T. C.

MARMARA ÜNİVERSİTESİ

SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ

GAZETECİLİK ANABİLİM DALI

GAZETECİLİK BİLİM DALI

BOSNA HERSEK, SIRBİSTAN VE HIRVATİSTAN ÖRNEKLERİ ÜZERİNDEN BATI BALKANLAR BASININININ TÜRKİYE'DEKİ 15 TEMMUZ DARBE GİRİŞİMİNİ SUNUŞU

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Danışman: Doç. Dr. MEHMET ÖZÇAĞLAYAN

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THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY

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ABSTRACT

REPORTING OF WESTERN BALKAN PRESS ON THE JULY 15 COUP ATTEMPT IN TURKEY THROUGH THE SAMPLES OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, SERBIA AND CROATIA

Media discourse plays a crucial role in producing the dominance of social actors in public life. Therefore, it is important to have a critical approach to media discours so we could understand its political and social connotation(s). With its power to decide what will be dominant in the media discourse, at the same time media is forming a public opinion on specific topic. Moreover, by creating a certain discourse about one group of people or their leader, media gains the power to control their influence and treatment towards them. In this respect, the way Turkey is represented in the media of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Croatia also shape the attitude and public opinion towards Turkey in those countries, or even its potential interference in them. Hence, media research is important for us so that we could have a better understanding of the world we are interfering with.

Examining media discourse is a kind of understanding over the perspective of the media and society on the events of political and social life and how media report on concrete events which affect our understanding of that event and its actors, moreover, their influence on our mental models as well. Mental models are a result of comprehension of discourse, perception or imagination. The way of understanding of some certain occurrence or even certain groups of people, we usually learn from public discourse created by media and society that we are interacting with. Public discourse influences our understanding of reality and shapes our mental model. Which information will be presented as the dominant one, depends only on the disseminators of public discourse – as it's explained through the social science theory Agenda-setting, media is not "teaching" us "what to think or talk", much rather it directs us on "about we are going to think or talk". Therefore, media is influencing our personal contribution to the public discourse. In this respect, in choosing the dominant news media is usually influenced by different sources of power.

As a state located between East and West, Turkey is an important factor in almost every geopolitical subject. Hence, the events of importance for Turkey can also be evaluated and understood within its regional and global importance. Besides of being constant challenge of creating and saving good relations with surrounding states, it is important for Turkey to

understand what the general social discourse reflected by their media regarding the domestic events of Turkey's.

The research is based on the critical discourse analysis applied through the quantitative analysis, analysis of news headlines, thematic orientation of the news and representation of social actors with macro-propositions through the selected newspapers of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Serbia.

Keywords: Turkey, July 15 Coup d'etat attempt, 2016 coup d'etat attempt, Western Balkan Press, media discourse, critical discouse analysis

ÖZET

BOSNA HERSEK, SIRBISTAN VE HIRVATISTAN ÖRNEKLERİ ÜZERİNDEN BATI BALKANLAR MEDYASININ TÜRKİYE'DEKİ 15 TEMMUZ DARBE GİRİŞİMİNİ SUNUŞU

Medya söylemleri, sosyal aktörlerin kamusal yaşamdaki baskınlığını sağlamakta çok önemli bir rol oynamaktadır. Bu nedenle, medya söylemlerine eleştirel bir yaklaşımın olması önemlidir, böylelikle bu söylemlerin altında yatan imalar anlaşılabilir. Medya söyleminde neyin baskın olacağına karar verme yetkisiyle, medya aynı zamanda belirli bir konuda kamuoyu oluşturmaktadır. Dahası, bir grup insan veya liderleri hakkında belirli bir söylem yaratarak etkilerini ve onlara yönelik tutumları kontrol gücü de kazanmaktadır. Bu bağlamda, Türkiye'nin Bosna-Hersek, Hırvatistan veya Sırbistan medyasında sunuluş biçimi, bu ülkelerde Türkiye'ye karşı tutum ve kamuoyunu, hatta potansiyel müdahalesini de şekillendirmektedir. Bu nedenle, medya araştırmaları bizim için üzerinde yaşadığımız dünyayı daha iyi anlayabilmemizi sağlamak anlamında önemlidir.

Medya söyleminin incelenmesi, medyanın ve toplumun politik ve sosyal meselelere bakış açısını anlamaktır. Medyanın somut olaylarla ilgili açıklamaları olayı ve onun aktörlerini nasıl algıladığımızı etkilediği gibi, ayrıca zihinsel modellerimizi de önemli ölçüde etkilemektedir. Zihinsel modeller, söylem, algı veya hayal gücünün idrakinin bir sonucudur. Belirli bir olayı, hatta bir grubu, anlama yolunu, genellikle etkileşim içinde olduğumuz medya ve toplum tarafından yaratılmış olan kamusal söylemden öğreniriz. Kamusal söylem gerçeklik algımızı etkiler ve zihinsel modeli şekillendirir. Hangi bilgilerin baskın olarak sunulacağı, yalnızca kamusal söylemi yaymakta olanlara -yani medyaya- bağlıdır. Sosyal bilim teorisi Gündem-belirleme yoluyla açıklandığı gibi, medya bize "ne düşüneceğimizi veya konuşacağımızı" öğretmez daha çok bizi "ne düşüneceğimiz veya konuşacağımız konusunda" yönlendirmektedir. Bu nedenle, media, kamu söylemine kişisel katkımızı da etkilemektedir. Bu bakımdan, medya baskın bilgiyi seçerken genellikle farklı güç kaynaklarından etkilenir.

Batı ile Doğu arasında bulunan bir devlet olarak Türkiye hemen hemen her jeopolitik konuda önemli bir faktördür. Bu nedenle, Türkiye için önem taşıyan olaylar, bölgesel ve küresel düzeyde de önemli addedilir. Sürekli çevre ülkelerle iyi ilişkiler kurma ve bunların

koruma mücadelesi vermenin yanında iç işlerinde yaygın toplumsal söylemi anlamak da Türkiye için önemlidir.

Araştırma nicel analizler, başlıkların analizi, haber konularının yönlendirilmesi, sosyal aktörlerin temsil biçimine dair makro önermeler yoluyla eleştirel söylem analizi üzerine kurulmuştur.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Türkiye, 15 Temmuz Darbe Girişimi, 2016 Darbe Girişimi, Batı Balkan Basını, medya söylemleri, Eleştirel Söylem Analizi

PREFACE

The influence of media on creating of public opinion and social discourse was one of the most interesting topics during my undergraduate studies. The interest in this field of media research, and in Critical Discourse Analysis as a specific method, has increased during my master's degree program at the Marmara University, Department of Journalism. The reason for conducting this type of study on the examples of press reporting about the military coup attempt in Turkey in three states of the former socialist regime, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cratia and Serbia, is a rich common history that manages to reflect even on today's political relations between these countries and the Republic of Turkey. My intention was to provide a better observation of social and media discourse about the concrete event but also about the Turkey in mentioned states.

The knowledge I gained during my master's degree program and by working on this thesis, is only a first step on my way of researching the Western Balkan media discourse. The most important thing that I learned during the process of research and thesis preparation, is that the time has an enormous value, therefore it has to be well organized and planed. The highlighting of the specific value of time will give me a higher motivation in my future pursuits.

On this occacion, I would like to thank the Turkish Government, The Ministry of Culture and Tourism, The Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities and their Turkey Scholarship (YTB) program for giving me the great opportunitiy to complete my master's study, but also for enabling me to learn Turkish language, Turkish culture and tradition.

Special thanks to my supervisor, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Mehmet Özçağlayan for the sources of knowledge to which he directed me and for the patience he had during my research.

I express a great gratitude and respect for the support of my husband, my parents and my family.

In the name of Omniscient,

Istanbul, 2019. Selma Alić - Šišić

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INTRODUCTION

Illegal military intervention, coup d'etat, is an act that would be condemned for most of the states if they were faced this violent attempt of owerthroving democratically elected authorities. However, when it comes to a state with a complex history, tradition and current political environment such as the Republic of Turkey, then it is expected that reactions to such an event are not predictable. It is therefore important for the Republic of Turkey to be aware of its importance and geopolitical position, but also to understand how it has been perceived and interpreted by other states, governments and societies.

The discourse on some state or nation that prevails in one certain region commonly determines the relations of society toward that specific state or nation. Media, as dominant disseminators of information, are the most responsible instruments in shaping and directing the discourse. Media are expected not only to create certain media content but more important to indicate, transmit and inform public regarding the ongoing event or phenomenon. The process of transmission considers an objective approach in news reporting so that the transmitted information can be liberated from bias. Since the social discourse is in a great extent formed under the influence of media, it's unacceptable for media to ignore one side of story, especially in reports that can cause hate speech, racism or any kind of bigotry in society. Hence, the main task of media is to communicate the truth.

By creating a certain discourse about one group of people or their leader, let's name them "subject", media gains the power to control the actions and treatment of society towards that specific "subject". This study seeks to identify and understand the media discourse in the three former socialist states of the Western Balkans: Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Serbia, on the failed military coup and the actors involved. This will also help in understenging the perception of the Republic of Turkey and Turkish people in these three countries.

Discourse has a crucial role in reproduction of domination. Therefore, it is important to have a critical approach to it so we could understand its political and social connotations. Media research is important for us so we could have a better understanding of the world we are interfering with. By this we consider discourse analysis, or to be more precise critical discourse analysis. Therefore, we use different methods in approaching the analyzing of the discourse created under the influence of the media reports.

The study consists of seven chapters explained as follow:

In Chapter I: From sultanate to democracy, the establishment of the Republic of Turkey is explained. In the case of Turkey, it is important to understand historical changes that preceded the constitutional reforms and became the basis of what we know today as the Republic of Turkey. The Chapter I focuses on the period of dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the reforms that were implemented during the transition period until the establishment of the republic. The litherature used for this chapter is from more domestic and international authors, some of them are: Erik-Jan Zürcher, Ahmad Feroz, Niyazi Berkes, Ergun Özbudun etc…

The Chapter II: History of military interventions in modern Turkey, is about the history of military interventions. In order to have a better understanding of the most important event for the Turkey in last two decades, but also to have a better insight into the political background of the state, it is required to mention earlier military interventions, which happens to be frequently linked with the establishing, same as with the overthrowing of the democraticly elected governments. Through Chapter II, four coup d'etats were analyzed: 1960, 1971, 1980 and the 1997. Hence, this chapeter also explains the political and social developments in Turkey from the establishing of republic until the beginning of 21st century. Authors dominantly used for this chapter: Andrew Mango, Eric Cornell, Walter F. Weiker…

The Chapter III: The 15th July coup d'etat – the event and narrative, explains the last military intervention in Turkey but also has pays attention to the events that preceded it. This chapter also includes explanations of Turkey's political scene from the beginning of a new era, along with details of some of the actors who may have been involved in the coup attempt. Litheratur for this chapter is of more recent dates, together with books meny articles and researches is also considered. Some of authors mentioned in this chapter: Atila Yayla, Asli Aydintasbas, Hakkı Taş etc…

In Chapter IV: Understanding the media of three Western Balkan states, the development and current situation of media in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic of Croatia and Republic of Serbia have been elaborated. The elaboration includes the state of media in post-socialist period, their adaptation to new political conditions, the state of public broadcasterst and private media outlets, the international reports on media freedoms, economic, social and politival media frameworks, online and printed media. The literature for this chapter was dominantely of Balkan based authors such as: Asim Mujkić, Helena Popović, Rade Veljanovski, Jovanka Matić, Dubravka Valić Nedeljković.

The Chapter V: Methodological approach, is about the methods and approaches used in analyzing the selected media. The research is based on the critical discourse analysis applied through the quantitative analysis, analysis of news headlines, thematic orientation of the news and representation of social actors with macro-propositions. In the selection of methods and approaches for media analysis, priority has been given to prominent linguists and media discourse analysts who developed the related models and theories such as T. A. Van Dijk, Norman Fairclough, Ruth Wodak, Michael Meyer, etc.

In Chapter VI: Database, analyzed newspapers are described with details. It is important to understand the orientation and editorial policy of the media outlet for better understanding of the reporting. Therefore, the nine analyzed newspapers are represented in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Oslobođenje, Dnevni avaz, Nezavisne novine), the Republic of Serbia (Danas, Večernje novosti, Politika) and the Republic of Croatia (Večernji list, Jutarnji list, Slobodna Dalmacija). This includes 279 issues of those newspapers with 499 news articles and 620 pictures published within the period from 16 July to 15 August of the year 2016, 31 days in total.

The Chapter VII: Critical discourse analysis research results that represents the research results for analyzed nine newspapers based on the critical discourse analysis applied through the quantitative analysis, analysis of news headlines, thematic orientation of the news and representation of social actors with macro-propositions.

A. RESEARCH SUBJECT

The subject of this study is media discourse about the July 15 coup attempt in Turkey in 2016, created in three former socialis states Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Serbia under the influence of daily press. This research will include observing the news articles in three countries which means observing the functioning of textual content within the three different socio-cultural practices. The research, as explained above, will cover nine daily newspapers in total from three countries, of which three newspapers in each; Bosnia and Herzegovina (Oslobođenje, Dnevni avaz, Nezavisne novine), the Republic of Serbia (Danas, Večernje novosti, Politika) and the Republic of Croatia (Večernji list, Jutarnji list, Slobodna Dalmacija). This includes 279 issues of the related newspapers with 499 news articles and 620 pictures published during the period from 16 July to 15 August 2016, 31 days in total. The daily papers will be used because of their continuity in news reporting and also for their easier accessibility comparing to some other sources of

information. Besides, newspapers are constant regarding their content; once they're printed out it's not possible to re-edit the content again. On the other side, media content on TV or radio stations can always be removed or re-edited on online media.

B. RESEARCH AIM

The main objective of this research is to clarify whether or not there are any differences in reporting about the concrete event in three former socialist Western-Balkan countries. In other words, throughout the research it is examined if it is possible for one event to be represented in different manner regarding the state and ethnic region where the news is published.

The contribution of this study is considered as a deeper understanding of the discourse on one of the most significant events of the last decade for the wider region, in the territory of three former socialist states with already established relations with the Republic of Turkey.

In this respect, the hypothesis of the research is based on the proposal if the region where the news is published, along with its ethnic factor, can influence the way the news is represented.

C. METHODOLOGY OF THE RESEARCH

Critical discourse analysis is determined as the most suitable analysis for this study and so it is applied through several research methods: quantitative analysis, headlines analysis, thematic orientation, representation of social actors and analyses of macro-propositions. The analysis results will be used as variables that will determine the final results of the study.

In the analysis of representation of social actors, the representation of event itself will be included as well. The analysis will be based on the macro-proposition taken from the news items, but also a visual representation of the actors and event in the newspaper will be considered. Therefore, the report will include some examples of published pictures and other visual elements. In this study each macro-preposition is defined trough "unit" that is expressed as keyword, representation of actors or metaphor.

CHAPTER I

FROM SULTANATE TO DEMOCRACY

1.1. INTRODUCTION TO THE CHAPTER

Established in 1923, Republic of Turkey (*Türkiye Cumhuriyeti)* in its short period of existence has already confronted four coup d'etats. Since the death of the first president Mustafa Kemal's in 1938; on almost every 10 to 15 years one military coup occurred in the Republic of Turkey. Even though almost every government in this period was selected in democratic way, they were faced with violent overthrown by military coup. Therefore, it is less surprisingly that current government also had to confront coup attempt. Although the coup intentions were noticed even in previous years jet only the 15th of July, 2016 case is having the clear elements of military coup. Naunihal Sigh defines a coup attempt as an explicit action involving some portion of the state military, police, or security forces, undertaken with intent to overthrow the government.[1] Even though the 15 July coup attempt wasn't taken under the intern chain of commands, still it was carried out by officers who had control over the 50% of military[2], and therefore it fits to Sigh's definition of coup attempt.

To be able to better understand the last coup attempt, but also to have an insight into the political situation in Republic of Turkey, it is necessary to mention earlier military coups, which happens to be frequently linked with the establishing, same as with the overthrowing of the democracy. But let's start from the beginning, from the days that have established Republic of Turkey and significantly shaped Turkish nation in the form that we today know.

1.2. FIRST SIGNS OF COUNTRY; CONSTITUTIONAL TENDENCIES IN THE END OF OTTOMAN EMPIRE

In the end of 19th century Ottoman Empire is losing most of its possessions and its power was slowly reduced to the territory that we today know as The Republic of Turkey. The sultanate manner of governing becomes insufficient and out of date, so sultans are being

[1] Singh, N. (2014). Seizing *Power: The Strategic Logic of Military Coups.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

[2] Ataman, M. (2017*). July 15 Coup Attempt in Turkey: Context, Causes and Consequences*. Istanbul: Turkuvaz Haberleşme ve Yayıncılık A.Ş.

forced to adjust to new conditions. The overthrown of Sultan Abdülaziz is considered as first military coup in modern Turkey history[3] and a sign that it's about time to make important changes in the state governing. Therefore, in 1876 a special committee (Meclis-i Muhsusa) with Sultan Abdulhamit chairing it, promulgated the Constitution (Kanun-i Esasi)[4], and this becomes the first step to constitutional changes on the territory of modern Turkey. According to Constitution, there was not "Ottoman Nation" but "Ottoman State", and the personality of sultan was risen up to the level of holiness so the sultan was not accountable to anyone. This was one of the main reasons for members of Assembly to insist on constitutional changes. However, this was only the beginning of almost 50 years long process of establishing the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM), and forming of Republic.

During the transition period, from sultanate to republic, Turkish society evolved the feeling of national unity and in the same time felt the inevitability of liberation from hereditary power - sultanate. Thus, the Constitution is being changed several times, and every time changes aimed to make sultan more accountable to Assembly. The amendments from this period made really important changes in the nature of the Ottoman political regime.[5]
This period is characteristic by the establishment of "The Young Turks" (*Jön Türkler*) movement, gathering young Ottoman bureaucrats, who had been educated in the modern, European-style colleges of the empire and often had studied in Europe as well.[6] The intention of this group was to reconnect Turkish people with their national identity and to be able to resist the international centers of power, but in the same time to move forward from traditional hereditary government set and ruled by sultans for the centuries. Movement was composed of all those who had joined forces in order to overthrow the Hamidian regime[7] and to reinstate the constitutional-parliamentary system.

The first more serious step towards the constitutional government, after the 1876, occurred in 1908, with overthrowing of the Sultan Abdülhamid II. Accordingly, this was the

[3] Kocabaş, S. (2011). *29 Mayıs 1876 Darbesinin İçyüzü: Sultan Abdülaziz Nasıl Devrildi?*. İstanbul: Bayrak Yayımcılık ve Matbaacılık Ltd. Şti.
[4] *Kanunlar ve Kararlar Başkanlığı Araştırma ve İnceleme Bürosuö*. (2017). MECLİS-İ MEBUSANDAN GÜNÜMÜZE KANUNLAR VE KARARLAR BAŞKANLIĞI (YASAMA HİZMETLERİ TEŞKİLATI). TBMM Basımevi - 1. Baskı
[5] ibid
[6] Zürcher, J. E. (2010). The *Young Turk Legacy and National Builidig: From the Ottoman Empire to Ataturk's Turkey*. London. I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd.
[7] Feroz, A. (1993). *The Making of Modern Turkey*. London. Routledge.

second coup d'etat in modern Turkish history and same as the first one it also aimed to move forward to constitutional system of governing. Together with renewal of Constitution, coup has caused dramatic changes in the empire. First of all media freedom brought an interactive debate on many various topics.[8] Political exiles who had either been banished to distant provinces or escaped to Europe began to return to the capital in the hope of carving out political careers for themselves.[9]

For Young Turks this was a moment of comprehending that the period of new political system has begun. The movement started with consolidating strengths needed for establishing the foundations of important governing changes in the empire. Unfortunately, besides the important improvements, the first years of renewal constitutional government were marked by a constant struggle for political power between the fractions inside of Young Turk movement; the Liberals and the Unionist.[10] Liberals belonged to upper class of Ottoman society while the Unionists were members of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) founded in 1889. The constant supremacy fight between these two groups was waged by several military coups; the one in 1908 was followed by dismissing of ministers of war and marine in 1909, what was denounced by Unionists as the coup d'etat. Next one occurred in 1912, when a pro-Unionists cabinet was forced to resign and make way for a Liberal government.

The Liberals may have saved the conquered position if there wasn't the Unionist coup d'etat of 23 January 1913, conducted to prevent Great Powers to overtake the city of Edirne. This was a final power overtaking between the Liberals and Unionists, even though the Liberals made one attempt more on 11 June, helped by British embassy. The Unionists managed to save the supremacy and form the shape of the "union and progress" ideology.[11]

1.3. THE QUESTION OF NATIONAL IDENTITY AND FORMING OF REPUBLIC

As it was clear that the epoch of Ottoman Empire has come to an end of its six centuries long governance, Turkish society was faced with challenge of new identity. Namely, one

[8] Erik, J. Z. (2010). page: 215
[9] Feroz, A. (1993). Page: 31
[10] ıbid. Page: 33
[11] Ibid. Page: 35-38

important aspect of the socio-political life in this period was the Islam, as a dominant religion of this region. On the other side, the influence of the West was on the rise which in a great extent caused the awakening of national awareness. The Young Turk movement intended to distinguish religion from state, but in the same time the movement wasn't content with foreign forces (the Great Power) involving into their identity, so they needed a new form of ideology. Therefore, the results of socio-political turmoil were three schools of thought: Islamist, Westernist and Turkist.[12]

During the period 1908-1918 these three schools will constantly cross each other, however, the Turkist school of thought was neither anti-West nor pro-West or, to put it in another way, they were as pro-Western as any Westernist and as anti-Western as any Islamist. They accepted both attitudes, but only partially.[13] Over the years, Turkists proved to be more effective in leading the positive action on the question of social reform. Thus, Turkish society didn't want to accept the westernized model of governing, which is, as it was considered "afflicted with social ills"[14], but on the other hand, it was also considered that the civilization elements carried through the sharia are „incompatible with modern civilization".[15] As Berkes explained, the Turkists "reform program would consist, not of secularization via Westernization, but of secularization via Turkification.[16]

Most prominent figure from this period was Mustafa Kemal, whose ideas were the guiding ones throughout the transition period from dissolving of the empire to establishing of the republic. Mustafa Kemal will take an extremely important role in years to come. Starting from 1908, the ideology of Ottomans started to change, regarding that the period right before the World War I is about to show how fast one nation can be transformed from monarchy to constitutional society. Since the Young Turk movement had an irreplaceable role in creating of Turkish ideology, we can say that their activities were the main trigger of changes in transition period.

As it's mentioned before, the 1908 coup d'etat, signified the open road for republic establishing, therefore the strengthening of Turkish national identity, was undoubtedly the

[12] Niyazi, B. (1998). *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*. London. C.Hurts&Co. (Pubishers) Ltd. Page; 337.
[13] Ibid. Page: 355
[14] Ibid. Page: 354
[15] Ibid. page: 365
[16] Ibid. Page: 366

continuation of this road. The intern turmoil in the end on Ottoman Empire certainly was an important subject of discussion for domestic society. However, the ongoing events in wider spectrum of society, requested from Young Turk movement to direct their activities to the outside world. This primarily refers to Balkan Wars (1912-1913) and Great War (1914-1918). Hence, the movement has become an important participant in creating of the geographically-political scene of the time. Namely, above mentioned salvage of the city of Edirne in 1913 was an answer of Young Turk movement, led by the Unionist fraction, to Great Powers' request to cede the city to Bulgaria. This absolutely was one of the most important political decisions, and it had significant influence on the immediate past. As a matter of fact, this event, together with the First Balkan War is considered as a "concrete Ottoman road to total war"[17], in other words this was the entering of Ottoman Empire into the World War I. Defeated by Italy in 1911-1912 on the southwest border of Empire, and exhausted by Balkan wars, Ottomans were forced to rethink their entire ideology and administrative policy. Once again the Young Turks, or to be more precise the Unionists are taking the leading part in this task.

The mobilization of population has been started with the beginning of the Balkan Wars, and continued with declaration of jihad – Holy War, in November 1914. The strength of army was recovered and the triumph at Gallipoli whipped out the trauma of losing the territories in region of Balkan and Libya. Even though the Ottomans faced the grate lost during the Great War, still it represents the turning point for Turks and for further development of their nation. The four years of Great War have destroyed the Ottoman Empire and led to its final end in 1922. The 36th sultan Mehmet VI Vahdettin resigned and made the way for Unionists to create a new structure for governing.

Previously empowered with strong feeling of national identity, Turkish society now got the main figure of recovery and state establishing – Mustafa Kemal. In 1920 Mustafa Kemal formed a new parliament, the Grand National Assembly, and this is considered as the final result of almost 50 years long struggle for constitutional changes. Shortly after, the Republic of Turkey has been established on 20th October 1923. Mustafa Kemal and his supporters wanted to see Turkey transformed into a modern nation state which, as Mustafa Kemal

[17] Kieser, H., Öktem, K. & Reinkowski, M. (2015). *World War I and The End of The Ottomans: From the Balkan Wars to the Armenian Genocide*. London., New York., I.B. Tauris&Co. Ltd., Page: 31

himself explained, would "live as an advanced and civilized nation in the midst of contemporary civilization".[18]

1.4. REFORM CHANGES THROUGH KEMALISM

The Republic's first government made structural changes in many sectors with an intention to make their country more similar to European countries. This period is recognized as period of nation building and establishing of peace. Starting from abolishment of Sultanate in 1922, forthcoming decade was fulfilled with reforms that will have an important impact on development of Turkish society until today. The ideological foundations of Mustafa Kemal's reform program become known as Kemalism. It included reforms regarding national politics, education, language, clothing and nation image, human rights, national economy, religion etc.

In aspect of education this is mostly related to language; creating new alphabet and introducing new words, but also insisting on education as the most important element of society renewal.

In the aspect of clothing the reform refers to removing the headscarf and traditional Ottoman clothes. In the sense of politics the reform was more than obvious; from the theocracy Turkish nation has evolved into secular country. Regarding economic reforms the government in Ankara searched for the most appropriate method of central control over the economy.

The Law of Surname was also adopted in 1934, and Mustafa Kemal was given the surname "Atatürk", meaning "the Father of the Turks", by the Grand National Assembly. By the law, surname "Atatürk" was dedicated only to Mustafa Kemal, as the founder of the Republic. Other citizens could choose their own surname as they wish other than this.

The new leader, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk promised that he will establish the political party that would "encompass all social classes, including farmers, workers, capitalists, industrialists, and intellectuals, and would serve as a vehicle for the implementation of a

[18] Feroz, A. (1993).Page: 53

major program of transformation."[19] It was certain that this type of political party would leave no necessity of existence of any other political party. Therefore, this period of Turkish history is known as the single-party regime of the Republican People's Party that ruled Turkey from 1923 to 1946.[20] Even though the one party had absolute power, with no left chances for opposition, this period is considered as the authoritarian rather than totalitarian.[21]

With strong indoctrination of masses Mustafa Kemal managed to establish the "secular character of the republican regime, thereby creating the first such state in the Muslim world".[22] As many members of Assembly were educated in West countries, the newly formed government was aware of how developed the European society was in different life spheres. The stagnancy in Turkish society was visible in almost every life aspect, but the one that attracted the most of attention of Mustafa Kemal, was education. Facing the fact that only 10.6 of population was literate[23], he had dedicated most of his career to making the reforms in education and making education obtainable to every citizen of the Republic. Maybe the most significant achievement in the sector of education was the introduction of new alphabet in 1928. Namely, as most of the population could not read or write the Ottoman language, Mustafa Kemal took as his first mission to establish a Turkish language, with new alphabet, based on the alphabets already used in European countries, but adjusted to speakers of Turkish language. His aim was to teach the Turks to this new alphabet so they can read, write and educate themselves. By the time, the government launched the "National Schools" designed to teach the new script to adults.[24] Schools started to work and the profession of teacher has become one the most valuables.

However, the education reform brought some negative consequences too. This reflects mainly in the fact that an average person in today's Turkey can't read any written document older than 100 years. The Ottoman language has become the separate discipline at the

[19] Unan, N. (1952). *Halk Partisi'ni Kurmak Hakkındaki Kararını Açıklaması*. 6.XIII. 1922. İn Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri, vol.2, 1906-1938, ed. Ankara: Türk İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü Yayımları, 46-48. Stated from: Hanioğlu. Ş., M. (2011). *Atatürk: An Intellectual Biography*. New Jersey. Princeton University Press, 143

[20] Özbudun, E. (2000). *Contemporary Turkish Politich: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation*. Colorado. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.

[21] Ibid, 5

[22] Hanioğlu. Ş., M. (2011). *Atatürk: An Intellectual Biography*. New Jersey. Princeton University Press, 157

[23] Tütengil, O., C. (1980). *1927 Türkiye'in Atatürk'ün Büyük Söylevi'nin 50. Zılı Semineri. Bildiriler ve tartışmalar*. Anakara. Türk Tarih Kurumu, 56

[24] Feroz, A. (1993). pp..81

universities and therefore the documents from the Ottoman period are not approachable to anyone except to those who are educated to read and interpret the Ottoman language.

Another important reform relates to clothing and it had great impact on the way Turkish women dresses even today. With the forming of Republic, traditional Ottoman clothing got almost lost. The government made strict rules forbidding women dressed into burka, or wearing a headscarf to enter any public places including schools and universities. This was a direct threatening on the freedom of choice and denial of rights on education. This erroneous practice has been abolished only few years ago.

Ataturk's reforms that have been established for almost two decades, had a great significance on the image of Turkish society. Even the Constitution of Republic of Turkey states that Republic of Turkey as the democratic, secular and social state governed by law is "loyal to the nationalism of Ataturk"[25].

1.5. THE FIRST APPLICATION OF MULTI-PARTY-SYSTEM

After the World War II Turkey had to show its determination to European values and democratization, hence the multi-party-system was introduced. The first multiparty elections were held in 1946 and Democratic Party (DP) won 64 seats while CHP 395. Latter, the Democratic Party (DP) was the first of opposition parties to rise to power in multiparty elections held in 1950, created by the intern fractions of conservative elements inside of CHP.[26] The DP won with the majority of votes. CHP resigned and left the government to DP's executives. The DP differed from their predecessors by being more conservative in the cultural policies but having more liberal attitudes regarding economy. In the first half of 1950s DP gave importance to issues as infrastructural investment, support of agriculture and the development of the private sector, but also they placed more emphasis in the liberalization of domestic and foreign trade. They have brought electoral power and introduced themselves as a powerful opposition by wining second elections in 1954 and the third ones in 1957.[27]

[25] Constitution of Republic of Turkey, Part One, General Principles, Article II – *Characteristics of the Republic*.
[26] Ibid. pp.34
[27] Mango, A (1994). pp.12-14

CHAPTER II
HISTORY OF MILITARY INTERVENTIONS IN MODERN TURKEY

2.1. MAY 27, 1960, FIRST MILITARY COUP D'ETAT

Besides the Republic establishing and reform changes that have modernized the society, the age of Ataturk's governing is also recognized as the age without any military coup attempt. From the Republic establishment in 1923, until the death of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk 1938, he was an absolute ruler, governing the state and having control over the military forces. Nevertheless, the stage of peace won't last long. In Turkish history Mustafa Kemal is known as founder of Republic, but his contribution to military forces is of the same character. We must not forget the importance of the Battle of Gallipoli, which is considered as the crucial one for the Republic establishing. The commander of this battle was Mustafa Kemal himself, and the victory brought him the rank of Marshal. Therefore, a good strategic capability provided him a full control over the military and a possibility to manage the state governing and to gain armed forces' trust at the same time.

Laying the foundations of Republic Mustafa Kemal retained his rank of Marshal and proposed that commanders have to choose between their military career and involvement in politics.[28] Since then, the Turkish military is considered as the guardian of the Turkish state with a moral obligation to protect the Republic against every kind of danger. Until the death of Mustafa Kemal, the military stayed completely loyal to government, which will not be the case in the upcoming years. Not long afterwards, the opposition culminated and the dominant Republicans People Party, which remained the only permitted party for over 20 years[29], felt threaten for the first time. Regarding the war circumstances the opposition took some time to develop.

Even though the living standard all around the country has changed - towns started to develop with increase of domestic and foreign trade, and the villages emerged from abject poverty - not everyone was content and included in the raise of prosperity. As a matter of fact, regardless the ostensibly development, the mid-50's were known as years of growing

[28] Mango, A. (1999) . *Atatürk*. London. John Murray, Ltd, 50 Albemarle Street, pp.400
[29] Cornell, E. (2001). *Turkey in the 21st Century: Opportunities, Challenges, Threats*. Richmond, Curzon Press, pp.34

inflation, political instability and discontent in urban areas[30]. Reasons for this can be found in the crop failure and the foreign trade deficit pushing economy by the point of international bankruptcy[31]. This period of Turkish history is also known for changed strategy toward the Turkish soldier. Hence the inflation didn't affect only the civilians, but also military members depending on the state funds. For the first time since the Republic was established, Turkish soldier has lost some of the fame and glory gained through previous years. Suddenly, the soldiers have become the citizens of lower economic status. Another important moment from the 50's was the accession of Turkey into NATO alliance. Regarding this, the NATO increased the discord among junior and senior officers along technological lines, in the same time when Adnan Menderes, in that time the president of the country, divided them along lines of rank and socioeconomic status by appeasement of the pashas[32].

The military fraction loyal to Kemalism complained about Ataturk's secularism being disturbed. As Mango (1994) explains, the CHP's leadership, closely related to Kemalism fraction, took a countrywide campaign including students, young officers and military cadets going out on the streets with an aim of overthrowing the government apparatus. The intention was accomplished on May 27, 1960, the date that commits to memory as the first military coup in the Republican era. As the coup plotters have announced over the Ankara Radio broadcast, "the Turkish armed forces have taken over the administration of the country" with an aim to extricate "the parties from the irreconcilable situation into which they have fallen."[33] The junta composed of thirty-eight officers completed the coup in just four hours. Names of the officers who organized and helped the government overtaking will be known in few days after General Cemal Gürsel, former Commander of Land Forces, became the Chairman of the National Unity Committee (NUC), a newly formed body for governing the nation. According to NUC, there were certain topics which required a solution so Turkey could move forward and make progress. The seventeen-man cabinet with fifteen "civilians" who had not been related to any political party has announced the government's program. The program was concentrated on solving the urgent problems such as creating of Constitution

[30] Feroz, A. (1993). pp. 125

[31] Lovat, D. (2001). *Turkey since 1970: Politics, Economics and Society*. New York. Palgrave Publishers Ltd. pp.12-14

[32] Feroz, A. (1993). pp. 121-125

[33] Walter. F., W. (1963). *The Turkish Revolution 1960-1961: Aspect of Military Politics.* Washington DC. The Brookings Institution. pp.20

based on democratic principles with "adherence to the spirit of the United Nations Charter and the Declaration of Human Rights[34].

One of important points of government's program was related to foreign policy expressing the intention to improve relations with Turkey's neighbor countries. The matter of economy was also on the list of priorities with statement that "trade policy must be one of the foundations of economic stability with volume and quality of Turkish goods increased so as to be able to command good prices. The goal of free imports and exports should be reached as soon as possible."[35] Regarding other noticeable matters in post-coup Turkey, the NUC pointed out needs of reforms in education, health and has required creating of nonpartisan administrative apparatus. In order to implement all required reforms and to establish new Constitution, in January 1961 NUC has convened Constituent Assembly composed of experts from many professions and representatives of private and political organizations.

While preparing the Constitution and Election Law, NUC took some other measures regarding the structure of military, academic and political life of country. Namely, with an explanation of rejuvenation of the armed forces, 5000 officers were retired, and shortly thereafter NUC dismissed 147 university professors. The political leaders related to DP government were in even worse situation. More than 400 politicians got into the trial which lasted for eleven months and took place in Yassıada islands. The most important verdict of trial is an execution of former Prime Minister Menderes and two members of his cabinet. There were three cases involving criminal charges, nine cases of corruption of government officials and seven cases of a political nature involving violation of Constitution, total nineteen cases with more than one thousand witnesses appeared during it.

The post-coup Turkey got an opportunity to start new era by establishing more democratic system ensuring the rule of law and higher level of human rights. The first step towards this was the initiative for constructing the new Constitution. The national referendum on Constitution was held on 9th of July and it has shown the desire of nation to enjoy greater degree of freedom. Constitution has been approved by slightly more than half the votes and it seemed like Turkey is starting its new political and economic chapter.

[34] Ibid, pp.22
[35] ibid

2.2. MARCH 12, 1971, THE COUP BY COMMUNIQUÉ

The 1960s coup d'etat marked the left-ward turn and opened doors to a rapidly growing pluralism, trade unions and radical parties. Actually, this process has started years ago by introducing the multi-party elections when Turkey moved from authoritarian system to democracy. Now, with more freedom regarding the human and political rights of individuals and groups guaranteed by the constitution, it was easier to form political party and to run for elections. However, most of the parties disappeared from political life by the elections held on 15 October 1961. Just four parties got into the election race and the election results have actually indicated how the success of each party was inevitably related to the first coup d'etat. Namely, by gaining the notable number of votes the supporters of Menderes, through the New Turkey Party (NTP) showed that they are still numerous and they have an intention to exist as a policy maker. Even that the RPP won the elections, this was considered as their great failure since the party had to made a coalition with newly founded Justice Party.

With an aim to keep the neo-DP coalition (NTP and JP) out of the government, the RPP is choosing to make a union with JP, considering this as a better solution. Anyway, the coalition couldn't last long giving that the Suleyman Demirel's JP is losing the influence in the Assembly and getting even less votes on the 1963 elections. The bad performance JP ascribed to their cooperation with RPP and this becomes the reason that they withdrew from the coalition. İn the upcoming period Demirel made sure that RPP is losing the power in ruling the state. After he ensured the resignation of İnonu the JP ruled by proxy over the Independent senator Suat Hayri Ürgüplü but also ministers from the parties of the right. The moment that Demirel was waiting for came in 1965 - the election year. İn that moment JP seemed to be the most appropriating party, since others were or too long in the governing position or too long in opposition. Therefore, JP won the 1965 elections with majority large enough to form the government. Demirel thus became the dominant political figure in this period of Turkish history. He was already known for having good relations with USA officials and in past himself had finished one part of his education in USA. This made him a symbol of modern capitalism and he was named as a Freemason.

As he was intending to create modern capitalistic country Demirel created a situation which was profitable for a small number of rich capitalists but in the same time harmful for

small independent tradesmen who failed to survive the competition.[36] This situation lead to social inequality which resulted with rebellion of middle class in country same as in the rows of JP. Demirel and party are getting into difficult situation but still managing to win the 1969 elections. Since the JP had significantly lower number of votes, opposition sees this fact as an opportunity to weaken the governing party. This led to the establishment of new political parties. Professor Necmetin Erbakan formed the İslamist National Order Party (NOP), some smaller fractions in JP have divided and established Democratic party.

The right wing of RPP establishes Reliance Party and Col. Turkeş renames RPNP into Nationalist Action. The global economic, social and political situation from the date has influenced the circumstances in Turkey in a great extent. The expansion of industry increases the society's expectations to the level which was even difficult to satisfy. During the last decade, Turkey's economy was based on agriculture with small, insufficiently developed industrial sector governed by state. However, by the end of sixties, the number of private enterprises is increasing, and their share in GDP becomes equal to the share of agriculture. The urbanization is also rising and population is rapidly moving from villages to cities in seek for better employment opportunities. This phenomenon causes deepening of socio-economic differences between the rich businessmen and middle class. İf we consider the fact that all this chaotic situation occurs in politically unstable Turkey therefore is not surprisingly how some of the influential society members thought how ''only way to power was via military coup''.[37]

The ''coup by memorandum'', as the 1971 coup d'etat become known, occur on 12 March. The Chief of General Staff imposed the memorandum to prime minister Suleyman Demirel. The main demand of the memorandum was the establishment of a government respecting the democratic principles with an aim of neutralization of the anarchical situation in which Turkey has been fallen during the last years. The memorandum emphasized that government must implement the reformist laws from the 1961 Constitution in accordance with Ataturk's views.[38] İf the requirements were to be refused, the military forces would take control of the government. The junta requested from Demirel to resign from the position of president and to withdraw the Justice Party government members from the parliament. The military chiefs threatened the government with new military intervention, therefore Demirel

[36] Feroz, A. (1993). pp.143
[37] ibid, pp.146
[38] Zürcher, J., E. (2004), *Turkey: A Modern History*, İ.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, London, pp. 258

was frighten as he was aware what meant the military intervention in case of Adnan Menderes. İt has only seemed that Turkey has faced similar coup d'etat, clearly this time without liquidations. However, as the Zürcher explains it was a coup by high command, not by radical group of officers as a previous one. The high command ''was mesmerized by the specter of communist threat.''[39]

Comparing to the 1960 coup, which had fatal consequences and caused the reestablishing of the Constitution, the 1971 "memorandum coup'' didn't involve complete break-down with already prepared institutional schemes. İt was more the ''re-equilibration of democracy'', which Linz defines as the ''political process that, after a crisis that has seriously threatened the continuity and stability of the basic democratic political mechanisms, results in their continued existence at the same or higher levels of democratic legitimacy, efficacy and effectiveness.''[40] İn the 1971 intervention, military did not took the power directly, they were more content to be the éminence grise and to govern behind the curtains. Therefore, the intervention distinguishes from other military interventions and it's considered as the half coup and a ''way station'' between the 1960 and 1980 interventions.[41] After Demirel's resignation the commanders were reluctant to govern the country directly, so they had to find enough good and acceptable figure for prime minister. Professor Nihat Erim came out as a most preferable candidate, therefore he was asked to form the government. However, forming of government didn't bring the end of problems for Turkey. The civil rebellion was increasing day by day and this will give rise to a decade long unstable situation in Turkey.

As the 1960 Constitution brought wider freedoms in civil gatherings and forming of the civil organizations, many youth organizations were established. Unfortunately, this step to democratization also had its negative side when it turned out how some of these organizations were terroristic ones. The student rebellion turned into terrorism when the faction of the splintered left executed the İsraeli consul in İstanbul, Elrom Ephraim. Already imposed martial law was renewed every two months by Assembly in accordance to meet the regulation of Constitution. The 1971 military intervention ended in 1973 with parliamentary elections when the RPP formed coalition with Necmetin Erbakan's National Salvation Party.

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[39] ibid

[40] Linz, J., J.(1978). *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibration*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, pp. 87

[41] Özbudun, E. (2000). *Contemporary Turkish Politics, Challenges to Democratic Consolidation*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, inc., Colorado, pp.35

2.3. SEPTEMBER 12, 1980, BLOODSHED ON THE STREETS

The 1970 didn't bring much of prosperity to Turkey, as a matter of fact the situation of economic, social and political crisis were predominant during the decade. Trapped between Western countries with accelerated modernization and Eastern countries with rising oil prices, Turkey was on the verge of bankruptcy. As Turkey was closed for the foreign products, the population faced the lack of some groceries, in developed countries considered as basic essentials. This additionally increased the peeve and discontent of people and inevitably led to more dramatic situation. Over these years there was several interferences into the Constitution by amendments regarding civil liberties and military autonomy. However, this didn't help in calming down the crisis. Even the elections only increased the social and political instability and people's trust to political parties. This chaotic situation was seen as the betel field for those political figures wishing to conquer the power in the state.

The highest point of violence culminated on May Day, few weeks before the 1977 elections. The walk on Taksim square organized as the symbol of resistance to increase of fascism, turned into, by then unknown, outburst of violence and terror. The May Day 1977 massacre took more than 30 victims and it was the first terror attack of this kind in modern Turkish history. After this, it seemed that it will be even more difficult to perform the elections, however the number of voters (72.4%) shown how they actually saw the elections as chance for change and rebuilding of peace. But, as the RPP, the party with highest rate of votes, failed to establish the government, the Demirel's JP got the chance to form their government in collaboration with their coalition partners. The violence and terror in Turkey increased to the level that even the elections were insufficient to end it. During the Second Nationalist Front government, as the Demirel's government was recognized, there were 126 murders and the oppression in southeast was on the rise.

In order to overcome the uncontrolled situation in country JP was forced to make a de facto coalition with RPP but even that could not make any progress. In the beginning of 1978 there were 30 political killings and terrorism become directed on specific individuals from academic and political life of Turkey. The violence and terror have spread all over the country; in the region of east Turkey, in town Bingöl Grey Wolves - the terroristic

organization, have destroyed more than 100 shops in one day.[42] Ecevit has announced that '' there had been 800 deaths and as a result of political violence and that his government had made 1999 arrests, of which 1052 were rightists and 778 leftists.''[43] All this forced the government to impose the marital law, however it wasn't sufficient enough to appease the situation. The commanders were asking government to allow them higher authorizations so they could be more involved in government's decisions and have the right to interference against the violence and terror groups. Even the opposition accused the Ecevit for ''not giving the army the powers necessary to carry out their tasks''[44]

After the 1979 elections for the fifth time in this decade we again have the Ecevit - Demirel replacement and JP once again unsuccessfully intended to establish stable government. By this time, behind the closed doors commanders started to develop their plan for seizing the power. The main person in this plot turned out to be the Turkey's Chief of Staff General Kenan Evren who had organized the meeting of generals in December 1979 in ıstanbul, right after his visit to Brussels where he had consultations with Turkey's Western allies. As the county already was in its turbulent times - terror on the streets, economy fall down - commanders have expected how the military intervention will be well received and supported by citizens. In order to create economic stability, Demirel took Turgut Özal as his economic adviser. Özal has presented the program whose main idea was to focus the economy on export instead of home market. The "24th of January Measures" as Özal's program become known among the people and in the media, initiated a lot of attention and positive reactions abroad same as in the Turkey. The important thing that Özal was asking for is the situation of political and social peace inside of county, and for army this was a reason more to carry out the intervention. Confident that military action will be successful, in June 1980 General Evren launched "Operation Flag", but since the Ecevit failed motion against the government, Evren canceled the operation. This time Erbakan stood on Demirel's side and helped him to survive motion. But not for a long time. As the Erbakan changed the direction and got close with Ecevit by making an agreement to harass the government again.

By the September 1980 the state was politically paralyzed with difficulties in forming the quorum in the Assembly and inability in electing new president since the President

[42] Feroz, A. (1993). pp.172
[43] ibid
[44] ibid, pp. 173

Korutürk's term expired six months ago. The High Command saw the intervention as the only relevant action in this matter. Therefore, the well-planned operation carried out on 12 September ended the political tensions and opened a new chapter in Turkey's political and economic life. The Özal's "24th of January Measures" together with the military intervention marked the turn to free market and extension of the trade liberalization. The terrorism on the streets was not immediately stopped but it significantly reduced. As the time was passing, it become safer for people to go out on the streets without risking their lives. The commanders named themselves as the government, by the time new government structure will be selected.

Considering that the 1961 Constitution unintentionally involved politics in everyday life of Turkish people and opened up the political liberalization, the military gathered the assembly to draft out a new constitution. Women's and youth branches were excluded from political parties, politic were banned on campuses same as the radical unions were banned, the trade unions and professional associations were forbidden to have any political interests and activities.[45] Furthermore, the new electoral law required from political parties to win leastwise 10 percent of votes in order to gain any seats in the parliament.

The new Constitution was approved by referendum in November 1982. Constitution also creates a seven-years presidency which made a Kenan Evren be a president by the end of decade. Next elections were held in 1983 and voters rejected each from the past know party in favor of new formed Turgut Özal's Motherland Party. İn this was Özal got the chance to form the government and continue with his trade liberalization program as a Prime Minister.

2.4. 28 FEBRUARY 1997, POSTMODERN COUP D'ETAT

After decades long violence and terrorism on streets of Turkey, country has finally entered a more peaceful period with social, political and economic stability. The government operated according to Turgut Özal's program for economic prosperity which increased exports and helped Turkish lira to become a convertible currency. Additionally, Turkey has become interesting and available to foreign investors and this, together with developing tourist sector, improved its creditworthiness. Özal was a pro-western oriented leader and all of his work was dedicated in getting Turkey closer to European society. Therefore, in 1987

[45] Mango, A. (1994). pp.24-25

Turkey has presented its first application to accede to a European Economic Community,[46] which was the predecessor of the European Union.

As Turkey was rapidly developing, for Turks this was an expected step but on the other side, as the Commission of the European Community in Brussels reported, the EC ‘’was not ready to enlarge nor was Turkey ready for membership.’’[47] Nowadays, Turkey’s tendency to fulfill all of the EC requirements and become a equal member of EU is still existing,[48] even though it has been more than 30 years since this first application and in spite of the fact that there were some alluding on membership referendum.[49] Nevertheless, besides the Turkey’s decisiveness to step out on the road of European integrations, there were other thing which marked the end of the 20th century. It is not unusual for this period of Turkey’s history to be described as the ages when the serious upraise of political Islam was firstly recognized. This primarily refers to Necmettin Erbakan’s Welfare Party (WP). The party shown up as the strongest opponent to the governing Suleyman Demirel’s True Path Party (TPP) by conquering 19 percent in the 1994 local elections and this was named as a ‘’Refah (welfare) earthquake’’. This is also a year when a current president of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, was chosen as the Mayor of İstanbul. Next year, the 1995, was even more important for WP since it managed to gain 158 parliamentary seats with 21.4 percent of votes.[50] This was also the highest rate of votes in favor of political Islam oriented party.

Erbakan used this favorable position of party to make a coalition with TPP and start to make changes on behalf of Islamic oriented population. The support of people, mostly from lower and middle class, towards the WP was constantly increasing. Although it was not clear ‘’whether the WP seriously intends to establish an İslamic state based on the shari’a, or would be satisfied with certain, mostly symbolic İslamic acts in some areas of social life’’[51] more secular parties have understood the actions of some party members, same as the party in general, as an alarm to interfere before the political Islam gets stronger.

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[46] *European Commision*. (2018). Key findings of the 2018 Report on Turkey. Brussels.
retrieved from:
[47] Mango, A. (1994). pp.86
[48] *Huriyet Daily News*. (01 October 2018). Turkey will not turn its back on Europe, says President Erdoğan.
[49] *Reuters.* (04 October 2018). Erdogan says he will consider referendum on Turkey's EU bid.
[50] Özbudun, E. (2000). pp. 87
[51] Ibid, pp.87

The economic changes have brought village population, who were dominantly more religious people, to settle down into the urban areas. In the beginning this didn't represent any problem since they already were illiterate and interested only in lower class job positions. Over the time, second generation of the village people is becoming more ambitious and well educated but still with the same religious mindset and practicing religion in their everyday life. The religion is starting to be a visible part of public life in Turkey and some have considered that this can distance the country from its European path and it's Western allies. The WP came to power by promising how the government will be more close to people from lower class of society and by advocating more democracy for everyone, emphasizing the rights of religious people to practice their religion free and without any negative consequences. Also, the party's leader Necmettin Erbakan was willing in making the cooperation with leaders from muslim world countries. As a Prime Minister, Erbakan has also allowed women to wear headscarf in state institution and intended to adjust working-hours during the month of Ramadan - a holy month of fasting for muslims.

We may say that this is a period when the debate over secularism versus religion is crystalized as the ''major and deep-seated division in Turkish society: modern versus traditional, progressive versus conservative, and rationalist versus religious.''[52] The secular parties were not content since all the WP actions started to influence the general image of Turkey's big cities which have represented the face of the state in front of the Western world.[53]

Even though the government was democratically elected, regarding all the circumstances military once again felt the need for interfering the state governing. This time it was an open war against spreading of political İslam and religious way of life. As it was declared by members of the National Security Council on 28th February 1997, the state was in middle of 'İslamist threat', hence the military was forced to react. Foremost the generals considered how government can't be led by a pro-islam leader, as Erbakan himself was. They have threatened with military force unless Erbakan signes the resignation. His WP was banned from government on the grounds that it wasn't secular and Erbakan, together with some other party members, was excluded from political life in Turkey. Second important

[52] Yavuz, M., H. (1997). Journal Article *''Political İslam and Welfare (Refah) Party in Turkey''*, Comparative Politics, PhD Program in Political Science, City University of New York, pp. 64

[53] BBC. (1990). *''Turkey and Europe''.*

consequence of 28th February postmodern coup was related to external appearance of population. It was widely spread how the clothing and life-style supposed to be in accordance with Atatürk principles, and Islamic way of woman dressing should be replaced by western trends and fashion.

The new government imposed the law prohibiting female students wearing a headscarf from entering the universities and state institutions. This led to an important consequences since many women with headscarf worked as teachers, and now around 11 000 of them were forced to resign and more than 3 500 who refused to resign were fired. Furthermore, around 1 600 of military members were fired and 2 500 more were forced to retire. All military members' wives. The enormous number of people, around 11 million, were blacklisted from public institutions and military. The Army commanders promised how the 28th February 'will last for 100 years', but according to later political and social situation in Turkey, it seems how this only provoked the opponents and the reaction will be shown right in the beginning of 21st century.

Despite that the coup is considered as the attack on democracy all over the Turkey, Turkey's Western allies didn't show much interest in defending the democracy and fundamental human rights as freedom of speech.[54] On the one side the EU countries were still advocate how Turkey should increase its level of democracy, but on the contrary they stayed blind in concrete cases when democracy should have been defended.

This postmodern coup is considered as the last coup before the era of Justice and Development Party (JDP), established by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in 2001. There were some intentions of government overthrowing during the first decade of 21st century and İ will mention them in next chapter. However, we can say that by the 15th of July coup attempt there was no any serious threat to JDP's government and its leadership. Even though it was failed coup, it is surely noticable how the 15th of July had consequences in matter of human victims but also in the aspect of political changes.

[54] Dietrich, J. and Wolfango, P. (2001),.''*Turkey at the Crossroads''*, Zed Book Ltd, 7 Cynthia Street, London N1 9JF, United Kingdom and Room 400, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010, USA, pp. 118

The matter of coups in Turkey is not only important part of Turkey's history but its present and future as well. Therefore, this is absolutely an inevitable topic if one is interested in learning about this country and its people.

CHAPTER III
THE 15th JULY COUP D'ETAT - THE EVENT AND NARRATIVE

3.1. NEW ERA OF TURKISH POLITICS

The political changes from the end of 20th and the beginning of 21st century have left almost every political figure in the past and created a field for new political era in country. The idea of secular country was dominant for more than 70 years, even since the Republic was founded by Mustafa Kemal. Secular parties in Turkey tried to keep religion on distance from state affairs, so they could get closer to European countries regarding the state polity, but also to preserve the idea of Kemalism, deeply rooted in Turkish society. The matter of society's religious identity was left behind even though that the most of population de facto never give up on it. The 1994 election results were the incentive for the religious oriented political parties to step-out and take their place in political race. We may say that this was one of the most important moments in contemporary Turkish history and the final turn on the crossroad of Turkish politics. As the matter of fact, the political figures who were able to foresee the importance of political and social turmoil from nineties are now the leaders of Turkish politics for almost 20 years consecutive.

Since the 1997 postmodern coup had some roughly measures regarding the population with dominantly Islamic way of life, the opposition instantly presented themselves as the main guardian of human rights on education and freedom of expression. After being elected as the Mayor of Istanbul, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan managed to gain trust of middle and lower class by promoting the policy of overthrowing the minor elite groups in state apparatus and giving the rights to poor and oppressed. Right after its dissolution from Erbakan, Erdoğan made a decision to establish new party based on the principles of Islam and democracy. It has seemed how Erdoğan has learned the lesson from his predecessors; it is important to use the frame of Europeanization and modernization but in the same time it is crucial for people that they don't have to make forceful changes in their lifestyle, especially regarding the religion.

The new Erdoğan's party Justice and Development Party (JDP) - abbreviated as "AK Parti" in Turkish, was established in August 2001 and in 2002 for the first time has participated in general elections. The results were more than satisfying for JDP. Namely, even

34.28% of voters gave their trust to JDP and so the party won 363 out of 550 parliament seats. Other parties were strongly defeated, except the RPP that had a good come back after the 1999 elections and won 19.40% which is 179 parliament seats. In later years it will become obvious that combination of religion and democracy brought a long-term good position to the party. JDP has officially begun its term by naming Abdullah Gül for Prime Minister. Soon he will be replaced by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan who stayed on this position until the 2014. Later on, in the presidential election in 2007, Abdullah Gul became a candidate for the 11th Turkish president.

This sparked a new debate in the Turkish parliament because Turkish Armed Forces officials believed that the JDP's candidate was too Islamic-oriented and would thus violate the secular spirit of the state. Once again army officials considered as their obligation to interfere the elections and to impose criteria for the election of the president. An official statement known as "e-coup" or "e-memorandum" was published on 27 April 2007 on the official web-site of Turkish Armed Forces by General Chief of Staff Yaşar Buyukanit. In the "e-memorandum" army officials highlighted that "the problem that emerged in the presidential election process is focused on arguments over secularism."[55], and that the Turkish Armed Forces are "absolute defender of secularism."[56] Therefor, they have asked for new Turkish president "who is not nominally but essentially secularist"[57] The JDP's answer to this was to call early elections in July 2007. With 47% of votes JDP managed to win the majority in parliament and to appoint Abdullah Gul for president.

Since their first entry into politics, "except during the transitional government between June 7 and November 1, 2015,"[58] the JDP has been able to remain in power as a one-party government and thus be considered as "one of the most successful political parties in the history of Turkish democracy."[59] However, during the governance of JDP controversial cases of Ergenekon and Sledgehammer occurred. Around 300 military officials were accused and arrested for plotting the overthrowing of, in that time Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan's government. The case lasted almost a decade and has brought many discussions regarding the

[55] *BBC News*. (28 April 2007). Excerpts of Turkish army statement.
[56] ibid
[57] Yayla, A. (2016). *"The Glorious resistance of Turkish democracy"*, in Ataman, M.(2016), *„July 15 Coup Attempt in Turkey, Context, Causes and Consequences",* SETA, Istanbul, pp. 25
[58] Ibid. pp 24
[59] Ibid

government orientation but also the perception of military forces. Both cases, Ergenekon and Sledgehammer ended with acquittal for accused military officials and were annulled by highest appeals court.[60]

Few decades before the JDP government, Turkey was quite unstable regarding the government forming and military-government relations. However, the JDP has changed the balance of power in Turkey by reducing the strength of the Turkish Army Forces to interfere political decisions, but also by strengthening the government to resist pressure from military officials. The best indicator of this is government's answer to the e-memorandum published by General Chief of Staff in 2007. Just one day after the e-memorandum was published, Government proclaimed a manifest reminding the military that "the General Staff is an institution under the command of the Government, the functions of which are determined with the Constitution and the related laws"[61] and that at the same time General Chief of Staff is "accountable to the Prime Minister regarding its duties and authorities."[62] For the first time in the history of the Turkish Republic, the government did not respond defensively but rather reactively reducing the army's power to interfere the political decisions.

Accordingly, we can say that Turkey had a two decades period without military coups but with serous military treats. These were the first signs of opposing to JDP government. Since then, JDP has gain numerous enemies among political parties, academicians, journalist and widely among population. JDP opponents are most commonly accusing the party for turning back to Ataturk's secularism by promoting the Neo-Ottomanism and being overmuch religiously oriented.

3.2. FETULLAH TERRORIST ORGANIZATION (FETO) – FROM RELIGIOUS GROUP TO STATE ENEMY

Considering the geopolitical position of Turkey, it is understandable that its foreign, as well as domestic politics, can have a significant impact on the global level. In the same manner, organizations established in such positioned country can be expanded globally and serve as a means of soft politics. However, the effect can be two-sided – while acting

[60] Solaker, G..(2016). Turkish appeals court overturns 'Ergenekon' coup plot convictions. *Reuters.*
[61] Ural, A. (2012). *Results of the April 27 Turkish Military's E-Memorandum*,published at Interdisciplinary Journal of Contemporary Research in Busines, Vol 4, No 8., pp. 731
[62] Ibid, pp.731

internationally and serving as state's extended arm by spreading the soft power, an organization can become overmuch independent with self-defined goals. Such an organization was created in Turkey in the early 1970s by Fethullah Gulen, an Islamic cleric who is currently in self-exile in Pennsylvania, U.S.A.

First roots of the organizations are coming from "book reading" gatherings established to provide education services and support youth on their way of religious studies in time when secular identity of Turks was too prominent and religious one under pressure. The gatherings had ideological foundations on teachings of Said Nursi, an Islamic scholar, founder of Nur (Nurculuk) Movement and author of Risale-i Nur (Epistle of light), a series of books on modern reinterpretation of The Qur'an. Later on, in 1974 Gulen parted from Nursi's path and formed his own network known as "Hizmet (Service) Movement", which will eventually become what is today known as the Parallel State Structure (PSS) or Fethullah Terroristic Organization (FETO).

As was previously explained in this study, the 1961 Constitution changes have brought more freedoms regarding the civil gatherings and forming of civil organizations. This period was important for Turkey's democratization since many civil groups started to enjoy their right on freedom of gathering and expression. Also, a global political situation had an important influence regarding the EU and USA politics towards Turkey. Namely, during the constant conflicts between Western block and Soviet Union, the role of Turkey wasn't that much explicit but it was still doubtlessly significant. Therefore, the Western countries didn't have any interest to intervene on rising number of political, religious and other civil groups, sects and cults. This was considered as part of the process of democratization rather than the path towards internal conflicts. In other words, if increased number of religious cults and other civil groups will keep Turkey far from Soviet Union and communism, which actually was a case, then there was no reason for Western countries to react towards their suppression. However, among all of those new established civil groups only those with strong connections and internal network managed to survive even for decades.

The most powerful one is surely the Hizmet Movement, or how it is latter known as Fethullah Terroristic Organization – FETO. The main advocacy of this group is investment in education. The education programs, elementary and high-school same as the university education, are used as main tool for recruiting the youth to serve the Movement. Many of cult

members were positioned on important and responsible jobs such as lawyers, judges, doctors, university professors… and young cult members had the opportunity to study at some of the most prestigious universities in Turkey and abroad. Gulen has spent more than two decades on spreading his network and directing his supporters to his desired target – seizing the power. The education through his private colleges and tutoring centers becomes the main means of achieving the goal. Over the years, education institutions related to his Hizmet Movement, were established in more than 170 countries around the world.

Gülen's influence was on the rise and he has emerged as a "messianic figure" who is able to control every aspect of the life of his followers,[63] including their private life and private relations as well. Besides the education institutions the FETO supporters owned many private companies and organizations such as Tuskon, Asia Bank, Kaynak Holding… that have become the most important sponsors of movement activities, including the financing of education institutions, providing the scholarships for students etc. Also, there are some private hospitals known to be established and governed by FETO supporters. The companies and institutions owned by movement members were usually considered as owned by and responsible to the movement. Furthermore, the movement gained a significant media influence through their media outlets such as: TV channels STV, STV Haber, Mehtap TV, Yumurcak TV, newspaper Zaman and its English edition Today's Zaman, news agency Cihan and few periodical magazines. All this helped the FETO to create strong network of obedient followers placed at responsible and important positions.

As the FETO organization was derived from the religious movement, the Nur Movement, at the beginning of its work, it had no any political affinities. However, we can say that this was only ostensibly since the FETO leader Fethullah Gulen was already used to direct the population in fighting the communism[64] by establishing a "local chapters for the Association for Fighting Communism."[65] As the number of supporters increased and the movement gained serious power, they have also become aware that they can influence the policy-making in the country. Their interfering to political life in Turkey starts in early 80's when they were close to Motherland Party (ANAP) and continues in 90's when they have

[63] Mert, A., O. (2016*). 15 July Coup Attempt and the Paralel State Structure,* Publication of the Presidency of the Republic of Turkey, Department of Corporate Communications, pp. 4
[64] *Sol international*. (11 November 2018). Fethullah Gulen was our man to fight communism".
[65] Aydintasbas, A. (2016). *The Good, The Bad and The Gulenist: The Role of The Gulen Movement in Turkey's Coup Attempt*. European Council on Foreign Relations, pp. 2

supported Necmetin Erkaban's Welfare Party (RP) in 1991, and Democratic Left Party (DSP) in 1999 elections. [66]

In this period Fethullah Gulen comes up with ideas that sound radically and shares them in public on Turkish television. Gulen advised his followers to "move in the arteries of the system without anyone noticing your existence until you reach all the power centers."[67] Gulen got even more direct by saying "The time is not yet right. You must wait for the time when you are complete and conditions are ripe, until we can shoulder the entire world and carry it. … You must wait until such time as you have gotten all the state power, until you have brought to your side all the power of the constitutional institutions in Turkey."[68] Because of these type of statements, Gulen was charged with anti-secular and destructive political activities, after which he fled to the United States of America and remained there in self-exile until today. Since then, Gulen continued to spread the network of his follower and their number in Turkey and abroad has increased significantly. Gulen does not prefer to leave his home in rural Pennsylvania, therefore he's communicating with his supporters usually over the video-link, phone calls or by messengers that are "lucky" enough to visit him, talk to him in person and then disseminate his messages.

Soon after Gulen left, political situation in Turkey is starting a new chapter marked by Justice and Development Party, a political player determined to combine democracy and Islam in order to conquer the power. To secure the majority in the parliament, but also to fight left-wingers represented by Kemalists and secularists, JDP founder and leader Erdogan entered to, at the time, seemingly good alliance with Hizmet Movement. On the other hand, Gulen saw this alliance as his own private benefit and therefore directed his supporters to vote in favor of the JDP to succeed in infiltrating their people into important positions in the state structure. It is not known was there ever any concrete agreement or just the two have found gather interest in supporting each-other.

However, this alliance will mark next two decades of Turkish politics. First phase is when Hizmet supporters are getting stronger and having more influence on Turkish society up

[66] Akyesilmen, N. and Ozcan, B., A. (2014). *Islamic Movements and Their Role in Politics in Turkey*. Jounal of Institute of Social Sciences, Volume 31.,Selcuk University, pp. 34-35
[67] Yavuz, M., H. Koc, R. (2016). *The Turkish Coup Attempt: The Gulen Movement vs. State*. Middle East Policy, Vol 23, No. 4. pp: 138
[68] Ibid

to 2013 when they are starting their campaign against Recep Tayip Erdogan and JDP in order to remove them from the throne and conquer complete power, which is a second phase of the alliance. By this time JDP was a rare party with constant majority in Parliament, able to consecutively form government. The anti-government and anti-Erdogan Gezi Park protests in 2013 are considered as first signs of dissolution between JDP and Hizmet Movement. After this, mutual accusations and curt proceedings started. While Hizmet Movement supporters were setting up some trials with insufficient evidences within massive corruption investigation, government responded with removing their people from important work places. Another indicator of the breakup was the 2015 election, when JDP had to repeat the elections in order to win the majority in Parliament.[69] The lack of Movement support was noticeable. The government continued with arrests and they have managed to seize control over the pro-Movement and anti-JDP oriented daily paper Zaman in March 2016.[70]

The number of the Movement supporters has drastically decreased over the years, so that for those who were familiar with the position and abilities of the Movement at that particular moment, it was no surprise that the coup of 2016 failed. During the coup attempt close to 250 people were shut death and around 2000 people were injured. The Parliament building was bombed by Turkish fighter jets occupied by coup plotters. After the coup attempt around 3000 Gulen-linked institutions all over the country were closed. This includes schools, hospitals, companies, dormitories, hostels, foundations, asociations…[71]

Turkish president Erdogan has accused FETO for coup attempt while Fethullah Gulen denies these accusations. However, according to testimonies of arrested coup plotters, there are some serious links between 15 July putschist junta and Fethullah Gulen.[72] The 15 July coup attempt investigation continues. Meanwhile, Turkish government asked Washington to detain Fethullah Gulen in order to extradite him to Turkey with accusations of being a mastermind of 15 July coup attempt.[73]

Within the Turkey FETO is mainly understood as terroristic organization, while this is still not the case on international level. Turkish government constantly warns about the

[69] *BBC News*.(02 November 2015*).* Turkey rlection: Ruling AKP regains majority.
[70] *BBC News.* (04 Mart 2016). Turkey seizez control of Zaman newspaper linked to Gulen.
[71] *Anadolu Agency*. (24 July 2016). Turkey to shut down all Gulen-linked companies.
[72] Mert, A., O. (2016). pp.19
[73] *Financial Times*.(13 September 2016).Turkey submits formal request for US to detain Fethullah Gulen.

dangers of FETO, however, the current position of FETO is seriously endangered but they still manage to stay active in abroad.

3.3. THE JULY 15 COUP ATTEMPT, CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES

As elaborated in the previous chapters of this paper, since its separation from sultanate, Turkey has undergone some turmoil periods regarding its domestic politics. Military interventions undertaken to bring down democratically elected governments have become the *differentia specifica* of Turkish democracy, because every time democracy was restored, the process would be interrupted by a military coup. Last two decades of Turkish government were the longest period without military intervention, although there were certain military-government turmoil. However, similarly as previous governments, current government also had to face the power of their-own military forces.

Hence, this coup differs from others by few characteristics. I would mention three characteristics that I consider as "new moments" regarding the military coups in Turkey. First of all, this was be the first time that a secular group within the military forces was not the main trigger of the intervention. For the first time, coup plotters were inspired by religious dogma, not by secularism that should be preserved regardless of the consequences, as it was seen in the previous military coups. The second difference would be that the main person accused for being a mastermind of 2016 coup attempt is not part of military structures, as a matter of fact, he's not even based in Turkey for almost 20 years. Fethullah Gulen, an Islamic cleric based in Pennsylvania, is a main person accused for organizing the coup d'etat 2016. The third difference and an important moment in the 2016 coup attempt is the resistance of the Turkish people that has never been seen in the history of military strikes in Turkey. It did not take much for the unarmed people to go out into the streets and fight the tanks and the army. The strength of people was powerful enough to defeat army solders and prevent the worst scenario on streets of Istanbul, Ankara and other cities in Turkey.

In the last few years before the coup attempt, FETO members felt threatened by the government, and therefore had to make some kind of counterattack and even risk being discovered. In 2012 government decided to close private university preparatory classes, a main recruitment base and an important source of financial foundation of FETO. Since FETO members already were well infiltrated in all sectors of society, it wasn't difficult for them to

make a propriate reaction. The main Istanbul prosecutor sought to arrest Chief of the National Inteligence Service (MIT), Hakan Fidan and his predecessor Emre Taner for establishing the dialogue with Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK) in 2008-2009 and re-establishing it in 2012.[74] Government accused the prosecutor of being the FETO supporter and stopped the investigation with amendments to the law on National Inteligence Service (MIT) and Penal Code. All prosecutors and police officers involved in investigation were indict for supporting the FETO movement, therefore they were arrested or dismissed.[75] Later on, government continued with shutting down FETO education institutions.

With an excuse of anti-corruption investigations, police officers and curt officials connected with FETO detained around 50 people close to Erdogan and JDP. Government claimed that this has nothing to do with corruption investigation, and that it was rather "an attempt by the prosecutors, police and judges connected with the Gulen movement to overthrow the government via a judicial coup."[76] These mutual accusations and investigations became known as 17-25 December and have brought political instability in Turkey. Moreover this has drew attention on the capabilities of Gulen movement and hinted at their hidden intentions.

After this it was obvious that Gulen supporters are infiltrated in every sector in country, including the most important ones such as police and judiciary. Another important result of 2013 Erdogan-FETO turmoil is that the movement has realized how difficult it could get for them to overthrown the government and that they should make a way better plan for their next intervention. And the plan become an armed military coup. Although Fethullah Gulen himself warned that the only thing that could jeopardize the takeover of power is premature action, coup plotters were forced to act prematurely and therefore risked to fail.[77] Just a week before the coup attempt the prosecutors in Izmir have arrested seven persons among whom two admirals with connections involved in operations against FETO.[78] This period was important since it preceded the annual Supreme Military Council (YAŞ) meeting planned for 1st August. The MIT had given the list of 600 military officers under suspicion to

[74] *Huriyet Daily News*.(11 November 2016). Intelligence failure questions from a spy chief.
[75] *Huriyet Daily News*. (10 Februar 2012). Government shields intel by changing law.
[76] Yavuz, M., H. and Koc, R. (2016), pp.140.
[77] Yavuz, M., H. and Koc, R. (2016), pp.138
[78] *Sabah*.(10 July 2016). „Feto operasyonu amiralle uzandı".

the military's general staff to be analyzed in detail during the YAŞ meeting.[79] For FETO, this was a call for an urgent reaction and an accelerated implementation of what was previously planned for a later period. So, the July 15th was the "last resort for Gulenists"[80] and a premature action that resulted in failure.

On the night of July 15th 2016 the army officials broke into the headquarters of state TV channel TRT with an excuse that there is a certain danger from DAESH and therefore they are obligated to protect state TV station.[81] The junta named themselves the "Peace at Home Council" (Yurtta Sulh Konseyi) which is a reference on Mustafa Kemal's maxim "peace at home, peace at world."[82] After breaking through to the main studio, the junta forced TRT news presenter to read "coup declaration" during the live broadcasting, stating the main message "Turkish Armed Forces seized power."[83] For most of Turks, same as for people outside of Turkey including myself, this was the first information about military rebellion and violence on the streets.

However, the whole case started earlier in the day. According to later news reports, one of the Army Aviation Command pilots came to MIT Headquarters around 2:45 p.m., saying that "there will be a helicopter attack on the MIT" and that he "had been ordered to kidnap MIT Undersecretary Hakan Fidan".[84] Meanwhile the coup plotter used the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) messaging system to send their "Operation Lightning Plan" (Hareket Yildirin Plani), a martial law with 20 points to all unites under their control. The memorandum stated that junta will take over the government on 16th July at 03:00 a.m. and curfew will start at 06:00 a.m.[85]

There are two usual ways of caring out the military coup. It can be carried out by "juntas inside the army, as in the case of the 1960 coup d'etat, or sometimes by the chain of commands inside the whole army"[86], like it was the case of the 1980 military coup. The coup plotters intended to involve a chain of command in 2016 coup d'etat, hence they have prepared the coup memorandum and declaration of martial law containing the appointments

[79] Mert, A., O. (2016), pp 16.
[80] Taş, H. (2018). The 15 July abortive coup and post-truth politics in Turkey. Southeast European and Black Sea studies, pp.5
[81] *Daily Sabah*.(10 July 2016), „Coup soldiers raided state-run broadcaster TRT, forcefully announced coup declaration".
[82] Taş, H. (2018). pp.5
[83] *Yeni Şafak*. (2007). „Pirate declaration at TRT" (with english subtitiles).
[84] *Yeni Şafak*. „July 15 Coup Attempt" (interactive map).
[85] ibid
[86] Atila, Y. (2016). pp. 23

and lists being signed by Brig. Gen. Mehmet Partıgöç, the head of the General Staff Personnel Planning Department and Col. Cemil Turan. However, for chain of commands they needed a signature of Cheif of General Staff Gen. Hulusi Akar who had refused to sign the document and this brought the main change in the way the coup has been carried out. The coup began too early and the putschists were forced to act only as a small junta inside the army. This has reduced their chances of a successful coup and the conquest of power. After announcing the decision that "No aircraft shall fly until further notice, all airborne aircrafts shall return to their bases and all vehicles, especially armored vehicles, shall stop immediately"[87] and after refusing to sign the documents and lead the coup, the Chef of General Staff, together with some senior officer, was detained by putschists and remained hostage throughout the night of the coup. According to news reports, one of the generals involved in coup at the air base in Ankara, offered Akar to put him in touch with Fethullah Gulen in person.[88]

Having left without the support of top military officials, the putschists had to act earlier and, therefore, more unsecured. Since the Chef of General Staff rejected to lead the coup and to give any orders, coup d'etat didn't have a chain of commands in whole Turkish army, it was rather organized only by a small group of rebellions within the army. Thus, lack of infantry in key locations such as bridges, airport and government buildings has significantly weakened the strength and durability of the coup plotters. They tried to seize Bosporus and Sultan Mehmed Fatih bridges by placing thanks and armed soldiers on each. At the same time Parliament building, Presidential Palace and General Staff building were attacked, and plotters even used fighter jets to bomb the parliament and the headquarters of the Turkish intelligence service and special police forces.[89] By this time putschists broke into the TRT building and forced a news presenter to read their coup declaration.

Turkish nation faced another military intervention, but for the first time in the history of military coups in Turkey, Turkish people made a different reaction. Namely, instead of identifying themselves with coup plotters and support them in government overthrowing, Turkish people tried to stop the plotters by reminding them that they should protect, not attack, their own nation. Spontaneous gatherings started on streets of Turkish cities, while helicopters opened fire on crucial locations in Istanbul and fighter jets took off from Akinci

[87] *Yeni Şafak*. „July 15 Coup Attempt" (interactive map)
[88] *Anadolu Agency*. (25 July 2016). „Genelkurmay Başkanı Orgeneral Akar'ın savcılık ifadesi".
[89] Yavuz, M., H. and. Koc, R. (2016). pp 142

Air Base to bombard Turkey's parliament in Ankara several times. Around 250 people died and more than 2000 were injured during the air strike. Putschists even used war planes F16 to scare and terrorize people on the streets.

The main target of putschists was Turkish president Recep Tayip Erdogan, who was on family vacation in Marmaris at the moment. The 37 – person assassination team headed to hotel where president was staying in order to execute him.[90] President managed to escape the hotel only 15 minutes before the putschists arrived. Few hours later, Erdogan was contacted by CNN news presenter via social media video call. In his first address to the public during the night, the president urged the people to go out onto the streets in defense of democracy and unity.[91] After a while, streets were filled with people and many went to meet the Turkish president at the Ataturk Airport. The coup is declared as illegal and president himself promised to people that everyone involved will pay a debt.[92] Gathered in masses people confronted the soldiers on the Bosporus Bridge and few other locations, forcing them to surrender. Government removed, and it's keep removing everyone related to FETO from state and public institutions.[93]

Failed military coup attempt has revealed some important details regarding the Turkish domestic politics. Even though the coup plotters have used the "peace at home" slogan, they couldn't manage to attract many kemalists to join them. There are possible two reasons for this, either the kemalists didn't considered that coup is a way for changes in Turkey, either there is not much kemalists left in Turkish army forces. Another important note is that religious groups in Turkey have never been this much strong; so much that they can start a coup attempt against government and even direct the election results. Anyway, some questions regarding the 15 July coup attempt are still open and many institutions in Turkey are constantly working to answer them.

[90] *Yeni Şafak*, „July 15 Coup Attempt" (interactive map). retrieved from:
[91] *CNN Turk*.(16 July 2016). "Erdogan: Milletimizi meydanlara davet ediyorum".
[92] ibid
[93] Mert, A. O.(2016). pp. 21

CHAPTER IV

UNDERSTANDING THE MEDIA OF THREE WESTERN BALKAN COUNTRIES

4.1. BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

4.1.1. The socio-economic and political framework

Current media situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina is a deep reflection of political confusion created in the end of 20th century, or to be precise, after the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the war aggression on this country. As a matter of fact, for better understanding of media work, we need to know that, not only Public Service Broadcasters (PSB) are working according to The General Framework Agreement for Peace[94], also known as the Dayton Agreement, but the work of private media sector is also influenced by divisions established by it. The Dayton Agreement, has created a non-centralized political-administrative system which makes Bosnia and Herzegovina's government one of the world's most complicated. After the war aggression, Bosnia and Herzegovina has become a "democratic state"[95], consisted of two Entities: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska, and the Brčko District as a single administrative unit of local self-government, existing under the sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina[96]. Furthermore, the territory of Federation is organized with 10 federal units - cantons[97], making the state administration even more complicated.

Regarding this, we are coming to number of 14 governments in Bosnia and Herzegovina: one state government, two entities, one Brčko District government and 10 cantonal governments. Further division is on 143 municipalities, as last level of political-administrative units in country.

This already complicated administrative structure is getting more difficult by political parties divided in ethno-national manner. Political parties are represented as elite part of society and as a matter of fact each political party is understood as guardian of ethno-national

[94] *General Framework Agreement For Peace in Bosnia And Herzegovina.* (1995). Dayton.
[95] *General Framework Agreement For Peace in Bosnia And Herzegovina*. (1995). Annex 4, Article 1, pp. 60.
[96] *Statute of Brčko District of Bosnia and Herzegovina*. (1999). Chapter 1, Article 1, pp. 1.
[97] *"Official Gazette" of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina*. (1995). Constitution of Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Chapter 1, Artical 2, pp. 3.

subjects and safety of ethnic group that they represent. They frequently use war rhetoric to provoke fear among population, and to create two sides in each discussion: "they" – as attackers of human rights, property, national identity and lives; and "us" – the defenders of human rights, lives, but above everything, protectors of national identity which makes "us" better than "them".

Ethnic divisions and disagreements of political parties are keeping country in bound and causing difficulties in implementation of any kind of reform, including the implementation of laws related to the PSB. Provoking the interethnic tensions ensures the power of political elites and it slowly drives society to "a democracy of ethnic oligarchies"[98]. As Freedom House states in its 2017 Nations in Transit report, the decrease of democracy and higher level of corruption, have settled Bosnia and Herzegovina as "the worst political dysfunction since the war."[99] Dysfunctional, as it is, political situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina is causing instability regarding to media sector too, especially to public service broadcasting system.

4.1.2. Broadcasters

Post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina has got a unique Constitution which is incomparable with any state constitution we got to know so far. Regarding to this specificity, but moreover because of tension of internal relations, the European Union had to establish a special supervisor for Bosnia and Herzegovina and named it the Office of High Representative (OHR). The OHR is an international institution responsible for supervising the implementation of civil aspects of Dayton Agreement. The function of High Representative (HR) is determined by Dayton Agreement. "High Representative represents the ultimate authority in terms of the Agreements' interpretation. High Representative is authorized to pass laws, if considered necessary, remove officials that obstruct activities from their posts and coordinate activities with other international organizations."[100] Among others decisions imposed by HR, Media Restructuring Decisions[101] are surely of the most important ones. Hence, in 2002 OHR has formally established the Public Service Broadcasting system in

[98] Mujkić, A. (2007). *"We, the Citizens of Ethnopolis"* Volume 14, *Constellations*, pp. 113.
[99] Jahić, D. (2017). *"Nations in Transit 2017: Bosnia and Herzegovina: Report,"* Freedom House.
[100] *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina.*
[101] *Office of High Representative*.

Bosnia and Herzegovina. This was an official condition for signing the Stabilization and Association Agreement between Bosnia and Herzegovina and European Union.[102]

Since it was established, PSB is ruled by political elites that are completely sabotaging normal functioning and development, under an excuse of vital national interest defense. Within the legal framework[103], Bosnia and Herzegovina's PSB system includes one state-level and two entity-level broadcasters:

- Radio-Television of Bosnia and Herzegovina - BH RT, with one television channel (BHT) and one radio station (BH Radio 1)[104]
- Radio-Television of Republika Srpska - RTRS, with one television channel and one radio channel[105]
- Radio-Television of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina - RT FBiH, with one television channel and one radio channel (Radio FBiH).

As Ahmetašević and Hadžiristić are claiming in their analysis of PSB system in Bosnia and Herzegovina for 2017[106], the organizational structure of PSB system in Bosnia and Herzegovina is an example of the failure of an ideal model in practice. These types of statements are mirroring non-implementation of all parts of Law on public Radio-Television System of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This mainly refers to failure in establishing Corporation of Public Broadcasting Services of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Together with establishing three broadcasters, the legal act calls for registration of the fourth unit on state level. The Corporation would be in charge of equipment, set development strategy, coordinate the technical and human potential of the three broadcasters, and collect all advertising revenues and the license fee and distribute them among the broadcasters in accordance with a predefined formula[107]. Although it's prescribed by regulation, Corporation was never established. Reasons for this could be found in ethnic fragmentation of country, which caused fragmentation of PSB too. Divided by national line, two entity PSBs, RTRS and RTFBiH, are

[102] Jusić, T. and Ahmetašević, N. pp.40.

[103] *Official Gazette of Bosnia and Herzegovina*. "Zakon o javnom radiotelevizijskom sistemu Bosne i Hercegovine" (Law on public Radio-Television System of Bosnia and Herzegovina), 78/05, Article 6.

[104] *Radio Televizija Bosne I Hercegovine*.

[105] *Radio Televizija Republike Srpske*.

[106] Ahmetašević N. and Hadžiristić T. (2017). *The Failure of Public Service Broadcasting in Bosnia and Herzegovina*, ANALITIKA, Center for Social Research, Sarajevo.

[107] *Official Gazette of Bosnia and Herzegovina.* "Zakon o javnom radiotelevizijskom sistemu Bosne i Hercegovine" (Law on public Radio-Television System of Bosnia and Herzegovina), , Article 6., stated form Ahmetašević N. and Hadžiristić T. The Failure of Public Service Broadcasting in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

constantly making obstructions and it is very difficult to make any jointly project or cooperation among them and state-level PSB, BHRT. Also, the reason for not forming the Corporation could be found in the obligation of PSB to bear the cost of Corporation as a legal entity[108].

In spite of a good constructed law regulation, which has previsedpossible disagreements between broadcasters, regarding the specificity of socio-political conditions of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and therefore has prescribed the registration of Corporation, PSB system of Bosnia and Herzegovina was not able to work as one organization respecting objectivity and impartiality as basic rules of journalism. Instead of serving as advocate of peace and reconciliation in country devastated by war aggression, PSB channels are acting as spokesman of ethnic leaders. Moreover, we can say that PSB system is not working according to the legal framework which supposed to regulate it. As a matter of fact, three PSBs are working as competitors, intending to protect ethno-political interests of national groups inside the entities they are established.

The broadcasting market in Bosnia and Herzegovina is overloaded. According to information from the end of 2017[109], 44 television stations and 148 radio stations in Bosnia and Herzegovina have the Licensees for Television/Radio Broadcasting (plus 54 television stations and one radio station with Licensees for Television/Radio Broadcasting over other Electronic Communication Networks). Out of this number there is 12 television and 62 radio public broadcasters (not including PSB channels) established in some of 10 cantons or 143 municipalities. Licensees for broadcasting are provided by Communication Regulatory Agency (CRA) for Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is established by HR in 2001. According to Law on public Radio-Television System of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the CRA, in coordination with Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina, is regulating radiofrequency spectrum, regarding the international conventions. The CRA is a state agency with responsibility to supervise broadcasting services, issue licenses, coordinate PSB system, and allocating the radio-frequency spectrum.

Toward the digitization of broadcasting system, Bosnia and Herzegovina is one of least developed countries in Europe. European commission in 2003 in its Statement COM (2003) 5412 recognized advantages of switch-over from analogue to digital broadcasting

[108] *Official Gazette of Bosnia and Herzegovina* . "Zakon o javnom radiotelevizijskom sistemu Bosne i Hercegovine" (Law on public Radio-Television System of Bosnia and Herzegovina), Article 14.
[109] *Communication Regulatory Agency Bosnia and Herzegovina*.

systems and gave basic directions to the countries for implementation of switch-over process.[110] The first mention of digitization in Bosnia and Herzegovina was in 2006, with the establishment of Digital Terrestrial Television (DTT) Forum, an expert body on digital transmission. The main task of Forum was to create the national strategy for introduction of the DTT standards in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Strategy on Digital Switch-Over was adopted in 2009 and first deadline for transition to a digital signal was in December 2011, but, doe to complicated socio-political situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Strategy is still waiting for its full implementation. The best demonstration of mismatching of PSB's is shown in 2016, when the Ministry of Transport and Communication announced that the digital signal will be launched in September 2016[111]. Shortly after the announcement, the RTRS declared, without explaining the details, that they are not ready to launch their signal in the same time as Sarajevo and Mostar.

One of the biggest crises of broadcasting media in Bosnia and Herzegovina occurred in 2016, when the national broadcaster BHRT was about to shutdown, as a result of the political and financial crises. This would made Bosnia and Herzegovina the only country in Europe without national broadcaster. The BHRT mainly relies on found from TV license fee via tax, but it also has an income from advertising and equipment rental. The Law of Communication proscribes that 50% of advertising tax and license fee income will belong to BHRT, while each of entity broadcasters, RTV FBiH and RTRS, will get 25%. The main purpose of such a solution was to provide a financial stability for the country-wide BHRT, but also to create a strong mechanism for the integration of the three broadcasters into a unified PSB system. Media organizations and journalist have actualized this problem and state broadcaster BHRT was not shutdown. In June 2017, European Broadcasting Union (EBU) in coordination with BHRT, media organizations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Ministry of Transport and Communication, organized International conference "National Public Service Broadcasting in Bosnia and Herzegovina". As the result of Conference, they have made a list of recommendations for solving the problem of political and financial crises of PSB in Bosnia and Herzegovina.[112]

[110] *DTT Forum Strategy On The Switch-Over from Analogue to Digital Terrestrial Broadcasting in The Frequency Bands of 174-230mhz and 470-862mhz in Bosnia and Herzegovina*. pp. 13

[111] *Nezavisne Novine*. (20 September 2016). Emitovanje digitalnog signala počinje 29. Septembra.

[112] *International Conference "National Public Service Broadcasting in Bosnia and Herzegovina".*

4.1.3. Print and online media outlets

Bosnia's print media market is also oversaturated. At the end of 2017, there were 10 daily newspapers, 8 press agencies, and more than 100 print periodicals[113]. According to information of Press Council there is also more than 100 online media in Bosnia and Herzegovina[114]. Regulation of print and online media is managed by Press Council (PC) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, non-government and non-profit organization established in 2006. The Press Council is a self-regulatory body for print and online media in Bosnia and Herzegovina, working at the state level for both entities – Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska.

With the initiative of media organizations and journalists, Bosnia and Herzegovina has become the first post-Yugoslavian country with established print media regulatory body. Mandate of the Press Council in Bosnia and Herzegovina was extended to online media in 2011. Among others, the objectives of Press Council are to improve and protect journalism profession through improvement and protection of ethics standards in print and online media, as well as through strengthening self-regulation in print and online media in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Also, the Press Council is monitoring the implementation of professional standards in newspaper and online coverage in Bosnia and Herzegovina[115]. Member of PC can be any printed or online media registered with the relevant authorities in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The PC is working on principle of receiving the complaints on reporting of printed or online media, determines is there an valuable reason for it according to Press Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and reacts via it.

Major dailies and print magazines have been privatized. There were suspicions about the legitimacy of some privatization processes of both dailies and printing companies, but without any judicial epilogue. In next chapter I will elaborate details about privatization of the daily newspaper that will be analyzed in this study. Dailies in particular are perceived to be highly influenced by certain political structures.

Of the seven news agencies, two have been funded directly from the budgets of two entities. The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina is founding the agency FENA (Federal News Agency) and Republika Srpska is founding agency SRNA (Srpska Republika News

[113] *Press Council in Bosnia and Herzegovina*.
[114] Ibid
[115] *Statute of Press Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina*, Article 12.

Agency), which increases doubts about their editorial independence. The online media ownership structures are also under the doubts, and some are even not officially reported as media business. Unfortunately, a large number of media services on a limited media market, is usually seen as suggestive of political and other conflicting affiliations rather than media pluralism[116].

4.1.4. International reports and media freedoms

As it's mentioned before, regarding the number of media in all sectors Bosnia and Herzegovina has a quite fulfilled media market. However, the quantity does not always guarantee the quality in the same time. Regardless the number of media unites media freedom is still not highly represented in Bosnia and Herzegovina. At least, this is what we see in reports of media market research agencies. If we compare Bosnia and Herzegovina to other Balkan countries, foremost with other two included in this study, we can see that it could be a typical representative of Western Balkan region.

According to the results of Freedom House report for 2017 Bosnia and Herzegovina is a partly free country, without any specific change in freedom of press or state of democracy from the last year[117]. Reporters without borders are giving us even wider picture of media freedom in Bosnia and Herzegovina where we can notice the decline of media freedom for last ten years, since 2006[118]. Also, the IREX Media Sustainability Index for Bosnia and Herzegovina shows a decline in the development of a sustainable media system in BiH since 2006 and stagnation in the past few years[119]. The RSF in its newest Freedom of the Press report places Bosnia and Herzegovina on 33rd place out of 42 European countries, and 65th place out of 180 countries in their World Press Freedom Index[120].

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[116] Hodžić, S. (2014). *"Media Integrity Matters, Reclaiming the public service values in media and journalism"*, Peace Institute, Institute for Contemporary Social and Political Studies, Ljubljana, Slovenia, pp. 129,130

[117] Freedom of the Press. (2017). Press Freedom's Dark Horizon,. Freedom House, pp. 27 & Freedom of the Press. (2016). The Battle for the Dominant Message, Freedom House, pp. 25

[118] Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. (2017). Media Freedom in BiH.

[119] Hodžić, S. and Pisker, L .(2016)."*Bosnia and Herzegovina*", Media Sustainability Index Washington, IREX

[120] Reporters without borders for Freedom of Information. (2017). Retrieved from: https://rsf.org/en/ranking/2017#

According to above mentioned analyses, freedom of media in Bosnia and Herzegovina is quite vulnerable. With noticeable decline of media freedom we can state that it is about time to get a reaction of media society and state institutions, which are crucial in this issue. In fact, we do need to mention that the most relevant agencies for media researching are worried about global decline of media freedom, and we must understand that this, unfortunately, has become a negative trend in the world. Press freedom worldwide deteriorated to its lowest point in 13 years in 2016, driven by unprecedented threats to journalists and media outlets in major democracies, intensified crackdowns on independent media in authoritarian settings, and moves by the Russian and Chinese regimes to increase their influence beyond their borders[121].

So, the media sector in Bosnia and Herzegovina is quite complicated, and therefore it is pretty much difficult to explain and understand it. But, as the topic of this study is not to elaborate the functioning of media sector in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the facts stated in this paragraph could be enough to realize what kind of system we are confronting. As it's mentioned in the beginning of this part, the complicated structure of any sector in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the sector of media, is caused by complexity of Dayton Peace Agreement which is often described as a straitjacket preventing the development of country and keeping it in constant status quo. Despite the fact that media freedom laws Bosnia and Herzegovina is having one of the most liberal ones, but the problem starts when it comes to implementation of laws.

4.2. THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA

4.2.1. Media at its turning point

Same as for any other ex-Yugoslavia country, the end of 20th and the beginning of 21st century was also an important turning point for Croatia. Since it has been established as independent country, Croatia's media policy got through different phases. The stagnation of media in nineties was caused by rise of nationalism and the fact that Croatia was involved in aggression on Bosnia and Herzegovina. This caused the devastation of state's economy and political system same as it imperiled media freedoms and media bias. Generally speaking, one of the main characteristics of Western Balkan media during the nineties was constant

[121] *Freedom of the Press*. (2017). pp.3

spreading of hate speech and dissemination of fake news. The other important thing is that each society had the awareness of this problem and advocated for changes that would be European orientated.

By the beginning of 2000, the new phase of journalism and media outlets is starting in Croatia. New governments apply a new media policy oriented towards a market-based pluralistic model that is dominant in Western Europe. The most important question in Croatia becomes the joining to European Union and this influences the decisions in media sector too. There has never been an explicit strategy developed by the policy makers in Croatia, instead, media-related policies were "imported" as a part of the EU accession processes.[122] Thus, Croatia has implemented several laws regarding the regulation of media and the most important ones are: the Media Act (2004), the Electronic Media Act (2009) and the Croatian Radio-Television Act (2010) that regulates the Public Service Broadcaster.[123] However, regardless the intentions to build in the law regulations, Croatia didn't make any great changes in media work. It seems that all efforts, changes and law regulations were the tool for accomplishing the main aim: access the European Union.

Therefore, the main point about media after the 2000 is that their work and reforms were adjusted with country's EU path. Luckily, the final goal is achieved and Croatia has become the member of European Union in 2013. Since then, the state of media is not changed significantly. At least that is how the EU and USA based research agencies are lately reporting.

4.2.2. Media freedoms

In its researches IREX is claiming that media in Croatia has "near sustainability" mixed media system. According to same report Croatia is second country in SEE region. But, the fact that it's behind Albania, which still has only candidate status for European Union, is not telling the bright story of media in Croatia. The media sector has been brought to the very edge of bankruptcy, and its basic role in increasing the number of well-informed citizens has been seriously compromised.[124] Even the new IREX's report for 2017 is recording the

[122] Popović, H. (2014). *"Reclaiming Public Service Values in Media and Journalism, Croatia",* Peace institute, Ljubljana, Slovenija, pp. 195
[123] ibid. pp. 196
[124] IREX, 2016

downturn of media sustainability in Croatia and puts the county on third place in region, behind Albania and Kosovo, which is not any encouraging. As further stated in report, the hate speech has become the part of the mainstream discourse, supported by leading public figures.

The government related figures, even the president personally, issued disturbing messages regarding cases of open verbal or physical attacks on journalists. Journalists are even warned that they should be aware of the consequences of what they report. The report goes that far to say that the line between "normal" and "extreme" has become blurred.[125]

Regarding the freedom of speech, according to Reporters Without Borders last report situation is not much promising. From a total of 180 countries, Croatia is on 74th place, behind Slovenia (37), Bosnia and Herzegovina (65) and Serbia (66). Comparing to last year Croatia has a decline of 11 places (from 63 to 74) which makes it a country with the greatest fall of freedom of speech in region. RSF is also claiming that journalists investigating corruption, organized crime, or war crimes are often subjected to harassment campaigns.

The defamation criminalization is one of the most serious threats to freedom of speech and the biggest reason of journalist self-censorship and as RSF is reporting insulting "the Republic, its emblem, its national hymn or flag" is punishable by up to three years in prison.[126] With last changes in Criminal Law of Croatia the act of offense and defamation on internet is also punishable. The obvious evidence of governments interference into media work is the case when the Croatia's Parliament fired HRT's (Public Service Broadcaster channel) director-general in March 2016 and appointed an acting director who proceeded to demote or reassign approximately 70 journalists and editors as part of what critics have called an ideologically driven "purge."[127] Also, media reporting on last Hague tribunal verdicts are closer to nineties' reporting rhetoric, more than to European values.[128]

According to above stated, we can see how media milieu in Croatia is not reflecting the European values which government is proclaiming to have. Even though the country has become the part of European Union, it seems like the media sector is going more backwards

[125] IREX, 2017

[126] Reporters without borders for freedom of information.

[127] ibid.

[128] Hebibović, N. (08 December 2017). MEDIJI POD KONTROLOM HDZ-a NEGODUJU: Ugroženo pravo na veličanje ratnih zločinaca (The HDZ controlled media protests: Endangered right of glorification of war criminals. *Analiziraj.ba*

than forward. Croatia has been criticized by regional, but also by European media and research centers.[129] Furthermore, the position of journalists is subordinate to media owners, who usually give more importance to profit than to journalism standards and quality.

Legislative provisions are often breached in favor of media owners at the expense of journalists, but without repercussions. For example, Article 26 of the Media Act addresses the relations among media owners, editors in chief and journalists, stipulating that these relations are regulated in media statutes. However, many media outlets do not have statutes and are never penalized for the violation of the law.[130]

4.2.3. Broadcasters

The HRT is the public institution founded by the Republic of Croatia, and granting public broadcasting services independent from any political or economic interest.[131] HRT's governing body consists of the General Director, the Directorate, Supervisory Board and the Program Council.[132] The General Director is named by Croatian Parliament by a majority of votes following the proposals of the Parliamentary Committee on Information, Informatization and Media.[133] The HRT operation is managed by five members of the Supervisory Board of which four are appointed in the Parliament and one is a representative of HRT employees. The HRT Directorate comprise the Director General, and heads of the working units within the HRT – Program, Production, Technology, and Management. The Program Council is in charge of protection of public interest, direct the program and requires its improvement, including other audiovisual and multimedia services. It has 11 members out of which 9 are appointed in the Parliament, and 2 by HRT employees.[134]

The Croatia's Parliament has a direct interference into the selection of HRT's governing body which puts the broadcaster's objectivity under the question. This manner of appointment empowered political parties, with the ruling one on the head, to take HRT "as an election prize rather an as a medium in service of the people."[135] The government influence

[129] Verseck, M. A.K.(30 November 2017). Kroatien trauert - um einen Kriegsverbrecher. *Spiegel*.
[130] Popović, H. (2014). Pp. 200
[131] "*The Law on Croatian Radio-Television",* (2010), Article 1.
[132] *Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia.* "Zakon o Hrvatskoj radioteleviziji", (The Law on Croatian Radio-Television) Article 18.
[133] Ibid, Article 19.
[134] Ibid, Articles 24 and 25.
[135] Griffen, S. (2016). *"Croatia: Media Freedom in Turbulent Times, Report on the June 2016"*, Joint International Mission.

on HRT is noticeable also through the changes in the program structure regarding the increase of nationalist and religious content.[136] Even the above mentioned HRT's third channel, also known as one of the most-watched art, culture and educational channels in Europe for 2015[137] has been detailed supervised by the new management. As the Croatian Journalists' Association (CJA) stated, "media has become activistic, passionate and non-professional". In the new program, as CJA is claiming, talk-shows of extremely religious and ideological character have replaced the valuable documentary contents. This type of indicators demonstrate how Croatia's PSB in not having a sufficient level of independency from ruling party and political figures. Also, this indicates that current low is insufficient and pro-government oriented, and that it's not providing enough institutional safeguards against political interference in PSB's program structure.

Media space in Croatia is not reserved only for PSB channels, but also for private media, reflecting the plurality in media sector. Currently in Croatia there is 10 major daily newspapers; 6 major political weeklies; 147 radio stations (6 of which are national); 30 TV stations.[138] Daily newspapers will be further explained in next chapter of this study. Similar to the other ex-Yugoslav countries Croatia had a quite non-transparent process of privatization. Some of the cases that are important for this study will be mentioned and explained in following chapters. The monitoring of audio-visual media service entities and electronic publication services is entrusted to Agency of Electronic Media (AEM). The AEM and its Service for Monitoring are legally obligated to provide control over the implementation of provisions on program principles and standards that are legally defined. Agency also provides managing of the audio-visual and radio programs broadcast through satellite, Internet, cable and other means of transmitting.[139]

4.3. THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA

4.3.1. The socio-economic and political framework

As one of countries that were last to leave Yugoslavia, Republic of Serbia is newly formed republic "based on rule of law and social justice, principles of civil democracy, human

[136] Ibid.
[137] IREX, 2017
[138] Ibid, pp. 40
[139] "*Electronic Media Act*", Article 69.

and minority rights and freedoms and commitment to European principles and values.[140]" If we exclude the war aggression on Bosnia and Herzegovina, which surely had the historical impact on Republic of Serbia, we can say that the most significant event in contemporary history of the state are the demonstrations of 5th October 2000 and overthrow of socialist regime, or in the other words the end of Yugoslavia. This event is remembered as the moment when Republic of Serbia goes from socialist to democratic governance system.

The future Serbia's government establishment announced new era of political, economic and social life in democratic Serbia. Certainly, this implies changes in media sector too. As a matter of fact, changes have started the same day. After the demonstrators took over the building of State Assembly, second important point was the building of national broadcaster, Radio Television of Serbia (RTS). As RTS was known for its support to ruling party and political establishment in Serbia, the demonstrators used the opportunity to broadcast the message "New Radio-Television of Republic of Serbia" on the main state broadcaster, proclaimed the end of socialist regime and the new beginning of democratic one. But, the national broadcaster wasn't the only media marked as pro-government. Also, the daily newspaper "Politika", which will be thoroughly analyzed in later chapters, had close relations with the president's office. This was the reason for demonstrator to break into their building and show the media that government-supportive journalism has come to the end.

4.3.2. Interference of foreign agencies and new media order

Regarding the media, the after-demonstration period was marked by a strong etatization of the leading public media, the adoption of undemocratic laws and regulations in the media sphere, and an increasing number of local and private electronic media (the so called "chaos in ether").[141] The establishment of free, independent and pluralistic media was one of the crucial tasks of new government in Republic of Serbia, and an important part of reform process. This is why they have established a new legal framework for media in accordance with European standards. Newly established independent or oppositional media were mainly supported by international donors. The interference of international organizations had an important impact on development of media in post communist society with the aim to

[140] *Constitution of Republic of Serbia*, article 1

[141] Veljanovski, R. (2009*). Medijski sistem Srbije* (Media System of Serbia) Beograd: Čigoja, pp. 24

provide an alternative voice of the audience in Serbia. These assistance efforts ensured the economic survival of these independent media outlets[142].

Regardless the intention of international assistance, unfortunately, none of the post-communist governments wasn't able to recover media sector and bring crucial changes that would direct media work in more democratic way. The Serbian democratic political elite proved to be the strongest obstacle for a reform-oriented media policy. Paradoxically, policy decisions were always justified with the utmost important public interest – consolidation of democracy[143]. Hence, one of the most absurd moments from the end of communist period, was an attempt to impose strict control over all media by oppressive Public Information Law as basis of government interfere with the media and oppressing of independent and oppositional media. This was the period when US officials were not allowed to work in Serbia. Therefore, US-based donors established their offices in Budapest (US Embassy) or in Podgorica, Montenegro (IREX), and continued to support independent media from the outside[144].

The changes that occurred at the beginning of new century, have intimated the brighter future for media sector. The overthrow of previous regime announced transition from nationalistic to more democratic approaches in government actions. Due to the lack of financial resources and with the need of establishing new pro-European standards in journalism, the involvement of international organizations was necessary.

This was a period when the international organizations from European Union and United States of America gave strong financial support to media in Serbia, but also they were supportive in establishing educated and pro-Europe oriented journalists. Thanks to the interference of international organizations Republic of Serbia is finally getting more democratic media outlets and an opportunity to break up with nationalistic media paradigm. Media sector goes from survival mode to state of development, with tendency of becoming sustainable and independent. Examples of systemic approaches could be found in direct support to the transformation of public media (the case of RTS), the establishment of new

[142] Davor, M. (2013). *Media Reforms in Turbulent Times, The Role of Media Assistance in the Establishment of Independent Media Institutions in Serbia, Analitika*, Center for Social Research.
[143] Matić, J., Valić, N., D.(2014*). Media Integrity Matters, Reclaiming Public Service Values in Media and Journalism*, pp. 331, Peace institute, Ljubljana, Slovenija.
[144] Davor, M. (2013)

commercial TV with a public mission (Television B92), and efforts to empower local actors to be able to survive in new market conditions.[145]

In the beginning of this transition period the independent media and government were in one specific conflict: Pro-democratic politicians expected the same level of support from media as they had during the overthrown of socialist regime. However, most of the independent media continued to do their job and criticize. Unfortunately, the economic crises and decrease of foreign investments are causing new instability in media sector. The media outlets are getting under the influence of powerful political figures and political parties. Once again, the state becomes one of the most important advertisers. Buying influence through indirect financial support to media was conducted in the form of subscriptions, campaigns, advertising paid by public institutions and companies under political control.[146]

Successive governments in post-socialist Serbia established a new media legal framework under the influence and guidance of the international organizations. Since the democratization of the country in 2000, there have been at least three phases of media policy[147] in Serbia. The first one was the modernization phase (2000-2003) when political actors established a consensus on EU accession and applied European standards in the sphere of media (privatization, self-regulation, establishment of public service, using expertise from civil society and professional associations). This was a good beginning and foundation for more democratic media but due to political changes on country the media sphere is also changing and next phase was the stagnation phase (2004-2008), as a result of the conservative and EU-skeptic government of the Democratic Party of Serbia. In this phase media policies were restrictive, media privatization frozen, new laws contradicting the established principles within media legal framework, and the independence of the RTS (public broadcaster) was limited. The third phase is the phase of re-emerged Europeanization which started in 2009 when Serbia was granted European Union candidate status. This implied the harmonization of domestic laws with the EU regulations, and the ratification of international acts and adoption of important domestic documents, such as the Strategy for media development.[148]

[145] Davor, M. (2013)
[146] Ibid p. 25
[147] Matić, J. and Valić, N., D.(2014). pp. 321-331
[148] Republic of Serbia, *"The Strategy for the Development of the Public Information System in the Republic of Serbia until 2016".*

4.3.3. Broadcasters

RTS was established in 1992, when, RTV Belgrade, RTV Novi Sad and RTV Priština, were merged into an RTV Serbia (RTS). During the 1990's, RTS gained status of unbiased media with highly represented war propaganda and hate speech. The transformation of RTS to a public service broadcaster was continuously delayed until the end of socialist system. For this reason, at the very beginning of transition period in Republic of Serbia, the question of RTS was one of the most important ones to be answered. As it was pro-government media, it was necessary to do fundamental changes in its structure and labor policy. Once again, the help of international organizations has become the motivational force which helped RTS to start new chapter in its work.

The EU, through various organizations, was the main proclaimer of reforms in media sector in Republic of Serbia. The most intensive support was in the beginning, when the normative provisions were set, and during the initial transformation phase. The legal ground for transformation was set up in 2002 when the Broadcasting Act was adopted. The law defined the concept of public service broadcasting and settled out the establishment of two public broadcasters – RTS with its base in Belgrade, and RTV, with headquarters in Novi Sad. After all necessary preconditions were fulfilled the public broadcasters started operating in 2006.[149] The public service broadcaster RTS is consisted of nine TV and four radio channels, and RTV has two TV and four radio stations. Both of broadcasters, RTS and RTV, are owning several media related unites such as music studios and web portals, and RTS has a publishing, research and documentation centers. The RTS has been a member of European Broadcasting Union (EBU) since 2001.

The transformation of the Serbian media and the entire media system was led by the ideals of free press and a dual broadcasting system in which the transformed PSB would play an important democratizing role.[150] The research on Serbia's PSB explains, the key problems with PSB operation in Serbia relate to the funding model, the lack of transparency in its operation and the partly politicized program. Ten years after its establishment, PSB in Serbia

[149] Davor, M.(2017). *The Future Of Public Service Broadcasting in Serbia*, Analitika, Center for Social Reserch, Sarajevo,

[150] Matić, J.(2014*). Servis građana ili servis vlasti (Service for Citizens or Service for Government*), Belgrade, Dobar naslov, pp 156

still has uncertain funding with no developed internal capacities to operate as a financially independent institution.[151]

Together with PSB on Serbia's media market there are many private media outlets too. According to recent researches, Serbia's media landscape is over-saturated with media outlets, with 818 print media, 284 radio stations, 175 television stations, and 334 internet news portals.[152] Hence, there are more than 1000 media outlets in Serbia, which gives an impression of media plurality and diversity. Print media will be further analyzed in following chapters.

4.3.4. International reports and media freedoms

As media analysts are explaining, after 13 years of democratization efforts, it seems to be that a new media system has not been put in place. The system is pluralistic; the media are predominantly in private ownership; the legal framework includes European democratic standards; broadcasting is regulated by bodies separated from executive state power; public service broadcasters have evolved from the former state-run radio and television company which acted as a pillar of the fallen autocratic regime. However, on the other hand, if we get deeper into media ownership, and if we consider the quality and relevance of media content, the media picture is not bright at all.

The media sector is liberalized but this has not brought a better-informed public. Media freedom has been expanded but it has endangered the concept of socially responsible journalism. The only industrial segments on the rise are the entertainment press and cable channels featuring reality shows and entertainment. The level of professionalism and reputation of journalists have been drastically reduced.[153] Regarding this, many media outlets have neither political nor economic independence, and recent researches are already explaining this as negative phenomena in Serbia.[154]

Serbia is among the countries with constant decrease of media freedom and media sustainability. The reasons are found in frequent verbal insults of media workers, lack of investigative journalism and self-censorship. Analytical reports are showing that media situation in Serbia is getting even worse over the years; for instance, the IREX Media

[151] Davor, M.(2017), pp. 42
[152] *IREX*. (2016). pp. 126
[153] Matić, J. and Valić, N., D.(2014). pp. 328
[154] *IREX.(*2016)

sustainability index for 2017, demonstrated the decline in free speech and professional journalism as a result of political pressure and lack of professional media regulations.[155] The last Freedom house report shows how Serbia went seven places down in terms of media freedom and now is on 66th place out of 180 countries included in research.[156] The vulnerability of basic journalistic valuables such as freedom of expression, impartiality and objectivity stems from the failure of establishing relevant law which would protect the editorial policy and disable political interference in work of media outlets.[157]

[155] *IREX*, (2017)

[156] Reporters without borders for freedom of information. (2019).

[157] *IREX*, (2017)

CHAPTER V

METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

5.1. APPROACH AND SAMPLE EXPLANATION

The main objective of this research is to clarify are there any differences in reporting about the concrete event in three former socialist Western-Balkan countries. In other words, throughout the research it is examined whether or not it is possible for one event to be represented in different manner regarding the county and ethnic region where the news is published. Media text analyses are important since they show us how does the text work within the sociocultural practices.[158]

In order to provide as much as relevant answer to this question, the research will cover nine daily newspapers from three countries, three newspaper from each country, Bosnia and Herzegovina (Oslobođenje, Dnevni avaz, Nezavisne novine), the Republic of Serbia (Danas, Večernje novosti, Politika) and the Republic of Croatia (Večernji list, Jutarnji list, Slobodna Dalmacija). This includes 279 news editions and 499 news articles with 620 pictures published is period from 16 July to 15 August 2016, 31 days in total. Daily newspapers are chosen to analyze because of their continuity in news reporting and also for their easier accessibility comparing to some other sources of information. Besides, newspapers are constant regarding their content; once they are printed out it is not possible to re-edit the content again. On the other side, media content on TV or radio stations can always be removed or re-edited - if we talk about online media. Observing the news articles in three different countries means observing the functioning of texts content within the three different socio-cultural practices.

Media are expected not only to create certain media content but also more important to indicate, transmit and inform public regarding the ongoing event or phenomenon. Media outlets are the creators of public opinion therefore they are also portraying the discourse on various of topics. The process of transmission considers an objective approach in news reporting so that the transmitted information can be liberated from bias. Also, since the social discourse is in a great extent formed under the influence of media, it's unacceptable for media

[158] Fairclough, N.(2003), *Analysing Discourse - Textual analysis of social research*., Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group., London and New York., pp. 7-8

to ignore one side of story, especially in reports that can cause hate speech, racism or any kind of bigotry in society. Hence, the main task of media is to communicate the truth.

If media avoids fair and honest reporting it could lead to lack of reality in media discourse and that further can lead to a discrimination of specific group of people based on their social differences, ethnicity etc. In other words, domination of one group over the other would be the expected result.

Discourse has a crucial role in reproducting domination. Therefore, it is important to have a critical approach to it so we could understand it's political and social connotation. Media has a power to decide what will be dominant in discourse and to form the public opinion on specific topic in the same time. Moreover, by creating a certain discourse about one group of people or their leader, media gains the power to control their influence and treatment towards them in the society where the news is being published. For instance, the way the Turkey is represented in media in Bosnia and Herzegovina, shapes the attitude and public opinion towards the Turkey or even its potential interference in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Hence, media research is important for us so we could have a better understanding of the world we are interfering with. By this we consider discourse analysis or to be more precise critical discourse analysis.

According to the one of the most prominent lecturers nowadays in the field of discourse analysis and media analysis - Van Dijk, critical discourse analysis (CDA) is "an interdisciplinary approach to the study of text and talk that uses language to examine relevant social problems."[159] It is certain kind of perspective on how the media and society understands events from political and social life. "We learn racism and sexism mostly through public form of discourse such as TV newspaper and generally media. Therefore, our mental models are predominantly formed under the media influence. How media reports on concrete event affects our understanding of event and its actors." explains Van Dijk.[160] This Van Dijk's observation is important in this concrete study because it explains how important role does media reporting have in forming of our mental models. The models are a result of comprehension of discourse, perception or imagination. The main feature of mental models is

[159] Dijk, V.(2013). Lecture at European University at Saint Petersburg, titled: *"Discourse and Knowledge",* organized by European University at Saint Petersburg, Saint Petersburg.

[160] DijK, V.(2012). lecture at Istanbul Bilgi University, titled *"Discriminatory Discourse and The Role of The Media"*, organized by Hrant Dink Foundation, Istanbul..

that their structure corresponds to the structure of what they represent.[161] When audience understands a description of the world, they can construct a similar, albeit less rich, representation - a mental model of the world based on the meaning of the description and on their knowledge.[162]

The way of understanding of some certain occurrence or even certain group of people we usually learn from public discourse created by media and society that we're interacting with. Public discourse influences our understanding of reality and shapes our mental model. As we can see, the understanding of media discourse is in correlation with our previous (general) knowledge same as our general knowledge - our mental model - is predominantly shaped by the influence of media discourse.

5.2. CONCRETE IMPLEMENTATION OF CDA

"For CDA, language is not powerful on its own - it gains power by the use powerful people make of it".[163] The relation of language and power is being constantly examined and challenged. As the authors are explaining: "Power does not derive from language, but language can be used to challenge power, to subvert it, to alter distributions of power in the short and long term."[164] Furthermore, Fairclough explains that the "producers exercise power over consumers in that they have sole producing rights and can therefore determine what is included and excluded, how events are represented and even the subject position of their audience.[165]" He also talks about the hidden power of media discourse which is strongly related to language structure of media content.[166] Therefore, our attention in this study is exactly on this particular matter - how does the media language in this three post-socialist countries (Bosnia & Herzegovina, Serbia, Croatia) distributes the power of event and participants.

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[161] Marr, D. (1982*). Vision: A Computational Investigation Into the Human Representation and Processing of Visual Information*, W.H. Freeman and Company, 41 Madison Avenue, New York, pp.19-36.
[162] Johnson, L., P., N.(1983). *Mental Models: Towards a Cognitive Science of Language, Ingerence, and Consciousness*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
[163] Wodak, R. and Meyer, M.(2001). *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*. SAGE Publications, London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi, pp. 10
[164] ibid
[165] Fairclough, N.(1989*). Language and Power (Language in Social Life Series*), Longman Inc., New York, pp. 54
[166] ibid, p. 49-62

Referring to all of the above I consider that the most suitable analysis for this study is critical discourse analysis applied through several research methods: quantitative analysis, analyses of macro-propositions, the representation of social actors, and analyses of the key words. It is important not to neglect the thematic organization of news discourse since it "plays a crucial role"[167] in understanding the discourse itself.

For better implementation of qualitative analysis this research will use a method of thematic structures in analyzing the news articles related to failed coup attempt in Turkey. This will provide us results on thematic orientation of newspapers and better understanding of which information prevails as a dominant one in press reports regarding the coup attempt. "A topic or theme is what the discourse is about"[168], therefore I have anticipated 13 categories of themes that could determine and direct the way of reporting and consequently the discourse itself. These topics could determine the way in which the event is covered. Therefore, the discourse itself could be understand based on the dominant topics. In representation of results the basic chart bars will be used and themes will be marked as T1, T2, T3 and so on. The themes that will be applied on each news item in selected nine newspapers, are listed belowe.

1. T1: The event is described as a coup attempt organized by Islamic cleric Fethulah Gülen and his movement FETO;
2. T2: The event is described as an overthrowing of president Recep Tayıp Erdogan or the coup setup by his government - fake coup;
3. T3: The event is test of democracy and victory of Turkish people;
4. T4: The focus of news is on arrests of army officials, public figures or civilians related to FETO movement;
5. T5: The coup is organized or supported by internal or external pro-western forces;
6. T6: The event is characterized as Erdoan's opportunity to defend his political opponents (the restitution of death penalty and/or change or constitution);
7. T7: The focus of news is on post-coup gatherings and meetings;
8. T8: The focus of news is on Turkish international relations;
9. T9: Reflection of event on domestic discourse
10. T10: The coup is end of Erdogan's era and good solution for Turkey
11. T11: Factual report on the event development / historical facts

[167] Van Dijk, T., A. (1988). pp.30
[168] ibid

12. T12: Official statements
13. T13: It is not clear what is happening in Turkey
14. Other topics

At the beginning of the analysis, I had only six topics, but the variety of reporting brought seven more frequently mentioned topics.

To collect required information, I've created three specific forms for the purpose of this research. Each analyzed text has been coded so it would be easier to follow one text through different forms. Below I'll explain the content and aim of each form that will be used in this research.

The Form No. 1 - Quantitative data collection, will be used to collect the data that we can express with numbers such as number of published articles, the text length, number of sources in text and number of pictures published along with the text. Collected information will be further analyzed and explained as part of research results. Also, some of the numbers will be used as indicators in further research of macro-propositions and key words.

In the Form No. 2 - Representation of social actors and macro-propositions, I'll follow the frequency of words related to above selected themes. This form reveals the frequency of the words, but also shows us which of the key words is most common in the text and this is important in order to understand the orientation of the content. Also, this form will use the keywords to reveal the manner in which social actors have been represented.

The Form No. 3 – Thematic orientation will be used in order to identify prevailing theme based on macro-propositions and metaphors indicating a representation of one or more themes in one single text. With this form we will understand which theme is dominant in each newspaper. The themes are marked as T1, T2, T3 and so on. Themes "are not defined as the meaning of individual words or sentences,[169] they rather "belong to the global, macro-level of discourse description"[170]. Hence, it is possible to represent every theme of news article as a macro-proposition since they are expressed in higher levels of text which considers deprivation of text of less important information. In this specific study I'll determine macro-prepositions and themes by applying macro-rules such as: deletion, generalization, and construction. Besides, I consider that it's important to pay attention on metaphors because it is

[169] Van Dijk, T., A. (1988). pp. 31
[170] Ibid

usual that some important determinations are expressed throughout metaphors which are directly related to our mental models. Constant use of one metaphor can have an impact on the way we think regarding to some specific topic, person or group of people. As example I would mention media reporting in former Yugoslavia when nationalistic propaganda had an irreversible impact on subsequent war events. Media reports precisely from the three countries that we analyze in this study, eventually became the war triggers against each other. In the beginning of war conflicts in the region of Former Yugoslavia, as some authors are explaining "each community first re-activated or re-created its national media in order to reinforce and re-invent a sense of national identity and difference."[171] Subsequent media analyses have revealed that metaphors, naming and word structures used in media discourse have created a firm ground for later warfare.

In the analysis of representation of social actors, the representation of event itself will be included as well. The analysis will be based on the macro-proposition taken from the news items, but also a visual representation of the actors and event in the newspaper will be considered. Therefore, the report will include some examples of published pictures and other visual elements. In this study each macro-preposition is defined trough "unit" that is expressed as keyword, representation of actors or metaphor.

The first to be analyzed will be the representation of coup attempt based on the macro-propositions explaining and chategorizeing the coup attempt. The main figures in this event are social actors directly or indirectly involved in the event. Therefore, as one of the main targets of the coup attempt, Turkish president Recep Tayıp Erdoğan, together with Turkish government is identified as the main actor of this event. Second event actor is Turkish people together with coup victimes. Third group of actors is Fethullah Gulen with his movement FETO and arrested/suspected coup plotters. Since there was a significant number of news regarding the Turkey's domestic, but also international relations the representation of Turkey is also included this analysis.

In this study each macro-preposition is defined trough "unit" that is expressed as keyword, representation of actors or metaphor. I'll identify macro-prepositions, or more precisely themes, by making connections between "units" in each news article. In representing the results of CDA, social context and previous knowledge will also be taken into account.

[171] Media and national ideologies.(2011). Mediacentar Sarajevo, pp.8-10

By interfering into our mental model media is constantly shaping it, therefore directing our thoughts, behaviors and actions towards a specific social event or its actors. Thus, news articles filtered through above explained forms will provide us with a better insight into the media discourse about Turkey in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Croatia. In one of his works Hall expounds critical discourse analysis as the analysis of "mental frameworks - the languages, the concepts, categories, imagery of thought, and the systems of representation - which different classes and social groups deploy in order to make sense of, define, figure out and render intelligible the way society works"[172]

[172] Hall, S.(1996). *Modernity: An introduction to modern societies*, Blackwell Publishers, Cambridge, pp. 26

CHAPTER VI

DATABASE

6.1. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION

The analyses include 499 news articles published in period of 31 day, from July 16 to August 15 in nine daily newspapers in three Western Balkan countries. Countries selected for this study are: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic of Serbia and Republic of Croatia. Selected and analyzed newspapers are: from Bosnia and Herzegovina: Oslobođenje, Dnevni Avaz, Nezavisne novine; from Republic of Serbia: Danas, Večernje novosti, Politika; from Republic of Croatia: Večernji list, Jutarnji list, Slobodna Dalmacija.

The important criteria in selecting the newspapers were readership and regional distribution. Below I'll clarify the reasons for choosing each of analyzed newspaper by explaining some of the facts that determines their work such as their history, editorial policy, ownership, readership, etc.

6.2. NEWSPAPERS FROM BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

According to information of Press Council in Bosnia and Herzegovina there is 8 daily newspapers, 8 press agencies, and more than 100 print periodicals[173]. There are also more than 100 online media outlets in Bosnia and Herzegovina[174]. Regarding the readership of daily papers, unfortunately, there is currently no official institution that monitors the circulation of daily newspapers and unfortunately most of the owners "keep circulation figures as a business secret or exaggerate them"[175]. Therefore, I had to rely on previous researches and some other data regarding printed media. Additionally, readership is significantly restricted by the ethnic character of the audience and this prevents print media from reaching a broader audience on the nationwide level.[176]

[173] *Press Council in Bosnia and Herzegovina*.
[174] Ibid
[175] Udovčić, Z.., Jusić, T., Halilović, M., Udovčić, R., (2001), *The Media at the Turning Point: A Media Landscape of Bosnia and Herzegovina*. Media Plan Institute, Sarajevo, pp. 15-16
[176] Jusić, T. (2004*), "Bosnia and Herzegovina*", Brankica Petkovic ed. Media Ownership and its Impact on Media Independence and Pluralism, Peace Institute, Ljubljana, Slovenia, pp. 73

It is important to mention how even some highly ranked organizations such as IREX, have published media analyses lacking the information of newspaper circulation statistics.[177] However, related researches are also based on the same newspapers as relevant samples in analyzing media discourse in printed media.[178] Furthermore, I've also considered the statistics regarding annual incomes and number of employees as an important factor in choosing newspapers for analyzing. Thus, among the daily newspapers in Bosnia and Herzegovina Dnevni avaz is printed media with highest annual income, next one is Oslobođenje followed with Nezavisne novine on third place.[179]

Hence, selected newspapers are enjoying respect and popularity in country, since all of them are dailies oriented towards news from political and social life and they've been publishing for more than 20 years. Below I'll elaborate each of selected newspapers.

6.2.1. Oslobođenje

Oslobođenje is a printed daily newspaper based in Sarajevo with a long history of publishing starting from 1943. It used to be the leading newspaper in Bosnia and Herzegovina with prevailing secular orientation, characterized as citizen-oriented media. Oslobođenje was well known as one of the most important media outlets during the aggression on Bosnia and Herzegovina a(nd was declared as the paper of the year in the world for the year 1992. After the war, "the paper was not able to adjust to the changed post-war media market"[180] and have lost a large percentage of its readership. Still, it is usually used for analyses in similar studies which means that it is respected and wellknown media.

Since 2006 Oslobođenje is owned by Selimović family and their MIMS company, well known for their anti-nationalistic anti-religious determinations and advocacy. The owner, Mujo Selimović also owns more business companies and their main occupation is trade. Media business does not bring much profit to them, they could even have some losses.[181] However, buying a TV channel TV1 showed that company will not give up the media sector.

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[177] IREX. (2017 & 2018). Sustainability report.

[178] Dzihana A., & Volcic. Z. (2011). MEDIA AND NATIONAL IDEOLOGIES Analysis of reporting on war crime trials in the former Yugoslavia. Mediacentar Sarajevo. **&**
SEENPM. (2004). MEDIA OWNERSHIP AND ITS IMPACT ON MEDIA INDEPENDENCE AND PLURALISM. Peace Institute,Slovenia.

[179] *Bisnode.* (2017). Top lista najvecih medija u BiH.

[180] Jusić, T. (2004). pp. 75

[181] *Forbes.* (10 Jun 2008). Interview with Mujo Selimović for Croatian edition of. Republished on B92 web site 2009.

The company's plan is to become more attractive to advertisers and to keep the position on the market through the synergy of print and electronic media.[182] Regardless of the fact that Oslobodjenje is owned by businessmen, it managed to maintain an independent editorial policy which is not case with some other newspapers in Bosnia and Herzegovina with similar ownership background. Unfortunately, after the war Oslobođenje never succeeded in regaining old success and circulation rates. However, it still remains among the most important printed media in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Oslobođenje is on second place regarding the annual income and number of employees, right after the paper Dnevni avaz.[183]

6.2.2. Dnevni avaz

Dnevni avaz was established during the war aggression on Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995, by the businessman and ex-journalist Fahrudin Radončić. As it's stated on their official news website, Dnevni avaz is the "Bosnian and Herzegovinian political daily newspaper."[184] The publisher is "Avaz-roto Press d.o.o" based in the capital Sarajevo, a publishing company with the same ownership background as a newspaper. It has been claimed that main interest of the media in the beginning of its work was to support the leading Bosniak political party - the Party of Democratic Action (SDA - Stranka Demokratske Akcije) in order to increase party's power. The media owner has always denied such claims,[185] while some politicians and other public figures claimed that Dnevni avaz had the support of the party, and even the first Bosnian president Alija Izetbegović.[186] However, the way of reporting has reflected the paper's adherence to the ruling party and for years this was an example on how politics can influence editorial policy. Nevertheless, there was also a period when Dnevni avaz showed its strictly opposed relationship towards SDA, especially regarding its current president Bakir Izetbegović.

In mid-2000 Dnevni avaz made noticeable effort regarding the independent editorial policy.[187] Even though the editorial concept is family-oriented, the influence on "political life

[182] *Faktor.*(09 January 2018). *Interview with Mujo Selimović.*.
[183] *Bisnode.* (2007).
[184] Dnevni avaz, impressum.
[185] *BH Dani*.(14 July 2000). Interview with Fahrudin Radončić.
[186] *BH Dani*.(14 July 2000). Interview with Edhem Bičakčić, ex Federal Prime Minister.
[187] Udovčić, Z., Jusić, T., Halilović, M., and Udovčić, R.(2001). pp. 15

of the country is enormous."[188] Eventually, 24 years of Dnevni avaz are filled with constant changes in representation of important political figures in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Paper's adaptable editorial policy was finally revealed after its owner Fahrudin Radončić established his political party and therefore instantly turned the media into his private tool for ruling the vox populi. Since then, the news in Dnevni avaz have been edited and published according to the ownership policy and the relations of his party towards people from political and public life. Even though there are no available data on newspaper circulation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dnevni avaz is often named as the daily paper with highest rate of sales and is usually used as a sample in analytical media researches. Additionally, among printed media Dnevni avaz is rated as a media with highest annual income and largest number of employees.[189]

6.2.3. Nezavisne novine

Nezavisne Novine were established in the end of aggression on Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1997 in Banja Luka, the most dominant city of smaller entity Republika Srpska. The founder and owner of paper is deceased Željko Kopanja, a prominent journalist with career started in Former Republic of Yugoslavia. The paper is oriented on political topics and is respected for its professionalism. The N.I.G.D. DNN, the publishing company of Nezavisne Novine, also launched a distribution of newspapers across the country, instead of the usual distribution in just one entity.[190] Also, the paper was among the first ones to publish a single edition of paper for the whole of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Through the years of the work the paper went through certain changes regarding the editorial policy. From the beginning it had a support of Republika Srpska's government but as researchers are claiming in later years the paper has been characterized as opposition media and as the most serious one in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in terms of its content and journalistic quality.[191] However, the financial support of the entity government continued in the following

[188] Jusić, T. (2004). pp. 74
[189] Bisnode.(2007).
[190] Udovčić, Z., Jusić, T., Halilović, M., and Udovčić, R. (2001),. pp. 9
[191] Jusić, T.(2004). pp. 75

years,[192] although the deceased owner of the media claimed that the editorial policy was independent.[193]

Despite being based in Banja Luka, in the past years paper managed a sizeable increase in sales throughout the country but it is still facing some problems regarding the daily circulation. Among the printed media, Nezavisne Novine are on the third place regarding the annual income, right after Dnevni Avaz on the first and Oslobođenje on the second place. The same is with the number of employees.[194] However, Nezavisne Novine are an example of media that has overgrown into a profitable business by printing publications of other news companies including even some from neighboring countries. Also, there is a certain number of papers distributed in Republic of Serbia.

6.3. NEWSPAPERS FROM THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA

Global trends in the media sector are fairly applicable in the media market in Croatia, characterized by a strong television sector, a decline in the number of print media and, of course, an increasing number of online media outlets.[195] Regarding the data on readership and generally media prevalence, Croatia is in a way better position than Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republic of Serbia. Since the country has become the member of European Union, it's much easier to reach more detailed data such as readership rates and audience structure. Therefore, the television, as the dominant media in country is followed by 78% of population, while newspapers are reaching up to 43%.[196] As regards to daily newspapers the total circulation is estimated at 300,000 copies a day. Among 11 major dailies, the top three are the tabloid 24sata with circulation of 55,000, Večernji List, circulation of 40,000, and Jutarnji list circulation of 30,000.[197]

For this analysis I'll use Večernji List and Jutarnji List, as the most prominent daily papers in Croatia. However, since the 24sata is a tabloid type of paper and this analysis requires more political and social oriented papers, instead of the daily 24sata, I've chosen to

[192] *Center for Investigative Reporting*. (2012). Government Millions for Private News Outlets in the RS.
[193] *Dnevni Avaz.* (19 November 2010). Interview with Željko Kopanja.
[194] Bisnode. (2017).
[195] *Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism*. (2018). Digital News Report ,Croatia, pp. 70
[196] ibid, pp. 71
[197] *Media Sustainability Index*.(2018). *The Development of Sustainable Independent Media in Europe and Eurasia*, in chapter Croatia, pp. 44

use the daily Slobodna Dalmacija, which comes on fourth place according to some statistics.[198] Detailed elaboration on sample papers follows below.

6.3.1. Jutarnji list

Jutarnji list is established in Zagreb in 1998. Jutarnji List is the most important publication of Hanza Media Group publishing company but also is among the three most popular daily papers in Croatia. As reports are showing, Jutarnji List's circulation is around 30, 000 copies per day, which places the paper on third place regarding the readership of daily papers in Croatia.[199]

The publishing company is one of the most important in Western Balkan region and consist of 16 printed and online publications. It was led by deceased lawyer Marian Hadžeković, who was claimed for certain irregularities in the process of privatization of the media group.[200]

6.3.2. Večernji List

Večernji list was founded in 1957 by the Croatian state-owned daily paper Vjesnik. From 2000 the owner is Austrian media company Styria Media Group AG[201] which keeps the largest market share in Croatia with 50-60 percent.[202] In its history, paper had strong links with Croatia's strongest political party HDZ.[203]

Among 11 major daily newspapers, Večernji list comes on second place with circulation of 40 000.[204] Considering that daily paper with the highest circulation rate in state is tabloid 24sata, Večernji list comes first as a politically and socially oriented daily paper. As they are claiming on their web site, Večernji list is preference of every sixth citizen in Croatia.[205]

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[198] *Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism*.(2018). Digital News Report. Croatia, pp. 71
[199] *Media Sustainability Index*.(2018,.).The Development of Sustainable Independent Media in Europe and Eurasia, in chapter Croatia, pp. 44
[200] Index.hr.(5 September 2018). KAKO JE EPH POSTAO HANZA MEDIA Hanžeković i Pavić bit će saslušani 3. Studenoga.
[201] Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. Balkanmedia, Mediamap.
[202] Croatian Competition Agency AZTN.
[203] Kurspahić, K.(2003). *Prime Time Crime: Balkan Media in War and Peace*, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington DC, pp.189
[204] *Media Sustainability Index* .(2018). The Development of Sustainable Independent Media in Europe and Eurasia, in chapter Croatia, pp. 44
[205] *Večernji list*.

6.3.3. Slobodna Dalmacija

Slobodna dalmacija ranks as fourth daily newspaper in Croatia regarding the circulation rate[206] and it's main newspaper for the region of Dalmacia. The paper was established in 1944 and it was one of the main newspapers in ex-Yugoslavia. Slobodna Dalmacia had some controversals regarding its privatization in the beggining of 90's. Also, in this period government has harsh interventions in papers editorial policy, therefore Slobodana Dalmacija becomes more government oriented media.[207]

After the war conflicts in Western Balkan region, newspaper gets new owners and changes the orientation from nationalistic to more liberal one. Once published by their own publishing group, Slobodna Dalmacija is being led by Hanza Media Group since 2005. After the crises during the 90's, Slobodna Dalmacija once again managed to break through among the most popular and most professional printed media in Croatia.

6.4. NEWSPAPERS FROM THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA

After the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the establishment of free, independent and pluralistic media was one of the crucial tasks of new government in Republic of Serbia. This was also an important part of reform process. The democratic transition of state announced transition from nationalistic to more democratic approaches in government actions, which considered less interference in media work as well. Number of media outlets increased, however "democratization of the media system has failed to become a factor in the democratization of society as a whole. Nowadays media in Serbia are still facing strong government interference and "decline of media freedom, security of journalists and financial sustainability" Besides all this, print media is experiencing some issues regarding the decline of circulation rate and growing presence of tabloids on print media market. Pro-government tabloids are often openly directed towards the government opponents and opposition.[208]

Appearing and disappearing of political tabloids, which are another *specificum* of print media market in Serbia, sometimes reveals hidden business-political networks within the

[206] *Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism.* (2018). Digital News Report,. Croatia, pp. 71
[207] Nizich, I. (1995). *Civil and Political Rights in Croatia,* Human Rights Watch, Helsinki, Pp. 68
[208] Media Ownership Monitor. (2018). Print Market in Serbia. Retrieved from:

country. Total number of daily papers in Serbia in 2017 was 894.[209] As European Journalism Centre (EJC) reports, number of printed media is reduced comparing to their number ten years ago. Namely, in 2007 there was 21 daily newspapers in Serbia, while current statistics are showing around 12 active dailies. Printed media market is having the lowest reach of audience and tabloids are having the highest circulation rate.[210] Total number of individuals reached by daily newspapers in 2017 was 1.5 million.[211] Referring to an "unreliable source" IREX reports that in the end of 2017 the highest circulation rate had tabloid Informer (151 487), on second place is daily Večernje Novosti (101 536), and third one is Srpski Telegraf (91 714).[212]

For this study I will use daily newspapers that are primarily politically oriented. Since the study requires more professional journalistic reports, tabloid type of newspapers will not be analyzed. Therefore, I have chosen to analyze Večernje Novosti, since the paper is already among those with highest circulation rate and it is politically oriented it is suitable for the study. Second newspaper is daily Danas, a paper known for their independent editorial policy and impartiality. And the third one is daily Politika, the newspaper with longest history of publishing in Western Balkan region, highly respected and know in all ex-Yugoslavia states. Selected newspapers report news and events from political and social life of Serbia, but also news from Balkan region and beyond. They are either among the newspapers with the highest circulation rate in Serbia, or are respected for their impartiality and long tradition.

A detailed elaboration of selected newspapers follows below.

6.4.1. Večernje Novosti

Established in 1953 as a semi-tabloid evening newspaper, Večernje Novosti managed to become one of the daily newspapers with highest circulation rate in Serbia. Similar to other media in Western Balkan region, the brake up of Yugoslavia pointed out paper's true orientation and their way of reacting in crises situations. The rhetoric of Večernje Novosti was nationalistic and right wing oriented, provoking the hate speech that caused the intolerance

[209] *Business Research Agency*. (2018).
[210] ibid
[211] *Desk report*. (2018). pp.19
[212] Media Sustainability Index. (2018). *The Development of Sustainable Independent Media in Europe and Eurasia*, in chapter Serbia, pp. 116

among ethnic groups and spread violence. During the war period Večernje Novosti got the reputation of "one-sided war reporting" sensationalist newspaper.[213]

Audience share of Večernje Novosti is 5.3% and it has mixed, state and private, ownership model. Even though most of the ownership and publishing details are not publicly available, it is known that the paper is published by Kompanija Novosti, a joint stock company majorly owned by state and unrevealed offshore structures. Therefore, 29.5% of paper is owned by Republic of Serbia and 62.2% is in hands of individual owners with links to Milan Beko, a powerful Serbian businessman who is also a former minister form Milošević regime.[214]

6.4.2. Danas

A daily newspaper Danas was first published on June 9, 1997. From the very beginning, the paper took an independent editorial policy towards the regime. Because of its open and uncensored reporting on relevant topics and events that corrupted Yugoslav and Serbian society in the late '90s, it was often targeted by the Serbian authorities, in fact it has been targeted even today.[215]

The paper is pro-European oriented and speaks mostly to the urban and educated population. Their circulation rate is quite low. The paper takes only 0.5% of audience share.[216] Justifying the circulation decline the Danas redaction points out that this newspaper is "one of the rare media outlets in Serbia that ignores the commercial side of tabloid journalism".[217] The newspaper remain anti-nationalistic, with strong dedication in not disseminating nationalistic messages and staying politically correct.[218]

The paper is published by Dan Graf publishing company, which is also engaged in book publishing.[219] The newspaper is "privately owned by more than ten people, mostly journalists by profession."[220]

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[213] Gordy, D., E. (1999). *The Culture of Power in Serbia, Nationalism and Destruction of Alternatives*, The Pennsylvania State University, Press University Park, Pennsylvania, pp. 71-78
[214] Media Ownership Monitor.(2018).
[215] Danas editorial office. (personal communication, Mart 10,2017).
[216] Media Ownership Monitor. (2018).
[217] Danas editorial office. (personal communication, Mart 10,2017).
[218] Listhaug, O.,Ramet, S., P. and Dulić, D.(2011)., *Civic and Uncivic Values: Serbia in the Post-Milošević Era*, Central European University Press, Budapest – New York, pp.: 299-306
[219] Media Ownership Monitor.(2007).
[220] Danas editorial office. (personal communication, Mart 10,2017).

6.4.3. Politika

The oldest newspaper in ex-Yugoslavia countries, and one of the oldest newspapers in Europe, daily Politika was first published on 25 January 1904.[221] Politika was known as "finest daily in the Balkans, reflecting the intellectual vitality and cosmopolitan spirit of Belgrade but open to a wider Yugoslav intellectual debate."[222] The paper was also recognized as the "most trusted newspaper in the region"[223] with the content that satisfys the highest European journalistic standards. However, the professional media reputation of the Politika was disrupted when warfare in the Balkans began.

The sudden change in the editorial policy of the Politika can be summed up in a statement by Živorad Minović, editor of Politika in the period of increasing nationalist tensions, who said: "Politika has no right to think differently from people."[224] During the dissolution of Yugoslavia until the overthrowing of Milošević regime, Politika was spreading nationalistic rhetoric supported by government and nationalistic groups. Together with radio-television system of Serbia, Politika was the main source of information in Serbia, therefore it was important for the regime to have control over it.[225]

Current Politika's audience share is 3.2% and circulation rate is lower than it used to be previous years. The ownership type is mixed with 50% of state ownership and 50% private ownership. Politika has remained under the influence of the state. Although there should be two directors, representing two owners, there is currently only one director, appointed by the state and in charge of the work of the media.[226]

[221] Kolsto, P. (2016). *Media Discourse and the Yugoslav Conflicts: Representations of Self and Other*, Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, London and New York, pp: 261
[222] Kurspahić, K. (2003). *Prime Time Crime: Balkan Media in War and Peace, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington DC,* pp: 42
[223] Ibid
[224] Ibid, Page: 46
[225] Klajn, L. (2007). *The Past in Present Times: The Yugoslav Saga*, University Press of America, pp. 189 - 209
[226] Media Ownership Monitor.(2007).

CHAPTER VII

CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS RESEARCH RESULTS

7.1. BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Of the three countries analyzed, Bosnia and Herzegovina showed the most interest in reporting on 2016 military coup attempt in Turkey. In 31 analyzed days and 93 editions of three daily newspaper there was 208 news items about the 2016 military coup attempt and related topics from Turkey. This is the highest number of published news among the analyzed states. Together with 208 news itesm, 254 photographs was published and the military coup related topics were in total 11 times on front pages of three analyzed newspapers. The highest number of published news items, not only in Bosnia and Herzegovina newspaper but also among the newspapers from other two states, was found in daily Dnevni avaz (117), next one is Oslobođenje (66), while Nezavisne novine had the least interest in developments in Turkey with only 25 published news items.

Table 1
Quantitative results, Bosnia and Herzegovina

	Number of published news items	**Nuber of sentences**	**Number of pictures**	**Front page**
Oslobođenje	66	925	64	3
Dnevni avaz	117	1629	151	6
Nezavisne novine	25	261	39	2
Total for B&H	**208**	**2815**	**254**	**11**

7.1.1. Oslobođenje

7.1.1.1. Quantitative analysis and coveredge frequencies

Oslobođenje was one day late in reporting, their first news item about the coup is published on 17 July. Therefore, on first event day (16.07.2016.) there wasn't any news published, during the first week (16.-22.07.2016.) there was 29, and in total one month period (16.07.-15.08.2016.) 66 news items. The coveredge frequency is 2,1 news items published per

day. In 31 analyzed editions the total number of sentences is 925 and the longest text titled "Turkey is far form Bosniaks?" (OS055), had 128 sentences. Oslobođenje published 64 pictures and coup related news were on their front page only three times. In 31 analyzed days there was only two days without any news related to faild coup attempt.

7.1.1.2. News headlines

Table 2

News headlines, Oslobođenje

Day	Date	Page No.	Text code	The headlines in published language	The headlines in English language
1	16.07.2016.		/		
2	17.07.2016.	10	OS001	Privedena 754 vojnika, 50 se predalo policiji	*754 officers were detained, 50 surendered themselves to the police*
	17.7.2016.	10	OS002	Prozapadna vojska stoji iza pokušaja puča	*Pro-Western army is behind the coup attempt*
	17.7.2016.	10	OS003	Yildırım najavio promjenu ustava	*Yildırım announced the change of constitution*
	17.7.2016.	10	OS004	Turska će iz krize izaći još jača	*Turkey will get even stronger after the crises*
	17.7.2016.	10	OS005	Zatvoren, pa otvoren vazdušni proctor	*Closed then again opened air space*
	17.7.2016.	11	OS006	Zaustavljen puč u Turskoj, Gulen odbacio optužbe	*Military Coup in Turkey stopped, Gulen rejects accusations*
	17.7.2016.	11	OS007	Narod Turske pokazao koga želi	*Turkish people have shown who do they want*
	17.7.2016.	11	OS008	Zvizdić: Podržavam Erdogana	*Zvizdić: I support Erdogan*
	17.7.2016.	11	OS009	Oštre osude državnog udara	*Harsh condemnation of military coup*
3	18.7.2016.	12	OS010	Pritvor za 6000 ljudi zbog pokušaja puča	*6 000 people detained for coup attempt*
	18.7.2016.	12	OS011	Sastanak Erdoan-Putin prve nedjelje augusta	*Erdogan-Putin meeting first week of August*
	18.7.2016.	12	OS012	Turska je položila ispit demokracije	*Turkey passed the democracy test*
	18.7.2016.	12	OS013	Grčka optužila osam turskih oficira	*Greece accused eight Turkish officers*
	18.7.2016.	13	OS014	Pokušaj puča	*Coup attempt*

				neutralisan, oproštaj od žrtava	*neutralized, one last farewell to the victims*
	18.7.2016.	13	OS015	Lažne su optužbe o ulozi SAD-a u puču	*The acusations about the intervention of USA in coup d'etat are folse*
	18.7.2016.	13	OS016	Otkazani letovi	*Canceled flights*
	18.7.2016.	13	OS017	Borba protiv ISIL-a	*Fight against ISIL*
4	19.7.2016.	12	OS018	Počeli su progoni u Turskoj	*The purges in Turkey have started*
	19.7.2016.	19	OS019	U pritvor prebačeno 27 generala i admirala	*27 generals and admirals transported to prision*
	19.7.2016.	19	OS020	Ranjen turski zvaničnik	*Turkish official wounded*
	19.7.2016.	41	OS021	Puč i posljedice	*Coup and cosequences*
5	20.7.2016.	15	OS022	Turska traži Gulena od SAD-a	*Turkey is requesting from USA to surrend Gulen*
6	21.7.2016.	14	OS023	Gulen poziva SAD da odbiju zahtjev Ankare	*Gulen is asking USA to refuse a request from Ankara*
	21.7.2016.	14	OS024	Strani borci preko Turske ulaze u Siriju	*Foreign fighters are entering Syria throug Turkey*
	21.7.2016.	14	OS025	WikiLeaks objavio Erdoanove dokumente	*WikiLeaks published Erdogan's documents*
7	22.7.2016.	18	OS026	Dva mjeseca zatvora prebjeglim vojnicima	*Two months of prision for breakaway soldgers*
	22.7.2016.	19	OS027	Pučistima nisu pomogli ni tenkovi, ni avioni	*Tenks and airplanes did not help the plotters*
	22.7.2016.	19	OS028	Čistka nije oslabila vojsku	*Purge did not weaken the army*
8	23.7.2016.	11	OS029	Za svaku kad krvi polagat će se računi	*Each drop of blood will be accounted*
	23.7.2016.	26-27	OS030	Neuspjeli puč u Turskoj	*Failed coup in Turkey*
	23.7.2016.	41	OS031	Haos u Turskoj	*Chaos in Turkey*
9	24.7.2016.	10	OS032	Dekret o zatvaranju škola, fondacija	*Decree on closing schools, foundations*
10	25.7.2016.	8	OS033	Tursko i(li) naše	*Turkish and (or) our*
11	26.7.2016.	18	OS034	Turska objavila naloge za hapšenje novinara	*Turkey has announced the arrest of journalists*
	26.7.2016.	18	OS035	Gulen ugrožava odnose Ankare i Washingtona	*Gulen jeopardize Ankara and Washington relations*
12	27.7.2016.	14	OS036	Većina Turaka optužuje Gulena za puč	*Most of Turks are accusing Gulen for coup*
13	28.7.2016.	14	OS037	Hapšenja u Turskoj u skladu sa zakonom	*Arrests in Turkey in accordance with the law*
14	29.7.2016.	18	OS038	Jildirim predsjedavao Vojnim vijećem	*Yildirim chaired the Military Council*
	29.7.2016.	18	OS039	Gulen bi mogao pobjeći iz Amerike	*Gulen could escape from America*

15	30.7.2016.	11	OS040	Zetvaraju se kasarne pučista	*Puchists barracks are closing*
	30.7.2016.	40	OS041	Za Republiku i demokratiju	*For Republic and democracy*
	31.7.2016.	11	OS042	Razriješeno 70 hiljada službenika	*70,000 employees were solved*
16	31.7.2016.	11	OS043	Na slobodi 758 vojnika	*758 soldiers were released*
17	1.8.2016.	12	OS044	Hiljade Erdoanovih pristalica u Kolnu	*Thausends of Erdogan supporters in Cologne*
	2.8.2016.	13	OS045	Ako vam je dobro, onda ništa	*If it's good for you, then never mind*
18	2.8.2016.	18	OS046	Vize ili otkazivanje sporazuma	*Visa or cancellation of a contract*
19	3.8.2016.	14	OS047	Amerika podržava tursku demokratiju	*America supports Turkish democracy*
20	4.8.2016.	14	OS048	Jedinstvom protiv zloupotrebe religije	*United against the abuse of religion*
21	5.8.2016.	18	OS049	Austrija za prekid pregovora	*Austria for the cancelation of negotiations*
	5.8.2016.	19	OS050	Nalo g za hapšenje Fethullaha Gulena	*Order for the arrest of Fethullah Gulen*
22	6.8.2016.	11	OS051	Ankara treba da ublaži ton	*Ankara needs to soften the tone*
	6.8.2016.	41	OS052	Miting u Kolnu	*Rally in Cologne*
23	7.8.2016.	11	OS053	Puč kao paljenje Rajhstaga	*The coup as the burning of Reichstag*
24	8.8.2016.	13	OS054	Jedinstvo na Mitingu demokratije i šehida	*Unity at the Meeting for Democracy and Martyrs*
	8.8.2016.	42-43	OS055	Daleko je Turska od Bošnjaka?	*Turkey is far form Bosniaks?*
25	9.8.2016.	14	OS056	BiH je odabrala Gulena, pa Erdogana	*BiH selected Erdoan after Gulen*
	9.8.2016.	15	OS057	Tursko i(li) naše	*Turkish and (or) our*
	9.8.2016.	19	OS058	Zapad je ostavio Tursku	*The West abandoned Turkey*
	10.8.2016.	14	OS059	Obrađivanje još traje u turskim pritvorima	*Processing continues in Turkish detention*
26	10.8.2016.	14	OS060	Putin i Erdogan čine pravu stvar	*Putin and Erdogan are doing the right thing*
27	11.08.2016.		/		
28	12.8.2016.	19	OS061	Poništene radne dozvole prosvjetarima	*Canceled work permits for teachers*
	13.8.2016.	11	OS062	Gulen za Le Monde o puču	*Gulen for Le Monde on the coup*
29	13.8.2016.	40	OS063	Susret cara i sultana	*The meeting of the emperor and sultan*

30	14.8.2016.	10	OS064	Poslan dopis za hapšenje Gulena	*A letter for arresting Gulen was sent*
	14.8.2016.	11	OS065	Biden u Turskoj 24. Augusta	*Biden in Turkey on August 24*
31	15.8.2016.		/		

The Oslobođenje headlines are short and are reflecting the main topic of the text. Among 65 headlines, in 11 of them Fethullah Gulen is mentioned which makes him the most prominent figure in Oslobođenje headlines. Turkish president Recep Tayıp Erdoğan is named in five headlines and coup plotters four times. Victims of the coup attempt are mentioned in only one headline, which reflects the general interest of Oslobodjenje in reporting on those about the death toll during and after the coup. Regarding the word selection there was much more hedlines with positive and supportive messages than those with negative tone (eg. *Turkey will get even stronger after the crises*, *Turkish people have shown who do they want*, *Turkey passed the democracy test*, *Failed coup in Turkey…).* In headlines mentioning the coup attempt there were direct and indirect accusation, but also methaphors and comparings with some historical events (eg. *Pro-Western army is behind the coup attempt, Most of Turks are accusing Gulen for coup, The coup as the burning of Reichstag, Chaos in Turkey…).* The Turkey – Bosnia relations and the reflection of the event on domestic discourse is also noticeable in headlines (eg. *BiH selected Erdogan after Gulen, Turkey is far form Bosniaks?, Turkish and (or) our…)*

7.1.1.3. Thematic orientation




Chart 1. Thematic orientation, Oslobođenje

The most prominen topics in the reporting of Oslobođenje are T4: The focus of news is on arrests of army officials, public figures or civilians related to FETO movement with 26 news items published, and the T6: The event is characterized as Erdoan's opportunity to defend his political opponents (the restitution of death penalty and/or change or constitution) with 17 news published. Both topics are related to arrestings and after-coup developments, however there was no much interestin explaining the concreate event development during the night of 15 July. Regarding the coup iniciators Fethullah Gulen and FETO movement were mentioned as such in nine news items, Turkish president Recep Tayıp Erdoğan in two texts. Accusations against Gulen are usualy statements of Turkish officials. There was no any clear accusation of any part in the event. Osolobođenje is know as a newspaper with balanced reporting. In choosing words for headlines and news, newspapers tended not to use exaggerated words or expressions that would put them on either side of the event. However, sometimes by avoiding the writing about certain topic reveals even more about the general attitude of newspaper towards the event. In the case of Oslobođenje it is noticeable that the topic of coup victims was avoided. In generaly the newspaper intended to stay neutral towards the main actors but also to highlight the independence of Bosnian society from Turkish president or Fethullah Gulen.

7.3.1. Representation of social actors and macro-propositions

a. Coup attempt

The attempted military coup in daily Oslobođenje in most of the cases is explained without much positive nor negative epithets and adjectives. It is usually named as “coup attempt” or “failed coup attempt”. In few cases the coup is described as “the overtrowhing of Recep Tayip Erdogan” (OS010), “violent overthrow of democratically elected government” (OS011), “anti-constitutional action” (OS011). The hronological explanation of the coup development, was published eight days after the coup, which deprived readers of a more thorough insight into the event at its very beginning. As Oslobođenje reported the coup had “roots in Erdoan's conflict with military”. Regarding the coup organizer, there was no direct accusations, only quoted statements about Gulen nine times, president Erdogan once and the pro-Western involvement three times.


OSLOBOĐENJE
NOVINE ZA BIH
Odgovor na prijetnju
Mališani iz Buča Potoka dobiće vrtić
Zaustavljen puč u Turskoj, Gulen odbacio optužbe
Revija na fontani Trevi očarala svijet
Naglasite ljepotu očiju
Kako klima-uređaji utiču na zdravlje?
Ključ uspješnog putovanja s bebom - biti spreman i ostati prilagodljiv
LOBOĐENJ
I OVE GODINE NAS ČITAJTE NA JADRANSKOJ OBALI


ŠTAMPA-TISAK 41
/REUTERS
Puč i posljedice
Pitanje je kako će u Turskoj od sada proći bilo ko ko se bude usudio da pisne protiv vlasti
VREME, BEOGRAD
Vojni Puč u Turskoj je propao iz nekoliko razloga.
Prvo: Osim što su akcije pučista širom Turske bile vojnički precizno koordinisane, sve je delovalo prilično diletantski; tenkovi na ulicama bez pratnje pešadije; vojnici koji ne znaju šta bi sa narodom koji ih okružuje, iako su proglašeni policijski čas i ratno pravo; nekakva saopštenja preko medija da je vojska preuzela vlast bez vidljivog lica koje preuzima komandu i bez poruke šta se traži i šta dalje; predsednik Turske Redžep Tajip Erdogan, protiv koga
je naslutiti. Ovako, prilično je lako predvideti kakve će posledice biti.
Ovaj pokušaj puča korene vuče u Erdoganovom obračunavanju sa vojskom odmah pošto je došao na vlast 2003: smenio je kompletan vojni vrh, neki oficiri su oterani, neki osuđeni za šta god i pozatvarani, podredio je do tada nezavisnu vojsku koja je kontrolisala politiku kontroli političkih vlasti, upravo da ne bi došlo do nekog novog puča, kakvih je proteklih decenija bilo u Turskoj. Za to je dobijao aplauze sa Zapada.
Godinama unazad Erdogan je go-

b. Turkish president Recep Tayıp Erdoğan

In referring to the president Erdogan Oslobođenje preferred to use his title, so he was most often named as a "legitimate president" and his government as "legitimate and democratically elected". However, there are recorded cases of pointing out Erdogan as "strong leader" (OS007), but also as a leader who has "silenced, marganilized and destoryed almost everyone in the state confronting him" (OS018).


OSLOBOĐENJE
NOVINE Z
Nema mjesta za paranoju
Referendum nije anketno pitanje
Plenković novi predsjednik HDZ-
HDZ će ponovo biti državotvorna s
sport+
Sve je spremno za novi sistem BHT Premijer lige
Sljedi bitka za prevlast u glavnom gradu
Čampara želi iskoristiti šansu iz snova
Filipović iz treće smjene na OI
VELIKO SEZONSKO SNIŽENJE -40% Planika
IZABERITE SVOJ PAKET
VRIJEDI BITI ČLAN!

c. Coup victims and Turkish citizens

In the reporting of Oslobođenje, Turkish citizens were recognized as the important factors of preventing the coup attempt: “had the crucial role in preventing military coup attempt”, “sacrificing their lives in defence of democracy”, “stood in defence of future and homeland” (OS012, OS014, OS027). Victims of the military coup are the least covered topic in Oslobođenje. Even in text with headline “Coup attempt neutralized, last goodbye to victims”, which is published on third day after the coup attempt, there was no number of killed civilians.



Pokušaj puča neutralisan, oproštaj od žrtava

Erdoan je izjavio da je pokušaj puča Gulenove terorističke grupe srušila volja naroda. Najavio je “čišćenja” u svim državnim institucijama Turske

Turske oružane snage saopštile su ...učer da je neutralisan vojni udar od ...etka, čiji je cilj bio svrgavanje vlasti, ...e da je vojska pod komandom dr... ...ave i turskog naroda. U saopštenju ...e ističe da je turski narod odigrao ...ajveću ulogu u sprečavanju voj... ...og udara. Kako je poznato, pučisti ...u zauzeli mostove u Istanbulu, ali ...a njihove namjere ometene kada ...a pristalice vlasti odgovorile na po... ...iv predsjednika Redžepa Tajipa ...rdoana i izašle na ulice da bi se su... ...rotstavile pučistima.

Smrtna kazna

Erdoan je izjavio da je pokušaj puča tzv. teroristične grupe imama Fetullaha Gulena srušila volja naroda. On je dodao da će se čišćenje tog "virusa" iz svih državnih institucija nastaviti, javlja Reuters.

Turski lider je to rekao na džena-

d. Fethullah Gulen and arrested/acused coup plotters

The first reports on coup attempt are naming FETO as the “paralel state structure” (OS001), but the later ones are more oriented to name it as the “so-called terroristic group” (OS014, OS023, OS018, OS033…) and as the “opponent of the Turkish President” (OS006…). Oslobođenje named Fethullah Gulen uslualy as “preacher” and “cleric” (OS035, OS039, OS018, OS065…), but also as the “terrorist leader” (OS022, OS048, OS064…). The hiden side of the movement is also discussed: “there is something mistic about him and his followers” (OS018…). Gulen is also a “former charismatic hatib from the Istanbul mosques” (OS030). As Oslobođenje reported, behind the cop was “one part of Turkish military forces” (OS009), sometimes named as “covards” (OS003) or “junta” (OS010).



Gulen bi mogao pobjeći iz Amerike

Turska je dobila obavještajne podatke da bi imam Fethullah Gulen mogao napustiti svoju kuću u Sjedinjenim Američkim Državama, izjavio je jučer turski ministar pravde Bekir Bozdag, javila je Fena. Turski ministar je rekao za Haberturk TV da bi Gulen mogao pobjeći u Australiju, Meksiko, Kanadu, Južnu Afriku ili Egipat, prenosi Reuters.

Turske vlasti tvrde da je Gulen, koji godinama živi u samonametnutom egzilu u Sjedinjenim Državama, organizator propalog puča 15. i 16. jula kada je pokušano svrgavanje vlade.

e. Republic of Turkey

In the beginning Turkey is described with positive adjectives such as "extremly important strategic country in the word", "state with democratic order" (OS008, OS009…), however as the support from the Western countries decreased, the newspaper changed the rethoric towards Turkey. The newspaper payed attention on statements of officials warning about the situation in Turkey: "avoid to travel to Turkey", "increased danger of terroristic groups in Turkey", "on the border of all instability", all violence", "democratic and economic deficits", "poor state of the economy and democracy" (OS015, OS051, OS028…). However there is the same number of statements of officials trusting in democratic order in Turkey being published in Oslobođenje: "it will remain strong ally in NATO", "a state of law even in conditions of state of emergency", "country and the Turkish people have come out even stronger" "Justice state Turkey can not act with revenge, can not do what they did ", "enviable stable country", "the most successful Muslim country of all time ". (OS029, OS028, OS037, OS047, OS055…). Turkish policy is described as: "nominaly democratic, but in practice it is applied with brudal autocracy" (OS018), and as the one "preparing for a geopolitical turn"



Sastanak Erdoan - Putin prve nedjelje augusta

Turski predsjednik Redžep Tajip Erdoan i ruski lider Vladimir Putin sastaće se prve nedjelje augusta, javila je jučer državna turska agencija Anadolija.

Biće to njihov prvi direktni susret od približavanja odnosa krajem juna nakon što je Rusija saopštila da se Erdoan izvinio zbog turskog obaranja ruskog avio- u novembru prošle godine,

javlja AFP. Putin je ranije pozvao Erdoana da bi izrazio podršku nakon neuspjelog puča.

- Vladimir Putin je u vezi sa pokušajem nasilnog svrgavanja demokratski izabranih turskih vlasti u noći 16. jula naglasio principijelni stav Rusije o kategoričkom neprihvatanju antiustavnih akcija i korištenja sile u životu zemlje naveo je Kremlj, prenosi TASS.



Daleko je Turska od Bošnjaka?

U najnovijem Mostu Radija Slobodna Evropa razgovaralo se o tome može li Ankara biti Bošnjacima ono što su Beograd i Zagreb bosanskohercegovačkim Srbima i Hrvatima. Sagovornici su bili Anis Bajrektarević, profesor međunarodnog prava i globalnih političkih studija na univerzitetu u Beču, i Esref Kenan Rašidagić, profesor Fakulteta političkih nauka u Sarajevu

7.1.2. Dnevni avaz

7.1.2.1. Quantitative analysis and coveredge frequencies

During the first day of reporting (16.07.2016.) Dnevni avaz published 12 news items. The two thirds of the total number of texts were published in the first week of reporting (16. – 22.07.2016), that is 76 news. And final number of published news items for one month is 117 news items in 31 Dnevni avaz editions. This is the highes rate of published articles for a single newspaper. The coveredge frequency is 3,7 news per day. The total number of sentences is 1629 which is the highest rate of published sentences among all the nine analyzed newspapers. Dnevni avaz also had the highest number of published photographs, 151 in total. The coup attempt relatet news were on the frot page for six times. Out of 31 analyzed days, only on three day there was no any news related to coup attempt, its background or consequences.

7.1.2.2. News headlines

Table 3

News headlines, Dnevni avaz

Day	Date	Page No.	Text code	Text title in published language	Text title in English language
	16.07.2016	2	DA001	Izetbegović uputio svoju podršku Erdoganu	*Izetbegovic expressed his support for Erdogan*
	16.07.2016	2	DA002	Borba za državnu televiziju	*Fight for the state television*
	16.07.2016	2, 3	DA003	Državni udar u Turskoj	*Military coup in Turkey*
	16.07.2016	3	DA004	Kuda ide Turska?	*Where is Turkey going?*
	16.07.2016	4	DA005	Sokolović: Nema panike ali ljudi čekaju ishod krize	*Sokolovic: No panic, but people are waiting for the outcome of the crisis*
	16.07.2016	4	DA006	Diplomati BiH u Turskoj imali pune ruke posla	*BH diplomats in Turkey were overwhelmed with work*
	16.07.2016	4	DA007	Studenti iz BiH su na sigurnom	*Students from Bosnia are safe*
	16.07.2016	4	DA008	Ne damo našu državu i Erdogana	*We won't give our state and Erdogan*
	16.07.2016	5	DA009	Svijet šokiran vojnim pučem	*The world shocked by military coup*
	16.07.2016	5	DA010	Ranije je narod vidio vojsku kao spasioca, ali sada nije tako	*Earlier, the people saw the army as a rescuers, but now it is not so*
	16.07.2016	5	DA011	Dolaze crni dani za zemlju	*Black days are coming for the state*
1	16.07.2016	5	DA012	Udar na demokratiju	*A rebellion against democracy*
	17.07.2016	2	DA013	Turska vlast je legalna	*Turkish government is legal*
	17.07.2016	2	DA014	Poslao avion po srbijance	*A plane sent to take the Serbians*
	17.07.2016	2	DA015	Junak Erdogan	*Hero Erdogan*
	17.07.2016.	2, 3	DA016	Slom pučista u Turskoj	*Breakdown of coup plotters in Turkey*
	17.07.2016	2	DA017	Građani obezglavili vojnika	*Citizens have beheaded soldier*
	17.07.2016.	3	DA018	Erdogan: Turci, Bošnjaci i Ermenci su jedna nacija	*Erdogan: Turks, Bosniaks and Armenians are one nation*
2	17.07.2016.	3	DA019	Nema ugroženih bh. Državljana	*There are no endangered BH citizens*

	17.07.2016	3	DA020	Ispit zrelosti	*The maturity exam*
	17.07.2016	4	DA021	Ovo je bio podmukao plan stvaranja haosa	*This was a perfidious plan of creating chaos*
	17.07.2016	4	DA022	Narod osujetio udar	*The people stopped the coup*
	17.07.2016.	4	DA023	SAD će razmotriti zahtjev za izručenje Gulena, ali Turska mora dokazati optužbe	*The US will consider the Gulen extradition request, but Turkey has to prove its allegations*
	17.07.2016	4	DA024	NATO i EU: Puna podrška Erdoganu	*NATO and EU: Fully support to Erdogan*
	17.07.2016.	5	DA025	Bh. Građani uputili podršku Erdoganu i narodu Turske	*BH Citizens have supported Erdogan and the people of Turkey*
	17.07.2016.	5	DA026	Podrška očuvanju demokratske tekovine i slobode	*Support the preservation of democracy and freedom*
	17.07.2016	5	DA027	Odbrana države	*Defense of the state*
	17.07.2016.	5	DA028	Zvizdić: Podrška institucijama Tursk	*Zvizdić: Support to institutions of Turkey*
	17.07.2016	6	DA029	Hronologija krvavih događaja	*Chronology of bloody events*
	17.07.2016.	6	DA030	Ničim nismo mogli naslutiti da će noć biti krvava	*We could not predict that the night would be bloody*
	17.07.2016.	6	DA031	Primjetili smo da se nešto sprema ali ovo nismo očekivali	*We noticed that something is happening, but this we did not expect*
	17.07.2016.	7	DA032	Kad smo sletjeli, dočekalo nas je 100 naoružanih vojnika	*When we landed, 100 armed soldiers was already there*
	17.07.2016.	7	DA033	Na Mevlana trgu više od pola miliona ljudi spremnih da brane državu	*On Mevlana Square more than half a million people are ready to defend the state*
	17.07.2016.	7	DA034	Pazarac zaustavio tenk	*A man from Pazar stopped the tank*
	17.07.2016	7	DA035	Ko je Fethulah Gulen?	*Who is Fethulah Gulen?*
	17.07.2016.	8	DA036	Erdogan je izašao kao ojačani pobjednik	*Erdogan emerged as a strengthened winne*
	17.07.2016.	8	DA037	Presudila je lojalnost turske vojske Erdoanu	*The loyality of Turkish army to Erdogan has overcame*
	17.07.2016	8	DA038	U 100 godina 7 vojnih udara	*7 military coups in 100 years*
	17.07.2016.	9	DA039	Najveću ulogu odigrali su građani, ne smije bit lova na vještice	*Citizens played the biggest role, there must not be "witch hunts"*
	17.07.2016	9	DA040	Da je uspio udar, došlo bi	*If the coup have*

	.			do destabilizacije Balkana	*succeeded, the Balkans would be destabilized*
	17.07.2016.	10	DA041	Bosanci i Hercegovci ne žele ranije s mora	*The Bosnians and Herzegovinians don't want to end the vacations earlier*
	17.07.2016.	10	DA042	Eren: Do zore smo u džamijama učili salavate	*Eren: We were reciting salawat in mosques until dawn*
	18.07.2016	2	DA043	Podrška turskim vlastima	*Support to Turkish government*
	18.07.2016	2	DA044	Saradnja BiH i Turske	*Cooperation of B&H and Turkey*
	18.07.2016	2	DA045	Besplatan prijevoz	*Free transportation*
	18.07.2016.	2	DA046	Keri: SAD nemaju ulogu u organizaciji vojnog udara	*Kerry: The United States are not involved in organizing a military coup*
	18.07.2016.	2	DA047	Gulen: Postoje izgledi da je cijeli vojni puč insceniran	*Gulen: There are odds that the entire military coup was faked*
	18.07.2016.	2	DA048	U 85 000 džamija učene dove	*Prayers were done in 85,000 mosques*
	18.07.2016	2, 3	DA049	Erdogan lovi izdajnike	*Erdogan hunts traitors*
	18.07.2016	3	DA050	Sastanak Erdogan - Putin	*Erdogan - Putin meeting*
	18.07.2016.	4	DA051	Bili smo preplašeni, posebno tokom bombardovanja	*We were terrified, especially during the bombing*
	18.07.2016.	4	DA052	Erdoanova poruka bila je presudna	*Erdoan's message was crucial*
	18.07.2016.	5	DA053	Turska je položila ispit iz demokratije	*Turkey passed the democracy test*
3	18.07.2016.	5	DA054	Pokušaj puča bio je u potpunosti iznenađujući!	*The coup attempt was completely surprising!*
	18.07.2016.	5	DA055	Život u Turskoj ide svojim tokom	*Life in Turkey goes on its course*
	19.07.2016	3	DA056	Lov na ljude	*Hunt on people*
	19.07.2016.	5	DA057	Sudbinski je važno da Turska ostane stabilna	*It is crucially important that Turkey remains stable*
	19.07.2016.	6	DA058	Objavljen snimak napada na Erdoganov hotel	*A video of the attack on Erdogan's hotel was released*
4	19.07.2016.	6	DA059	Avioni čuvajnu Istanbul, napetost i dalje u zraku	*Airplanes guard Istanbul, the tension still in the air*

	19.07.2016.	7	DA060	Keri i Mogerini: Kazniti odgovorne ali se držati zakona	*Keri and Mogherini: Punish responsible ones and adhere to the law*
	19.07.2016	7	DA061	Han: Liste bile pripremljene	*Han: The lists were prepared*
	19.07.2016.	7	DA062	Ako uvedu smrtnu kaznu, ostaju bez pristupanja EU	*If they impose the death penalty, they will remain without EU accession*
	20.07.2016.	6, 7	DA063	Erdogan prijeti uvođenjem smrtne kazne, pršte smjene	*Erdogan is threatening by the imposition of the death penalty, dismisions are on the rise*
	20.07.2016.	6	DA064	Vraćanje smrtne kazne - kraj evropskih integracija	*Restoration of the death penalty - end of European integrations*
	20.07.2016.	6	DA065	Gulen: SAD me neće izručiti Turskoj	*Gulen: The US will not extradite me to Turkey*
	20.07.2016	7	DA066	Fakti	*Facts*
	20.07.2016.	8	DA067	Zašto se sukob iz Turske prenosi u BiH	*Why the Turkish conflict is being transmitted in B&H*
5	20.07.2016.	8	DA068	Ne dozvoliti da se frustracije iz Turske prenesu na BiH	*Don't let frustrations from Turkey to be transferred to BiH*
	21.07.2016.	6	DA069	Smijenjeno 50.000 ljudi zbog povezanosti s pokušajem puča	*50,000 people have been removed due to their connections to the coup attempt*
	21.07.2016.	6	DA070	Erginaj prenio Izetbegoviću pozdrave i zahvalnost	*Erginaj expressed greetings and gratitude to Izetbegovic*
6	21.07.2016.	7	DA071	Usluge u ljetovalištima na najvišem nivou	*Highest level of services at vacation resorts*
	22.07.2016.	6, 7	DA072	Erginaj: Borba protiv gulenovaca, "Bosna Sema": Tražimo zaštitu	*Erginaj: Fight against Gulenists, "Bosna Sema": We are asking for protection*
	22.07.2016.	6	DA073	Vukadinović: Ne smije biti lova na vještice	*Vukadinovic: There must not be hunting for witches*
	22.07.2016.	6, 7	DA074	Život ide svojim tokom, turisti nemaju problema	*Life goes on, tourists don't have problems*
7	22.07.2016.	7	DA075	Pučisti oborili ruski avion, pokušali izazvati rat?	*Putschists shoot down Russian plane, tried to provoke war?*
	23.07.2016.	3	DA076	MVP: Budite oprezni ako putujete u Tursku	*MVP: Be cautious if traveling to Turkey*
	23.07.2016	3	DA077	Turisti se mogu osjećati sigurno	*Tourists can feel safe*
8	23.07.2016	5	DA078	Proučena salla za šehide u	*Last salah for martyrs in*

	.			Turskoj	*Turkey*
	23.07.2016	(+) 3	DA079	Prijelomni trenuci	*Crucial moments*
	23.07.2016	(+) 6	DA080	Fotografija sedmice	*Photo of the week*
	23.07.2016	(+) 10	DA081	Nova Turska i njena revolucija	*New Turkey and its revolution*
	23.07.2016 .	(+) 11	DA082	Nikome se ne ponovoilo	*I hope it will never happen again*
	23.07.2016 .	(+) 14, 15	DA083	Podržati demokratski put Turske u EU	*Support to democratic EU integrations of Turkey*
	23.07.2016 .	(+) 14, 16	DA084	Mogu li se posljednja dešavanja u Turskoj odraziti na BiH?	*Can the latest developments in Turkey be reflected in BiH?*
9	24.07.2016 .	6, 7	DA085	Zatvorene institucije, poništeni pasoši, pučisti u pritvoru 30 dana	*Institutions closed, passports canceled, putschists in detention for 30 days*
	24.07.2016	6	DA086	Obama: nismo umiješani	*Obama: We are not involved*
	24.07.2016	7	DA087	Uhapšen Gulenov nećak	*Gulen's nephew was arrested*
	24.07.2016 .	(+) 11	DA088	Noć u kojoj je izvršen puč nikada neću zaboraviti	*I will never forget the night of coup*
10	25.07.2016 .	7	DA089	Erdogan: Ne zanima me šta govore evropski zvaničnici	*Erdogan: I don't care what European officials are saying*
11	26.07.2016 .	7	DA090	Izručenje Gulena ili narušavanje odnosa	*Extradition of Gulen or disturbance of relations*
	27.07.2016 .	5	DA091	Turska brani demokratiju, ne kršimo ljudska prava	*Turkey defends democracy, we do not violate human rights*
12	27.07.2016 .	6	DA092	Putin i Erdogan sastaju se 9. Avgusta	*Putin and Erdogan are meeting on 9 August*
	28.07.2016 .	2	DA093	Snažna podrška stabilizaciji prilika u Turskoj	*Strong support to stabilization of the situation in Turkey*
13	28.07.2016 .	7	DA094	Vlasti izdale nalog za pritvaranje 47 novinara	*Authorities issued an order to detain 47 journalists*
14	29.07.2016 .	6	DA095	Gulenova kuća bit će javni toilet	*Gulen's house will be a public toilet*
15	30.07.2016 .	6, 7	DA096	Odnosi Turske i SAD sve više zategnuti	*Relations between Turkey and the United States are increasingly strained*

	30.07.2016.	(+) 6,7	DA097	Sunovrat i preporod	*Downfall and rebirth*
16	31.07.2016.	7	DA098	Propada dogovor Brisela i Ankare	*The agreement of Brussels and Ankara fails*
	01.08.2016.	6, 7	DA099	Hiljade njemačkih Turaka uputile poruke podrške Redžepu Erdoganu	*Thousands of German Turks have sent messages of support to Recep Erdogan*
17	01.08.2016.	6	DA100	Kontrola nad vojskom	*Control over the army*
	02.08.2016.	7	DA101	Ankara traži objašnjenje u vezi sa zabranom govora	*Ankara is demanding for explanation on a speech ban*
18	02.08.2016.	7	DA102	Protest ispred Gulenovog imanja	*The protest in front of Gulen's property*
19	03.08.2016	6, 7	DA103	Pokušaj vojnog udara Tursku koštao 100 milijardi dolara	*Military coup attempt to cost Turkey $ 100 billion*
20	04.08.2016.	6,7	DA104	Erdogan: Scenarij za puč napisan vani	*Erdogan: A coup scenario was written abroad*
	05.08.2016.	6,8	DA105	Turska izdala nalog za hapšenje Fethullaha Gulena	*Turkey issues arrest warrant for Fethullah Gulen*
	05.08.2016.	7	DA106	Keri dolazi u posjetu	*Kerry comes to visit*
21	05.08.2016.	8	DA107	Zahvalnost narodu BiH	*Gratitude to the people of BiH*
22	06.08.2016.		/		
	07.08.2016.	11	DA108	Tragovi od metaka po zgradama podsjećaju na ratno Sarajevo	*Traces of bullets in the buildings are reminding of warlike Sarajevo*
23	07.08.2016.	11	DA109	Restrukturiranje radi spriječavanja udara	*Restructuring to prevent coup d'etat*
24	08.08.2016.		/		
25	09.08.2016.	6, 7	DA110	Kako će se susret Erdogana i Putina odraziti na region!?	*How will the meeting between Erdogan and Putin affect the region !?*
26	10.08.2016.	6, 7	DA111	Rusija i Turska otvaraju novu stranicu odnosa	*New chapter of Russia - Turkey relations*
	11.08.2016.	6	DA112	Jake veze s Moskvom	*Strong relations with Moscow*
27	11.08.2016.	7	DA113	Turski vojni oficir zatražio azil u Americi	*Turkish military officer requests asylum in America*
28	12.08.2016.	6	DA114	Turski vojni atašei pobjegli u Italiju	*Turkish military attaches fled to Italy*

	13.08.2016.	6, 7	DA115	Turski sud izdao nalog za hapšenje Hakana Šukura	*Turkish court issues arrest warrant for Hakan Shukur*
29	13.08.2016.	7	DA116	U bijegu 208 diplomata	*208 diplomats escaped*
30	14.08.2016.	7	DA117	Traže pritvor za Gulena	*Demanding the prison for Gulen*
31	15.08.2016.		/		

In the headlines of daily Dnevni avaz, the most prominent figure was Turkish president Recep Tayıp Erdoğan who is mentioned in 17 headlines. The second one is Fethullah Gulen, mentioned in 11 headlines. The coup attempt is genraly marked as negative event for the Turkey without directly labeling the guilty party, only with indirect accusations (eg. *Gulen: There are odds that the entire military coup was faked*, *Erdogan: A coup scenario was written abroad*, *A rebellion against democracy*, *The maturity exam*, *This was a perfidious plan of creating chaos*, *Defense of the state*, *Turkey passed the democracy test, Where is Turkey going?*, *Black days are coming for the state*, *Erdogan hunts traitors*). There is only one headline about the coup attempt victims, however Dnevni avaz payed more attention to the stories of people survived the coup (eg. *We won't give our state and Erdogan, We could not predict that the night would be bloody, A man from Pazar stopped the tank, We were terrified, especially during the bombing, I hope it will never happen again…).* Special attention was on reflection of the event on discourse in Bosnia and Herzegovina (*Cooperation of B&H and Turkey, Why the Turkish conflict is being transmitted in B&H, Don't let frustrations from Turkey to be transferred to BiH, Can the latest developments in Turkey be reflected in BiH?).*

7.1.2.3. Thematic orientation




Chart 2. Thematic orientation, Dnevni avaz

The two topics that attracted the most of Dnevni avaz attention are T8: The focus of news is on Turkish international relations and T4: The focus of news is on arrests of army officials, public figures or civilians related to FETO movement, which means that the newspaper was orientet towards the events that followed the coup attempt. Regarding the the topics of possible coup attempt organizer weren't in main focus of Dnevni avaz, but still the most prominent among them was involvement of pro-western factors (T5), while other two alternatives, a plot by Fethullah Gulen (T1) and a fake coup by Recep Tayıp Erdoğan (T2) were equally represented. Unlike in other newspapers, in Dnevni avaz the reaction of Turkish people (T3), was much more recognized and accepted as a positive act. These are also the topics that received the least attention in Dnevni Avaz, along with T10: The coup is end of Erdogan's era and good solution for Turkey.

7.1.2.4. Representation of social actors and macro-propositions

a. Coup attempt

The coup attempt is usually named as “military coup” and “faild coup attempt” (DA003, DA005, DA016, DA026, DA34, DA49, DA047, DA098, DA103…). However, Dnevni avaz had few oppinions on coup as “a plan of destabilization of Turkey” (DA057, DA021, DA013…). In few articles the newspaper suggested that the coup could lead to bigger and more bloody conflicts like war : “the danger of civil war and bloodshed” (DA010), “the biggest fear is that there will be an open conflict” (DA012), “it could lead to a civil war” (DA041), “inter-Muslim clash” (DA097).






2 aktuelno

HAOS Grupa unutar vojske pokušala izvršiti puč u armiji

Državni udar u Turskoj!

Bombe bačene na zgradu parlamenta u Ankari ● Ubijeno 17 policajaca u napadu iznad prijestonice oborio helikopter u kome su bili pobunjenici ● Gru

Blokirani mostovi

aktuelno 3

Premijer: Pobuna, a ne udar

i nasilno preuzeti vlast u zemlji

pučista na sjedište specijalnih snaga ● Vojni avion pa „Mir u zemlji" tvrdi da je preuzela vlast

Slouma lokacija

Pucali na građane

b. Turkish president Recep Tayıp Erdoğan

Dnevni avaz primarly named Turkish president Recep Tayıp Erdoğan as "democratically elected" (DA023, DA025, DA028, DA043, DA056, DA067, DA107, DA108…). His political power also was highlighted in several texts: "not only the leader of Turkey, but the leader of all Muslims" (DA008), "powerful turkish president" (DA054), "a high range politician" (DA057), "is responsible for everything, good or bad" (DA081). As to president's position in relation to military coup, he is represented as someone benefiting from the coup, but also capable to respond in such a situation: "received absolute support from citizens" (DA013), "the main kahriman" (DA015), "showed wisdom" (DA027), "the biggest winner" (DA036). "Erdoan's message was crucial" (DA052)….



c. Coup victims and Turkish citizens

In their reporting Dnevni avaz highlighted the importance of Turkish people during and after the coup attempt. It can even be noted in the headlines that the Turkish people have significant space in reporting this media. Some of headlines with Turkish people as dominant figures: “The people stopped the coup” (DA022), “We won't give our state and Erdogan” (DA008)... However, in some news Turkish citizens who reacted on the coup attempt are represented as violent and brutal: “have beaten and beheaded the soldier” (DA017). This information has never been verified as correct. The topic of victims wasn’t much prominent in Dnevni avaz either. Only in few texts the number of victims is mentioned. Differently from other newspapers Dnevni avaz had more photographs with people diying on the streets and generally pictures of the clash of people and army.



Građani obezglavili vojnika

Britanski “Independent” i drugi svjetski mediji prenose vijest da su okupljeni građani jučer na jednom od istanbulskih mostova nasmrt pretukli i obezglavili jednog od vojnika koji su učestvovali u pokušaju državnog udara.

Na fotografiji koja je objavljena na društvenim mrežama vidi se jedan od vojnika koji je obezglavljen. Također, na drugim fotografijama koje prenose svjetske agencije vide se građani dok tuku vojnike koji su se predali. Prije toga mediji su objavili šokantne snimke tenkova kojima su upravljali pobunjenici tokom puča, a koji su gazili preko ljudi, automobila i svega što im se našlo na putu.

Masa se brutalno obračunala s pobunjenicima



Više građana ranjeno: Borba za demokratiju







1. Uhapšeno i predalo se 2.839 pripadnika oružanih snaga: Istraga se proširuje i na pravosuđe
2. Turski narod branio slobodu na ulicama
3. Sandžaklija Suat Numanolu legao je pod tenk na aerodromu Ataturk ne dozvolivši mu da ide dalje
4. Slavlje Erdoanovih pristalica
5. Obračun s pučistima bio je brutalan (Foto: EPA i AFP)



d. Fethullah Gulen and arrested/accused plotters

In reportings of Dnevni avaz the coup plotters were most often named with macro-proportions such us: “a small group within the military” (DA003, DA008, DA010, DA020, DA021, DA022, DA027, DA033, DA037, DA039, DA051…). The conspirators are much less commonly named as a terrorist group. Two aspects of Fethullah Gulens personalitiy were dominant when Dnevni avaz reported on him. Firstly, he is represented as religious figure with macro-proposition such as: “preacher” (DAO16, DA046, DA066…), “religious leader” (DA023…). As second, in some news items Fethullah Gulen was represented as intellectual figure with macro-propositions: “scholar”, “Said Nursi follower”, “started dialog with other religious organizations”.




Zatvorenici čekaju suđenje za pokušaj prevrata


Gulen: Osnivač Gulenističkog pokreta

Ko je Fetulah Gulen



e. Republic of Turkey

Republic of Turkey is more often represented as instabile state than the state that has successfully overcomed the military coup attempt: “a serious whirl of instability” (DA010), “can not guarantee security”(DA014), “exposed to destabilization” (DA040), “Turkey supposed to be a democratic country” (DA011), “a state that was a model for the Muslim world” (DA012), “target for destabilization” (DA057). It is also named as friendly and brotherly state (DA002, DA004, DA093…), based on the long historical relations of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republic of Turkey. The great importance was also given to Turkish international relations as the most dominant topic in the coverage of Dnevni Avaz: “Turkey is in an important strategic position” (DN021, DN057…), “crucial partner of EU”, “an important ally of NATO” (DN024).

7.1.3. Nezavisne novine

7.1.3.1. Quantitative analysis and coveredge frequencies

Nezavisne novine started their reports on coup attempt two days after the coup occurred. This late involvement in the topic already shows the low interest in the event. In the first week of reporting (16. – 22.07.2016), Nezavisne novine shared nine news on coup attempt and in one month there was only 25 news items. The coveredge frequency is 0.8 news per day. Nezavisne novine published 261 sentences regarding the coup attempt and related topics. There were 39 photographs. The coup attempt was placed on front page only two times. In 31 analyzed days, on 11 days there wasn’t any news related to coup attempt.

7.1.3.2. News headlines

Table 4

News headlines, Nezavisne novine

Day	Date	Page No.	Text code	Text title in published language	Text title in English language
1, 2	16.-17.07.2016		/		
3	18.07.2016.	14, 15	NN001	Svilen gajtan o vratu pučista	*A silk hanging rope threatens the putschists*
	18.07.2016.	15	NN002	Svjetski lideri o Turskoj	*World leaders about Turkey*
4	19.07.2016.	6	NN003	Puč pokolebao turiste iz RS	*The coup discouraged tourists from RS*
	19.07.2016.	14, 15	NN004	Erdoganov puč?!	*Erdogan's coup?!*
5	20.07.2016.	15	NN005	Emine Erdogan, sultanija luksuza	*Emine Erdogan, a luxury sultan*
	20.07.2016.	15	NN006	Ankara traži Gulena	*Ankara is asking for Gulen*
6	21.07.2016.	14, 15	NN007	Religijska mobilizacija	*Religious mobilization*
	21.07.2016.	15	NN008	Dolazak u Rusiju	*Meeting in Russia*
7	22.07.2016.	14, 15	NN009	"Gorka turska kahfa" za neistomišljenike	*"Bitter Turkish coffee" for those with different mindsets*
8, 9	23.-24.07.2016.	14	NN010	Grci tvrde: Erdogan nije bio ugrožen	*The Greeks claiming: Erdogan was not threatened*
10	25.07.2016.	14, 15	NN011	Uhapšeno 13.000 ljudi, Erdogan ne planira stati	*13,000 people were arrested, Erdogan is not planning to stop*
11	26.07.2016.		/		
12	27.07.2016.	15	NN012	Recep Tayip Erdogan	*Recep Tayip Erdogan*
13	28.07.2016.		/		
14	29.07.2016.		/		
15	30.07.2016.		/		
16	31.07.2016.		/		
17	01.08.2016.	14	NN013	Dekret za konačni obračun	*Decree for final clash*
18	02.08.2016.	14	NN014	Turska ucijenila EU: Ukinite vize ili stižu milioni izbjeglica	*Turkey blackmails EU: Visas abolished or millions of refugees arriving*
		14	NN015	Konsultacije zbog Kelna	*Consultations for Cologne*

19	03.08.2016.	14	NN016	Vojni puč težak 100 milijardi dolara	*A military coup worth $ 100 billion*
20	04.08.2016.		/		
21	05.08.2016.		/		
22, 23	06.-07.08.2016	14	NN019	Erdogan: U puču sam dva puta izbjegao smrt	*Erdogan: I avoided death in the coup twice*
24	08.08.2016.	13	NN020	Erdogan: Ovo nije zadnji puč	*Erdogan: This is not last coup*
		13	NN021	Turska ne može u EU	*Turkey can not join EU*
25	09.08.2016.		/		
26	10.08.2016.	13	NN022	Ruka ruci i velika očekivanja	*Hand to hand and high expectations*
27	11.08.2016.	13	NN023	Zapad strahuje od nove ljubavi	*The West fears of new love*
28	12.08.2016.	14	NN024	Bijeg vojnih atašea u Italiju	*The escape of military attachés to Italy*
29, 30	13.-14.08.2016.	13	NN025	Gulen se vraća ako se optužbe potvrde	*Gulen returns if the charges are confirmed*
31	15.08.2016.		/		

In 25 publidhed headlines in Nezavisne novine, Turkish president Recep Tayıp Erdoğan was mentioned in five headlines and Fethullah Gulen in two. There was no much headlines regarding the coup background or organizator, only one with assuming it could be Turkish president Recep Tayıp Erdoğan (*Erdogan's coup?!).* The Nezavisne novine didn't have much interest in reporting about the coup attempt, in 10 out of 31 analyzed days there wasn't any hedlines about the coup attempt. However, the newspaper was more interested in Erdoğan's familiy. Therefore, the old story about the president's wife is actualized (*Emine Erdogan, a luxury sultan).* In their headlines Nezavisne novine used metaphors such as: *A silk hanging rope threatens the putschists* – this was the first published text and explains the reinstatement of the death penalty and possible killings of arrested coup plotters. *"Bitter Turkish coffee" for those with different mindsets* – also refers to punishment for government opponents. *The West fears of new love* – the words *new love* refers to meeting of Turkish president Recep Tayıp Erdoğan and Russian president Vladimir Putin. *Religious mobilization* – Turks taking the streets during the coup attempt and in days follows it, is described as religious mobilization by Turkish president.

7.1.3.3. Thematic orientation




Chart 3. Thematic orientation, Nezavisne novine

Out of total 25 news item, T6: The event is characterized as Erdoan's opportunity to defend his political opponents (the restitution of death penalty and/or change or constitution) was mentioned in 13 texts, that is half of published news. Regarding the coup organizers only the T2: The event is described as an overthrowing of president Recep Tayıp Erdogan or the coup setup by his government - fake coup, was mentioned in two news items, the T5: The coup is organized or supported by internal or external pro-western forces is mentioned in one news item, while the third alternative T1: The event is described as a coup attempt organized by Islamic cleric Fethulah Gülen and his movement FETO, wasn't discussed.

7.1.3.4. Representation of social actors and macro-propositions

a. Coup attempt

In the reports of Nezavisne novine, coup attempt had the "impresion of fake coup" (NN014), and it was "planned by the Turkish authorities" (NN004). Also, the newspapes shared the statements assuming that the coup could be ornized by pro-western forces: "CIA had involvement" (NN007).





b. Turkish president Recep Tayıp Erdoğan

The president Erdogan is representet with negative atributes such as: “vindictive, absurd, authoritarian, stubborn” (NN001). The macro-propositions such as: “worst of the Turkish leader is yet to come” (NN001) and “Erdogan is relentless” (NN013) were used to explain his attitude in after-coup days. In describing president’s reaction on the news about the coup, newapaper wrote that he was: “calm like a grave and with ash grayish face” (NN001). Regarding the attack on him during the coup attempt, it was firstly said that he “somehow managed to survive” (NN001), later, statements denying his life threatening, were published: “he was not in life danger” (NN010). However, newspaper also published Erdogan’s statements saying that he has “avoided death twice in the coup” (NN019). For Nezavisne novine other members of Erdogan family were also interesting. The newspaper published an old article about the “luxury living” of his wife (NN005).





c. Coup victims and Turkish citizens

People gathered on the streets of Istanubl are named as Erdogan supporters: "until yesterday, the supporters stayed on the streets" (NN001). They were also described as violent: "Islamists abuse citizens who do not support Erdogan" and "jihadists" (NN007). However, in the same text where they write about the luxury life of Erdogan's family, the newspaper compared the living standard of Turkish citizens saying that they "live on less than 3 pounds a day" (NN005). The number of those killed during the coup attempt is mentioned in one of the first reports in Nezavisne novine.





d. Fethullah Gulen and arrested/acused coup plotters

In the reporting of Nezavisne novine, the coup plotters are described with macro-propositions such as: “a few Turkish generals”, “minorities within the army and not the army themselves” (NN001). Fethullah Gulen is named as “an Islamic priest” and “preacher” (NN004, NN006, NN009, NN011, NN025).



Groblje izdajnika

Dok Turska razmišlja o ponovnom uvođenju smrtne kazne zbog optuženih za pokušaj puča, istanbulski gradonačelnik Kadir Topbas je odvojio poseban prostor za "ukop izdajnika", gdje će ljudi moći proklinjati odgovorne za puč.
"Urotnici ipak neće biti spaseni od pakla", kazao je Topbas.
Inače, religijske zajednice su odbile klanjati dženazu ubijenim pučistima.



Uhapšeno 13.000 ljudi, Erdoan ne planira stati

ANKARA - Turska je nakon neuspjelog pokušaja državnog udara uhapsila ukupno 13.000 ljudi.
Premijer te zemlje Binali Jildirim juče je rekao da je u Istanbulu uhapšeno 3.879 ljudi, u Ankari 2.734, u Izmiru 197, dok je u ostalim provincijama uhapšeno 6.192. Ukupno je uhapšeno 1.329 policajaca, 8.831 vojnik od kojih su 163 generali i admi-

e. Republic of Turkey

The newspaper prognosed a few negative developments for the Republic of Turkey to follow the faild coup attempt. Firstly, they looked back at the touristic potentials of Turkey and said that the state will be “eliminated as a tourist destination” (NN003). Before the joing rally of government and opposition, newspaper assumed that “when the opposition organizes its meetings and fills the streets, there will be new unrest” (NN007). And the third prognose about the future of Turkey is that the “Islamization of the country is possible” (NN007).

7.2. REPUBLIC OF CROATIA

Of the three countries analyzed, Republic of Croatia had the lowest interest in reporting on 2016 military coup attempt in Turkey. In 31 analyzed days and 93 editions of three daily newspaper there was 95 news items about the 2016 military coup attempt and related topics from Turkey. In three analyzed daily newspaper there was 208 photographs and the military coup related topics were in total only five times on front pages. The highest number of published news items, among the newspapers from Croatia had daily Jutarnji list (39), next one is Večernji list (36), while Slobodna Dalmacija had the least interest in developments in Turkey with only 28 published news items.

Table 5

Quantitaive results, Republic of Croatia

	Number of published news items	**Nuber of sentences**	**Number of pictures**	**Front page**
Jutarnji list	39	869	72	2
Večernji list	36	804	96	2
Slobodna Dalmacija	28	603	40	1
Total for Croatia	**95**	**2276**	**208**	**5**

7.2.1. Jutarnji list

7.2.1.1. Quantitative analysis and coveredge frequencies

During the first day of reporting (16.07.2016.), the Jutarnji list published only two news items. In the first week of reporting (16.-22.07.2016.) there was 20 news items published, which is more than half of total number of published news items for one month (16.07.-15.08.2016.) and that is 39. The coveredge frequency is 1.2 news items published per day. In 31 analyzed editions the total number of sentences is 869 and the longest text titled “That evening I was at a wedding in Istanbul. The shooting started...” (JL022), had 111 sentences. Jutarnji list published 72 pictures and coup related news were on their front page only two times. In 31 analyzed days there was ten days without any news related to faild coup attempt.

7.2.1.2. News headlines

Table 6

News headlines, Jutarnji list

Day	Date	Page No.	Text code	Text title in published language	Text title in English language
1	16.07.2016	18, 19	JL001	Udar u Turskoj, tenkovi na ulicama, odjekuju eksplozije, Erdogan u bijegu	*Coup in Turkey, tanks on the streets, explosion blast, Erdogan on the run*
	16.07.2016	18	JL002	Osam razloga za vojni puč i rušenje Turske vlasti	*Eight reasons for the military coup and the demise of the Turkish authorities*
2	17.07.2016	6	JL003	Srbija na granicu šalje vojsku zbog udara u Turskoj i izbjeglica	*Serbia sends troops to the border due to the coup in Turkey and refugees*
	17.07.2016	6, 7, 8	JL004	Pobuna izazvala pokolj	*The rebellion caused slaughter*
	17.07.2016	8	JL005	NATO i EU se zbog IS-a, izbjeglica i terorizma boje kaosa u Turskoj	*NATO and the EU are scared of the chaos in Turkey because of ISIL, refugees and terrorism*
	17.07.2016	9	JL006	Puč	*Coup d'etat*
	17.07.2016	9	JL007	Povijest vojnih udara	*History of military coups*
	17.07.2016	9	JL008	Puč je slomljen odlučnošću naših građana	*The coup is broken by the determination of our citizens*
	17.07.2016	10	JL009	Vojska nije htjela pucati na građane i tako je spasila demokraciju	*The army did not want to shoot people and thus save democracy*
	17.07.2016	10, 11	JL010	Turski prijatelji su mi rekli: požuri kući i ne izlazi više van	*My Turkish friends told me to go home quickly and to not get out anymore*
	17.07.2016	10	JL011	Kurdsko pitanje je jedan od razloga za izbijanje ovog puča	*The Kurdish issue is one of the reasons for the outbreak of this coup*
	17.07.2016	11	JL012	Erdogan je gasio internet, a sad ga je spasio app FaceTime	*Erdogan has shut down the Internet, and now he has been saved by the FaceTime app*
3	18.07.2016	16	JL013	Zapad složno Erdoganu:	*West appeals to*

				Prolijevanje krvi treba zaustaviti, puč nije bianco ček za izravnavanje računa	*Erdogan: Blood spill should be stopped, coup is not a blank check for account balancing*
	18.07.2016	17	JL014	Sve su izvjesnije sumnje da je Erdogan odobrio puč	*There is a growing suspicion that Erdogan approved the coup*
4	19.07.2016	16	JL015	Erdogan stalno traži krivce, a sad mu je glavna meta Gulen	*Erdogan is constantly searching for the guilty, and now his target is Gulen*
	19.07.2017	16, 17	JL016	Erdogan: Izglasa li parlament smrtnu kaznu koju naš narod traži, ja ću je objaviti	*Erdogan: If the parliament votes for the death sentence that our people seek, I will announce it*
5	20.07.2016	19	JL017	Turska vlada ne zna gdje joj je čak 14 ratnih brodova	*The Turkish government does not know where their 14 warships are*
6	21.07.2016	19	JL018	Pučist iz vojnog vrha: "Da, ja sam radio za Fehullaha Gulena"	*Coup plotter from the military top: "Yes, I worked for Fethullah Gulen"*
7	22.07.2016	18, 19	JL019	Istanbul nakon udara	*Istanbul after a coup d'etat*
	22.07.2016	19	JL020	Gulenovi pristaše na udaru i u BiH	*The Gulenians are under threat in Bosnia and Herzegovina*
8	23.07.2016	33, 34	JL021	Moj nećak pitao je baku: Babaanne, je li se nešto loše dogodilo Turskoj?	*My nephew asked his grandmother: Babaanne, did something bad happen to Turkey?*
	23.07.2016	35	JL022	Te večeri bio sam na svadbi u Istanbulu. Počeli su pucati...	*That evening I was at a wedding in Istanbul. The shooting started...*
9	24.07.2016	2	JL023	Turska traži da zatvore Gulenove škole u BiH	*Turkey is demanding to close Gulen's schools in Bosnia and Herzegovina*
10	25.07.2016		/		
11	26.07.2016	19	JL024	Vlasti izdale uhidbene naloge za 42 novinara	*The authorities issued arrest warrants for 42 journalists*
12	27.07.2016	18	JL025	Erdogan uhitio poznatu novinarku zbog Gulena	*Erdogan arrested a prominent journalist because of Gulen*
13	28.07.2016	19	JL026	Puč u Turskoj utjecat će na budućnost NATO-a	*The coup in Turkey will affect the future of*

					NATO
	28.07.2016	24	JL027	Zatvara se više od 100 medijskih organizacija	*More than 100 media organizations are closing*
14	29.07.2016	22	JL028	Velika čistka	*The big purge*
15	30.07.2016		/		
16	31.07.2016		/		
17	01.08.2016.	18,19	JL029	Skup u Kolnu: Čak 2300 policajaca pazilo da ne dođe do sukoba oko Erdogana	*Cologne rally: 2,300 police officers were taking care of preventing the clash about Erdogan*
18	02.08.2016.	19	JL030	Uhićeno 11 komandosa koji su trebali ščepati Erdogana	*Arrestment of 11 commandos that supposed to capture Erdogan*
19	03.08.2016.	19	JL031	Cijena vojnog puča čak 100 milijardi dolara	*The cost of a military coup is as high as $ 100 billion*
20	04.08.2016.		/		
21	05.08.2016.	19	JL032	Erdogan: Neka se suci iz Italije bave mafijom, a ne mojim sinom	*Erdogan: Let the Italian judges deal with the mafia, not my son*
22	06.08.2016.	18	JL033	Austrijski kancelar: Pregovore o članstvu Turske treba prekinuti	*Austrian Chancellor: Talks on Turkey's membership should be terminated*
	06.08.2016.	18	JL034	Nalog za uhićenje Fethullaha Gulena	*Warrant for the arrest of Fethullah Gulen*
23	07.08.2016.		/		
24	08.08.2016.	20, 21	JL035	Turski neprijatelj br. 1: Islamski propovjednik sada traži saveznike i u Vatikanu	*Turkish enemy no. 1: The Islamic preacher is now seeking allies in the Vatican as well*
	08.08.2016.	21	JL036	2,5 milijuna zastava za skup u Istanbulu	*2.5 million for the flag for the Istanbul rally*
25	09.08.2016.		/		
26	10.08.2016.	16,17	JL037	Susreo se car sa sultanom: Putin i Erdogan zajedno protiv Europe i Zapada	*Emperor meets Sultan: Putin and Erdogan together against Europe and the West*
27	11.08.2016.	16	JL038	Erdogana podržava 67 posto stanovništva	*Erdogan supported by 67 percent of the population*
28	12.08.2016.		/		
29	13.08.2016.		/		
30	14.08.2016.		/		
31	15.08.2016.		/		

For their headlines daily Jutarnji list used adjectives and macro-propositions with negative connotation such as: “tanks on the streets, explosion blast” (JL001), “rebellion caused slaughter” (JL004), “scared of the chaos in Turkey” (JL005), “Blood spill” (JL013), “The big purge” (JL028). In their first reports Jutarnji list was positive towards the coup attempt in Turkey, so they even published the text with headline “Eight reasons for the military coup and the dismise of the Turkish authorities”, which approves the military intervention in Turkey and justifies it as a fight against the Turkish government. Turkish president is the most prominent figure in the Jutarnji list headlines, mentioned 11 times. Most of the headlines had macro-propositions that are discrediting Turkish president: “Erdogan on the run” (JL001), “Erdogan has shut down the Internet” (JL012) “There is a growing suspicion that Erdogan approved the coup” (JL014) “Erdogan is constantly searching for the guilty” (JL015). There is one headline with macro-proposition disseminating the positive information on Turkish president, and that is that Erdogan is supported “by 67 percent of the population”. However, the text following the headline is still not so approving towards the president.

7.2.1.3. Thematic orientation




Chart 4. Thematic orientation, Jutarnji list

The most prominent topic in the reporting of Jutarnji list was T8: The focus of news is on Turkish international relations, which referes on relations of Turkey withs Western countries and its reestablished relations with Rusian president Vladimir Putin. The second one is T4: The focus of news is on arrests of army officials, public figures or civilians related to

FETO movement. Regarding the coup organizers, Fethullah Gulen is mentioned in only one news item as a possible coup organizer (T1), Turkish president Recep Tayıp Erdoğan is mentione three times (T2). The newspaper didn't discuss or shared statements assuming that there could be any involvement of pro-western forces (T5). The T10: The coup is end of Erdogan's era and good solution for Turkey (10) was promoted in three news items. This determines Jutarnji list as a media with pro-coup orientation.

7.2.1.4. Representation of social actors and macro-propositions

a. Coup attempt

The recorded macro-propositions from Jutarnji list are showing how this newspaper has reported on military coup attempt as an act of confronting the Islamic structures and Islamic identity of Turkey and Turkish people: "the army has surrounded Islamic institutions" (JL001), "the last resistance to Islamization and dictatorship" (JL015). The Jutarnji list also reported how the leader of the coup is, in that time, Cheif of General Staff Gen. Hulusi Akar: "the rebel of army is led by Hulusi Akar" (JL001) which is a folse information.



b. Turkish president Recep Tayıp Erdoğan

The Jutarnji list reported on Turkish president in the way that the focus of event is transmited from the defence of nation and state to the president's personal interests. The

statement of Turkish president calling on the unity and defence of the state is published as he called on Turkish citizens to "stand in front of tanks and keep him in power" (JL001), and the possible reason of the coup is that the president "wanted to increase his presidential powers" (JL002). According to Jutarnji list, during the first moments of the coup attempt, Turkish president has "already asked for asylum in Germany" (JL001). In describing president Jutarnji list used pejorative and even insulting adjectives and macro-structures: "an enemy of social networks" (JL012), "brutal and deprived of civilization manners" (JL015), has a "totalitarian character" (JL005). He is also: "suspected of approving the coup" (JL014). Regarding the inretnational relations Erdogan "has more voters in Germany than in Turkey" (JL029), and his reconciliation with Putin is described as "Erdogan and Putin couple in love" (JL037). Erdogan and Gulen are described as former friends and former allys, but also as the "two roosters" that managed to "destroy Kemalism together" (JL035).

c. Coup victims and Turkish citizens

There was no any significant mentioning of victims except the news published one day after the coup, reporting the death toll: "at least 265 people died" (JL004). Turkish people are generally represented as the "faithful president's followers" (JL021). There are also macro-propositions showing Turkish people as violent and vindictive: "cut a throat to one soldier" (JL021), "young soldiers cried while crowd shouted Allahu ekber" (JL021) – the sentence explains the moment when the crowd had stoped the tenks on the one of Istanbul's bridges. The "young soldires" in this sentence refears to coup plotters being forced to surrend at the moment.

d. ***Fethullah Gulen and arrested/acused coup plotters***

Fethullah Gules is usually described as "Erdoan's former ally" and "Erdoan's enemy (JL026, JL027, JL004…) "priest" (JL014, JL034, JL016…), "sincere humanists (JL015…) and as an "Islamist leader" (JL022…). However, some macro-propositions with more negative adjectives were used: "intolerant and violent" (JL035). According to Jutarnji list the coup plotters were led by the Cheif of General Staff Gen. Hulusi Akar: "the rebel of army is led by Hulusi Akar! (JL001). The junta was a "substantive part of the army" (JL001). The coup plottes are often represented as victims of Turkish people: "young soldiers cried while crowd shouted Allahu ekber" (JL021) and as the group in army that is "left without political support" (JL004). Since they faild in military coup attempt, Jutarnji list named them "the clumsy putschists" (JL038).

e. Republic of Turkey

In the reporting of Jutarnji list Republic of Turkey is uslualy mentioned as the "an important NATO member" (JL005, JL026…). Algthoug the calming of situation was mentioned (JL008, JL019, JL017…) Turkey is still described from the religious perspective: "strong islamization of state" (JL002), "Muslim fundamentalist battlefield" (JL035).

7.2.2. Večernji list

7.2.2.1. Quantitativ analysis and coveredge frequencies

During the first day of reporting (16.07.2016.) Večernji list published only two news items. Almost two thirds of the total number of news items were published in the first week of reporting (16. – 22.07.2016), that is 23 news out of 36 published in one month (16.07.-15.08.2016.) in 31 Večernji list editions. The coveredge frequency is 1,1 news per day. The total number of sentences is 804. Večernji list had the highest number of published photographs among the newspapers from Croatia, 96 in total. The coup attempt relatet news were on the frot page for two times. Out of 31 analyzed days/editions, in 15 days/editions there was no any news related to coup attempt, its background or consequences which shows low interest of Večernji list in the analyzed event.

7.2.2.2. News headlines

Table 7

News headlines, Večernji list

Day	Date	Page No.	Text code	Text title in published language	Text title in English language
1	16.07.2016	2, 3	VL001	Erdogan se pokušava domoći Njemačke i zatražiti azil	*Erdogan is trying to break through to Germany and seek for asylum*
	16.07.2016	3	VL002	Twiter otvoren - Erdogana više nema	*Twitter opened - no more Erdogan*
2	17.07.2016	3	VL003	Mobitel i oporba spasili Erdogana	*Mobile phone and opposition rescued Erdogan*
	17.07.2016	4	VL004	Ataturk je naciju ujedinio, Erdogan ju je podijelio	*Ataturk united the nation, Erdogan divided it*
	17.07.2016	5	VL005	Erdoganov neprijatelj broj 1 Gulen miljenik je Zapada	*Erdogan's enemy no. 1 Gulen, a favorite of the West*
	17.07.2016	6	VL006	Srbija šalje vojsku, Bugarska zatvorila granicu s Turskom	*Serbia sends army, Bulgaria closed the border with Turkey*
	17.07.2016	6	VL007	Kovač: Podržavamo vlast, ne putujte u Tursku	*Kovač: We support the government, do not travel to Turkey*
	17.07.2016	6	VL008	"Narod je spriječio udar u jedinstvu i solidarnosti"	*"The People Prevented the Coup in Unity and Solidarity"*
	17.07.2016	6	VL009	Niko od građana BiH nije se želio vratiti iz Turske	*None of the citizens of BiH wanted to return from Turkey*
	17.07.2016	6	VL010	Dokazi o umješanosti	*Evidence of involvement*
3	18.07.2016	6, 7	VL011	Erdogan osvetnik na udaru EU: Prestanite sa čistkama!	*EU on the avenger Erdogan: Stop the purges!*
	18.07.2016	7	VL012	Hrvatska je spremna podići ograde na graničnim prijelazima	*Croatia is ready to close the border crossings*
	18.07.2016	7	VL013	Tri moguća scenarija tko je izveo puč	*Three possible scenarios of who made the coup*
	18.07.2016	18	VL014	Propali puč kao nagovještaj Erdoganove samovlasti?	*The faild coup as a hint of Erdogan's self-governance?*
4	19.07.2016	16	VL015	Erdogan u 48 sati uhitio ili smijenio 20 000 ljudi	*Erdogan arrested or dismissed 20,000 people*

					in 48 hours
	19.07.2016	16	VL016	U Turskoj ste na pogrešnoj strani, Obama i Merkel	*In Turkey, you are on the wrong side, Obama and Merkel*
	19.07.2016		VL017	Pučem i vanjskom politikom Erdogan pokušava prevariti svijet	*By the coup and by foreign policy, Erdogan is trying to deceive the world*
	19.07.2016	26, 27	VL018	Erdogan kontrolira drugu najveću vojsku NATO-a	*Erdogan controls the second largest army in NATO*
5	20.07.2016	16, 17	VL019	Turska i smrtna kazna: Diljem su svijeta lani smaknute 1634 osobe	*Turkey and the death penalty: around the world 1634 people were executed last year*
	20.07.2016	16	VL020	"Zatvorite sve škole izdajnika Gulena u BiH"	*"Close all the Gulen traitor's schools in BiH"*
6	21.07.2016	14	VL021	Smrtna kazna put je u građanski rat i kaos	*The death penalty is a path to civil war and chaos*
7	22.07.2016	14	VL022	Gradonačelnik Istanbula: Otvorit ćemo novo groblje samo za izdajnike	*Mayor of Istanbul: We will open a new cemetery for traitors only*
	22.07.2016	15	VL023	Trump: Čestitam Erdoganu kako je uspio preokrenuti stvari nakon puča	*Trump: I congratulate Erdogan on how he managed to reverse things after the coup*
8	23.07.2016	28, 29, 30	VL024	Erdogana kao novog sultana i mesiju slijedi samo Bakir Izetbegović	*Only Bakir Izetbegovic follows Erdogan as a new Sultan and Messiah*
9	24.07.2016	38, 39, 40	VL025	Tayyip Erdogan	*Tayyip Erdogan*
10	25.07.2016		/		
11	26.07.2016		VL026	Turska - u zatvorima siluju vojnike, uhićena 42 novinara	*Turkey - soldiers raped in prisons, 42 journalists arrested*
	26.07.2016	19	VL027	Zašto Erdogan društvo čisti od onih koji su bili njegovi saveznici	*Why does Erdogan cleanse society from those who were his allies*
12	27.07.2016	24, 25	VL028	Gulen će ipak ostati u Americi	*Gulen will still stay in America*
13	28.07.2016		/		
14	29.07.2016		/		
15	30.07.2016		/		
16	31.07.2016		/		
17	01.08.2016.	14	VL029	Erdogan prosvjedima pristaša želi destabilizirati i Njemačku	*With protests of his supporters, Erdogan wants to destabilize*

					Germany as well
	01.08.2016.	14	VL030	Erdogan kontrolira vojsku i obavještajnu službu	*Erdogan controls the military and intelligence*
18	02.08.2016.	15	VL031	Novi Migrantski val U Europu preko Turske u listopadu	*New Migrant Wave To Europe via Turkey in October*
	02.08.2016.	15	VL032	Erdogan: Naš cilj je da umremo kao mučenici	*Erdogan: Our goal is to die as martyrs*
19	03.08.2016.		/		
20	04.08.2016.		/		
21	05.08.2016.		/		
22	06.08.2016.		/		
23	07.08.2016.		/		
24	08.08.2016.	14	VL033	Beč: Mi ćemo zaustaviti Erdogana	*Vienna: We will stop Erdogan*
25	09.08.2016	20	VL034	Čak 80 posto Turaka traže od vlasti da uvede smrtnu kaznu	*As many as 80 percent of Turks ask the authorities to impose the death penalty*
26	10.08.2016.	14	VL035	Pakt Erdogan-Putin protiv Amerike i Europske unije	*Erdogan-Putin Pact v. America and European Union*
	10.08.2016.	15	VL036	Sviđaju mi se Gulenove ideje i pogled na svijet	*I like Gulen's ideas and the way he views the world*
27	11.08.2016.		/		
28	12.08.2016.		/		
29	13.08.2016.		/		
30	14.08.2016.		/		
31	15.08.2016.		/		

According to words that the newspaper have selected for their headlines, the main topic in their reports were the actions and reactions of Turkish president Recep Tayip Erdogan. President't surname Erdogan is mentioned in even 19 headlines which direcly shows that the main orientation of newspaper was the president himself. Some headlines had even pointed out some folse information: "Erdogan is trying to break through to Germany and seek for asylum" (VL001), "Twitter opened - no more Erdogan" (VL002). Also, some assumed president's intentions were expressed in headlines: "The faild coup as a hint of Erdogan's self-governance?" (VL014), "Erdogan Erdogan is trying to deceive the world" (VL017), Erdogan wants to destabilize Germany as well (VL029). The nameings for president used in headlines are: "the avenger" (VL011) and "a new Sultan and Messiah" (VL024).

Fethullah Gulen is mentioned in only four headlines, arrested or accused coup plotters in only three. Coup victims are not mentioned in any of Večernji list headlines.

7.2.2.3. Thematic orientation




Chart 5. Thematic orientation, Večernji list

The Večernji list has started their reports with focus on T10: The coup is end of Erdogan's era and good solution for Turkey, however as it was concluded that the military intervention faild, the newspaper changed their focus to T6: The event is characterized as Erdoan's opportunity to defend his political opponents (the restitution of death penalty and/or change or constitution). This topic is mentioned in 16 news items and is the most prominent topis in reporting of Večernji list. Same as the headline analysis, thematic orientation also explains that the newspaper had the most interest in reporting about Turkish president, while topics including coup plotters or coup victims were left out.

7.2.2.4. Representation of social actors and macro-propositions

a. Coup attempt

In the first news about the military intervention, the coup was glorified since it was assumed that it was a succssfull military coup. Večernji list descrided coup as “a step towards stabilization of the region” (VL001), and explained that its intention was to “restore the constitutional order, respect for human rights and freedoms, the rule of law and general security” (VL002). However, as soon as it was clear that the coup is faild, it was concluded that it “will destabilize and divide society” (VL003). In further explanation of what caused a failor of the coup Večernji list explained it with macro-propositions such as: “ it was not secular enough” (VL004), “it was desperate act and the last kick of the Kemalist ideology” (VL014), “clumsily performed and trivial” (VL017).



b. Turkish president Recep Tayıp Erdoğan

Dominantly negativ representaion of Turkish president is evident through following macro-propositions: “today's ISIS would not exist without Erdogan” (VL001), “now already former presiden” (VL002), “He does not control anything more and has no power” (VL002), “mentally deep in the past” (VL004), “he broke the nation” (VL004), “real avenger” (VL011), “is increasingly showing the desire for revenge” (VL015).

c. Coup victims and Turkish citizens

The number of people killed during the coup attempt is published two day after the coup occurred, when it was clear that it faild: “almost 300 died” (VL003). Among all the topics regarding the coup attempt the coup victims is one of the least covered topics.

Tukish people are described with macro-proportions such as: “Erdogan's supporters that are stil on the sreets shouting "Allahu ekber"” (VL015), “the most radical Islamists” (VL021).

d. Fethullah Gulen and arrested/acused coup plotters

In the first reports, simiraly to coup attempt, the coup plotter are also glorified and considered that they are doing the right thing. According to Večernji list, the junta consisted of “the core of the army faithful to the republic and its traditions” (VL002) which points out that the coup is secular in nature and combating the religious identity of Turkey. Fethullah Gulen is named sad the “Turkish cleric and dissident”, “more radical than Erdogan” (VL004), “Erdogan's anemy number 1” (VL020, VL028)

e. Republic of Turkey

General discourse on Turkey in the reporting of Večernji list leaves the impression that Turkey is an instabile state with growing religious and safety issues. It is represented as the state that “gives support to Islamists” (VL001) with even more direc macro-propositions: “we don't recommend traveling to Turkey” (VL007), “Is there anything democratic in today's Turkey?” (VL016), “In Turkey, madness dominated” (VL021).

7.2.3. Slobodna Dalmacija

7.2.3.1. Quantitative analysis and coveredge frequencies

In 31 analyzed editions, the coup related news took place in only 10. In 21 editions there wasn’t any news related to coup attempt which clearly shows the lach of interest in coup attempt in Turkey. Slobodna Dalmacija started their reports on coup attempt two days after the coup occurred (17.07.2016.). Therefore, on the first day of event there wasn’t any news about the coup attempt. The two thirds of published news, exact 19 news articles, are taking

place in first week of reporting (16. – 22.07.2016). The total number of news for one month (16.07.2016. – 15.08.2016.) is 28. The coveredge frequency is 0.9 news per day. Nezavisne novine published 603 sentences regarding the coup attempt and related topics. There were 40 photographs and the coup attempt was placed on front page only once.

7.2.3.2. News headlines

Table 8

News headlines, Slobodna Dalmacija

Day	Date	Page No.	Text code	Text headline in published language	Text headline in English language
1	16.07.2016.		/		
2	17.07.2016.	2, 3	SD001	Traljavi puč spasio je uzdrmanog Erdogana	*The clumsy coup rescued the upsetted Erdogan*
	17.07.2016.	3	SD002	Poruka Hrvatima: Ostanite u hotelima	*Message to the Croats: Stay in hotels*
	17.07.2016.	3	SD003	Od saveznika do zakletog neprijatelja	*From an ally to the greatest enemy*
	17.07.2016.	3	SD004	S Bospora prijeti tempirana bomba	*The timed bomb threats from the Bosphorus*
	17.07.2016.	4	SD005	Puč je skršen - mobitelom	*The coup is broken - by cell phone*
	17.07.2016.	4	SD006	Erdoganovi grijesi	*Erdogan's sins*
	17.07.2016.	4, 5	SD007	Turska će izgubiti 15 miliona $	*Turkey will lose $ 15 million*
	17.07.2016.	4, 5	SD008	Bomba je eksplodirala 500 metara od moje žene i kćerkice	*The bomb exploded 500 meters from my wife and daughter*
	17.07.2016.	5	SD009	Iz Istanbula se ne leti, zračne luke su blokirane	*There is no flight from Istanbul, the airports are blocked*
3	18.07.2016.	12, 13	SD010	Erdogan Veličanstveni napada prvi	*Erdogan, the magnificent, attacks first*
	18.07.2016.	12, 13	SD011	Turska ljuta na Ameriku	*Turkey is mad at America*
4	19.07.2016.	10, 11	SD012	Suci moraju slušati sultana	*Judges must listen to the sultan*
	19.07.2016.	11	SD013	Postupa kao Hitler	*He acts like Hitler*
5	20.07.2016.	12	SD014	Potpora Erdoganu	*Support to Erdogan*
	20.07.2016.	12, 13	SD015	Erdogan zaigrao ruski rulet	*Erdogan played Russian roulette*
	20.07.2016.	12, 13	SD016	Masovne čistke	*The greatest mass*

				nezapamćene još od Staljina	*purges since Stalin*
6	21.07.2016.		/		
7	22.07.2016.	10	SD017	Putin je spasio Erdoganu glavu	*Putin saved Erdogan's head*
	22.07.2016.	10	SD018	BiH se podijelila zbog Turske	*B&H divedes because of Turkey*
8	23.07.2016.	6	SD019	Poziv na linč roditelja čija djeca pohađaju Gulenove škole	*A call for lynch of a parent whose children are attending Gulen's schools*
	23.07.2016.	10	SD020	Zadnja pošta Turska	*Last post Turkey*
	23.07.2016.	11	SD021	Erdoganova rukavica Zapadu	*Erdogan's glove to the West*
	23.07.2016.	29	SD022	Mi smo protiv vojnog udara, ljudi danas slave na ulicama	*We are against the military coup, people are celebrating in the streets today*
9	24.07.2016.	4	SD023	Erdogan zatvara sve, pa i škole	*Erdogan closes everything, even schools*
10	25.07.2016.		/		
11	26.07.2016.		/		
12	27.07.2016.		/		
13	28.07.2016.	4	SD024	Pronašli smo Gulenovu školu u Zagrebu	*We found Gulen's school in Zagreb*
14	29.07.2016.		SD025	Škola nije Gulenova ali nauk mi se sviđa	*The school is not Gulen's, but I do like his teachings*
	30.07.2016.	3	SD026	Erdogan se sada oslanja na Kemaliste	*Erdogan relies on Kemalists*
15	30.07.2016.	3	SD027	Turska postaje velika prijetnja Europi	*Turkey becomes a great threat to Europe*
16	31.07.2016.		/		
17	01.08.2016.		/		
18	02.08.2016		/		
19	03.08.2016.		/		
20	04.08.2016.		/		
21	05.08.2016.		/		
22	06.08.2016.		/		
23	07.08.2016.		/		
24	08.08.2016.		/		
25	09.08.2016.		/		
26	10.08.2016.		/		
27	11.08.2016.		/		
28	12.08.2016.		/		
29	13.08.2016.	37	SD028	Erdogan ga vjenčao a sada ga želi uhititi	*Erdogan was at his wedding and now wants to arrest him*
30	14.08.2016.		/		

31	15.08.2016.		/		

The Slobodna Dalmacija headlines are reflecting the newspapers interest in reporting the coup. The most inretesting topic for Slobodna Dalmacija is Turkish president who is mentioned in nine headlines. In some headlines we can notice the use od metaphors that are explaining the representation of Turkish president but coup attempt as well: “The timed bomb threats from the Bosphorus” (SD004), “He acts like Hitler” (SD013), “Erdogan played Russian roulette” (SD015), “The greatest mass purges since Stalin” (SD016).

7.2.3.3. Thematic orientation




Chart 6. Thematic orientation, Slobodna Dalmacija

Slobodna Dalmacija focused its reports on the T4: The focus of news is on arrests of army officials, public figures or civilians related to FETO movement, and also on the T6: The event is characterized as Erdoan's opportunity to defend his political opponents (the restitution of death penalty and/or change or constitution). The low interest in reporting the coup attempt reflected the prominence of the topics as well. There wan no reports on the gatherings and meetings occurred after the coup attempt. The topics of coup background and organizers are also left out, except two news item where is mentioned that the coup “could be simulated” by Turkish president as the possible organizer (SD013, SD010).

7.2.3.4. Representation of social actors and macro-propositions

a. Coup attempt

Coup attempt is named as "the period of chaos, violence and death" (SD001), "coup attempt that caused chaos in stete" (SD008). The suspicions that the coup was fake and planed by Turkish president were also present in the Slobodna Dalmacija reports: "could be simulated" (SD013, SD010). After the coup failed it is called the "clamsy coup attempt" (SD016), but also as the "career opportunity" (SD026) fot the officers of lower rank.



b. Turkish president Recep Tayıp Erdoğan

In the reporting of Slobodna Dalmacija Turkish president is only figure that is characterized as the possible coup organaizer. The newspaper argued that "in this way he removed the identified enemies (SD001), and "becomes even more authoritarian" (SD010, SD027). Erdogan is also named as the "sultan from Bosphorus" (SD010, SD012, SD020, SD021), and was compared with Adolf Hitler, a man responsible for the terrifying deaths of millions: "acts similarly as Hitler" (SD013).

c. Coup victims and Turkish citizens

There was only one information on deth toll, two days after the coup: "161 person died" (SD001). The only thing said about Turkish people is that they are "not satisfied in Turkey" (SD005).

d. Fethullah Gulen and arrested/accused coup plotters

Fethullah Gulen is represented as the leader of Islamic movement that has millions of followers around the world (SD003, SD005, SD0010). It is interesting that in one text it is stated how "Gulen offers a secular state" (SD006), meaning that in comparing to what current Turkish government together with Erdogan is offering, Gulen could be a better solution for Turkey. Also, Gulen's religious side is pointed out, naming him as the "spiritual leader" (SD018, SD019), "preacher" "(SD010).

e. The Republic of Turkey

Slobodna Dalmacija shared the statement of the Croatia's president saying that "Croatia supports the democratically elected Turkish authorities" (SD002). However, in their further reports Turkey is rather recognized the state with increasing Islamization not democracy, and as a state that "supports suspicious armed groups" (SD006). The newspaper clearly distinguished Turkey from the European countries with macro-propositions explaining Turkey as: "state of emergency in Turkey is not as state of emergency in France" (SD021), "exporter of instability in Europe" (SD010), "Turkey becomes a society of fear" (SD027).

7.3. THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA

In 31 analyzed day and 93 editions of three daily newspaper there was 188 news items about the 2016 military coup attempt and related topics from Turkey. According to number of published items Serbian didn't have the highest rate, however newspapers from Serbia had the highest number of published sentences, 2968. Together with 188 news itesm, 160 photographs were published and the military coup related topics were in total 19 times on front pages of three analyzed newspapers. Večernje novosti had the highest number of published news items – 80, next one is Politika - 65, while daily Danas had the least interest in developments in Turkey with only 28 published news items.

Tablo 9

Quantitative results, Republic of Serbia

	Number of published news items	Nuber of sentences	Number of pictures	Front page
Večernje novosti	80	1340	90	4
Danas	43	651	33	4
Politika	65	997	37	11
Total for Serbia	**188**	**2968**	**160**	**19**

7.3.1. Večernje novosti

7.3.1.1. Quantitative analysis and coveredge frequencies

Among the three analyzed newspapers from Serbia, Večernje novosti had the highest number of published news items. On the first day of reporting (16.07.2016) Večernje novosti published nine news and during the first week (16. – 22.07.2016) there was 48 news about the coup attempt, wich is half of total number of published news. In one month's period (16.07. – 15.08.2016.) and 31 analyzed issues Večernje novosti published 80 news. The coveredge frequeny is 2,5 news per day. Večernje novosti had 1340 sentences and 90 pictures. The coup related news was on the front page four times. In 31 analyzed days, only on five days there wasn't any news about the coup attempt.

7.3.1.2. News headlines

Table 10

News headlines, Večernje novosti

Day	Date	Page No.	Text code	Text headline in published language	Text headline in English language
1	16.7.2016.	8, 9	VN001	Vojska preuzela vlast u Turskoj	*The army took power in Turkey*
	16.7.2016.	8	VN002	Nećemo dozvoliti ugrožavanje demokratije	*We will not allow the threat to democracy*
	16.7.2016.	8	VN003	Helikopteri napali sedište policije	*Helicopters attacked the police headquarters*
	16.7.2016.	8	VN004	Vojni udari već potresali Anakaru	*Military strikes were already taking place in Ankara*
	16.7.2016.	9	VN005	Ne može se reći da li je uspeo udar	*It is not clear was the coup successful*
	16.7.2016.	9	VN006	EU: Uzdržanost	*EU: Restrained*
	16.7.2016.	9	VN007	Gulen uz pučiste	*Gulen with putschists*
	16.7.2016.	9	VN008	Obama pozvao da se podrži Erdogan	*Obama calls for Erdogan support*
	16.7.2016.	9	VN009	Rusi zabrinuti	*The Russians are worried*
2	17.7.2016.	2, 3	VN010	Erdoğan jači od puča vojske, sledi "čišćenje" protivnika	*Erdoğan is stronger than a military coup, "cleansing" of the opponent begins*
	17.7.2016.	2	VN011	Bivši prijatelj, sada smrtni neprijatelj	*Former friends, now mortal enemies*
	17.7.2016.	3	VN012	Od zatvora do bijele palate	*From jail to white palace*
	17.7.2016.	3	VN013	Svi pučevi	*All the coups*
	17.7.2016.	3	VN014	Za svet stabilnost Turske najvažnija	*For the world, the stability of Turkey is the most important*
	17.7.2016.	3	VN015	Emina Jahović ostala u šoku	*Emina Jahovic was shocked*
	17.7.2016.	4	VN016	Planovi i pare jači od straha	*Plans and money are stronger than fear*
	17.7.2016.	4	VN017	Agencije ne vraćaju novac za aranžmane	*Agencies do not return money for arrangements*
	17.7.2016.	4	VN018	Scenario za poraz sekularne države	*Scenario for the defeat of a secular state*
	17.7.2016.	4	VN019	Pučisti potpomognuti spolja	*Plotters were supported from the outside*
	17.7.2016.	8	VN020	Sikter, bre!	*Sikter, bre!*
3	18.7.2016.	8	VN021	Naše kamijondžije idu za Istanbul	*Our trucks go to Istanbul*

	18.7.2016.	8	VN022	Putin čeka informacije	*Putin is waiting for information*
	18.7.2016.	8	VN023	Pucnjava na aerodromu	*Shooting at the airport*
	18.7.2016.	8	VN024	Uhapšeni pučisti	*Putschists arrested*
	18.7.2016.	8	VN025	Erdogan traži glavu Gulena	*Erdogan asks for Gulen's head*
	18.7.2016.	8	VN026	Druga po snazi NATO armija puna problema	*The second most powerful NATO army is full of problems*
	18.7.2016.	9	VN027	U Turskoj je bilo jezivo	*It was horrible in Turkey*
	18.7.2016.	16	VN028	Lažni puč u Turskoj	*Fake coup d'etat in Turkey*
4	19.7.2016.	8, 9	VN029	Da li Erdogan šalje pučiste na streljanje	*Does Erdogan ordering shooting of putschists?*
	19.7.2016.	8	VN030	Ljuti i Brisel i Vašington	*Brussels and Washington are angry*
	19.7.2016.	9	VN031	Konzul Marković: Život ide u normal	*Consul Markovic: Life goes back to normal*
	19.7.2016.	9	VN032	Sead Ozturk: Ništa kao što je bilo	*Sead Ozturk: Nothing is as it used to be*
	19.7.2016.	9	VN033	Letovanje jače i od puča	*The holiday is stronger than the coup*
	19.7.2016.	9	VN034	Ove čistke su bez kraja	*These purges are endless*
5	20.07.2016.	8	VN035	Erdogan traži Gulena od Amerike	*Erdogan wants Gulen from America*
	20.07.2016.	8	VN036	Fetulahdžije organizovale puč	*The coup was organized by Gulenists*
	20.07.2016.	9	VN037	Propovednik ili agent CIA	*Preacher or CIA agent*
6	21.07.2016.	8, 9	VN038	Narod na ulici čuva državu i Erdogana	*People on the street guard the state and Erdogan*
	21.07.2016.	9	VN039	Optužnica za 99 generala	*Indictment for 99 generals*
	21.07.2016.	9	VN040	Vanredno stanje i zvanično	*Official state of emergency*
	21.07.2016.	9	VN041	U avgustu Erdogan u Rusiji	*Erdogan in Russia in August*
	21.07.2016.	9	VN042	Ima neka tajna veza	*There is some secret connection*
7	22.07.2016.	10	VN043	Samo mi ne diraj zastavu, zemlju i ženu	*Don't touch my flag, country and wife*
	22.07.2016.	10	VN044	Agencije dužne da vrate deo novca	*Agencies are obliged to return a part of the money*
	22.07.2016.	10	VN045	Avioni "Er Srbija" po redu letenja	*"Air Serbia" airplanes on regular flights*
	22.07.2016.	11	VN046	Erdogan vlada dekretima	*Erdogan rules with decrees*
	22.07.2016.	11	VN047	Odkuka pilota	*Pilot's decision*
	22.07.201	11	VN048	Uslovna kazna	*Conditional sentence*

	6.				
8	23.07.2016.	8, 9	VN049	U zatvoru se ne budi novo jutro	*There is no new sunrise in prison*
	23.07.2016.	8	VN050	Rusi ne veruju u turske priče	*Russians don't believe in Turkish stories*
	23.07.2016.	8, 9	VN051	Letovanje uz vanredno stanje	*Vacation with state of emergency*
	23.07.2016	9	VN052	Ankara ignoriše Brisel	*Ankara ignores Brussels*
9	24.07.2016.	10	VN053	Izlazi li Turska iz NATO?	*Is Turkey leaving NATO?*
	24.07.2016.	11	VN054	Gase se i mnoge škole	*Many schools are also being closed*
	24.07.2016.	11	VN055	Na pragu velikog sukoba	*At the threshold of a major conflict*
10	25.07.2016.	9	VN056	Turska u znaku dobre volje	*Turkey with a sign of goodwill*
	25.07.2016.	9	VN057	Požar kod NATO baze u Izmiru	*Fire next to the NATO base in Izmir*
	25.07.2016.	9	VN058	Tražili pa se predomislili	*Requested, then have changed their minds*
	25.07.2016.	9	VN059	Hapšenja se nastavljaju	*Arrests continue*
11	26.07.2016.	9	VN060	Nazad ambasadori	*Refusal of the ambassadors*
	26.07.2016.	16	VN061	Preti li atomski terorizam	*Does the atomic terrorism threatenes*
12	27.07.2016.	8	VN062	Rezervisani prema Erdoganu	*Retained towards Erdogan*
13	28.06.2016.	9	VN063	Turski zahtevi za Prištinu	*Turkish demands for Prishtina*
14	29.06.2016.	9	VN064	Izetbegović u procepu	*Izetbegovic in a gap*
	29.06.2016.	9	VN065	Ja sam naredio rušenje Rusa	*I ordered the demolition of a Russian aircraft*
15	30.01.2016.	9	VN066	Erdoganu i vojska	*Erdogan got the army too*
16	31.07.2016.		/		
17	01.08.2016.	9	VN067	Erdogan potpuno preuzeo armiju	*Erdogan took over the army completely*
	01.08.2016.	9	VN068	Mi smo Nemačka	*We are Germany*
18	02.08.2016.	8	VN069	Ankara migrantima ucenjuje EU	*Ankara uses migrants to blackmail EU*
		8	VN070	Zaoštreno i sa SAD	*Tensions with the US as well*
19	03.08.2016.	8	VN071	Erdogan: Zapad je organizovao puč	*Erdogan: The West organized a coup*

	03.08.2016.	8	VN072	Hapšenje lekara, ostavke u fudbalu	*Arresting doctors, resigning in football*
20	04.08.2016.	8	VN073	Evropsko razumevanje	*European understanding*
21	05.08.2016.		/		
22	06.08.2016.	8	VN074	Ankara zaoštrila odnose sa Zapadom	*Ankara tightens relations with the West*
23	07.08.2016.		/		
24	08.08.2016.	8	VN075	Erdoganov "pečat" na demokratiju	*Erdogan's "confirmation" of democracy*
25	09.08.2016.	8	VN076	Erdogan se okrenuo Putinu	*Erdogan turned to Putin*
26	10.08.2016.	8	VN077	Putina i Erdogana pomirio biznis	*Business has reconciled Putin and Erdogan*
27	11.08.2016.		/		
28	12.08.2016.	9	VN078	Erdoganov ultimatum Vašingtonu	*Erdogan's ultimatum to Washington*
29	13.08.2016.	8	VN079	"Pozitivni signali" Vašingtona	*The "positive signals" from Washington*
30	14.08.2016.	8	VN080	Pokrenut veliki egzodus turskih građana	*A large exodus of Turkish citizens began*
31	15.08.2016.		/		

In their headlines Večernje novosti uses attributes and nouns with dominant negative meaning, creating a sense of unreliability and lack of security in relation to Turkey and Turkish society (e.g. *cleansing of opponents, asks for Gulen's head, horrible, fake coup, ordering shootings, angry, purges, Ankara ignores, leaving NATO, conflict, refusal, atomic terrorism, blackmails EU, tightens relations, ultimatum, exodus…).* The most prominent actor in headlines is Turkish president Recep Tayıp Erdoğan, mentioned in 16 headlines. Fethullah Gulen and his supporters, together with coup ploters are mentioned in only five headlines. The victims of the military coup attempt didn't take place in this daily paper's headlines.

7.3.1.3. Thematic orientation




Chart 7. Thematic orientation, Večernje novosti

Among 13 determinated topics, the most dominant one in the reporting of Večernje novosti was T8: Turkish international relations, mentioned in 18 texts. It is important to mention that not every text about Turkish international relations was analyzed. The topic considers only news items on Turkish international relations that are actualized by coup attempt. The second dominant topic in Večernje novosti was T4: The focus of the news is on army officials, public figures, civilians or institutions related to FETO movement, mentioned in 12 texts. Večernje novosti had six news items mentioning T6: The event is characterized as Erdoan's opportunity to defend his political opponents (the restitution of death penalty and/or change or constitution), while there was no any text characterizing coup as good solution for Turkey and as an end of Erdoan's era. Between the topics about possible coup perpetrators and organizers T2: The event is described as an overthrowing of president Recep Tayıp Erdogan or the coup setup by his government - fake coup, and T5: The coup is organized or supported by internal or external pro-western forces, were mentioned in four news items each. The third assumed organizator FETO movement was mentions as that in two news items.

7.3.1.4. Representation of social actors and macro-propositions

a. Coup attempt

In their first news item about coup d'etat in Turkey, Večernje novosti reported as the coup was successfully done by Turkish army. With headline "The army took power in Turkey" (VN001) on their fornt page, the paper disseminated a wrong information about the coup attempt in Turkey. Even though the coup was stopped in few hours, this newspaper didn't have an adequate reaction and therefore has contributed in creating uncertain image about the events in Turkey. The macro-proposition "complete takeover of power" (VN001) explains that the army has taken the power and that Turkey is currently under their rule.


ВОЈСКА ПРЕУЗЕЛА ВЛАСТ У ТУРСКОЈ

ПРЕДСЕДНИК ЕРДОГАН ПОЗВАО НАРОД НА УЛИЦЕ, НЕЗВАНИЧНО ЗАТРАЖИО АЗИЛ У БРИТАНИЈИ И НЕМАЧКОЈ

БЛОКАДА АЕРОДРОМА И МОСТОВА

ПРЕДСЕДНИК ЕРДОГАН СЕ ОБРАТИО ПУТЕМ СКАЈПА СА НЕПОЗНАТЕ ЛОКАЦИЈЕ

НЕЋЕМО ДОЗВОЛИТИ УГРОЖАВАЊЕ ДЕМОКРАТИЈЕ

АМБАСАДА СРБИЈЕ ПРАТИ СИТУАЦИЈУ У ТУРСКОЈ

НЕ МОЖЕ СЕ РЕЋИ ДА ЛИ ЈЕ УСПЕО УДАР

ЕУ: УЗДРЖАНОСТ

Although there is a photograph of civilians on the tank, which is consequently taken after the people have disarmed the conspirators, the newspaper did not comment on the people opposing the puchists. It was only said that "some groups responded to the President's call".



The reports from following days determined the coup attempt as the "first failed military coup" (VN010), and soon as the "set up" by Turkish president: "everything will raise suspicions that the Erdogan is involved " (VN018, VN025, VN028…) or coup helped by the Western powers (VN019, VN042, VN055, VN071…). There were two news items (VN007, VN036) suspecting Fethullah Gulen and FETO movement of being involved in organizing and ordering of coup d'etat.

b. Turkish president Recep Tayıp Erdoğan

According to Večernje novosti's first report, president Erdoğan was about to escape to Tehran, then to Qatar, and to ask for asilium in Germany, but also in the United Kingdom (VN002). Večernje novosi published four news items, including opinions, agency news and reports, claiming that Turkish president Erdogan has "organized a coup to strengthen himself in power" (VN018). Erdogan was also named as: "cheap populist and dictator" (VN012), "ready for anything" and "the master of all political processes and trends in the country" (VN028). In second half of analysis, during the third and forth week of reporting, Turkish president was represented as more authoritarian: "Erdogan angry" (VN062), "wants full control" (VN066), "he shows who is the boss" (VN067), "deviates from democracy" (VN074).



Ердоїан: Желимо да САД изруче терористу. Гулен: Покушај удара можда намештен

c. Coup victims and Turkish citizens

In first report on coup attempt Večernje novosti claimed that 80 civilians and 19 police officers died during the coup d'etat. In their next edition, when they have published that coup is actualy failed, the number of victims was 265. Victims have been mentioned in only a few

news items, which is not common in events involving large numbers of victims. Also, regarding the photographs, the newspaper paid no special attention to the people died on the streets which is usually in this type of events the main topic. There was no usual division between "good and bad guys", but the situation was presented as there are no innocent victims. All actors are involved in creating chaos. The newspaper prepared report from the streets of Istanbul where the burial of an innocently killed child and the pain of his father were described only to show the cruelty of Turkish government in making a decion about the state of emergeny: "while families bury children, the government decides on a state of emergency" (VN049). The coming out on the streets was unexpected and unseen reaction of Turkish people and certainly one of the important moments in stopping the coup attempt, even so this was not seen as brave act of patriotism. The one of two texts that places people as dominant topic starts with title: "People on the street guard the state and Erdogan" (VN038), presenting the people only as Erdoan's followers.



d. Fethullah Gulen and arrested/acused coup plotters

The macro-propositions such as: a religious leader (VN010), a great Muslim (VN0011), the son of a "imam" (VN011), the most prominent Muslim figure with about 3 million followers (VN0011), a spiritual leader (VN035), a Turkish Muslim "imam" (VN078), are showing the Fethullah Gulen as a calm and certenly not dangerous person dedicated to religious and spiritual life. With this type of descriptions, it is quite difficult to identify Gulen with organizing the plot against the state. However, in one text Gulen is mentioned as "possible organizer of a coup" (VN011) and a controversial preacher (VN007). Also, in some news items Gulen is associated with Turkish president as his former ally (VN0074, VN012). Fethullah Gullen, as one of the main actors of the event is the most prominent figure in these

texts which makes him a dominant person in Večernje novosti reporting. Hence, the macro-propositions used for Gulen are important in understanding the orientation of newspaper towards Gulen and its role in coup attempt.

e. The Republic of Turkey

As it was already mentioned the main topic in Večernje novosti reporting was Turkey with its international relations. The analyzing of macro-propositions also helped in better understanding of the main information disseminated over Večernje novosti. Therefore, some of the frequent macro-propositions pointing out this topic as dominant one, are: second largest NATO army (VN001), a crucial NATO ally (VN008), an important partner of EU (VN014). This type of macro-propositions reflects the positive aditude of Večernje novosti towards the Turkey, however, there are also recorded more negative macro-propositions that are reflecting Turkey as unstabile state with unstabile international relations caused by coup attempt. Such macro-propositions are as follows: (in Turkey) people don't feel safe (VN027), Turkey does not belong to EU (VN030), weapons conquered the streets (VN049), (Turkey is) the private state of a group of people (VN049), is Turkey preparing to leave NATO? (VN053) etc. The most inappropriate moment in Večernje novosti was a constant publishing of a burning Turkish flag which is used as header on pages with news about coup attempt. This header was used for eight days, from 17.07. do 24.07.



7.3.2. Danas

7.3.2.1. Quantitative analysis and coveredge frequency

The daily danas had two published news on the first day of reporting (16.07.2016). A 24 news items, that is more than a half of the total number of published news, is shared during the first week (16. – 22.07.2016.). In one-month, daily Danas shared 43 news about the coup attempt. The coveredge frequency is 1.3 news per day. In 31 analyzed editions, daily Danas

had 651 sentences and 33 photographs. The news related to coup attempt were on the front page four times. 11 out of 31 days didn't have any news about the coup attempt.

7.3.2.2. News headlines

Table 11

News headlines, Danas

Day	Date	Page No.	Text code	Text headline in published language	Text headline in English language
1, 2	16./ 17.07.2016.	10	DN001	Vojska tvrdi da je preuzela vlast, Vlada demantuje	*The army claims to have conquer power, the government denies it*
	16./ 17.07.2016.	10	DN002	Pala lira, Turci dižu novac s bankomata	*Turkish lira in decline, Turks reise money from ATMs*
3	18.07.2016.	10,11	DN003	Od 6000 uhapšenih polovina su sudije	*Out of the 6 000 arrested, half are judges*
	18.07.2016.	10	DN004	Odblokirane srpske kamiondžije	*Serbian trucks unblocked*
	18.07.2016.	11	DN005	Imućni imam iz Pensilvanije	*A wealthy priest from Pennsylvania*
	18.07.2016.	11	DN006	Erdogan će biti surov	*Erdogan will be cruel*
	18.07.2016.	11	DN007	*Erdogan – Obama*	*Erdogan – Obama*
	18.07.2016.	11	DN008	*Erdogan – Putin*	*Erdogan – Putin*
4	19.07.2016.	9	DN009	Pučologija	*Putschology*
	19.07.2016.	14	DN010	Propali puč daje neki razlog za slavlje	*The failed coup gives some reason for celebration*
	19.07.2016.	14,15	DN011	Oficiri želeli da spreče čistku	*Officers wanted to stop the purge*
	19.07.2016.	14, 15	DN012	Poštovati ustavni poredak Turske	*To respect the constitutional order of Turkey*
	19.07.2016.	15	DN013	Alan Žipe: EU da ne prima nove članice	*Alain Juppe: The EU to not receive new members*
	19.07.2016.	15	DN014	Jildirim: Ukupno ubijeno 208 ljudi	*Yildirim: A total of 208 people were killed*
5	20.07.2016.	8	DN015	Turska i Srpski peti oktobar	*Turkish and Serbian October fifth*
	20.07.2016.	12	DN016	Turski vojni vrh bio upozoren na udar	*The Turkish military top was warned of a coup*
	20.07.2016.	12	DN017	Propali puč jača	*The failed coup*

				turski antiamerikanizam	*strengthens Turkish anti-Americanism*
	20.07.2016.	13	DN018	Otkazi za 1577 turskih dekana	*1577 Tursksh deans dismissed*
	21.07.2016	2	DN019	Srbija slična Erdoganovoj diktaturi	*Serbia is similar to Erdogan's dictatorship*
	21.07.2016.	14	DN020	Vanredno stanje u Turskoj	*A state of emergency in Turkey*
6	21.07.2016.	14	DN021	Otkaz za 21 000 nastavnika u privatnim školama	*21 000 teachers in private schools dismissed*
	22.07.2016.	14	DN022	Demokratija u Turskoj "snažnija nego ikad"	*Democracy in Turkey "stronger than ever"*
	22.07.2016.	14	DN023	Ne izlaziti iz pravnih okvira	*To not leave the legal frameworks*
7	22.07.2016.	14	DN024	Uslovna kazna za turske pilote u Grčkoj	*Conditional sentence for Turkish pilots in Greece*
8	23.07.2016.	8	DN025	Odbegle turske vojnike prebacuju iz Soluna u Atinu	*Escaped Turkish soldiers transferred from Thessaloniki to Athens*
9	24.07.2016.		/		
	25.07.2016.	9	DN026	Jildirim: Broj 13 000 nije konačan	*Yildirim: The number 13,000 is not final*
10	25.07.2016.	9	DN027	Zajednički protest opozicije i vlasti	*Joint protest of opposition and government*
11	26.07.2016.	15	DN028	Sada nam je najvažnije da Amerika izruči Gulena	*Now, what matters most to us is that America extradites Gulen*
	27.07.2016.	14	DN029	Uhapšena ugledna turska novinarka	*A well-respected Turkish journalist arrested*
12	27.07.2016	15	DN030	Čudna smrt turskog sekularizma	*The strange death of Turkish secularism*
13	28.07.2016.	15	DN031	Navodi o torturi nisu istiniti	*The allegations of torture are not true*
14	29.07.2016.		/		
15	30.07.2016.		/		
16	31.07.2016.		/		
	01.08.2016.	10	DN032	Erdogan "zaposeda" armiju	*Erdogan "owns" the army*
	01.08.2016.	10	DN033	Gledajte svoja posla	*Mind your own business*
17	01.08.2016.	10	DN034	Čavušolu: Vize, ili ne zaustavljamo izbjeglice	*Chavushoglu: Visas, or we don't stop refugees*
18	02.08.1026.		/		

19	03.08.2016.	14	DN035	Turska uporna u zahtevu da Amerika isporuči Gulena	*Turkey persists in demanding America extradite Gulen*
20	04.08.2016.	15	DN036	Renci: Sudovi u Italiji ne slušaju Erdogana	*Renci: The courts in Italy do not listen to Erdogan*
21	05.08.2016.	14	DN037	Turska za sada ne vraća smrtnu kaznu	*Turkey does not return the death penalty for now*
22	06.08.2016.		/		
23	07.08.2016.		/		
	08.08.2016.	10	DN038	Približavanje "u inat" zapadu	*Reconciliation "in spite" to west*
	08.08.2016.	10	DN039	Podrška Erdoganu iz Novog Pazara	*Support for Erdogan from Novi Paza*
24	08.08.2016.	10	DN040	Više od milion ljudi na mitingu u Istanbulu	*More than a million people on rally in Istanbul*
25	09.08.2016.	3	DN041	Podrška Turskoj, ne Erdoganu	*Support to Turkey, not to Erdogan*
26	10.08.2016.	13	DN042	Rusija ne može Turskoj zamijeniti EU	*Russia cannot be a substitute for EU in Turkey*
27	11.08.2016.	13	DN043	Turska ostaje važan član NATO	*Turkey remains an important NATO member*
28	12.08.2016.		/		
29	13.08.2016.		/		
30	14.08.2016.		/		
31	15.08.2016.		/		

In their headlines daily Danas had a more moderate approach towards Turkey and events after the coup attempt including the statements about the reestablishing of death sentence and post-coup gathering. In some headlines we can find a macro-prepositions with clearly supportive messages (e.g. *some reason for celebration, joint protest, allegations of torture are not true, Turkey does not return the death penalty, a million people on rally in Istanbul, Turkey remains an important NATO member).* However, in their headlines the daily was not so moderate towards the Turkish president (*Erdogan will be cruel, Erdogan's dictatorship, death of Turkish secularism, Support to Turkey, not to Erdogan)*, showing him as a dominant negative figure in after-coup period.

7.3.2.3. Thematic orientation




Chart 8. Thematic orientation, Danas

Since daily Danas had the fewer nuber of published news items among the analyzed newspapers form Serbia, the most frequent topic, T8: Turkish International Relations, was recorded in only 11 texts. News items for this topic mostly refer on Turkey's relations with NATO, West and Rusia. Second most frequent topic in daily Danas is T4: The focus of the news is on army officials, public figures, civilians or institutions related to FETO movement, which is mentioned in eight texts. In general, Danas didn't show much interest in reporting on coup attempt and the number of published articles proves it. In their reports the newspaper tended to follow international relation of Turkey and to give more information about arrested individuals, while topics such as coup attempt victims and coup organizators were left out.

7.3.2.4. Representation of social actors and macro-propositions

a. Coup attempt

In the first reports of daily Danas, coup d'etat is characterized as a faild coup attempt, however from the beggining Danas tried to not place themselves on anyones side by claiming that situation in unclear: "it is not clear who has control over Turkey" (DN001). In further reporting, the newspaper paid more attention to what the coup would change rather than the background of the coup: "has caused problems at global level" (DN003), "it will empower the illiberal aspects of democracy" (DN030). In daily Danas there was no much discussion

reagarding the organizer of the coup, however Erdogan's statement about possible foreign interventions in the case was shared: "the west supports terrorism and stands behind the coup" (DN035).

b. Turkish president Recep Tayıp Erdoğan

Based on analyzed news items and selected macro-propositions, daily Danas presented Erdogan as a cruel leader with "the worst yet to come" (DN006). Turkish government is "inclined to dictatorship" (DN019) but "no matter how authoritative, they are still a legitimate choice of Turks" (DN009). Even though the newspaper intended to stay impartiality regarding the coup attempt, it is noticable a raising tension and intolerance towards the Turkish president and the Republic of Turkey. On the second day after the coup, President Erdogan was on the cover with the headline "The world is afraid of Erdogan's revenge", which confirms the image of a cruel leader that is dominant in reporting.



c. Coup victims and Turkish people

The Turkish people is firstly represented in a state of uncertainty that they were facing: "not sure what to expect in the morning" (DN002), later on they are recognized as the "Erdogan's supporters" (DN005) but also as the ones who are "ready to die for the state" (DN020). The victims were mentioned as statistics, without any further explanations or details.

d. Fethullah Gulen and arrested/accused coup plotters

In the reports of daily Danas Fethullah Gulen was represented as the "retired priest" and as "influential and charismatic" (DN003, DN005, DN010). He is also an "ex friend of Erdogan's". The mild rhetoric was used in describing Gulen but also Erdogan's accusations about his movement "viral terrorist network" (DN028) were published. In most cases Gulen is named as muslim preacher and FETO movement as the "Islamist movement" (DN029). There weren't further investigations about possible FETO institutions in Serbia. The coup plotters are described as "a small part of the army" (DN009), "poor and dull" with "amateur behavior" (DN010).

e. The Republic of Turkey

The Turkey is described as a state with "long history of military coups" (VN001), hinting that this is a common event for a country like Turkey. In reporting on a rally held in Sandžak, Danas distinguishes that the support is not for Turkish president Erdogan, but for the Republic of Turkey.

7.3.3. Politika

7.3.3.1. Quantitative analysis and coveredge frequency

Politika is among those newspapers that didn't have any news about the coup attempt on the first day of analyzing (16.07.2016.). During the first week (16. – 22.07.2016) there was 36 news, and during one month (16.07. – 15.08.2016.) the total number of published news items is 65. The coveredge frequency is 2,0 news per day. There was 997 sentences and 37 photographs in 31 analyzed editions. News related to coup attempt were on the front page for 11 times. Out of 31 analyzed days, on eight days there wasn't any news about the coup attempt.

7.3.3.2. News headlines

Table 12

News headlines, Politika

Day	Date	Page No.	Text code	Text headline in published language	Text headline in English language
1	16.07.2016.		/		
	17.07.2016.	2	PL001	Crni bilans leta 2016	*The 2016 Black Balance*
	17.07.2016.	2	PL002	Grčka vraća pučiste u Tursku	*Greece returns putschists to Turkey*
	17.07.2016.	3	PL003	Šta očekivati od "sultana" posle neuspelog puča	*What to expect from a "sultan" after a failed coup*
	17.07.2016.	3	PL004	Pilot koji je oborio ruski avion učestvovao u vojnom udaru	*A pilot who shot down a Russian plane was involved in a military coup*
	17.07.2016.	4	PL005	Neuspeo pokušaj vojnog udara u Turskoj	*Failed military coup attempt in Turkey*
	17.07.2016.	4	PL006	Reakcije iz sveta	*Reactions from the world*
	17.07.2016.	4	PL007	Ankara zatvorila pa otvorila vazdušni prostor oko Inđirlika	*Ankara closed and reopened the airspace around the Incirlik*
	17.07.2016.	4	PL008	Ko je Fetulah Gulen, "osumnjičen" kao inspirator puča?	*Who is Fetullah Gulen, "suspected" as the inspiration behind the coup?*
	17.07.2016.	5	PL009	Srbija ne preuzima odgovornost za one koji putuju u Tursku	*Serbia assumes no responsibility for those traveling to Turkey*
2	17.07.2016.	5	PL010	Turisti i jučer čarter letovima iz Beograda otišli u Antaliju	*Yesterday tourists went to Antalya from Belgrade by charter flights*
	18.07.2016.	3	PL011	Puč i posledice	*Coup and cosequences*
	18.07.2016.	3	PL012	Erdogan ponavlja optužbe protiv Gulena	*Erdogan reiterates the allegations against Gulen*
	18.07.2016.	3	PL013	Hici upozorenja tokom hapšenja pučista u Istanbulu	*Shots of warning during the arrest of a putchists in Istanbul*
3	18.07.2016.	3	PL014	Državni udar tek počinje	*The coup is just beginning*
4	19.07.2016.	3	PL015	Masovni progoni u Turskoj	*Mass persecution in Turkey*

	19.07.2016.	3	PL016	Vikiliks: "Stižu dokumenti o Turskoj"	*WikiLeaks: "Documents about Turkey are coming"*
	19.07.2016.	3	PL017	Žipe protiv prijema Turske i zemalja Balkana u EU	*Juppe against Turkey and the Balkan countries joining the EU*
	19.07.2016.	3	PL018	Nemačka štampa: Erdoganov sistem će kolabirati	*German press: Erdogan's system will collapse*
	19.07.2016.	11	PL019	Nema vraćanja novca za aranžmane u Turskoj	*There is no refund for arrangements in Turkey*
	20.07.2016.	3	PL020	Erdogan: Izbegao sam smrt za deset minuta	*Erdogan: I avoided death in ten minutes*
	20.07.2016.	6	PL021	Erdoganova senka nad Balkanom	*Erdogan's shadow over the Balkans*
5	20.07.2016.	6	PL022	Turska je Kosovo i uvek će biti u BiH	*Turkey is Kosovo and will always be in B&H*
	21.07.2016	3	PL023	Poslije vojnog puča civilni udar	*After the military coup, a civil coup*
	21.07.2016	3	PL024	Bivši funkcioner Stejt departmenta: CIA je znala šta se događa	*Former State Department official: The CIA knew what was going on*
	21.07.2016	5	PL025	Edukacija i biznis na istoj adresi	*Education and business at the same address*
	21.07.2016	5	PL026	Gulen inspiracija, a ne finansijer škole	*Gulen as an inspiration, not the school financier*
	21.07.2016	5	PL027	Islamska zajednica Srbije: Ne sarađujemo sa "Bejzom"	*Islamic Community of Serbia: We do not cooperate with "Bejza"*
	21.07.2016	5	PL028	Turska od Kambodže traži zatvaranje škola povezanih s Gulenom	*Turkey asks Cambodia to close schools linked to Gulen*
6	21.07.2016	5	PL029	"Gulenisti" u Novom Pazaru	*"Gulenists" in Novi Pazar*
	22.07.2016.	3	PL030	Da li Erdogan vodi Tursku u diktaturu	*Does Erdogan lead Turkey to dictatorship*
	22.07.2016.	3	PL031	Pučiste sahranjuju na "groblju za izdajnike"	*Putschists are being buried in "traitor cemetery"*
	22.07.2016.	3	PL032	Ankara najavila suspenziju Konvencije o ljudskim pravima	*Ankara announces suspension of Convention on Human Rights*
	22.07.2016.	3	PL033	Ambasada: vanredno stanje u skladu sa konvencijom	*Embassy: The state of emergency is in accordance with the Convention*
7	22.07.2016.	10	PL034	Turisti idu u Tursku uprkos vanrednom	*Tourists go to Turkey despite the state of*

				stanju	*emergency*
	22.07.2016.	10	PL035	Ministarstvo turizma Turske: nema prepreka za bezbedan odmor	*Turkish Ministry of Tourism: no obstacles to safe holiday*
	22.07.2016.	10	PL036	Ljajić: Vratiti novac onima koji otkažu put	*Ljajic: Give money back to those who cancel the trip*
	23.07.2016.	3	PL037	Gulen testira američko-turske odnose	*Gulen tests US-Turkish relations*
	23.07.2016.	3	PL038	Lavrov: Odnosi s Turskom zavisiće od saradnje oko Sirije	*Lavrov: Relations with Turkey will depend on co-operation on Syria*
8	23.07.2016.	7	PL039	Sa Gulenom povezano 15 obrazovnih institucija u BiH	*15 educational institutions in B&H affiliated with Gulen*
9	24.07.2016.		/		
	25.07.2016.	3	PL040	Erdogan nije dobio podršku G20	*Erdogan did not receive G20 support*
10	25.07.2016.	3	PL041	Jildirim: Turska uhapsila 13000 ljudi	*Yildirim: Turkey arrests 13,000 people*
11	26.11.2016.	2	PL042	Čavušoglu: Hvala Putinu na bezuslovnoj podršci tokom puča	*Cavusoglu: I thank Putin for unconditional support during the coup*
	27.07.2016.	2	PL043	Evropa do jeseni čeka "novog" Erdogana	*Europe is expecting a "new" Erdogan by the fall*
	27.07.2016.	4	PL044	Erdogan uskoro u Moskvi	*Erdogan in Moscow soon*
	27.07.2016.	7	PL045	Srpski turisti se brčkaju u vanrednom stanju	*Serbian tourists swim in a state of emergency*
12	27.07.2016.	7	PL046	Gradske vlasti Novog Pazara se ogradile od Gulena	*The city authorities of Novi Pazar were fenced off from Gulen*
	28.07.2016.	2	PL047	Puč u Turskoj posvađao Turke u Njemačkoj	*A coup in Turkey divided the Turks in Germany*
13	28.07.2016.	3	PL048	Čistka traje, hapšenje novinara "Zamana"	*Purges continue, arrest of "Zaman" journalist*
	29.07.2016.	4	PL049	Turski piloti kao "potrošni materijal"	*Turkish pilots as "consumable material"*
14	29.07.2016.	4	PL050	Poruka Erdoganu: "Čvrsto stoj i ne poklekni, BiH je uz tebe"	*Message to Erdogan: "Stand firm and don't kneel, B&H is with you"*
15	30.07.2016.	3	PL051	Erdogan sa članovima turskog Saveta bezbednosti	*Erdogan with members of the Turkish Security Council*
16	31.07.2016.	7	PL052	Portret bez rama: Fethulah Gulen	*Frameless Portrait: Fethullah Gulen*

				Srce svih zavera	*The heart of all conspiracies*
	01.08.2016.	4	PL053	Erdogan preuzeo kontrolu nad turskom vojskom	*Erdogan seized control over the Turkish army*
17	01.08.2016.	4	PL054	Erdoganove pristalice: Mi smo Nemačka	*Erdogan supporters: We are Germany*
18	02.08.2016.		/		
	03.08.2016.	2	PL055	Erdoganova moć u Nemačkoj	*Erdogan's power in Germany*
	03.08.2016.	2	PL056	Erdogan: Zapad stoji iza pučista	*Erdogan: The West is behind the putschists*
19	03.08.2016.	2	PL057	Novi satiričarski udar na predsjednika	*A new satirical coup on the president*
20	04.08.2016.	2	PL058	Novi nesporazumi Turske i EU oko izbjeglica	*New Turkey-EU misunderstandings about refugees*
21	05.08.2016.		/		
22	06.08.2016.	2	PL059	Erdoganova giljotina za novinare	*Erdogan's Press Guillotine*
23	07.08.2016.	3	PL060	Američki ambasador: Nismo umešani u puč	*US Ambassador: We are not involved in the coup*
24	08.08.2016.	3	PL061	Erdogan u Rusiji, Keri u Turskoj	*Erdogan in Russia, Keri in Turkey*
	09.08.2016.	3	PL062	Erdogan: Razgovaraću sa prijateljem Vladimirom	*Erdogan: I'll talk to my friend Vladimir*
25	09.08.2016.	6	PL063	I gulenista na mitingu podrške Erdoganu	*A gullenist at a rally supporting Erdogan*
26	10.08.2016.	3	PL064	Pomirenje "prijatelja" Erdogana i Putina	*Reconciliation of "friends" Erdogan and Putin*
27	11.08.2016.		/		
28	12.08.2016.	3	PL065	Turska preti Zapadu okretanjem od NATO-a	*Turkey threatens the West by turning away from NATO*
29	13.08.2016.		/		
30	14.08.2016.		/		
31	15.08.2016.		/		

Regarding the event actors, based on the headlines the most prominent figure is Turkish president Recep Tayıp Erdoğan who is mentioned by name in 18 headlines. Fethullah Gulen is mentioned in eight headlines, while third actor, in this research determined as "putschists/Gulenists" was mentioned in three headlines. Fourth important actor in this research named as "victims" was not mentioned in headlines in Politika daily paper. Most of the headlines are pointing out the president Erdoğan's statements whether about the coup or

about the Turkish international relations actualizated by the faild coup attempt. There are some headlines with rough expresions explaining the actions taken by the state and governement towards the coup plotters and individuals related to FETO (e.g. *Turkey threatens…, …Press Guillotine, Mass persecution…, … dictatorship, Turkey arrests…, Purges continue, …seized control),* while headlines with coup ploters and Fethullah Gulen mentioned, are having more soft character (e.g. *…the inspiration behind the coup?, Gulen as an inspiration…)*

7.3.3.3. Thematic orientation




Chart 9. Thematic orientation, Politika

Politika daily had the most interest in T4: The focus of the news is on army officials, public figures, civilians or institutions related to FETO movement. This topic is mentioned in 23 out of 65 news items published in Politika. Second most important topic in Politika was T8: Turkish International Relations with 17 published news articles. This daily paper had also an important interest in topics T6: The event is characterized as Erdoan's opportunity to defend his political opponents (the restitution of death penalty and/or change or constitution), and T9: Reflection of event on domestic discourse. The chart shows how Politika didn't show much interest in reporting on the development of the coup attempt or determining the actual organizer of the coup. Also, there was no interest in reporting about fights and a several days guarding of Turkish people on the streets of Istanbul and Ankara. However, Politika's reporting focused on the arrests and firings of individuals and the closure of institutions associated with the FETO movement. In 14 news items, arrestings and closures which followed the coup attempt are mentioned in connection with constitutional changes,

restitution of death penalty or as Turkish president's oportunity to defend his political opponents.

7.3.3.4. Representation of social actors and macro-propositions

a. Coup attempt

Daily newspaper Politika was one day late in reporting about the coup attempt in Turkey. In their first mentioning of the coup, it is stated that "it could be expected" (PL001). From the first reports the coup is named as failed coup attempt. The focus was on how will coup benefit to Turkish president Recep Tayıp Erdoğan: "in the short term, it will help Erdogan consolidate power" (PL018). Regarding the coup background, the statements about involvement of the western forces are published: "some media have raised doubts that the CIA was involved in the preparation of the coup" (PL061). In text with headline "Turkish pilots as "consumable material"" (PL049) it is said that Fethullah Gulen "is behind the recent failed military coup in Turkey". This is the only text with clear naming of organizator of coup attempt.


Неуспео покушај
војног удара у Турској

b. Turkish president Recep Tayıp Erdoğan

Recep Tayıp Erdoğan is presented as a peron that benefits the most from the failed coup attempt. The most arguing topic in the Politika was Erdogan's reaction and action after the coup attempt. "What to expect from a "sultan" (PL003) after a failed coup" is headline of

one of the first news items published as coup reaction in Politka. According to Politika's reports, the failed coup attempt made Erdogan more powerful, or in their words: "stronger than ever" (PL001), "the most powerful man in the Turkey" (PL003), "as if he had welcomed new development in the country" (PL015), "reacted with a counter coup" (PL018), "behaves like a chosen sultan" (PL031). Erdogan's international influence was also highlighted: "the most influential leader in the Balkans" (PL021), "all he has to do is to clap his hands to make a clash of groups in Germany" (PL047).


ПОЛИТИКА

Основана 1904. године

Познате нове адресе београдских судова
стр. 9

Добијена дозвола за градњу српске школе на југозападу Албаније
стр. 13

Звиждуци за Теда Круза, сенатора „издајника"
стр. 3

ДАНАС ДОДАТАК

Да ли Ердоган води Турску у диктатуру

После увођења ванредног стања, аналитичари упозоравају да се председник неће смирити док не укине парламентарни систем и уведе председнички


СВЕТ

Недеља 17. јул 2016. 03

Шта очекивати од „султана" после неуспелог пуча

Онима који су стали против Рецепа Тајипа Ердогана прети одмазда

Парола о „нула проблема са суседима" је за време Ердогановог вакта мутирала у „нула пријатеља међу суседима", а чини се да он ради све да би се што више удаљио од Ататуркове мота „Мир у земљи, мир у свету"

c. Coup victims and Turkish people

In Politika's reports "played a key role in stopping the coup" (PL003), however they are still naded as "Erdogan's supporters" (PL012). Coup victims were mentioned in five news items, without any specific attention or details.


politika

politika@danas.rs

Danas 3

Kako je predsednik Turske „pomirio" zavađene bošnjačke stranke i političare

Podrška Turskoj, ne Erdoganu

NAŠA PRIČA

Beograd - Istovremeno kad i u Istanbu-

ng između Bošnjaka koji žive u Turskoj i u Sandžaku. „Bošnjaci koji žive u Turskoj su uglavnom kemalistički orijentisani.

ključuje naš sagovornik. Nazim Ličina, član Organizacionog odbora zadovoljan je kako je događaj protekao, kao i odzi-

iting podrške Turskoj i Vladi Red[3] epa
ijipa Erdogana u Novom Pazaru

d. Fethullah Gulen and arrested/acused coup plotters

Apart from one text in which Gulen was mentioned as the organizer of the coup, in other texts Gulen is explained as: “preacher” and “religious leader” (PL005, PL020, PL028, PL043…) Gulen’s movement is once named as “parallel state” (PL004), but more often expressions such as “influential movement” or “intellectual political organization” (PL003, PL008, PL029, PL039) were used. The coup was done by “one part of army” and “lower rank officers” (PL001, PL005). Fethullah Gulen was at first front page related to couop attempt.


ПОЛИТИКА

Усамљеност – највећи терет трећег животног доба

Како банке зарађују и на туристичким аранжманима

Неуспео покушај војног удара у Турској

e. Republic of Turkey

In several texts Turkey is characterised with negative phrases such as “increasingly moving away from the EU”, “going towards an even more authoritarian country”, “is too weak to join the EU”, “powerles”, “very weakened country” (PL017, PL023, PL052, PL058).


ПОЛИТИКА

Смена straже испред Ататурковог маузолеја у Анкари

Турска прети Западу окретањем од НАТО-а

CONCLUSION

The aim of this study was to analyze the reporting of three former socialist Western states about the last coup attempt in Turkey and to determine if there were any differences in reporting of newspapers from different countries and different ethnic groups. The media reports are usually used as main source for understanding the social discourse. Media discourse used in case of coup attempt shows the intentions and interests of each country towards Turkey and its people. Therefore, the secondary objective was to show the general attitude of society towards the coup d'etat, innocent victims, Turkey, Turkish people, Recep Tayip Erdogan and Fethullah Gulen.

For proving the starting hypothesis of this research, the results of analysis are used as variables: quantitative analysis, analysis of news headlines, thematic orientation of the news and representation of social actors with macro-propositions. Based on these four variablas it is determined is the hypothesis correct.

Based on 499 analyzed news items, 208 from Bosnia and Herzegovina, 188 from the Republic of Serbia and 95 from the Republic of Croatia, we can see that our starting hypothesis is justified since there are recorded differences in news reporting about one same event. The main difference is in reporting of newspapers from Croatia that had the lowest number of published news, but also the adjectives and metaphors with negative connotations were used in describing event and main actors.

Bosnia and Herzegovina had the highest rate of published news items, followed by Serbia than Croatia. The difference between number of news in Bosnia press and Serbia press (20 news) is much less than the the difference between Bosnia and Croatia (113 news). According to quantitative analysis we can see that the interest of newspapers from Croatia is higher in the beginning of reporting when they have reported that the coup attempt is succesfull and it will bring the end to Erdogan and prosperity to Turkey. However, in further days the interest in coup attempt changed. This variable showed that Croatia had the lack of interest in reporting about the coup attempt which confirms the research hypothesis.

The similar situation is with one newspaper form Bosnia and Herzegovina, Nezavisne novine, that had the lowest number of published news among all the analyzed newspapers. These newspapers are known as oriented towards the Serbian population in Bosnia and

Herzegovina, who usually does not show much interest in topics related to Republic of Turkey. This low interest of a newspaper that is dominant in one ethnic group also confirms our hypothesis.

If we take a look to news headlines, we will notice that the main person in most of the headlines in all nine newspapers is Turkish president Recep Tayip Erdogan. The difference is only the daily Oslobođenje that had more headlines on Fethullah Gulen than on Erdogan. The actions, reactions and statements of Turkish president were dominantly promoted in headlines. As the study showed, this variable also depends on in which state and ethnical environment the headline is published. Some of the newspapers such as Oslobođenje from Bosnia and Herzegovina intended to use a moderate rethoric toward the Turkey and Turkish president, while others were more direct with open accusations. The newspaers from Croatia were supporting and approving the coup attempt even in their headlines. In the first days of reporting, newspapers from Serbia, together with Nezavisne novine from Bosnia and Herzgovina, represented the coup as successful, later they have changed their rethoric but without a clear support to Turkish government.

Regarding the thematic orientation, newspapers had interest in similar topics, however there are againg some important differences. The topic of arrests army officials and public figures or civilians related to FETO movement was the most prominent in newspapers from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and the second prominent in the Republic of Croatia. The most dominant topic in newspapers from the Republic of Croatia is characterizing the event as Erdogan's opportunity to defend his political opponents (the restitution of death penalty and/or change or constitution). The concreate development of coup attempt and the consequences that it will bring to Turkish society wasn't promoted in reportings.

The selection of macro-propositions and representation of social actors was the most important variable in this study. The results for each newpaper were elaborated in Chapter 7. The joint characteristic for all newspaper is that the reporting on coup victims and air stikes were left out. The most important difference in the results for this variable is that the newspapers from Croatia were only ones to openly support coup d'etat in Turkey as a good solution for political situation in Turkey. For newspapers from other two states, we can say that they hesitated from harsh condemnation and taking sides in the event. Still, it is noticeable that all the newspapers preferred to accuse Erdogan of faking the coup, rather than condemning Gulen for organizing the coup.

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