T.C.
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ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER ANABİLİM DALI
ULUSLARARASI POLİTİK EKONOMİ BİLİM DALI

DIŞ POLİTİKA ARACI OLARAK KALKINMA YARDIMLARI: FRANSA ÖRNEĞİ

Yüksek Lisans Tezi

AHMAD SHOAIB GHULAM NABİ

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Danışman

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ABSTRACT

The concerted efforts towards global poverty alleviation has intensified the debate surrounding foreign aid. Developed-industrialized nations of the West-to a large extent- set the norms, defined the rules and shaped institutions of governing foreign aid since 1948 which had marked the emergence of government sponsored foreign aid by the United States through the Marshal Plan. Africa region has always been at the center of this north-south relation as well as development agenda of international organizations like the UN. 2000's marked the beginning of a new era in which various new donors of South begun to be more active in Sub-Sahara Africa region. Among other western foreign aid donors, France remains one of the major external actors in Africa where it continues to engage actively in Sub-Saharan Africa through different social, economic, political and cultural platforms.

This thesis attempts to comparatively analyze how French foreign aid to SSA has changed over time in response to the transformation of the international system since the end of Cold War. It argues that France foreign aid in Sub-Sahara Africa could best explained as a tool of its foreign policy. The thesis finds that during the Cold War, Post-Cold War and the 2000s, France continued to utilize/ instrumentalize its foreign aid to pursue national interests defined ranging from security and democratization, to global influence and trade. Unlike the 1990s where foreign aid experienced significant reduction in Sub-Sahara Africa, the 2000s experienced higher foreign aid allocation to the region not only through bilateral allocation, buts also through multilateral channels. Nonetheless, whereas the defined interests of France varied across the three eras, the pursuit of French cultural and linguistic universality has been identified as common in the foreign policy interests and foreign aid allocation to SSA.

Key words: Foreign Aid, France, Sub-Saharan Africa, Foreign Policy, Interests

ÖZET

Küresel yoksulluğun azaltılmasına yönelik ortak çabalar dış yardımı çevreleyen tartışmaları yoğunlaştırmıştır. Batının gelişmiş sanayileşmiş ülkeleri büyük ölçüde normlar belirledi, 1948'den bu yana ABD'nin devlet destekli dış yardımları Mareşal Plan aracılığıyla ortaya çıkan kuralları belirledi ve dış yardım yönetim kurumlarını şekillendirdi. Afrika bölgesi her zaman bu kuzey-güney ilişkisinin ve BM gibi uluslararası örgütlerin kalkınma gündeminin merkezinde yer almıştır. 2000'ler, Güney'in çeşitli yeni bağışçılarının Sahra Altı Afrika bölgesinde daha aktif olmaya başladığı yeni bir dönemin başlangıcı olmuştur. Diğer batılı dış yardım bağışçıları arasında Fransa, farklı sosyal, ekonomik, politik ve kültürel platformlar aracılığıyla Sahra altı Afrika'da aktif bir rol üstlenmiş olup Afrika'nın en büyük dış aktörlerinden biri olmaya devam etmektedir.

Bu tez, Soğuk Savaş'ın sona ermesinden bu yana uluslararası sistemin dönüşümüne yanıt olarak Sahra altı Afrika'ya yapılan Fransız dış yardımının zaman içinde nasıl değiştiğini karşılaştırmalı olarak incelemeye çalışmaktadır. Sahra altı Afrika'da Fransa dış yardımlarının en iyi dış politikasının bir aracı olarak açıklanabileceğini savunmaktadır. Bu tez, Soğuk Savaş, Soğuk Savaş Sonrası ve 2000'li yıllar boyunca Fransa'nın güvenlik ve demokratikleşmeden küresel etkiye ve ticarete kadar tanımlanmış ulusal çıkarları sürdürmek için dış yardımını araç olarak kullanmaya devam ettiğini bulmuştur. Sahra Altı Afrika'da dış yardımın önemli ölçüde azaldığı 1990'ların aksine, 2000'ler bölgeye sadece ikili tahsis yoluyla değil, aynı zamanda çok taraflı kanallar yoluyla da daha yüksek dış yardım tahsisi yaşatmıştır. Bununla birlikte, Fransa'nın tanımlanmış çıkarları üç döneme ayrılabilirken, Fransız kültürel ve dilsel evrensellik arayışı dış politika çıkarları ve Sahra Altı Afrika'ya dış yardım tahsisinde yaygın olarak tanımlanmıştır.

Anahtar kelimeler: Dış Yardım, Fransa, Sahra Altı Afrika, Dış Politika, Çıkarlar

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1 INTRODUCTION

The use of foreign aid was fundamentally adopted into the mainstream international politics to address the high rates of poverty and reduce the increasing economic inequalities between the developed and developing countries (Riddell, 2008: 1). The Marshall Aid Plan of 1948-51 marked the first significant step towards the internationalization of foreign aid aimed at reconstructing Western Europe and deterring the spread of communism under the European Recovery Programme (Cromwell, 1982). Concurrently, when Sub-Sahara Africa and other developing regions were emerging as independent states after World War 2, foreign aid became a key feature of the developing bilateral relations from late 1950s (Deegan, 2003). This is because there was need for both financial and human capital to spark development of national economies in the new independent states.

France and other Western powers such as the US, Britain, Italy, Portugal, Netherlands and Belgium embarked on providing foreign aid on bilateral bases in the form of financial grants and, or, loans to countries in south of the Sahara (Chafer, 2004). While this assistance was intended to enhance development in Sub-Saharan Africa, it was also a form of prestige as it conferred international respect to the donor countries for being wealthy and industrialised (Cumming, 2017: 1). Additionally, providing foreign aid was largely perceived as a symbol of solidarity with the developing countries by the foreign aid donors.

However, the change in the structure of the international order influenced donor countries to transform the platform of foreign aid into a means of expanding social, cultural, political and economic influence and interests in global affairs (Gulrajani & Swiss, 2017: 18). Foreign aid became a key instrument of foreign policy used to encourage developing countries to adopt politically "desirable behaviour" particularly during Cold War. Foreign aid programmes were

used as instruments of sanctions largely to obviate further spread of communism (Lancaster, 1999: 1).

From the 1960 to late 1980s foreign aid was regarded widely as the path through which developing countries could attain economic development (Lancaster, 2008: 25). However, in Sub-Sahara Africa (SSA), scholars argue that it led to the entrenchment of economic dependency and bad governance that rendered the region vulnerable to extensive external political influences because of weak political and economic structures (Moyo, 2009: 15).

Nonetheless, foreign aid become a key component of leading nations to exert their influence in the international system through their respective foreign policy agendas (Tarnoff & Lawson, 2016; Apodaca, 2006). Although other foreign policy tools such as economic sanctions (positive or negative), diplomatic relations, cooperation, agreements, trade, and military could equally advance the national interests of states, foreign aid proved appealing particularly in Sub-Sahara Africa that needed financial resources for development after independence. For the donor states, gaining influence over other states could enable such states to shape the international system in such ways that could be beneficial in either maintaining the status quo or changing the status quo altogether (Palmer & Morgan, 2006). As a foreign policy tool, foreign aid offered Sub-Sahara African countries incentives to either change state behaviour or a reward for changing a particular behaviour of the state.

According to Tarnoff & Lawson (2016), foreign aid provided flexibility such that it can influence events, address critical problem, and project power and values of states in the international system. The decision regarding the allocation of foreign aid (how, where, when, why) is often made by political class and are perceived as the interest of the government on behalf of the state. On a broader scale, foreign aid can be used to pursue for policy interests of states that are not limited to advancing good governance, poverty alleviation, promoting human rights, and pursuing cultural and economic interests in different forms (Kisangani &

Pickering, 2015; Apodaca, 2017). As such, foreign aid is used to pursue foreign policy interests of the state.

French interests in SSA can be traced back to 17th century when France established a trading port in Senegal (Klein,1998: 22). This marked the onset of French influence in the continent that became formalized through the Berlin Conference of 1884-5 that partitioned the entire African continent between European (France, Britain, Belgium, Italy, Germany, Spain, Dutch and Portugal). This partition was the outcome of the European powers' competition and quest for global influence by pursuing and protecting their social, economic and political interests in Africa. Iliffe (2007: 195) argues that partition of the continent formalized French colonial policy to Africa.

Sub-Sahara Africa remains central to French national and global interests. France had the largest colonial empire in Africa which it established deeply rooted socio-cultural, political and economic ties during the colonial era. After independence, its former francophone Africa colonies remained under the sphere of influence of France as part of its wider agenda to pursue global political influence, market for French goods, source of natural resources such as oil, and centre for overseas investments by French private and public multinational companies. To maintain these bilateral ties and maintain its influence with the continent, France "instrumentalized" its foreign aid towards SSA as a priority in its foreign policy by sustaining its position among the top five largest bilateral foreign aid donors towards SSA and multilaterally through influential platforms, most notably the European Union.

Between the 1990s and 2000s, France had overlapping foreign policy interests shaped by major international political events. During the Cold War, French interests were majorly anchored on expanding its cultural influence and maintaining its colonial economic exploitation policy of the African economies through corrupt and authoritarian regimes supported by French foreign aid. In the post-Cold War era, the influence of democratization;

globalization; emergence of new non-traditional donors such as China, India, Turkey, Brazil; and, the global war on terrorism, has influenced how France is approaching the region relative to cooperation. According to Barrios (2010: 3), since 2000, France remains main actor in the region despite the rise of South-South cooperation as evidenced by its expansion of new bilateral ties with states outside the traditional francophone Africa regions.

1.1 Research Questions

i. What are the main motivations driving foreign aid allocation by France to SSA during 2000s, as compared to Cold War and 1990s era?

ii. How has France foreign aid (both in material and ideational/normative terms) to Sub Sahara Africa (SSA) changed, during 2000s as compared to Cold War and 1990s era?

1.2 Justification of Case Selection and Importance of this Study

This study has focused on France based on several considerations. Foremost, during the Cold War and post-Cold War, France has consistently been categorized among the top five largest providers of foreign aid not only in SSA but also globally (Honig & Weaver, 2019; Dietrich, 2016). Secondly, since the end of the Second World War, France has been classified as a traditional middle power state often highlighted for its non-developmental concerns at the centre of its foreign aid program especially in SSA. Thirdly, with a possible exception of only Japan, foreign aid is a fundamental cornerstone of France's foreign policy in continuity for decades (Lancaster, 1999; Tint, 1972). As such, the transformation of foreign aid allocation by France would be representative of the general changes in French foreign policy and in the wider context, how middle powers have transformed their foreign policy interests since the end of the Cold War. France therefore provides an essential case study upon which analysis of whether the changing international structures have truly transformed the nature of foreign aid since the 1990s.

1.3 Aims and Contribution to Literature

This thesis aims to examine how France has instrumentalized its foreign aid to advance its foreign policy interests in Sub-Saharan Africa and how this relationship has changed over time in response to the transformation of the international system since the end of Cold War. This study will try to contribute to comparative literature by specifically looking at French foreign aid in Sub-Sahara Africa. While conducting literature review, this study found that very little attention has been given to the case of France and how it uses foreign aid as an instrument of its foreign policy in Sub-Saharan Africa despite being one of the external actors with a vast presence and influence across the region. Existing studies by Rioux & Van Belle (2005) covered the influence of Le Monde in French foreign aid allocation; Renou (2002) addressed the transforming French foreign policy in Sub-Saharan African; and Bossuat (2003) conducted a study on French foreign aid during Charles de Gaulle government.

A search on the Council of Higher Education- Thesis Centre, reveals that existing theses on France have not yet covered a comparative assessment on how France has instrumentalized its foreign aid to pursue its foreign policy interests. A thesis by Ngwa (2019) looks provides a comparative assessment about the perception of foreign policies between France and Turkey. Another thesis by Akçay (2018), offers a comparative study of the cultural diplomacy between France and Britain in Africa. As such, this thesis will add to the narratives and aims to broaden the literature on the scope of French foreign aid and foreign policy in Sub-Saharan Africa by conducting a comparative assessment of French aid in 2000's with that of Cold War and post-Cold War era.

1.4 Method of Research

This thesis adopts explanatory research methodology. It asks "explanatory" questions of "what" the motivations of French Foreign aid are to Sub Sahara Africa in 2000's as compared to cold war and post-cold war era. The thesis also attempts to understand "how" the French

foreign aid has changed in 2000's as compared to previous periods The strength of this explanatory research methodology lies in its ability to increase understanding on the subject by enabling the researcher to determine how and why French foreign aid to SSA has changed in 2000s as compared to Cold war and post-Cold War era. This dissertation utilizes an in-depth literature research drawn from both primary and secondary sources. In this regard, the thesis refers to primary sources such as public documents (such as reports, annual reports, and charters), official documents and statements of ministries (for instance, the French Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs), institutions (such as the European Commission, Council of the European Union, World Bank, OECD), information provided by the official websites of the development agencies/ministries and peer-reviewed academic articles to present findings of the research. In terms of data collection techniques existing statistics of OECD and World Bank data were also used to compare and contrast the "material" changes in French Foreign aid to sub-Sahara Africa.

2 CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 The Concept of Foreign Aid

The emergence of aid can be connected to three important events during the 1940s. First, was the establishment of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) in 1943 to address the impact of war in Europe (Browne, 1990). UNRRA was the forerunner of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and UN International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) after United Nations was established in 1945. By 1946, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (later World Bank), was giving loans to Europe, marking the emergence of multilateral aid system. Secondly, the emergence of Cold War rivalry between the US and Soviet Union in 1946- immediately after the end of World War 2, instigated the rise of bilateral aid such that in 1948, the Marshall Plan begun a process of channeling USD 13 billion in form of foreign aid from the US to Europe over a period of four years (Browne, 1997). Thirdly, the 1940s also marked the emergence of independence movements in former European colonies thereby influencing colonial powers to establish aid programs as a continuation of their colonial interests during the 1950s (Browne, 1997).

Foreign aid is a multifarious concept that can take several forms and is usually allocated through either multilateral or bilateral channels. A study by Minoiu and Reddy (2010: 9) defines foreign aid as that aid, which is expended and anticipated to promote development, whether attained through economic growth or by other means. Radelet et al., (2004) reinforces this definition by arguing that foreign aid channeled through and spent by multilateral organizations, is arguably more conditioned to be appropriately used for the purposes that result in real development. The Development Assistance Committee (DAC, 2006) database denotes foreign aid as those transactional assistance made to a recipient country in favor of development.

Figure 1: A simple depiction of the aid architecture



Source: Kharas (2007)

Several studies (Alesina et al., 2000; Dollar et al., 2004; Moyo, 2009) have covered the allocation of foreign aid and the underlying motives for foreign aid flows to developing countries. Alesina et al. (2000), argues that the biggest aid donors are more prone to motivation by political and strategic considerations, a consequence which promptly highlights the general increase in foreign aid for instance during the Cold War other than reasons such as eradication of poverty or economic development.

The Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) categorizes aid flows into three broad categories (OECD, 2011). These include; official development assistance (ODA) which is the largest as it consists of aid provided by donor governments to low and middle-income countries. Secondly, official assistance (OA)- aid provided by governments to countries with per capita incomes higher than $9,000 (e.g., Bahamas, Cyprus, Israel) and to countries that were formerly part of the Soviet Union (Van Bilzen, 2015: 4; OECD, 2011). Thirdly, private voluntary assistance- includes grants from non-governmental organizations, religious groups, charities, and foundations given to governments from low-income and

middle-income countries (Huang & Pascual, 2017: 19). Increasingly, non-governmental organizations and other charitable foundations have been at the forefront of mobilizing funds publicly from individuals, businesses and companies for a wide range of activities in developing countries.

Figure 2: New Foreign Aid Architecture



Source: Kharas, 2007

As demonstrated in figure 2, the introduction of actors in the foreign aid has outside governments has resulted in the emergence of a new complex aid architecture. There has been an increase in both the number of bilateral donors and recipient countries. This is also true for multilateral donors in the form of international non-governmental organizations and private sector groups who are engaged in both donation of foreign aid as well as implementation of some non-governmental donor development programs.

According to Kharas (2007), the transfer of foreign aid from donor to recipient countries can be in several forms and that not all aid as reported by donor states, goes to the recipient

countries. Within the structures of foreign aid allocation, part of the delegated funds are used by the development agencies of recipient countries as administrative overheads and in advocacy for more foreign aid allocation. Secondly, debt forgiveness is also considered as aid despite that some of the debts could never be repaid by recipient states. Because debt forgiveness may include debts accumulated as penalties over non-repayment of loans, they can often be inflated particularly if accumulated for several years. Kharas (2007) also argues that other assistance given in the form of food aid, are often evaluated using donor country prices which are significantly higher than the food prices in developing countries.

Figure 3: Official Development Assistance Trends (1960-2015)



Source: OECD (2018)

Figure 3 demonstrates the trends of ODA as reported by OECD since 1960 to 2015. The flow of ODA to developing countries demonstrate three different patterns particularly from the mid-1970s to early 1990s. These patterns correlate with the structure of the international system that was characterized by Cold War. To sustain their influence in global politics, donor countries provided foreign aid incrementally until the end of Cold War in 1991 when the Soviet Union collapsed. The second phase of aid allocation from 1994 to 2000, marked a

significant decline in foreign in period characterized by Kharas (2007) as a time of 'aid fatigue' that was also accompanied by failed states in developing world and rising poverty. Since 2000, through a UN-led initiative to end severe poverty, the establishment of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) led to more foreign aid allocations to recipient developing countries.

2.1.1 Development Aid

Development aid largely encompasses direct involvement of foreign donors in designing and execution of a development project (OECD, 2007). Though there has was a decline of ODA in form of project aid from the late 1980s, ODA to specific projects still exist (Mosley, 1986; Tarp, 2000; Naude, 2009). Development aid is dominated by funds channeled to interventions in sectors such as health, education, rural development including agriculture, transport and power, housing, and water supply and sanitation. However, small amounts of project aid are channeled to industrial, mining, trade and cultural projects (Riddell 2007). Many ODA funded development projects aim at achieving specific outputs by providing resources, skills and systems which the recipient country needs.

Development aid can also be in the form of program aid. The Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development defines program aid as those financial contributions that are not linked to specific activities (OECD, 2017). More specifically, OECD highlights that program aid is a closer proxy of ODA that is allocated to recipient countries that have a say on how the aid can be appropriated to meet the needs of the country. Program aid can be categorized into two groups that include: budgetary support and balance of payments (OECD, 2017). In the category of budget support, financial aid is provided to increase the aggregate revenue and enhance the total expenditure of the government. Financial support channeled towards the treasury in the Ministry of Finance are referred to as General Budget Support to facilitate the implementation of development and poverty alleviating policies with emphasis

on the capacity of the recipient governments to use funds efficiently. Program aid channeled to target sectors are referred to as Sector Budget Support.

Technical assistance can also be categorized under the broad category of development aid. This is foreign aid that involves the dissemination of technical skills, extension services and general knowledge. According to the UNESCO convention (2005), technical aid is assistance provided by international specialists through sharing of information and expertise, skills and training, consultancy, sharing of knowledge and may also involve transfer of technical data. Technical assistance often strives to maximize the quality of project implementation and impact through support policy development, management and capacity building.

Technical assistance for several decades has sometimes assumed the nature of support in terms of teaching staff in various institutional levels of education and specialized trainers have continually offered skill-training to meet their needs and to achieve their immediate objectives (Riddell 2007). It is also important to point out that both the definition offered by UNESCO and Riddell (2007) only covers a modest role of technical aid in as far transfer of knowledge and expertise between countries is concerned. This is because increasingly, immense knowledge and skills are transferred from developed to developing countries through initiatives and activities of private sectors such as investments, overseas returning private students, migrants, media and books. Nonetheless, there are also problems associated with technical assistance as a form of foreign aid such as the high costs incurred especially regarding consultancy payments.

2.1.2 Humanitarian Aid

Barnett opines that humanitarian aid emerged alongside three phases of ‘humanitarianism’. In his analysis, he identifies imperial humanitarianism from the early 19th century through to World War 2; neo-humanitarianism from World War 2 to end of Cold War; and thirdly, liberal humanitarianism since the end of Cold War (Barnett, 2011). Likewise, Walker and

Maxwell (2009) argue that the evolving structure of the world, made distinctive transformations in the emergence and evolution of humanitarianism. Walker and Maxwell describe the Cold War era as that of 'mercy and manipulation' and the post-Cold War era as 'globalization of humanitarianism'. For Randolph Kent, World War 2 was the turning point in humanitarianism because it represent the recognition for the need to have an effective international intervention on behalf of people suffering from various forms of disasters (Kent, 1987: 36). In terms of institutionalization of humanitarianism, World War 1 is attributed for the establishment of the Commission for the Relief of Belgium (CRB) that was established in 1914 to address the challenges of food for the Belgian and French civilians in the territories that were under German occupation and were subjected to a blockade by the Allied forces (Great Britain, France, Russia, Italy, Romania, Japan and the United States) (Smith, 1985).

Humanitarian aid is assistance or support that is given for the purposes of saving and preventing the further loss of lives, expel immediate suffering, and enable those suffering to maintain and, or, retain their human dignity during and in the aftermath of natural disasters and man-made crisis (Riddell, 2007; OECD, 2017). More often, humanitarian aid has been successful in realizing its tangible objectives. These are not limited to saving lives; distribution of food; emergency healthcare services to individuals affected or exposed to vulnerabilities such as diseases, water shortages, poor sanitation; and shelter to victims who have been displaced because of natural disasters (Olorubtoba & Gray, 2006; Hilhorst & Jansen, 2010). However, the sustained internal conflicts in war prone areas reduce resources to meet development objectives as more resources are directed to meet humanitarian needs (Riddell 2007).

When exploring the question on foreign aid, more emphasis is always placed on the Official Development Assistance. According to Radelet (2016: 4), Global Official Development Assistance grew steadily from the 1960s all through to 1992 when the Cold War came to an

end, and then declined sharply until late 1990s. Aid flows began to increase again towards the end of 1990s following economic crisis of 1998 that led to petitions for more debt relief; when western governments transformed foreign aid to tool of political coercion to developing countries undertaking democratization; and, after the attacks of September 11, 2001 on the United States that marked the beginning of the global war against terrorism (Radelet, 2016: 5).

Historically larger percentage of foreign aid has been provided as bilateral assistance directly from one government to another through agencies such as the French Development Agency, Turkish International Development Agency (TICA), Japan International Development Agency (JICA), UK Aid and US Aid. Some donors also provide aid indirectly as multilateral assistance, by pooling resources together from many donors into a single umbrella donation. Some of the major multilateral institutions include the World Bank; the International Monetary Fund; the African Development Bank; Asian Development Bank; Inter-American Development Banks; European Union; and the various agencies of the United Nations such as United Nations Development Program. Foreign aid continues to remain one of the important sources of foreign capital flows to low and middle-income countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.

2.2 Theoretical Approaches to Foreign Aid

There are several theories that scholars and practitioners of foreign aid use to examine and explain different issues or themes in the foreign aid architecture and domain. Often, scholars attempt to analyze foreign within the context of International Relations (IR) theories in order to understand better the relations between states in the international system. Some of these theoretical approaches include liberal approaches (aid as a source of cooperation); realist approaches (enhancing national power and security); and constructivism (reflection of humanitarianism). A better incite of these theoretical approaches to foreign aid is discussed below.

2.2.1 Idealist/Liberalist Approaches

Idealists are optimistic about human behavior as inherently good and argue that foreign aid allocation is shaped by non-material reasons such as moral inclinations or humanitarian obligations (Cosgriff, 2001). Idealists also argue that donor countries may provide foreign aid to promote democracy and support human rights and freedoms. Studies by Dowling and Hiemenz (1985) and Gillis et al., (1992) supports this argument in their conclusion that states with relatively lower development and per capita incomes receive higher amounts of aid than middle-income countries.

However, liberalism provides a deeper incite on foreign aid. Liberalists argue that to be able to develop an effective and sustainable means of poverty alleviation and other global challenges including ending the dependency on aid, then the market forces in the developing countries must be reinforced (Kamat, 2010). Foreign aid provides a solution to dependency because it can be used to stimulate markets in developing countries. Alternatively, foreign aid is given to end dependency on aid by stimulating economic growth that can have spill over effect on social life such improving healthcare and access to education (Klees, 2010).

Liberalists argue that foreign aid is a platform through which donor and recipient states cooperate in addressing issues of globalization and interdependence. Development in developing countries is viewed as beneficial to donor countries because it offers the opportunity to address some of the major global challenges such as environmental degradation, infectious diseases, hunger and poverty which can also become threats to donor countries if not addressed.

2.2.2 Realist Approaches

Realism contrasts sharply with the idealist/liberalist theoretical perspectives and was widely adopted from World War 2 towards the end of Cold War. Realist scholars interpret foreign aid as a tool used primarily to achieve the national interests of donor countries- both political and

economic interests (Lancaster, 2008). This is because realism perceives the international system as anarchic, thus, states exist in constant fear and suspicion of other states (Schraeder et al., 1998). Governments therefore use foreign aid to sustain or transform the international order to favor their national interests such as security (Gilpin, 1984). This nature of states was adequately manifested during the Cold War era whereby donor states and aid agencies that belonged to either the Soviet Union or the Western bloc provided aid to developing countries based on their allegiances to either of the bloc. However, this power rationale during the Cold War subsided with the collapse of the Soviet and donor states drastically reduced their aid budgets (Carbone, 2017). However, the pursuit for security as emphasized in realism, re-emerged as a motivation for foreign aid programs with more intensity after the September 9th 2001 terrorist attack in US (Lancaster, 2008).

Within the realist theory, there are scholars who have different views of what constitute security, power, and the nature of international system. For classical realists, foreign aid is designed and implemented with the primary consideration of military, political and strategic importance of the recipient countries (Adane-Nigatu, 2015; McKinlay, 1979). Neo-realists on the other hand, argue that foreign aid is given from the consideration of the economic potential of the recipient state (Cosgriff, 2001). Neo-realists argue that foreign is allocated by donor states in way that can ultimately advance their own economic interests. For instance, recipient countries endowed with more natural resources, industrial competitiveness or provide a huge market base for imports from donor countries will benefit from higher amounts of foreign aid (Tuman et al., 2001; Fuller, 2002).

2.2.3 Constructivist Approaches

The constructivist theory that has strong foundations on sociological traditions by Weber and Durkheim (Ruggie, 1998: 857) plays a major role in analyzing and addressing issues in world politics and its greatest attraction is the fact that it posits to rest precisely at the interchange

between rationalism and reflectivism approaches. It offers an alternative understanding on themes such as foreign policies, balance of power and anarchy, the difference between state identity and interests, what power entails and any prospects for change in world politics (Hopf, 1998: 172).

Constructivists highlight the increased legitimacy and the improved enforcement mechanisms of international law and the efforts of governments to demonstrate some level of attention to human rights (Barratt, 2007). According to Mughanda (2011) relations between states in global politic cannot be comprehensible without rules, regulations and norms that are mutually recognized. Because foreign aid allocation is also a social construct, recipients of foreign aid ought to conform with the rules and regulations of maintaining a secure international system, promote democratic processes and universal respect human rights (Mughanda, 2011). Respecting these norms is important for developing countries that receive aid because their interests can be changed or formed by the international norms that provide meaning to international politics. In the absence of these norms, states can therefore not be predictable (Jemczyk, 2015).

As such, constructivists view foreign aid donation as not necessarily driven by states' pursuit of maximization of power or and security, or for enhancing cooperation between donors and recipients, but rather, for the sake of moral imperatives (Lancaster, 2008). Foreign aid recipient states can therefore access foreign aid based on political stability (democracy), recognition of mutually shared values (democracy, human rights), and social reconstruction within partner states (Fielden, 1998). In other words, allocation of foreign aid to developing countries is fundamentally to improve the quality of life in less developed states.

2.2.4 **Post-Colonial Approaches to Foreign Aid**

Post-colonial approaches emerged from the scholarly critique of Western enlightenment by placing emphasis on resisting ideologies that tend give legitimacy to a perceived notion of

Western superiority particularly with regard to the colonial experience. The notion on Western supremacy over other regions was largely conceived in terms of knowledge and the development models of the West. These ideas formed some of the underlying factors for European colonialism that was characterized by cultural, political, and economic exploitation of colonies which were viewed as being backward or 'uncivilized' by the Western powers.

According to Foucault (1980), the major feature of post-colonial approaches is the emphasis on demonstrating how the structural relations such as domination are expressed and legitimized by socio-political and economic discourses between the dominators and the dominated. Post-colonial critics examine Western discourses such as colonialism and how they continue to manifest in contemporary times. In regard to foreign aid, post-colonial scholars criticize foreign aid as a continuation of colonialism. These scholars (Moore, 2015; Escobar, 2012) refute the idea that aid is provided to advance the course of free trade and development in order to reduce poverty or inequality is simply part of a larger liberal agenda. In other words, post-colonial theory highlight ties between donors and recipients and how they relate to each other with regard to foreign aid and emphasize that donor-recipient relations reflects similar features witnessed during the colonial era.

2.3 Summary

Various theories have been fronted to examine foreign aid as an aspects of international relations. While these theories explain different aspects of foreign aid, no single theory provides a comprehensive analysis of why countries give or accept aid. This is partly due tto the fact that different countries pursue different interests in the international system. There are powers that prioritize economic relations, politics or cultural interests. Secondly, in regard to the time frame, states pursue and prioritize strategic interests based on the structure of the international system during a particular period. For instance, states may harbor different priorities in post-2000s eras from those that were pursued during the 1990s. For powers such

as France that are seeking to maintain if not increase their international status as a major global power, the diverse interests cannot be merely contained in a single theory but rather, can be examined from the different theoretical perspectives that examine different interests and why France adopts its foreign aid to pursue such interests.

2.4 Theoretical Framework: Foreign Aid as an Instrument of Foreign Policy

Without any prior analysis of foreign aid, the fact that it is allocated to other countries connotes that it is a subject of foreign policy. The main distinctions that arise are, first, whether foreign aid is allocated from the main consideration of political relations and that its main objectives are to achieve specific strategic, ideological or strategic benefits of the donor. Secondly, whether foreign aid is not given by donor countries so that they can have direct benefits from it but rather, as means of supplementing domestic resources and adding additional resources for the development and social transformation of recipient states.

Several theories have been developed to examine the use of foreign aid as a tool of foreign policy. Often, this is examined through an analysis of how involved donor countries are in the recipient countries, or in other words, the social, political and economic influence of donor states in recipient countries. As can be deduced in the literature review section, the involvement of France in SSA is extensive. As such no single theory of International Relations can comprehensively capture the dynamics of how France uses its foreign aid as a tool of foreign policy. This thesis therefore adopts three major theories to contextual French foreign aid and its interests in Africa in a period spanning three phases of Cold (up to 1990) War, post-Cold War (1990s), and the age of multilateralism (from the 2000s).

During the Cold War, the structure of the international system was largely driven by the pursuit for power and security. For France, foreign aid enabled it to establish strong ties as a continuation of its former colonial empire particularly with the countries in Francophone

Africa. Through foreign aid, France established strong ties with SSA heads of states and governments who in turn supported French agenda in the international system. But, for France, influence in SSA did not just represent its global ambitions to remain a major power. The region represented French interests in terms of culture and more specifically, the French language. As such, while France was driven by power and allocated foreign aid to secure and sustain its influence in the continent, foreign was also to pursue its cultural ambitions. The Cold War era therefore represented aspects of classical realism and constructivism in French foreign policy which was secured and sustained through foreign aid.

During the post-Cold War, the structure of international system transformed with the end of Cold War. The end of security threat from the Soviet Union and emergence of Western dominated international power structure saw the Western bloc push for liberalization of countries into market economies and democracy. To influence developing countries into adopting these far-reaching reforms, foreign aid was allocated based on compliance to democratization. France as a major Western power also subjected its foreign aid allocation. Theoretically, the post-Cold War era for France reflected liberal and neoliberal tendencies in its foreign policy and foreign aid allocation to SSA. Moreover, from the late 1990s to the 2000s, multilateralism emerged as a new framework for global cooperation on the eradication of poverty which had substantially increased in SSA due to economic crises, conflicts and political instabilities experienced throughout the 1990s.

3 LITERATURE REVIEW

This section will address literature on foreign aid and the engagement of France in SSA. Studies on foreign aid can be broadly categorized into three. The first category of literature

examines the impacts of foreign aid, the second category analyses how foreign aid is allocated, and thirdly, what determines the allocation of foreign aid.

3.1 Literature on Effects of Foreign Aid

Scholars on this category of foreign aid analysis examine the impact of foreign aid channelled through bilateral or multilateral agencies with the central question, 'does aid work?' Casella and Eichengreen (1996) in their studies regarding the impacts of foreign aid on economic stabilization conclude that foreign aid is only effective in addressing a particular economic event under specific circumstances. Boone (1996) reaffirms this argument by documenting in his studies on economic impacts of foreign aid as having no effect on investments and on the contrary, only contributes to higher consumption. Burnside and Dollar (2000) reiterate that foreign aid can only be effective on countries with good, working and stable policies.

Making a unilateral conclusion on the effects of foreign aid is rather difficult because of at least two fundamental reasons. First, the experience of foreign differs across regions or countries. Whereas aid programs such as the Marshal Plan which registered success plan in Europe, other aid programs in regions such as SSA particularly during the structural adjustment programs did not yields success. Secondly, governments and multilateral institutions have failed to adequately outline the output of their foreign aid programs. More emphasis is given on the input of foreign aid by bilateral and multilateral aid agencies. In other words, while there is clear communication regarding the amounts and in what form foreign aid is distributed, that is not replicated in discussions regarding the output of the same.

Nonetheless, this also resulted in more pressure from critics of foreign aid, civil societies, donors, and recipients of foreign aid leading to a formal process that established the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. The implementation of the Paris declaration is influencing donors and recipients to evaluate means through which foreign aid can systematically allocated and used to create development.

3.2 How and Why do Donors Give Aid?

The second category which examines who gives aid and why perhaps captures the central theme of this study. Focus on these studies is on how and why donors allocate foreign aid. Do the former colonies, strategic allies, poor countries or any other recipient of aid receive the largest share of aid? And if yes, why? If not, why?

For instance, Robinson (2008), in a study on the use of foreign aid by Germany as instrument of foreign policy in Africa argues that it has allowed Germany to expand its market base for German products and services in the continent and thereby increasing the global status of Germany as a major international power. In terms of global security, Germany has used its foreign aid as an instrument of foreign policy in fighting poverty and advancing the agenda on good governance through the development of fundamental democratic principles. Robinson (2008) argues that Germany has used its foreign aid platform to advance its foreign policy agenda on environmental conservation where Germany remains a global leader.

Akiko (2000), also provides a study on how Japan has used its foreign aid as an instrument of the Japanese foreign policy. Despite Japan being one of the previous largest beneficiaries of foreign aid during the 1970s, this has henceforth shifted and today Japan is one of the major foreign aid donors. Akiko (2000) argues that Japan's foreign aid contribution especially towards Africa has been as a tool of its foreign policy goals of international conflict prevention and building of peace. This has been evidenced by the vast Japanese foreign aid investments in sectors such as education, healthcare and infrastructure. Akiko (2000) argues that Japan is using its foreign aid to influence countries from preoccupations with military build-ups, creation of weapons of mass destruction, violations of human rights and freedoms as well as the chronic degradation of the environment. These key foreign policy agendas have the capabilities to directly threaten the security of Japan and its survival. Additionally, Balcı and Yeşiltaş (2005) in their study of Japanese foreign aid and its foreign policy, conclude that

Japan uses its development assistance as a foreign policy tool to advance her national interests such as national security since 1950s as the primary foreign policy goals while those of humanitarian assistance and promotion of good governance (democracy) remain secondary objectives.

Andreasen (2014) argues that whereas the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) have established mechanisms for evaluating its foreign aid performance relative to economic development, there was still low focus put on the use of foreign aid by US as an instrument of foreign policy. He concludes his study by highlighting that the regression analysis outcome of the US foreign economic and military aid falls short in achieving US foreign policy goals because in as much as foreign aid made gains in the attainment of market liberation, the provision of military aid alongside this cancels all the gains made. Moreover, whereas the use of foreign aid as an instrument of foreign policy may result in stability of government, it is an expensive endeavor for the US government.

In his book "UAE and Foreign Policy: Foreign aid, identities and interests," Almezaini (2012) documents that UAE is the leading foreign aid donor in the Middle East and one of the leading international foreign aid donors in respect to its gross domestic product to advance its foreign policy objectives of pursuing humanitarian support, moral and diplomatic ties with recipient countries. The core argument by Almezaini (2012) is that although UAE uses its foreign aid for political considerations especially during the 1970s, increasingly, cultural factors have become the main influence for UAE's use of foreign aid as a tool of foreign policy specifically from the 1980s.

Turkey has also deployed its foreign aid capabilities more so in Africa, the Middle East and the Balkans. Turkish humanitarian assistance has become a key component of its foreign policy approach that among other objectives, striving to build strong relations with aid-recipient states, increase bilateral trade, spread Turkish culture and advance Turkish influence

on global affairs. According to Ozkan (2011), the priority of Turkey in its foreign policy and bilateral relations is driven by mutual need for economic development and this has been one the key factors that has led to the establishment of various projects under the foreign development auspices of TIKA in more than 37 countries across the continent.

For France, the colonial links with Africa are extensive in economics, politics, and culture, making Sub-Sahara Africa an integral component of the French global agenda. Having been weakened by the World War 2, Africa became even more important to France as a means of restoring the global power image of France. According to Martin (2000), post-World War 2 saw a shift in French foreign policy in Africa beyond the previous geopolitical and diplomatic interactions to include economic and financial interests for France. As a consequence, France has opted to expand its influence beyond its traditional Francophone allies to other new allies all over the African continent. Hugon (2003) reaffirms this by arguing that France has since established comparatively stronger ties with other non-franc zone African states than those within the franc zone. Moncrieffe (2012) however stresses that although French foreign policy in Africa has since shifted more towards economic and financial interactions, France stills maintains its military links through bases in countries it considers as strategic to her foreign policy goals.

3.3 Determinants of Foreign Aid

The third literature category of foreign aid addresses the determinants of foreign aid and make comparative analyses between donors. The main focus of these literature is the amount of foreign aid relative to GDP (Imbeau 1989; Pratt 1989; Lumsdaine 1993; Noël and Thérien 1995). However, a study by Breuning and Ishivanna (2003), examines the dispersion of foreign aid. The studies aforemention examine various aspects of donor states and hypothesize that states that have generous domestic welfare, positively correlate with relative

levels of foreign aid. (Imbeuau, 1989; Pratt, 1989). However, Imbeau (1989) emphasizes that institutional inertia is the primary factor in foreign aid levels.

According to Lumsdaine (1993), there is a link between domestic and international concerns or interests for the eradication of poverty. As such, Lumsdaine argues that foreign aid was broadly the result of humanitarian ideas and values that found support within the domestic political systems, religious and moral traditions of Western countries. These values influenced support for international cooperation and determination on the need to eradicate poverty. As such, the levels of foreign aid are determined by how concerned and committed the donor state is regarding poverty eradication. Other studies (Alesina & Dollar, 2000) have also argued that foreign aid is determined by the needs of the recipient countries or whether recipient countries uphold human rights and advance the course for democracy (Gates & Hoefler, 2004).

3.4 France in Africa

3.4.1 Franco-African Relations

Several scholars (Péan 1990; Foccart parle I. 1995; Gaillard. 1997; Smith & Glaser 1992 1997; Verschave, 1998) have conducted studies on Franco-Africa relations since the end of decolonization of the continent. These scholars argue that decolonization did not mark the end but rather a restructuring of the previous imperial relationship between Africa and France and that the French turned back to Sub- Saharan Africa as the region for projection of French power. Varschave (1998) argues that these relations occurred at different levels. Politically, many post- independence Francophone African leaders had developed close political ties with members of the French house of Deputies in Paris. Franco-African summits became regular and these ties were cemented by regular visits by the French heads of state. Additionally, several French teachers, doctors, lecturers and education advisors purposely served to reinforce the French cultural presence in Sub-Saharan Africa.

In addition, (Chaffer, 1996: 558) documents that Sub-Saharan Africa became the centre where France projected its military power having an annual average military intervention of at least once during the first 35 years of independence in the region. Chaffer (1996) and Adda and Smouts (1989) also argue that the economic aid given majorly to francophone Sub- Saharan Africa served to facilitate the strategic interests of France in the region. Other studies such as Andreasen (2014) in discussing the use of foreign aid by the United States argues that it is primarily to advance global political stability, political influence and increase market liberalization in countries that are recipients of foreign aid.

3.4.2 France and the Colonial Past

Whereas former colonial powers granted full independence to their former colonies, France established far-reaching post-independence pacts with several SSA countries that were its former colonies.

Figure 4: France Colonial Empower in Africa



Francis (2016) documents the continuation of French foreign policy in Africa as part of the historical colonial relations that allots France a privileged position in Francophone zones. Accordingly, Koutonin (2008) notes that the colonial pact between France and some African countries has developed into legal mechanisms that sustains the French political and economic activities in the continent as it seeks to achieve its foreign policy interests. Francis (2016) argues that the activities of France in Francophone zones has led to low rates of development and exacerbated dependency by some African countries leading to consequences such as recurring political instability and civil conflicts.

3.4.3 La Francafrique

According to Touati (2007) the idea of Francafrique is a controversial diplomatic component that fails to account the comprehensively the interests of citizens in decision-making processes. Touati (2007) opines that despite the end of colonialism in the region, the reality

and operational mechanism of neo-colonial Francafrique[1] remains functional. The conditionalities imposed by international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund regarding the criteria of accessing international aid based on agreeing to free market competition has seen Sub-Saharan African countries prioritise personal ties with donor countries such as France. This has resulted in a network of both French and African elites who have been accused of supporting and entrenching autocratic and corrupt regimes in the region through the support of France foreign aid machinery (Bovcon, 2011). Moreover, Bovcon (2011) highlights that Francafrique is underpinned fundamentally by the ideological discourse that sustains Franco-African relations by making them resilient to change.

According to Francis (2013), the military intervention of France in Sub-Sahara African countries such as Mali in 2012 and even more contemporarily in Libya is a clear indication that France is not yet about to end its long history of military intervention in the continent. Francis (2013) argues that such actions reflect an opaque Françafrique tradition. Renou (2000) in his article; "A Major Obstacle to African Unity: The New Franco-American Cold War on the Continent", identifies three key components of the foreign policy of France in the continent during the 1990s. Renou (2000) argues that France exploits its vast influence in the region to secure its international reputation as a leading medium power; to secure raw materials and sources of energy critical to its domestic industries; and thirdly, to maintain its market monopoly in Francophone Sub-Saharan Africa.

3.4.4 France and the United Nations on Africa

A study by Melly and Darracq (2013) on French policy in Africa, argues that France sees its foreign policy interests in the continent to be under threat. The study highlights the concerns of French diplomats at the UN that the increased activities of emerging powers in the

[1] Francafrique is conceived as a network of high-ranking French and African elites who spearhead or extensively influence the formulation of foreign policies. This category of people consists of politicians, state officials, heads of oil, gas and weapon manufacturing companies.

international system is creating new dynamics in Africa. This is particularly true for the period between 2011-12 when all the members of BRICS (Brazil, India, China, and South Africa) were members of the UN Security Council. Notably, France and the UK previously took the leading role in initiating and discussing African issues in the Security Council. However, recent times has seen major powers such as China and Russia challenge this authority by weighing on issues pertaining to Africa using their veto powers to shoot down resolutions of the council. However, Melly and Darracq (2013) also argue that there are grounds for cooperation between the foreign policy interests of France and China in areas such as security and stability of the region.

Nonetheless, has been an active actor at the UN in discussing and initiating resolutions that concerns Africa. Since 1995, under President Chirac, France established a new military strategy for Africa in order to prevent itself from being dragged into civil wars like it was with the Rwandan genocide experience. Increasingly, France accepted and supported delegation of peacekeeping missions in Africa from the UN and African. France initiated the Reinforcement of Peacekeeping Capacites (RECAMP) programme to assist in the training od African troops for UN peacekeeping operations in the continent (Melly & Darracq, 2013).

3.4.5 France and Military Engagement in Africa

Sıradağ (2014) has covered the security interests of France in Africa. He notes that France has long standing ties with the continent as early as the 17th century that are both political and economic in nature. Sıradağ (2014) argues that France has deep security interests and that, this has influenced France to engage approximately more than 50 times in military interventions across the continent since 1960. This military power of France in Africa has strengthened its political and economic influence.

Since the end of colonial era, France has established a significant military presence in Africa through the establishment of military bases and signed military cooperation agreements with

several Francophone African countries that has enabled it to maintain military bases in countries such as Chad, Central African Republic, Senegal, Côte D' Ivoire and Gabon. Medard (2005) argues that these military cooperation agreements between former French colonies in Sub-Sahara Africa are not only to guarantee the interests of France in the continent but to also safeguard African countries from both external and internal threats. In justifying the intervention of France in domestic affairs of its former African colonies, former President Hollande argued that such actions were meant to prevent the establishment of terror states that can be a security threat to France and the West. Hollande cited the near collapse of the Malian state in 2012 after the military of Mali failed to halt the advances of separatist rebels and their jihadist allies. Francis (2016) argues that failure by other African countries to deploy forces in such circumstances therefore forces France to make unilateral decisions to intervene in certain conflicts in the region.

Moncrieff (2012) criticizes French military activities in the continent and emphasizes the need for France to provide a comprehensive and well outlined support for democracy and other political reforms in the region with the collaboration of other regional bodies. Raphala (2017) also provides a sharp critique of French foreign security policy using the case studies of Ivory Coast and the Central African Republic. He argues that the deep involvement of France in the continent has earned it a rather unpopular tag of being a ‘police officer’ in Francophone Africa sometimes at the expense of Africans whose security become threatened.

3.5 South-South Cooperation

New studies on foreign aid have also examined South-South bilateral aid cooperation. Whereas the traditional foreign aid structure has been one that sees foreign aid flowing from the developed countries (north) to developing countries (south), there is a paradigm shift. The phenomenon of South-South cooperation has received a greater momentum in the system of foreign aid. Increasingly, emerging powers from the Global South are becoming active actors

in the framework of foreign aid. Emerging powers of the Global South such as China, India, Brazil, and South Africa are not only regional powers, but are becoming more active in international politics (Purushothaman, 2013).

Amongst these rising Southern donor, China and India are distinctive as the largest foreign aid donors while other emerging powers such as Brazil, Turkey, and South Africa are increasingly play important roles as providers of development assistance (Purushothaman, 2013). However, even though the amount of development assistance provided by these emerging Southern powers is comparatively lower to the traditional foreign aid donors, their role are nonetheless increasing despite being recipient of foreign aid themselves. According to Kragelund (2010), despite China and India being the leading donors in South-South cooperation, they occupy a dual position as both foreign aid donor and recipient countries.

Unlike the DAC donors, South-South emerging donors are yet to develop institutions of self-restraint that regulate their foreign aid structures. However, the absence of rules and regulations similar to those applied by DAC donors, allows these emerging donors to use foreign aid in pursuing their short-term national interests (Sato et al., 2010). Emerging donors also offer choice to recipient countries against the DAC donor thereby establish an environment for healthy competition (Sat et al., 2010).

Emerging donors particularly China has come under heavy criticism. First, China has been criticized for using foreign aid to purse political (recipients to drop diplomatic ties with Taiwan in favor of China) and commercial interests (promoting Chinese exports and securing access to raw materials in recipient countries) (Woods, 2008). Secondly, the allocation of aid to undemocratic and corrupt governments, there is fear that China can potentially undermine the efforts of traditional donors to provide aid based on merit of the recipient regimes (Kragelund, 2010). Traditional donors have also developed frameworks that account for

important issues such as environmental appraisals and macroeconomic policies. South-South donors have been criticized for not considering these factors (Manning, 2006).

In summary, the above studies have widely covered the subject of foreign aid and the involvement of France in SSA. However, there still exists a gap in literature that comparatively analyze the changes in France foreign aid and questions France has instrumentalized its foreign aid as a tool of its foreign policy. More specifically, to the best of our knowledge, there exists no comparative analysis on how French foreign has evolved in Sub-Sahara Africa with changes in the international systems. From the Cold War era that was characterized by ideological competition, to post-Cold War era of democratization and globalization, no study has undertaken a comparative study of French foreign aid and how these changes in aid were reflected in France's foreign policy in Sub-Sahara Africa. This concern forms the underlying aim of this thesis.

4 FRENCH FOREIGN AID IN SUB-SAHARA AFRICA

4.1 Foundation of French Foreign Aid

4.1.1 Historical Mindset

The concentration of French aid in Africa has historically been associated with the political, economic, cultural and linguistic ties with its former colonies (Hayter, 1965). France has consistently been ranked among the top four largest providers of foreign aid both before and after the Cold War (OECD, 1998: 15). A study by Meimon (2005), highlights that from the beginning, the actors in French foreign aid mobilized to reaffirm Africans the depoliticized nature of the French foreign aid approach in the region especially during the early decades after independence in the 1960s. France highlighted that its foreign aid policy was founded on a basis of 'a noble course' and was to be executed by highly qualified and experienced agents largely drawn from a pool of former colonial administrators (Dimier, 2001).

During World War 2, the colonial administration of France underwent far-reaching changes that enabled it to play a major role in the management of foreign aid after the war. The Caisse centrale de la France libre (CCFL) was established in 1941 to manage all the revenues and circulation on currency largely in francophone Africa (Patat & Lutfalla, 1990). Furthermore, the Ministry of Colonies was cleaved into two. One division was mandated with 'overseas France' that included Africa and the other division overseeing 'associated States'. The authority of these divisions extended over all French spheres of influence in sub-Saharan Africa and in the Pacific (Dimier, 2001).

The Caisse centrale de la France libre (CCFL) would later play an important role in the formulation of reconstruction policy in Sub-Saharan Africa (French West Africa and Equatorial Africa). In 1944, it was reformed, and its authority increased to encompass development. Notably, the management of this new institution was drawn from members of the Free France Movement who had served alongside African compatriots in the Liberation of

France (Bridier, 1991). This group had a different mentality from those of the former colonial administrators involved in foreign aid. For instance, the establishment of 46-860 Act of 1946 initiated a ten-year plan for the funding and execution of social development programs in Sub-Sahara Africa to improve quality of life (Pacquement, 2010).

The Act also provided for the establishment of mixed economy companies in Sub-Sahara Africa in which the French state maintained majority holding. Additionally, this Act transformed the Franc Zone into a very protective grouping that minimized contact between the countries in francophone Sub-Sahara Africa and other regions within and outside Africa (Hayter, 1966: 10). It is the Caisse centrale de la France libre (CCFL) that gradually transformed over the years to become the present-day française de développement (AFD).

After World War 2, France increased expenditures in colonial territories based on the vision of establishing a great French Union whereby extensive part of Sub-Sahara Africa would be indirectly assimilated into France with the promise of to the enjoying the benefits of being part of the France (Chafer, 2001). In the former France West African territories, the net expenditure on civil servants per person increased four times from a previous average of 7.7 (1913 francs) in 1930 to 33.4 francs per head in 1955. Notably, this increase in expenditure on civil servants for instance was not the direct result of inflation but rather due to the rising number of labor movements in French colonies (Cogneau et al., 2018). The labor movements dominated by African civil servants in the formal sector demanded that they receive similar renumerations to their French counterparts in mainland France using the "equal pay for equal work" slogan (Cooper & Frederick 1996).

After independence of French colonies from 1960s, more ties in commerce, development co-operation and finance; diplomacy; and the military cooperation agreements between France and Côte d'Ivoire (1960), the Central African Republic (1960), Djibouti (1977), Gabon (1960), Senegal (1960, revised in 1974), Cameroon (1960, revised in 1974), Comoros (1973,

revised in 1978) and Togo (1963) were established (Lavallee & Lorchard, 2019). While majority of these states became autonomous republics in 1958 in the French Community, their subsequent attainment of independence in the 1960s provided a platform for the renewal of deep military and economic cooperation with France.

4.1.2 Humanitarian Claim

France commissioned the Jeanneney Report in 1963 which provided the basis for French foreign aid to its former colonies and other regions by highlighting that foreign aid from France would also be premised on humanitarian support. The report argued that even if France considered poverty of other countries as non-threatening its own development or security, France must come to their aid for the mere reason that it would be intolerable to ignore the fate of such countries. The Jeanneney Report (1963: 20) documents that:

> "The first reason, sufficient in itself, for a French policy of cooperation with the Third World is the feeling which France has of her duties towards humanity.' The populations of many countries are increasing so fast that even a modest improvement in individual situations would require a long-term rate of economic growth superior to those of Europe and the United States. Over a thousand million people are in danger of suffering a drop in their standard of living. France certainly cannot change the fate of these multitudes alone. But the disproportion between her means and the immensity of the work to be accomplished is not an excuse for inaction. Even if France thought that the misery of others threatened neither her security nor her development, she should assist them simply because it would be intolerable to be heedless of their fate. 'To fail in this duty would be to deny the civilisation which she incarnates, to destroy its inspiration, to endanger its flowering. Politics here combine with ethics."

Additionally, the report highlighted that it is the desire for France to expand the reach of French language, culture and that in the long-term, France stood to experience certain

political and economic benefits from giving aid (Jeanneney Report, 1963). The French language was identified as one aspect of the French culture that was targeted to expand and become a universal language (Mughanda, 2011). In the context of SSA, the report argued that French language would be of great importance, because indigenous languages in other countries such as Africa were not ideal for the new world driven by technology. The Jeanneney Report (1963: 21) documents that:

> "France has always experienced the need to act beyond her own frontiers. Such action must be the work of men prepared to be expatriates and of a culture aiming at universality. It is better that young men wishing to work abroad should do so in the framework of a national policy of co-operation. Such a policy should make their work as effective as possible, and their stay and return should be so organized that France benefits afterwards from their experiences. France desires more than any other nation to disseminate her language and culture. The French language can be useful to countries whose own language is not suitable for modern ideas and techniques or is not internationally accepted."

4.1.3 Platform for Cultural Cooperation

In 1964 De Gaulle emphasized that "cooperation is from now on a great ambition for France" (Bossaut, 2003: 437). It is evident from its colonial policies in Africa that France put a great value on its 'French civilization' and universal validity. The ideals of the French revolution were not only destined for the French or Europeans but was envisioned to extend across the French frontiers to other parts of the world thus, the need to spread its ideals and civilization is a fundamental motive for French foreign aid.

Scholars such as Schraeder et al., (1998) argue that French foreign aid was intended to be an expression of its cultural expansion such that a significant percentage of its total aid is in the form of technical assistance. Prior to the independence of SSA, cultural imperialism contrary to economic or military imperialism, was a policy that France attached significant value

(Hayter, 1965). French as a language is the primary tool of spreading the French culture and is unique component of French foreign aid comparatively to the approach of other donors. The relevance of French language and the pursuit of its universality by France made it an essential determining factor in French foreign aid policy decision-making processes and a premise for cooperation with recipient countries (Martin, 1989; Hook, 1995).

In 1959, Charles de Gaulle established the Ministry of Cooperation with the mandate to spearhead development in countries within the scope of France that largely included former colonies in SSA (Bossuat, 2003). Cultural cooperation became a key pillar in this new relation of foreign aid as espoused by the actions of the Ministry to send volunteers overseas to Africa from 1962 (Cumming, 2017). Whereas in 1964 there were only 154 French public servants, the number of employees significantly increased to 1003 people by 1996 in Sub-Sahara Africa (Cumming, 2001).

Language is a very essential aspect of the French aid policy. Foreign aid allocation data deduced from 1989, demonstrates that the top ten aid recipient countries including Algeria, Morocco, Ivory Coast, Senegal, Cameroon, Mali, Gabon, Madagascar, Chad, and Guinea, were all former colonies of France (Schraeder, 1995). France allocated approximately eighty-two percent of its annual African development assistance budget to these countries that are regarded as part of the Francophonie.

Table 1: Top 20 France Net Bilateral Aid Recipients in 1989

Country	*Foreign Aid Allocation (USD)*
French Polynesia	285,820,001
New Caledonia	280,450,010
Senegal	255,020,004
Ivory Coast	196,529,999
Morocco	157,380,000
Madagascar	107,070,000
Indonesia	108,940,000
Mali	108,160,004
Gabon	104,239,998
China	103,390,000
India	103,390,000
Congo Dem. Republic	99,459,999
Guinea	96,059,998
Cameroon	95,639,999
Benin	83,669,998
Chad	78,129,997
Burkina Faso	70,089,996
Central African Republic	63,889,999
Niger	60,230,000

Source: World Bank Data (2020)

According to Martin (1995: 17), the annual Francophone countries summits are the building pillars of France-Africa cultural ties, due to the fact that they are often extensively advertised as reunions initiated to support further the already close relations between France and African countries.

To solidify its cultural influence in the region, France considered the rise of Mobutu Ssese Seko as an undisputed leader of DR Congo during the 1960s as furthering or promoting the influence of Anglo-Saxon into francophone Africa (Schraeder, 2000). For France, this could

potentially demonstrate triumph for US over French interests (Foccart, 1995: 10-11). As a countermeasure, France embarked on integrating former Belgium colonies into France sphere of influence. Consequently, former colonies of Belgium such as Rwanda, Zaire and Burundi were integrated back into Franco zone and increased the amount of foreign aid allocations throughout the 1980s (McNulty, 1999). As such, the French aid policies during the 1980s were cultivated to counter the influence of Anglo-Saxon (American and British) influence in Francophone Africa. Consequently, higher amounts of foreign aid were given to Rwanda (USD, 199 million), Zaire (USD 461 million) and, Burundi (USD 243 million) (Schraeder, 1998: 318-19).

4.1.4 Platform for Long-Term Benefits

Any allocation of foreign aid to SSA was envisioned to present long-term benefits for the French republic. SSA and other developing countries in the Third World were considered as increasingly becoming enlightened on what was said and done on its behalf and as such, support from these countries was considered as invaluable in the international arena (Jeanneney Report, 1963). Whereas France was cognizant that the strategic requirements of states was rapidly transforming through science and technology, France would still benefit from defense advantages resulting from the goodwill of cooperation between France and SSA (Baumaud, 1995).

The long-term benefits also included economic opportunities. The Jeanneney Report (1963) identified that France could exploit the defense needs for SSA countries and supply aid in the form of machines and installations. But even more importantly, France considered that should aid to SSA assist in fighting underdevelopment and propel these countries towards a path of development, then SSA countries would become new partners in mutually beneficial economic cooperation. This would further enable French industries to penetrate deeper into the SSA market.

"France may also expect economic advantages from supplying in the form of aid high-quality machinery and installations: technical references are thus acquired in countries which may later become solvent and where, without the help of aid, French industries might not have penetrated. The experience gained may also be valuable" (Jeanneney, 1963: 21).

4.2 French Foreign Aid During Cold War

By the 1960s, France was ranked among the top four economic powers in the world (Sachs et al., 1995). Politically it had gained permanent membership position in the UN Security Council, with full veto powers and had emerged as one of the frontrunners of the European dynamic of integration. The French military had also acquired developed nuclear capabilities in 1960. Additionally, France was gaining influence through its membership as a founder in critical security institutions such as North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), and the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) (Renou, 2002). These attributes thrusted France into a leading middle power with vast political and economic influence globally.

In Africa, the clout for independence was getting stronger and France was compelled to cede independence to its former colonies. The decolonization process therefore became an important factor in how France would later associate with its former colonies during and after the Cold War. In SSA, France was determined to maintain its influence because the region provided a strong foundation for France in the international system (UN) as well as in the context of reinforcing its frontiers to better deter external aggression (Chafer, 2016).

Many of the French SSA colonies attained independence from France during the 1960s majorly through peaceful negotiations. However, for France, these negotiations also provided another opportunity to extend its colonial relations through the establishment of cooperation agreements that offered France a preferential access to these countries for raw materials, and for African governments, military protection for their new regimes (Martin, 1995). Colonial

agreements such as the CFA (Communauté Financière Africaine/ Africa Financial Community) monetary system continued and France guaranteed support for several African heads of states (Francafrique) who in turn defended the interests of France in Africa (Siradağ, 2014). The CFA franc was a consolidation of each of the currencies used in French colonies and was instituted during the 1930s and 1940s. The CFA franc currency was pegged to the French franc at an exchange rate of 0.5 CFA francs per French franc[2]. In the Franc Zone, this economic cooperation provided an unlimited currency convertibility guarantee for the CFA franc and the French franc (now euro).

According to Gounnin (2009) and Dozon (2003), the independence of African states from the beginning of independence was tied to aid from France. After independence of its former SSA colonies, the promotion of French culture became a key feature of its foreign policy (Hook, 1994; Schraeder, 1995). For France, its culture was inherently attached to the French language. Quinn and Simon (2006) argue that France provided aid to countries that used French as the official language to ensure that the French culture expands further. Huriaras (1998) documents that the need to expand French language and culture was so strong that the French imagined the existence of an Anglo-Saxon conspiracy that sought to threaten the interests of France in Africa. Consequently, there was a consensus amongst French policymakers that French language was to be spread further (policy of rayonnement/shine/spread). Former Prime Minister Georges Pompidou said, "for us Frenchmen, there is somehow a need to defend the French tongue. This is a fundamental reason to maintain bilateral aid" (Lancaster, 1999: 257).

Despite granting independence to African states, it did not create any major disruptions to France because the heads of states and government of the newly independent African states

[2] The O.5 Exchange rate remained until January1994 except for the adjustments in the French Franc in 1968 that introduced a new Frenh Franc equivalent to 100 francs of the old currency. The rate of exchange remained the same for the old franc but increased to 50 CFA francs for the new French franc.

had already established close ties with France (Quinn & Simon, 2006). In the case of Guinea that voted to break ties with France in 1958, only attracted French retaliation by cutting off all foreign aid to Guinea for 18 years.[3] To other SSA that maintained good relations with France, aid was given in conspicuously large amounts, heavily tied and predominantly through bilateral aid channels (Cumming, 2001). De Gaulle argued that French aid would acquire the highest diplomatic leverage in the region because of the existing strong personal relations between France and African political elites (Lancaster, 1999).

During the Cold War, empirical studies by Schraeder et al., (1998) concludes that the need for France to maintain its influence in SSA, influenced its foreign aid allocation. Specifically, cooperation in military, trade and linguistic/cultural ties, became the underlying factors that explained hoe France allocated foreign aid during the Cold War era. Unlike other countries or donor aid programs, other factors such as ideology had minimal impact of French foreign to SSA during the Cold War (McKinlay, 1979; Hook, 1994).

4.3 Foreign Aid During 1990's

4.3.1 Democratization

From the beginning of the 1990s, SSA was undergoing changes in response to the transformation of the international power structure that was facing eminent collapse of Soviet Union. This triumph of Western capitalism and structures of governance in the form of democracy, led to the emergence of a new group of post-independence African politicians challenging the political status quo in the region who had benefited for decades from close relations and protection from foreign powers such as France (Makinda, 1996). Political regimes in the former colonies of France such as Gabon and DR Congo had survived the Cold

[3] De Gaulle took the no vote in Guinea to the 1958 French attempt to establish a French community of states very seriously. See, for example, LeVine (2004)

War and attempted regime changes because France intervened on several occassions militarily to either protect regimes from coups, or restore regimes after coups.

Table 2: French Military Interventions in Former SSA Colonies

Year	Country	Mission
1990	Gabon	To support president Omar Bongo and evacuate foreign nationals from cities damaged by political protests
1991	DR Congo (Zaire)	To support the regime of Mobutu Sese Seko
1995	Comoros	To halt a coup and protect the regime
1996-7	Central African Republic	To maintain order after a coup

Source: Sıradağ, 2014

Other regimes favourable to French interests such as the apartheid regime and settler states in Angola, Rhodesia and Mozambique, France also provided military aid that enabled them last longer. In Sudan, France supported the Sudanese regime that was waging war against the secessionists in the south, while in Nigeria, France supported the Biafran rebels in order to undermine the influence of Nigeria (allied with Britain) in West Africa (Renou, 2002). Between 1990-1997 France also provided large supply of weapons and military support ally regimes in Gabon, DR Congo, CAR and Comoros that only fuelled internal rebellions (Jackson, 2007). This is because in the absence of democratic processes to changing regimes, political violence became the alternative option for groups and political parties advocating for change in governance (Wang, 1998). Despite the intervention of France on behalf of ally-SSA governments, internal conflicts and calls for democratization remained prevalent.

At the beginning of the 1990s decade, France hinted its intentions to retract from its previous security logic of the Cold War and unconditional support for authoritarian regimes in SSA which was increasingly becoming unjustifiable (Martin, 1995). This intent in policy change is captured in the speech by President Francoise Mitterrand in June 1990 during the France-Africa Summit (Bat, 2012; Schraeder, 1995: 551). President Mitterrand announced that

moving forward, French foreign aid allocation to SSA countries would be tied to democratization processes:

> "We must talk about democracy. You should not consider freedom to be a hidden enemy. It will be, believe me, your best friend. French aid would in the future flow more enthusiastically to those countries that take steps toward democracy" (The New York Times, June 22, 1990).

This commitment to promote democratization remained a dream for most parts of the 1990s. Countries that were experimenting the path of democracy such as Niger, Mali and Benin were subjected to reduced foreign aid allocation while those that were recognized as dictatorships such as Zaire, Togo and Cameroon received more French aid. According to Bourmaud (1996), France continued to facilitate and implement foreign aid programs that assisted pro-France SSA regimes to organize and win general elections. For example, the authoritarian regime in Cameroon led by Paul Biya was a recipient of foreign aid increment from USD 159 million in 1990 to USD 175.7 million and USD 425.7 million in 1991 and 1993 respectively. The increased foreign aid flow to the regime of Paul Biya was to facilitate another electoral victory for Paul Biya against the leading frontrunner John Fru who was from the Anglophone Cameroon and perceived as hostile to French interests (Bourmaud, 1996).

Table 3: Net bilateral aid flows from France to Selected Sub-Sahara African States

	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
CAR	69,730,003	70,019,997	87,699,997	61,990,002	52,500,000	44,259,998	31,080,000	30,670,000
Niger	115,830,002	103,080,002	86,779,999	136,070,007	73,440,002	86,839,996	94,580,002	66,110,001
Mali	92,449,997	89,660,004	80,160,004	90,730,003	81,699,997	82,300,003	63,169,998	59,689,999
Benin	83,889,999	35,790,001	45,570,000	56,400,002	54,270,000	44,259,998	26,580,000	28,770,000
Zaire	72,199,997	24,090,000	16,459,999	12,280,000	14,670,000	14,880,000	12,920,000	9,770,000
Togo	71,669,998	57,630,001	44,419,998	36,540,001	67,949,997	35,980,000	32,630,001	31,620,001
Cameroon	175,720,001	407,269,989	425,709,991	308,549,988	265,160,004	176,009,995	199,839,996	152,770,004

Source: Word Bank Data

This marked the foreseeable end of France aid as a tool of its francophone patronage (Cumming, 2003).

During the 1990's, SSA's political regimes were largely described as either autocratic[4] or closed anocracy.[5] None of the French military interventions in the region in the 1990s served to support or establish democratic processes. For instance, foreign aid in terms of military intervention, military aid, and economic package of USD 160 million, that was intended for the Rwandan regime under President Habyarimana between 1990 and 1994, was to counter the People's Front for Restructuring (FPR) rebels who were perceived as pro-American

[4] A system of government in which an autocrat, defined as a single person or party, possesses supreme and absolute power. The decisions of this autocrat are subject to neither external legal restraints nor regularized mechanisms of popular control (See, Johnson, P. M. (2013). A glossary of political economic terms. *http://www.auburn.edu/~ johnspm/gloss/index. html? http://www. auburn. edu/- johnspm/gloss/trade-off. html*.)

[5] A regime that permits some means of participation through opposition group behaviour but that has incomplete development of mechanisms to redress grievances. (See, Regan, Patrick; Bell, Sam (December 2010). "Changing Lanes or Stuck in the Middle: Why Are Anocracies More Prone to Civil Wars?". *Political Science Quarterly*. **63** (4): 747–759)

(Prunier, 1995). Military uprisings in the Central African Republic to oust the democratically elected but increasingly authoritarian and corrupt regime of President Habyarimana that maintained close ties with France attracted French military intervention. This affirmed that authoritarian regimes in SSA that were democratically elected or not, had nothing to fear as France would not abandon them if the regime safeguarded French interests.

In countries as Zaire (DR Congo), whereas France issued a public condemnation of the Mobutu Sese Sseko regime for its failure to conduct elections, it maintained a 'humanitarian assistance' that provided lifeline to the regime against rebels for several more years (Cumming, 2003). France ultimately withdrew its support to DR Congo government because the Joseph Kabila-led guerrilla rebels was supported by the US and the Mobutu regime had lost its international credibility (Vershave, 1998).

4.3.2 Emergence of Global Governance

Towards the end of the 1990s, it was becoming clear that the approach of France to SSA since independence, was in crisis and facing a catastrophic failure (Vershave, 1998). SSA was in both economic and political crisis. Economically, the 1990s coincided with the peak of the gross failure of the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) imposed on African countries by international institutions such as International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank that had begun in the 1980s. During the implementation of these reforms opposition political parties condemned governments especially on the issue of privatization of public companies to foreign powers like France (Arnd et al., 2000). For example, Gabonese Interior Minister Louis Gaston Mayila, denounced privatization as a form of "economic recolonization" (Harsch, 2000: 8). In a few countries such as Ghana and Zaire (DR Congo), opposition to privatization has been cited as one factor in the ouster of incumbent governments (Mohan, 1996).

In francophone Africa, the coinciding intervention by French investors in the privatization of public companies (Medard, 2004) was branded as a form of recolonization. These views were not only confined to political opposition groups but also by local business organizations. In 1999, the National Business Forum in Cameroon (Groupement interpatronal du Cameroun) vented their frustrations with the terms of bidding for the national water and electricity companies that discriminated against local investors and favoured French enterprises (Harsch, 2000: 9-10). To many, France was a criminal accomplice that was ready to do whatever necessary to maintain its influence in the region (Renou, 2002).

To address the emerging economic crisis in SSA, the World Bank and IMF established the Highly Indebted Poor Countries initiative in 1996 to reward reforms with debt relief (Browne, 1997). By the virtue of France being a member of both the European Commission and OECD-DAC, it hypothetically if not practically, signed on both trends set by these two organizations. This marked the beginning of France's disengagement from its historical foreign aid stance that was heavily tied on culture (language), colonial history and national interests to more cooperation with multilateral institutions. Previously, France had considered the Bretton Woods institutions as proxies of Anglo-Saxon power (Huliaras, 1998). The US was emerging as a new actor competing with France over influence in SSA. The Balludur Doctrine of France mandated that all recipients of French foreign aid should establish economic agreements with both the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (Fuchs, 1995).

Increasing international and domestic pressure necessitated France to evaluate its actions in the region. Scholars of foreign aid highlight that in instances that foreign policy interests of donor states drive aid, then the impact of such aid towards development is very minimal. A study by Burnnel (1997: 40) documents that:

"…political, strategic and diplomatic goals have been responsible for much aid being given to countries that are not among the poorest," while "aid's development effectiveness [may be] a function of the extent to which development is really the primary object."

Consequently, during the 1990s, donors were often implored by foreign aid scholars to disassociate aid from the sole pursuit of national foreign policy goals of donor states (Tarp, 2000; Thorbecke, 2000). This change in discourse was reflected through a set of principles for bilateral aid established by the Development Assistant Community's international technocrats and the emergence of the European Commission as a donor of foreign aid.

Foreign aid previously given to the regimes that were closely aligned with France was reformed to give it a much clearer objective in terms of financing development programmes in SSA (Huliaras, 1998). According to Dufourcq (1997), foreign aid in the form of official development assistance was henceforth to become indispensable by assisting the region to deal with the impacts of the structural adjustment programmes.

In the period between 1992 to 1993, French aid to SSA Africa registered a slight increase. However, this was largely due to requests made to France by countries such as Senegal, Gabon, Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire and Congo that were facing eminent financial bankruptcy and therefore needed financial bailouts (Martin 1995). French aid to these countries therefore came in as budgetary support or payment of arrears owed to the IMF and World Bank. Ultimately, a biting economic crisis particularly in francophone Africa after the devaluation of the CFA franc in 1994 deepened these financial and economic problems. France therefore came to the realization that it could no longer sustain the financial needs for the region especially at a time when there was a recession (Martin, 1995). Prime Minister Balladur candidly stated that, "France alone cannot solve all the economic and financial problems of all

the African countries. The international financial institutions must become much more involved in Africa than they are at present."[6]

Figure 5: Net Bilateral Aid flow from France to Sub-Sahara Africa & EU (USD billions)



Source: OECD, 2020

From figure 2, French bilateral aid decreased significantly from 1990 to 2000 while SSA begun receiving multilateral aid albeit comparatively lesser to France. However, the multilateral aid was on a slow but constant increase. Previous allocations of French aid to SSA was dominated by bilateral aid. In 1994 for instance, 78.7% of the total aid disbursed by France was bilateral aid while 21.3% was given to multilateral institutions such as the European Union, international financial institutions and the United Nations (OECD, 1995; Conte, 1997). In terms of mandatory contributions, in 1994 France was the fifth largest contributor to the UN, its subsidiary bodies and its specialized institutions (with a 6% share for the period 1992- 1995) (OECD, 1995). Additionally, France contributed 49.5% (USD 850 million) of its total multilateral aid to the European Commission. Other multilateral banks and financial institutions received 8.09% (USD 0.69 million) of the total French aid (Conte, 1997). The World Bank received USD 0.444 billion in 1994.

[6] Quote d in J. P. Bechtold, Zyad Limam, and Francois Soudan, 'Balladur: ce que veut la France' , in Jeune Afrique, 23 December 1993-5 January 1994, p. 55.

In summary, the 1990s was an era where France focused its foreign aid and policy towards safeguarding its interests in the continent from other European powers and particularly US. Moreover, the period also created many challenges in the sense that the presence of France in SSA was not only threatened by other external actors, but also domestic actors calling for changes in government or regimes. Thirdly, the emergence of global governance and international criticism against France meant that it had to respond by adjusting its behavior in the international system. Theoretically, the 1990s marked the movement of France from a realist foreign policy in SSA to liberalism through calling for democratization as part of aid conditionality as well as engaging in multilateralism in its foreign aid approach to SSA.

4.4 French Aid to SSA since 2000

In 1998, France established a Priority Solidarity Zone (PSZ). These are countries identified by France as priority partners in the development cooperation (ODA) in areas such as economic development, climate change, good governance and sustainable development (France Diplomatie, 2020). The countries in the PSZ include Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Guinea, Haiti, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Togo.[7] These states were to receive higher ODA particularly towards development and for purposes of mutual cooperation, thus, reversing the trend that was largely witnessed in the 1990s where ODA allocation reduced (Gabas, 2005: 28).

Due to the significant decline in foreign aid allocation during the 1990s, a new commitment was reaffirmed by the international community to development during a series of international conferences. During the United Nations Millennium Summit convened in New York in 2000, a declaration by 191 states was made for more collaboration in ending poverty and a pledge

[7] Aide au Développement et Gouvernance Démocratique: Zone de Solidarité Prioritaire, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et Européennes, http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/actions-france_830/aide-au-developpement_1060/zone-solidarite-prioritaire_6119.html

was made to achieve eight developmental goals by 2015. These goals included: eradicating extreme poverty and hunger; reduce child mortality; achieve universal primary education; improve maternal health; combat HIV/AIDS and malaria, ensure environmental sustainability; and establish a global partnership on develop.[8]

In 2002, the Monterrey Consensus on development financing was finalized by the international community and it identified six complementary platforms for maximizing financial flows for development. These included, mobilizing foreign direct investments; increasing trade; increasing international financial and technical cooperation; mobilizing international financial resources for development; and liberalizing international trade. The 2005 Gleneagles Summit of the G8 states (France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, Japan, the United States, Canada, and Russia) also yielded a new declaration for further increase of development assistance and debt cancellations for heavily indebted countries in developing countries. Moreover, members of the OECD-DAC signed the Paris Declaration in the same year to increase the effectiveness of aid based on five principles[9]. These principles include ownership of aid by recipient states (control over development policies); aligning aid with national development strategies (support the development priorities of recipient states); harmonizing aid activities (between donors to increase efficiency); managing aid results (develop strong evaluation and monitoring frameworks); and, provide for mutual accountability of aid by both donors and recipients. In 2007, France transposed the Paris Declaration into a French Action Plan, which encompasses the different fundamental principles of the Declaration.[10]

[8] See World Health Organization (WHO) Global Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). https://www.who.int/topics/millennium_development_goals/about/en/

[9] See OECD. Adapting French aid to the challenges of a changing world. https://www.oecd.org/derec/france/41975559.pdf

[10] Sew Law.gov: Regulation of Foreign Aid: France. https://www.loc.gov/law/help/foreign-aid/france.php

Previously in 2004, France had also initiated a Framework Partnership Document (document cadre de partenariat, DCP) to respond to the previous criticisms of its aid policy by restructuring its foreign aid programme. The DCP was developed for the priority zone countries to guide bilateral cooperation with France over a period of 5 years between 2007-2011 (France Diplomatie, 2020). The DCP document provides guidelines for bilateral cooperation agreements that are to be designed at the domestic level of the priority country under the guidance of the respective French ambassadors and co-signed by local authorities. The DCP also specified a limited number of sectors that had to account for at least 80% of the total annual aid budget.

Table 4: Net France Bilateral Aid Allocations to Sub-Sahara Africa (2001-2010)

Year	**2001**	**2002**	**2003**	**2004**	**2005**	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**
World Total	**3.426**	**4.522**	**6.432**	**6.875**	**7.028**	**7.573**	**5.842**	**6.184**	**6.633**	**7.442**
SSA	**0.8595**	**2.004**	**2.826**	**2.802**	**3.690**	**4.024**	**2.465**	**2.211**	**2.857**	**2.927**
SSA % of Total French Aid	**25.09**	**44.32**	**43.94**	**40.76**	**50.69**	**53.14**	**42.19**	**35.76**	**43.07**	**39.33**
Angola	5,94	9.850	14.26	21.879	9.93	..	3,240	2.920	4.150	4.090
Benin	42.52	40.49	36.76	62.86	42.72	73.750	56.4	66.410	50.390	48.790
Botswana	0.41	0.64	1.22	1.9	1.35	1.45	9.24	2.420	1,040	6.460
Burkina Faso	44.02	53.86	66	83.63	79.35	131.429	114.76	142.01	77.42	63.83
Burundi	4.67	7.14	4.39	34.80	13.92	13.9	18.280	17.410	15.960	15,190
Cape Verde	2.62	3.12	3.85	4.68	4.13	4.43	5.970	8.720	3.890	2.970
Cameroon	59,28	119.01	290.59	129.13	16.78	243.610	596.229	113.190	90.590	82,080
CAR	20.9	16.46	23.91	36.58	32.99	26.830	54.190	26.350	25.910	24,530
Chad	39.52	34.82	57.31	46.33	41.07	42.140	47.850	39.480	41.030	40.650
Comoros	9.42	10.97	10.83	13.49	14.09	19.440	18.270	19.1	22.060	20.900
Congo	11.18	23.73	18.08	36.01	998.729	123.380	18.520	367.980	93.150	909,400
Côte d'Ivoire	110.4	531.29	116.47	62.16	54.90	106.820	50.690	39.490	119,906.000	138.520
DR Congo	7.94	0.82	1,274	134.68	41.47	57.240	27.600	30.510	30.290	13.470
Ethiopia	6.61	10.18	15.56	26.25	15.19	17.350	20.050	18.740	38.270	13.300
Gambia	0.51	0.36	0.36	0.15	0.27	0.630	0.74	0.460	0.340	0.350
Guinea	20.39	22.55	4.33	72.32	29.79	20.620	55.090	73	82.050	3.140

Guinea-Bissau	3.85	3.95	36.1	5.38	2.96	9.920	3.380	5.570	6.100	1.840
Kenya	9.86	17.6	20.49	32.17	7.94	20.080	47.820	55.680	44.760	123.349
Liberia	1.49	1.74	12.9	0.82	0.55	2.050	1.130	26.840	0.3	232.039
Madagascar	41.69	46.33	128.14	484.51	88.22	103.820	141.970	88.419	97.470	84,019
Mali	60.82	63.57	69.89	81.52	83.61	81.620	214.020	81.9	74.720	77.559
Mauritania	18.56	20.02	45.5	29.2	29.71	31.6	37.920	29.4	34.970	32,230
Niger	36.95	34.42	155.92	195.8	70.22	88.790	56.720	67.830	57.400	49.980
Nigeria	14.81	8.79	7.99	7.38	1,422.89	2,027.150	11.8	11.870	9.060	8.880
Senegal	102.37	104.47	119.5	509.77	156.99	287.470	176.660	189.029	140.880	157.229
Somalia	0.5	0.39	0.76	0.4	0.55	1.690.	6,160	8.490	4.730	3,500
South Africa	1.27	25.35	20.16	2.48	28.23	158.770	105	32.930	..	47.630
Sudan	1.84	2.4	3.95	11.63	18.17	14.710	13.8	11.2	10.360	10.080
Tanzania	13.13	15.98	1.55	119.95	2.48	2.030	2.96	4.780	7.900	21.340
Togo	10.33	18.68	21.2	26.51	29.73	33.340	33.670	127.680	40.510	168.020
Uganda	6.52	5.48	4.65	6.18	7.63	5.390	8.98	17.440	14.570	1.770
Zambia	7.67	10.13	2.11	103.8	15.810	63.710	1.110	1.220	7.370	0.840
Zimbabwe	1.99	3.22	5.16	3.14	3.64	3,.570	15.450	7.390	4.610	3.030

Source: World Bank, 2020

As can be deduced from Table 3, bilateral aid to Sub-Saharan Africa experienced significant increase from 2001 when French ODA to the region amounted to USD 0.85 billion to USD 2.92 in 2010. French bilateral aid expanded outside its traditional Franco zone area (largely former colonies) to other regions in Eastern and Southern Africa. Other Sub-Saharan African countries such as South Africa, Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania, received year-on-year increased foreign aid allocations from France. The overall ODA by France between 2001 and 2003 increased significantly from USD 4.2 billion to USD 7.3 billion representing a rise in the ODA to GNI ration from 0.32% to 0.41% making it the largest G7 foreign aid donor country. However, this increase was also largely comprised of aid in terms of debt relief. In Sub-Sahara Africa, the largest aid recipients (Senegal, Mali, Cote d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso and Mali) were all former French colonies in the region. According to a report by OECD (2012), between 2001 and 2006, French ODA increased year-on-year partly due to higher amounts of debt relief offered to SSA countries. This growth in foreign aid volume was also a form of

compliance with commitments made during the Monterrey Consensus in 2002 that resolved that DAC donor countries commit to increase ODA ratio to Gross National Income (GNI) of 0.5% and 0.7% in 2007 and 2012 respectively (OECD, 2012).

In 2006, France allocated 70% of its ODA to 43 African countries from the priority zone. Out of this, Sub-Sahara received 58% of the total allocated bilateral aid to Africa. This high foreign allocation to the region is consistent with the post-2000 commitment of France (to allocate two-thirds of its ODA to Africa) and other donor countries to help less developed countries achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and reflect the continuation of existing strong ties between France and the continent (OECD, 2012).

4.4.1 French Multilateral Aid

Besides bilateral aid, there has also been aid contributions made by France through multilateral institutions. The United Nations emphasizes in its Charter, the importance of international cooperation in solving international socioeconomic and political problems and encourages member states to promote international higher standards of living through development. A study by Tisch and Wallace (1994) identifies that positive aspects of multilateral aid should not be tied aid; given to poorest countries; less politically motivated; objective of foreign aid should not be undermined by other economic policies such as import quotas; and, capacity to make long-term commitments for foreign aid geared towards the needs of the recipient countries. According to Tisch and Wallace (1994:52-4), multilateral aid enhances the international system of states and therefore improving the stability of all states.

France heeded calls by members of the OECD to channel foreign aid through multilateral institutions such as the European Union, World Bank, UN, IMF and regional development

bank (RDBs)[11] (Milner, 2006: 107). McLeod (2004), observes that since 2000, France made readjustments towards international values. As such, multilateralism has become a major platform through which France advances its interests.

Following the establishment of the Millennium Development Goals in 2000, France embarked on a strong commitment to provide aid through the European Commission and other multilateral platforms. The desire for France to have and sustain its influential role within international institutions strengthened its resolve to develop a clear policy and strategy regarding multilateral aid. Such international institutions included the EU, UN, and global funds (e.g Global Fund to fight AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis). In 2005 for instance, multilateral aid which was not common during the 1990s, had increased to USD 3.291 billion representing 27% of its total ODA in 2006. Out of this multilateral allocation, the European Community, World Bank, Global Funds to fight AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis, accounted for 66% of its multilateral aid. Despite developing multilateral aid partnerships with 68 organizations, 80% of the total multilateral aid was concentrated amongst the EU, African Development Bank, the Global Fund and World Bank (OECD, 2012).

Since 2000, France has taken a key lead in enhancing access to healthcare and environment conservation. According to France Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs, 24% of French multilateral aid is allocated to healthcare and research pertaining diseases through the Global Fund to Fight AIDs, Tuberculosis and Malaria.[12] Sub-Sahara Africa is the largest recipient of this fund at 72% (ibid). France is a founding member of the Global Fund; the largest European donor and the second largest public donor overall, with a total contribution of €4.87

[11] Regional Development Banks include institutions such as African Development Bank, Africa Development Fund, Asian Development, Africa Solidarity Fund, UN, World Bank, Central American Bank of Economic Integration, Caribbean Central Bank, Inter-American Development Bank and the Nordic Development Bank.

[12] In 2002, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria was established to raise, manage and invest global financial contribution to respond to the health threats of HIV/AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis. Through partnerships with civil society organizations, governments and other private entities, the Global Fund has an approximated expenditure of USD 4 billion annually spread over 100 countries.

billion as of 2019 (The Global Fund, 2020). Funds towards environment and directed towards Green Climate Fund Global Environment Facility.

Figure 6: France Pledges & Contributions to Global Donor Fund



Source: Global Fund Data, 2020

European institutions for development which are recipient or approximately half of all the multilateral aid volume by France include: (i) the European Development Fund (EDF)-which is the main source of official development assistance managed by the European Commission contains the primary source of ODA disbursed for programmes in Africa, Pacific and the Caribbean; (ii) the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI)- majorly covers regions such as Middle East, Latin America, and South Africa. It also covers activities or programmes pertaining to building capacity of non-state actors or promoting food security and (iii) the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENV)-deals with the Balkans, Mediterranean and Eastern Europe (France Diplomatie, 2020).

Table 5: French Total ODA Contribution through multilateral channels (USD Millions)

Year	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Total Aid (Developing Countries)	**..**	**..**	**154.275**	**117.311**	**127.443**	**112.870**	**112.620**	**..**	**219.913**	**255.845**
Sub- Sahara Africa Total	**17.738**	**19.313**	**78.757**	**59.139**	**46.187**	**44.080**	**11.980**	**..**	**15.468**	**35.576**
Percentage to SSA	**..**	**..**	**51.05**	**50,41**	**36.24**	**39.15**	**10.64**	**..**	**7.03**	**13.9**
Angola	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	0.225	..
Benin	..	..	..	..	2.662	2.564	..	..	..	0.724
Burkina Faso	..	1.479	2.628	2.442	3.029	2.005	0.555	..	..	2.082
Burundi	0.696	1.589	0.528	0.386	..	0.027	0.555	..	..	0.590
Cameroon	..	..	..	..	..	0.949	0.444	..	1.522	0.944
CAR	1.042	0.199	1.043	..	0.133	1.396	2.329	..	1.409	1.062
Chad	0.692	3.974	4.102	4.627	3.671	3.854	0.943	..	0.902	2.710
Comoros	0.418	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Congo	..	0.265	..	..	..	..	..	..	0.225	5.901
Côte d'Ivoire	..	..	1.390	0.643	2.726	1.172	..	..	..	1.052
DR Congo	4.992	0.795	1.390	1.285	1.062	0.235	0.166	..	0.451	2.360
Djibouti	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	0.575
Ethiopia	2.158	0.530	0.834	..	0.730	1.061	0.388	..	0.902	1.180
Gambia	..	..	..	..	..	..	0.166	..	..	..
Guinea	..	..	0.139	..	3.040	3.734	1.220	..	0.564	1.055
Guinea-Bissau	0.139	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Kenya	..	..	..	..	1.019	0.265	..	..	0.564	0.177
Liberia	..	..	0.695	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Madagascar	2.437	1.126	3.128	2.442	2.921	0.597	0.222	..	1.240	1.637
Mali	..	0.132	0.834	1.799	7.293	2.813	1.442	..	0.902	2.267
Mauritania	..	1.523	1.001	3.599	1.660	0.265	0.555	..	..	0.708
Niger	0.128	4.106	1.808	5.656	3.545	5.033	2.440	..	1.635	2.487
Nigeria	..	..	..	..	..	0.133	..	..	1.635	0.354
Senegal	..	..	..	0.964	0.372	0.567	0.333	..	0.225	1.669
Somalia	..	..	..	1.285	1.417	..	..	..	1.691	..
South Africa	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1.416
South Sudan	..	..	..	1.285	..	0.398	..	..	0.564	..
Sudan	2.507	1.921	1.738	1.928	..	..	..	..	0.250	..
Tanzania	..	..	0.417	..	..	..	..	..	0.282	..
Togo	..	0.199	0.348	0.193	2.728	2.718	..	..	..	0.829
Uganda	..	..	..	..	..	0.398	0.222	..	..	..
Zimbabwe	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	0.282	..

Source: OECD 2020

In Table 5, data regarding the allocation of multilateral aid from France to developing countries before 2011 remain unavailable from the OECD dataset. However, since 2011, there has been increased allocation in the cumulative amount of multilateral aid given to developing countries through multilateral platforms. However, the same cannot be said to French multilateral aid to SSA. While cumulative multilateral aid increased between 2009 to 2012, a slight decrease is witnessed since 2013.

4.5 France Vs. Rising Powers in SSA

Over the last decade, emerging powers have risen and advanced their influence in SSA to the extent that the interests of traditional powers such as France have increasingly been considered as threatened. China for example, has emerged and overtaken France as the biggest economic partner including in countries that were former part of French colonies. China's influence in the Franc Zone has yielded a foreign policy challenge for France in a region which it had for decades since the beginning of colonialism, maintained unrivalled economic and political ties. Since, 2007, China has emerged to challenge this influence in several countries where China has emerged as the dominant economic partner as demonstrated in Table 6.

Table 6: Imports from China and France by Selected Franc Zone Countries (2000 & 2017)

Country in Franc Zone	2000		2017	
	France (Imports in USD millions)	China (Imports in USD millions)	France (Imports USD millions)	China (Imports USD millions)
Cameroon	1st (509.37)	8th (41.02)	2nd (1, 016,313.98)	1st (1,785,730.01)
Burkina Faso	2nd (142,498.73)	4th (27,217.08)	3rd (318,645.02)	1st (518,734.16)
Central African Rep.	1st (27,675.42)	13th (589.46)	1st (109,426.02)	4th (27,713.51)
Senegal	1st (423,596.95)	11th (41,384.28)	1st (989,930.67)	2nd (654,466.22)
Madagascar	1st (129,101.41)	2nd (117,513.	4th (247,489.08)	1st (759,104.15)
Mauritius	1st (201,280.25)	3rd (157,733.31)	3rd (422,625.01)	1st (863,998.12)

Source: Author Analysis from UN International Trade Data

France has attempted to counter this competitive threat posed by the emerging powers in the region with a particular focus on China. France has continually emphasized that Chinese aid specifically in the form of bilateral loans, are nothing more than a debt-trap that will ultimately threaten the autonomy of African countries.

Since 2000, there has been a gradual shift witnessed in SSA involving the movement away from France to other new partners such as China, India, Brazil, Russia. Despite the existence of established French companies such as Total, Areva and Bollore in SSAA for several decades operating in energy and development of infrastructure, they have criticised over their involvement in scandals such as corruption and accusations of market monopoly. Despite French companies continued involvement in infrastructure projects in SSA, China has emerged as a more preferred economic partner for majority of SSA countries.

While it can be said that France is fortunate enough to get support from other European powers and the US in countering the influence of China in the region, it has also taken proactive measures towards reviving its Francafrique connections. Increasingly, French

political leaders such as President Macron has made regular trips to SSA countries and issued speeches demonising Chinese investments as promoting unsustainable debt on one hand glorifying French interests in Africa as protective on African sovereignty. Since coming to office, President Macron has made trips to Kenya, Senegal, Algeria, Ghana, Mali, Ethiopia, Chad, Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Niger, Djibouti, Cote d'Ivoire and Mauritania. Macron's visit to other countries outside its traditional former colonial allies demonstrates its policy to expand to other areas in order to counter the influence of other emerging powers. Notably, China has not shown any indications on decreasing its ambitions in the region. Through Forums on China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) China pledged USD 60 billion to Africa[13].

[13] http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-09/03/c_137441596.htm Xi announces 60 billion USD of financing to Africa

5 FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

5.1 Cold War Era

This study set out to examine the use of foreign aid as a tool of foreign policy for France in sub-Sahara Africa in 2000's compared to previous cold war and post-Cold war era. While French aid has been varying through different periods as is discussed below, allocation has been significantly through development aid.

During the Cold War, the approach of France towards the region was characterised by a patron-cliental relation. In West Africa where France established strong influence over African countries, foreign aid was used to pursue four important foreign policy goals for France. First, foreign aid was used as an incentive for Sub-Sahara Africa governments to shun away communism that was being promoted by Soviet Union. The attitude of France towards Soviet Union was that its preference of communism as an ideology not only represented totalitarianism, but also, opposed the fundamental values of the Western liberal democracy (Campbell, 1989). Moreover, communism also directly threatened the interests of France both within the region and internationally.

Secondly, SSA was central to France ambitions as a major power and therefore maintaining its influence was significant for accessing important raw materials such as oil and uranium. According to Pederson (2000) it was the desire for France under president Charles de Gaulle to become independent both in terms of military capabilities. Uranium was therefore an important mineral for France that was to be used in the production of nuclear weapons and energy from commercial nuclear power plants. When uranium was discovered in its former colonies of Gabon and Niger, France not only provided more foreign aid, but also intervened militarily when the regimes came under threat. In uranium mining companies such as SOMAIR and COMINAK (Niger) and COMUF (Gabon), majority shareholding in these companies was by a French nuclear fuel company known as COGEMA (1989).

Thirdly, promoting French language and culture was a fundamental foreign policy issue particularly in the former French colonies in West and Central Africa during the Cold War. According to Round & Odedokun (2004), often, colonial powers such as France provide more foreign aid to their former colonies than to other states colonized by other powers. For France, foreign aid was therefore a diplomatic tool to promoting the French language and culture through giving aid for purposes of developing French cultural centers and educational training facilities which also constituted French aid to the region. Cultivating a sense of cultural solidarity between France and some SSA countries clothed in the banner of Francophonie, provided the foundation upon which all the other interests of France in the continent could be pursued. Additionally, more aid to promote French language and culture was also a response of the obsession and fear of the influence of Anglophone encroachment in former French colonies.

Foreign aid allocated to Sub-Sahara African countries was to incentivize African states to support France in international institutions such as the United Nations that was increasingly becoming active on issues pertaining to international security. Supporting African heads of states through was perceived as a way of securing diplomatic support on international issues. At independence of its former colonies, France signed several military accords with African states including Gabon, Ivory Coast, Djibouti, Cameroon and Comoros. While the accords permit France to intervene in these states when faced with either internal or external threats, the extent to which they could do so remained largely vague (Guillemin, 1979). In fact, regarding intervention during scenarios such as coups, the accords do not examine whether the intervention on behalf of head of an African state has popular support (legitimacy) or not. Intervention to stop a coup in the Central Africa Republic in (1996) demonstrated no consideration for public interest because the coup for instance, was not politically motivated

to seize power but rather, it was a protest by the mutineers over failure of the government to pay salaries for several months (Vasset, 1997).

In summary, the Cold War era characterized a period when France strived to continue and needed to further develop ties with its former colonies in Sub-Sahara Africa after their independence as a means of preserving and pursing the overarching French ideology of grandeur (greatness). The continuation of strong bilateral ties between France and its former colonies in Sub-Sahara Africa offered a path for France to restore and sustain its image as a major power bringing or establishing a power balance between the US and the Soviet Union. To achieve these goals, as well as continue to have access to crucial resources such as uranium and oil, France maintained its foreign aid flows to Sub-Saharan Africa countries in significant amounts.

5.2 Post-Cold War Era- 1990s

During the Post-Cold War era, mistakes arising from military actions and inactions in Africa during the 1990s, particularly in Rwanda and several corruption scandals involving Françafrique, pressured new actors in French foreign policy and foreign aid to re-evaluate the position of France in the region. The emergence of the post-Cold War era found African states majority of which were exclusively allied with France in economic crises, political instability, conflicts, and severe humanitarian crises. A parliamentary report on the role of France in the 1994 Rwandan genocide that led to the death of over 800,000 people established blamed France for failure to act and save lives (Prunier, 1995). This consequently led to establishment of rules that were previously non-existence regarding relations with Africa.

Secondly, France shifted from a unilateral policy towards Africa to multilateralism. President Chirac (1995-2007) for instance emphasized that France would relate to Africa under a new partnership that would replace the system of assistance. The unilateral approach to the region that characterised French foreign aid and policy during the Cold War had damaged the image

of France not only within Africa but also in the international system. Also, activities such as the frequent military operations in the region were very costly for France. As such, France not only shifted towards providing foreign aid (financial) through multilateral institutions such as the EU, but it also begun involving institutions such as the UN, AU, NATO and EU in military programs in Africa. Multilateralism therefore offered France way of sharing the financial dependency of its former Sub-Sahara colonies and on the other hand it improved the image of France in international system as a mediator between Africa and Europe (Bourmand, 1996).

Thirdly, the post-Cold War introduced democratization that was part of the reform process spearheaded by multilateral organizations such as the World Bank, IMF and other IOs. As a requirement, foreign aid was increasingly given as a conditionality subject to political and economic reforms. The aid conditionalities attached to democratization therefore led to lower allocation of foreign aid to majority of states that had not yet taken reforms such as introducing multiparty politics.

Nonetheless, it is imperative to recognize that while African leaders during the Cold and post-Cold War eras played a role in the emergence of dependency on aid by majority of African countries, France equally played a big role in this. The nature of French foreign aid to the region for the better part of these two periods, inculcated a culture of corruption not only amongst African leaders, but also the French political elites. Several publicised scandals such as the oil scandal by Elf[14] oil company and the involvement of high-ranking politicians from France in money laundering activities in the continent cannot be brushed aside (Melly & Darracq, 2013). Through its foreign aid structures, France reinforced its influence in the continent in order to safeguard its interests in the continent, often, with devastating results.

[14] In 1963, General de Gaulle established Elf as a state oil company meant to ensure that France achieved independence in its oil needs. Africa was identified as a central component for France to attain its oil independence (*Le Monde*, November 12, 2003)

Indeed, France has been criticized for its alleged support of the Hutu regime that ultimately resulted in the Rwandan genocide of 1994 as well as providing assistance to the regime of Mobutu Sese Sseko until his overthrow from government.

5.3 During the 2000s

The beginning of the 2000s marked two important issues for France and how it would approach SSA. First, the event of 9th September, 2001 did not only transform the global geopolitics, but also, the architecture of foreign aid. The perspective of donor countries such as France changed because there was the realization that developing countries in Africa and Asia are very important in keeping global security. This is because developing countries with weak security or experiencing conflicts could become staging grounds for terrorist groups. As a result, there was more need for cooperation with developing countries. Foreign aid was therefore increasingly channelled through multilateral channels and directed more towards development initiatives because underdeveloped states could be very fragile to security threats. In other words, the self-interests for donor states such as France was more cognizant that a world with less poverty and diseases, offers a secure environment with better opportunities for both donors and recipient countries.

Secondly, the 2000s also marked an increasing engagement of emerging powers such as China and India. Actors in France foreign diplomacy became increasingly concerned with the growing activities of emerging powers that threatened its political and economic standing in the continent. As a consequence, in order to counter the influence of these emerging powers in the continent, France also shifted its foreign policy and aid away from its traditional Francophone allies and started deepening relations with other emerging African powers (South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, Angola, Ghana and Ethiopia) that presented strategic importance and economic potential. The presence of these emerging powers since the 2000 provided several African countries with alternatives to navigate both domestic needs and

international needs particularly with the presence of China which has emerged as a strong country economically and enjoys veto privileges similar to France in the UN Security Council.

In brief, since the beginning of the 2000s, political leaders in France have manifested comparatively more willingness to break away from the past foreign aid and policy behaviors that characterized the last four decades prior to 2000 particularly in relation to Francafrique that damaged the image of France internationally. However, despite the several attempts to reform the foreign aid architecture of France, beginning with presidents Mitterrand, Chirac and Sarkozy, transcending beyond the old foreign aid practices remained a big challenge for France (Benquet, 2010). President Chirac introduced critical reforms during the 1990s following the exposure of massive corruption scandals labelled against Elf oil company. Having succeeded President Chirac, Sarkozy also came to power with a promise to reform the foreign aid and foreign policy behavior of France towards Africa and particularly, Sub-Saharan Africa by reverting from the traditional foreign aid and policy behavior in the continent (Renou, 2010). But, despite his election campaign pledges to end Francafrique, very little of the pledge was transformed into real action and instead, France continued to use its foreign aid to incentivise Africa leaders to support France in both Africa and in the international system.

5.4 Conclusion

For France, foreign aid has been one of its most preferred tool of foreign policy towards Africa given through bilateral and multilateral channels. Over time since 1960, the French foreign policy has shown elements of continuity (particularly on pursuing it cultural universality) and also transformed at the same time to respond to the changes in global geopolitics and trends. The table below demonstrated the trend in foreign aid allocations and the interests underlying the trends during different phases of international politics.

Table 6: French Foreign Aid Trends and Interests During Cold War, Post-Cold War and 2000s

Phase	General Foreign Aid Trend to SSA	Interests
Cold War (From independence in the 1960s to 1990)	High amounts of foreign aid given to states in the Franc Zone. Nature of foreign aid is unconditional No emphasis on good governance and democracy	Maintain influence in SSA which translates in bigger influence in the international system. Continue the policy on expanding French language and culture Maintain French economic interest (public and private companies) Secure natural resources such as uranium and oil
Post-Cold War (throughout 1990s)	Declining amounts of foreign aid after the collapse of Soviet Union Increased conflicts, economic and political instability leads to emergence of conditional aid. Calls for market liberalization (privatization) Aid given on the merit of progress in political reforms (democracy	Economic interests (focus on trade) Advance the emerging trends on global governance Continue with the policy on French cultural and language expansion
Since 2000	Aid to developing countries in SSA increase Multilateralism emerges as an active platform for international development cooperation Aid given through bilateral and multilateral channels France expands its aid outside the traditional Franc Zone members to include countries from other regions of SSA with greater focus	Poverty eradication and climate change Security interests after 9/11 terror attack Economic interests (trade) Counter the growing presence of emerging powers Continuation of the policy on expanding French culture and language

Source: Author Analysis

As highlighted in Table 5, France adopted its foreign aid to respond to the changes in the international system. From the Cold-War era to 2000s, French foreign aid to Sub-Sahara

Africa has undergone extensive regional diversification. French interests and aid allocation is not only driven by the existence of strong personal ties that were synonymous with the Cold War and post-Cold War eras. Increasingly, France is moving towards embracing more common global values such as market liberation, democracy, climate change, and good governance.

In conclusion, this thesis has emphasized on how France has instrumentalized its foreign aid to achieve various policy goals in Sub-Sahara Africa from the periods between the Cold War and the 2010. This therefore leaves another gap that requires further research on how French foreign aid has transformed since 2010 and whether aid remains a central tool for France in pursuing its foreign policy. Secondly, the scope of this study has been limited to SSA even though, North Africa which was largely colonized by France have also maintained ties since independence and are significant recipients of France foreign aid. This is another area that needs further research. Last but not least, this study has identified that despite a growing trend in academia to analyze Africa as SSA and North Africa, there are challenges regarding access to data on multilateral aid to SSA prior to 2010. Consequently, there is need to develop an accurate database where comprehensive data regarding both multilateral and bilateral aid as well as the nature (debt relief, grants or loans) can be accessed easily.

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