agha, and *seksoncubaşı* ("head-mastiffkeeper," fifth-ranking general of the Corps) İbrâhim Agha who, after serving outstandingly at the siege of Chania against Venice, took Arnavut Bektaş's stead in Baghdad as of early December 1645. Karaçelebizâde, *Ravzatü'l-Ebrâr*, 380. As late as 1651, the Court Janissaries manning Baghdad were still 8,000-strong. İsmail

3. Peace Consummation Becomes Entangled, Missions Shuttle for Resolution

The swap of war prisoners began once the ratifications were sent out, and would go on until the later missions of 1641 would fulfil their business. First, Shah Safi sent back Atabeğli Murtazâ Pasha (governor of Çıldır) along with some other pashas who had been held in captivity since the earlier years of the war. İsmâil Beyg Çepni was named the shah's commissioner to hand over this batch of captives.[38]

Before long, Murad IV died unawaitedly. His health was worsening since he had come back to Constantinople. After drinking overmuch along with his friends Emirgûneoğlu (Yusuf Pasha a.k.a. Tahmaspkulu Xan Kaçar, the Iranian second vizier of the Ottoman Imperial Council) and Silahdar Mustafa (Pasha, now the admiral-in-chief) in the latter's feast at İbrâhimpaşa Palace, he became bedridden, losing his life on 8 February 1640 at twenty-seven years old. His brother İbrâhim followed him on the throne while Kemankeş Mustafa Pasha kept the grand vizierate.[39] The Safavids were looking up to Kemankeş Mustafa as the architect of the peace of Zuhab. They therefore deemed his abiding at the Empire's helm an assurance that the Ottomans would not call off the deal, as to be seen below.

At once, top-ranking Iranian prisoners of war at Constantinople, who until then, out of respect to their standing, had likely been subjected to a kind of forced abode at the capital rather than imprisonment, wrote a letter to Iran telling of Murad IV's death. The dispatch was intercepted in Scutari on February 9, and thus came these captives' favourable conditions to an end. They were locked up at Rumelihisarı, the stronghold to the north of Constantinople at the European banks of Bosphorus.[40]

News of the imperial enthronement was broadcasted with festivities along the Iranian border. Küçük Hasan Pasha (governor-general of Van) sent an agent bearing papers to the grand vizierate, telling that the shah of Iran was abiding by the peace, and Kemankeş Mustafa Pasha laid the summaries of these papers before the new padishah.[41] The news of Murad IV's death were welcome at the Safavid court.[42] It

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Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devleti Teşkilatlarından Kapıkulu Ocakları I: Acemi Ocağı ve Yeniçeri Ocağı*. Ankara, 1988, 329.

38 Muhammed Yusuf Vâlih Kazvînî-Isfahânî, *Huld-i Berîn [İran der Zaman-ı Şah Safi ve Şah Abbas-ı Düvvüm]*. Ed. by Muhammed Rızâ Nasîrî. Tahran, 2003, 291.

39 Even in his term under Murad IV, he was an outstandingly strong-willed minister, insomuch that he did not shy away even from not fulfilling some already-issued imperial handwrits (*hatt-ı hümâyun*, an imperial decree with the padishah's own handwriting on top, or an order that the padishah himself wrote down from scratch, which were even more overbearing than an imperial decree), on the grounds that a certain matter was not for the good of the state. He also did not shy away from openly reproaching the padishah at a face-to-face meeting for his lack of knowledge in statecraft. İ. Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Târihi*. Vol. 3:1. Ankara, 1983, 206–207, 209–215.

40 Giorgio Rota, 'The Death of Tahmâspqolî Xân Qâjâr According to a Contemporary Ragusan Source', in *Iran und iranisch geprägte Kulturen. Studien zum 65. Geburtstag von Bert. G. Fragner*. Markus Ritter – Ralph Kauz – Birgitt Hoffmann. Wiesbaden, 2008, 56.

41 Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arşivi, *Evrak*, z.7022 e. 110 [d.794 g.105].

42 Vâlih Kazvînî-Isfahânî, *Huld-i Berîn*, 294.

seems that his steadfastness in the war still made the Safavids fear him even after the signing of the peace. His death, in the eyes of the Safavids, must have lessened the likelihood that a new war start by the will of the Ottoman monarch himself.

The news of Murad IV's death and İbrâhim's accession must have reached Isfahan about the time that Hamzapaşazâde Mehmed Agha (a court affiliate[43] who, as envoy-extraordinary, had brought Murad IV's peace-letter and the grand vizier's letters ratifying the Border Protocol of Zuhab in answer to Shah Safi's pledge-deed handed over at Constantinople by envoy Mehemmedkulu Sültan Çağatay) had just come to the Safavid court but had not yet started his official business. This brought about an unprecedented situation. Peace treaties in force formally had to be reconfirmed by new Ottoman rulers upon enthronement. However, the succession of 1640 happened at a time after the peace protocol had been underwritten, the ratificatory Safavid pledge-deed had been handed over to the imperial court, and the ratificatory Ottoman peace-letter had been sent out, but before the imperial envoy could hand over this peace-letter to the shah of Iran and be sent back along with the shah's letter acknowledging the takeover. Therefore, the shah could technically keep away from meeting the Ottoman envoy on the grounds that the sender was now dead. Likewise could the padishah technically declare the envoy as well as the letters he bore null on the grounds that Murad IV, who had sent them, had died before their takeover by the shah.

Likely both so as to forestall an interregnum of documents from endangering the fresh peace and to soothe his own restlessness, Sultan İbrâhim Khan sent Shah Safi a letter of friendship. In the same dispatch, Kemankeş Mustafa Pasha too sent a letter[44] to the "augustly-fortunate Shah his sublime Majesty, the sky of the sun of sultanate, of Saturn-gateway, of KeyChosroes-army.[45]" The grand vizier thereby shared with Safi the news of the death of Murad IV "the supreme sultan, premier khaqan, shadow-caster upon the realms of Arabia and Persia, asylum of the rulers of the Turks and Daylam, the deceased Lord-Sovereign,[46]" and the "august accession[47]" to the "Ottoman throne of cosmic mastership, which is the asylum of the Cyrsus-es and the refuge of the Caesers,[48]" by "the supreme of the sultans of the Earth, the premier of the khaqans, shah-of-shahs, Sultan İbrâhim Khan."[49]

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43 *Müteferrika*[*-i Dergâh-ı Âlî*]. See Ebulkasım Haydar Beyg Evoğlu, *Mecma'ü'l-İnşâ*, British Library Ms. Add. 7668, f. 277b for the *müteferrika*ship of Mehmed Agha.

44 Evoğlu, *Mecma'ü'l-İnşâ*, ff. 276b–277b.

45 "sipihr-i mihr-i saltanat, … âlî-hazret … Keyvân-eyvân … Keyhüsrev-sipâh … Şâh, … baht-ı hümâyun".

46 "sultânü'l-a'zam, hâkânü'l-ekrem, sâye-endâz-ı memâlikü'l-Arab ve'l-Acem, … melce'-i … mülûkü'l-Türk ve'd-Deylem … merhûm Hudâvendigâr".

47 "cülûs-ı hümâyunları".

48 "melâz…-ı Ekâsire ve … melce'-i … Kayâsıre … olan taht-ı … Osmânî ve … sâhib-kırânî".

49 "a'zamü's-selâtîn-i rûy-i zemîn, ekrem-i havâkîn, … şehinşâh … Sultan İbrâhim Han." *Ibid*.

Next, the grand vizier told how he, as he kept his post, "submitted" to his new lord the "conditions of the treaty[50]" struck between Murad IV and Shah Safi, and how İbrâhim answered in speech:

> "because Our deceased brother Sultan Murad Khan his Majesty has made peace with the Shah of Persia, also because pledge-deeds from both sides have been given and taken, it is necessary to conform to the dogma *do not violate your oaths after you affirm them*. So long as no violation of the pledge arises from that side, it is appropriate that the path of friendship be open from this side too."[51]

Kemankeş Mustafa thus guaranteed that as long as the Safavids did not go against treaty conditions, the Ottomans would abide by the peace, in the making of which he himself had strived. But in the *sanctio* below, which looks more like a *comminatio*, the grand vizier spelled out for the shah what he indeed meant:

> "Namely as follows: if Your illustrious party shows leniency in safeguarding this treaty, does not observe the peace with heart and soul, and lets arise conditions that indicate the violation of the pledge, then it will be imperative that an unwished-for move also be made by this side. Accordingly, if Your illustrious desire is friendship, You shall please to show diligence to the execution of its necessities, and hurry in the dispatch of missions and missives with gifts worthy of [the shah-of-shah's] august presence.[52]"

Kemankeş Mustafa Pasha also sent a letter[53] to the field marshal of Iran – "[Gürcü] Rüstem Xan [Saakadze] his sublime Excellency, the administrator of the shahly state, the xan of xans of the shah.[54]" Aside from first Kemankeş Mustafa's mention of his "previous friendship[55]" of personal nature with Rüstem Saakadze, in line with which he also shared the news of the "soundness of [his] health,"[56] and then the technical as well as rhetorical make-ups needed owing to the change of the

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50 "ahvâl-i … muâhedeyi … arz eyledikte".

51 "Çünki merhum karındaşımız Sultan Murad Han hazretleri … Acem Şahı ile sulh edip tarafeynden ahidnâmeler verilip alınmış, *ve lâ tenkudû eymâne ba'de tevkîdihâ* nass…ına imtisâl lâzımdır. Mâdem ki ol taraftan nakz-ı ahd… sudûr etme…dikçe, … bu taraftan dahi … dostluk tarîkası … güşâde olmak münâsiptir." *Ibid*.

52 "Şöyle ki, bu muâhede…nin himâyet…i umûrunda cânib-i şerîfinizden müsâmaha olunup cân-u-gönülden sulhu riâyet etmeyip nakz-ı ahdi müş'ir ahvâl sudûr eder ise, ol vakit bu taraftan dahi hilâf-ı me'mul hareket olunmak iktizâ eder. Ona göre dostluk murâd-ı şerîfiniz ise, levâzımın icrâsıyla ihtimâm buyurulup … huzûr-ı hümâyun…a lâyık … hedâyâ ile … irsâl-i rüsül ve resâilde isti'câl buyuralar." *Ibid*.

53 Evoğlu, *Mecma'ü'l-İnşâ*, ff. 282ab–283a.

54 "meâlî-nisâb, … devlet-iyâb, … müdebbir-i … devlet-i şâhî, … hân-ı hânân şâh … Rüstem Hân".

55 "müvâlât-ı sâlife".

56 "sıhhat-i ten-dürüstî".

addressee, this letter is but a version of the one written to the shah at the same time. And as he did with the shah, the grand vizier demanded from the marshal of Iran too that the Safavid court not stall envoy Hamzapaşazâde Mehmed Agha any longer, and send a reputable ambassador along with worthy gifts.[57]

In these letters, the name of the diplomat bearing them was not mentioned. This hints that he may have been sent out shortly upon the enthronement – likely in late February. The letters must have been forwarded to Hamzapaşazâde Mehmed Agha in a hurry so that they could reach him before his meeting with the shah and be handed over together with the original dispatch. Besides İbrâhim's restlessness, which can be sensed from the writs shuttling within the Empire (to be seen below), the unprecedented gap of law arising from the death of an Ottoman ruler after bindingly agreeing to a peace but before the fulfilment of the last deed of ratification had also driven the Sublime Porte to make known the imperial succession to the Safavid court.

These letters do not put forth something new in the set hierarchy, by which the padishah ranked as supreme emperor and the shah as king. Noteworthy is the grand vizier's taking the field marshal of Iran, rather than the chief vizier,[58] as his addressee and greeting the marshal with an *inscriptio* of regal degree. The choice of Rüstem Saakadze as addressee instead of chief vizier Sarı Taki can be explained with the imperial court's sticking with wartime settings and not yet deeming the peace consummated. It therefore kept on dealing with the marshal of Iran, and not the chief vizier, as the absolute deputy of the shah and hence the correspondence partner, if not match, of the padishah's commander-in-chief.

The highlight of these letters is their threatening tone. To ensure that the Ottoman position be understood, it would be enough to let the shah and the marshal of Iran know that as long as the Safavids abided by the peace conditions, so would the Ottomans. Yet, putting a *sanctio* into these letters, and in that making an elegant, in-wording implicit but in-meaning explicit threat like a *comminatio*, and to top it all, the inclusion thereof even in the grand vizier's letter to the shah – a genre which was to reflect the respect that an appointed prime minister had to show towards a reigning king whatever the particularities of their hierarchical relationship and the agenda of the correspondence were – are already odd, if not unheard-of, and bear witness to what the Sublime Porte wanted to utter notwithstanding İbrâhim's restlessness: if Isfahan was to breach the agreed-upon peace, Constantinople would strike back hard and in onslaught. In other words, through these letters of 1640, the Ottomans warned the Safavids not to *go farther and fare worse*.

Seemingly in early summer, Beşir, the agent of Küçük Hasan Pasha (of Van), came back from Tabriz bearing Rüstem Xan Saakadze's letters addressed to the

57 Evoğlu, *Mecma'ü'l-İnşâ*, ff. 282ab–283a.

58 *itimâdü'd-devle*, but also *vezîr-i/sadr-ı a'zam*, hence grand vizier, which is more common in modern English usage for the Safavid premiers, but is replaced here with "chief vizier" so as to not be mistaken for the Ottoman grand vizier.

pasha (the imperial court already knew that this emissary had been sent from Van to Iran). Rüstem Saakadze wrote about two strongholds that had to be torn down in line with the treaty, and said that the peace was steady. Beşir also brought the news that the [Ottoman] envoy [Hamzapaşazâde Mehmed Agha] had met the shah [at the welcome audience] in late May 1640, and was about to be let off along with a new ambassador from the shah. Rüstem's papers were forwarded to the imperial court. In his summation to the padishah, the grand vizier foresaw that good would come out of this.[59]

On 15 September 1640, Bıyıklı Derviş Mehmed too drew up his exposition to the grand vizier: the shah had clothed the padishah's envoy with a robe of honour, held him in high esteem, and commanded his dignitaries as well as aghas to give feasts in the envoy's honor in turns; someone who had witnessed these came to Baghdad and gave the news. It seemed that Safi would send his chief-of-staff of the musketeers with gifts as envoy. Tradesmen coming from Iran to Baghdad too confirmed the news. The pasha of Baghdad also said that he would soon forward more precise intelligence, as he was yet waiting for his formerly sent-out spies to come back [from Iran].[60]

The same report had it that the head of the shah's guard – Canıpek Xan Şamlu – had strongly counselled Safi not to fight with the padishah: because first, Iran would become fully encircled and crippled in a war with the Empire, for it was already fighting with India and the Uzbeks. Next, the monarch of Rûm was already greater [in strength] than the shah of Iran, the chief of the shah's guard reportedly said. Thirdly – this must have been spiced up to calm down İbrâhim's restlessness, – this Safavid commander had underscored that the new padishah was even bolder and

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59 Topkapı, *Evrak*, z.7022 e.193 [d.795 g.82]. This undated document and the related series of summations – z.7022 e.244 [d.796 g.27], z.7022 e.249 [d.796 g.32], z.7022 e.315 [d.796 g.97] – are misdated to h. 18. B. 1058 by the archivist. Any possibility other than that the year should be h.1050 [1640] is ruled out, however, when one bears in mind firstly the padishah's restlessness about whether the shah would reconfirm the peace by sending an ambassador or restart the war, next the new padishah's lack of self-confidence as to how he was compared to Murad IV, thirdly that the padishah was grown up enough to handwrite commands, fourthly that a Hasan Pasha was the governor-general of Van, fifthly that an Ahmed Pasha was the governor-general of Diyarbekir, and lastly that a Rüstem Xan in Tabriz oversaw withdrawal steps after the pacification. See Fikret Sarıcaoğlu, 'Melek Ahmed Paşa', *TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi.* Vol. 29. Ankara, 2004 42–44; Küpeli, *Osmanlı–Safevi Münâsebetleri*, 278.

60 Topkapı, *Evrak*, z.3420 e.1 [d.640 g.5]. The undated document is misdated to h.1058 by the archivist. However, firstly, there is a grown-up padishah measuring his reign against that of Murad IV. Then, there is a Mehmed [Pasha] as [the Ottoman governor-general] of Baghdad. Thirdly, there is a Mehmed as Ottoman envoy at Isfahan. Fourthly, there is uncertainty on whether the shah would abide by the peace or choose war. Fifthly, there is Canıpek Xan Şamlu as the incumbent head of the Safavid royal guard. And, lastly, there is [Efrâsiyaboğlu] Ali Pasha at the helm of Basra. All these at the same time are only possible in the year h.1050 [1640].

more daring than the Murad IV as well as being clever and wise. All in all, he had suggested that the shah abide by the peace so that the Safavids can strike back against onslaughts from India and the Uzbeks. Word had it that, what had made Safi to consolidate the peace with the Ottomans by sending a congratulatory embassy instead of restarting the war was such strong counsel by Canıpek Şamlu. The pasha of Baghdad also shared the news that a mission had come from a county of Iran for trade- and pilgrimage-related business, and forwarded to the grand vizierate the letter brought by this mission too. Last but not least, Bıyıklı Derviş Mehmed also told of the hearsay that Efrâsiyaboğlu Ali Pasha of Basra had sent a footman to the shah, whom Safi had much welcomed. However, he believed that there was nothing tangible to suspect, as the roaming of such words was commonplace at borderlands.[61]

Before long, a courier from Melek Ahmed Pasha the governor-general of Diyarbekir reached Constantinople after a nine-day trip. He brought papers from his own lord as well as from the pasha of Van: as had been laid before the imperial court earlier, Safavid troops were gathering, however they were not on the march and their target was not known; though the borderlands were yet safe, the governors-general held the troops at the Iranian frontier on the watch.[62] Soon, another courier from [Küçük] Hasan Pasha reached Constantinople after a sixteen-day trip. The governor-general of Van let the grand vizier know that unlike his former news, there was "no [military] gathering of the Kızılbaş,[63]" peace was steady, borderlands were safe, and a [Safavid] ambassador was about to come. İbrâhim scrawled an *imperial handwrit* on the grand-vizier's summation, saying that he awaited good news.[64]

Having misgivings about the outcome of this business, İbrâhim later said in another imperial handwrit to the grand vizier that he had thought this through, and he asked: "otherwise they used to fear the deceased padishah, do they not fear Us?[65]" In his summation of answer, the grand vizier strived to soothe İbrâhim's restlessness by underscoring that whoever from the House of Osman reigned, the enemy feared him to the utmost owing to his might, wealth, and military, there was still time for the ambassador to show up, the Iranian borderlands were safe, Van, Şehrizor, and Baghdad were watched over by the now-twofold military personnel deployed there with imperial handwrits, and spies had been sent out, who would soon come back with intelligence. Kemankeş Mustafa assured the padishah that any evil to be done by foes would hit back the perpetrator; the Ottoman State was mighty and there was nothing to upset İbrâhim's "august mind[66]".[67]

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61 *Ibid*.
62 Topkapı, *Evrak*, z.7022 e.249 [d.796 g.32]. See note 59 for the dating of the document.
63 "Kızılbaş'ın cemiyeti olmayıp"
64 Topkapı, *Evrak*, z.7022 e.244 [d.796 g.27]. See note 59 for the dating of the document.
65 "[Kızılbaş'ta olan elçi ahvalinden tefekküre vardım.] Yoksa merhum pâdişahtan havfederlerdi, bizden havfetmezler mi?"
66 "hâtır-ı hümâyun[larına kesel verecek bir nesne yoktur]".

The aforesaid summations, imperial handwrits, letters, and reports lay bare that the new padishah worried much about how the Safavid court would react to Murad IV's unawaited death. İbrâhim must have feared that others deemed him a ruler weaker than his brother and that this might hearten old foes to start a war. İbrâhim must have therefore become obsessed about what would come out of the Ottoman legation at Isfahan and whether a standalone Safavid ambassador would be sent, the nonfulfillment of which could forebode a war. It was however the new padishah himself, rather than imperial dignitaries, who feared this likelihood. The news from the governors at the borderland, the grand vizier's opinion, and the content of the Sublime Porte's diplomatic letters all betoken that Ottoman statesmen neither deemed it likely that Shah Safi would restart the war nor thought that a war with Iran would jeopardize the Empire's holdings; a new showdown with the Safavids could even be in the Ottomans' further behalf.

İbrâhim's restless waiting at last came to an end. In acknowledgement of the takeover of Murad IV's peace-letter and to wish İbrâhim well on his enthronement, Shah Safi ordered on 15 October 1640 that his ambassador to the padishah get ready.[68] The shah did not know whether the new padishah would acknowledge Murad IV's peace. Safi was therefore no less restless than İbrâhim, insomuch that the Safavids withheld their already decided-upon campaign to take back Kandahar from Mughal India until the outcome of this embassy to Constantinople would become known.[69] The start of this embassy had been belated, for the Safavid court had to make up its mind about the gap of law stemming from Murad IV's death before the fulfilment of the peace consummation, and, also, so as to let Hamzapaşazâde Mehmed Agha run through the steps of his diplomatic business after a too long wait owing to the aforesaid uncertainty.[70] Meanwhile, the lord (*melik*) of Imereti, who had stayed on as an Ottoman vassal after 1639, sent an emissary to Shah Safi bearing gifts.[71] Imereti had once been vassal to the Safavids amid the last war, so it seems that by means of this undertaking, its ruler wanted to set up contact with Iran on the groundwork of the new status quo.

Hamzapaşazâde Mehmed's mission was far from being ceremonial. The consummation of the peace hinged on his handing over the imperial letter to the shah at an audience and then being duly let off along with gifts and the shah's ambassador. Hence, the Hamzapaşazâde Mehmed legation to Isfahan and the Mehemmedkulu Çağatay legation to Constantinople are not to be deemed as the first diplomatic contacts after the peace of Zuhab. These two rather made up the last deed

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67 Topkapı, *Evrak*, z.7022 e.315 [d.796 g.97]. See note 59 for the dating of the document.

68 Isfahânî, *Hülâsatü's-Siyer*, 286. Note that the dating of the Islamic lunar years in this book is flawed. Each date provided for the happenings after 1638 should be set right by adding one to the given year.

69 Matthee, *Persia in Crisis*, 123.

70 İskender Beyg, *Zeyl-i Âlem-ârâ*, 245.

71 Vâlih Kazvînî-Isfahânî, *Huld-i Berîn*, 299.

putting the deal of 1639 into force. Therefore, the after-Zuhab period rather begins not with the start but with the fulfilment of these missions.

Though stalled off for too long a time, Murad IV's envoy was in the end much welcome at Isfahan. Kara Xan Şamlu, brother of head of the royal guard (*korucu-başı*) Canıpek Xan Şamlu, was named Hamzapaşazâde Mehmed Agha's host-officer at the head of a group of military officers and notables leading the procession into the capital. At Safi's behest, the Ottoman envoy was taken to the new Royal Grand Mosque[72] of Isfahan to perform the Friday prayer together with the gathered congregation and dignitaries, and after the prayer, chief-justice Mirza Habibullah Kerekî hosted him at an event held in his honour. On later days, chief vizier Sarı Taki and Canıpek Şamlu hosted him at separate events. After formalities were over, the shah feasted, entertained, and honourably let off Hamzapaşazâde Mehmed. He was to go back to Constantinople along with Yirmidört İbrâhim Xan Kaçar – the governor of Berda (in Karabağ) and now ambassador to the padishah bearing the shah's and the chief vizier's letters as well as gifts.[73] The imperial envoy and the royal ambassador must have set out from Isfahan in the winter of 1641.

Back in Constantinople, Kumuşlu Mîr-Fettah's son (Mîrfettahoğlu) was put to death in late-March/early-April 1641, as his "removal was [deemed] necessary[74]".[75] His and his father's former conduct with the Ottomans may hint at what the grounds for this exception to the swap of prisoners could be. Mîr-Fettah's entanglement with the Ottomans begins with Shah Abbas I's sending him and his troops to Baghdad beleaguered by the Ottomans in 1626, and later on his leading the defence there. When the Ottomans had beleaguered Erivan, which ended in the fortress's fall (1635), Shah Safi too had sent Mîr-Fettah, then the colonel of the musketeers of Isfahan (*tüfenkçi binbaşısı*[76]), to strengthen the garrison. When the commander of the fortress, (Akçakoyunlu[77]) Emirgûneoğlu Tahmaspkulu Xan Kaçar, had been negotiating the terms of yielding, Mîr-Fettah had opened fire on Ottoman troops amid the truce and thus sabotaged the deal. Again, when the Ottomans beleaguered Baghdad in 1638, he was raised to the commandership of the shah's musketeers (*tüfenkçi ağası*) and entrusted with leading the musketeers manning Baghdad. As

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72 "mescid-i câmi'-i cedîd-i şâhî".

73 Vâlih Kazvînî-Isfahânî, *Huld-i Berîn*, 301; Bîcen, [*Sahîfe-i Girâmî*], published in Giorgio Rota, *La Vita e i Tempi di Rostam Khan (Edizione e Traduzione Italiana del Ms. British Library Add 7,655.* Wien, 2009, 417; see Küpeli, *Osmanlı–Safevi Münâsebetleri*, 270n, 272, 279 for the cognomen "Hamzapaşazâde" of Mehmed Agha.

74 "izâlesi lâzımdır".

75 Kâtib Çelebi, *Fezleke*, 896, 916; Vecîhî Hasan Efendi, *Târih-i Vecîhî*, f. 20b in Buğra Atsız, *Das Osmanische Reich um die Mitte des 17. Jahrhunderts. Nach den Chronicken des Vecihi (1637–1660) und des Mehmed Halifa (1633–1660)*. München, 1977.

76 The title *minbaşı*/*binbaşı*, namely. the "head-of-a-thousand," historically marked a rank roughly overlapping with *colonel*, unlike its use today in the Turkish Armed Forces for the lower rank of *major*/*squadron leader*.

77 Faruk Sümer, 'Kaçarlar', *TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi*. ek–1. Ankara, 2016, 700–701.

Gürcü Bektaş Xan (Mirimanidze), the Safavid commander of Baghdad, consulted his officers about giving in, Mîr-Fettah strongly gainsaid, knowing that if he fell into Ottoman hands, Murad IV's wrath would befall him before anyone else, owing to what he had done in Erivan in 1635. After yielding, some Safavid commanders, among whom was Mîr-Fettah, hindered the emptying of the fortress, did not lay down weapons, and did not let go of their troops. The Ottoman troops coming into the fortress made this, together with the breach of truce back in 1635, an excuse to slaughter the defenders, and Mîr-Fettah fell captive. Yet, even after this, and although Ottoman forces already held parts of the fortress, his sons still did not give in or leave their weapons. This then stirred up the next slaughter. Only thereafter did his sons end up alongside other Safavid captives.[78] Mîr-Fettah seems to have been put to death together with his son.[79] By the time of these executions in 1641, Kumuşlu Agha-Tâhir, brother of Mîr-Fettah, was the shah's head of musketeers.[80]

The Ottoman court thus set aside and put to death a prisoner of war who had twice breached a truce given to him. Even more striking is that at the time of the execution, the convicts' brother/uncle was a military dignitary of Safavid Iran. Iranian sources speak of neither the execution nor a reaction thereto from the Shahdom, and Ottoman sources do not give further clues. However, as is seen from the final account of the Habsburg minister-resident in Constantinople, Johann Rudolf Schmid, Mîrfettahoğlu and a few other prisoner dignitaries, who had been until then held honourably, for they had yielded, but who following Murad IV's death were locked up in Seven Towers, were put to death in consummation of the peace, as part of the deal that came out from the latest bargaining between the two states. The general consensus of Ottoman statesmen was against putting them to death though. Instead, so as to hearten likely defections from Iran, they spoke for handling these high-ranking captives kindly; such personalities, if disheartened by executions, would be driven to stay as the shah's true servants to the death. The Habsburg minister-resident also remarked that the deal was made between Iran and an Ottoman Empire stronger than it, that neither court would think of starting a war but this could happen only if an uprising in the Ottoman east would lay the groundwork for it, and that Iran's weakness against the Empire was otherwise too inbuilt to be deemed temporary or conjunctural.[81]

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78 Küpeli, *Osmanlı–Safevi Münâsebetleri*, 153, 159, 212, 214, 248, 259, 263–265; Arak'el of Tabriz, *Book of History*. Trans. by George A. Bournoutian. Costa Mesa, 2010, 444.

79 Rota, 'Death of Tahmâspqolî Xân Qâjâr', 56–57

80 Vâlih Kazvînî-Isfahânî, *Huld-i Berîn*, 332. In the following works, Agha-Tâhir is mistaken for his older brother Mîr-Fettah, seemingly misled by the former's nickname "the second Mîr-Fettah": Muhammed Tâhir Vahîd Kazvînî, *Abbâsnâme, yâ Şerh-i Zindegânî-yi 22-Sâle-i Şâh Abbâs-ı Sâni (1052–1073)*. Ed. by İbrâhîm Dihgân. Erâk, hs.1329, 56–58; Kathryn Babayan, *The Waning of the Qizilbash: The Spiritual and the Temporal in the Seventeenth-century Iran*. PhD diss., Princeton University, 1993, 316. Besides, Kumuşlu Agha-Tâhir too was put to death after 1643 when he still held the aforesaid post.

81 Johann Rudolf Schmid, *Finalrelation 1–4 vom 12. November 1643*, published in

As it seems, Kumuşlu Agha-Tâhir had to politically disown his brother and nephew after the peace of Zuhab, for the latter breached the given truce and brought about the wiping out of the Safavids' best army. Those picked out were put to death after arrangement with the Safavids, so the deal thereof must have been made either through informal links or border diplomacy between governors. The Sublime Porte thereby got rid of an untoward captive who had again and again breached truces, and the Shahdom got rid of high-ranking commanders whose headstrongness while yielding Baghdad had cost the Safavids the slaughter of their tens of thousands of choice troops. Thus, by means of these political executions, the two sides did away with likely grounds for later strife between one another. That the Sublime Porte agreed to put them to death while negotiating as the overbearing side shows that it did not deem a renewed war with the House of Safi to be in its behalf, which it thought would be best upheld by making the peace last. Thus, instead of setting an example to win over and spur high-ranking defectors from Iran in a later war, it chose to consolidate its winnings already on hand by getting rid of those whose further stay at the imperial court would belittle the shah. It is highly likely that the Safavids had at the outset asked for the handover of these persons, but the Ottomans, from a position of strength, must have set aside these ones, and agreed only to putting them to death. Thereby they would still gladden the Safavid court while underscoring once again that they had the upper hand.

Safavid ambassador Yirmidört İbrâhim Kaçar, alongside Ottoman envoy Hamzapaşazâde Mehmed, reached Constantinople on 16 June 1641, about three months after the executions. The padishah entrusted grand vizier Kemankeş Mustafa Pasha, marshal of the Imperial Council (*dîvan-ı hümâyun çavuşbaşısı* / *dîvan beği*) Boynueğri Durak Agha, and the Privy Arms-Bearer (*silahdâr-ı şehriyârî*) with overseeing the welcome at the capital. Hüseyinpaşa Palace, near Bayezid Square, was earmarked for housing the embassy. However, meeting or communicating with the guests was strongly forbidden for anyone from outside. A janissary captain and his company were pinned to the embassy, both to ensure its safety and control its contacts.[82] The Sublime Porte wanted to oversee the flow of news to the Safavid ambassador.

On 14 July 1641, the padishah let İbrâhim Kaçar into audience at Topkapı Palace. Abiding by the convention, the event was made to coincide with the three-monthly gathering of the Imperial Council at which the pays of the Court Corps were given out to their officers (hence the name "throng council[83]"), a symbolic

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Meienberger, *Johann Rudolf Schmid zum Schwarzenhorn als kaiserlicher Resident in Konstantinopel in den Jahren 1629–1643*. Bern, 1973, 259–260.

82 As was the law, the Central Treasury covered the embassy's costs of travel, housing, and food. Kadrî Efendi, *Târih,* II, 1153; Naîmâ, *Târih*, 951; Murat Uluskan, *Dîvân-ı Hümâyun Çavuşbaşılığı (XVI. ve XVI. Yüzyıllar*. MA thesis, Marmara Üniversitesi, 1998. See the list of the marshals of the Imperial Council in the unpaginated appendix.

83 "galebe dîvânı," where *galebe* refers to the word's Turkish-specific semantic shift as in its

show of strength to guest diplomats. The ambassador outwardly became overwhelmed and was on the brink of quivering upon seeing the splendour, insomuch that the marshal of the Imperial Council uncustomarily afforded him a seat, though this offer may have also been made to make up the impression that the ambassador was overwhelmed. After the gatekeepers of the Sublime Court took over the shah's gifts, the Imperial Council participants went ahead to the audience hall. The grand vizier put beside the pedestals of the throne the shah's letter, which congratulated İbrâhim's accession and wished their friendship to go on. Given permission, the ambassador neared the padishah and kissed his hand. Reportedly, he showed marks of being deeply impressed and overwhelmed by the greatness of the setting, which was also a big public event. The dwellers of Constantinople filled the road from Hagia Sophia to the Imperial Gate – the way in to the outermost courtyard of Topkapı Palace, to see the procession of the Iranian embassy.[84]

The ambassador must have looked amazed in line with the eastern diplomatic etiquette of feigning to be stunned and to forget speech before a receiver who was in higher standing than the sender.[85] Not long after, the ambassador was also received by the grand vizier.[86] Shah Safi's and Rüstem Saakzade's letters to Kemankeş Mustafa were also handed in there. İbrâhim Kaçar was regardfully entertained in Constantinople following these official meetings; Imperial Council viziers held feasts of their own in his honour.[87]

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version "*kalabalık*" (meaning *crowd*), rather than to its main meaning, *victory*/*win*. For a detailed description of the protocol and ceremonies, see İbrâhim Yıldırım, *Osmanlı Devleti'nde Elçi Kabulleri*. İstanbul, 2014; Mehmed Es'ad Efendi['nin] *Teşrifat-ı Kadime*['si]. Ed. by H. Ahmet Arslantürk – Miraç Tosun – Serdal Soyluer. İstanbul, 2012, 108–127; [*Şâir*] *Abrurrahman Abdi Paşa Kanunnâmesi*, 36–37.

84 Kadrî Efendi, *Târih,* II, 1154–1155; *Naîmâ, Târih*, 951. The grand vizier, Imperial Council viziers, the commander of the Janissary Corps, the *defterdar*, financial and chancellery staff, Imperial Council bailiffs, the two chief justices, etc. all attended the event. Ceremonies began with the orderly coming of the Court Corps officers along with the Inner Court officials. This special gathering of the Imperial Council for Yirmidört İbrâhim Kaçar's audience happened on a stormy day. Amid the ceremonies, a domed, worn-out building, which stood next to Hagia Sophia and overlooked the Imperial Gate, was struck by lightning when it was swarmed with people beholding the procession. Because of the lightning bolt, crash of thunder, and consecutive stampede, more than ten people died, while many were wounded.

85 Maria Pia Pedani, 'The Sultan and the Venetian *Bailo*: Ceremonial Diplomatic Protocol in Istanbul', in Ralph Kauz – Giorgio Rota – Jan Paul Niederkorn (eds.), *Diplomatisches Zeremoniell in Europa und im Mittleren Osten in der Frühen Neuzeit*. Wien, 2009, 296–297.

86 BOA, *Ali Emiri – Sultan İbrâhim*, 495. Thirty-nine men from the embassy were clothed with robes of honor according to each one's rank. Although this document giving detailed knowledge about the kind and the worth of the robes of honor given out to each embassy member was drafted on 23 February 1642, it must not have taken so long for the embassy to set out. This document writing down the cost of these items was most likely drawn up sometime after the audience.

87 Solakzâde Mehmed Efendi, *Târih*. İstanbul, h.1298, 767.

In his letter[88] to Kemankeş "Mustafa Pasha his vizierial, princely, and superb Highness, curator of the Sublime Imperial State, reliance of the Gorgeously Imposing Ottoman Sultanate, great marshal, the grand vizier,[89]" Shah Safi confirmed the takeover of this former commander-in-chief's "candid letter[90]" brought by envoy [Hamzapaşazâde] Mehmed Agha. Thereby, he said, "it became apparent once again that the goodwill of that sublimely-magnified premier [Kemankeş Mustafa] is true.[91]" As for the grand vizier's words in his last letter that if the Safavids would uphold the peace then so would the Ottomans, the shah reminded that he himself had started the peace talks with the padishah "his most-sublime Majesty, the supreme of the sultans of the age, the second Alexander the Great, God's shadow.[92]" Therefore, he said, all his efforts would be steered towards strengthening the peace, and of the grand vizier he awaited the same. Yirmidört İbrâhim Kaçar was also entrusted with bringing up (in talks) other matters for the grand vizier to lay before the padishah. Lastly, Safi asked Mustafa Pasha to keep on doing whatever was needed for the good of the two states, and to let him know of any demand or claim he might have thereon; the shah would readily expend his heed to fulfil them.[93]

Likewise, Gürcü Rüstem Xan Saakadze, the marshal of Iran, sent a letter[94] to Kemankeş Kara "Mustafa Paşa his vizierial, princely, and sublime Majesty, of heavens-dignity, the sponsor of the expediencies of nations, the pillar of the Sublime Sultanate, the arm of the elevated Ottoman State, the sight of the looks of the Shadow of God, the revered marshal, the paramaount premier.[95]" After acknowledging the pasha's "correspondence of courtesy[96]" and wishing his good health to last, Rüstem told that Kemankeş Mustafa's last letter "caused complete rejoice[97] over glad-tidings."[98]

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88 Evoğlu, *Mecma'ü'l-İnşâ*, ff. 277b–278a.

89 "Cenâb-ı vâlâ-nisâb, … vezâret u iyâlet-penâh, … mü'teminü'l-Devleti'l-Aliyyeti'l… Hâkâniye, mu'temedü's-saltanati'l-behiyyeti'l-celîleti'l-Osmâniye, … serdâr-ı muazzam … Mustafa Paşa-yı vezîr-i a'zam." *Serdâr-ı muazzam* should have technically been *serdâr-ı ekrem* or – *a'zam* to mark off Kemankeş Mustafa Pasha's *commandership-in-chief* (word-for-word, *supreme marshal*).

90 "mektûb-i muhâlasat[-üslûb]".

91 "müceddeden hakîkat-i hayr-hâhî-yi ân sadr-ı âlî-kadr zâhir geşte".

92 "a'zam-ı selâtîn-i rûzgâr, … sânî-yi İskender-i Zül-karneyn, … a'lâ-hazret … zıllullah".

93 Evoğlu, *Mecma'ü'l-İnşâ*, ff. 277b–278a.

94 *Ibid*., ff. 283a–283b.

95 "âlî-hazret, sipihr-menzilet, … vezâret u iyâlet…-penâh, … kâfil-i mesâlihü'l-ümem, … rüknü's-saltanati'l-aliyye, … adudü'd-devleti'l-refî'ati'l-Osmâniye, … manzûr-ı enzâr-i Zıllullahî, serdâr-ı mükerrem, sadr-ı efham … Mustafa Paşa." *Serdâr-ı mükerrem* should have technically been *serdâr-ı ekrem* to mark off Kemankeş Mustafa Pasha's *commandership-in-chief*.

96 "mükâtebât-ı mülâtafet".

97 "mûcib-i istibşâr…-ı tamâm geşt".

98 Evoğlu, *Mecma'ü'l-İnşâ*, ff. 283a–283b.

As it seems, the Safavid court wanted to give the impression that it had taken no offence at the pasha's letters which, besides peace-favouring proposals, contained courteous threats too. Hence, in these answers, the Shahdom only spoke of the glad-tidings of the imperial enthronement and the grand vizier's readiness to uphold the peace, whereas it shunned bringing up the pasha's *sanctio* and *comminatio*. Above all is noteworthy that Shah Safi saw nothing wrong in uttering that he deemed the grand vizier a mediator at the imperial court to secure the harmony between the two states, and that in line with whatever the grand vizier would thereon ask for, he was ready to do everything to contribute. Hence, with the letters of 1641, the Safavids upheld their acknowledgement of Ottoman superiority in hierarchy as well as in strength. They did not even feel the need to hide that they wished for peace more than the Ottomans did, and the shah willingly asked – officially on the record – the grand vizier to intercede with the padishah on the Safavids' behalf.

The Iranian chancery kept titles of military command in the *inscriptio* it put together for Kemankeş Mustafa Pasha in both letters. This, along with the wartime measure that the Janissary chief-of-staff was standing watch at Baghdad at the head of an extraordinary garrison of 20,000, betokens that the technical state of war was lengthened into the first three years following the pacification at Zuhab. That the Sublime Porte deemed the field marshal of Iran to be the Shahdom's absolute deputy instead of the shah's chief vizier also bear witness thereto.

While the Yirmidört Kaçar embassy was in business at the imperial capital, Rüstem Saakadze wrote a follow-up letter[99] to Kemankeş Mustafa. Formalities aside, the field marshal shared the news that "from among the evil Kurd[ish tribe]s who always mean malice and want that injury come at the laws of peace, Baban Süleymân Bey [the elder] repeatedly raided Budak Sültan Mükrî's territory, which is within the territory of this [i.e. Iranian] side in the border-protocol [of Zuhab].[100]" Upon Budak's telling of the breach to Rüstem, the marshal had "repeatedly written compositions to the former governor of Şehrizor – Cafer Pasha – and the current governor – Hasan Bey – for his inhibition. And the mentioned Süleyman Bey was not inhibited by their inhibition; again he was not wasting a moment in stirring sedition.[101]" Rüstem underscored that he had neither shared the issue with the shah, nor dealt with it himself, nor entrusted the ambassador with laying it before the imperial court, "lest a defect find its way into the pillars of pacification.[102]" Giving the true credit to the grand vizier in having built the peace, the marshal asked him to

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99 *Ibid*., ff. 284b–285a.

100 "ez … Ekrâd-ı bed-nihâd, ki hemîşe der saded-i fesâd bûde mî-hâhend ki … halel der kavânîn-i sulh [u salâh] be hem resed, Süleyman Beyg Babân mükerreren ülkâ-yı Budak Sültân Mükrî ra, ki der sınur-nâmçe dâhil-i ülkâ-yı in taraf … est, tâht nümûde".

101 "mükerrer be Cafer Paşa-yı hâkim-i sâbık-ı Şehrizor ve Hasan Beyg-i hâkim-i hâl der bâb-ı men'-i û kitâbât neveşt. Ve Süleymân Beyg-i mezkûr be men'-i îşân memnu' neşüde, bâz dakîka ez dakâyık-ı fitne-engîzî râ fevt nemî-küned".

102 "mebâdâ kusûrî be-erkân-ı musâlaha râh yâbed".

"discipline [Baban] Süleymân Bey [the elder], and if not, authorize that this [Iranian] party set to chastising him.[103]"[104]

For Rüstem Saakadze to send this follow-up letter, the aforesaid breaches must have become too serious to be dealt with by borderland mechanisms. That the Baban matter makes up the whole content of the letter also upholds this reading. Looking at how Iran's marshal worded his requests and at the two earlier letters, it is seen that in the eyes of the Safavids, Kemankeş Mustafa had come to be deemed as a revered and influential statesman, owing to his leadership throughout the delicate, drawn-out steps of two years of peace-making. Thus, for the good of the Ottoman-Safavid peace, or in other words for the good of Iran, the marshal could contact him outwardly without even sharing the issue with the shah. We do not know how this particular case ended up. However, with an eye to the men and breaches involved, it foreboded the great, wreckful cross-border rebellion under Baban leadership, which would occupy the agenda of Ottoman–Safavid relations throughout the 1690s.

At the same time, the German emperor had set about to renew the ongoing truce with the Sublime Porte. As a token thereof, an extraordinary emissary of the Habsburgs met the grand vizier at an audience on 8 July 1641.[105] İbrahim Kaçar was by then already in Constantinople for three weeks. In all likelihood, the shah's ambassador thus became aware that no "German campaign" in central Europe was upcoming for the Ottomans: the Habsburg monarchy was entangled in what would have come to be known as the Thirty Years War, and therefore sought to keep the peace along its eastern borders. That the Ottomans' main army would not be tied up in Europe anytime soon, and was thus fieldable in a showdown with the Safavids, must have shaped the ambassador's impression, and hence his later report to the shah's court in Iran, hardening the Ottoman-friendly stand that the Safavid State had taken willy-nilly.

At the beginning of September 1641,[106] the padishah met İbrâhim Kaçar at a farewell audience at which the earlier ceremonies were repeated, and gave him leave. The ambassador set out for Iran on September 7.[107] At the same time, the high- and middle-ranking Iranian commanders, who had been captured amid the Ottoman taking of Erivan (1635) and Baghdad (1638), were freed from Seven Towers and sent alongside the leaving embassy in return for the Ottoman captives that İbrâhim Kaçar had brought from Iran.[108] The ambassador must have sent on a

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103 "Süleyman Beyg… râ te'dîb … nümâyend, ve-illâ în-cânib râ ruhsat nümâyend ki der saded-i tembîh-i û der âmede".

104 Evoğlu, *Mecma'ü'l-İnşâ*, ff. 284b–285a.

105 Mahmut Halef Cevrioğlu, 'Ottoman Foreign Policy during the Thirty Years War', *Turcica* 49 (2018) 219.

106 Cemâdeyilâhir 1051

107 Kadrî Efendi*, Târih,* II, 1158; Isfahânî, *Hülâsatü's-Siyer*, 292.

108 Müneccimbaşı Derviş Ahmed Dede Efendi, *Sahâifü'l-Ahbâr*. Trans. by Ahmed Nedîm. Vol. 3. İstanbul, h.1285, 680; Kâtib Çelebi, *Fezleke*, 917; Kadrî Efendi*, Târih,* II, 1158.

man of his ahead to let the shah know that his mission ended favourably, for the news of the new padishah's acknowledging Murad IV's peace reached Isfahan in September 1641. Only thereupon did Safi start the already decided-upon campaign upon Kandahar against Mughal India, which had been put on hold until peace with the Sublime Porte would become steady.[109]

On the same day as the embassy headed out (September 7[110]), the Ottomans put to death another high-ranking statesman, Akçakoyunlu Tahmaspkulu Xan Kaçar, a.k.a. Emirgûneoğlu Yusuf Pasha.[111]

Son of Akçakoyunlu Emirgûne Xan Kaçar whom Abbas I had installed as governor of Çukursa'd in 1604,[112] he was the commander of Erivan who defended the fortress against the Ottomans in 1635 and later yielded. Thereupon, Murad IV, who commanded the army himself, lets him into the Imperial Marquee, and he takes up a new name after the audience, becoming Emirgûneoğlu Yusuf Pasha (the former name, also adopted, openly betokens servitude to the House of Safi). Moreover, the padishah bestows vizierate upon him and makes him governor-general of Aleppo, while his former chief-of-staff, who also sought shelter at the Ottoman court, gets the neighbouring pashalik of Tripoli.[113] Not long thereafter, Emirgûneoğlu comes to Constantinople and becomes one of Murad IV's closest friends while also holding the post of resident vizier, which he kept until his death. İbrâhim confiscated the pavilion and the gloriette Emirgûneoğlu had built in the district of Kağıthane.[114] Remarkably, he was there both in the welcome and the farewell audiences of the 1641 Safavid embassy as a member of the Imperial Council.[115]

The publicized flow of events has it that at Kemankeş Mustafa's farewell feast, İbrâhim Kaçar tells him that he wanted to go back to Iran together with Emirgûneoğlu (who was his clansman), as the latter wanted to renew his troth to the House of Safi and asked for the ambassador's help. This former Safavid governor was now an Ottoman vizier, however. His wish to switch back to the Safavid side would therefore be nothing short of high treason, and that is why the grand vizier could not go ahead on his own initiative. Knowing it well, the ambassador asks whether the padishah would let this happen. Sultan İbrâhim Khan, not liking what he hears, wants to know whether Emirgûneoğlu himself wished to leave or the ambassador made this up. The grand vizier answers that Emirgûneoğlu himself sent word to İbrâhim Kaçar underhand, asking him to forward to the grand vizier his

109 Matthee, *Persia in Crisis*, 123.
110 Rota, 'Death of Tahmâspqolî Xân Qâjâr', 57.
111 Kâtib Çelebi, *Fezleke*, 917.
112 *The Journal of Zak'aria of Agulis*, annotated translation and commentary by George A. Bournoutian. Costa Mesa, 2003, 63.
113 Küpeli, *Osmanlı-Safevi Münâsebetleri*, 215.
114 *Naîmâ, Târih*, 951; Kâtib Çelebi, *Fezleke*, 917.
115 *Kadrî Efendi, Târih,* II, 1154, 1158. His brother, Akçakoyunlu Emirgûneoğlu Abbaskulu Kaçar, had stayed back in Iran: *The Journal of Zakaria of Agulis*, 68, 75.

leaning to go back to Iran. The padishah, becoming wrathful upon hearing this, says: "those who do not appreciate Our beneficence must be punished. You shall rub out his impure existence from the page of the age![116]" Emirgûneoğlu is lured into a sham meeting with the grand vizier and hurriedly put to death.[117] However, this was only the governmentally publicized, politically twisted pretext.

A Ragusan doctor, Francesco Crasso, remarks in his letter to the Venetian bailo in Constantinople, Alvise Contarini, that the public opinion swung between buying the official news and believing the unpublicized truth.[118] As the Habsburg minister-resident in Constantinople – Johann Rudolf Schmid – wrote down in his final account, the truth was that İbrâhim Kaçar rather asked for Emirgûneoğlu to be put to death,[119] not to be let go back to Iran. He indeed met the same end as the dignitaries put to death earlier within the framework of the Ottoman-Safavid deal consummating the peace of Zuhab.[120]

Whether Emirgûneoğlu's end had been settled together with that of the prisoners put to death earlier (most notably Kumuşlu Mîr-Fettah and his son) and fulfilled belatedly owing to his being an Imperial Council vizier, or whether the Safavid request that the Ottomans hand him over – and if not possible then put him to death – was forwarded later through the incoming ambassador, is the only part of this affair that is left undocumented. Though the latter case seems more likely with an eye to the day chosen for the execution and İbrâhim Kaçar's ambassadorial commission to bring up in talks some further matters that were not written in the letters, as remarked in his credentials. In all likelihood, the ambassador bargained and struck a deal with the Sublime Porte over Emirgûneoğlu.

Either way, Emirgûneoğlu was a high-ranking traitor in the eyes of the Safavid court, and his going over to the Ottomans could by no means be put behind politically. And though the favour he had enjoyed under Murad IV must have come to an end with İbrâhim's enthronement, he kept his Imperial Council vizierate up until the end. His abiding at the imperial court along with the highest favours he enjoyed must have been taken as a slight to the Shahdom. As the overlord who had held him dear was now dead, selling off Emirgûneoğlu would not be that much of a concession. By giving up on him, the Sublime Porte confirmed its long-time stake in

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116 "Bizim nîmetimizin kadrini bilmezlere cezâsı verilmek gerektir. Vücûd-ı nâ-pâkini sahife-i rûzgârdan hakkedesin".

117 Hacı Halife Mustafa Nihâdî, *Târih-i Nihâdî*, published in Hasine Biga, *Târih-i Nihâdî (1b–80a) (Transkripsyon ve Değerlendirme)*. MA thesis, Marmara Üniversitesi, 2004; Satiye Büşra Uysal, *Târih-i Nihâdî (80b–152a) (Transkrispyon ve Değerlendirme)*. MA thesis, Marmara Üniversitesi, 2004; Hande Nalan Özkasap, *Târih-i Nihâdî (152b–233a) (Transkripsiyon ve Değerlendirme)*. MA thesis, Marmara Üniversitesi, 2004, f. 113a; Solakzâde, *Târih*, 767–768; Vecîhî, *Târih*, f. 21a; Rota, 'Death of Tahmâspqolî Xân Qâjâr', 57. See *ibid*. for more details on how the execution was staged.

118 Rota, 'Death of Tahmâspqolî Xân Qâjâr', 57.

119 Karaçelebizâde, *Ravzatü'l-Ebrâr*, 350.

120 Schmid, *Finalrelation Nr.4*, 259.

upholding the peace. But by putting him to death instead of handing him over, it underscored that peaceful relations would always rest on the Empire's having the upper hand against Iran.

İbrâhim named Müteferrika Kabil Agha, a "court affiliate," as envoy to Shah Safi. He was to go along with the leaving ambassador Yirmidört İbrâhim Kaçar.[121] In Iran, Abbaskulu Beyg, an officer of the royal guard, alongside his troops welcomed and entertained Kabil Agha as host-officers. The envoy made known at Shah Safi's audience in Isfahan that the padishah was confirming the ongoing peace, and handed in the gifts[122] as well as the imperial letter. The envoy agha was held in high esteem throughout his stay at the Safavid court, like İbrâhim Kaçar at the Sublime Porte; Iranian officials regularly attended to him while he enjoyed his host's honours and treats. Chief vizier Sarı Taki, ministers, and other dignitaries hosted, feasted, and entertained the envoy one by one at the shah's behest. Kabil Agha was given leave once the diplomatic business and the courtesy receptions came to an end. Safi named Karadağlı Maksud Sültan, the chief-vicegerent[123] of the shah in the latter's capacity as grandmaster of the Kızılbaş/Safavid Order, as his extraordinary ambassador to Sultan İbrâhim Khan. Karadağlı would go along with the envoy-agha.[124]

Besides the padishah's epistle, the envoy-agha had also brought a letter[125] from Kemankeş Mustafa Pasha to field marshal "Rüstem Xan [Saakadze] his sublime Excellency, the administrator of the shahly state, the xan of xans of the shah.[126]" The grand vizier wrote that when Shah Safi's "presents[127]" had been laid before Sultan İbrâhim Khan, his "gaze of regard and sublime attention came about, and they [i.e. the shah's presents] attained the majestic acceptance," and likewise when the shah's letter had been "submitted to the basis of the most-sublime throne, it had become the sight of [İbrâhim's] august gaze." Thereupon, said the grand vizier, the padishah had decreed that a letter of answer be written to strengthen the friendship between the two Houses. Kemankeş Mustafa highlighted once again his own agency in the making of the peace of Zuhab, and quoted from his overlord's letter that so long as the Safavids abided by the peace, so would the Ottomans.

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121 Cevrî İbrâhim Çelebi and Sarı Abdullah Efendi, *Düstûrü'l-İnşâ*, Süleymâniye Kütüphânesi, Nûr-ı Osmâniye no. 4304, entry heading: "bâlâda mastûr olan mufassal olmakla gönderilmeyip tekrar mumâ-ileyhe Abdullah Efendi müsveddesiyle ber-vech-i ihtisâr bu nâme tahrîr olunup Sadrazam'dan Şâh-ı Acem'e gönderilmiştir;" Kadrî Efendi*, Târih,* II, 1158.

122 Isfahânî, *Hülâsatü's-Siyer*, 294.

123 He had formerly served, when holding the same office, as the Safavids' wartime ambassador to the Ottoman Empire in 1637. He had been withheld until 1639 and sent back after Baghdad's fall, before the talks at Zuhab. See Küpeli, *Osmanlı–Safevi Münâsebetleri*, 233–236, 247, 269–270. See also Vâlih Kazvînî-Isfahânî, *Huld-i Berîn*, 242–243, 255.

124 İskender Türkmân, *Zeyl-i Âlem-ârâ*, 250–251; Floor, '*Khalifeh al-Kholafa*', 56.

125 Evoğlu, *Mecma'ü'l-İnşâ*, ff. 283b–284a.

126 "meâlî-nisâb, … devlet-iyâb, … müdebbir-i … devlet-i şâhî, … hân-ı hânân-ı şâh".

127 "pişkeş".

Then, he brought up two more practical issues: firstly, a spot called Şâhinkale, which was to remain at the Ottoman side with an eye to its location and distance against the named spots along the drawn border but had not been marked as such at the protocol of Zuhab, was being held by the Safavids. For the grand vizier, if the pledge-deeds [of Zuhab] said so, that was fine, but otherwise, this went against the peace, and had to be set right. Next, as laid down in the demarcation, the Safavids had torn down the strongholds of Zencîr (near the border at Iraq) and Kotur (at the Azerbaijani border), while the Ottomans had torn down the strongholds of Mekü and Magazberd (at the Azerbaijani border). Later, however, the Safavids had manned Mekü, and in reaction thereto, the Ottomans had manned Magazberd. Reminding that these too went against the treaty, the grand vizier wrote that the shah's government was to send an answer through the padishah's envoy, Müteferrika Kabil Agha, in a way worthy of the friendship between the two sides.[128]

This letter by Kemankeş Mustafa highlights two aspects in Ottoman–Safavid dealings. The first one is so-to-say inbuilt. This writ, by naming the shah's dispatch a *present* (*pîşkeş*) rather than *gift* (*hediye*), and by saying that the padishah chose to, but otherwise did not have to, take over these presents as well as the shah's letter, marks the Ottomans' higher standing, this time in ceremonial. Throughout the next eighty years until the Safavids' downfall, the Sublime Porte, in its diplomatic writings, would sometimes draft such ptassages depicting settings that call forth the padishah's primacy, while the Safavid chancellery would not, or could not, do the same for the shah.

The other aspect is rather conjunctural. The Safavids' manning the stronghold of Mekü, which the Ottomans told to have torn down as foreseen by the treaty, would become a recurring subject of strife. It would soon bring on an Ottoman military show of strength at the border, in 1646/47. A later re-garrisoning in the 1710s would lead to an official protest in 1720. The Sublime Porte must have sent the 1641/42 legation to Isfahan owing to the grand vizier's demand that the Shahdom answer for manning Mekü and Şahinkale in contrariety to the treaty, for otherwise there were seemingly no grounds for this mission.

At about the same time, in 1641, Bıyıklı Derviş Mehmed pasha of Baghdad went on with the military operations to consolidate the Ottoman sway over the province's insubordinate Arab tribes, as these could likely trigger a crisis with Iran. In the fiefdoms of Semavat and Halid, the Huza'li and the Benî Lâm tribes, both Ottoman vassals, wanted to all together go over to the Safavid side, which for the Empire would mean loss of land and income. They later rose up against Ottoman overlordship and set to highway robbery as a show of disobedience. Derviş Mehmed made his chief-of-staff Ali Agha the leader of his choice troops and sent them to quell this Safavid-friendly uprising. After a fight of shorter than two hours, most of the Benî Lâm rebels were killed whereas the chieftain of the Huza'li fled to Iran

128 Evoğlu, *Mecma'ü'l-İnşâ*, ff. 283b–284a.

along with some of his following. The aforesaid fiefdoms were swallowed up by Baghdad as counties.[129] Shah Safi gave Zeydân, at the eastern cost of the Persian Gulf, as fief to the chieftain of the Huza'li and his tribesmen,[130] but shunned taking a step as to the land under Ottoman lordship.[131]

It seems that Bıyıklı Derviş Mehmed was indeed the "subduing governor" that the imperial court wanted to have in middle Iraq after winning it back. Through pre-emptive and swift military thrusts, he forestalled defections of remarkable scale to Iran. At a time when the Ottoman–Safavid military withdrawal was still underway and the normalization was barely beginning, a crisis could break out if such defections were not nipped in the bud.

Shah Safi died on 14 May 1642 at thirty-one years old, young and from heavy drinking like Murad IV, and his nine-year old son Mehemmed (Abbas II) took his stead. His dynastic slaughters and losing Iraq back to the Empire aside, Safi left behind a kingdom that was a bit smaller but more handleable. The losses of Baghdad and Kandahar had dealt heavy blows to Safi's prestige both inside and outside Iran. The peace of Zuhab, though sealing defeat, had at the same time worked out the greatest problem that had been destabilizing Safavid Iran, namely the Ottoman threat. The kingdom thereby become remarkably steadier. Safi also left behind a well-settled prime minister, Sarı Taki, who had been holding this post since 1634. The change on the throne did not upset governmental stability. However, after Safi's death, Sarı Taki plotted for and brought about the killing of field marshal Rüstem Xan Saakadze (1643). The threesome of Sarı Taki, Mehemmed Ali Beyg, and Canıpek Xan Şamlu ensured a swift shift, working together with queen-mother Anna Khanum until Canıpek Şamlu, at Abbas II's behest, would slay Sarı Taki in his house (1645).[132] As the peace of Zuhab was still shaky, Abbas II made his enthronement into a diplomacy opportunity to consolidate it.

Karadağlı Maksud, whom Shah Safi had already named ambassador for the settlement of border strifes, was given new instructions and letters. Besides the conventional diplomatic business, now he was also to talk the Sublime Porte into tearing down the stronghold of Melet on the Van mountain range, in line with the peace conditions. The 150-men embassy reached Constantinople in early December 1642. On December 30, Imperial Council was held for the welcome meeting. The

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129 Nazmizâde, *Gülşen-i Hulefâ*, 234. Heads of the 600 killed rebels were sent to Baghdad along with a handsome booty. Naîmâ, *Târih*, 955.

130 İskender Türkmân, *Zeyl-i Âlem-ârâ*, 252.

131 BOA, *Mühimme Defteri* 89, entry 57. About a year later, when Bıyıklı Derviş Mehmed was no longer the pasha of Baghdad, his household still held prisoners from the Benî Lâm; most of whom were women and children. On 11 August 1642, the Imperial Council ruled that these prisoners be freed.

132 Roemer, 'The Safavid Period', 287–288; Matthee, *Persia in Crisis*, 41–43. With the early deaths of Murad IV and Safi on the one hand and the political killings of Kemankeş Mustafa Paşa (1644) and Saru Taqi (1645) on the other, the leadership that fought the last Ottoman–Safavid war and then reestablished the peace would die out.

embassy handed in Abbas II's gifts, was clothed with robes of honour, and then the padishah had Karadağlı Maksud let into audience.[133] Abbas II's open-handedness with gifts ensured an extraordinarily warm welcome for his ambassador by İbrâhim.[134]

The short but precise *expositio* of Abbas II's letter[135] to "Sultan İbrâhim Khan his most-sublime Majesty, the greatest shah-of-shahs, the essence of creation and genesis, the second Alexander the Great, khakan son khakan, God's shadow[136]" tells how Safi, after sending his ambassador to the padishah, had died while on the road to Khorasan with the goal of dealing with the Mughals himself and strengthening Iran's eastern borders. Safi is said to have bequeathed to Abbas not only the kingship but also the policy of "preserving the friendship and attachment that became consolidated with the padishah.[137]" The new shah likewise wrote that he steered his whole diligence towards "consolidating the affection and recovery that have been established therebetween.[138]" He asked that İbrâhim too take up the same priorities and that Ottoman appointees abide by the peace conditions. Karadağlı Maksud would share some "[unwritten] remaining matters[139]" in talks. Seemingly, the ambassador handed in the original letter sent by the now-dead Shah Safi as well.[140] The shah also wrote a letter to grand vizier Kemankeş Mustafa, as to be seen from the answers below.

While Abbas II's ambassador was still in Constantinople between the two imperial audiences, [Müteferrika[141]] Yusuf Agha became named İbrâhim's forthcoming envoy to wish Abbas well on his accession and to hand in the letters of answer; the legation was allotted its budget in February.[142] Once diplomatic business

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133 The embassy was housed at Ferhadpaşa Palace near Bayezid Square, and a certain Dilaver Agha was named host-officer. Kadrî Efendi, *Târih,* II, 1169; Naîmâ, *Târih*, 961; *Düstûrü'l-İnşâ*, entry heading: "Şehinşâh … Sultan İbrâhim Han … taraf…ına Şah Abbas-ı Sânî cânibinden gelen nâmedir". In Sarı Abdullah Efendi's correspondence compilation, this letter is misdated to 10 October 1646.

134 Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*. Vol. 5. Graz, 1963, 306.

135 *Düstûrü'l-İnşâ*, entry heading: "Şehinşah … Sultan İbrâhim … taraf[ına] … Şah Abbas-ı Sânî cânibinden gelen nâmedir."

136 "a'lâ-hazret … şehinşâh-ı a'zam, … hülâsa-i îcâd u tekvîn, …, sânî-yi İskender-i Zül-Karneyn, … el-Hâkân bin el-Hâkân, … Sultan İbrâhim Han, … zıllullah".

137 "hıfz-ı … dûstî ve meveddetî ki bâ … Pâdişâh istihkâm pezîrüfte".

138 "istihkâm-ı … muhabbet ve iltiyâmî ki fîmâbeyn istikrâr yâfte".

139 "bâkî umûr".

140 *Düstûrü'l-İnşâ*, entry heading: "Şehinşah … Sultan İbrâhim … taraf[ına] … Şah Abbas-ı Sânî cânibinden gelen nâmedir."

141 He was likely a *müteferrika*. The incomplete titulature in the copy of the letter sent along (see below) is "kıdvetü'l-emâcid ve'l-ekârim" ("model of the glorious and the generous"), the one used for *müteferrika*s of the Imperial Court. See Mübahat Kütükoğlu, *Osmanlı Belgelerinin Dili (Diplomatik)*. İstanbul, 1994, 105.

142 Kadrî Efendi, *Târih,* II, 1168; Vahîd Kazvînî, *Abbasnâme*, 54.

was fulfilled, Karadağlı Maksud was let into his farewell audience on 20 February 1643. The ambassador seems to have been held in esteem at the imperial court. After securing the reconfirmation of the peace, taking over İbrâhim's letter to Abbas II, and getting the permission to set out, the embassy left Constantinople on February 23.[143] Envoy Yusuf Agha met the shah's court in Kazvin. Festivities were held in his honour at the gardens of Saadet-âbâd, where the envoy must have also been housed. He handed over the letters and gifts in reconfirmation of the peace at the audience given after a few days.[144]

In his answer[145] to "Shah Abbas [II] his sublime Majesty, of Efrâsiyâb-perception, exalter of Iranian diadem and dignity,[146]" Sultan İbrâhim Khan "as shah-of-shahs[147]" greeted the shah and condoled with him on the death of "Shah Safi, upon him be absolution.[148]" After wishing Abbas well "on the attainment of the throne and crown,[149]" he appreciated the new shah's "tending towards the concord and union[150] [between the two states]" and "expressly forewarning the authorities of his domain that they painstakingly work to consolidate the concurrence and erase disagreement in line with the promised conditions[151] [of Zuhab]."[152]

He happily accepted Abbas's wish to reconfirm the peace and sent his "worldwide-obeyed decree[153]" for the Empire's borderland authorities to abide by the treaty, wrote İbrâhim. He also underscored that Karadağlı Maksud, after fulfilling his mission, was honourably given leave. With which condition he reconfirmed the peace, however, İbrâhim worded as follows:

> "until this moment, Our forefathers who have reigned on the Ottoman throne, have not wantonly rejected the monarchs who are constant requestors at Their [i.e. Ottoman rulers'] Threshold and refuge-seekers under Their shadow,

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143 Kadrî Efendi, *Târih,* II, 1169; Naîmâ, *Târih*, 961. On February 22, one day before Karadağlı Maksud set out, all Ottoman civil, military, and judicial dignitaries on the highway from Constantinople to the Iranian border were decreed to help the embassy in every way. A host-officer was also sent along as road guide until the embassy left Ottoman land. See the relevant decree: *Mühimme Defteri* 89, ent. 153.

144 Vahîd Kazvînî, *Abbasnâme*, 45.

145 *Düstûrü'l-İnşâ*, the entry without a heading, following the entry titled "bu cânipten Şah Abbas-ı Sânî tarafına gönderilmek için sâbıkan reisülküttap olan Abdullah Efendi müsvedde ettiği nâmedir, lâkin bu mektup gönderilmeyip bâdehu yazılan gönderilmiştir".

146 "âlî-hazret, … Efrâsiyâb-ferâset, firâzende-i dîhîm ü gâh-ı Îrânî, … Şâh Abbas".

147 "şâhenşâhâne".

148 "Şah Safi aleyhi'l-gufrân".

149 "serîr ü efser … müyesser olmağla".

150 "cânib-i vifâk ve ittihâda ikbal".

151 "hükkâm-ı vilâyetinize şerâyit-i mev'ûde üzere istihkâm-ı … muvâfakat ve indirâs-ı muhâlefet bâbında hüsn-i ihtimâm etmeleri için tenbîh-i ekîd".

152 *Düstûrü'l-İnşâ*, the entry without a heading, following the entry titled "bu cânipten Şah Abbas-ı Sânî tarafına gönderilmek için sâbıkan reisülküttap olan Abdullah Efendi müsvedde ettiği nâmedir, lâkin bu mektup gönderilmeyip bâdehu yazılan gönderilmiştir".

153 "fermân-ı cihân-mutâ".

> when these [foreign monarchs] opened all around the doors of friendship, prepared the causes of mutual help, and by submitting [their] veracity and designs, knocked the door of manliness and cast down the garments of hostility.[154] … So long as no situation contrary to the pledge and the covenant that will preoccupy our [celestially-]victorious troops arises,[155] [peace shall prevail].”[156]

In his answer[157] – drawn up by former state secretary Sarı Abdullah Efendi – to the letter that the “Shah his sublime Majesty, of Jamshid-grandeur, the unique pearl of crown and dignity[158]” had sent him through Karadağlı’s embassy, Kemankeş Mustafa Pasha wished Abbas well on his “investiture with the affairs of the sultanate,[159]” and condoled with him on the death of Shah Safi “upon him be God’s mercy.[160]” Once the “shah-of-shahs his grandiose Majesty, the world’s haven, cosmic master, crown bestower to the reigning sovereigns, supreme of the sultans of the age, God’s shadow in the Both Worlds[161]” heard of the shah’s meaning, wrote the grand vizier, his “seas of majestic beneficence surged, and he pleased to bestow upon the side of [the shah] the friendship-sealed august letter attesting to the alignment of the rites of peace and righteousness.[162]”[163]

Safavid dignitaries, namely chief vizier Sarı Taki, head of the royal guard Canıpek Xan Şamlu, the marshal of the court (*eşik ağası başı*), and the marshal of the council (*divan beği*) Biçerlü Murtazâkulu Xan Şamlu took upon hosting and

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154 “evreng-nişîn-i Osmânî olan … ecdâd…ımızın … atebe…lerinden ricâda ve sâye…lerine ilticâda olan selâtin-i etrâfa ebvâb-ı müvâlâtı güşâde ve esbâb-ı mümâlâtı âmâde kılıp bu âna değin arz-ı hulûs ve taviyyet ile kar’-ı bâb-ı mürüvvet ve hal’-i siyâb-ı husûmet edenleri bilâ-mûcib reddetmemişlerdir”.

155 “mâdem ki … asâkir-i … nusret-istimâlimizi bâis-i iştigâl olacak hilâf-ı ahd ü misâq bir vaz’ … peydâ olmaya”.

156 *Düstûrü’l-İnşâ*, the entry without a heading, following the entry titled “bu cânipten Şah Abbas-ı Sânî tarafına gönderilmek için sâbıkan reisülküttap olan Abdullah Efendi müsvedde ettiği nâmedir, lâkin bu mektup gönderilmeyip bâdehu yazılan gönderilmiştir”.

157 *Düstûrü’l-İnşâ*, letter heading: “bâlâda mastûr olan mufassal olmakla gönderilmeyip tekrar muma-ileye Abdullah Efendi müsveddesiyle ber-vech-i ihtisar bu nâme tahrir olunup Sadrazam’dan Şâh-ı Acem’e gönderilmiştir.” In the version that was not sent, a reference is made to the shah’s qualification of “world-possession (cihândârî),” which hints at an imperial capacity and is left out in the version that was indeed sent.

158 “âlî-hazret, … Cemşîd-şevket, … dürre-i ferîde-i efser ü gâh, … Şah”.

159 “taklîd-i umûr-ı saltanat”.

160 “Şah Safi aleyhi rahmetullah”.

161 “şevketlü … âlem-penâh şehinşah … sahib-kırân, tâc-bahş-ı hüsrevân-ı evreng-mekîn, … a’zam-ı selâtîn-i zamân … zıllullah fi’l-âlemeyn”.

162 “bihâr-ı eltâf-ı hıdîvâneleri temevvüc etmekle cânib…lerine tensîk-i merâsim-i sulh u salâhı mübeyyin nâme-i hümâyun-ı müvâlat-nigîn erzânî buyurup…”

163 *Düstûrü’l-İnşâ*, letter heading: “bâlâda mastûr olan mufassal olmakla gönderilmeyip tekrar muma-ileye Abdullah Efendi müsveddesiyle ber-vech-i ihtisar bu nâme tahrir olunup Sadrazam’dan Şâh-ı Acem’e gönderilmiştir”.

entertaining [Müteferrika] Yusuf Agha in turns at the shah's behest as long as the envoy-agha was in Kazvin. In the farewell audience, the envoy was entrusted with the answer letters, after which he set out for Constantinople.[164] Throughout his stay in Kazvin, Yusuf Agha impressed his hosts with his skill in diplomacy, knowledge of languages, and bookishness.[165]

Seemingly neither state thought that a border issue was weighty enough to be made room for in their writings, not even the Benî Lâm's fruitless bid to go over from Ottoman to Safavid sway. The Iranians acknowledged that dealing with unrest beyond the border was an Ottoman monopoly, even if the wrongdoers were Safavid-friendly. In other words, the Shahdom was satisfied with the borders as they were, and was not on the lookout for an opportunity to widen them. Small-scale entanglements could be dealt with on the spot, and would at best lead to letter exchange between the neighbouring provinces of the Empire and Iran so as to take coordinated measures.

The treaty of Zuhab's belated coming-into-force did not bring about a standstill in Ottoman–Safavid relations. In the years that followed, the soundness of the peace would be tested by Venetian bids to draw Iran into the Cretan War and the Ottomans' show of strength with an Imperial Army near Erivan. Yet, the peace would outlive not only these fragile moments but also the showdowns between the two states near the Persian Gulf and in Iraq, which would chronically occupy the agenda of relations over the 1650s, 60s, and 70s. As an outcome of the rapprochement, which would slowly come into being over more than forty years of unbroken peace and thanks to the Safavid refusal to team up with the anti-Turkish Holy League, the two sides' dealings would go through a golden age from 1684 to 1701, bringing on an unheard-of Ottoman–Safavid *perpetual peace in alliance* at a time when uprisings of international scale upset whole imperial and Iranian provinces in Kurdistan and around the Persian Gulf. Nonetheless, the Sublime Porte would not shy away from reminding the Shahdom diplomatically and militarily that the Ottomans had the upper hand. Worsening from 1702 onwards, relations would bear until 1722 considerable friction in the shape of diplomatic strifes and border conflicts, yet a war between the two states would not break out.[166]

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164 Vahîd Kazvînî, *Abbasnâme*, 45; Babayan, 'The Waning of the Qizilbash', 316.

165 Vâlih Kazvînî-Isfahânî, *Huld-i Berîn*, 299–300.

166 See my 'Fraternity, Perpetual Peace, and Alliance in Ottoman–Safavid Relations, 1688–1698: A Diplomatic Revolution in the Middle East', *Turcica* 50 (2019) 145–207, and 'Ottoman Empire and Safavid Iran, 1639–1722'.